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The FCC today released an executive summary of its National Broadband Plan, which is supposed to be delivered to Congress tomorrow.  Of course, executive summaries by their nature are brief and usually don’t explain the underlying logic and evidence supporting the conclusions. Here are a few highlights, some possible interpretations, and things to look for when the full plan gets released tomorrow:

Recommendation: “Undertake a comprehensive review of wholesale competition rules to help ensure competition in fixed and mobile broadband.” This could signal that the FCC plans to re-impose “unbundling” or “line sharing” regulations, which would require broadband companies to let competitors use their lines and other facilities at regulated rates. Such initiatives would likely undermine broadband deployment and investment.  Economic research by my GMU colleague Tom Hazlett and others finds that broadband investment, competition, deployment in the US took off only after the FCC eliminated line-sharing requirements. Christina Forsberg and I summarized a lot of this research here.

Recommendation: “Make 500 Mhz of spectrum available for broadband within ten years … Enable incentives and mechanisms to repurpose spectrum.” This is a fantastic recommendation. A Mercatus Center review of the costs of federal telecommunications regulations found that federal spectrum allocation, which prevents spectrum from being reallocated to uses that consumers value highly (like broadband), is by far the costliest federal regulation affecting telecom and the Internet. This recommendation indicates the FCC leadership would like to auction a lot more spectrum and share the proceeds with existing users (like broadcasters) in order to overcome resistance to reallocation. It’s not quite a market in spectrum, but it might be the closest the FCC can come.

Recommendation: “Broaden the USF contribution base to ensure USF remains sustainable over time.” Uh-oh. I’m not sure what this means, but if means that broadband subscribers will have to start payng into the FCC’s universal service fund (USF), watch out! Most economic studies find that consumer demand for broadband is very price-sensitive. That means if the FCC slaps broadband with universal service fees (which currently exceed 10 percent), we’ll see a big drop in broadband subscribership — maybe by 4-7 million subscribers. This is , of course, precisely the opposite of what the FCC wants to accomplish!

Recommendation: “Reform intercarrier compensation, which provides implicit subsidies to telephone companies by eliminating per minute charges over the next ten years…” Another excellent idea.  “Intercarrier compensation” refers to payments phone companies make when they hand traffic off to each other. Small, rural phone companies usually receive the highest per minute payments — as much as 15-30 cents per minute! This is a huge markup on long-distance phone service — another price-sensitive service!

Recommendation: Provide subsidies so that rural areas can have broadband with download speeds of 4 MB.  It will be interesting to read in the full plan where this 4 MB figure came from. Does it reflect the speed of service that a lot of Americans currently have, so these subsidies are just supposed to help equalize opportunities for rural residents? Or does it reflect some balancing of the costs and benefits of subsidizing broadband in rural areas?  Or is this a magic number experts believe subscribers need, regardless of the choices consumers actually make in the marketplace and regardless of what it costs?

The executive summary also lists a set of goals, such as ensuring that every American has the ability to subscribe to “robust” broadband service, having 100 million households with access to 100 MB broadband, and ensuring that the US has the fastest and most extensive wireless networks of any nation.  When the full plan comes out, look carefully at whether or how the FCC plans to measure accomplishment of these goals.  More importantly, look to see whether the FCC explains how it will quantify how much its own policies actually contribute to these goals over time. The FCC is famous for NOT doing these kinds of things, so let’s see if the broadband plan signals a new era in accountability.

I published an opinion piece today for CNET arguing against recent calls to reclassify broadband Internet as a “telecommunications service” under Title II of the Communications Act.

The push to do so comes as supporters of the FCC’s proposed Net Neutrality rules fear that the agency’s authority to adopt them under its so-called “ancillary jurisdiction” won’t fly in the courts.  In January, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit heard arguments in Comcast’s appeal of sanctions levied against the cable company for violations of the neutrality principles (not yet adopted under a formal rulemaking).  The three-judge panel expressed considerable doubt about the FCC’s jurisdiction in issuing the sanctions during oral arguments.  Only the published opinion (forthcoming) will matter, of course, but anxiety is growing.

Solving the Net Neutrality jurisdiction problem with a return to Title II regulation is a staggeringly bad idea, and a counter-productive one at that.  My article describes the parallel developments in “telecommunications services” and the largely unregulated “information services” (aka Title I) since the 1996 Communications Act, making the point that life for consumers has been far more exciting—and has generated far more wealth–under the latter than the former.

Under Title I, in short, we’ve had the Internet revolution.  Under Title II, we’ve had the decline and fall of basic wireline phone service, boom and bust in the arbitraging competitive local exchange market, massive fraud in the bloated e-Rate program, and the continued corruption of local licensing authorities holding applications hostage for legal and illegal bribes.

Continue reading →

Can we steer people toward hard news — and get them to financially support it — through the use  of “news vouchers” or “public interest vouchers”? That’s the subject of this latest installment in my ongoing series on proposals to have the government play a greater role in the media sector in the name of sustaining struggling enterprises or “saving journalism.”

As I mentioned here previously, last week I testified at the FCC’s first “Future of Media” workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” (@3:29 mark of video).  It was a great pleasure to testify alongside the all-star cast there that day, which included the always-provocative Jeff Jarvis of the CUNY Graduate School of Journalism.  He delivered some very entertaining remarks and vociferously pushed back against many of the ideas that others were suggesting about “saving journalism.” Jeff is a very optimistic guy–far more optimistic than me, in fact–about the prospect that new media and citizen journalism will help fill whatever void is left by the death of many traditional media operators and institutions. He had a lively exchange with Srinandan Kasi, Vice President, General Counsel and Secretary of the Associated Press, that is worth watching (somewhere after the 5-hour mark on the video).

Nonetheless, Jarvis is a enough of a realist to know that it has always been difficult to find resources to fund hard news, which he creatively refers to as “broccoli journalism.”  This is what is keeping the FCC, the FTC (workshop today), and many media worrywarts up at night; the fear that as traditional financing mechanisms falter (advertising, classifieds, subscription revenues, etc) many traditional news-gathering efforts and institutions will disappear. Of course, while it is certainly true we are in the midst of a gut-wrenching media revolution with a great deal of creative destruction taking place, it is equally true that exciting new media business models and opportunities are developing. We shouldn’t over look that, as I argued here and here.

Anyway, a lot of different proposals are being put forth by scholars and policymakers to find new ways to finance news-gathering or “save journalism.” One of the ideas that has been gaining some steam as of late is the idea of crafting a “public interest voucher” or what Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, authors of the new book The Death and Life of American Journalism, call a “Citizenship News Voucher.”  And McChesney discussed this idea in more detail when he spoke at today’s FTC event on saving journalism. Continue reading →

An Associated Press story this morning by Eileen AJ Connelly provides our latest example of Regulatory Whak-A-Mole, known to scholars as “term substitution.” 

Bank of America announced that it will discontinue charging overdraft fees on debit cards. This comes in response to new regulations that prohibit banks from charging overdraft fees unless the consumer has consented to the fee.  Since the bank has no way of getting your consent when you walk into Starbucks and perpetrate an overdraft while buying your latte macho grande and muffin, it simply won’t let the transaction go through.

Wa-Hoo, another victory for consumers. Well, not quite. Customers who place a high value on not being embarrassed in Starbucks are arguably worse off. (How do you return a latte macho grande if you find out you don’t have enough money to pay for it after your coffee concierge has mixed it?) More seriously, customers who might want to use an overdraft for a more substantial purchase will no longer have this option.

I wonder about the argument that regulators are saving hapless, uninformed consumers. The AP article reveals that 93 percent of overdraft fees are generated by 14 percent of customers — “serial overdrafters.” That means there are a lot of folks out there who repeatedly try to use their debit cards as a source of credit, albeit an expensive one. I don’t know about you, but it would only take one or two overdraft fees before I’d realize it’s cheaper to keep a $25 balance in my account than to pay more than that in multiple overdraft fees. If most overdrafters have done this more than once, they must know they will be charged a fee and have decided that’s the lesser of multiple evils. So why take this choice away from them?

Point-of-sale overdrafts may not be the only casualty of this regulation. The article quotes banking analyst Robert Meara’s prediction that banks might curtail free checking, which many apparently offer as a loss leader to generate fee income. A smaller stream of fee income makes “free checking” less attractive for banks.

Which consumers does this ultimately hurt? I can think of one group: people with low incomes who can’t afford checking account fees and  use debit cards responsibly.  

Somehow I doubt that was the regulators’ intention.

We’re from government and we’re here to help save journalism.”

That seems to be the hot new meme in media policy circles these days. Last week, it was the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) kicking off their “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” This week, it’s the Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) turn as they host the second in their series of workshops on How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age? Meanwhile, the Senate has already held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become nonprofit organizations in an effort to help them stay afloat.

I have no doubt that many of the public policymakers behind these efforts have the best of intentions and really are concerned about what many believe to be a crisis in the field of journalism. But here are my three primary concerns with Washington’s sudden interest in “saving journalism”: Continue reading →

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

We’re hoping that the Government Accountability Office (GAO) has made some sort of mistake, because it’s hard to believe its latest findings about the paperwork burden generated by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) regulatory activity. In late January, the GAO released a report on “Information Collection and Management at the Federal Communications Commission” (GAO-10-249), which examined information collection, management, and reporting practices at the FCC. The GAO noted that the FCC gathers information through 413 collection instruments, which include things like: (1) required company filings, such as the ownership of television stations; (2) applications for FCC licenses; (3) consumer complaints; (4) company financial and accounting performance; and (5) a variety of other issues, such as an annual survey of cable operators.  (Note: This does not include filings and responses done pursuant to other FCC NOIs or NPRMs.)

Regardless, the FCC told the GAO that it receives nearly 385 million responses with an estimated 57 million burden hours associated with the 413 collection instruments. A “burden hour” is defined under the Paperwork Reduction Act as “the time, effort, or financial resources expended by persons to generate, maintain, or provide information to a federal agency.” And the FCC is generating 57 million of ‘em! Even though we are frequently critical of the agency, these numbers are still hard to fathom. Perhaps the GAO has made some sort of mistake here. But here’s what really concerns us if they haven’t made a mistake. Continue reading →

Today I am testifying at an FCC hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” [Speaker lineup here.] The purpose of the workshop is to explore:

  • A brief history and overview of policies involving “public interest” requirements for commercial media and telecommunications companies;
  • The state of local commercial broadcast TV and radio news and information; and
  • The impact of media convergence and the emergence of the Internet, mobile technologies, and digital media on FCC media policy.

In my remarks, I focused on “Why Expansion of the FCC’s Public Interest Regulatory Regime is Unwise, Unneeded, Unconstitutional, and Unenforceable.” Down below I have attached my written remarks. Continue reading →

Yesterday I engaged in a lively luncheon debate about Net neutrality regulation with Ben Scott of Free Press at a Catholic University Law School event on “Implementing the National Broadband Plan.” To open the debate, I made a very quick 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation. I argued that the the objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Down below you will find my working notes to see how I then elaborated on each objection in a bit more detail. And then Ben and I engaged in some spirited banter for the next 45 minutes.

Unfortunately, it doesn’t appear that the video of our debate is online just yet, but once it is I will post it here. However, the folks from NextGenWeb asked me to shoot a short 2 1/2 min video clip after the debate summarizing my remarks. If you can stand the sight of my big fat head in your browser for that long, here ya go:

http://blip.tv/play/gYh4gci5IQI%2Em4v

The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation

The objections to a Net neutrality regulatory regime can be grouped into 5 major categories: (1) Legal; (2) Economic; (3) Engineering; (4) Practical; and (5) Philosophical / Principled. Each objection will be briefly summarized below: Continue reading →

Today I am attending, and speaking at, a terrific event in downtown DC sponsored by the Catholic University Law School on“Implementing the National Broadband Plan: Perspectives from Government, Industry, and Consumers.” It’s being held at the offices of the law firm of Wiley Rein LLP.  Edward Lazarus, Chief of Staff to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski kicked off the event with a nice keynote address talking about the broad goals of the FCC’s coming National Broadband Plan. Lazarus broke the ice by joking with the crowd — which is heavily made up of communications industry lawyers — that “The FCC is doing everything it can to provide full employment for telecom lawyers.  Whatever else we are failing at, we are succeeding at that.” Again, it was a joke, so I don’t want to make too much out of it, but…  No, strike that, I do want to talk about that for a minute! Because this is actually a very important question: Exactly how much bureaucracy and deadweight loss to the economy (in the form of more lawyering and lobbying) is going to accompany the National Broadband Plan?

Two years ago, I posted an essay on “Lawyers, Lawsuits and Net Neutrality Regulation,” in which I attempted to highlight the uncomfortable fact that Net neutrality regulation will likely lead to a bureaucratic nightmare at the FCC and a lawyer’s bonanza once the lawsuits start flying in court. Of course, now we have Net neutrality regulations and a National Broadband Plan pending at the FCC, so the potential for bloated bureaucracy will only grow larger. Do you think I am exaggerating? Well, here are some facts to consider from our recent experience in the field of “telecom reform.”  In the years following passage of the Telecom Act, entire forests fell because of the thousands of pages of regulatory and judicial interpretations that were handed down trying to figure out what that word meant. In fact, let’s take a quick tally of the paperwork burden the FCC managed to churn out in just three major “competition” rules it issued in an attempt to implement the Telecom Act and define the “cost” of unbundled network elements (“UNEs”):

Debate over the regulatory status of broadband heated up this week as trade associations and major broadband companies sent a letter to the Federal Communications Commission arguing strenuously against reclassification of broadband as “telecommunications service” subject to regulation under Title II of the Communications Act. One implication of Title II regulation is that broadband could be regulated like a public utility. Comparisons of broadband to services like electricity or railroads, which I discussed last week, also raise the prospect of public utility regulation. 

Classic public utility regulation restricts entry and regulates prices to prevent firms from charging excessive prices.  It’s typically used in situations where competition is believed to be impossible (or, where pre-existing policy decisions have created monopolies that aren’t going to go away very soon).

Broadband is not a monopoly; it is an oligopoly. Contrary to popular perception, that is not synonymous with “evil.” Although both monopoly and oligopoly end in “-opoly,” that doesn’t mean broadband competitors will charge monopoly prices, or even somewhat excessive prices.  The only firm conclusion that emerges from economic literature on oligopoly is, “anything’s possible, depending on the specific facts and circumstances.”

But there are also firm conclusions that emerge from economic literature on public utility regulation.  Just about every time the federal government has tried to impose public utility regulation on an oligopoly, it has ended up enforcing a cartel.  This is what happened in the past with railroads, trucking, airlines, and brokerage firms. There are a few times federal price regulation did not enforce cartels in oligopolistic or competitive industries. In those cases, it usually created shortages  — most notably gasoline and natural gas in the 1970s.

Title II regulation is not necessarily synonymous with public utility regulation. Title II could be used to impose some “nondiscrimination” requirements, without necessarily directly regulating broadband providers’ prices or profits.

But anyone who actually wants the FCC to regulate broadband providers’ prices and profits needs to read the peer-reviewed economics literature on the actual effects of public utility regulation in practice on the federal level. (More literature is cited here.) Then they need to explain why the results in broadband would be different.  And the explanation needs to be better than “We know better now, we’re smart, and we promise.”