Artificial Intelligence & Robotics

The Brookings Institution hosted this excellent event on frontier AI regulation this week featuring a panel discussion I was on that followed opening remarks from Rep. Ted Lieu (D-CA). I come in around the 51-min mark of the event video and explain why I worry that AI policy now threatens to devolve into an all-out war on computation and open source innovation in particular. ​

I argue that some pundits and policymakers appear to be on the way to substituting a very real existential risk (authoritarian govt control over computation/science) for a hypothetic existential risk of powerful AGI. I explain how there are better, less destructive ways to address frontier AI concerns than the highly repressive approaches currently being considered.

I have developed these themes and arguments at much greater length in a series of essays over on Medium over the past few months. If you care to read more, the four key articles to begin with are:

In June, I also released this longer R Street Institute report on “Existential Risks & Global Governance Issues around AI & Robotics,” and then spent an hour talking about these issues on the TechPolicyPodcast about “Who’s Afraid of Artificial Intelligence?” All of my past writing and speaking on AI, ML, and robotic policy can be found here, and that list is update every month.

As always, I’ll have much more to say on this topic as the war on computation expands. This is quickly becoming the most epic technology policy battle of modern times.

There’s been exciting progress in US drone policy in the past few months. First, the FAA in April announced surprising new guidance in its Aeronautics Information Manual, re: drone airspace access. As I noted in an article for the State Aviation Journal, the new Manual notes:

There can be certain local restrictions to airspace. While the FAA is designated by federal law to be the regulator of the NAS [national airspace system], some state and local authorities may also restrict access to local airspace. UAS pilots should be aware of these local rules.

That April update has been followed up by a bigger, drone policy update from FAA. On July 14, the FAA went further than the April guidance and updated and replaced its 2015 guidance to states and localities about drone regulation and airspace policy.

In this July 2023 guidance, I was pleasantly surprised to see the FAA recognize some state and local authority in the “immediate reaches” airspace. Notably, in the new guidance the FAA expressly notes that that state laws that “prohibit [or] restrict . . . operations by UAS in the immediate reaches of property” are an example of laws not subject to conflict preemption.

A handful of legal scholars–like ASU Law Professor Troy Rule and myself–have urged federal officials for years to recognize that states, localities, and landowners have a significant say in what happens in very low-altitude airspace–the “immediate reaches” above land. That’s because the US Supreme Court in US v. Causby recognized that the “immediate reaches” above land is real property owned by the landowner:

[I]t is obvious that, if the landowner is to have full enjoyment of the land, he must have exclusive control of the immediate reaches of the enveloping atmosphere. …As we have said, the flight of airplanes, which skim the surface but do not touch it, is as much an appropriation of the use of the land as a more conventional entry upon it.

Prior to these recent updates, the FAA’s position on which rules apply in very low-altitude airspace–FAA rules or state property rules–was confusing. The agency informally asserts authority to regulate drone operations down to “the grass tips”; however, many landowners don’t want drones to enter the airspace immediately above their land without permission and would sue to protect their property rights. This is not a purely academic concern: the uncertainty about whether and when drones can fly in very low-altitude airspace has created damaging uncertainty for the industry. As the Government Accountability Office told Congress in 2020:

The legal uncertainty surrounding these [low-altitude airspace] issues is presenting challenges to integration of UAS [unmanned aircraft systems] into the national airspace system.


With this July update, the FAA helps clarify matters. To my knowledge, this is the first mention of “immediate reaches,” and implicit reference to Causby, by the FAA. The update helpfully protects, in my view, property rights and federalism. It also represents a win for the drone industry, which finally has some federal clarity on this after a decade of uncertainty about how low they can fly. Drone operators now know they can sometimes be subject to local rules about aerial trespass. States and cities now know that they can create certain, limited prohibitions, which will be helpful to protect sensitive locations like neighborhoods, stadiums, prisons, and state parks and conservation areas.

As an aside: It seems possible one motivation for the FAA adding this language is to foreclose future takings litigation (a la Cedar Point Nursery v. Hassid) against the FAA. With this new guidance, the FAA can now point out in future takings litigation that they do not authorize drone operations in the immediate reaches of airspace; this FAA guidance indicates that operations in the immediate reaches is largely a question of state property and trespass laws.

On the whole, I think this new FAA guidance is strong, especially the first formal FAA recognition of some state authority over the “immediate reaches.” That said, as a USDOT Inspector General report to Congress pointed out last year, the FAA has not been responsive when state officials have questions about creating drone rules to complement federal rules. In 2018, for instance, a lead State “participant [in an FAA drone program] requested a clarification as to whether particular State laws regarding UAS conflicted with Federal regulations. According to FAA, as of February 2022 . . . FAA has not yet provided an opinion in response to that request.”

Four years-plus of silence from the FAA is a long time for a state official to wait, and it’s a lifetime for a drone startup looking for legal clarity. I do worry about agency non-answers on preemption questions from states, and how other provisions in this new guidance will be interpreted. Hopefully this new guidance means FAA employees can be more responsive to inquiries from state officials. With the April and July airspace policy updates, the FAA, state aviation offices, the drone industry, and local officials are in a better position to create commercial drone networks nationwide, while protecting the property and privacy expectations of residents.

Further Reading

See my July report on drones and airspace policy for state officials, including state rankings: “2023 State Drone Commerce Rankings: How prepared is your state for drone commerce?”.

As I noted in a recent interview with James Pethokoukis for his Faster, Please! newsletter, “[t]he current policy debate over artificial intelligence is haunted by many mythologies and mistaken assumptions. The most problematic of these is the widespread belief that AI is completely ungoverned today.” In a recent R Street Institute report and series of other publications, I have documented just how wrong that particular assumption is.

The first thing I try to remind everyone is that the U.S. federal government is absolutely massive—2.1 million employees, 15 cabinet agencies, 50 independent federal commissions and 434 federal departments. Strangely, when policymakers and pundits deliver remarks on AI policy today, they seem to completely ignore all that regulatory capacity while simultaneously casually tossing out proposals to just add more and more layers of regulation and bureaucracy to it. Well, I say why not see if the existing regulations and bureaucracy are working first, and then we can have a chat about what more is needed to fill gaps.

And a lot is being done on this front. In a new blog post for R Street, I offer a brief summary of some of the most important recent efforts. Continue reading →

Can we advance AI safety without new international regulatory bureaucracies, licensing schemes or global surveillance systems? I explore that question in my latest R Street Institute study, “Existential Risks & Global Governance Issues around AI & Robotics.” (31 pgs)  My report rejects extremist thinking about AI arms control & stresses how the “realpolitik” of international AI governance is such that things cannot and must not be solved through silver-bullet gimmicks and grandiose global government regulatory regimes.

The report uses Nick Bostrom’s “vulnerable world hypothesis” as a launching point and discusses how his five specific control mechanisms for addressing AI risks have started having real-world influence with extreme regulatory proposals now being floated. My report also does a deep dive into the debate about a proposed global ban on “killer robots” and looks at how past treaties and arms control efforts might apply, or what we can learn from them about what won’t work.

I argue that proposals to impose global controls on AI through a worldwide regulatory authority are both unwise and unlikely to work. Calls for bans or “pauses” on AI developments are largely futile because many nations will not agree to them. As with nuclear and chemical weapons, treaties, accords, sanctions and other multilateral agreements can help address some threats of malicious uses of AI or robotics. But trade-offs are inevitable, and addressing one type of existential risk sometimes can give rise to other risks.

A culture of AI safety by design is critical. But there is an equally compelling interest in ensuring algorithmic innovations are developed and made widely available to society. The most effective solution to technological problems usually lies in more innovation, not less. Many other multistakeholder and multilateral efforts can help AI safety. Final third of my study is devoted to a discussion of that. Continuous communication, coordination, and cooperation—among countries, developers, professional bodies and other stakeholders—will be essential. Continue reading →

This week, I appeared on the Tech Freedom Tech Policy Podcast to discuss “Who’s Afraid of Artificial Intelligence?” It’s an in-depth, wide-ranging conversation about all things AI related. Here’s a summary of what host what Corbin Barthold and I discussed:

1. The “little miracles happening every day” thanks to AI

2. Is AI a “born free” technology?

3. Potential anti-competitive effects of AI regulation

4. The flurry of joint letters

5. new AI regulatory agency political realities

6. the EU’s Precautionary Principle tech policy disaster

7. The looming “war on computation” & open source

8. The role of common law for AI

9. Is Sam Altman breaking the very laws he proposes?

10. Do we need an IAEA for AI or an “AI Island”

11. Nick Bostrom’s global control & surveillance model

12. Why “doom porn” dominates in academic circles

13. Will AI take all the jobs?

14. Smart regulation of algorithmic technology

15. How the “pacing problem” is sometimes the “pacing benefit”

 

It was my pleasure to recently appear on the Independent Women’s Forum’s “She Thinks” podcast to discuss “Artificial Intelligence for Dummies.” In this 24-minute conversation with host Beverly Hallberg, I outline basic definitions, identify potential benefits, and then consider some of the risks associated with AI, machine learning, and algorithmic systems.

Reminder, you can find all my relevant past work on these issues via my, “Running List of My Research on AI, ML & Robotics Policy.”

It was my pleasure to recently join Matthew Lesh, Director of Public Policy and Communications for the London-based Institute of Economic Affairs (IEA), for the IEA podcast discussion, “Should We Regulate AI?” In our wide-ranging 30-minute conversation, we discuss how artificial intelligence policy is playing out across nations and I explained why I feel the UK has positioned itself smartly relative to the US & EU on AI policy. I argued that the UK approach encourages a better ‘innovation culture’ than the new US model being formulated by the Biden Administration.

We also went through some of the many concerns driving calls to regulate AI today, including: fears about job dislocations, privacy and security issues, national security and existential risks, and much more.

Continue reading →

The R Street Institute has just released my latest study on AI governance and how to address “alignment” concerns in a bottom-up fashion. The 40-page report is entitled, “Flexible, Pro-Innovation Governance Strategies for Artificial Intelligence.”

My report asks, is it possible to address AI alignment without starting with the Precautionary Principle as the governance baseline default? I explain how that is indeed possible. While some critics claim that no one is seriously trying to deal with AI alignment today, my report explains how no technology in history has been more heavily scrutinized this early in its life-cycle as AI, machine learning and robotics. The number of ethical frameworks out there already is astonishing. We don’t have too few alignment frameworks; we probably have too many!

We need to get serious about bringing some consistency to these efforts and figure out more concrete ways to a culture of safety by embedding ethics-by-design. But there is an equally compelling interest in ensuring that algorithmic innovations are developed and made widely available to society.

Continue reading →

Recently, the Future of Life Institute released an open letter that included some computer science luminaries and others calling for a 6-month “pause” on the deployment and research of “giant” artificial intelligence (AI) technologies. Eliezer Yudkowsky, a prominent AI ethicist, then made news by arguing that the “pause” letter did not go far enough and he proposed that governments consider “airstrikes” against data processing centers, or even be open to the use of nuclear weapons. This is, of course, quite insane. Yet, this is the state of the things today as a AI technopanic seems to growing faster than any of the technopanic that I’ve covered in my 31 years in the field of tech policy—and I have covered a lot of them.

In a new joint essay co-authored with Brent Orrell of the American Enterprise Institute and Chris Messerole of Brookings, we argue that “the ‘pause’ we are most in need of is one on dystopian AI thinking.” The three of us recently served on a blue-ribbon Commission on Artificial Intelligence Competitiveness, Inclusion, and Innovation, an independent effort assembled by the U.S. Chamber of Commerce. In our essay, we note how:

Many of these breakthroughs and applications will already take years to work their way through the traditional lifecycle of development, deployment, and adoption and can likely be managed through legal and regulatory systems that are already in place. Civil rights laws, consumer protection regulations, agency recall authority for defective products, and targeted sectoral regulations already govern algorithmic systems, creating enforcement avenues through our courts and by common law standards allowing for development of new regulatory tools that can be developed as actual, rather than anticipated, problems arise.

“Instead of freezing AI we should leverage the legal, regulatory, and informal tools at hand to manage existing and emerging risks while fashioning new tools to respond to new vulnerabilities,” we conclude. Also on the pause idea, it’s worth checking out this excellent essay from Bloomberg Opinion editors on why “An AI ‘Pause’ Would Be a Disaster for Innovation.”

The problem is not with the “pause” per se. Even if the signatories could somehow enforce a worldwide stop-work order, six months probably wouldn’t do much to halt advances in AI. If a brief and partial moratorium draws attention to the need to think seriously about AI safety, it’s hard to see much harm. Unfortunately, a pause seems likely to evolve into a more generalized opposition to progress.

The editors continue on to rightly note:

This is a formula for outright stagnation. No one can ever be fully confident that a given technology or application will only have positive effects. The history of innovation is one of trial and error, risk and reward. One reason why the US leads the world in digital technology — why it’s home to virtually all the biggest tech platforms — is that it did not preemptively constrain the industry with well-meaning but dubious regulation. It’s no accident that all the leading AI efforts are American too.

That is 100% right, and I appreciate the Bloomberg editors linking to my latest study on AI governance when they made this point. In this new R Street Institute study, I explain why “Getting AI Innovation Culture Right,” is essential to make sure we can enjoy the many benefits that algorithmic systems offer, while also staying competitive in the global race for competitive advantage in this space. Continue reading →

In my latest R Street Institute report, I discuss the importance of “Getting AI Innovation Culture Right.” This is the first of a trilogy of major reports on what sort of policy vision and set of governance principles should guide the development of  artificial intelligence (AI), algorithmic systems, machine learning (ML), robotics, and computational science and engineering more generally. More specifically, these reports seek to answer the question, Can we achieve AI safety without innovation-crushing top-down mandates and massive new regulatory bureaucracies? 

These questions are particular pertinent as we just made it through a week in which we’ve seen a major open letter issued that calls for a 6-month freeze on the deployment of AI technologies, while a prominent AI ethicist argued that governments should go further and consider airstrikes data processing centers even if the exchange of nuclear weapons needed to be considered! On top of that, Italy became the first major nation to ban ChatGPT, the popular AI-enabled chatbot created by U.S.-based OpenAI.

My report begins from a different presumption: AI, ML and algorithmic technologies present society with enormously benefits and, while real risks are there, we can find better ways of addressing them. Continue reading →