[Cross posted at Truthonthemarket]
I don’t think so.
Let’s start from the beginning. In my last post, I pointed out that simple economic theory generates some pretty clear predictions concerning the impact of a merger on rival stock prices. If a merger is results in a more efficient competitor, and more intense post-merger competition, rivals are made worse off while consumers benefit. On the other hand, if a merger is is likely to result in collusion or a unilateral price increase, the rivals firms are made better off while consumers suffer.
I pointed to this graph of Sprint and Clearwire stock prices increasing dramatically upon announcement of the merger to illustrate the point that it appears rivals are doing quite well:
The WSJ reports the increases at 5.9% and 11.5%, respectively. In reaction to the WSJ and other stories highlighting this market reaction to the DOJ complaint, I asked what I think is an important set of questions:
How many of the statements in the DOJ complaint, press release and analysis are consistent with this market reaction? If the post-merger market would be less competitive than the status quo, as the DOJ complaint hypothesizes, why would the market reward Sprint and Clearwire for an increased likelihood of facing greater competition in the future?
A few of our always excellent commenters argued that the analysis above was either incomplete or incorrect. My claim was that the dramatic increase in stock market prices of Sprint and Clearwire were more consistent with a procompetitive merger than the theories in the DOJ complaint.
Commenters raised three important points and I appreciate their thoughtful responses. Continue reading →

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