As I noted in a recent interview with James Pethokoukis for his Faster, Please! newsletter, “[t]he current policy debate over artificial intelligence is haunted by many mythologies and mistaken assumptions. The most problematic of these is the widespread belief that AI is completely ungoverned today.” In a recent R Street Institute report and series of other publications, I have documented just how wrong that particular assumption is.
The first thing I try to remind everyone is that the U.S. federal government is absolutely massive—2.1 million employees, 15 cabinet agencies, 50 independent federal commissions and 434 federal departments. Strangely, when policymakers and pundits deliver remarks on AI policy today, they seem to completely ignore all that regulatory capacity while simultaneously casually tossing out proposals to just add more and more layers of regulation and bureaucracy to it. Well, I say why not see if the
existing regulations and bureaucracy are working first, and then we can have a chat about what more is needed to fill gaps.
This a running list of all the essays and reports I’ve already rolled out on the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and robotics. Why have I decided to spend so much time on this issue? Because this will become the most important technological revolution of our lifetimes. Every segment of the economy will be touched in some fashion by AI, ML, robotics, and the power of computational science. It should be equally clear that public policy will be radically transformed along the way.
Eventually, all policy will involve AI policy and computational considerations. As AI “eats the world,” it eats the world of public policy along with it. The stakes here are profound for individuals, economies, and nations. As a result, AI policy will be the most important technology policy fight of the next decade, and perhaps next quarter century. Those who are passionate about the freedom to innovate need to prepare to meet the challenge as proposals to regulate AI proliferate.
There are many socio-technical concerns surrounding algorithmic systems that deserve serious consideration and appropriate governance steps to ensure that these systems are beneficial to society. However,
there is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that AI innovations are developed and made widely available to help improve human well-being across many dimensions. And that’s the case that I’ll be dedicating my life to making in coming years.
Here’s the list of what I’ve done so far. I will continue to update this as new material is released: Continue reading →
Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!
What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?
Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) voted on July 1 to withdraw its pubic affirmation of consumer welfare as the guiding principle for antitrust enforcement. While this change is symbolic at this point, it weakens the agency’s public commitment to an objective consumer-based approach to antitrust. The result opens the door to politicized and unprincipled antitrust enforcement that will ultimately hurt rather than benefit consumers.
The FTC is the nation’s primary consumer protection agency, focused on ensuring a healthy market that avoids the dangers of monopolistic practices. The statement on the agency’s antitrust enforcement had been uncontroversial up to this point. A bipartisan group of commissioners passed the statement in 2015—during the Obama Administration—and the statement primarily clarified that the FTC’s antitrust enforcement under Section 5 of the FTC Act concerning the agency’s authority over unfair and deceptive trade practices was guided by consumer welfare. In other words, the FTC would focus on those acts that cause or are likely to cause harm to consumers, based on objective economic analysis rather than the effects of business moves on competition itself or other policy standards. The statement sought to provide clarity to consumers and businesses, and in fact, the sole vote against it was on the basis that the statement was too abbreviated to provide meaningful guidance.
Despite these uncontroversial origins, on Thursday at a hastily announced open meeting, the current FTC voted 3-2 to withdraw this statement. The withdrawal of the FTC’s statement is the latest signal that antitrust policy, particularly at the FTC, is shifting away from focusing on consumers and using the consumer welfare standard. Instead, there are now real concerns the FTC will enforce antitrust policy in a way that promotes competitors or ideology at consumers’ expense.
Most specifically, rejecting the consumer welfare standard signals the FTC may apply its enforcement power in more subjective ways based in changing political motives and policy preference, as was seen in earlier eras of antitrust enforcement. For example, if not focused on the consumer welfare standard, the FTC could act against some of the largest tech companies to break them up or prevent mergers even though consumers were not harmed—or were even helped—by these changes in the market. This shift would have three specific, if related, implications.
First, it would undermine confidence among consumers in the FTC’s actions. It is far less clear now by what standards antitrust enforcement will be guided and if they are truly objective. As a result, it is unclear what the purpose behind enforcement is.
Second, such expansive enforcement could diminish the options available to consumers. Without the consumer welfare standard, aggressive antitrust enforcement could lead to regulatory interventions in competitive and dynamic markets apart from a data-based and consumer-focused analysis. The result of such unnecessary enforcement could be to raise costs or eliminate products, preventing consumers from having access to products they enjoy or face higher prices, not because of unfair or anti-competitive behavior but because of political animus against a particular industry.
Finally, this shift away from the consumer welfare standard is likely to result in inefficient markets. Unprincipled or politically motivated enforcement could result in some products and services never making it to consumers. In other cases, markets may find certain “competitors” kept alive past their value, or other markets could remain with few choices because companies fear that entrance would be considered anticompetitive. Without the consumer welfare standard, misguided notions of concentration or “bigness” could result in a less beneficial market and instead benefit competitors with inferior products that would not have otherwise survived—all to the detriment of consumers.
When regulators move away from an objective, consumer-focused approach to antitrust, it is ultimately the consumers who are harmed in the form of higher prices, inferior products, and less innovation. As Commissioner Christine Wilson stated prior to the vote, “If the Commission is no longer focused on consumer welfare then consumers will be harmed.”
Does anyone remember Blockbuster and Hollywood Video? I assume most of you do, but wow, doesn’t it seem like forever ago when we actually had to drive to stores to get movies to watch at home? What a drag that was!
Yet, just 15 years ago, that was the norm and those two firms were the titans of video distribution, so much so that federal regulators at the Federal Trade Commission looked to stop their hegemony through antitrust intervention. But then those firms and whatever “market power” they possessed quickly evaporated as a wave of Schumpeterian creative destruction swept through video distribution markets. Both those firms and antitrust regulators had completely failed to anticipate the tsunami of technological and marketplace changes about to hit in the form of alternative online video distribution platforms as well as the rise of smartphones and robust nationwide mobile networks.
Today, this serves as a cautionary tale of what happens when regulatory hubris triumphs over policy humility, as Trace Mitchell and I explain in this new essay for
National Review Online entitled, “The Crystal Ball of Antitrust Regulators Is Cracked.” As we note:
There is no discernable end point to the process of entrepreneurial-driven change. In fact, it seems to be proliferating rapidly. To survive, even the most successful companies must be willing to quickly dispense with yesterday’s successful business plans, lest they be steamrolled by the relentless pace of technological change and ever-shifting consumer demands. It is easy to understand why some people find it hard to imagine a time when Amazon, Apple, Facebook, and Google won’t be quite as dominant as they are today. But it was equally challenging 20 years ago to imagine that those same companies could disrupt the giants of that era.
Hopefully today’s policymakers will have a little more patience and trust competition and continued technological innovation to bring us still more wonderful video choices.
This week, the Trump Administration proposed a new policy framework for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies that attempts to balance the need for continued innovation with a set of principles to address concerns about new AI services and applications. This represents an important moment in the history of emerging technology governance as it creates a policy vision for AI that is generally consistent with earlier innovation governance frameworks established by previous administrations.
Generally speaking, the Trump governance vision for AI encourages regulatory humility and patience in the face of an uncertain technological future. However, the framework also endorses a combination of “hard” and “soft” law mechanisms to address policy concerns that have already been raised about developing or predicted AI innovations.
AI promises to revolutionize almost every sector of the economy and can potentially benefit our lives in numerous ways. But AI applications also raise a number of policy concerns, specifically regarding safety or fairness. On the safety front, for example, some are concerned about the AI systems that control drones, driverless cars, robots, and other autonomous systems. When it comes to fairness considerations, critics worry about “bias” in algorithmic systems that could deny people jobs, loans, or health care, among other things.
These concerns deserve serious consideration and some level of policy guidance or else the public may never come to trust AI systems, especially if the worst of those fears materialize as AI technologies spread. But
how policy is formulated and imposed matters profoundly. A heavy-handed, top-down regulatory regime could undermine AI’s potential to improve lives and strengthen the economy. Accordingly, a flexible governance framework is needed and the administration’s new guidelines for AI regulation do a reasonably good job striking that balance. Continue reading →
I have been covering telecom and Internet policy for almost 30 years now. During much of that time – which included a nine year stint at the Heritage Foundation — I have interacted with conservatives on various policy issues and often worked very closely with them to advance certain reforms.
If I divided my time in Tech Policy Land into two big chunks of time, I’d say the biggest tech-related policy issue for conservatives during the first 15 years I was in the business (roughly 1990 – 2005) was preventing the resurrection of the so-called Fairness Doctrine. And the biggest issue during the second 15-year period (roughly 2005 – present) was stopping the imposition of “Net neutrality” mandates on the Internet. In both cases, conservatives vociferously blasted the notion that unelected government bureaucrats should sit in judgment of what constituted “fairness” in media or “neutrality” online.
Many conservatives are suddenly changing their tune, however. President Trump and Sen. Ted Cruz, for example, have been increasingly critical of both traditional media and new tech companies in various public statements and suggested an openness to increased regulation. The President has gone after old and new media outlets alike, while Sen. Cruz (along with others like Sen. Lindsay Graham) has suggested during congressional hearings that increased oversight of social media platforms is needed, including potential antitrust action.
Meanwhile, during his short time in office, Sen. Josh Hawley (R-Mo.) has become one of the most vocal Internet critics on the Right. In a shockingly-worded USA Today editorial in late May, Hawley said, “social media wastes our time and resources” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” He even referred to these sites as “parasites” and blamed them for a long list of social problems, leading him to suggest that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” along with various other sites and services.
Hawley’s moral panic over social media has now bubbled over into a regulatory crusade that would unleash federal bureaucrats on the Internet in an attempt to dictate “fair” speech on the Internet. He has introduced an astonishing piece of legislation aimed at undoing the liability protections that Internet providers rely upon to provide open platforms for speech and commerce. If Hawley’s absurdly misnamed new “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” is implemented, it would essentially combine the core elements of the Fairness Doctrine and Net Neutrality to create a massive new regulatory regime for the Internet. Continue reading →
Over at the Mercatus Center Bridge blog, Trace Mitchell and I just posted an essay entitled, “A Non-Partisan Way to Help Workers and Consumers,” which discusses the new Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Economic Liberty Task Force report on occupational licensing.
We applaud the FTC’s calls for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, but regret the missed opportunity to address root problem of excessive licensing more generally. But while FTC is right to push for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, policymakers need to confront the sheer absurdity of licensing so many jobs that pose
zero risk to public health & safety. Licensing has become completely detached from risk realities and actual public needs.
As the FTC notes, excessive licensing limits employment opportunities, worker mobility, and competition while also “resulting in higher prices, reduced quality, and less convenience for consumers.” These are unambiguous facts that are widely accepted by experts of all stripes. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations, for example, have been completely in league on the need for comprehensive licensing reforms. Continue reading →
Last week the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit vacated a Federal Trade Commission order requiring medical diagnostic company LabMD to adopt reasonable data security, handing the FTC a loss on an important data security case. In some ways, this outcome is not surprising. This was a close case with a tenacious defendant which raised important questions about FTC authority, how to interpret “unfairness” under the FTC Act, and the Commission’s data security program.
Unfortunately, the decision answers none of those important questions
and makes a total hash of the FTC’s current unfairness law. While some critics of the FTC’s data security program may be pleased with the outcome of this decision, they ought to be concerned with its reasoning, which harkens back to the “public policy” test for unfairness that was greatly abused by the FTC in the 1970’s.
The most problematic parts of this decision are likely dicta, but it is still worth describing how sharply this decision conflicts with the FTC’s modern unfairness test. The court’s reasoning could implicate not only the FTC’s data security authority but its overall authority to police unfair practices of any kind.
(I’m going to skip the facts and procedural background of the case because the key issues are matters of law unrelated to the facts of the case. The relevant facts and procedure are laid out in the decision’s first and most lucid section. I’m also going to limit this piece to the decision’s unfairness analysis. There’s more to say about the court’s conclusion that the FTC’s order is unenforceable, but this post is already long. Interesting takes here and here.)
In short, the court’s decision attempts to rewrite a quarter century of FTC unfairness law. By doing so, it elevates a branch of unfairness analysis that, in the 1970s, landed the FTC in big trouble. First, I’ll summarize the current unfairness test as stated in the FTC Act. Next, I’ll discuss the previous unfairness test, the trouble it caused, and how that resulted in the modern test. Finally, I’ll look at how the
LabMD decision rejects the modern test and discuss some implications.
The Modern Unfairness Test
If you’ve read a FTC complaint with an unfairness count in the last two decades, you’re probably familiar with the modern unfairness test. A practice is unfair if it causes substantial injury that the consumer cannot avoid, and which is not outweighed by benefits to consumers or competition. In 1994, Congress codified this three-part test in Section 5(n) of the FTC Act, which reads in full:
The Commission shall have no authority under this section or section 57a of this title to declare unlawful an act or practice on the grounds that such act or practice is unfair unless the act or practice [1] causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which [2] is not reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and [3] not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition. In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination. [Emphasis added]
The text of Section 5(n) makes two things clear: 1) a practice is not unfair unless it meets the three-part consumer injury test and 2) public policy considerations can be helpful evidence of unfairness but are not sufficient or even necessary to demonstrate it. Thus, the three-part consumer injury test is centrally important to the unfairness analysis. Indeed, the three-part consumer injury test set out in Section 5(n) has been synonymous with the unfairness test for decades.
The Previous, Problematic Test for Unfairness
But the unfairness test used to be quite different. In outlining the test’s history, I am going to borrow heavily from Howard Beales’ excellent 2003 essay, “The FTC’s Use of Unfairness Authority: Its Rise, Fall, and Resurrection.” (Beales was the Director of the FTC’s Bureau of Consumer Protection under Republican FTC Chairman Timothy Muris.) Beales describes the previous test for unfairness:
In 1964 … the Commission set forth a test for determining whether an act or practice is “unfair”: 1) whether the practice “offends public policy” – as set forth in “statutes, the common law, or otherwise”; 2) “whether it is immoral, unethical, oppressive, or unscrupulous; 3) whether it causes substantial injury to consumers (or competitors or other businessmen).” …. [T]he Supreme Court, while reversing the Commission in Sperry & Hutchinson cited the Cigarette Rule unfairness criteria with apparent approval….
This three-part test – public policy, immorality, and/or substantial injury – gave the agency enormous discretion, and the FTC began to wield that discretion in a problematic manner. Beales describes the effect of the
S&H dicta:
Emboldened by the Supreme Court’s dicta, the Commission set forth to test the limits of the unfairness doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court gave no guidance to the Commission on how to weigh the three prongs – even suggesting that the test could properly be read disjunctively.
The result was a series of rulemakings relying upon broad, newly found theories of unfairness that often had no empirical basis, could be based entirely upon the individual Commissioner’s personal values, and did not have to consider the ultimate costs to consumers of foregoing their ability to choose freely in the marketplace. Predictably, there were many absurd and harmful results.
According to Beales, “[t]he most problematic proposals relied heavily on ‘public policy’ with little or no consideration of consumer injury.” This regulatory overreach triggered a major backlash from businesses, Congress, and the media. The Washington Post called the FTC the “National Nanny.” Congress even defunded the agency for a time.
The backlash prompted the agency to revisit the
S&H criteria. As Beales describes,
As the Commission struggled with the proper standard for unfairness, it moved away from public policy and towards consumer injury, and consumer sovereignty, as the appropriate focus…. On December 17, 1980, a unanimous Commission formally adopted the Unfairness Policy Statement, and declared that “[un]justified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act, and the most important of the three S&H criteria.”
This Unfairness Statement recast the relationship between the three
S&H criteria, discarding the “immoral” prong entirely and elevating consumer injury above public policy: “Unjustified consumer injury is the primary focus of the FTC Act, and the most important of the three S&H criteria. By itself it can be sufficient to warrant a finding of unfairness.” [emphasis added] It was this Statement that first established the three-part consumer injury test now codified in Section 5(n).
Most importantly for our purposes, the statement explained the optional nature of the
S&H “public policy” factor. As Beales details,
[I]n most instances, the proper role of public policy is as evidence to be considered in determining the balance of costs and benefits” although ”public policy can ‘independently support a Commission action . . . when the policy is so clear that it will entirely determine the question of consumer injury, so there is little need for separate analysis by the Commission.’” [emphasis added]
In a 1982 letter to Congress, the Commission reiterated that public policy “is not a necessary element of the definition of unfairness.”
As the 1980s progressed, the Unfairness Policy statement, specifically the three-part test for consumer injury, “became accepted as the appropriate test for determining unfairness…” But not all was settled. Beales again:
The danger of unfettered “public policy” analysis as an independent basis for unfairness still existed, however [because] the Unfairness Policy Statement itself continued to hold out the possibility of public policy as the sole basis for a finding of unfairness. A less cautious Commission might ignore the lessons of history, and dust off public policy-based unfairness. … When Congress eventually reauthorized the FTC in 1994, it codified the three-part consumer injury unfairness test. It also codified the limited role of public policy. Under the statutory standard, the Commission may consider public policies, but it cannot use public policy as an independent basis for finding unfairness. The Commission’s long and dangerous flirtation with ill-defined public policy as a basis for independent action was over.
Flirting with Public Policy, Again
To sum up, chastened for overreaching its authority using the public policy prong of the
S&H criteria, the FTC refocused its unfairness authority on consumer injury. Congress ratified that refocus in Section 5(n) of the FTC Act, as I’ve discussed above. Today, under modern unfairness law, FTC complaints rarely make public policy arguments and only then to bolster evidence of consumer injury.
In last week’s LabMD decision, the 11
th Circuit rejects this long-standing approach to unfairness. Consider these excerpts from its decision:
“The Commission must find the standards of unfairness it enforces in ‘clear and well-established’ policies that are expressed in the Constitution, statutes, or the common law.”
“An act or practice’s ‘unfairness’ must be grounded in statute, judicial decisions – i.e., the common law – or the Constitution. An act or practice that causes substantial injury but lacks such grounding is not unfair within Section 5(a)’s meaning.”
“Thus, an ‘unfair’ act or practice is one which meets the consumer-injury factors listed above and is grounded in well-established legal policy.”
And consider this especially salty bite of pretzel logic based on a selective citation of the FTC Act:
“Section 5(n) now states, with regard to public policy, ‘In determining whether an act or practice is unfair, the Commission may consider established public policies as evidence to be considered with all other evidence. Such public policy considerations may not serve as a primary basis for such determination.’ We do not take this ambiguous statement to mean that the Commission may bring suit purely on the basis of substantial consumer injury. The act or practice alleged to have caused injury must still be unfair under a well-established legal standard, whether grounded in statute, the common law, or the Constitution.” [emphasis added]
Yet those two sentences in 5(n) are quite clear when read in context with the full paragraph, which
requires the three-part consumer injury test but merely permits the FTC to consider public policies as evidence. The court’s interpretation here is also undercut by the FTC’s historic misuse of public policy and Congress’s subsequent intent in Section 5(n) to limit the FTC overreach by restricting use of public policy evidence. Congress sought to restrict the FTC’s use of public policy; the 11th Circuit’s decision seeks to require it.
To be fair, the court is not exactly returning to the wild pre-Unfairness Statement days when the FTC thought public policy alone was sufficient to find an act or practice unfair. Instead, the court has developed a new, stricter test for unfairness that requires both consumer injury and offense to public policy.
After crafting this bespoke unfairness test by inserting a mandatory public policy element, the decision then criticizes the FTC complaint for “not explicitly” citing the public policy source for its “standard of unfairness.” But it is obvious why the FTC didn’t include a public policy element in the complaint – no one has thought it necessary, for more than two decades. (Note, however, that the Commission’s decision does cite numerous statutes and common law principles as public policy evidence of consumer injury in this case.)
The court supplies the missing public policy element for the FTC: “It is apparent to us, though, that the source is the common law of negligence.” The court then determines that “the Commission’s action implies” that common law negligence “is a source that provides standards for determining whether an act or practice is unfair….”
Having thus rewritten the Commission’s argument and decades of FTC law, the court again surprises. Rather than analyze LabMD’s liability under this new standard, the court “assumes
arguendo that the Commission is correct and that LabMD’s negligent failure to design and maintain a reasonable data security program invaded consumers’ right of privacy and thus constituted an unfair act or practice.”
Thus, the court does not actually rely on the unfairness test it has set out, arguably rendering that entire analysis dicta.
Why Dicta?
What is going on here? I believe the court is suggesting how data security cases
ought to be pled, even though it cannot require this standard under Section 5(n) – and perhaps would not want to, given the collateral effect on other types of unfairness cases.
The court clearly wanted to signal something through this exercise. Otherwise, it would have been much easier to have assumed
arguendo LabMD’s liability under the existing three prong consumer injury unfairness test contained in the FTC’s complaint. Instead, the court constructs a new unfairness test, interprets the FTC’s complaint to match it, and then appears to render its unfairness analysis dicta.
So, what exactly is the court signaling? This new unfairness test is stricter than the Section 5(n) definition of unfairness, and thus any complaint that satisfies the
LabMD test would also satisfy the statutory test. Thus, perhaps the court seeks to encourage the FTC to plead data security complaints more strictly than legally necessary by including references to public policy.
Had the court applied its bespoke standard to find that LabMD was not liable, I think the FTC would have had no choice but to appeal the decision. By upsetting 20+ years of unfairness law, the court’s analysis would have affected far more than just the FTC’s data security program. The FTC brings many non-data security cases under its unfairness authority, including illegal bill cramming and unauthorized payment processing and other types of fraud where deception cannot adequately address the problem. The new
LabMD unfairness test would affect many such areas of FTC enforcement. But by assuming arguendo LabMD’s liability, the court may have avoided such effects and thus reduced the FTC’s incentive to appeal on these grounds.
Dicta or not, appeal or not, the LabMD decision has elevated unfairness’s “public policy” factor. Given the FTC’s misuse of that factor in the past, FTC watchers ought to keep an eye out.
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Last week’s LabMD decision will shape the constantly evolving data security policy environment. At the Charles Koch Institute, we believe that a healthy data security policy environment will encourage permissionless innovation while addressing real consumer harms as they arise. More broadly, we believe that innovation and technological progress are necessary to achieve widespread human flourishing. And we seek to foster innovation-promoting environments through educational programs and academic grant-making.
“Responsible research and innovation,” or “RRI,” has become a major theme in academic writing and conferences about the governance of emerging technologies. RRI might be considered just another variant of corporate social responsibility (CSR), and it indeed borrows from that heritage. What makes RRI unique, however, is that it is more squarely focused on mitigating the potential risks that could be associated with various technologies or technological processes. RRI is particularly concerned with “baking-in” certain values and design choices into the product lifecycle before new technologies are released into the wild.
In this essay, I want to consider how RRI lines up with the opposing technological governance regimes of “permissionless innovation” and the “precautionary principle.” More specifically, I want to address the question of whether “permissionless innovation” and “responsible innovation” are even compatible. While participating in recent university seminars and other tech policy events, I have encountered a certain degree of skepticism—and sometimes outright hostility—after suggesting that, properly understood, “permissionless innovation” and “responsible innovation” are not warring concepts and that RRI can co-exist peacefully with a legal regime that adopts permissionless innovation as its general tech policy default. Indeed, the application of RRI lessons and recommendations can strengthen the case for adopting a more “permissionless” approach to innovation policy in the United States and elsewhere. Continue reading →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology. Learn more about TLF →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology.
Running List of My Research on AI, ML & Robotics Policy
by Adam Thierer on July 29, 2022 · 0 comments
[last updated 4/3/2025 – Check my Medium page for latest posts]
This a running list of all the essays and reports I’ve already rolled out on the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), machine learning (ML), and robotics. Why have I decided to spend so much time on this issue? Because this will become the most important technological revolution of our lifetimes. Every segment of the economy will be touched in some fashion by AI, ML, robotics, and the power of computational science. It should be equally clear that public policy will be radically transformed along the way.
Eventually, all policy will involve AI policy and computational considerations. As AI “eats the world,” it eats the world of public policy along with it. The stakes here are profound for individuals, economies, and nations. As a result, AI policy will be the most important technology policy fight of the next decade, and perhaps next quarter century. Those who are passionate about the freedom to innovate need to prepare to meet the challenge as proposals to regulate AI proliferate.
There are many socio-technical concerns surrounding algorithmic systems that deserve serious consideration and appropriate governance steps to ensure that these systems are beneficial to society. However, there is an equally compelling public interest in ensuring that AI innovations are developed and made widely available to help improve human well-being across many dimensions. And that’s the case that I’ll be dedicating my life to making in coming years.
Here’s the list of what I’ve done so far. I will continue to update this as new material is released: Continue reading →