There are a lot of inaccurate claims – and bad economics – swirling around the Universal Music Group (UMG)/EMI merger, currently under review by the US Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission (and approved by regulators in several other jurisdictions including, most recently, Australia). Regulators and industry watchers should be skeptical of analyses that rely on outmoded antitrust thinking and are out of touch with the real dynamics of the music industry.
The primary claim of critics such as the American Antitrust Institute and Public Knowledge is that this merger would result in an over-concentrated music market and create a “super-major” that could constrain output, raise prices and thwart online distribution channels, thus harming consumers. But this claim, based on a stylized, theoretical economic model, is far too simplistic and ignores the market’s commercial realities, the labels’ self-interest and the merger’s manifest benefits to artists and consumers.
For market concentration to raise serious antitrust issues, products have to be substitutes. This is in fact what critics argue: that if UMG raised prices now it would be undercut by EMI and lose sales, but that if the merger goes through, EMI will no longer constrain UMG’s pricing power. However, the vast majority of EMI’s music is not a substitute for UMG’s. In the real world, there simply isn’t much price competition across music labels or among the artists and songs they distribute. Their catalogs are not interchangeable, and there is so much heterogeneity among consumers and artists (“product differentiation,” in antitrust lingo) that relative prices are a trivial factor in consumption decisions: No one decides to buy more Lady Gaga albums because the Grateful Dead’s are too expensive. The two are not substitutes, and assessing competitive effects as if they are, simply because they are both “popular music,” is not instructive. Continue reading →
The privacy debate has been increasingly shaped by an apparent consensus that de-identifying sets of personally identifying information doesn’t work. In particular, this has led the FTC to abandon the PII/non-PII distinction on the assumption that re-identification is too easy. But a new paper shatters this supposed consensus by rebutting the methodology of Latanya Sweeney’s seminal 1997 study of re-identification risks, which in turn, shaped the HIPAA’s rules for de-identification of health data and the larger privacy debate ever since.
This new critical paper, “The ‘Re-Identification’ of Governor William Weld’s Medical Information: A Critical Re-Examination of Health Data Identification Risks and Privacy Protections, Then and Now” was published by Daniel Barth-Jones, an epidemiologist and statistician at Columbia University. After carefully re-examining the methodology of Sweeney’s 1997 study, he concludes that re-identification attempts will face “far-reaching systemic challenges” that are inherent in the statistical methods used to re-identify. In short, re-identification turns out to be harder than it seemed—so our identity can more easily be obscured in large data sets. This more nuanced story must be understood by privacy law scholars and public policy-makers if they want to realistically assess current privacy risks posed by de-identified data—not just for health data, but for all data.
The importance of Barth-Jones’s paper is underscored by the example of Vioxx, which stayed on the market years longer than it should have because of HIPAA’s privacy rules, thus resulting in 88,000 and 139,000 unnecessary heart attacks, and 27,000-55,000 avoidable deaths—as University of Arizona Law Professor Jane Yakowitz Bambauer explained in a recent Huffington Post piece.
Ultimately, overstating the risk of re-identification causes policymakers to strike the wrong balance in the trade-off of privacy with other competing values. As Barth-Jones and Yakowitz have suggested, policymakers should instead focus on setting standards for proper de-identification of data that are grounded in a rigorous statistical analysis of re-identification risks. A safe harbor for proper de-identification, combined with legal limitations on re-identification, could protect consumers against real privacy harms while still allowing the free flow of data that drives research and innovation throughout the economy.
Unfortunately, the Barth-Jones paper has not received the attention it deserves. So I encourage you consider writing about this, or just take a moment to share this with your friends on Twitter or Facebook.
Adam Thierer, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, discuses recent calls for nationalizing Facebook or at least regulating it as a public utility. Thierer argues that Facebook is not a public good in any formal economic sense, and nationalizing the social network would be a big step in the wrong direction. He argues that nationalizing the network is neither the only nor the most effective means of solving privacy concerns that surround Facebook and other social networks. Nor is Facebook is a monopoly, he says, arguing that customers have many other choices. Thierer also points out that regulation is not without its problems including the potential that a regulator will be captured by the regulated network thus making monopoly a self-fulfilling prophecy.
Is competition really a problem in the tech industry? That was the question the folks over at WebProNews asked me to come on their show and discuss this week. I offer my thoughts in the following 15-minute clip. Also, down below I have embedded a few of my recent relevant essays on this topic, a few of which I mentioned during the show.
I suppose there’s something to be said for the fact that two days into DirecTV’s shutdown of 17 Viacom programming channels (26 if you count the HD feeds) no congressman, senator or FCC chairman has come forth demanding that DirecTV reinstate them to protect consumers’ “right” to watch SpongeBob SquarePants.
Yes, it’s another one of those dust-ups between studios and cable/satellite companies over the cost of carrying programming. Two weeks ago, DirecTV competitor Dish Network dropped AMC, IFC and WE TV. As with AMC and Dish, Viacom wants a bigger payment—in this case 30 percent more—from DirecTV to carry its channel line-up, which includes Comedy Central, MTV and Nickelodeon. DirecTV, balked, wanting to keep its own prices down. Hence, as of yesterday, those channels are not available pending a resolution.
As I have said in the past, Washington should let both these disputes play out. For starters, despite some consumer complaints, demographics might be in DirecTV’s favor. True, Viacom has some popular channels with popular shows. But they all skew to younger age groups that are turning to their tablets and smartphones for viewing entertainment. At the same time, satellite TV service likely skews toward homeowners, a slightly older demographic. It could be that DirecTV’s research and the math shows dropping Viacom will not cost them too many subscribers.
So, as I write this, I’m watching a House Commerce “Future of Video” hearing and I am trying to figure out if I’m the only person who was alive and watching television in the 1970s. I mean, come on, doesn’t anyone else remember the era of the Big 3 and meager viewing options?! Well, for those who forget, here were some of your TV viewing options this day in history, June 27, 1972. Read it and weep (and then celebrate the cornucopia of viewing riches we enjoy today in a world of over 900 video channels + the Internet).
On Wednesday morning, the U.S. House of Representatives Energy & Commerce Subcommittee on Communications and Technology will hold a hearing on “The Future of Video.”
As we Tech Liberators have long argued on these pages (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7), government’s hands have been all over the video market since its inception, primarily in the form of the FCC’s rulemaking and enforcement enabled by the Communications Act. While the 1996 Telecommunications Act scrapped some obsolete video regulations, volumes of outdated rules remain law, and the FCC wields vast and largely unchecked authority to regulate video providers of all shapes and sizes. Wednesday’s hearing offers members an excellent opportunity to question each and every law that enables governmental intervention—and restricts liberty in—the television market.
It’s high time for Congress to free up America’s video marketplace and unleash the forces of innovation. Internet entrepreneurs should be free to experiment with novel approaches to creating, distributing, and monetizing video content without fear of FCC regulatory intervention. At the same time, established media businesses—including cable operators, satellite providers, telecom companies, broadcast networks and affiliates, and studios—should compete on a level playing field, free from both federal mandates and special regulatory treatment.
The Committee should closely examine the Communications and Copyright Acts, and rewrite or repeal outright provisions of law that inhibit a free video marketplace. Adam Thierer has chronicled many such laws. The Committee should, among other reforms, consider:
Restoring traditional copyright protection to broadcast signals, instead of the compulsory license created by the 1976 Copyright Act;
Abolishing the “must-carry” rule that requires pay-TV providers to transmit certain broadcast signals without compensation;
Everyone loves to hate record labels. For years, copyright-bashers have ranted about the “Big Labels” trying to thwart new models for distributing music in terms that would make JFK assassination conspiracy theorists blush. Now they’ve turned their sites on the pending merger between Universal Music Group and EMI, insisting the deal would be bad for consumers. There’s even a Senate Antitrust Subcommittee hearing tomorrow, led by Senator Herb “Big is Bad” Kohl.
But this is a merger users of Spotify, Apple’s iTunes and the wide range of other digital services ought to love. UMG has done more than any other label to support the growth of such services, cutting licensing deals with hundreds of distribution outlets—often well before other labels. Piracy has been a significant concern for the industry, and UMG seems to recognize that only “easy” can compete with “free.” The company has embraced the reality that music distribution paradigms are changing rapidly to keep up with consumer demand. So why are groups like Public Knowledge opposing the merger?
Critics contend that the merger will elevate UMG’s already substantial market share and “give it the power to distort or even determine the fate of digital distribution models.” For these critics, the only record labels that matter are the four majors, and four is simply better than three. But this assessment hews to the outmoded, “big is bad” structural analysis that has been consistently demolished by economists since the 1970s. Instead, the relevant touchstone for all merger analysis is whether the merger would give the merged firm a new incentive and ability to engage in anticompetitive conduct. But there’s nothing UMG can do with EMI’s catalogue under its control that it can’t do now. If anything, UMG’s ownership of EMI should accelerate the availability of digitally distributed music.
To see why this is so, consider what digital distributors—whether of the pay-as-you-go, iTunes type, or the all-you-can-eat, Spotify type—most want: Access to as much music as possible on terms on par with those of other distribution channels. For the all-you-can-eat distributors this is a sine qua non: their business models depend on being able to distribute as close as possible to all the music every potential customer could want. But given UMG’s current catalogue, it already has the ability, if it wanted to exercise it, to extract monopoly profits from these distributors, as they simply can’t offer a viable product without UMG’s catalogue. Continue reading →
I’m pleased to report that the Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new white paper on video marketplace regulation and the ongoing “retrans” wars by one of America’s leading media economists, Bruce M. Owen. Owen’s new paper, “Consumer Welfare and TV Program Regulation,” examines the lamentable history of misguided federal interventions into America’s video marketplace. Owen also explores to possibility of deregulating this marketplace via the important new Scalise-DeMint bill, “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act.” If you’re following these issues, Owen’s paper is must-reading. Here’s the abstract:
Getting rid of obsolete regulation of the broadcast and distribution of video programming is essential to the efficient operation of a market that has the potential to greatly increase the benefits to consumers. Services that increase video program distribution capacity have been delayed and suppressed for many years, and consumer benefits were lost as the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) pursued ill-defined and ephemeral “public interest” and “localism” objectives.
It is past time to stop extending interventions originally intended for old technology to a range of new competitive media. No longer is there any rational public policy basis for a government agency to dictate how much or what content the viewing public can see, any more than there ever has been for printed media. There is no market failure to which the current regulatory framework is responding and no longer any reason for FCC bureaucrats to decide how much of the spectrum should be used for each of many existing and future commercial services. Spectrum reform, along with the repeal of other broadcast programming restrictions contained in the proposed Scalise-DeMint Next Generation Television Marketplace Act, provide a roadmap for the necessary reform. With an adequate supply of tradable rights in spectrum, we will find out how much additional competition is possible among traditional wired and wireless, analog and digital, and fixed and mobile delivery services.
Writing over at the conservative Big Government blog (part of the Breitbart.com network of blogs), someone who goes by the pseudonym “Capitol Connection” has posted an editorial about the debate over retransmission consent reform that is full of misinformation and misguided policy prescriptions, at least if you believe is truly limited government. The piece is entitled, “Big Cable Would Prefer if You Paid Their Bills,” and the problems are almost immediately evident from that headline alone. First, what is a supposedly small government-oriented blog doing using a silly label like “Big Cable” to describe a vigorously competitive sector of our capitalist economy? Using terms like “Big Cable” is a silly lefty tactic. Second, no one in the cable industry is proposing anyone “pay their bills” except for the customers who enjoy their services. Isn’t a fee for service part of capitalism?
Anyway, that’s just the problem with the title of the essay. Sadly, the rest of the piece is filled with even more erroneous information and arguments about the retransmission consent regulatory process as well as the bill that aims to reform that process, “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act” (H.R. 3675 and S. 2008). That bill, which is sponsored by Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) and Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), represents a comprehensive attempt to deregulate America’s heavily regulated video marketplace. In a recent Forbes oped, I argued that the DeMint-Scalise effort would take us “Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming” by eliminating a litany of archaic media regulations that should have never been on the books to begin with. The measure would:
eliminate: “retransmission consent” regulations (rules governing contractual negotiations for content);
end “must carry” mandates (the requirement that video distributors carry broadcast signals even if they don’t want to);
repeal “network non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity” regulations (rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with broadcasters outside their local communities);
end various media ownership regulations; and
end the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a “duty to deal” upon content owners to the benefit of video distributors.
This represents genuine and much-needed deregulation of a market that has been encumbered with far too much top-down control and micro-management by the FCC over the past several decades. To be clear, none of these rules apply to any other segment of our modern information economy. Every day of the week, deals are cut between content creators and distributors in many other segments of the media industry without these rules encumbering the process. The DeMint-Scalise bill is an attempt to get big government out of the way and let these deals be cut in a truly free market without regulators putting their thumb on the scale in one direction or the other. Continue reading →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology. Learn more about TLF →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology.