Infrastructure Control as Innovation Regulation

by on August 10, 2018 · 0 comments

The ongoing ride-sharing wars in New York City are interesting to watch because they signal the potential move by state and local officials to use infrastructure management as an indirect form of innovation control or competition suppression. It is getting harder for state and local officials to defend barriers to entry and innovation using traditional regulatory rationales and methods, which are usually little more than a front for cronyist protectionism schemes. Now that the public has increasingly enjoyed new choices and better services in this and other fields thanks to technological innovation, it is very hard to convince citizens they would be better off without more of the same.

If, however, policymakers claim that they are limiting entry or innovation based on concerns about how disruptive actors supposedly negatively affect local infrastructure (in the form of traffic or sidewalk congestion, aesthetic nuisance, deteriorating infrastructure, etc.), that narrative can perhaps make it easier to sell the resulting regulations to the public or, more importantly, the courts. Going forward, I suspect that this will become a commonly-used playbook for many state and local officials looking to limit the reach of new technologies, including ride-sharing companies, electric scooters, driverless cars, drones, and many others.

To be clear, infrastructure control is both (a) a legitimate state and local prerogative; and (b) something that has been used in the past to control innovation and entry in other sectors. But I suspect that this approach is about to become far more prevalent because a full-frontal defense of barriers to innovation is far more likely to face serious public and legal challenges. Continue reading →

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Problems with Precautionary Principle-Minded Tech Regulation & a Federal Robotics Commission

by on September 22, 2014 · 0 comments

If there are two general principles that unify my recent work on technology policy and innovation issues, they would be as follows. To the maximum extent possible:

  1. We should avoid preemptive and precautionary-based regulatory regimes for new innovation. Instead, our policy default should be innovation allowed (or “permissionless innovation”) and innovators should be considered “innocent until proven guilty” (unless, that is, a thorough benefit-cost analysis has been conducted that documents the clear need for immediate preemptive restraints).
  2. We should avoid rigid, “top-down” technology-specific or sector-specific regulatory regimes and/or regulatory agencies and instead opt for a broader array of more flexible, “bottom-up” solutions (education, empowerment, social norms, self-regulation, public pressure, etc.) as well as reliance on existing legal systems and standards (torts, product liability, contracts, property rights, etc.).

I was very interested, therefore, to come across two new essays that make opposing arguments and proposals. The first is this recent Slate oped by John Frank Weaver, “We Need to Pass Legislation on Artificial Intelligence Early and Often.” The second is Ryan Calo’s new Brookings Institution white paper, “The Case for a Federal Robotics Commission.”

Weaver argues that new robot technology “is going to develop fast, almost certainly faster than we can legislate it. That’s why we need to get ahead of it now.” In order to preemptively address concerns about new technologies such as driverless cars or commercial drones, “we need to legislate early and often,” Weaver says. Stated differently, Weaver is proposing “precautionary principle”-based regulation of these technologies. The precautionary principle generally refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

Calo argues that we need “the establishment of a new federal agency to deal with the novel experiences and harms robotics enables” since there exists “distinct but related challenges that would benefit from being examined and treated together.” These issues, he says, “require special expertise to understand and may require investment and coordination to thrive.

I’ll address both Weaver and Calo’s proposals in turn. Continue reading →

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Important Cyberlaw & Info-Tech Policy Books (2012 Edition)

by on December 17, 2012 · 131 comments

The number of major cyberlaw and information tech policy books being published annually continues to grow at an astonishing pace, so much so that I have lost the ability to read and review all of them. In past years, I put together end-of-year lists of important info-tech policy books (here are the lists for 2008, 2009, 2010, and 2011) and I was fairly confident I had read just about everything of importance that was out there (at least that was available in the U.S.). But last year that became a real struggle for me and this year it became an impossibility. A decade ago, there was merely a trickle of Internet policy books coming out each year. Then the trickle turned into a steady stream. Now it has turned into a flood. Thus, I’ve had to become far more selective about what is on my reading list. (This is also because the volume of journal articles about info-tech policy matters has increased exponentially at the same time.)

So, here’s what I’m going to do. I’m going to discuss what I regard to be the five most important titles of 2012, briefly summarize a half dozen others that I’ve read, and then I’m just going to list the rest of the books out there. I’ve read most of them but I have placed an asterisk next to the ones I haven’t.  Please let me know what titles I have missed so that I can add them to the list. (Incidentally, here’s my compendium of all the major tech policy books from the 2000s and here’s the running list of all my book reviews.)

Continue reading →

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FTC sacrifices the rule of law for more flexibility; Commissioner Ohlhausen wisely dissents

by on August 2, 2012 · 1 comment

On July 31 the FTC voted to withdraw its 2003 Policy Statement on Monetary Remedies in Competition Cases.  Commissioner Ohlhausen issued her first dissent since joining the Commission, and points out the folly and the danger in the Commission’s withdrawal of its Policy Statement.

The Commission supports its action by citing “legal thinking” in favor of heightened monetary penalties and the Policy Statement’s role in dissuading the Commission from following this thinking:

It has been our experience that the Policy Statement has chilled the pursuit of monetary remedies in the years since the statement’s issuance. At a time when Supreme Court jurisprudence has increased burdens on plaintiffs, and legal thinking has begun to encourage greater seeking of disgorgement, the FTC has sought monetary equitable remedies in only two competition cases since we issued the Policy Statement in 2003.

In this case, “legal thinking” apparently amounts to a single 2009 article by Einer Elhague.  But it turns out Einer doesn’t represent the entire current of legal thinking on this issue.  As it happens, Josh Wright and Judge Ginsburg looked at the evidence in 2010 and found no evidence of increased deterrence (of price fixing) from larger fines:

If the best way to deter price-fixing is to increase fines, then we should expect the number of cartel cases to decrease as fines increase. At this point, however, we do not have any evidence that a still-higher corporate fine would deter price-fixing more effectively. It may simply be that corporate fines are misdirected, so that increasing the severity of sanctions along this margin is at best irrelevant and might counter-productively impose costs upon consumers in the form of higher prices as firms pass on increased monitoring and compliance expenditures. Continue reading →

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For The Last Time: The Bell System Monopoly Is Not Being Rebuilt

by on April 22, 2011 · 6 comments

Believe it or not, this argument is being trotted out as part of the pressure from consumer activist groups against AT&T’s proposed acquisition of T-Mobile. The subject of a Senate Judiciary Hearing on the merger, scheduled for May 11, even asks, “Is Humpty Dumpty Being Put Back Together Again?”

It seems because the deal would leave AT&T and Verizon as the country’s two leading wireless service providers, the blogosphere is aflutter with worries that we are returning to the bad old days when AT&T pretty much owned all of the country’s telecom infrastructure.

It is true that AT&T and Verizon trace their history back to the six-year antitrust case brought by the Nixon Justice Department, which ended in the 1984 divestiture of then-AT&T’s 22 local telephone operating companies, which were regrouped into seven regional holding companies.

Over the last 28 years, there has been gradual consolidation, each time accompanied by an uproar that the Bell monopoly days were returning. But those claims miss the essential goal of the Bell break-up, and why, even though those seven “Baby Bell” companies have been integrated into three, there’s no going back to the pre-divestiture AT&T.

Continue reading →

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Remembering What Regulatory Capture Looked Like: The Airline Experience

by on April 11, 2011 · 0 comments

This week, my colleague Jerry Brito asked me to guest lecture to his George Mason University law school class on regulatory process. He asked me to talk about one of my favorite topics: the sad, sordid history of regulatory capture. Regular readers will recall the compendium I posted here a few months ago [and that I continue to update] of selected passages from books and papers penned by various economists and political scientists who have studied this issue.

Again, it doesn’t make for pretty reading, but the lesson that history teaches is vital: No matter how noble the “public interest” goals of regulatory advocates or their specific proposals, the only thing that really counts is what regulation means in practice.  Regrettably, all too often, regulation is “captured” by various interests and used to their advantage, or at least to the disadvantage of potential competitors, new entrants, and innovation.

While I was gathering some materials for the case study portion of my lecture — which incorporates the history of telecommunications monopolization, broadcast industry regulatory shenanigans, and transportation / airlines fiascos — I figured I had to post a passage from one of my favorite books on regulation of all-time: Thomas K. McCraw’s brilliant Pulitzer Prize-winning 1984 book, Prophets of Regulation. In his chapter on the late great Alfred Kahn, the father of airline deregulation, McCraw recounts the history of the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB) from its creation in the 1940s up until the time of Kahn’s ascendency to CAB chairman in the Carter Administration (and then the CAB’s eventual deregulation and abolition). Here’s the key passage from that history: Continue reading →

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Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found

by on December 19, 2010 · 661 comments

[Note: This post is updated regularly as I discover relevant old or new material.]

“Regulatory capture” occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular — to further their own ends.  Capture theory is closely related to the “rent-seeking” and “political failure” theories developed by the public choice school of economics.  Another term for regulatory capture is “client politics,” which according to James Q. Wilson, “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).”  (James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 1989, at 76).

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.  (See, for example, the reaction of New Republic’s Jonathan Chait to Will Wilkinson’s recent Economist column about the prevalence of corporatism in our modern political system.)  Yet, countless studies have shown that regulatory capture has been at work in various arenas: transportation and telecommunications; energy and environmental policy; farming and financial services; and many others.

I thought it might be useful to build a compendium of quotes from various economists and political scientists who have studied the regulatory process throughout history and identified regulatory capture or client politics as a major problem.  I would greatly appreciate having others suggest additional quotes and studies to add to this list since I plan to update it frequently and eventually work all of this into a future paper or book. [Note: I have updated this compendium over a dozen times since the original post, so please check back for updates.]

The following list is chronological and begins, surprisingly, with the thoughts of progressive hero Woodrow Wilson…

Continue reading →

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Private Ownership of Public Law

by on October 26, 2010 · 7 comments

Carl Malamud is a breakthrough thinker and doer on transparency and open government. In the brief video below, he makes the very interesting case that various regulatory codes are wrongly withheld from the public domain while citizens are expected to comply with them. It’s important, mind-opening stuff.

It seems a plain violation of due process that a person might be presumed to know laws that are not publicly available. I’m not aware of any cases finding that inability to access the law for want of money is a constitutional problem, but the situation analogizes fairly well to Harper v. Virginia, in which a poll tax that would exclude the indigent from voting was found to violate equal protection.

Regulatory codes that must be purchased at a high price will tend to cartelize trades by raising a barrier to entry against those who can’t pay for copies of the law. Private ownership of public law seems plainly inconsistent with due process, equal protection, and the rule of law. You’ll sense in the video that Malamud is no libertarian, but an enemy of an enemy of ordered liberty is a friend of liberty.

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Broadband and Title II Regulation: An Economic Primer

by on April 16, 2010 · 4 comments

Last week the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Federal Communications Commission cannot impose net neutrality rules on broadband providers under its “ancillary jurisdiction” under the Communications Act.  If it wants to impose net neutrality, the FCC must first reverse previous decisions and reclassify broadband as a “Title II” common carrier.

Whoa!  The previous two sentences prove that this economist has been spending way too much time around telecom lawyers.

In almost-plain English, the court decision means the FCC cannot impose net neutrality regulations unless it publicly changes its five-headed mind and decides that broadband is much like an old-fashioned telephone monopoly and should be regulated much the same way. 

A lot of regulatory economists pretty much gag at this idea, or worse. Non-economists wonder what triggers this visceral reaction.

Let me explain.  As the recipient of 8 years of excellent Jesuit education, of course I have three reasons.

First, anyone who follows the scholarly literature on economic regulation generally knows that this form of regulation has a pretty checkered track record. In a wide variety of industries, economic regulation has increased prices, inflated costs, stunted innovation, and/or created shortages. In addition, because this regulation transfers enormous amounts of wealth — $75 billion annually in the case of federal telecommunications regulation — it creates enormous incentives for firms to lobby and litigate to bend the rules in their favor. While big corporations may feel they benefit from these expenditures, from a society-wide perspective the fight over wealth transfers is pure waste because it rarely produces anything of value for consumers. 

Utility regulation works best in relatively stangant industries where a company makes a big capital investment, pays a few employees to run it, and doesn’t need to innovate much.  In those kinds of situations, it’s easier for regulators and other outsiders to determine costs, set some rates that let the utility earn a reasonable rate of return, and keep the regulated company from gaming the system too much. If you think this describes broadband, well, good luck. A local water utility is probably the best example.

Second, anyone knowledgeable about the economic theory underlying utility regulation (which includes most economists who specialize in the area, and some lawyers) understands that regulation is supposed to be a last resort for “natural monopoly” industries where it’s cheaper to have one firm serve the entire market. A monopolist protected from competition could increase prices, degrade service, or do other things that increase its profits while harming consumers; economic regulation seeks to prevent those behaviors. But if competition is possible, competition is preferable. 

When phone, cable, wireless, and satellite companies bombard us continually with solicitations to switch to their broadband services, and I can see multiple wires running down the street outside my house when I go up on the roof to adjust the satellite dish, it’s pretty darn obvious that broadband is NOT a natural monopoly, even if competition isn’t “perfect.”  Therefore, broadband lacks a key prerequisite for public utility regulation to possibly increase consumer welfare.  Indeed, the most anti-consumer results of economic regulation have occurred when government created monopolies, cartels and/or shortages by imposing this regulation on industries where competition is possible, such as cable TV, trucking, railroads, airlines, oil, and natural gas.

Third, recent economic studies find that the FCC’s decision to classify cable, DSL, and fiber broadband as a less-heavily-regulated “information service” generated a tsunami of investment and spurred competition. See, for example, this study by my GMU colleagues Thomas Hazlett and Anil Caliskan. Some more cites are available on pp. 17-18 of this comment to the FCC. If you don’t believe economic studies, just keep in mind that the aggressive marketing of dirt-cheap entry-level DSL tracks pretty closely with the FCC’s decision that DSL is an information service not subject to Title II regulation.  Coincidence?

So, please excuse those of us regulatory economists who vomit when the subject of Title II comes up. If you check out the links above, perhaps the reaction will be more understandable.

I have not addressed the question of whether it’s realistic to think that reclassification of broadband under Title II could be a workable mechanism to impose just a limited, targeted, surgical, light-handed, smart, data-driven, evidence-based, transparent, transformative, sustainable, green, hybrid, itsy bitsy teenie weeny yellow polka-dot bikini smidgen of net neutrality regulation to prevent only certain forms of anti-consumer discrimination, without imposing the customary broad panpoly of public utility price and service regulation. Whether that’s possible in theory, or likely in real-world political practice, is a different issue for a different day. (Whether the other name for that kind of regulation is “antitrust” is also a different  issue for a different day.) For the moment, I just wanted to provide some context on the broader Title II issue.

And now I’ll go clean off my shoes.

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Cutting the Video Cord: Pro-Regulatory NYT Realizes “Cable Freedom Is a Click Away”

by on December 15, 2009 · 25 comments

Three months ago, when the DC Circuit struck down the FCC’s “Cable Cap”—which prevented any one cable company from serving more than 30% of US households out of fear that he larger cable companies would use their “gatekeeper” power to restrict programming—the New York Times bemoaned the decision:

The problem with the cap is not that it is too onerous, but that it is not demanding enough.

Even with the cap — and satellite television — there is a disturbing lack of price competition. The cable companies have resisted letting customers choose, a la carte, the channels they actually watch….

[The FCC] needs to ensure that customers have an array of choices among cable providers, and that there is real competition on price and program offerings.

Perhaps the Times‘ editors should have consulted with the Lead Technology Writer of their excellent BITS blog.  Nick Bilton might have told him the truth: “Cable Freedom Is a Click Away.”  That’s the title of his excellent survey of devices and services (Hulu, Boxee, iTunes, Joost, YouTube, etc.) that allow users to get cable television programming without a cable subscription.

Nick explains that consumers can “cut the video cord” and still find much, if not all, their favorite cable programming—as well as the vast offerings of online video—without a hefty monthly subscription.  (Adam recently described how Clicker.com is essentially TV guide for the increasing cornucopia of Internet video.)  This makes the 1992 Cable Act’s requirement that the FCC impose a cable cap nothing more than the vestige of a bygone era of platform scarcity, predating not just the Internet, but also competing subscription services offered by satellite and telcos over fiber.  That’s precisely what we argued in PFF’s amicus brief to the DC Circuit a year ago, and largely why the court ultimately struck down the cap.

Bilton notes that “this isn’t as easy as just plugging a computer into a monitor, sitting back and watching a movie. There’s definitely a slight learning curve.”  But, as he describes, cutting the cord isn’t rocket science.  If getting used to using a wireless mouse is the thing that most keeps consumers “enslaved” to the cable “gatekeepers” the FCC frets so much about, what’s the big deal?  Does government really need to set aside the property and free speech rights of cable operators to run their own networks just because some people may not be as quick to dump cable as Bilton?  Is the lag time between early adopters and mainstream really such a problem that we would risk maintaining outdated systems of architectural censorship (Chris Yoo’s brilliant term) that give government control over speech in countless subtle and indirect ways? Continue reading →

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