This week, the U.S. Chamber of Commerce Commission on Artificial Intelligence Competitiveness, Inclusion, and Innovation (AI Commission) released a major report on the policy considerations surrounding AI, machine learning (ML) and algorithmic systems. The 120-page report concluded that “AI technology offers great hope for increasing economic opportunity, boosting incomes, speeding life science research at reduced costs, and simplifying the lives of consumers.” It was my honor to serve as one of the commissioners on the AI Commission and contribute to the report.
Over at the R Street Institute blog, I offer a quick summary of the major findings and recommendations from the report and argue that, along with the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)’s recently released AI Risk Management Framework, the AI Commission report offers, “a constructive, consensus-driven framework for algorithmic governance rooted in flexibility, collaboration and iterative policymaking. This represents the uniquely American approach to AI policy that avoids the more heavy-handed regulatory approaches seen in other countries and it can help the United States again be a global leader in an important new technological field,” I conclude. Check out the blog post and the full AI Commission report if you are following debates of algorithmic policy issues. There’s lot of important material in there.
In my latest R Street Institute blog post, “Mapping the AI Policy Landscape Circa 2023: Seven Major Fault Lines,” I discuss the big issues confronting artificial intelligence and machine learning in the coming year and beyond. I note that the AI regulatory proposals are multiplying fast and coming in two general varieties: broad-based and targeted. Broad-based algorithmic regulation would address the use of these technologies in a holistic fashion across many sectors and concerns. By contrast, targeted algorithmic regulation looks to address specific AI applications or concerns. In the short-term, it is more likely that targeted or “sectoral” regulatory proposals have a chance of being implemented.
I go on to identify seven major issues of concern that will drive these policy proposals. They include:
In an earlier essay, I explored “Why the Future of AI Will Not Be Invented in Europe” and argued that, “there is no doubt that European competitiveness is suffering today and that excessive regulation plays a fairly significant role in causing it.” This essay summarizes some of the major academic literature that leads to that conclusion.
Since the mid-1990s, the European Union has been layering on highly restrictive policies governing online data collection and use. The most significant of the E.U.’s recent mandates is the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). This regulation established even more stringent rules related to the protection of personal data, the movement thereof, and limits what organizations can do with data. Data minimization is the major priority of this system, but there are many different types of restrictions and reporting requirements involved in the regulatory scheme. This policy framework also has ramifications for the future of next-generation technologies, especially artificial intelligence and machine learning systems, which rely on high-quality data sets to improve their efficacy.
Whether or not the E.U.’s complicated regulatory regime has actually resulted in truly meaningful privacy protections for European citizens relative to people in other countries remains open to debate. It is very difficult to measure and compare highly subjective values like privacy across countries and cultures. This makes benefit-cost analysis for privacy regulation extremely challenging — especially on the benefits side of the equation.
What is no longer up for debate, however, is the cost side of the equation and the question of what sort of consequences the GDPR has had on business formation, competition, investment, and so on. On these matters, standardized metrics exist and the economic evidence is abundantly clear: the GDPR has been a disaster for Europe. Continue reading →
President Biden began his 2023 State of the Union remarks by saying America is defined by possibilities. Correct! Unfortunately, his tech-bashing will undermine those possibilities by discouraging technological innovation & online freedom in the United States.
America became THE global leader on digital tech because we rejected heavy-handed controls on innovators & speech. We shouldn’t return to the broken model of the past by layering on red tape, economic controls & speech restrictions.
What has the tech economy done for us lately? Here is a look at the value added to the U.S. economy by the digital sector from 2005-2021. That’s $2.4 TRILLION (with a T) added in 2021. These are astonishing numbers.
FACT: According to the BEA, in 2021, “the U.S. digital economy accounted for $3.70 trillion of gross output, $2.41 trillion of value added (translating to 10.3 % of U.S. GDP), $1.24 trillion of compensation + 8.0 million jobs.”
In 2021…
$3.70 trillion of gross output
$2.41 trillion of value added (=10.3% percent GDP)
$1.24 trillion of compensation
8.0 million jobs
FACT: globally, 49 of the top 100 digital tech firms with most employees are US companies. Here they are. Smart public policy made this list possible.
FACT: 18 of the world’s Top 25 tech companies by Market Cap are US-based firms.
It’d be a huge mistake to adopt Europe’s approach to tech regulation. As I noted recently in the Wall Street Journal, “The only thing Europe exports now on the digital-technology front is regulation.” Yet, Biden would have us import the EU model to our shores.
My R Street colleague Josh Withrow has also noted how, “the EU’s approach appears to be, in sum, ‘If you can’t innovate, regulate.’” America should not be following the disastrous regulatory path of the European Union on digital technology policy.
On antitrust regulation, here is a study by my R Street colleague Wayne Brough on the dangerous approach that the Biden administration wants, which would swing a wrecking ball through the tech economy. We have to avoid this.
It is particularly important that the US not follow the EU’s lead on artificial intelligence regulation at a time when we are in heated competition w China on the AI front as I noted here.
American tech innovators flourished thanks to a positive innovation culture rooted in permissionless innovation & policies like Section 230, which allowed American firms to become global powerhouses. And we’ve moved from a world of information scarcity to one of information abundance. Let’s keep it that way.
“The only thing Europe exports now on the digital-technology front is regulation,” I noted in my response, and that makes it all the more mind-boggling that Biden and Barr want to go down that same path. “[T]he EU’s big-government regulatory crusade against digital tech: Stagnant markets, limited innovation and a dearth of major players. Overregulation by EU bureaucrats led Europe’s best entrepreneurs and investors to flee to the U.S. or elsewhere in search of the freedom to innovate.”
Thus, the Biden and Barr plans for importing European-style tech mandates, “would be a stake through the heart of the ‘permissionless innovation’ that made America’s info-tech economy a global powerhouse.” In a longer response to the Biden oped that I published on the R Street blog, I note that:
“It is remarkable to think that after years of everyone complaining about the lack of bipartisanship in Washington, we might get the one type of bipartisanship America absolutely does not need: the single most destructive technological suicide in U.S. history, with mandates being substituted for markets, and permission slips for entrepreneurial freedom.”
What makes all this even more remarkable is that they calls for hyper-regulation come at a time when China is challenging America’s dominance in technology and AI. Thus, “new mandates could compromise America’s lead,” I conclude. “Shackling our tech sectors with regulatory chains will hobble our nation’s ability to meet global competition and undermine innovation and consumer choice domestically.”
I spent much of 2022 writing about the growing policy debate over artificial intelligence, machine learning, robotics, and the Computational Revolution more generally. Here are some of the major highlights of my work on this front.
POLICY DEFAULTS: “The Proper Governance Default for AI” – Which policy default should we choose for algorithmic technologies: The Precautionary Principle or The Proactionary Principle? This is the single most important issue in AI policy today.
Everywhere you look in tech policy land these days, people decry China as a threat to America’s technological supremacy or our national security. Many of these claims are well-founded, while others are somewhat overblown. Regardless, as I argue in a new piece for National Review this week, “America Won’t Beat China by Becoming China.” Many pundits and policymakers seem to think that only a massive dose of central planning and Big Government technocratic bureaucracy can counter the Chinese threat. It’s a recipe for a great deal of policy mischief.
Some of these advocates for a ‘let’s-be-more-like-China’ approach to tech policy also engage in revisionist histories about America’s recent success stories in the personal computing revolution and internet revolution. As I note in my essay, “[t]he revisionists instead prefer to believe that someone high up in government was carefully guiding this decentralized innovation. In the new telling of this story, deregulation had almost nothing to do with it.” In fact, I was asked by National Review to write this piece in response to a recent essay by Wells King of American Compass, who has penned some rather remarkable revisionist tales of government basically being responsible for all the innovation in digital tech sectors over the past quarter century. Markets and venture capital had nothing to do with it by his reasoning. It’s what Science writer Matt Ridley correctly labels “innovation creationism,” or the notion that it basically takes a village to raise an innovator. Continue reading →
Over at Discourse magazine this week, my R Street colleague Jonathan Cannon and I have posted a new essay on how it has been “Quite a Fall for Digital Tech.” We mean that both in the sense that the last few months have witnessed serious market turmoil for some of America’s leading tech companies, but also that the political situation for digital tech more generally has become perilous. Plenty of people on the Left and the Right now want a pound of flesh from the info-tech sector, and the starting cut at the body involves Section 230, the 1996 law that shields digital platforms from liability for content posted by third parties.
With the Supreme Court recently announcing it will hear Gonzalez v. Google, a case that could significantly narrow the scope of Section 230, the stakes have grown higher. It was already the case that federal and state lawmakers were looking to chip away at Sec. 230’s protections through an endless variety of regulatory measures. But if the Court guts Sec. 230 in Gonzalez, then it will really be open season on tech companies, as lawsuits will fly at every juncture whenever someone does not like a particular content moderation decision. Cannon and I note in our new essay that, Continue reading →
I have a new oped in the Orange County Register discussing reforms that can help address the growing problem of “zombie government,” or old government policies and programs that just seem to never die even thought they have long outlived their usefulness. While there is no single solution to this sort of “set-it-and-forget-it” approach to government that locks in old policies and programs, but I note that:
sunsets and sandboxes are two policy innovations that can help liberate California from old and cumbersome government regulations and rules. Sunsets pause or end rules or programs regularly to ensure they don’t grow stale. Sandboxes are policy experiments that allow for the temporary relaxation of regulations to see what approaches might work better.
When California, other states, and the federal government fail to occasional do spring cleanings of unneeded old rules and programs, it creates chronic regulatory accumulation that has real costs and consequences for the efficient operation of markets and important government programs.
My colleague Wayne Brough and I recently went on the “Kibbe on Liberty” show to discuss how to discuss the state of free speech on the internet. We explained how censorship is a Big Government problem, not a Big Tech problem. Here’s the complete description of the show and the link to the full episode is below.
“With Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter, we are in the middle of a national debate about the tension between censorship and free expression online. On the Right, many people are calling for government to rein in what they perceive as the excesses of Big Tech companies, while the Left wants the government to crack down on speech they deem dangerous. Both approaches make the same mistake of giving politicians authority over what we are allowed to say and hear. And with recent revelations about government agents leaning on social media companies to censor speech, it’s clear that when it comes to the online conversation, there’s no such thing as a purely private company.”
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