Telecom & Cable Regulation

Cecilia Kang of the Washington Post reports that

the telecom industry is forcing policymakers to re-examine what has long been a basic guarantee of government – that every American home should have access to a phone, along with other utilities such as water or electricity.

Industry executives and state lawmakers who support this effort want to expand the definition of the phone utility beyond the century-old icon of the American home to include Web-based devices or mobile phones.

The quid pro quo for a monopoly franchise was an obligation to provide timely service upon reasonable request to anyone, subject to regulated rates, terms and conditions.  The Telecommunications Act of 1996 eliminated the monopoly franchise, but the obligation to serve remains in the statute books of most states.  Telecom providers, aka carriers-of-last-resort (COLR), are stuck with the quid without the quo.

This has become a problem as more and more consumers are “cutting the cord” in favor of wireless or VoIP services.  AT&T, for example, has lost nearly half of its consumer switched access lines since the end of 2006.  However, most of the loops, switches, cables and other infrastructure which comprise the telephone network must be maintained if telecom providers have to furnish telephone service to anyone who wants it within days. Continue reading →

Unshackling a market from obsolete, protectionist regulations can be a very challenging undertaking, especially when the lifeblood of a regulated industry is at stake. The latest push for regulatory reform to encounter the murky waters of modernization is the “Next Generation Television Marketplace Act.” The ambitious and comprehensive bill, introduced by Rep. Steve Scalise and Sen. Jim DeMint in their respective chambers of Congress, aims to free up the broadcast television market. The federal government’s hands have been all over this market since its inception, overseen primarily by the FCC, pursuant to the Communications Act.

The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act (“DeMint/Scalise”) is a bold and laudable bill that would, on the whole, substantially free up America’s television marketplace. But one aspect of the bill—its abolition of the retransmission consent regime—has sparked a vigorous debate among free marketers. This essay will explain what this debate is all about and why policymakers should think twice before getting rid of retransmission consent.

Toward a Free Market in Television

The DeMint/Scalise bill takes an axe to many of the myriad rules that stand in the way of a free market in television programming. As Co-Liberator Adam Thierer recently explained on these pages, the bill’s many provisions would among other things get rid of the compulsory licensing provisions in the Copyright Act that empower government to set the rates cable and satellite (“pay-TV”) providers must pay to retransmit distant broadcast signals. It would eliminate the “network non-duplication” rule, which generally bars pay-TV providers from carrying out-of-market signals that offer the same programs as local broadcasters. The bill would also end the “must-carry” rule that forces pay-TV providers to retransmit certain local broadcast signals without receiving any compensation.

These are just a few of the many provisions of the DeMint/Scalise bill that would substantially reform the Communications and Copyright Acts to foster a free video marketplace and bring television regulation into the 21st century. (For a more in-depth assessment of the positive aspects of the DeMint/Scalise proposal, see Adam’s informative Forbes.com essay, Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming; Randy May’s superb Free State Foundation Perspectives essay, Broadcast Retransmission Negotiations and Free Markets;” and Bruce Owen’s FSF essay, The FCC and the Unfree Market for TV Program Rights.)

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Imagine the following scenario. The government passes a law that includes regulations governing “transactional consent” for retail commerce. These regulations stipulate how buyers and sellers of various goods shall do business. Some of the rules give the sellers special rights to demand that the stores carry some of their goods as well as rules stipulating that stores not carry the goods of competing sellers from other markets. On the flip side, other preexisting rules give buyers the right to demand that certain sellers deal their goods to them at regulated rates.

Now, it’s true that a contractual negotiation takes place in this “marketplace” governed by “transactional consent” regulations, but does this sound like a truly free market to you? Most of us would say No.

Regrettably, that’s the essential error that the American Conservative Union (ACU) makes in a letter they sent to members of Congress this week in which they made the case against H.R. 3675 and S. 2008, “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act.” That bill, which is sponsored by Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) and Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), represents a comprehensive attempt to deregulate America’s heavily regulated video marketplace. In a recent Forbes oped, I argued that the DeMint-Scalise effort would take us “Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming” by eliminating a litany of archaic media regulations that should have never been on the books to begin with. The measure would:

  • eliminate: “retransmission consent” regulations (rules governing contractual negotiations for content);
  • end “must carry” mandates (the requirement that video distributors carry broadcast signals even if they don’t want to);
  • repeal “network non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity” regulations (rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with broadcasters outside their local communities);
  • end various media ownership regulations; and
  • end the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a “duty to deal” upon content owners to the benefit of video distributors.

Despite these clearly deregulatory provisions, in its letter to Capitol Hill, the ACU argues that the DeMint-Scalise bill would somehow interfere with what they regard as a free market in video programming. The ACU writes: Continue reading →

Yesterday, the International Center for Law and Economics and TechFreedom jointly filed comments [pdf] with the FCC on the Verizon SpectrumCo deal.  In the comments, ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom President Berin Szoka counter the primary arguments against the deal:

Critics lament the concentration of spectrum in the hands of one of the industry’s biggest players, but the assumption that concentration will harm to consumers is unsupported and misplaced.  Concentration of spectrum has not slowed the growth of the market; rather, the problem is that growth in demand has dramatically outpaced capacity.  What’s more: prices have plummeted even as the industry has become more concentrated.

While the FCC undeniably has authority to review the license transfers, the argument that the separate but related commercial agreements would reduce competition is properly the province of the Department of Justice.  That argument is best measured under the antitrust laws, not by the FCC under its vague “public interest” standard.  Indeed, if the FCC can assert jurisdiction over the commercial agreements as part of its public interest review, its authority over license transfers will become a license to regulate all aspects of business.  This is a recipe for certain mischief.

The need for all competitors, including Verizon, to obtain sufficient spectrum to meet increasing demand demonstrates that the deal is in the public interest and should be approved.

The DOJ’s recent press release on the Google/Motorola, Rockstar Bidco, and Apple/ Novell transactions struck me as a bit odd when I read it.  As I’ve now had a bit of time to digest it, I’ve grown to really dislike it.  For those who have not followed Jorge Contreras had an excellent summary of events at Patently-O.

For those of us who have been following the telecom patent battles, something remarkable happened a couple of weeks ago.  On February 7, the Wall St. Journal reported that, back in November, Apple sent a letter[1] to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) setting forth Apple’s position regarding its commitment to license patents essential to ETSI standards.  In particular, Apple’s letter clarified its interpretation of the so-called “FRAND” (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms that ETSI participants are required to use when licensing standards-essential patents.  As one might imagine, the actual scope and contours of FRAND licenses have puzzled lawyers, regulators and courts for years, and past efforts at clarification have never been very successful.  The next day, on February 8, Google released a letter[2] that it sent to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), ETSI and several other standards organizations.  Like Apple, Google sought to clarify its position on FRAND licensing.  And just hours after Google’s announcement, Microsoft posted a statement of “Support for Industry Standards”[3] on its web site, laying out its own gloss on FRAND licensing.  For those who were left wondering what instigated this flurry of corporate “clarification”, the answer arrived a few days later when, on February 13, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released its decision[4] to close the investigation of three significant patent-based transactions:  the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, the acquisition of a large patent portfolio formerly held by Nortel Networks by “Rockstar Bidco” (a group including Microsoft, Apple, RIM and others), and the acquisition by Apple of certain Linux-related patents formerly held by Novell.  In its decision, the DOJ noted with approval the public statements by Apple and Microsoft, while expressing some concern with Google’s FRAND approach.  The European Commission approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility on the same day.
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Congress freed up much-needed electromagnetic spectrum for mobile communications services Friday (H.R. 3630), but it set the stage for years of wasteful lobbying and litigating over whether regulators should be allowed to pick winners and losers among mobile service providers.

The wireless industry has thrived in the near absence of any regulation since 1993.  But lately the Federal Communications Commission has been hard at work attempting to change that.

A leaked staff report in December helped sink AT&T’s attempted acquisition of T-Mobile.  And the commission has taken the extraordinary step of requesting public comments on an agreement between Comcast and Verizon Wireless to jointly market their respective cable TV, voice and Internet services, beginning in Portland and Seattle.  Nothing in the Communications Act prohibits cable operators and mobile phone service providers from jointly marketing their products.

FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski objected to a previous version of the spectrum bill which, among other things, would have prohibited the commission from manipulating spectrum auctions for the benefit of preferred entities.  The limitation was removed, and Sec. 6404 provides that nothing in the legislation “affects any authority the Commission has to adopt and enforce rules of general applicability, including rules concerning spectrum aggregation that promote competition.

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After three years of politicking, it now looks like Congress may actually give the FCC authority to conduct incentive auctions for mobile spectrum, and soon.  That, at least, is what the FCC seems to think.

At CES last week, FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski largely repeated the speech he has now given three years in a row.  But there was a subtle twist this time, one echoed by comments from Wireless Bureau Chief Rick Kaplan at a separate panel.

Instead of simply warning of a spectrum crunch and touting the benefits of the incentive auction idea, the Chairman took aim at a House Republican bill that would authorize the auctions but limit the agency’s “flexibility” in designing and conducting them. “My message on incentive auctions today is simple,” he said, “we need to get it done now, and we need to get it done right.” Continue reading →

[Cross posted at TechFreedom.org]

It’s hard to believe TechFreedom launched just last January. As we begin 2012, let me share with you the mantra that continues to guide our work: “Technology expands the capacity to choose; and it denies the potential of this revolution if we assume the Government is best positioned to make these choices for us.”

That’s how Justice Kennedy explained the Supreme Court’s 2000 decision to strike down cable television censorship: better that parents choose for themselves what media are appropriate for their children. In short, as technology empowers, regulation should recede.

But except where courts impose this standard, the presumption in most tech policy debates is just the opposite: only government can protect us. In 1999, Larry Lessig predicted that “Cyberspace, left to itself, will not fulfill the promise of freedom. It will become a perfect tool of control.”  That pessimism shapes how most advocates, commentators, regulators, lawmakers, and even judges think about tech policy.

It’s a seductive idea: If only the right policy “levers” can be pulled, in the right way, at the right time, perhaps cyberspace can come closer to fulfilling that “promise of freedom.” Give me a lever large enough, some regulators seem to think, and I’ll free the world!

We’re skeptical—not of their motives, but of their ability to plan a free and thriving Internet.  Just as Hayek said about the “curious task” of economics, we aim “to demonstrate to men how little they really know about what they imagine they can design.” Will those policy levers really do what those pulling them think?  What else will they do? Will cyberspace really turn out better than if it had been left to itself?

This isn’t an merely an argument for self-regulation, but for the broader, more complex process by which market forces check corporate power.   Continue reading →

Today, AT&T announced they had abandoned their planned acquisition of T-Mobile after the DOJ sued to block the deal and the FCC published a report sharply critical of the deal. The following statement can be attributed to TechFreedom Fellows Larry Downes, Geoffrey Manne and Berin Szoka:

Nearly two years ago, the Obama FCC declared a spectrum crisis. But Congress has refused to authorize the agency to reallocate underused spectrum from television broadcasters and government agencies—which would take years anyway.

The AT&T/T-Mobile merger would have eased this crisis and accelerated the deployment of next-generation 4G networks. The government killed the deal based on formalistic and outdated measures of market concentration—even though the FCC’s own data show dynamic competition, falling prices, and new entry. The disconnect is jarring.

Those celebrating the deal’s collapse will wake up to a sober reality: There is no Plan B for more spectrum. All the hand-wringing about “preserving” competition has only denied consumers a strong 4G LTE competitor to compete with Verizon—and slammed the brakes on continued growth of the mobile marketplace.

Unfortunately, this is just part of a broader pattern of regulators attempting to engineer technology markets they don’t understand. The letter sent today by the Senate Antitrust Subcommittee urging the Department of Justice to investigate Google’s business practices relies on similar contortions of market definition to conclude that the search market is not competitive. In both cases, regulators are applying 1960s economics to 21st century markets.

Ultimately, it’s consumers who will lose from such central planning.

The FCC’s universal service tax is officially out of control. The agency announced yesterday that the “universal service contribution factor” for the 1st quarter of 2012 will go up to 17.9%.  This “contribution factor” is a tax imposed on telecom companies that is adjusted on a quarterly basis to accommodate universal service programs. The FCC doesn’t like people calling it a tax, but that’s exactly what it is. And it just keeps growing and growing. In fact, as the chart below reveals, it has been exploding in recent years. It was in single digits just a few years ago but is now heading toward 20%. And not only is this tax growing more burdensome, but it is completely unsustainable. As the taxable base (traditional interstate telephony) is eroded by new means of communicating, the tax rate will have to grow exponentially or the base will have to be broadened to cover new technologies and services. We should have junked the current carrier-delivered universal service subsidy system years ago and gone with a straight-forward voucher system. A means-tested voucher could have targeted assistance to those who needed it without creating an inefficient, unsustainable hidden tax like we have now. For all the ugly details, I recommend reading all of Jerry Ellig’s research on the issue.