Miscellaneous

[Cross posted at Truthonthemarket]

Basic economic theory underlies the conventional antitrust wisdom that if a merger makes the merging party a more effective competitor by lowering its costs, rivals facing this more effective competitor post-merger are made worse off, but consumers benefit. On the other hand, if a merger is likely to result in collusion or a unilateral price increase, the rival firm is made better off while consumers suffer. In the latter case — the one the DOJ complaint asserts we are experiencing with respect to the proposed AT&T merger — marketwide coordination or reduction of competition resulting in higher prices makes the non-merging rival better off.

Basic economic theory thus generates a set of clear testable implications for the DOJ’s theory of the transaction:

  1. events that the merger more likely should have a negative impact upon non-merging rivals’ stock prices when the merger is procompetitive (reflecting the likelihood the firm will face a more efficient, lower-cost rival in the future);
  2. events that make a merger less likely should have a positive impact upon non-merging rivals’ stock prices when the merger is procompetitive (reflecting the reduced likelihood that the merger will face the more efficient competitor in the future)
  3. by similar economic logic, events that make an anticompetitive merger more likely to occur should result in increase non-merging rivals’ stock prices (who will benefit from higher market prices) while events that make an anticompetitive merger less likely should decrease non-merging rivals’ stock prices.

The DOJ complaint clearly stakes out its position that the merger will be anticompetitive, and result in higher market prices. Paragraph 36 of the DOJ’s complaint focuses upon potential post-merger coordination:

The substantial increase in concentration that would result from this merger, and the reduction in the number of nationwide providers from four to three, likely will lead to lessened competition due to an enhanced risk of anticompetitive coordination. … Any anti competitive coordination at a national level would result in higher nationwide prices (or other nationwide harm) by the remaining national providers, Verizon, Sprint, and the merged entity. Such harm would affect consumers all across the nation, including those in rural areas with limited T-Mobile presence.

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TLF Turns 7

by on August 15, 2011 · 0 comments

The Technology Liberation Front (TLF) turned 7 yesterday. We got underway on Aug 14, 2004 with this post. For more of the backstory of how things got started, see this post upon the occasion of our 5th anniversary. We’re now up to 5,800+ posts and we’ve received almost 34,400 comments on those entries.

The goal of the TLF was to bring together liberty-loving technology policy analysts who were concerned about rising calls for government control of the Internet, digital technologies, and media and communications platforms. While we’ve slowed down a bit here in recent years, I’m quite proud of what we’ve done over the years to advance that vision and want to I thank everyone involved in the effort and all those readers who found it worth their time to stop by.

We’ll keep fighting the good fight for technology and information freedom!

I’m no grammar Nazi. In fact, I’m closer to being a grammar anarchist. I’ve been fighting teachers and editors for years about split infinitives (they rock!), contractions (fine in small doses), and run-on sentence (OK, they are probably right about that one, but I just can’t control myself).  Nonetheless, it makes sense to have some basic ground rules for grammar and good writing. Sometimes, however, those rules just can’t be found.

I raise this issue because I’m finishing up my next book and I find myself struggling with the proper hyphenation and capitalization of various Internet terms. After much consultation with the Mercatus Center’s grammar czar Jennifer Zambone, I think I have finally grown comfortable with two rules I have long ignored (or just been horribly schizophrenic about using consistently) in my past writing. They are: Continue reading →

A couple days before Congress announced a debt deal, half a dozen telecommunications companies filed a plan on July 29 with the Federal Communications Commission that attempts to resolve a much longer-running set of negotiations over big bucks.  The “America’s Broadband Connectivity” Plan seeks to replace Universal Service Fund subsidies for telephone service in rural areas with subsidies for broadband in rural areas.

Like the federal budget negotiations, the never-ending negotiations over USF get bogged down in arguments over distribution: who gets what.  Indeed, it’s almost exclusively an argument over which companies get what. But federal telecommunications policy is supposed to advance the overall public interest, not just haggle over what corporate interest gets what piece of my pie. Here is a quick take on the biggest strengths and weaknesses of the plan in terms of advancing overall consumer welfare. By “consumer welfare,” I mean not just the welfare of the folks receiving subsidized services, but also the welfare of the majority who are paying a 15 percent charge on interstate phone services to fund the USF.

BIGGEST STRENGTHS

Fixed-term commitment: Rural phone subsidies have become a perpetual entitlement with no definition of when the subsidies can end because the problem is considered solved.  The ABC plan proposes a 10-year commitment to rural broadband subsidies.  By 2022 the FCC should assess whether any further high-cost universal service program is needed. This idea remedies a significant deficiency in the current high-cost subsidy program, which doesn’t even have outcome goals or measures. (That’s why I like to sing the final verse from “And the Money Kept Rolling In” from Evita when I talk about universal service.  Free State Foundation President Randy May asked me for an encore of this at the end of the foundation’s July 13 program on universal service, available here.)

Intercarrier compensation: “Intercarrier compensation” refers to the per-minute charges communications companies pay when they hand off phone traffic to each other. The plan proposes to ramp down all intercarrier charges to a uniform rate of $0.0007/minute.  Economists who study telecommunications have pointed out for decades that high per-minute charges reduce consumer welfare by discouraging consumers from communicating as much as they otherwise would.  MIT economist Jerry Hausman, in a paper prepared for the filing, estimates that low, uniform intercarrier charges would increase consumer welfare by about  $9 billion annually.

Legacy obligations: Public utility regulation traditionally forced regulated companies to offer certain services or serve certain markets at a loss, then charge profitable customers higher prices to cover the losses. Judge Richard Posner referred to this opaque practice as “Taxation by Regulation“: the customers paying inflated prices get “taxed” to accomplish a public purpose, but they don’t know it.  Some of these obligations continue today as federal requirements applied to “Eligible Telecommunications Carriers” or state “Carrier of Last Resort” obligations.  The plan would remove these obligations for companies that are not receiving USF subsidies.

BIGGEST WEAKNESSES

Definition of broadband: The plan would continue to inflate the cost of rural broadband subsidies by defining “broadband” as 4 megabytes per second download and 768 kilobytes per second upload.  This means 3G wireless, satellite, and some wireless Internet service providers do not count as “broadband.” This decision more than doubles the number of households considered “unserved” and rules out some lower-cost technologies.  Jerry Brito and I have written extensively about both the economics and the legality of this.  Interestingly, the ABC coalition’s legal white paper arguing that the commission has legal authority to adopt the plan makes no effort to show that the commission has authority to subsidize 4 mbps broadband; it only shows the commission has authority to subsidize some form of broadband.

Alternative cost technology threshold: The plan includes an “alternative cost technology” threshold that allows substitution of satellite broadband for customers who would cost more than $256/month to serve.  Inclusion of a threshold is actually a strength. But the $256/month figure is way too high.  Satellite broadband with speeds of 1-2 mbps is now available for $60 – $110 per month.  Consumers who pay a 15 percent surcharge on their local phone bills to fund USF should not be expected to provide a subsidy of more than $200 per month.

Mobility: The plan appears to advocate subsidies for mobile broadband service in places where it is not currently available.  So now the rural entitlement expands to include not just basic broadband service in the home to stay connected, but also a mobile service that a lot of Americans don’t even buy unless their employers pay for it! I question whether mobile broadband satisfies the 1996 Telecommunications Act’s criteria for universal service subsidies, such as “essential” (not just nice) for education or public safety, or subscribed to by a “substantial majority” of households. These questions should be thoroughly examined before anyone receives subsidies for mobile broadband. At a minimum, households should be eligible for only one broadband subsidy — wireline or mobile — but not both.

 

 

Awesome.

[By Geoffrey Manne and Joshua Wright.  Cross-posted at TOTM]

Our search neutrality paper has received some recent attention.  While the initial response from Gordon Crovitz in the Wall Street Journal was favorablecritics are now voicing their responses.  Although we appreciate FairSearch’s attempt to engage with our paper’s central claims, its response is really little more than an extended non-sequitur and fails to contribute to the debate meaningfully.

Unfortunately, FairSearch grossly misstates our arguments and, in the process, basic principles of antitrust law and economics.  Accordingly, we offer a brief reply to correct a few of the most critical flaws, point out several quotes in our paper that FairSearch must have overlooked when they were characterizing our argument, and set straight FairSearch’s various economic and legal misunderstandings.

We want to begin by restating the simple claims that our paper does—and does not—make.

Our fundamental argument is that claims that search discrimination is anticompetitive are properly treated skeptically because:  (1) discrimination (that is, presenting or ranking a search engine’s own or affiliated content more prevalently than its rivals’ in response to search queries) arises from vertical integration in the search engine market (i.e., Google responds to a query by providing not only “10 blue links” but also perhaps a map or video created Google or previously organized on a Google-affiliated site (YouTube, e.g.)); (2) both economic theory and evidence demonstrate that such integration is generally pro-competitive; and (3) in Google’s particular market, evidence of intense competition and constant innovation abounds, while evidence of harm to consumers is entirely absent.  In other words, it is much more likely than not that search discrimination is pro-competitive rather than anticompetitive, and doctrinal error cost concerns accordingly counsel great hesitation in any antitrust intervention, administrative or judicial.  As we will discuss, these are claims that FairSearch’s lawyers are quite familiar with.

FairSearch, however, grossly mischaracterizes these basic points, asserting instead that we claim

“that even if Google does [manipulate its search results], this should be immune from antitrust enforcement due to the difficulty of identifying ‘bias’ and the risks of regulating benign conduct.”

This statement is either intentionally deceptive or betrays a shocking misunderstanding of our central claim for at least two reasons: (1) we never advocate for complete antitrust immunity, and (2) it trivializes the very real—and universally-accepted–difficulty of distinguishing between pro- and anticompetitive conduct.

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I have always struggled with the work of media theorist Marshall McLuhan. I find it to be equal parts confusing and compelling; it’s persuasive at times and then utterly perplexing elsewhere.  I just can’t wrap my head around him and yet I can’t stop coming back to him.

Today would have been his 100th birthday. He died in 1980, but he’s just as towering of a figure today as he was during his own lifetime. His work is eerily prescient and speaks to us as if written yesterday instead of decades ago. Take, for example, McLuhan’s mind-blowing 1969 interview with Playboy. [PDF] The verse is awe-inspiring, but much of the substance is simply impenetrable. Regardless, it serves as perhaps the best introduction to McLuhan’s work. I strongly encourage you to read the entire thing. The questions posed by interviewer Eric Norden are brilliant and bring out the best in McLuhan.

I was re-reading the interview while working on a chapter for my next book on Internet optimism and pessimism, a topic I’ve spent a great deal of time pondering here in the past. Toward the end of the interview, McLuhan is asked by Norden to respond to some of his critics. McLuhan responds in typically brilliant, colorful fashion: Continue reading →

FCC Commissioner Robert M. McDowell delivered a terrific speech this week on “Technology and the Sovereignty of the Individual” at a broadband conference in Stockholm, Sweden.  The speech serves as another reminder that McDowell is one of those ultimate rare birds: a regulator who is a first-rate intellectual thinker and a great champion of individual liberty. It’s a beautiful statement in defense of real Internet freedom. I can’t recall ever seeing another federal official cite the great Bruno Leoni in a speech!

Here’s a sample of what Commissioner McDowell had to say:

To propel freedom’s momentum, policy makers should remember that, since their inception, the Internet and mobile connectivity have migrated further away from government control.  As the result of longstanding international consensus, the Internet itself has become the greatest deregulatory success story of all time.  To continue to promote freedom and prosperity, regulators should continue to rely on the “bottom up” nongovernmental Internet governance bodies that have a perfect record of keeping the ’Net working and open.  We must heed the advice of leaders like Neelie Kroes, who has consistently called on regulators to “avoid over-hasty regulatory intervention,” and steer clear of “unnecessary measures which may hinder new efficient business models from emerging.” I couldn’t agree more.  Changing course now could not only trigger an avalanche of international regulation, but it could halt the progress of freedom’s march as well.

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Deets after the jump. Continue reading →

My expectations of the Electronic Frontier Foundation are high. It’s an organization that does a tremendous amount of good, advocating for rights to freely use new technologies. Alas, a blog post about how good EFF is would be as interesting as a newspaper story about the lack of house fires in Springfield. So I’ll share how I feel EFF has gone wobbly on Bitcoin.

Bitcoin, the very interesting distributed digital currency that is inflation-, surveillance-, and confiscation-resistant, has been getting a lot of attention. EFF announced yesterday, though, that it would reverse course and stop accepting donations denominated in Bitcoin.

Its justifications, laid out in a blessedly brief and well-organized blog post, were three: Continue reading →