Broadband & Neutrality Regulation

For CNET this morning, I write about the latest tempest in the AT&T/T-Mobile USA merger teapot: cellular backhaul or “special access” as its known in the industry.

Like a child sitting on Santa’s lap at the mall, Sprint CEO Dan Hesse included backhaul in his wish list of conditions he’d like to see attached to the deal.  Yesterday, Public Knowledge duly confirmed that yes, backhaul is a “multiplier” problem for the deal.

(Sprint says they would like the deal blocked, but that is mere posturing.  What they really want is to use the FCC’s bloated and unprincipled merger review process to sneak in as many private concessions for themselves as they can get.   And who can blame them for trying?  More on that in a moment.)

For those who don’t know, backhaul is the process of moving cellular traffic (voice and data) to other high-speed networks (traditionally landline copper but now including cable, fiber, microwave and local Ethernet) to transport them to their ultimate destination.  As mobile use increases, of course, the necessity of reliable, high-speed backhaul to keep overall performance up becomes more critical than ever.

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For Forbes.com this morning, I take a close look at last month’s controversial FCC order requiring facilities-based wireless carriers to negotiate data roaming agreements with other carriers.

There are business, technical, and legal reasons why the order stands on unsteady ground, which the article looks at in detail.

The order, by encouraging artificial competition in nationwide mobile broadband, could also undermine arguments against AT&T’s merger with T-Mobile USA.

How so?  If every regional, local, or rural carrier can offer their customers access to the nationwide coverage of Verizon, AT&T, or Sprint, on terms overseen for “commercial reasonableness” by the FCC, what’s the risk of consumer harm from combining AT&T and T-Mobile’s infrastructure?  Indeed, doing so would create stronger nationwide 3G and 4G networks for other carriers to use.  In that sense, it’s actually pro-competitive, and a pragmatic solution to spectrum exhaustion. Continue reading →

Melissa Yu is the winner of first prize in the middle school category of C-SPAN’s StudentCam 2011 competition. Her video, “Net Neutrality: The Federal Government’s Role in Our Online Community,” is an eight-minute look at the push for regulation of Internet service with an emphasis appropriate for students on how the three branches of government have each been involved in the story up to now.

Many TLF readers already know the story and the key players, but if you haven’t been following along, or if you want a refresher, here’s a better video than I could have produced in eighth grade. Or now. Congratulations, Melissa Yu!

Like Milton, I’m very worried about the political vulnerabilities that might arise if the wireless sector grows more concentrated. Still, I think it’s a big mistake to legitimize one repressive incarnation of coercive state power (antitrust intervention) to reduce the likelihood that another incarnation (information control) will intensify. This approach is not only defeatist, as Hance argues, but it also requires a tactical assessment that rests on several dubious assumptions.

First, Milton overestimates the marginal risk that the AT&T – T-Mobile deal will pave the way for an information control regime. The wireless market isn’t static; the disappearance of T-Mobile as an independent entity (which may well occur regardless of whether this deal goes through) hardly means we’re forever “doomed” to live with 3 nationwide wireless players. With major spectrum auctions likely on the horizon, and the possibility of existing spectrum holdings being combined in creative ways, the eventual emergence of one or more nationwide wireless competitors is quite possible — especially if, as skeptics of the AT&T – T-Mobile deal often argue, the wireless market underperforms in the years following the acquisition.

More importantly, network operators, like almost all Internet gatekeepers, face mounting pressure from their users not to facilitate censorship, surveillance, and repression. Case in point: AT&T is a leading member of the Digital Due Process coalition (to which I also belong) that’s urging Congress to substantially strengthen the 1986 federal statute that governs law enforcement access to private electronic communications. Consider that AT&T’s position on this major issue is officially at odds with the official position of the same Justice Department that’s currently reviewing the AT&T – T-Mobile deal. Would a docile, subservient network operator challenge its state overseers so publicly?

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I’m gratified that my recent writing on the Bitcoin virtual currency project has stirred much conversation and I thought I’d take a moment to continue that conversation.

Tim Lee has written two posts critiquing the viability of Bitcoin from the supply and demand side. Dan Rothschild has responded in part. Tyler Cower also weighed in.

To address Tim I’ll simply say this: Do I think Bitcoin will replace the dollar? No. Might Bitcoin have certain systemic design flaws that might impede its success? Quite possibly. Will Bitcoin become the de facto, manipulation-proof currency of the internet? Who knows. Tim’s posts are a somewhat technical critique of Bitcoin’s long-term feasibility. It’s a great contribution, but since I’m neither a gold bug nor a Bitcoin booster per se, I don’t find it especially interesting.

That all said, what I do think is revolutionary about Bitcoin is that its developers have solved, without the use of a middleman, the double-spending problem faced by virtual currencies. That gives us license to realistically imagine a world without regulable financial intermediaries online.

While Tim overlooks what makes Bitcoin radical, Tom Sydnor groks it viscerally. Writing in a lengthy comment on my post, Tom expresses dismay at what Bitcoin represents and offers what I would, with apologies, characterize as the cyber-conservative response. Continue reading →

On Forbes this morning, I analyze the legislative and judicial challenges to last year’s FCC Open Internet rules, the so-called net neutrality order.

Despite the urgency of Friday’s budget machinations, the House took time out to pass House Joint Resolution 37, which “disapproves” the FCC’s December rulemaking.  If passed by the Senate and not vetoed by President Obama, HJR 37 would effectively nullify the net neutrality rules, and ensure the FCC cannot pass alternate versions of them absent new authority to do so from Congress.

Most commentators believe that the House action was merely symbolic.  Passage in the Senate requires only a simple majority, but the neutrality fight has turned violently partisan since the mid-term elections and getting a few Democratic Senators on-board may be hard.  More to the point, the White House last week pre-emptively threatened to veto the resolution.

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says Nick Schulz, in partial answer to the question why regulators want to control telecom and wireless even though those sectors currently enjoy “rising customer satisfaction, falling prices, enviable investment levels, and greater innovation—even during the Great Recession.”

[Cross-posted at Truthonthemarket.com]

There is an antitrust debate brewing concerning Google and “search bias,” a term used to describe search engine results that preference the content of the search provider.  For example, Google might list Google Maps prominently if one searches “maps” or Microsoft’s Bing might prominently place Microsoft affiliated content or products.

Apparently both antitrust investigations and Congressional hearings are in the works; regulators and commentators appear poised to attempt to impose “search neutrality” through antitrust or other regulatory means to limit or prohibit the ability of search engines (or perhaps just Google) to favor their own content.  At least one proposal goes so far as to advocate a new government agency to regulate search.  Of course, when I read proposals like this, I wonder where Google’s share of the “search market” will be by the time the new agency is built.

As with the net neutrality debate, I understand some of the push for search neutrality involves an intense push to discard traditional economically-grounded antitrust framework.  The logic for this push is simple.  The economic literature on vertical restraints and vertical integration provides no support for ex ante regulation arising out of the concern that a vertically integrating firm will harm competition through favoring its own content and discriminating against rivals.  Economic theory suggests that such arrangements may be anticompetitive in some instances, but also provides a plethora of pro-competitive explanations.  Lafontaine & Slade explain the state of the evidence in their recent survey paper in the Journal of Economic Literature:

We are therefore somewhat surprised at what the weight of the evidence is telling us. It says that, under most circumstances, profit-maximizing vertical-integration decisions are efficient, not just from the firms’ but also from the consumers’ points of view. Although there are isolated studies that contradict this claim, the vast majority support it. Moreover, even in industries that are highly concentrated so that horizontal considerations assume substantial importance, the net effect of vertical integration appears to be positive in many instances. We therefore conclude that, faced with a vertical arrangement, the burden of evidence should be placed on competition authorities to demonstrate that that arrangement is harmful before the practice is attacked. Furthermore, we have found clear evidence that restrictions on vertical integration that are imposed, often by local authorities, on owners of retail networks are usually detrimental to consumers. Given the weight of the evidence, it behooves government agencies to reconsider the validity of such restrictions.

Of course, this does not bless all instances of vertical contracts or integration as pro-competitive.  The antitrust approach appropriately eschews ex ante regulation in favor of a fact-specific rule of reason analysis that requires plaintiffs to demonstrate competitive harm in a particular instance. Again, given the strength of the empirical evidence, it is no surprise that advocates of search neutrality, as net neutrality before it, either do not rely on consumer welfare arguments or are willing to sacrifice consumer welfare for other objectives.

I wish to focus on the antitrust arguments for a moment.  In an interview with the San Francisco Gate, Harvard’s Ben Edelman sketches out an antitrust claim against Google based upon search bias; and to his credit, Edelman provides some evidence in support of his claim.

I’m not convinced.  Edelman’s interpretation of evidence of search bias is detached from antitrust economics.  The evidence is all about identifying whether or not there is bias.  That, however, is not the relevant antitrust inquiry; instead, the question is whether such vertical arrangements, including preferential treatment of one’s own downstream products, are generally procompetitive or anticompetitive.  Examples from other contexts illustrate this point.

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Here are some quick thoughts on the proposed AT&T – T-Mobile merger, mostly borrowed from my previous writing on the wireless marketplace. First, however, I highly recommend this excellent analysis of the issue by Larry Downes, which cuts through the hysteria we’re already hearing and offers a sober look at the issues at stake here.  Anyway, here are a few of my random thoughts on the deal:

* The deal will likely be approved: First, to cut to the chase.. After much wrangling, the deal will probably be approved primarily because of two factors, both of which help political officials as much as AT&T: (1) The deal delivers upon the National Broadband Plan promise of getting the country blanketed with wireless broadband; and (2) it “brings home” T-Mobile by giving an American company control of a German-held interest. As Larry Dignan of ZNet says, it is tantamount to “playing the patriotism card.”

* One reason it might not be approved: Some Administration critics, especially from the more liberal part of the Democratic base, could make this a litmus test for Obama administration’s antitrust enforcement efforts. In the wake of the Comcast merger approval — albeit after several pounds of flesh were handed over “voluntarily” to get the deal approved — some of the Administration’s base will be looking for blood. I remember how the Powell FCC was under real heat to “get tough” on mergers back in 2001-02 and during that time blocked the proposed DirecTV-EchoStar deal, possibly as a result of the pressure. The same thing could happen to AT&T – T-Mobile here.

* It’s all about spectrum: From AT&T’s perspective, this deal is all about getting more high-quality spectrum, which is in increasingly short supply. Indeed, as Jerry Brito noted earlier, this merger should serve as another wake-up call regarding the need to get spectrum reform going again to ensure that existing players can reallocate their spectrum to those who demand it most. (Hint: Incentivize the TV broadcasters to sell... NOW!) But, in the short-term, this deal helps AT&T built out a more robust nationwide wireless network. Over the long-haul, that should help T-Mobile deliver better service to its customers. Continue reading →

Twitter could be in for a world of potential pain. Regulatory pain, that is. The company’s announcement on Friday that it would soon be cracking down on the uses of its API by third parties is raising eyebrows in cyberspace and, if recent regulatory history is any indicator, this high-tech innovator could soon face some heat from regulatory advocates and public policy makers. If this thing goes down as I describe it below, it will be one hell of a fight that once again features warring conceptions of “Internet freedom” butting heads over the question of whether Twitter should be forced to share its API with rivals via some sort of “open access” regulatory regime or “API neutrality,” in particular. I’ll explore that possibility in this essay. First, a bit of background.

Understanding Forced Access Regulation

In the field of communications law, the dominant public policy fight of the past 15 years has been the battle over “open access” and “neutrality” regulation. Generally speaking, open access regulations demand that a company share its property (networks, systems, devices, or code) with rivals on terms established by law. Neutrality regulation is a variant of open access regulation, which also requires that systems be used in ways specified by law, but usually without the physical sharing requirements. Both forms of regulation derive from traditional common carriage principles / regulatory regimes. Critics of such regulation, which would most definitely include me, decry the inefficiencies associated with such “forced access” regimes, as we prefer to label them. Forced access regulation also raises certain constitutional issues related to First and Fifth Amendment rights of speech and property. Continue reading →