Antitrust & Competition Policy

Just when you thought the FCC’s investigation of the wireless industry couldn’t get any stranger, TechCrunch reports that the Commission has sent letters to AT&T, Apple, and Google inquiring about Apple’s recent decision to reject the Google Voice app from the iPhone App Store (as Berin discussed yesterday).google-voice-iphone-app-rejected-by-apple

It’s been over two years since the original iPhone was launched, but it seems the FCC still doesn’t get it: the iPhone is very clearly a closed platform — a prototypical walled garden — and Apple has the final say on what applications users can install. When you buy an iPhone, you’re not simply buying a piece of hardware, but actually a package deal that includes software, hardware, and a wireless contract. Is this anti-consumer? 26 million consumers don’t think so. The iPhone 3GS, the latest version of the phone, is selling so fast that Apple’s CFO says they can’t make enough to meet demand!

Of course, the iPhone model isn’t for everyone. I, for one, don’t own one because I’m an obsessive tinkerer and prefer a phone that’s as open as possible. But not everyone shares my preferences. As mentioned above, over 26 million iPhones have been sold since June 2007, so openness clearly isn’t make-or-break for a lot of consumers. Who knows, maybe some people actually trust Apple and like the comfort of knowing that every app they can get comes with a seal of approval from Cupertino.

The FCC’s letter to Apple demands an explanation for why Google Voice was rejected. If Apple’s explanation doesn’t satisfy the FCC’s criteria — which, by the way, are entirely unclear — then what? Will the FCC force Apple to accept Google Voice? Say what you will about Apple’s app store track record, but the prospect of federal regulators having the final word on which applications smartphone owners can install hardly seems pro-consumer. The FCC can’t even figure out how to run its own website!

In some ways, the iPhone has perhaps been too successful for its own good. It’s so popular that many consumers seem to no longer view it as just another product but instead as an item to which they are entitled. Thus, bureaucrats and Congresscritters in search of political points are making a big fuss over the fact that the iPhone isn’t everything to everyone. Why can’t it be wide open? Why isn’t in available on every carrier nationwide? Why is it so expensive to purchase without a service contract?

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The iPhone-obsessed blogosphere is atwitter about the Apple”s exclusion of the Google voice application from the iPhone app store. On Friday, the FCC sent letters of inquiry to the two companies as well as AT&T.

Whatever one thinks about whether Apple and AT&T should be able to operate their own networks as they see fit, this cat-fight should at least demonstrate the pointlessness of the investigation opened by the FTC in May as to whether Apple and Google are violating the antitrust laws by having two members of their boards of directors in common: Google CEO Eric Schmidt and former Genentech CEO Art Levinson. If the two companies were, in fact, trying to collude in an anti-competitive manner, they don’t seem to be doing a very good job of it!

Meanwhile, if you don’t like how Apple runs its app store, don’t get an iPhone! If you already have one, you could follow the lead of TechCrunch’s Michael Arrington and simply cancel your existing iPhone contract to get a more “open” phone—such as one powered by Google’s Android operating system.

Me, I’m just waiting for Google Voice to offer number portability so I can start using the service without having to change the number I’ve had for the last five years—and plan to take to my ashen grave (somewhere beyond low Earth orbit).

Nick Wingfield has a great piece in today’s WSJ: Yahoo Tie-Up Is Latest Sign Tide Turning for Microsoft’s Ballmer (subscription required but can be found through a Google News search) about how Microsoft’s fortunes may be looking up across the board—especially with yesterday’s Yahoo!/Microsoft search/advertising partnership. The most interesting passage is this one:

For [Microsoft CEO Steve] Ballmer, the agreement provides some redemption in an area he has stressed is critical to Microsoft’s future. In an interview, he says the Yahoo deal received “more of my personal attention over the last 18 months than anything else we’re involved with,” including focusing on its most important new product in years, Windows 7. “It’s a big deal,” he says.

Of course, complex partnerships always require lots of time from senior management, but in this case, Ballmer’s quip speaks directly to the costs of antitrust scrutiny in terms of one of the most valuable resources available to any company: the time and attention of senior management. The “attentional cost” can of this deal for Microsoft could be broken into four parts beyond the normal costs of structuring any deal to make the most business sense:

  1. How to structure the a Microsoft/Yahoo! deal so that it would be approved by regulators (defensive);
  2. How to block a Google/Yahoo! deal (offensive);
  3. Nursing the deal through the regulatory approval process over the coming months; and
  4. The possibility that all of these costs could be wasted, to varying degrees, if antitrust regulators decide to block or restrict the deal.

These are all “deadweight losses” on the economy pure and simple—and ultimately costs to consumers.

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Eric Goldman, one of the few active cyberlibertarians in legal academe, has a thoughtful post about the search partnership announced today. Eric notes blogger Danny Sullivan’s observation about the decline in Yahoo’s assets and his comment that:

Microsoft is getting a huge bargain courtesy of the US Department Of Justice. Without Google being able to compete for Yahoo’s business, the billions that were floating around in 2008 become millions in 2009.

Danny and Eric certainly have a strong point: One of the costs of the Justice Department’s decision to block Google from partnering with Yahoo! is that Yahoo! wound up fetching much less in its deal with Microsoft. But the intervening slump in the economy and online advertising has also contributed in the drop in Yahoo!’s share price and overall valuation, so it’s difficult to make an apples-to-apples comparison. Eric is probably right that in assessment that:

Yahoo was unbelievably crazy for passing on Microsoft’s acquisition proposal from a year-and-a-half ago. It looked like a foolish mistake at the time, and hindsight has definitely not improved that assessment!

It would seem that both Yahoo! and Microsoft under-estimated the likelihood that antitrust regulators would block a Yahoo!/Google deal a year ago: Microsoft probably wouldn’t have offered as much as it did to acquire Yahoo!’s search business ($31/share) and Yahoo! (currently $15.14/share) certainly wouldn’t have held out for a better deal from Google. While the end result ended up being a Yahoo!/Microsoft deal anyway, the delay of over a year in reaching a deal is itself a significant cost of what economists would call the “regime uncertainty” created antitrust: Without clear rules, it’s difficult for economic actors to predict the decisions by regulators. A delay of a year could well prove to make a big difference in the ability of the two companies to mount a successful response to Google in search and advertising—just as Microsoft’s 18 month delay back in 2003-2004 in developing a search ad auction system to respond to Google’s AdWords system (which now produces 2/3 of its revenue) probably did much to thwart Microsoft’s initial efforts to compete in search. Continue reading →

A key point that Berin and I try to get across in our Forbes editorial today about the Yahoo!-Microsoft deal is that the high-tech marketplace evolves too rapidly for creaky Analog Era antitrust laws to keep up. We wanted to say more on that point in our piece, but we had a tight deadline (and a strict word limit!)  Well, turns out that we really don’t need to do so now because Farhad Manjoo of Slate has done a better job than we ever could have making that point in this essay today entitled, “The Case Against the Case Against Google“:

But if the government was right on the facts [in the Microsoft case], it was wrong on the big picture. The theory behind the prosecution was that Microsoft’s mobster tactics would raise the price of software and slow down innovation. But that didn’t happen. In 2002, Microsoft settled the antitrust case with the Bush administration; it faced no substantial penalties for its years of bad behavior. At that point, it still looked unbeatable—it had the same OS monopoly, office-software monopoly, and Web-browser monopoly. And you know what happened? It got beat anyway. Many of Microsoft’s assets turned out not to matter, because upstarts like Google and old foes like Apple found ways to innovate around them.

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We’ve just published an op-ed over at Forbes.com about today’s big Yahoo!-Microsoft deal.
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Searching For Success: Web 1.0 Titans Struggle to Reinvent Themselves
by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

Yahoo! and Microsoft on Wednesday announced a partnership in which Microsoft’s Bing search engine technology will power search for both companies, but Yahoo! will manage advertising sales and content creation.

This should be cause for celebration as a good thing for consumers. By providing a strong competitor with a combined 28% market share, the deal should also be a source of relief at Google, which has come under increasing attack for its supposed market dominance. But if recent concerns about online search, advertising, competition and privacy are any guide, many will fail to appreciate why the deal is pro-consumer, or what it says about the rapid evolution of the Internet.

It’s easy to forget that just a decade ago most of us still hadn’t done our first Google search, Microsoft was still focused on the desktop and Yahoo! was still serving up the online equivalent of the Yellow Pages. AltaVista, AOL, CompuServe and Geocities still ruled the roost.

Today, as we enjoy the fruits of a true cyber-renaissance, cyberspace circa 1999 increasingly looks like the Digital Dark Ages: The old online walled gardens have crumbled, desktop applications have migrated to the cloud and search has redefined our experience of the Web.

Oh, and did we mention just about all of it is “free“? Sounds like exactly the sort of vigorous innovation, expanding consumer choice, falling prices and cut-throat competition that policymakers should want, right?

Alas, regulators seem stuck in the past. European officials in particular seem hell-bent on continuing the antitrust crusade of the ’90s against Microsoft, myopically focused on fading paradigms (desktop operating systems and Web browsers). But instead of narrowly defining high-tech markets based on yesterday’s technologies or market structures, policymakers should embrace the one constant of the Internet economy: dynamic, disruptive and irrepressible change.

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My comments on the new Microsoft/Yahoo ad deal appears below. Please ignore the date.

Great piece in Wired by Fred Vogelstein asking “Why Is Obama’s Top Antitrust Cop Gunning for Google?” It paints a pretty good picture of the coming antitrust ordeal that Google is likely to be subjected to by the Obama Administration. And, as usual, I couldn’t agree more with the skepticism that Eric Goldman of Santa Clara University Law School articulates when he notes: “The problem for antitrust in high tech is that the environment changes so rapidly. Someone who looks strong today won’t necessarily be strong tomorrow.”  More importantly, as Vogelstein’s article notes, we’ve been down this path before with less than stellar results when you look at the IBM investigation in the 70s and the Microsoft case from the 90s (a fiasco that is still going on today):

After the government initiated its case against IBM, the company spent two decades scrupulously avoiding even the appearance of impropriety. By the time the suit was dropped in the early 1980s, company lawyers were weighing in on practically every meeting and scrutinizing every innovation, guarding against anything that could be seen as anticompetitive behavior. A decade later, innovation at Big Blue had all but ceased, and it had no choice but to shrink its mainframe business. (It has since reinvented itself as a services company.)

Microsoft took the opposite approach. Gates and company were defiant, to the point of stonewalling regulators and refusing to take the charges seriously. “Once we accept even self-imposed regulation, the culture of the company will change in bad ways,” one former Microsoft executive told Wired at the time. “It would crush our competitive spirit.” Gates put it even more directly: “The minute we start worrying too much about antitrust, we become IBM.” Microsoft’s hostility to the very idea of regulation resulted in several avoidable missteps—including remarkably antagonistic deposition testimony from Gates—that ultimately helped the DOJ rally support for its ongoing antitrust suit against the company. Although Microsoft ultimately settled, the public beating appears to have taken a toll on the company, which has been unable to maintain its reputation for innovation and industry leadership.

Read the whole article for all the gory details.  This is going to be the biggest antitrust case of all-time once it is finally launched and I feel confident predicting that it will make many lawyers and consultants very, very rich while doing absolutely nothing to help consumer welfare.  But perhaps those DOJ lawyers can at least get Google to lower the prices for all those services they offer. Oh, wait, they’re all free.  But don’t worry, I’m sure Beltway bureaucrats will do a great job of running something as complex as search algorithms and online advertising markets.  Right.

Goog MS logosI don’t get it. Technology journalist Robert X. Cringely, whose work I typically greatly admire, had a confusing editorial in the New York Times yesterday entitled “Chrome vs. Bing vs. You and Me” in which he makes what appear to me to be contradictory statements about the impact of the Google-Microsoft wars. Commenting on Google’s recent move into the OS world and Microsoft’s launch of Bing, its new and improved search platform, Cringely argues:

This is all heady stuff and good for lots of press, but in the end none of this is likely to make a real difference for either company or, indeed, for consumers. It’s just noise — a form of mutually assured destruction intended to keep each company in check.

That statement itself is hopelessly contradictory. If two companies are engaged in such a heated war “to keep each [other] in check,” isn’t that by definition something that could make a difference for consumers? Indeed, what Cringely goes on to say seems to confirm that in my mind:

So why does Google even bother? To keep Microsoft on its toes. […]

So Google Chrome and Chrome OS and Android are all intended to keep Microsoft on the defensive and less likely to push its own Big Red Button. This makes even more sense given the recent advent of Microsoft’s Bing search technology, which performs precisely the same competitive control function against Google. Bing hasn’t a hope of toppling Google as the premier search engine and Microsoft knows it. To date, Bing’s success has actually been at the expense of Google’s competitors, not Google itself. But thanks to Microsoft’s deep pockets and fierce screwball reputation, Bing has already accomplished its main purpose: reminding Google executives who they’re messing with.

Hey, what’s wrong with all of this?!  Of course, it may be true, as Cringely argues, that, “Some company with a new idea and no legacy products to defend will eventually arise to clean Microsoft’s clock. Or maybe Microsoft’s market will simply disappear as PC’s are subsumed into cars and mobile phones, possibly leaving Windows behind in the process.” But what’s wrong with Google putting the pressure on in the meantime? And why shouldn’t we love the sound of Microsoft putting more pressure on Google with Bing? I’ve been using Bing a lot lately (I’ve made it my new Firefox search default, in fact) and have been very impressed. Even if it doesn’t win back market share lost to Google in recent years, it really does keep Google on its toes and innovating.  And that’s a great thing.

Moreover, what would Cringely prefer? For both companies to just cede traditional territory to the other and roll over and play dead? I’m not sure how that would benefit anyone.

His confusing editorial ends with still more contradiction, arguing that, until some other independent innovators arise to truly topple Microsoft and Google, “these [two] companies will posture, spend a little money on research and development, and keep each other in check, while reporters and publications pretend that it matters.”  Again, Robert, it does matter. The money spent on R&D (which is not “a little” amount, I might add) and the pressure they place on each other by encroaching on each other’s core competencies, is important to the market, consumers, and future innovation. Cringely should be praising these developments, not complaining about them.

Wired Magazine editor Chris Anderson has an important new book out, “Free: The Future of a Radical Price.” He focuses on the economics of free services, building on the excellent analysis of thinkers like Mike Masnick (whose 2007 essay, “The Grand Unified Theory on The Economics of Free,” succinctly sums up the concept).free-chris-anderson

Following up on his book, Anderson has a new op-ed up on CNN.com in which he explores how the emergence of free services in the digital age has raised new challenges for antitrust regulators:

Now Google has Microsoft-like dominance in search and search advertising. What should it not be allowed to do? That question may come to define this era of antitrust law. When [Christine] Varney was confirmed, she withdrew the Bush administration’s report setting relatively conservative standards of antitrust enforcement and declared, “The Antitrust Division will be aggressively pursuing cases where monopolists try to use their dominance in the marketplace to stifle competition and harm consumers…

Varney and her team of economists and lawyers are no doubt tangling with the question of how to enforce antitrust laws in a way that ensures an “even” playing field for competition without causing consumers to lose access to free services that are growing more abundant by the day.

But there’s a more important question that Varney should be asking: what actually constitutes market dominance in the age of free? Is the fact that a firm has a substantial share of a distinct marketplace a reliable indicator of dominance? And if the result of firms achieving high market share is an explosion of free goods and services, is it even in consumers’ interests for government to go after “dominant” firms?

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