Keeping politicians' hands off the Net & everything else related to technology
I earlier promised some graphs to illustrate a parable about copyright’s future. I’d like to start, here, by offering a picture of the standard economic model of IP. (Attentive readers may recall that whereas other use “IP” for “intellectual property,” I use it to stand for “intellectual privilege“). See figure 1, below:
When more players enter the market for expressive works, an author faces both new competitors and new customers. What affect does that have on copyright’s power to stimulate authorship? Assume, both for the sake of simplicity and because it seems reasonable, that the ratio of authors/consumers holds steady. I posit that copyright will in that event offer greater rewards for authorship. Allow me to explain, here with a parable, and in a later post with some graphs.
When economists draw graphs to describe monopolies, they typically represent both average revenue (i.e., price) and aggregate demand with a single line. Why? Because they assume that, by dint of revealed preference theory, sales of a good reveal the demand for it, and that a monopolist, by definition, alone satisfies the demand for a particular good. See figure one, below.
I question, though, whether that sort of graph does an adequate job of describing the sorts of monopolies protected by copyrights and patents. Because the law does not protect them perfectly, those sorts of “intellectual privilege” (the term I advocate in lieu of “intellectual property”) suffer unremunerated uses. Some such uses happen through infringement, such as street corner sales of pirated DVDs. Others happen by dint of special legislative exceptions, such as the unlicensed public performances of musical works allowed to certain small commercial retail establishments.
How does market growth affect the efficiency of copyright? I earlier argued that, holding all else equal, the low marginal cost of reproducing expressive works ensures that a larger audience will tend to reward copyright owners with larger profits. Population increases thus threaten to throw copyright policy out of balance, making the costs of its restrictions outweigh the benefits of its incentives. I’d here like to air a related but distinctly different argument: Holding all else equal, an increase in population, because it brings an increase in the number of authors motivated by non-pecuniary incentives, tends to render copyright less necessary.
Betcha.com recently began offering a U.S.-based, P2P, honor-based betting service. Its FAQ claims that Betcha.com avoids the reach of domestic state and federal anti-gambling laws because, “Unlike any other betting venue on the planet, Betcha bettors always retain the right to withdraw their bets . . . . Therefore, they are not ‘risking’ anything. No ‘risk;’ means no ‘gamble.'” Will Betcha’com’s hack of anti-internet gaming laws work?
I’m planning a paper on how growth in markets affects the efficacy of copyright, and am shopping around an abstract. I welcome your comments. The abstract goes a little something like this:
Does copyright protection offer the best means of stimulating the production of expressive works? Maybe it does now. If so, however, copyright will probably over-protect expressive works in coming years. We should hope that it will, at any rate, given that human progress will render copyright obsolete.
I recently posted on SSRN a draft paper, “Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense,” Codifying Copyright’s Misuse Defense, 2007 Utah L. Rev. __ (2007) (invited) (forthcoming). Herewith, the abstract:
I earlier described why the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (the “UnInGEn-ious Act”) will put the domestic financial services industry at the disadvantage of overseas competitors capable of escaping U.S. regulations. How will Mastercard, Visa, and their ilk react to the resulting loss of business? More likely than not, by seeking shelter in one of the UnInGEn-ious Act’s safe harbors. The result: legal Internet gambling will increase in the U.S.
With the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006, Congress took aim at Internet gambling, pulled the trigger, and shot the domestic financial services industry. The regulatory bloodshed might temporarily put off American consumers of Internet gambling services. Very quickly, though, foreign financial services will step into the breach. More likely than not, Internet gambling will continue unabated. Federal lawmakers will have done little more than won a sound-bite for the upcoming elections and encouraged the widespread use of Internet-based financial systems capable of wholly escaping U.S. control. Hence my moniker for the new law: The UnInGEn-ious Act.
The Washington Stock Exchange (WSX) has successfully launched! Because it uses market processes to predict electoral and legislative events, WSX promises to make political news more accurate and fun. Soon, reporters might routinely sprinkle their stories with statements like, “Traders on the Washington Stock Exchange still predict that Republicans will hold onto to the House, but the odds just got longer.” As an alternative to polls or talking heads, WSX offers the virtues of blogospheric decentralization plus hard numbers.
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology.
