Articles by Tim Lee

Timothy B. Lee (Contributor, 2004-2009) is an adjunct scholar at the Cato Institute. He is currently a PhD student and a member of the Center for Information Technology Policy at Princeton University. He contributes regularly to a variety of online publications, including Ars Technica, Techdirt, Cato @ Liberty, and The Angry Blog. He has been a Mac bigot since 1984, a Unix, vi, and Perl bigot since 1998, and a sworn enemy of HTML-formatted email for as long as certain companies have thought that was a good idea. You can reach him by email at leex1008@umn.edu.


One of this week’s podcast guests, Derek Slater, has a fantastic post over at the EFF blog on AT&T’s flip-flopping position on domestic surveillance. In 1928, in an amicus brief in the famous Olmstead wiretapping case, Ma Bell made the same comparison I made earlier this week:

The telephone has become part and parcel of the social and business intercourse of the people of the United States, and this telephone system offers a means of espionage to which general warrants and writs of assistance were the puniest instruments of tyranny and oppression.

And of course, the voice recognition and data mining technologies the feds have today makes the wiretapping at issue in Olmstead look puny.


Over the weekend, Congress passed legislation that dramatically expands the executive branch’s domestic surveillance powers. The legislation replaces the FISA warrant process that has governed domestic surveillance since the 1970s with a new process in which courts would only review the general procedures used to select surveillance targets, not a list of the targets themselves.

In this week’s podcast, Adam and I are joined by two of my favorite commentators on civil liberties: Derek Slater of the Electronic Frontier Foundation and Julian Sanchez of Reason magazine. They explain what’s wrong with the legislation, how it’s connected to EFF’s ongoing lawsuit against AT&T, and what we need to do to restore our privacy rights.

There are several ways to listen to the TLF Podcast. You can press play on the player below to listen right now, or download the MP3 file. You can also subscribe to the podcast by clicking on the button for your preferred service. And do us a favor, Digg this podcast!

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A great insight from Avi Rubin, who attributes it to California Secretary of State Debra Bowen:

The current certification process may have been appropriate when a 900 lb lever voting machine was deployed. The machine could be tested every which way, and if it met the criteria, it could be certified because it was not likely to change. But software is different. The software lifecycle is dynamic. As an example, look at the way Apple distributes releases of the iPhone software. The first release was 1.0.0. Two minor version numbers. When the first serious flaw was discovered, they issued a patch and called it version 1.0.1. Apple knew that there would be many minor and some major releases because that is the nature of software. It’s how the entire software industry operates.

So, you cannot certify an electronic voting machine the way you certify a lever machine. Once the voting machine goes through a lengthy and expensive certification process, any change to the software requires that it be certified all over again. What if a vulnerability is discovered a week before an election? What about a month before the election, or a week after it passes certification? Now the point is that we absolutely expect that vulnerabilities will be discovered all the time. That would be the case even if the vendors had a clue about security. Microsoft, which arguably has some of the best security specialists, processes and development techniques issues security patches all the time.

Software is designed to be upgraded, and patch management systems are the norm. A certification system that requires freezing a version in stone is doomed to failure because of the inherent nature of software. Since we cannot change the nature of software, the certification process for voting machines needs to be radically revamped. The dependence on software needs to be eliminated.

Times Unselect

by on August 7, 2007 · 0 comments

The New York Post is reporting that the New York Times is going to ditch its paywall, making all of its new content freely available to the world. The rumor comes a week after rumors that Rupert Murdoch is considering doing the same with the Journal.

It’ll be interesting to see how long Salon and The Economist can soldier along with a paywall/daypass model. They’re both excellent publications, yet I hardly ever visit them because the blogs I read hardly ever link to them. My sense is that they’d be significantly more prominent if they had gone free a few years ago.

Hat tip: Yglesias, who concludes that the Internet will “make being an important opinion writer less financially lucrative, relative to other professions, than it once was.”

Julian on the FISA Fiasco

by on August 7, 2007 · 0 comments

Over at Reason Julian chastises the Democrats for their spinelessness in passing the FISA “modernization” this weekend:

The hasty passage of the massive USA PATRIOT Act, a scant 45 days after [the 9/11] attacks, was ill-considered but understandable. Six years later, however, the administration has grown comfortable with the prerogatives panic affords. And, perversely, it has learned that it can continue to wield those prerogatives even under a Democratic majority, provided it insists on regarding Congress always and only as a last resort.

Consider the provenance of this “emergency” legislation. President Bush first authorized the National Security Agency to carry out a range of surveillance activities without court order, the full scope of which is still unknown, but which at the least included monitoring communications between persons in the United States and targets abroad. (Wholly international communications had always been exempt from the privacy restrictions imposed by U.S. law.) When this was revealed by The New York Times late in 2005, the administration insisted that national security required that intelligence agents be allowed to bypass even the super-secret—and highly compliant—FISA courts. Then, following the 2006 midterm elections, which gave Democrats a congressional majority, the Department of Justice abruptly announced that it had found a way to work within FISA after all. Finally, according to The LA Times, a spring ruling by a FISA court judge found that even this restricted version of the six-year-old program ran afoul of the law.

Suddenly it became urgent that Congress “modernize” what was invariably described as “the 1978 FISA statute,” conjuring images of forlorn agents in white polyester leisure suits vainly hunting for al-Qaeda terrorists hidden under Pet Rocks. Yet FISA had already been updated dozens of times since its initial passage, including six major amendments since the September 11 attacks, giving the administration myriad opportunities to request all the “modernization” it required, subject to thorough public debate. But even this manufactured urgency, it seems, was not enough. On the eve of the legislature’s August recess, House Democrats had worked out a compromise bill with Director of National Intelligence Michael McConnell, which preserved a modicum of judicial oversight over the expanded surveillance powers it granted. But the White House pronounced this unsatisfactory, threatening a veto and demanding still broader powers. If Democrats did not yield completely before Congress adjourned, Bush said, they would “put our national security at risk.”

More where that came from. I’ve also got a summary of the bill over at Ars.

Humor for the Day

by on August 6, 2007 · 0 comments

Slashdot reports on a new flashlight that makes subjects puke when you point it at them.

A Slashdot commenter says:

Just browse a few pages on myspace…you’ll get a similar nauseating effect.

Via TechDirt, Wired reports that SoundExchange, the cartel for the major labels collective licensing authority for digital music, has been lobbying for Congress to make terrestrial broadcasters pay royalties for playing music on the air. That despite the fact that radio stations have been legally entitled to play music without royalties (to the band—I believe they have to pay statutory royalties to the songwriter), and despite the fact that the labels beg and plead with radio stations to play their songs more.

Cato chairman Bill Niskanen wouldn’t be surprised.

The spying bill passed by Congress this weekend, says that:

With respect to an authorization of an acquisition under section 105B, the Director of National Intelligence and Attorney General may direct a person to immediately provide the Government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to accomplish the acquisition in such a manner as will protect the secrecy of the acquisition and produce a minimum of interference with the services that such person is providing to the target.

105B requires only that “reasonable procedures [be] in place for determining that the acquisition of foreign intelligence information under this section concerns persons reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.” Court oversight is limited to verifying, after the fact, that these “procedures” are in fact “reasonable.” Notice that it’s easy to imagine that some domestic-to-domestic calls or emails could “concern” a person located outside of the United States.

We’re inching ever closer to giving the executive branch the power to issue Writs of Assistance.

Zune Dance

by on August 6, 2007 · 4 comments

This is awesome:

More here. Hat tip: Fake SteveDaniel Lyons

The Loyal Opposition

by on August 4, 2007 · 0 comments

More on the FISA legislation from the Wall Street Journal:

The bill would update the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, known as FISA. It would allow the government to intercept, without warrants, communications between a U.S. resident and a foreign party suspected of involvement in “foreign intelligence” matters. It would drop existing language requiring that the foreigner be suspected more specifically of connections to terrorist groups.

The bill also would clarify that the government can intercept foreigner-to-foreigner communications that pass through U.S. lines or switches. The government long has had the power to intercept purely foreign communications.

If a U.S. resident is the chief target of surveillance of his or her communications with a foreigner, the government would have to obtain a warrant from the special FISA court.

Congressional Democrats won a few concessions before the Senate passed the bill late Friday. New wiretaps would have to be approved by the director of national intelligence and the attorney general, not only the attorney general.

So let me get this straight: the White House says “we think we should be able to eavesdrop on virtually any domestic-to-foreign phone call without court oversight, based on the say-so of one of the president’s subordinates.” And the Democrats response was “Hell no! Warrantless spying should require the say-so of two of the president’s subordinates!”

It’s a good thing we don’t have a rubber-stamp Republican Congress any more.