Articles by Solveig Singleton

Solveig Singleton is a lawyer and writer, with ventures into ceramic sculpture, photography, painting, and animal welfare work. Past venues for her policy work include the Cato Institute (mostly free speech, telecom, and privacy), the Competitive Enterprise Institute (mostly privacy and ecommerce), the Progress and Freedom Foundation (mostly IP). She is presently an adjunct fellow with the Institute for Policy Innovation and is working on a new nonprofit venture, the Convergence Law Institute. She holds degrees from Cornell Law School and Reed College. Favorite Movie: Persuasion. Favorite Books: Dhalgren; Villette; Freedom and the Law. Favorite Art: Kinetic sculpture--especially involving Roombas. Most obsolete current technology deployed: a 30 yr. old Canon AE-1. Music: these days, mostly old blues, classical guitar, Poe, Cowboy Junkies, Ministry. Phobia: Clowns.


Adam Mossoff has written an important paper shedding light on the nature and constitutional status of patents:

Mossoff, Adam, “Who Cares What Thomas Jefferson Thought about Patents? Reevaluating the Patent ‘Privilege’ in Historical Context” . MSU Legal Studies Research Paper No. 03-21

Adam sheds light on what eighteenth and nineteenth century scholars meant by calling patents “privileges.” Lawyers of the day referred to many types of civil rights that helped secured property rights as “privileges.” “Privileges” was a legal term of art for rights that did not arise in a state of nature, but that arose when people joined together in societies under a social contract–civil rights. Referring to such rights as “privileges” was not intended at all to disparage them or disconnect them from property rights (as in the “privileges and immunities” clause). Thus he traces nineteenth century case law that treat patents as a form of property, subject to “trespass” and broadly defended.

Adam’s paper also drew my attention to two other problems, less related to IP, but none-the-less worth mentioning.

1) The sad neglect of legal history in the law schools, and the tendency of the legal system to pick up on and amplify errors in interpreting cases of the past. This has arisen again and again–with privacy law, with the Ninth Amendment, and on and on. In my view this arises originally from the fact that law was not an academic discipline like history. It was a trade. Law professors taught the trade, and did not much try to be “academic.” Objective historical research was not taken seriously, but only as an addendum to advocacy. Today law schools try to be on a intellectual par with graduate schools in philosophy and history and have little interest in trade problems, but objective research is taken no more seriously. If they want to produce scholarship of lasting and real value, they are going to have to up their standards. I should close by saying that there are important exceptions–true legal scholars–but not enough.

2) The second problem is something the tendency of ideological libertarians (including myself) to underestimate the sophistication of natural rights and social contract theory. It is often accepted by libertarians that rights that do not belong in a state of nature are simply problematic. And a good number of libertarians would dismiss such rights as impossible. But that will not do, because then we must dismiss things like the right to vote, the rights of due process, and so on, as impossible, because all these arise not in a state of nature but in civil society. We might well be cautioned about taking discussions of the “state of nature” too literally. Like “perfect competition” or “zero information costs” in economics, it makes a splendid thought experiment. But in reality the evolution of legal systems and societies is vastly more complex.

A longer version of this note is up on IPcentral, for those to whom it looks familiar.

My paper entitled Women and the Information Technology Revolution: Getting the Message of Markets has been released by the Independent Women’s Forum. I must confess that during the drafting phase, this paper was designated in my directories by the less dignified “chicktech.” This paper represents my first foray in some years into the strange world of feminist theory, in which technology is too often portrayed as yet another imposition of male culture. This stands in sharp contrast, I should note, to the not-at-all-strange world of feminist practice, in which one considers the situation of actual women in real situations, particularly in other countries. There is a much greater willingness from this perspective to recognize how much technology has done to alleviate misery. But still little appreciation of what markets have done for technology.

Shortly after I submitted this paper for publication, our family acquired a Roomba, one of those robot floor cleaners (I used to describe him as a robot vacuum cleaner, but the iRobot folks were cleverer than that, and avoided bulk by adopting the compact floor sweeper as a model, rather than a massive vacuum cleaner). Had we acquired him before I completed my paper, it would have been full of praise for the industry and enthusiasm with which he cleans our floors. (Yes, it’s a “he,” though we have not named him yet). There is a lot of whirring and twirling. He’s saved us literally hours of time… with three cats and a toddler, our floor accumulates a pretty nasty scum very quickly, and I’ve calculated that an entire day throughout the week was generally spent on sweeping and mopping. I’d like to challenge technology skeptics to acquire a Roomba, and cling to their vision of technology as a treadmill from which there is no escape from drudgery. And we didn’t even get the fancy new model that remembers rooms and calculates the most efficient path and charges itself!

Here is some material generated by PFF scholars:

My short paper “Net Neutrality: Video Dialtone Redux?” A quote:

Right now there are huge opportunities for growth and expansion of broadband networks and services, including content. And problems as well, from spam to capacity limits, from authentication problems to quality of service issues. Hopefully these issues all have technical solutions, but deploying those solutions is going to take some capital. Do we really want to narrow the business models that can be used to raise and recover that capital down to… video dialtone for the Net?

Testimony of Kyle Dixon before the Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, February 07, 2006.

Testimony of Randolph May before the House Committee on Energy and Commerce, Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, March 30, 2006.

“The Economics of Net Neutrality: Why the Physical Layer of the Internet Should Not Be Regulated,” by Christopher S. Yoo, PFF Progress on Point 11.11, July 2004.

See also “Are ‘Dumb Pipe’ Mandates Smart Public Policy? Vertical Integration, Net Neutrality, and the Network Layers Model,” by Adam Thierer, Journal of Telecommunications & High-Technology Law, Vol. 3, Issue 2, 2004.

More links below:

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Here find my comments on the dangers of “net neutrality.” Who even remembers video dialtone? “Open video services.” And other similar regulatory ventures.

“Open” sounds awful democratic. But when it is a regulatory mandate it quickly devolves into something navigable only by an elite.

Dr. John Rutledge offers a perspective on Chinese censorship, greatly informed by his frequent travels there. An excerpt:

I use the word “attempt” because, as any parent can tell you, controlling the communication of young people is impossible. That’s just as true in China as in the US. The kids there have cell phones too. And like our kids they don’t talk with each other any more; they just send IM’s (Instant Messages).

They are also good at circumventing restrictions by inventing new words to replace the keywords the censors dislike.

Young people I have spoken with in China (they actually “talk” with old people like me who don’t know how to IM) tell me they have easy access to 95% of the information on the Internet, although they sometimes resort to Internet Cafe’s to do so.

Thus I persist in optimism.

Here’s a few thoughts on Jim Harper’s splendid post of a few days ago on the nature and origins of IP as compared to physical property. I can’t find much to disagree with in it, but apparently I was expected to? So I will clarify where I think points of controversy might arise starting off from there.

A) One of the assertions that seems to be made with some frequency about the enterprise at IPcentral of which I am a part is that we think that IP and physical property are just the same. As far as I know, neither myself nor any of my colleagues think that (I don’t speak for them ordinarily but I think I can safely venture to do so on this point). But we’ll tend to emphasize the similarities rather than the differences when we think the differences are not as relevant as they are sometimes thought to be:

An example: It is sometimes pointed out that the marginal cost of sharing IP is zero or nearly zero. This is sometimes taken as an argument by people who know a little economics (and no Austrian economics) that this is what the price of IP should be as well–zero or nearly zero. But the argument proves too much; it turns into an attack on physical property as well. The marginal cost of an alarming amount of *phsyical property* is nearly zero as well (stamping out another pill once the drug has been researched and is in production, for example, or another silicon chip, or what have you). Furthermore as the physical property economy evolves and production becomes more efficient, we should expect the production of more and more physical property to near marginal cost–if you are in the business of producing physical property, one of your aims is quite likely to be to drive the cost of production lower and lower. Furthermore in order to sustain incentives for production both IP and physical property need to be priced above marginal cost, especially when marginal cost is zero or near zero. (I need to add a link here to the conference a few years back on marginal costs, but I can’t find it now. Ah, here it is.).

What I just said, in a nutshell: I think the differences between physical property and IP are extremely significant, but not necessarily in the ways that IP critics commonly think they are (here’s an article I wrote on the significance of some differences a while back). For the most part my colleagues at IPcentral think along similar lines. We might use physical property examples as analogies, but an analogy is well, an analogy, not intended to be taken too literally.

If it makes IP critics happier, I could call “intellectual property” something else. Say, “intellectual schmoperty,” or more seriously, as I experimented with a few years back, a set of special default rules for contract (that happen not to require privity). But whether one calls it property or not, the substance of the debate about its merits remains the same, and one can still make analogies.

B) The second point where I suspect we ultimately differ is in the nature of the fences that Jim talks about and the sort of fences that I would describe. Fences are definitely important. Physical fences are the most basic, and then there are also legal fences, either contractual or statutory. But did Jim mean there could be only physical fences? (I don’t think he meant that, that would be Hobbes not Locke).

Either way, fences have costs; keeping the costs of the fences low is important. Physical ones are nice because they are relatively self-enforcing and therefore cheaper–even after development costs (which are internalized by the fencer and so kept in check). For legal bounds, they can’t usually be self-enforcing, but it is better if they are somehow enforceable. Contracts that make a simple trade are best; you give me money, pretty much simultaneously I give you an apple, done. Then comes contracts that involve relations that are more remote in time in place… they get awfully complicated. And then finally comes statutes, which are the most complicated of all, and start involving rent-seeking risks and a load of other stuff. Last-resort rules and last-resort enforcement institutions that have not evolved nearly as fast the private economy (a government failure, if you would, rather than a market failure).

So what do we do in an environment where fences of any kind have suddenly become almost impossible to maintain? We could just . . . let it go. But I think that this ends up in a world that is a little too close to Hobbes for my taste, or for investor’s tastes. So where I ultimately differ with Jim is in thinking that it is all right to tinker a bit at the margins with the substantive ground rules to help the fences take shape and maintain some semblance of integrity. Nor do I think the burden of bearing the costs of the fencing needs to be entirely on the owners of the property being fenced, just so long as most of it is.

But it is really a small difference. To make an analogy, Jim (Harper) would not like, I take it, legal rules restricting the proliferation of specialized tools for opening locked car doors. I think that such rules are preferable to the alternative. But note that for me this is essentially an empirical question about the circumstances under which everyone is better off!!!! A very hard call to make on the basis of a priori arguments. Which is why I have booted IP into my mental category of hard problems.

Jim, go ahead and make your argument now about malum prohibitum, etc., if you want, I thought you were going to make that and I wanted to respond to that, too.

We policy wonks think of ourselves as taking the long view of things, but have we been thinking ahead enough?
In the category of far future threats to liberty–from the New York Times:

In his new book, “How to Survive a Robot Uprising,” Dr. Wilson offers detailed … advice on evading hostile swarms of robot insects (don’t try to fight–“loss of an individual robot is inconsequential to the swarm”); outsmarting your “smart” house (be suspicious if the house suggests you test the microwave by putting your head in it); escaping unmanned ground vehicles (drive in circles–they’ll have a harder time tracking you); and surviving hand-to-hand combat with a humanoid (smear yourself with mud to disguise your distinctive human thermal signature and go for the “eyes”–its cameras).

I so want a Rhoomba and a Scooba, if only to watch them interact with the cats, but my husband says we have to buy this book first.

Okay, this is off topic, but the sound of assorted Maryland residents burning the rubber off their tires, which I can hear from inside my home office, is beginning to annoy me. On the off chance that some of them have actual jobs that do something besides soak up tax money, and thus we would be better off if they make if out of the parking lot, some suggestions:

1) If stuck, do not spin your wheels. You are burning the tread off your tires and making ice.
2) Rock to get out of rut (forward, reverse, forward, reverse). Momentum is good.
3) If moving in deep snow, for Pete’s sake don’t stop (unless you are facing downhill).
4) Don’t do anything suddenly.
5) Easy on the salt. Salt makes puddles, which become ice.
6) Sand is good. Kitty litter, birdseed, and bunches of twigs make decent substitutes.
7) If you have a front wheel drive, devote more attention to digging out the front wheels than the back.

Sonia, anything to add?

Here’s a link to my assessment of Cory Doctorow’s take on Google’s video offering over at ipcentral’s blog. I think I’m becoming a smart-ass in my old age.

Here are some of my thoughts on intellectual property in the classical liberal tradition, since we’ve started in on this. This is a series, and it isn’t done yet. Others have also posted in this series at the ipcentral blog (category “Liberty”); these are just links to some of my own basic entries. I haven’t gotten to Jim Harper’s “Malum Prohibitum, Malum in Se” argument yet, for example. Patience, Jim.

I. Introduction–Because You Asked, Libertarians and IP

II. Rights in Ideas

III. Enforcement Problems.

IV. Natural Law

V. Public Choice and Rent-Seeking

VI. Monopoly?

VII. Alternatives, and more alternatives, and more…

Background: I used to be an IP anarchist, a la Tom Palmer and Tom Bell. But then I spent a few years working at CEI at the time that Jim Delong was also there. I was party to and audience to many, many arguments about IP, mostly involving Jim, Fred Smith, and various others. And I was persuaded that there is something to this IP stuff after all, that it is more like physical property than I ever wanted it to be. I boosted it in my mind into the category of hard problems. I don’t think I had ever done this with a policy problem before, so I’m not worried that I have any alarming tendencies to do so. And there it remains to this day.