Articles by Ryan Hagemann

Ryan HagemannRyan Hagemann is the director of technology policy at the Niskanen Center. His research specialties include privacy and surveillance, robotics and automation, decentralized networks, Internet policy, and issues at the intersection of sociology, economics, and technology. He has previously authored works on the economic and social ramifications of autonomous vehicles with the Mercatus Center. He has been published in The Wall Street Journal, Wired, The Washington Examiner, US News & World Report, The Hill, and elsewhere. Ryan graduated from Boston University with a B.A. in International Relations, Foreign Policy and Security Studies and holds a Master of Public Policy in Science and Technology Policy from George Mason University.


Co-authored with Adam Thierer

Why would progressives abandon the most successful progressive technology policy ever formulated?

In a recent piece in The Washington Spectator, Marc Rotenberg and Larry Irving have some harsh words for progressives’ supposed starry-eyed treatment of Internet firms and the Clinton Administration policies that helped give rise to the modern digital economy. They argue that the Internet has failed to live up to its promise in part because “[p]rogressive leaders moved away from progressive values on tech issues, and now we live with the consequences.”

But if the modern Internet we know today is truly the result of progressive’s self-repudiation, then we owe them and the Clinton Administration a debt of gratitude, not a lecture.

Unfortunately, Rotenberg and Irving take a different perspective. They criticize progressives for standing aside while “a new mantra of ‘multistakeholder engagement’” replaced traditional regulatory governance structures, unleashing a Pandora’s Box of “self-regulatory processes” that failed to keep the private sector accountable to the public.

Rotenberg and Irving are also upset that the First Amendment rights of Internet companies have received stronger support following the implementation of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which was enacted by Congress in 1996 and signed into law by President Clinton as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

All of this could have been avoided, they argue, if the Clinton Administration had instead embraced the creation of a National Information Infrastructure (NII) to govern the Internet. As part of its 1993 proposed “Agenda for Action,” the Clinton White House toyed with the idea that “[d]evelopment of the NII can help unleash an information revolution that will change forever the way people live, work, and interact with each other,” citing specific examples of how it would: empower people to “live almost anywhere they wanted, without foregoing opportunities for useful and fulfilling employment”; make education “available to all students, without regard to geography, distance, resources, or disability”; and permit healthcare and other social needs to be delivered “on-line, without waiting in line, when and where you needed them.” Luckily, all these things came to pass precisely because the Clinton Administration went a different route, ignoring the heavy-handed regulatory approach offered by early tech policy wonks and opting instead to embrace a different governance framework: The Framework for Global Electronic Commerce.

The 1997 Framework outlined a succinct, market-oriented vision for the Internet and the emerging digital economy. It envisioned a model of cyberspace governance that relied on multistakeholder collaboration and ongoing voluntary negotiations and agreements to find consensus on the new challenges of the information age. Policy was to be formulated in an organic, bottom-up, and fluid fashion. This was a stark and welcome break from the failed top-down technocratic regulatory regimes of the analog era, which had long held back innovation and choice in traditional communications and media sectors.

“Where governmental involvement is needed,” The Framework advised, “its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.” The result was one of the most amazing explosions in innovation our nation and, indeed, the entire world had ever witnessed. It was precisely the flexibility of multistakeholder governance—as well as the strong support for the free flow of speech and commerce—that unleashed this tsunami of technological progress.  

It’s strange, then, that Rotenberg and Irving decry the era of “multistakeholder engagement” that the Clinton Administration Framework presaged, especially because they included similar provisions in their own frameworks. For example, in “A Public-Interest Vision of the National Information Infrastructure,” the authors specifically called for “democratic policy-making” in the governance of the emerging Internet, arguing that “[t]he public should be fully involved in policy-making for the information infrastructure.” They go even further by citing the value of “participatory design,” which emphasized iterative experimentation and information feedback loops (learning by doing) in the process of designing network standards and systems. These “[n]ew approaches,” Rotenberg and Irving argue, “combine the centralized and decentralized models, obtaining the benefits of each while avoiding their deficiencies.” Embracing “[b]oth participatory design and the experimental approach to standardization,” they concluded, would “achieve the benefits of democratic input to design and policy-making without sacrificing the technical advantages of consistency and elegance of design.”

On this point, Rotenberg and Irving are correct. Unfortunately, it seems their valuation of such processes do not apply to the regulatory structures overseeing these technologies. This is despite the “Agenda for Action” explicitly calling for the NII to “complement … the efforts of the private sector” by “work[ing] in close partnership with business, labor, academia, the public, Congress, and state and local government.” What’s more “multistakeholder” than that?

For all their lamentations of the multistakeholder process, Rotenberg and Irving engaged in that very process in the 1990s. Their proposals had their shot at convincing the Clinton Administration that a national regulatory agency governing the Internet was necessary to usher in the digital age. And in one of those ironic twists of history, they failed to get their agency, but nevertheless bore witness to the emergence of a free and open Internet where innovation and progress still flourish.

We shouldn’t lose sight of this miraculous achievement and the public policies that made it all possible. There’s nothing “progressive” about rolling back the clock in the way Rotenberg and Irving recommend. Instead, America should double-down on the Clinton Administration’s vision for innovation policy by embracing permissionless innovation, collaborative multistakeholderism, and strong support for freedom of speech as the cornerstones of public policy toward other emerging technologies and sectors.

In recent months, I’ve come across a growing pool of young professionals looking to enter the technology policy field. Although I was lucky enough to find a willing and capable mentor to guide me through a lot of the nitty gritty, a lot of these would-be policy entrepreneurs haven’t been as lucky. Most of them are keen on shifting out of their current policy area, or are newcomers to Washington, D.C. looking to break into a technology policy career track. This is a town where there’s no shortage of sage wisdom, and while much of it still remains relevant to new up-and-comers, I figured I would pen these thoughts based on my own experiences as a relative newcomer to the D.C. tech policy community.

I came to D.C. in 2013, originally spurred by the then-recent revelations of mass government surveillance revealed by Edward Snowden’s NSA leaks. That event led me to the realization that the Internet was fragile, and that engaging in the battle of ideas in D.C. might be a career calling. So I packed up and moved to the nation’s capital, intent on joining the technology policy fray. When I arrived, however, I was immediately struck by the almost complete lack of jobs in, and focus on, technology issues in libertarian circles.

Through a series of serendipitous and fortuitous circumstances, I managed to ultimately break into a field that was still a small and relatively under-appreciated group. What we lacked in numbers and support we had to make up for in quality and determined effort. Although the tech policy community has grown precipitously in recent years, this is still a relatively niche policy vocation relative to other policy tracks. That means there’s a lot of potential for rapid professional growth—if you can manage to get your foot in the door.

So if you’re interested in breaking into technology policy, here are some thoughts that might be of help. Continue reading →

In a recent Senate Commerce Committee hearing on the Internet of Things, Senators Ed Markey (D-Mass.) and Richard Blumenthal (D-Conn.) “announced legislation that would direct the National highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA) and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to establish federal standards to secure our cars and protect drivers’ privacy.” Spurred by a recent report from his office (Tracking and Hacking: Security and Privacy Gaps Put American Drivers at Risk) Markey argued that Americans “need the equivalent of seat belts and airbags to keep drivers and their information safe in the 21st century.”

Among the many conclusions reached in the report, it says, “nearly 100% of cars on the market include wireless technologies that could pose vulnerabilities to hacking or privacy intrusions.” This comes across as a tad tautological given that everything from smartphones and computers to large-scale power grids are prone to being hacked, yet the Markey-Blumenthal proposal would enforce a separate set of government-approved, and regulated, standards for privacy and security, displayed on every vehicle in the form of a “Cyber Dashboard” decal.

Leaving aside the irony of legislators attempting to dictate privacy standards, especially in the post-Snowden world, it would behoove legislators like Markey and Blumenthal to take a closer look at just what it is they are proposing and ask whether such a law is indeed necessary to protect consumers. Continue reading →