I have a long opinion piece on CNet today, arguing that much of the talk of “reclassifying” or “relabeling” broadband Internet access to bring it under the FCC’s regulatory authority is just that—talk.

On April 6th, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled definitively that the squishy doctrine of “ancillary jurisdiction” provides no authority for the FCC to impose its net neutrality rules on broadband Internet providers.

Law professors and paid advocates are doing a good job of convincing journalists who don’t understand the finer points of administrative law that all the FCC needs to undo that decision is the will to change the classification of broadband and…problem solved.

Not quite.  Those who argue the FCC can simply waive a regulatory wand and give itself all the jurisdiction it needs under Title II of the Communications Act are engaging in serious wishful thinking, or worse.

Continue reading →

By Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

Opt-in mandates may soon be coming to an Internet near you! Rick Boucher, House Energy & Commerce Committee Chairman, is expected to soon introduce the privacy bill he’s been working on behind closed doors for many months. At the heart of the bill is supposed to be a mandate that websites and services obtain opt-in consent prior to collecting information with users—at least if they plan on sharing that information with any third party or doing with it beyond what a narrow safe harbor would allow.

Boucher is apparently trying to strike the right balance between “protecting privacy” and the benefits to users of advertising and data collection. But there may be significant costs to an opt-in regime that are little appreciated by privacy advocates, who tend to think of opt-out as meaningless and opt-in as the ideal of user empowerment.  In their new paper “Opt-in Dystopias,” Google’s Senior Policy Counsel Nicklas Lundblad and Policy Manager Betsy Masiello provide a sophisticated analysis of the dark side of opt-in.  They argue that “mandatory opt-in applied across contexts of information collection is poised to have several unintended consequences on social welfare and individual privacy,” specifically:

    •   Dual cost structure: Opt-in is necessarily a partially informed decision because users lack experience with the service and value it provides until after optingin. Potential costs of the opt-in decision loom larger than potential benefits,
    whereas potential benefits of the opt-out decision loom larger than potential costs.

    •   Excessive scope: Under an opt-in regime, the provider has an incentive to exaggerate the scope of what he asks for, while under the opt-out regime the provider has an incentive to allow for feature-by-feature opt-out.

    •   Desensitisation: If everyone requires opt-in to use services, users will be desensitised to the choice, resulting in automatic opt-in.

    •   Balkanisation: The increase in switching costs presented by opt-in decisions is likely to lead to proliferation of walled gardens.

Lundblad and Masiello discuss each of those concerns in great detail, so read the paper for further elaboration. They do a particularly good good walking the reader through the complexity of even defining what we mean by “opt-in,” which is far trickier than most people imagine.

Continue reading →

Check out this amazing map of the “Dogs of War” of online competition created by Gizmodo’s Shane Snow (view full size here):

For all the complaining about these three tech titans, they’re locked in fierce competition with each other. This chart doesn’t even mention other players in the vibrantly competitive online ecosystem, like Facebook, Yahoo!, Twitter, and countless others. Makes you want to go spend a weekend playing an endless game of Risk, Axis & Allies or Supremacy with your best frenemies, doesn’t it? But of course, the board game analogy only goes so far, because today’s battlelines and players are only a snapshot of a long-term process of dynamic, highly rivalrous competition. But as Adam and I noted in our Forbes.com piece last fall calling for quick approval of Microsoft’s search partnership with Yahoo!:

Alas, regulators seem stuck in the past. European officials in particular seem hell-bent on continuing the antitrust crusade of the ’90s against Microsoft, myopically focused on fading paradigms (desktop operating systems and Web browsers). But instead of narrowly defining high-tech markets based on yesterday’s technologies or market structures, policymakers should embrace the one constant of the Internet economy: dynamic, disruptive and irrepressible change. Continue reading →

Last Thursday I shared my thoughts in two short (<5 min) RussiaToday interviews on on President Obama’s big speech about NASA and his long-overdue cancellation of NASA’s white elephant known as “Ares I” rocket. (See Jeff Foust’s analysis here and here.) I was sorry to see the Administration decide to preserve the Orion capsule as a lifeboat for the International Space Station, but as I indicate below, I can’t really blame them for feeling they had to “throw a bone” to the Congressional lions defending that program and the jobs it created (using tax dollars that killed far more jobs, of course—a classic “seen v. unseen” problem).

But as I note below, the far more important good news is that, if Obama gets his way, NASA would finally buy crew launch services to ISS and for future deep space missions from the private sector (expanding its limited COTS program) instead of building its own rockets and capsule for this purpose. This decision is easily single best thing the Administration has done thus far. They have a tough fight ahead with the few members of Congress who actually care about this—who just so happen to be the ones whose districts will face job cuts when dead-end, wasteful make-work programs are canceled. The irony here is just too thick: Many of the same kinds of folks who’ve been decrying Obama as a socialist (not unjustly, in my opinion) now attack him on nationalist grounds for trying to turn part of our ultra-socialist space program over to the private sector.

Here’s another clip: Continue reading →

It’s intended as a cute line, but the opener of Stephanie Clifford’s New York Times story about custom coupons is packed with ideological assumptions: “For decades, shoppers have taken advantage of coupons. Now, the coupons are taking advantage of the shoppers.”

Meta-data in printed coupons can reveal much about the people using them.

Here’s a shocker, people: Free money might come with strings attached.

It would be wrong to dismiss the privacy problems that custom coupons might contain. They’re similar to the privacy problems that lots of other new technologies and business processes have. But the starting point if you worry about them is that you don’t have to use them.

I don’t—and it’s not even because of privacy worries. I just don’t.

But Clifford quotes two advocates of government regulation in her article—zero advocates of freedom, market experimentation, or innovation. Ed Mierzwinski, consumer program director for the United States Public Interest Research Group, says, “There really have been no rules set up for this ecosystem.”

Rules, rules. Anything new has to be draped in rules.

I would have opened the article saying, “For decades, shoppers have taken advantage of coupons. Now, the deal is going to be a little more fair.” Where does the story go from there?

Over at Convergences I consider the writings of Polk Wagner, beginning thus:

Polk Wagner has written some worthwhile papers on law and technology. I heartily recommend those that support points on which we agree, such as The Perfect Storm: Intellectual Property and Public Values, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 1107. 2005. This paper notes how the de facto balance between copyright and fair use has shifted over the years, and that in key respects copyright has lost, not gained, ground, and also noting that fair use is far from being the only key conceptual or practical limit on copyright.

But his paper “On Software Regulation,” is a bit muddled.  It may not be Professor Wagner’s fault, for the article was written following up on the “code is law” meme, which is at bottom a rather unhelpful observation. If “code is law” then so is everything else—the laws of physics, architecture, road design, engineering, biology, the laws of physics, religion, education, insect swarming patterns, families, and so on. All of these things affect human behavior and shape and regularize society. My complaint with “code is law” is not that is not true, in a sense—but that it is very unhelpful in understanding any real problem. Many institutions and systems affect human behavior, but they do so in different ways. It is understanding the differences that will be the key to resolving any serious human problems.

Consistent with this, Professor Wagner begins by noting that “code is law” tells us nothing about how code and law relate. But he restates the view that software code constitutes regulation. Software “regulates” in the sense that it makes human conduct more regular and affects the public. But is it really much like “regulation” enacted through a legal process by Congress or the FCC, or even like law described by courts? Certainly not. But the paper’s description of the differences is oddly incomplete.

For the remainder, visit Convergences here.

Last week the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the Federal Communications Commission cannot impose net neutrality rules on broadband providers under its “ancillary jurisdiction” under the Communications Act.  If it wants to impose net neutrality, the FCC must first reverse previous decisions and reclassify broadband as a “Title II” common carrier.

Whoa!  The previous two sentences prove that this economist has been spending way too much time around telecom lawyers.

In almost-plain English, the court decision means the FCC cannot impose net neutrality regulations unless it publicly changes its five-headed mind and decides that broadband is much like an old-fashioned telephone monopoly and should be regulated much the same way. 

A lot of regulatory economists pretty much gag at this idea, or worse. Non-economists wonder what triggers this visceral reaction.

Let me explain.  As the recipient of 8 years of excellent Jesuit education, of course I have three reasons.

First, anyone who follows the scholarly literature on economic regulation generally knows that this form of regulation has a pretty checkered track record. In a wide variety of industries, economic regulation has increased prices, inflated costs, stunted innovation, and/or created shortages. In addition, because this regulation transfers enormous amounts of wealth — $75 billion annually in the case of federal telecommunications regulation — it creates enormous incentives for firms to lobby and litigate to bend the rules in their favor. While big corporations may feel they benefit from these expenditures, from a society-wide perspective the fight over wealth transfers is pure waste because it rarely produces anything of value for consumers. 

Utility regulation works best in relatively stangant industries where a company makes a big capital investment, pays a few employees to run it, and doesn’t need to innovate much.  In those kinds of situations, it’s easier for regulators and other outsiders to determine costs, set some rates that let the utility earn a reasonable rate of return, and keep the regulated company from gaming the system too much. If you think this describes broadband, well, good luck. A local water utility is probably the best example.

Second, anyone knowledgeable about the economic theory underlying utility regulation (which includes most economists who specialize in the area, and some lawyers) understands that regulation is supposed to be a last resort for “natural monopoly” industries where it’s cheaper to have one firm serve the entire market. A monopolist protected from competition could increase prices, degrade service, or do other things that increase its profits while harming consumers; economic regulation seeks to prevent those behaviors. But if competition is possible, competition is preferable. 

When phone, cable, wireless, and satellite companies bombard us continually with solicitations to switch to their broadband services, and I can see multiple wires running down the street outside my house when I go up on the roof to adjust the satellite dish, it’s pretty darn obvious that broadband is NOT a natural monopoly, even if competition isn’t “perfect.”  Therefore, broadband lacks a key prerequisite for public utility regulation to possibly increase consumer welfare.  Indeed, the most anti-consumer results of economic regulation have occurred when government created monopolies, cartels and/or shortages by imposing this regulation on industries where competition is possible, such as cable TV, trucking, railroads, airlines, oil, and natural gas.

Third, recent economic studies find that the FCC’s decision to classify cable, DSL, and fiber broadband as a less-heavily-regulated “information service” generated a tsunami of investment and spurred competition. See, for example, this study by my GMU colleagues Thomas Hazlett and Anil Caliskan. Some more cites are available on pp. 17-18 of this comment to the FCC. If you don’t believe economic studies, just keep in mind that the aggressive marketing of dirt-cheap entry-level DSL tracks pretty closely with the FCC’s decision that DSL is an information service not subject to Title II regulation.  Coincidence?

So, please excuse those of us regulatory economists who vomit when the subject of Title II comes up. If you check out the links above, perhaps the reaction will be more understandable.

I have not addressed the question of whether it’s realistic to think that reclassification of broadband under Title II could be a workable mechanism to impose just a limited, targeted, surgical, light-handed, smart, data-driven, evidence-based, transparent, transformative, sustainable, green, hybrid, itsy bitsy teenie weeny yellow polka-dot bikini smidgen of net neutrality regulation to prevent only certain forms of anti-consumer discrimination, without imposing the customary broad panpoly of public utility price and service regulation. Whether that’s possible in theory, or likely in real-world political practice, is a different issue for a different day. (Whether the other name for that kind of regulation is “antitrust” is also a different  issue for a different day.) For the moment, I just wanted to provide some context on the broader Title II issue.

And now I’ll go clean off my shoes.

Please join us for this Progress & Freedom Foundation luncheon briefing today at 12-2 pm in the Capitol Visitor Center, Room SVC 208/209 at E Capitol St NE & 1st St NE. I’ll be moderating a discussion of the growing powers of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and what it might mean for consumers, advertisers, media creators, and the Internet.

If you can’t make it in-person, you can listen live here.

As I’ve discussed herehere and here, financial reform legislation passed by the House (HR 4173) and now under debate in the Senate would give the FTC sweeping new powers to regulate not just Wall Street, but also unfair or deceptive trade practices across the economy. This could reshape regulation in a wide range of areas, such as privacy, cybersecurity, child safety, COPPA, and child nutrition, affecting media online as well as offline. Unfortunately, as Adam and I have noted, there seems to be a disconnect at the FTC between concerns over the future of struggling media creators and efforts to step up regulation on a number of fronts, especially privacy. The FTC has also asserted expanded authority to regulate “unfair” competition in its lawsuit against Intel, based solely on the FTC’s Section 5 unfairness authority rather than traditional antitrust law. PFF has assembled a group of expert panelists—veteran FTC practitioners, scholars and insiders—to discuss these issues and more. Here’s our panel:

  • Jack Calfee, Resident Scholar, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI) & author of Fear of Persuasion: A New Perspective on Advertising and Regulation (1998)
  • Maureen Ohlhausen, Partner, Wilkinson Barker Knauer, Consumer Protection Law and Competition Law practices, & 11-year FTC veteran
  • Jim Davidson, Chair of the Public Policy group, Polsinelli Shughart PC
  • Stu Ingis, Partner, Venable LLP

To Register: Please RSVP online here (for free). Continue reading →

Years ago, when I worked on Capitol Hill, a colleague invited me to attend a meeting with some university professors who had a new idea for regulation of the telecommunications sector.

“Bits,” they said. “All regulation should center on bits.”

With convergence on IP-based communications, the regulatory silos dominating telecommunications would soon be more than anachronistic. Indeed, they would be a burden on the telecom sector. Bits were the fundamental unit of measure for the coming telecommunications era, and regulation should be formed around that reality.

My colleague and I looked at each other, amused. Continue reading →

TechLawJournal has a thorough analysis of Justice John Paul Stevens’ opinions in technology-related areas. I reproduce it here with permission. (Tim Lee’s shorter Cato@Liberty post about Justice Stevens’ legacy in tech is here.)

Justice John Paul Stevens, who has served on the Supreme Court since 1975, announced on April 9, 2010, that he will retire when the Court completes its current term this summer. This article reviews his contributions to technology related areas of law.

Outline of Article:
1. Summary.
2. Copyright Cases.
3. State Immunity in IPR Cases.
4. Patent Cases.
5. Communications Cases.
6. Internet Speech Cases.
7. Privacy Cases.
8. Other Cases.

1. Summary.

Justice Stevens wrote the majority opinion in the 1984 landmark Sony Betamax case. It was a 5-4 opinion. He joined in the unanimous 2005 opinion in MGM v. Grokster, regarding vicarious copyright infringement by the distributors of peer to peer systems. He wrote a long and vigorous dissent in Eldred, the 7-2 case regarding the Copyright Term Extension Act.

Justice Stevens led the fight against extending sovereign immunity to states for violation of, among other things, intellectual property laws. He dissented from the outset, and never considered the Court to be constrained by the doctrine of stare decisis. However, his concern was with the conservatives’ interpretation of states rights, not incenting the creation of intellectual property. Continue reading →