September 2008

Most debates–from privacy to net neutrality–about consumer protection in Internet policy come down to the following increasingly-cliched exchange:

1. Advocate of Regulation: “The government must intervene to protect users against Companies who want to [___________] by writing new laws or regulations!”

2. Regulatory Skeptic: “Why don’t we rely on the FTC’s enforcement of End User License Agreements (EULAs), privacy policies and other terms of service (TOS) under existing law?  If companies spell out their policies clearly and then are required to stick to them, those policies will become part of competition:  Companies will compete for consumers by offering attractive policies the same way they compete for consumers by offering attractive products & prices.”

3. Advocate of Regulation: “That doesn’t work because nobody actually reads all that legalese!  They’re impossibly dense for non-lawyers, so companies always make such agreements as broad as possible to allow them to do whatever they damn well please–and bury all the really scary provisions.”

And yet… within 12 hours of releasing its new Chrome Browser, Google removed a clause from the Chrome EULA that essentially would have Given Google the right to whatever it liked with all content posted by users anywhere online using Chrome.  If this incident demonstrates anything, it’s that there are significant “market forces” at work to restrain companies from writing agreements & policies that allow them to screw consumers.  Indeed, it beautifully demonstrates why the Regulatory Skeptic ultimately wins this debate with one final response:

4. Regulatory Skeptic: “It doesn’t matter if 99%+ of users never read a EULA or TOS.  No matter how hard companies might try to bury some ominous provision, the relatively small number of consumer protection watchdogs who do read such provisions protect everyone else by calling attention to true areas of concern.  Not every blogger who complains about something he doesn’t like in a EULA is going to make Slashdot, but overall, provisions that cross a certain line will get public attention and most companies will bend over backwards to avoid bad PR.  So, the market does work to protect consumers without the need for further government regulation.”

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Recently for DRMWatch I commented on the Court of Appeals ruling that Cablevision’s remote digital video recorder service did not directly violated copyright. The Court, however, did raise the possibility of indirect liability. Continue reading →

According to this new survey by NDS:

Americans rank the DVR [digital video recorders] as the third most indispensable household item (62%), after the washing machine (97%) and the microwave oven (86%) — Americans rank the DVR as the second most essential household technology item they can’t live without (81%), beaten only by the mobile phone (92%) — 3 out of 4 respondents with partners say that having a DVR makes for a happier home life

When you think about, it is incredible that DVRs only came on the scene in the late 1990s and yet now — less than a decade later — they are considered an “indispensable” technology by most people.

This has some important policy implications for debates over content regulation. In a paper I penned last October entitled, “Parental Control Perfection? The Impact of the DVR and VOD Boom on the Debate over TV Content Regulation,” I outlined how new video technologies, such as digital video recorders (DVRs) and video on demand (VOD) services, are changing the way households consume media and are helping parents better tailor viewing experiences to their tastes and values. I provided evidence showing the rapid spread of these technologies and discussed how parents are using these tools in their homes. Finally, I argued that these developments will have profound implications for debates over the regulation of video programming. As parents are given the ability to more effectively manage their family’s viewing habits and experiences, it will lessen—if not completely undercut—the need for government intervention on their behalf.

If you are interested, I have embedded the paper down below. Today’s survey results from NDS make it clear that the process I discuss in my paper is happening at an even fast pace than I originally predicted.

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CITP Visiting Scholars

by on September 3, 2008 · 4 comments

Princeton’s Center for IT Policy, where I’ll be studying for the next five years or so, is looking for visiting scholars for Spring 2009. Here are the details:

The Center has secured limited resources from a range of sources to support visitors this coming spring. Visitors will conduct research, engage in public programs, and may teach a seminar during their appointment. They’ll play an important role at a pivotal time in the development of this new center. Visitors will be appointed to a visiting faculty or visiting fellow position, or a postdoctoral role, depending on qualifications.

We are happy to hear from anyone who works at the intersection of digital technology and public life. In addition to our existing strengths in computer science and sociology, we are particularly interested in identifying engineers, economists, lawyers, civil servants and policy analysts whose research interests are complementary to our existing activities. Levels of support and official status will depend on the background and circumstances of each appointee. Terms of appointment will be from February 1 until either July 1 or September 1 of 2009.

When the definitive history of Kevin Martin’s regulatory reign of terror against the cable industry is finally written, I have a feeling that Ted Hearn of Multichannel News will be the man who pens it. There is no one who has been reporting on these issues longer or with more investigative vigor than Ted. In an absolutely scathing piece today about a former Martin staffer, Ted does a nice job summarizing the major elements of Martin’s war on cable. It reads like the list of grievances against King George found in the Declaration. (Think: “He has erected a multitude of New Offices, and sent hither swarms of Officers to harrass our people, and eat out their substance.”)  Anyway, I just thought I’d throw Ted’s list up here for those keeping score at home:

— He secretly rewrote an FCC study issued in November 2004 that had concluded that cable a la carte was a bad idea.

— He walked away from a handshake agreement with NCTA, Comcast and Time Warner that the rollout of family programming packages would end his a la carte jihad.

— He stripped cable’s control over critical wiring in apartment buildings, affirming the identical policy that a court had previously struck down.

— He voided exclusive contracts between cable operators and apartment building owners just a few years after the FCC gave the green light to such deals.

— He required cable operators to carry must carry TV stations in analog and digital for three years after voting against such a policy in February 2005.

— He extended program access rules for five years, a gift to DirecTV and Dish Network even though the two satellite providers are larger than every cable company in the U.S. except Comcast and Time Warner.

— He imposed expensive set-top box equipment mandates on cable, making it vastly more costly for Comcast and Time Warner to reach the goal of all-digital platforms.

— He capped cable ownership at 30% of pay-TV subscribers nationally—the same limit that a federal court kicked back to the FCC as unlawful—while letting AT&T and Verizon basically divide the country’s phone market.

— He slashed cable leased access rates to zero in an act of bureaucratic malice that a federal appeals court has now blocked and that the Office of Management and Budget has rejected as a violation of the Paperwork Reduction Act.

— He decided to brand Comcast an Internet outlaw when all the company did was occasionally frustrate a tiny minority of customers whose massive consumption of Web porn and pirated Hollywood films was destroying the service for others.

So, if Tim Wu’s thesis is correct that the broadband marketplace is “a cartel,” should we be reading headlines in today’s Wall Street Journal and CNET News.com like this: “Price War Erupts For High-Speed Internet Service” and “Broadband Price War Brews“? From the WSJ story:

The battle between cable and phone companies to sign up new customers for high-speed Internet service is heating up, creating fresh opportunities for consumers to cut their bills. […] While the most generous offers are coming from the phone companies, some analysts expect cable companies will also become more aggressive in their own promotions as they compete to retain customers.

Geez, if that’s a cartel, give me more of them!

I contributed the Cato institute’s side in this debate at Opposing Viewpoints. I took the “no” position to the question “Should the Government Regulate Net Neutrality?” Arguing opposite are the Save the Internet coalition, the Open Internet Coalition, and Public Knowledge.

I wrote my points before seeing the other peoples’ contributions, but my take on the debate is best summarized by this comment which should be appearing on the site in the near future:

What’s striking about the arguments of all three pro-regulation contributors is that while they adopt the rhetoric of urgency, none of them has offered a specific explanation of what will happen if Congress does not enact new regulations. It may very well be true that the major incumbents would like to transform the Internet into a proprietary network, but thus far, there are precious few examples of them actually attempting to do so. Indeed, the only example of any significance that they’ve been able to cite is Comcast’s interference with BitTorrent. And that example certainly doesn’t support their argument.

Comcast interfered in a relatively minor way with one of the dozens of applications on the Internet. For its trouble, the company got a bunch of negative publicity, a customer backlash, and (thanks to header encryption technology) no real control over the use of BitTorrent on its network. By March, Comcast was in full-scale retreat, signing an agreement with BitTorrent, Inc, and pledging to stop blocking BitTorrent traffic by the end of the year.

By the time the FCC ruled on the issue in July, its involvement had been rendered completely superfluous by the progress of events. Comcast wasn’t posing a looming threat to network neutrality that the FCC had beaten back. Comcast had already surrendered months ago, and the FCC showed up long after the battle was over to claim credit for the victory.

The other examples network neutrality activists like to cite are even weaker. For example, Verizon briefly refused to give an SMS short code to a pro-choice group. Not only did this incident have nothing to do with the Internet, but Verizon voluntarily reversed itself just a few days later. Once again, any regulatory response would have been far too late to make a difference.

In short, there’s no “precipice” here. Network owners don’t have a magic wand that will transform the Internet into a proprietary network. The filtering and blocking tools network providers do have are clumsy and easily circumvented. There are plenty of people monitoring broadband providers’ behavior, and they will ensure that any network neutrality violations get widely publicized. Network owners saw what happened to Comcast, and they learned that interfering with network neutrality is a bad business strategy: it’s more likely to produce angry customers than larger profits.

The advocates of new regulation have been predicting the imminent death of network neutrality for three years now. Yet network neutrality is no more endangered today than it was at the height of the Congressional debate over network neutrality in 2006. If we do start to see real evidence that technological and market forces are inadequate to protect the neutral Internet, there will be plenty of time to debate and pass appropriate regulations at that point. But it would be a mistake to pass new regulations now based on purely speculative concerns.

To follow-up on my post from this morning I should note that Google Chrome immediately asks you  which search engine you’d like to use upon installing, conveniently providing users with a chance to use something other than their default search engine and dodging potential complaints about the browser from Microsoft.

Speaking of Redmond, Ballmer and Co. may need to fear Chrome not as a browser, but as a new computing platform.  Michael Arrington writes on this at TechCrunch in a post which gets right to the heart of the matter.  Check out “Meet Chrome, Google’s Windows Killer” in which Arrington shows us how Chrome combined with Gears makes for a platform that can allows OS to fade into the background.

I for one am skeptical that we’re anywhere near cloud computing being practical for anything other than the lightest of tasks.  Google Docs simply doesn’t compare to Office, but I don’t think it’s trying to as many will claim.  I use the service, along with several other “cloud” computing programs, but I use them in addition to my local apps, not as a substitute for them.  See John C. Dvorak for more reasons why cloud applications stink.

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Peering and Transit at Ars

by on September 2, 2008 · 5 comments

My favorite thing about Ars Technica (aside from the fact that I get to write for them) is their in-depth features on technical issues. Out today is the best discussion I’ve seen of transit and peering for the lay reader. One key section:

I once heard the following anecdote at a RIPE meeting.

Allegedly, a big American software company was refused peering by one of the incumbent telco networks in the north of Europe. The American firm reacted by finding the most expensive transit route for that telco and then routing its own traffic to Europe over that link. Within a couple of months, the European CFO was asking why the company was paying out so much for transit. Soon afterward, there was a peering arrangement between the two networks…

Tier 1 networks are those networks that don’t pay any other network for transit yet still can reach all networks connected to the internet. There are about seven such networks in the world. Being a Tier 1 is considered very “cool,” but it is an unenviable position. A Tier 1 is constantly faced with customers trying to bypass it, and this is a threat to its business. On top of the threat from customers, a Tier 1 also faces the danger of being de-peered by other Tier 1s. This de-peering happens when one Tier 1 network thinks that the other Tier 1 is not sufficiently important to be considered an equal. The bigger Tier 1 will then try to get a transit deal or paid peering deal with the smaller Tier 1, and if the smaller one accepts, then it is acknowledging that it is not really a Tier 1. But if the smaller Tier 1 calls the bigger Tier 1’s bluff and actually does get de-peered, some of the customers of either network can’t reach each other.

When I first learned about the Internet’s basic peering model, it seemed like there was a real danger of a natural monopoly developing if too many tier 1 providers merge or collude. But what this misses is that larger networks are facing a constant threat of having their customers bypass them and peer directly with other customers. As a result, even if there were only one tier 1 provider, that provider wouldn’t have that much monopoly power, because any time it raised its prices it would see its largest customers start building out infrastructure to bypass its network.

In effect, the BGP protocol that controls the interactions of the various network creates a highly liquid market for interconnection. Because a network has the technical ability to change its local topology in a matter of hours, it’s always in a reasonably strong bargaining position, even when dealing with a larger network.

Things are trickier in the “last mile” broadband market, but at least if we’re talking about the Internet backbone, this is a fiercely competitive market and seems likely to remain that way for the foreseeable future.

Google is entering the browser wars today (if any such war still exists) with the launch of Chrome, its new web browser.  I’m glad to see more competition in browsers as I think—and I hope everyone else agrees with me—that Firefox is the only real game in town. I know that Internet Explorer is more popular, but that seems to only be because it is shipping with every Windows PC and because many enterprise web applications require IE’s non-standard browser. Firefox is preferred browser for anyone who works with the web regularly and has bothered to compare browsers.

One implication of this foray by Mountain View into the browser arena is that—should Chrome be at all successful—they will soon be accused of using their supposed search monopoly to squeeze out competition from IE and Firefox. That is assuming that anything in Chrome favors Google’s search, like making it the default search engine for the browser, which I’m sure it will be.

It’s funny to think that Microsoft, the poster-child from antitrust suits, could be the one launching such a suit. Just a few short years ago we saw Microsoft scoffing at the very notion of antitrust or monopoly power, arguing that it in no way used its market share to its own advantage. Now we see Redmond lashing out against Google as a monopolist. At a recent conference I had the unpleasant experience of watching a panel on online advertising devolve into a fight between the Microsoft and Google reps over whether Google was a search and advertising monopolist.

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