Giving McCain benefit of doubt on public safety spectrum

by on March 5, 2007

I got my hands on the new public safety communications bill that John McCain introduced last Thursday, but which is not yet available on the web. Unlike what has been reported here and elsewhere, McCain’s bill isn’t a straight-up implementation of the Cyren Call plan. With some trepidation, I say there’s actually quite a bit to like.

McCain’s bill does take 30 MHz now slated for commercial auction and designate it for public safety, which in my book is a bad idea because public safety already has plenty of spectrum, and consumers would forgo the benefits of new commercially available spectrum. But here’s what he does: he sets up a “working group” of first responder and government representatives who will write a report to the FCC outlining what an ideal public-private interoperable network on the 30 MHz would look like. The FCC is then authorized to auction the 30 MHz as long as all the bidders agree to use the spectrum to provide a network that matches the report’s specifications. In some ways this is a lot like the Frontline Wireless proposal. If there is no bidder, however, then the Cyren Call plan kicks in and a Public Safety Broadband Trust Corporation, established by the bill, can buy the spectrum using FCC loan guarantees.

So what’s to like? Well, what there is to like is in the first part of the bill assuming the Cyren Call contingency doesn’t kick in.


First, the spectrum won’t just be licensed via a comparative hearing; at least it will be auctioned, which will hopefully draw out the best candidate. Second, it doesn’t put the spectrum in the hands of a committee of public safety representatives, but gives it to a commercial entity with the incentives to profit by building a viable network. Having first responders outline their requirements and then having private firms bid to build is almost exactly what the UK did with its Airwave national network. (Airwave is a case study in my recent paper.)

The problems I see with this are two. First, why can’t you do the same thing on spectrum that is already allocated for public safety? The bill could just give the FCC authority to auction off any public safety spectrum it identifies as suitable for such a network without having to touch 30 MHz of commercial spectrum. One point of optimism: As I read the bill, I thought, well, if this particular 30 MHz block is so important, then at least identify 30 MHz of existing public safety spectrum that can be vacated and auctioned “in exchange.” Well, Sec. 402 of the bill requires the FCC and others to prepare a report “on how during the next 15 years public safety organizations can (1) end their use of Land Mobile radio spectrum below 512 MHz, and begin to use either [the new 30 MHz band, or the already allocated 24 MHz band].” Now, this is just a long-term study and not a mandate to vacate spectrum after a transition to the new networks, but it’s a step in the right direction.

The second problem I see is one of incentives. How do we make sure that the plan the working group proposes is realistic. That is, how do we make sure it’s not so ambitious and costly that it would guarantee no bidders for the public safety auction? How do we make sure the working group has the same incentives as potential bidders? Perhaps their incentive will be just the opposite. They might write an impossible plan so that the Cyren Call contingency kicks in. It’s true that there will be government members of the working group, and the group’s plan will be made available for comment by the FCC, but we shouldn’t overlook the incentives here.

Finally, allow me to put on my wishful thinking hat. One of the main reasons I don’t completely like the Cyren Call, FCC “centralized national network,” or Frontline Wireless plans is that they create one national network. In other words, a new public safety communications monopoly. Instead I’d like to see two or more private competing interoperable public safety networks. Well, there’s this passage in the McCain bill:

SEC. 302. PREPARING FOR AUCTION.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 45 days after the date of enactment of this Act, the Federal Communications Commission shall issue a notice of proposed rule making to determine how the spectrum described in section 301 should be allocated for auction. The rulemaking shall be completed by July 1, 2007.

(b) CONTENT OF NOTICE.—In the notice required under subsection (a), the Federal Communications Commission shall (1) ask for comments on the proposed auction; and (2) consider (A) the financial, technical, competitive, and public safety merits of re-banding such spectrum into three 10 MHz bands of paired 5 MHz channels for auction; and (B) whether such spectrum is better auctioned (i) as one band of 30 MHz with two paired channels of 15 MHz; or (ii) any other configuration not described in clause (i) or subparagraph (A).

Am I crazy, or does this leave the door open for more than one network?

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