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By Brent Skorup and Michael Kotrous

In 1999, the FCC completed one of its last spectrum “beauty contests.” A sizable segment of spectrum was set aside for free for the US Department of Transportation (DOT) and DOT-selected device companies to develop DSRC, a communications standard for wireless automotive communications, like vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) and vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I). The government’s grand plans for DSRC never materialized and in the intervening 20 years, new tech—like lidar, radar, and cellular systems—advanced and now does most of what regulators planned for DSRC.

Too often, however, government technology plans linger, kept alive by interest groups that rely on the new regulatory privilege, even when the market moves on. At the eleventh hour of the Obama administration, NHTSA proposed mandating DSRC devices in all new vehicles, an unprecedented move that Brent and other free-market groups opposed in public interest comment filings.  As Brent wrote last year ,

In the fast-moving connected car marketplace, there is no reason to force products with reliability problems [like DSRC] on consumers. Any government-designed technology that is “so good it must be mandated” warrants extreme skepticism….

Further,

Rather than compel automakers to add costly DSRC systems to cars, NHTSA should consider a certification or emblem system for vehicle-to-vehicle safety technologies, similar to its five-star crash safety ratings. Light-touch regulatory treatment would empower consumer choice and allow time for connected car innovations to develop.

Fortunately, the Trump administration put the brakes on the mandate , which would have added cost and complexity to cars for uncertain and unlikely benefits.

However, some regulators and companies are trying to revive the DSRC device industry while NHTSA’s proposed DSRC mandate is on life support. Marc Scribner at CEI uncovered a sneaky attempt to create DSRC technology sales via an EPA proceeding. The stalking horse DSRC boosters have chosen is the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) regulations—specifically the EPA’s off-cycle program. EPA and NHTSA jointly manage these regulations. That program rewards manufacturers who adopt new technologies that reduce a vehicle’s emissions in ways not captured by conventional measures like highway fuel economy.

Under the proposed rules , auto makers that install V2V or V2I capabilities can receive credit for having reduced emissions. The EPA proposal doesn’t say “DSRC” but it singles out only one technology standard that would be favored in this scheme: a standard underlying DSRC

This proposal comes as a bit of surprise for those who have followed auto technology; we’re aware of no studies showing DSRC improves emissions. (DSRC’s primary use-case today is collision warnings to the driver.) But the EPA proposes a helpful end-around that problem: simply waiving the requirement that manufacturers provide data showing a reduction in harmful emissions. Instead of requiring emissions data, the EPA proposes a much lower bar, that auto makers show that these devices merely “have some connection to overall environmental benefits.” Unless the agency applies credits in a tech-neutral way and requires more rigor in the final rules, which is highly unlikely, this looks like a backdoor subsidy to DSRC via gaming of emission reduction regulations.

Hopefully EPA regulators will discover the ruse and drop the proposal. It was a pleasant surprise last week when a DOT spokesman committed that the agency favored a tech-neutral approach for this “talking car” band. But after 20 years,  this 75 MHz of spectrum gifted to DSRC device makers should be repurposed by the FCC for flexible-use. Fortunately, the FCC has started thinking about alternative uses for the DSRC spectrum. In 2015 Commissioners O’Rielly and Rosenworcel said the agency should consider flexible-use alternatives to this DSRC-only band.

The FCC would be wise to follow through and push even farther. Until the gifted spectrum that powers DSRC is reallocated to flexible use, interest groups will continue to pull any regulatory lever it has to subsidize or mandate adoption of talking-car technology. If DSRC is the best V2V technology available, device makers should win market share by convincing auto companies, not by convincing regulators.

Those of us with deep reservations about the push for ever more unlicensed spectrum are having many of our fears realized with the new resistance to novel technologies using unlicensed spectrum. By law unlicensed spectrum users have no rights to their spectrum; unlicensed spectrum is a managed commons. In practice, however, existing users frequently act as if they own their spectrum and they can exclude others. By entertaining these complaints, the FCC simply encourages NIMBYism in unlicensed spectrum.

The general idea behind unlicensed spectrum is that by providing a free spectrum commons to any device maker who complies with certain simple rules (namely, Part 15’s low power operation requirement), device makers will develop wireless services that would never have developed if the device makers had to shell out millions for licensed spectrum. For decades, unlicensed spectrum has stimulated development and sale of millions of consumer devices, including cordless phones, Bluetooth devices, wifi access points, RC cars, and microwave ovens.

Now, however, many device makers are getting nervous about new entrants. For instance, Globalstar is developing a technology, TLPS, based on wifi standards that will use some unlicensed spectrum at 2.4 GHz and mobile carriers would like to market an unlicensed spectrum technology, LTE-U, based on 4G LTE standards that will use spectrum at 5 GHz.

This resistance from various groups and spectrum incumbents, who fear interference in “their” spectrum if these new technologies catch on, was foreseeable, which makes these intractable conflicts even more regrettable. As Prof. Tom Hazlett wrote in a 2001 essay, long before today’s conflicts, when it comes to unlicensed devices, “economic success spells its own demise.” Hazlett noted, “Where an unlicensed firm successfully innovates, open access guarantees imitation. This not only results in competition…but may degrade wireless emissions — perhaps severely.”

On the other hand, the many technical filings about potential interference to existing unlicensed devices are red herrings. Prospective device makers in these unlicensed bands have no duty to protect existing users. Part 15 rules say that unlicensed users like wifi and Bluetooth “shall not be deemed to have any vested or recognizable right to continued use of any given frequency by virtue of prior registration or certification of equipment” and that “interference must be accepted.” These rules, however, put the FCC in a self-created double bind: the agency provides no interference protection to existing users but its open access policy makes interference conflicts likely. Continue reading →

The most pressing challenge in wireless telecommunications policy is transferring spectrum from inefficient legacy operators like federal agencies to the commercial sector for consumer use.

Reflecting high consumer demand for more wireless services, in early 2015 the FCC completed an auction for a small slice of prime spectrum–currently occupied by federal agencies and other non-federal incumbents–that grossed over $40 billion for the US Treasury. Increasing demand for mobile services such as Web browsing, streaming video, the Internet of Things, and gaming requires even more spectrum. Inaction means higher smartphone bills, more dropped calls, and stuttering downloads.

My latest research for the Mercatus Center, “Sweeten the Deal: Transfer of Federal Spectrum through Overlay Licenses,” was published recently and recommends the use of overlay licenses to transfer federal spectrum into commercial use. Purchasing an overlay license is like acquiring real property that contains a few tenants with unexpired leases. While those tenants have a superior possessory right to use the property, a high enough cash payment or trade will persuade them to vacate the property. The same dynamic applies for spectrum. Continue reading →

The FCC is being dragged–reluctantly, it appears–into disputes that resemble the infamous beauty contests of bygone years, where the agency takes on the impossible task of deciding which wireless services deliver more benefits to the public. Two novel technologies used for wireless broadband–TLPS and LTE-U–reveal the growing tensions in unlicensed spectrum. The two technologies are different and pose slightly different regulatory issues but each is an attempt to bring wireless Internet to consumers. Their advocates believe these technologies will provide better service than existing wifi technology and will also improve wifi performance. Their major similarity is that others, namely wifi advocates, object that the unlicensed bands are already too crowded and these new technologies will cause interference to existing users.

The LTE-U issue is new and developing. The TLPS proceeding, on the other hand, has been pending for a few years and there are warning signs the FCC may enter into beauty contests–choosing which technologies are entitled to free spectrum–once again.

What are FCC beauty contests and why does the FCC want to avoid them? Continue reading →

There is renewed interest in unlicensed spectrum as the FCC approaches the TV white space issue (again). Tim B. Lee reports on some of the unlicensed supporters,

Activists at the South by Southwest Interactive festival in Austin, TX, built a free wireless network to help publicize the power of unlicensed “white spaces” technology. The project is part of a broader campaign to persuade the FCC not to auction off this spectrum for the exclusive use of wireless carriers.

Unlicensed spectrum for high-powered devices has been called Super Wifi (“wifi” in this context is used loosely; Super Wifi is a PR term and has nothing to do with the wifi technical standard). Frankly, there are many reasons to be cautious about assigning more unlicensed spectrum, especially given the confusing information out there about the technology. (For instance, despite a popular rumor, Super Wifi would not provide free Internet access to everyone with a device, as Matt Yglesias and Jon Brodkin point out.) Continue reading →

Over at his always-informative Spectrum Blog, wireless guru Michael Marcus brings to my attention a new report that will definitely be of interest to everyone here about “The Economic Value Generated by Current and Future Allocations of Unlicensed Spectrum.”  It was written by Rich Thanki of Perspective Associates, a UK consulting firm. I haven’t had time to finish the whole thing yet, but it basically lays out the argument for opening up more spectrum, especially “white spaces,” to unlicensed use.

Anyway, Mike Marcus has an much better write-up of the report than I could ever do, so head over there to check out his discussion.  One important thing that Mike stresses is the importance of technical flexibility:

But the key issue here is not the presence or absence of a license, the key issue is deregulation. A major reason why unlicensed networks have been so innovative is that the descendants of the FCC Docket 81-413 rulemaking, e.g. Wi-Fi, Bluetooth, and Zigbee have been in spectrum bands with great technical flexibility… If you overregulate unlicensed systems, they can stagnate just as much as licensed one often do.

I think that is an important insight and essential lesson that we should always keep in mind when it comes to spectrum policy, regardless of whether we talking about licensed or unlicensed spectrum.  Although I’ve always been a bit torn about how much spectrum should be allocated on an unlicensed (or “commons”) basis versus auctioned (property rights model), as Marcus suggests, flexibility is crucial in either case.   In all the heated catfights over licensed and unlicensed spectrum, that point sometimes gets overlooked.

The white space debate has been the subject of much attention lately, with Microsoft, Dell, and Google pitted against the CTIA on the question of how to allocate white spaces between UHF channels. The two competing proposals are 1) auction off white spaces, similar to the 700mhz auction, or 2) leave them unlicensed and managed (like 2.4Ghz) but allow devices which don’t cause interference.

This controversy again raises the issue of the desirability of unlicensed spectrum. I’ve been reading about the merits of unlicensed spectrum, inspired by a 2006 exchange between Jerry Brito and Mike Masnick on TLF and TechDirt. Jerry makes a compelling argument that command-and-control commons rules might hinder the emergence of superior networks operating with devices emitting greater than 4w EIRP.

The public interest is to allocate the spectrum in the most economically efficient manner, so if unlicensed spectrum uses do not make the best use of scarce airwaves, unlicensed bands should be auctioned off. Tim envisions privately managed commons that would provide for much the same openness now offered by unlicensed spectrum, but without a monolithic regulator imposing centralized rules.

Continue reading →