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If there is one thing I have learned in almost 23 years of covering communications and media regulation it is this: No matter how well-intentioned, regulation often has unintended consequences that hurt the very consumers the rules are meant to protect. Case in point: “universal service” mandates that require a company to serve an entire area as a condition of offering service at all. The intention is noble: Get service out to everyone in the community, preferably at a very cheap rate. Alas, the result of mandating that result is clear: You get less competition, less investment, less innovation, and less consumer choice. And often you don’t even get everyone served.

Consider this Wall Street Journal article today, “Google Fiber Is Fast, but Is It Fair? The Company Provides Neighborhoods With Faster and Cheaper Service, but Are Some Being Left Behind?” In the story, Alistair Barr notes that:

U.S. policy long favored extending service to all. AT&T touted its “universal service” in advertisements more than a century ago. The concept was codified in a 1934 law requiring nationwide “wire and radio services” to reach everyone at “reasonable charges.” In exchange for wiring a community, telecommunications providers often gained a monopoly. Cities made similar deals with cable-TV providers beginning in the 1960s.

The problem, of course, is that while this model allowed for the slow spread of service to most communities, it came at a very steep cost: Monopoly and plain vanilla service. I documented this in a 1994 essay entitled, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly.” As well-intentioned regulatory mandates started piling up, competition slowly disappeared. And a devil’s deal was eventually cut between regulators and AT&T to adopt the company’s advertising motto — “One Policy, One System, Universal Service” — as the de facto law of the land. Continue reading →

Google’s announcement this week of plans to expand to dozens of more cities got me thinking about the broadband market and some parallels to transportation markets. Taxi cab and broadband companies are seeing business plans undermined with the emergence of nimble Silicon Valley firms–Uber and Google Fiber, respectively.

The incumbent operators in both cases were subject to costly regulatory obligations in the past but in return they were given some protection from competitors. The taxi medallion system and local cable franchise requirements made new entry difficult. Uber and Google have managed to break into the market through popular innovations, the persistence to work with local regulators, and motivated supporters. Now, in both industries, localities are considering forbearing from regulations and welcoming a competitor that poses an economic threat to the existing operators.

Notably, Google Fiber will not be subject to the extensive build-out requirements imposed on cable companies who typically built their networks according to local franchise agreements in the 1970s and 1980s. Google, in contrast, generally does substantial market research to see if there is an adequate uptake rate among households in particular areas. Neighborhoods that have sufficient interest in Google Fiber become Fiberhoods.

Similarly, companies like Uber and Lyft are exempted from many of the regulations governing taxis. Taxi rates are regulated and drivers have little discretion in deciding who to transport, for instance. Uber and Lyft drivers, in contrast, are not price-regulated and can allow rates to rise and fall with demand. Further, Uber and Lyft have a two-way rating system: drivers rate passengers and passengers rate drivers via smartphone apps. This innovation lowers costs and improves safety: the rider who throws up in cars after bar-hopping, who verbally or physically abuses drivers (one Chicago cab driver told me he was held up at gunpoint several times per year), or who is constantly late will eventually have a hard time hailing an Uber or Lyft. The ratings system naturally forces out expensive riders (and ill-tempered drivers).

Interestingly, support and opposition for Uber and Google Fiber cuts across partisan lines (and across households–my wife, after hearing my argument, is not as sanguine about these upstarts). Because these companies upset long-held expectations, express or implied, strong opposition remains. Nevertheless, states and localities should welcome the rapid expansion of both Uber and Google Fiber.

The taxi registration systems and the cable franchise agreements were major regulatory mistakes. Local regulators should reduce regulations for all similarly-situated competitors and resist the temptation to remedy past errors with more distortions. Of course, there is a decades-long debate about when deregulation turns into subsidies, and this conversation applies to Uber and Google Fiber.

That debate is important, but regulators and policymakers should take every chance to roll back the rules of the past–not layer on more mandates in an ill-conceived attempt to “level the playing field.” Transportation and broadband markets are changing for the better with more competition and localities should generally stand aside.

In a recent post, Tim Lee does a good job of explaining why facilities-based competition in broadband is difficult. He writes,

As Verizon is discovering with its FiOS project, it’s much harder to turn a profit installing the second local loop; both because fewer than 50 percent of customers are likely to take the service, and because competition pushes down margins. And it’s almost impossible to turn a profit providing a third local loop, because fewer than a third of customers are likely to sign up, and even more competition means even thinner margins.

Tim thus concludes that

the kind of “facilities-based” competition we’re seeing in Kansas City, in which companies build redundant networks that will sit idle most of the time, is extremely wasteful. In a market where every household has n broadband options (each with its own fiber network), only 1/n local loops will be in use at any given time. The larger n is, the more resources are wasted on redundant infrastructure.

I don’t understand that conclusion. You would imagine that redundant infrastructure would be built only if it is profitable to its builder. Tim is right we probably should not expect more than a few competitors, but I don’t see how more than one pipe is necessarily wasteful. If laying down a second set of pipes is profitable, shouldn’t we welcome the competition? The question is whether that second pipe is profitable without government subsidy.

That brings me to a larger point: I think what Tim is missing is what makes Google Fiber so unique. Tim is assuming that all competitors in broadband will make their profits from the subscription fees they collect from subscribers. As we all know, that’s not how Google tends to operate. Google’s primary business model is advertising, and that’s likely from where they expect their return to come. One of Google Fiber’s price points is free, so we might expect greater adoption of the service. That’s disruptive innovation that could sustainably increase competition and bring down prices for consumers–without a government subsidy.

Kansas City sadly gave Google all sorts of subsidies, like free power and rackspace for its servers as Tim has pointed out, but it also cut serious red tape. For example, there is no build-out requirement for Google Fiber, a fact now bemoaned by digital divide activists. Such requirements, I would argue, are the true cause of the unused and wasteful overbuilding that Tim laments.

So what matters more? The in-kind subsidies or the freedom to build only where it’s profitable? I think that’s the empirical question we’re really arguing about. It’s not a forgone conclusion of broadband economics that there can be only one. And do we want to limit competition in part of a municipality in order to achieve equity for the whole? That’s another question over which “original recipe” and bleeding-heart libertarians may have a difference of opinion.

I somehow missed this excellent ITIF paper by Robert D. Atkinson and George Ou when it came out at this point last year, but George has just dusted it off, made a couple of updates, and re-posted it over at the Digital Society blog. Worth reading. It touches on a lot of the same case studies I have been documenting in my ongoing series, “Problems in Public Utility Paradise.”  In particular, it focuses on the UTOPIA and iProvo fiascos out in Utah. Here’s a key takeaway from those case studies:

The lessons learned in Utah is that projected uptake models and deployment plans don’t always come to fruition, and when that happens the consequence is failure.  For UTOPIA, the project was projected to reach 35% uptake rates by February 2008 but the reality was less than 17% uptake.  UTOPIA had also hoped for 17% uptake from lucrative business customers but the reality was only 2 to 3 percent.  Provo County’s iProvo was hoping for 10,000 subscribers by July 2006 with the assumption that 75% of those customers would subscribe to lucrative triple play services, but the reality was 10,000 customers in late 2007 with only 17% of those customers subscribing to triple play.  Many consumers were quite happy to subscribe to existing broadband cable or telecom providers.  The consistent theme in Utah was an overestimation of the uptake rates and the underestimation of competition from incumbent cable operator Comcast and telecom operator Qwest which led to consistent underperformance.

Ouch. For more details, see this old essay of mine about UTOPIA from 2008, and this piece from last Sept about iProvo. Not a pretty picture. As I say every time I pen a piece about the latest muni failure du jour, these case studies should serve as a cautionary tale about the dangers of grandiose, centrally planned broadband schemes. There is no such thing as a free lunch. Network-building is hard, and politicians usually aren’t that good at doing it.

Fiber is Nice

by on January 21, 2009 · 13 comments

FWIW…  Just upgraded — at no cost — to Verizon’s 20/5 FIOS plan. Been hitting almost 25 megs pretty consistently today. I was on Verizon’s 10/2 plan beforehand and the 5/2 plan before that. Didn’t notice as much of a difference when I moved from 5 to 10, but jump to 20 is definitely noticeable on big file downloads.

Cox Cable has also been offering nice speed boosts in my neighborhood (McLean, VA) recently, so I suspect that’s why I was offered the free upgrade yesterday when I called Verizon about adding some new HD channels to my FIOS TV package.

Ken Ferree and I just filed an amicus brief with the D.C. Circuit in what could be among the most important First Amendment cases involving economic regulation in years:  Comcast’s challenge to the FCC’s cap on the maximum size of a cable operator’s nationwide subscriber-audience.  While few may feel righteous indignation at limitations targeted at large corporations such as Comcast or Time Warner, the larger principle at stake here is deeply important: Will the First Amendment provide a meaningful check on what USC law professor Chris Yoo has called “architectural censorship” (i.e., so-called “structural” regulations that “have the unintended consequence of reducing the quantity, quality, and diversity of media content”).

In a nutshell, we argue that that:

  1. The provisions of the 1992 Cable Act authorizing the FCC to impose a “cable cap” are outdated in world of media abundance and vibrant platform competition.
  2. Because cable is no longer the unique “bottleneck” or “gatekeeper” that it was in 1992, these statutory provisions (not just the FCC’s 30% rule) must be subject to strict scrutiny under the First Amendment as a limitation on free speech.
  3. Because there are “less restrictive means” of ensuring cable operators do not impede the flow of video programming to consumers, the court should strike down these provisions.
  4. Even if the court upholds the statute, it should nonetheless strike down the cap issued by the FCC in December 2007 (30% of all Multichannel Video Programming (MVPD)  subscribers as based on an outdated model of the video marketplace.

I encourage you to read our brief (below).  I’ve provided a summary below, along with some additional commentary we just couldn’t cover under our 3500 word limit.

Strict Scrutiny.  Yoo’s article Architectural Censorship and the FCC is essential reading for anyone who believes that government regulations on the size and shape of the “soapbox” can have huge effects on speech itself.   Yoo argues that the First Amendment should check this kind of regulation–however “content-neutral” it might seem–under “strict scrutiny”, which requires that the government show that a regulation is the “least restrictive means” available for advancing a “compelling government interest.”  But Yoo ultimately concludes (pp. 713-718, PDF pp. 45-50) that, under existing precedent, most “architectural censorship will be effectively insulated from meaningful judicial review.”  Continue reading →

So, if Tim Wu’s thesis is correct that the broadband marketplace is “a cartel,” should we be reading headlines in today’s Wall Street Journal and CNET News.com like this: “Price War Erupts For High-Speed Internet Service” and “Broadband Price War Brews“? From the WSJ story:

The battle between cable and phone companies to sign up new customers for high-speed Internet service is heating up, creating fresh opportunities for consumers to cut their bills. […] While the most generous offers are coming from the phone companies, some analysts expect cable companies will also become more aggressive in their own promotions as they compete to retain customers.

Geez, if that’s a cartel, give me more of them!