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new paper: “Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech”

by on January 14, 2011 · 0 comments

Today the Mercatus Center has released a short new paper I have authored on “Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech.”  I begin the piece by noting that:

Federal policy makers, state legislators, and state attorneys general have recently shown interest in regulating commercial advertising and marketing. Several new regulatory initiatives are being proposed, or are already underway, that could severely curtail or restrict advertising or marketing on a variety of platforms. The consequences of these stepped-up regulatory efforts will be profound and will hurt consumer welfare both directly and indirectly.

I go on to note that “advertising can be an easy target for politicians or regulatory activist groups who make a variety of (typically unsubstantiated) claims about its negative impact on society,” but then continue on to explain how “the role of commercial speech in a free-market economy is often misunderstood or taken for granted.” I outline how, despite regulators’ concerns, consumers actually derive three important types of benefits from advertising and marketing: (1) Informational / Educational Benefits; (2) Market Choice / Pro-Competitive Benefits; and (3) Media Promotion / Cross-Subsidization.  After discussing each benefit, I conclude that:

For these reasons, a stepped-up regulatory crusade against advertising and marketing will hurt consumer welfare since it will raise prices, restrict choice, and diminish marketplace competition and innovation—both in ad-supported content and service markets, and throughout the economy at large.  Simply stated, there is no free lunch.

Read the entire 1,800-word essay here.  I have also embedded the document down below in a Scribd reader.

Continue reading →

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Adobe Improves Privacy Controls Before Regulators Can Saddle Up

by on January 14, 2011 · 6 comments

Via @csoghoian (who can be wrathful if you don’t attribute), Adobe buries the lede in its blog post about privacy improvements to the Flash player. They’re working with the most popular browser vendors on integrating control of “local shared objects”—more commonly known as “Flash cookies”—into the interface. Users control of Flash cookies will soon be similar to control of ordinary cookies.

It doesn’t end there:

Still, we know the Flash Player Settings Manager could be easier to use, and we’re working on a redesign coming in a future release of Flash Player, which will bring together feedback from our users and external privacy advocates. Focused on usability, this redesign will make it simpler for users to understand and manage their Flash Player settings and privacy preferences. In addition, we’ll enable you to access the Flash Player Settings Manager directly from your computer’s Control Panels or System Preferences on Windows, Mac and Linux, so that they’re even easier to locate and use. We expect users will see these enhancements in the first half of the year and we look forward to getting feedback as we continue to improve the Flash Player Settings Manager.

Mysterious, sinister “Flash cookies” were Exhibit A in the argument for a Do Not Track regulation. There is no way that people can cope with the endless array of tracking technologies advertisers are willing to deploy, the argument went, so the government must step in, define what it means to be “tracked,” and require it to stop—without kneecapping the free Internet. (Good luck with that!)

But Flash cookies are now quickly taking their place as a feature that users can control from the browser (or OS), customizing their experience of the Web to meet their individual privacy preferences. This is not a panacea, of course: People must still be made aware of the importance of controlling Flash cookies, as well as regular cookies. New tracking technologies will emerge, and consumer-friendly information controls meeting those challenges will be required in response.

But if this is what the drawn-out “war” against tracking technologies looks like, color me pro-war!

In a few short months, Adobe has begun work on the controls needed to put Flash cookies under peoples’ control. The Federal Trade Commission—prospective imposer of peace through complex, top-down regulation—took more than a year to produce a report querying whether a Do Not Track regulation might be a good idea. This problem will essentially be solved (and we’ll be on to the next one) before the FTC would have gotten saddled up.

Yes, Adobe may have acted because of the threat of damaging government regulation. That seems always to be what gets these companies moving. Of course it does, when the primary modus operandi of privacy advocacy is to push for government regulation. Were the privacy community to work as assiduously on boycotts as acting through intermediary government regulators, change might come even faster.

We could do without the standing army of regulators. Having a government sector powerful enough to cow the business sector is costly, both in terms of freedom and tax dollars.

With the failure of Do Not Track, the vision of a free and open Internet—populated by aware, empowered individuals—lives on.

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Understanding the Costs of Regulation

by on January 12, 2011 · 1 comment

My colleague Dr. Richard Williams, who serves as the Director of Policy Research at the Mercatus Center, has just released an excellent little primer on “The Impact of Regulation on Investment and the U.S. Economy.” Those who attempt to track and analyze regulation in the communications and high-tech arenas will find the piece of interest since it provides an framework for how to evaluate the sensibility of new rules.

Williams, who is an expert in benefit-cost analysis and risk analysis, opens the piece by noting that:

The total cost of regulation in the United States is difficult to calculate, but one estimate puts the cost at $1.75 trillion in 2008. Total expenditures by the U.S. government were about $2.9 trillion in 2008. Thus, out of a total of $4.6 trillion in resources allocated by the federal government, 38% of the total is for regulations. If regulations always produced goods and services that were valued as highly as market-produced goods and services, then this would not be a cause for alarm. But that is precisely what is not known. In fact, there is evidence to the contrary for many regulations. Where regulations take resources out of the private sector for less valuable uses, overall consumer welfare is diminished. … Regulation also impacts the creation and sustainability of jobs… [which] can have very real consequences for the economy.

He also explains how regulation can affect international competitiveness, especially when burdensome rules limit the ability of companies to attract capital for new innovations and investment. Continue reading →

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“Preserving the Internet,” But Which One?: Reading the FCC’s Net Neutrality Order (Part IV)

by on January 12, 2011 · 5 comments

This is Part IV of a five-part commentary on the FCC’s Dec. 23, 2010 “Open Internet” Report and Order.

Part I looked at the remarkably weak justification the majority gave for issuing the new rules.

Part II explored the likely costs of the rules, particularly the undiscussed costs of enforcement that will be borne by the agency and accused broadband access providers, regardless of the merits.  (See Adam Thierer’s post on the first attenuated claim of violation, raised before the rules even take effect.)

Part III compared the final text of the rules to earlier drafts and alternative proposals, tracing the Commission’s changing and sometimes contradictory reasoning over the last year.

Part IV, (this part), looks at the many exceptions and carve-outs from the rules, and what,  taken together, they say about the majority’s dogged determination to see the Internet as it was and not as it is or will become.

Part V will review the legal basis on which the majority rests its authority for the rules, likely to be challenged in court.

What does an Open Internet mean?

The idea of the “open Internet” is relatively simple:  consumers of broadband Internet access should have the ability to surf the web as they please and enjoy the content of their choice, without interference by access providers who may have financial or other anti-competitive reasons to shape or limit that access. Continue reading →

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“Fake Neutrality” or Government Takeover?: Reading the FCC’s Net Neutrality Report (Part III)

by on January 5, 2011 · 6 comments

In Part I of this analysis of the FCC’s Report and Order on “Preserving the Open Internet,” I reviewed the Commission’s justification for regulating broadband providers.   In Part II, I looked at the likely costs of the order, in particular the hidden costs of enforcement.  In this part, I compare the text of the final rules with earlier versions.  Next, I’ll look at some of the exceptions and caveats to the rules—and what they say about the true purpose of the regulations

In the end, the FCC voted to approve three new rules that apply to broadband Internet providers.  One (§8.3) requires broadband access providers to disclose their network management practices to consumers.  The second One (§8.4) prohibits blocking of content, applications, services, and non-harmful devices.  The third One (§8.5) forbids fixed broadband providers (cable and telephone, e.g.) from “unreasonable” discrimination in transmitting lawful network traffic to a consumer.

There has of course been a great deal of commentary and criticism of the final rules, much of it reaching fevered pitch before the text was even made public.  At one extreme, advocates for stronger rules have rejected the new rules as meaningless, as “fake net neutrality,” “not neutrality,” or the latest evidence that the FCC has been captured by the industries it regulates.  On the other end, critics decry the new rules as a government takeover of the Internet, censorship, and a dangerous and unnecessary interference with a healthy digital economy.  (I agree with that last one.)

One thing that has not been seriously discussed, however, is just how little the final text differs from the rules originally proposed by the FCC in October, 2009.  Indeed, many of those critical of the weakness of the final rules seem to forget their enthusiasm for the initial draft, which in key respects has not changed at all in the intervening year of comments, conferences, hearings, and litigation. Continue reading →

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Chairman Genachowski and his Howling Commissioners: Reading the Net Neutrality Order (Part I)

by on December 30, 2010 · 8 comments

At the last possible moment before the Christmas holiday, the FCC published its Report and Order on “Preserving the Open Internet,” capping off years of largely content-free “debate” on the subject of whether or not the agency needed to step in to save the Internet.

In the end, only FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski fully supported the final solution.  His two Democratic colleagues concurred in the vote (one approved in part and concurred in part), and issued separate opinions indicating their belief that stronger measures and a sounder legal foundation were required to withstand likely court challenges.  The two Republican Commissioners vigorously dissented, which is not the norm in this kind of regulatory action.  Independent regulatory agencies, like the U.S. Courts of Appeal, strive for and generally achieve consensus in their decisions. Continue reading →

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op-ed: “Privacy Regulation and the ‘Free’ Internet”

by on December 24, 2010 · 2 comments

[Here’s an oped of mine that recently ran on Reuters.  Readers will recognize many of these themes and arguments since I have developed them here on the TLF many times before.]

Privacy Regulation and the “Free” Internet

by Adam Thierer, Mercatus Center at George Mason University

Would you like to pay $20 a month for Facebook, or a dime every time you did a search on Google or Bing?  That’s potentially what is at stake if the Obama administration and advocates of stepped-up regulation of online advertising get their way.

The Internet feels like the ultimate free lunch.  Once we pay for basic access, a cornucopia of seemingly free services and content is at our fingertips.  But those services don’t just fall to Earth like manna from heaven.  What powers the “free” Internet are data collection and advertising. In essence, the relationship between consumers and online content and service providers isn’t governed by any formal contract, but rather by an unwritten  quid pro quo: tolerate some ads or we’ll be forced to charge you for service.  Most consumers gladly take that deal—even if many of them gripe about annoying or intrusive ads, at times. Continue reading →

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Now back to the National Broadband Plan…

by on December 21, 2010 · 0 comments

I recorded a commentary today  for KQED–NPR in the Bay Area–on the importance of the National Broadband Plan.  In the wake of tumult over net neutrality, Title II, and other regulatory gibberish, the important goals of the NBP, published in March of 2010, have been lost.  That’s unfortunate, because the authors did a great job of setting out ambitious goals essential to maintain U.S. competitiveness.  The plan also relies for funding on private investment and incentives, giving it a realistic chance of success.

While recent polls indicate that few Americans want the government involved in encouraging adoption of broadband, I believe this is one example where intervention–if only of the cheerleading and goal-setting variety–is appropriate.  As I’ve written extensively elsewhere, the Internet’s success is a function of network effects, as succinctly described by Metcalfe’s Law.  The more people who have broadband access, the more valuable the network is for everyone.  And the better the chances for serendipitous new uses and applications to flourish.

Those of us who already have broadband access, in other words, would benefit just as much from getting non-users online as those users themselves.

Perhaps even more.

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Regulatory Capture: What the Experts Have Found

by on December 19, 2010 · 661 comments

[Note: This post is updated regularly as I discover relevant old or new material.]

“Regulatory capture” occurs when special interests co-opt policymakers or political bodies — regulatory agencies, in particular — to further their own ends.  Capture theory is closely related to the “rent-seeking” and “political failure” theories developed by the public choice school of economics.  Another term for regulatory capture is “client politics,” which according to James Q. Wilson, “occurs when most or all of the benefits of a program go to some single, reasonably small interest (and industry, profession, or locality) but most or all of the costs will be borne by a large number of people (for example, all taxpayers).”  (James Q. Wilson, Bureaucracy, 1989, at 76).

While capture theory cannot explain all regulatory policies or developments, it does provide an explanation for the actions of political actors with dismaying regularity.  Because regulatory capture theory conflicts mightily with romanticized notions of “independent” regulatory agencies or “scientific” bureaucracy, it often evokes a visceral reaction and a fair bit of denialism.  (See, for example, the reaction of New Republic’s Jonathan Chait to Will Wilkinson’s recent Economist column about the prevalence of corporatism in our modern political system.)  Yet, countless studies have shown that regulatory capture has been at work in various arenas: transportation and telecommunications; energy and environmental policy; farming and financial services; and many others.

I thought it might be useful to build a compendium of quotes from various economists and political scientists who have studied the regulatory process throughout history and identified regulatory capture or client politics as a major problem.  I would greatly appreciate having others suggest additional quotes and studies to add to this list since I plan to update it frequently and eventually work all of this into a future paper or book. [ Note: I have updated this compendium over a dozen times since the original post, so please check back for updates.]

The following list is chronological and begins, surprisingly, with the thoughts of progressive hero Woodrow Wilson…

Continue reading →

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FTC Endorses “Do Not Track” Information Control Regime for the Internet

by on December 1, 2010 · 18 comments

This morning, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) released its eagerly-awaited Preliminary FTC Staff Report on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change: A Proposed Framework for Businesses and Policymakers. As expected, the agency has generally endorsed an expanded regulatory regime to govern online data collection and advertising efforts in the name of protecting consumer privacy.  More specifically, the agency endorsed a so-called “Do Not Track” mechanism that would supposedly help consumers block unwanted data collection or advertising.  Here’s how the agency describes it:

Such a universal mechanism could be accomplished by legislation or potentially through robust, enforceable self-regulation.  The most practical method of providing uniform choice for online behavioral advertising would likely involve placing a setting similar to a persistent cookie on a consumer’s browser and conveying that setting to sites that the browser visits, to signal whether or not the consumer wants to be tracked or receive targeted advertisements.  To be effective, there must be an enforceable requirement that sites honor those choices. (p. 66)

I’m sure we’ll have plenty more to say here about the issue in coming weeks and months (comments on the FTC report are due by Jan. 31), but we’ve already commented on this proposal here before. See 1, 2, 3.  To briefly summarize a few of those concerns: Continue reading →

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