Last night here on the TLF, Bret Swanson raised a number of objections with this FCC-commissioned report about international broadband comparisons, which was conducted by some folks at Harvard University’s Berkman Center. Meanwhile, over at the Digital Society blog, George Ou also offers a hard-nosed look at the Berkman broadband report and concludes “The underlying data cited by Berkman study is simply too flawed to be of any use.” I recommend everyone check out both essays. It will be interesting to hear how the Berkman folks respond. Some of these international broadband comparisons are really fishy. [Here’s a podcast we did on that issue two years ago.]
One quick point… Like Bret, I also found it shocking that–even though the report reads like an ode to forced access regulation–the Berkman folks didn’t spend much time discussing the result of America’s previous open-access regime. “The gaping, jaw-dropping irony of the report,” Bret argues, “was its failure even to mention the chief outcome of America’s previous open-access regime: the telecom/tech crash of 2000-02. We tried this before. And it didn’t work!” Indeed, America’s regulatory experiment with forced access regulation involved a lot of well intentioned laws and regulation, and too many acronyms to count–CLECs, TELRIC, UNE-P, etc– but it did not result in serious, facilities-based competition. Instead it offered us the fiction of competition through network-sharing, or what Peter Huber once referred to as building “networks out of paper.” The results were disastrous for investment during that period since regulatory uncertainly led to a lot of stunted innovation.
In sum, sharing is not competing. You can socialize and commoditize old pipes for awhile and get decent results in the short-term, but you’ll sacrifice long-run investment and innovation if you do. [For more background, see my recent essay on “The Fiction of Forced Access ‘Competition’ Revisited” and this old Cato piece on “UNE-P and the Future of Telecom “Competition” as well as Jeff Eisenach’s PFF white paper, “Broadband Policy: Does the U.S. Have It Right After All?”]
Whatever you think about this messy dispute between AT&T and Google about how to classify web-based telephony apps for regulatory purposes — in this case, Google Voice — the key issue not to lose site of here is that we are inching ever closer to FCC regulation of web-based apps! Again, this is the point we have stressed here again and again and again and again when opposing Net neutrality mandates: If you open the door to regulation of one layer of the Net, you open up the door to the eventual regulation of all layers of the Net.
You might not buy that story initially but if you doubt it then I invite you to read just about any history of American broadcast media regulation over the course of the past seven decades. (You might want to start with Krattenmaker & Powe’s Regulating Broadcast Programming or Jonathan Emord’s
Freedom, Technology, and the First Amendment). In such histories you will find a common theme: Once regulation of media and communications platforms gets underway, the natural progression of things is uni-directional — Up! That is, when new questions arise about how to “deal with” a new service, network, platform, or technology, the general tendency is the “regulate up” instead of “deregulating down.” When regulators are given a greater say about the contours of markets as technologies evolve and/or converge, we shouldn’t be surprised that their first instinct is to “bring them into the fold.”
And, sadly, that is exactly what is likely to occur eventually with Google Voice. The only really interesting question is what else regulators start mucking with in the search and applications layer once they get their hands on it. And if you still insist that I am being overly paranoid about “regulatory creep” and the prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into the Federal Information Commission, then consider what the agency had to say about cloud computing in paragraph 60 (pg. 21) of the FCC’s recent Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, which was launched on August 27th: Continue reading →
Despite my frequent disagreements with his policy conclusions, Farhad Manjooo of Slate is one of the most gifted tech policy pundits around today and everything he writes is worth reading (and I whole-heartedly agreed with his recent article on the high-tech and antitrust). Alas, I find myself again disagreeing with him again today.
In his latest column, “The Great iPhone Lockdown: Should the FCC force Apple to sell Google’s apps?” Manjoo responds to a recent essay by TLF contributor Ryan Radia (“Newsflash to FCC: The iPhone is a Closed Platform, and Consumers Love It“). In that essay, Ryan generally argued that: (a) a lot of people own and love the iPhone despite some silly restrictions on certain apps; and (b) if they don’t like that, there are plenty of other options from which they can choose. Consequently, regulation seems unwarranted and likely highly misguided in light of the potential unitended consequences in might yield. It’s an argument I very much agree with, of course. Anyway, Manjoo responds:
Radia’s argument isn’t crazy. Just the other day, I argued that the government shouldn’t go after Google for antitrust violations because the tech industry is fluid; companies that are on top today can fall tomorrow. So what if Apple rejects apps capriciously? If its actions are so terrible, consumers will eventually abandon it.
But then Manjoo counters that argument and goes completely off-the-rails with several assertions that I find quite perplexing: Continue reading →
Our readers may be interested in this excellent WSJ article, Too Risky for Venture Capitalists: Why proposals for a government bailout were roundly rejected. We should all take heart in the the fact that the venture capital community itself resoundingly opposed the notion of accepting a massive infusion of taxpayer money, especially Tom Friedman’s suggestion:
“You want to spend $20 billion of taxpayer money creating jobs?” Mr. Friedman wrote. “Fine. Call up the top 20 venture capital firms in America” and invest the money with them.
But I see three more reasons why those interested in technology policy should pay attention to this encouraging episode.
First, the groundswell of opposition seems to have been driven largely by the Internet, both as a vehicle for disseminating the bailout proposals and for voicing opposition to them:
Venture capitalists certainly agree that innovators and start-up companies, not bailed-out GMs or Chryslers, will create the new jobs. They rightly brag that almost 20% of U.S. gross domestic product is generated by companies built by venture capital, such as Intel, Apple and Google. Still, they almost universally panned the notion of taxpayer support. Their real-time rejection is an excellent example of how social media — here, the venture community dissecting a proposal online — can now quickly take down bad ideas.
Second, it should almost go without saying that venture capital is the fountainhead of innovation, especially the disruptive innovation that is constantly pushing the envelope of technology policy. A healthy VC sector is the bedrock of a dynamic, free and innovative economy. The VCs realize that this requires, more than anything else, avoiding the market distortions caused by government funding: Continue reading →
MIT’s Technology Review has a great review of a new biography of Georges Doriot (Wikipedia) by Businessweek Editor Spencer E. Ante entitled,
Creative Capital: Georges Doriot and the Birth of Venture Capital. Born in France, Doriot fought in World War I, then studied at Harvard Business School, served as director of the U.S. military’s Military Planning Division during World War II as a brigadier general, and in 1946 launched American Research and Development Corporation (ARD) as the first publicly owned venture capital firm.
Doriot’s legacy looms large today, even if his name is new to most:
Contemporaneously with ARD’s watershed investment in [Digital Equipment Corporation], others began walking the trails Doriot had blazed: Arthur Rock (a student of Doriot’s in the Harvard class of 1951) backed the departure of the “Traitorous Eight” from Shockley Semiconductor to form Fairchild Semiconductor in 1957, then funded Robert Noyce and Gordon Moore when they left Fairchild to found Intel; Laurance Rockefeller formed Venrock, which has since backed more than 400 companies, including Intel and Apple; Don Valentine formed Sequoia Capital, which would invest in Atari, Apple, Oracle, Cisco, Google, and YouTube.
Doriot himself would likely have felt at home among today’s embattled and outnumbered regulation-skeptics in the technology policy community:
he opposed both the dirigiste political economy of his native France and the tax hikes and anticompetitive laws enacted in the United States under the New Deal. Such regulations, he maintained, arrogated to bureaucrats the function of the markets; their worst feature was that they let government lend money to failing businesses. Ante notes that a former colleague of Doriot’s, James F. Morgan, recalled him as “the most schizophrenic Frenchman I’ve ever met”–devoted to his original land’s wine, cuisine, and language even as “the French capacity to make very simple things complicated drove him nuts.”
Continue reading →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology.