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Google’s Latitude and Privacy Concerns

by on February 7, 2009 · 31 comments

Google LatitudeGoogle’s latest major launch is “Latitude,” a geo-location service that lets users find friends on a digital map and then network with them. These services are often referred to as “LBS,” which stands for “location-based services.” I wrote about LBS here before in my essay on “The Next Great Technopanic: Wireless Geo-Location / Social Mapping.” As I pointed out in that piece, LBS raise privacy concerns with some people because, by their nature, these technologies involve the tracking of users.

But I’ve argued that those concerns are generally over-blown, especially because you have to download and opt-in to these services. In other words, you know what you’re getting into. Moreover, companies who offer these services, like Loopt and now Google, go out of their way to offer privacy safeguards. Indeed, even some privacy activists agree.

For example, Michael Zimmer of the School of Information Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, is someone who pays close attention to privacy issues and is often critical of Google and other companies for supposedly not paying enough attention to privacy concerns. In the case of Latitude, however, he argues that “Google Actually Got it (Mostly) Right.”  Here’s his snapshot of “what Google’s done to help give users control of their information flows in Latitude”: Continue reading →

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Google’s MeasurementLab.net Now Makes Network Management Transparent—So Why Mandate Net Neutrality?

by on January 29, 2009 · 11 comments

Google has—as I noted it would last June—finally released (PCWorld, Google’s policy blog)  its eagerly-awaited suite of tools available for free (of course) at MeasurementLab.net that allow users to monitor how their ISP might be tweaking (degrading, deprioritizing, etc.) their traffic—among other handy features.  Huzzah!

So, now that we have visibility into traffic management practices on a large scale, remind me again why the FCC would need to  mandate “net neutrality” requirements?  Why not just leave the matter up to the FTC to enforce each ISP’s terms of use under the agency’s existing authority to punish unfair and deceptive trade practices?  Won’t the threat of users switching to another broadband provider discipline ISPs’ traffic management?  (As long as ISPs have traffic nationwide traffic management policies, even those users in areas lacking meaningful broadband competition will be protected from discriminatory network management practices by pressure in other markets.)

“If you believe that network neutrality government regulation is not needed, if you believe that the market will handle this … then you should also welcome Measurement Labs,” [Princeton Center for Information Technology Policy director Ed] Felten said. “What you are appealing to is a process of public discussion … in which consumers move to the ISP [Internet service provider] that gives them the best performance. It’s a market that’s facilitated by better information.”

Yes, it’s true (as PCWorld article linked to above points out) that a consumer might not be able to discern whether apparent degradation of their traffic was actually caused by the ISP or whether it might be the result of, say, spyware or simple Internet congestion.  But they don’t need to figure that out for themselves.  Although the relatively small percentage of users who install this tool are likely to be highly sophisticated (at least the early adopters), all they need to is “sound the alarm” about what they think might be a serious violation of “net neutrality” principles, and a small cadre of technical experts can do the rest:  examining these allegations to determine what ISPs are actually doing.  

Sure, there will be false alarms and of course many advocates of “net neutrality” regulation will still insist that ISPs shouldn’t be allowed to practice certain kinds of network management, no matter how transparently the ISPs might disclose their practices.  But the truth will emerge, and in the ongoing tug-of-war between public pressure and ISPs’ practical needs to manage their networks smartly, between the desire of some to have practices disclosed very specifically and the ISPs’ desire to maintain operational flexibility, I suspect we’ll find a relatively stable (if constantly-evolving) equilibrium.  It won’t be perfect, but do we really think government bureaucrats will do a better job of finding that happy medium?

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Cutting the (Video) Cord: YouTube Close to Deal for Pro Talent

by on January 29, 2009 · 10 comments

This ongoing series has focused on the growing substitutability of Internet-delivered video for traditional video distribution channels like cable and satellite.  YouTube has recently begun exploring adding traditional television programming to its staggering catalogue of mostly amateur-generated content.  

But now YouTube is going one step farther by exploring  the possibility of signing Hollywood professionals to produce “straight-to-YouTube” content:

The deal would underscore the ways that distribution models are evolving on the Internet. Already, some actors and other celebrities are creating their own content for the Web, bypassing the often arduous process of developing a program for a television network. The YouTube deal would give William Morris clients an ownership stake in the videos they create for the Web site.

This kind of deal would make Internet video even more of a substitute for traditional subscription channels—thus further eroding the existing rationale for regulating those channels.  

But what’s even most interesting about this development is that YouTube’s interest seems to be driven primarily by the possibility of reaping greater advertising revenues on such professional content than on its currently reaps from its vast, but relatively unprofitable, catalogue of user-generated content:  

YouTube’s audience is enormous; the measurement firm comScore reported that 100 million viewers in the United States visited the site in October. But, in part because of copyright concerns, the site does not place ads on or next to user-uploaded videos. As a result, it makes money from only a fraction of the videos on the site — the ones that are posted by its partners, including media companies like CBS and Universal Music. The company has shown interest in becoming a home for premium video in recent months by upgrading its video player and adding full-length episodes of television shows. But some major television networks and other media companies are still hesitant about showing their content on the site. The Warner Music Group’s videos were removed from the site last month in a dispute over pay for its content.

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Nuts & Bolts: Everything You Wanted To Know About Cookies But Were Afraid To Ask

by on January 27, 2009 · 16 comments

As a means of introducing myself to TLF readers, this is an article that I wrote for the PFF blog in September that has not been previously mentioned on the TLF. Most of my other PFF blog posts have been cross-posted by Adam Thierer or Berin Szoka, but I’ve taken ownership of those posts so they appear on my TLF author page.

This is the first in a series of articles that will focus directly on technology instead of technology policy. With an average age of 57, most members of Congress were at least 30 when the IBM PC was introduced in 1981. So it is not surprising that lawmakers have difficulty with cutting-edge technology. The goal of this series is to provide a solid technical foundation for the policy debates that new technologies often trigger. No prior knowledge of the technologies involved is assumed, but no insult to the reader’s intelligence is intended.

This article focuses on cookies–not the cookies you eat, but the cookies associated with browsing the World Wide Web. There has been public concern over the privacy implications of cookies since they were first developed. But to understand them , you must know a bit of history.

According to Tim Berners Lee, the creator of the World Wide Web, “[g]etting people to put data on the Web often was a question of getting them to change perspective, from thinking of the user’s access to it not as interaction with, say, an online library system, but as navigation th[r]ough a set of virtual pages in some abstract space. In this concept, users could bookmark any place and return to it, and could make links into any place from another document. This would give a feeling of persistence, of an ongoing existence, to each page.”[1. Tim Berners-Lee, Weaving The Web: The Original Design and Ultimate Destiny of the World Wide Web. p. 37. Harper Business (2000).] The Web has changed quite a bit since the early 1990s.

Today, websites are much more dynamic and interactive, with every page being customized for each user. Such customization could include automatically selecting the appropriate language for the user based on where they’re located, displaying only content that has been added since the last time the user visited the site, remembering a user who wants to stay logged into a site from a particular computer, or keeping track of items in a virtual shopping cart. These features are simply not possible without the ability for a website to distinguish one user from another and to remember a user as they navigate from one page to another. Today, in the Web 2.0 era, instead of Web pages having persistence (as Berners-Lee described), we have dynamic pages and “user-persistence.”

This paper describes the various methods websites can use to enable user-persistence and how this affects user privacy. But the first thing the reader must realize is that the Web was not initially designed to be interactive; indeed, as the quote above shows, the goal was the exact opposite. Yet interactivity is critical to many of the things we all take for granted about web content and services today.

Continue reading →

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Feedsqueezer: Another Competitor for Google

by on January 24, 2009 · 10 comments

Those who criticize Google as a “monopoly” usually focus on the search and advertising markets.  Google may indeed have a huge lead in those markets, but it is by no means a “monopoly” in the strict sense of the word as the only (“mono-“) seller in that market.  

If the critics are concerned about about true “monopoly” or at least something close to it, perhaps they ought to focus on Feedburner, the free service Google acquired back in 2007.  If one takes a very narrow definition of the service Feedburner offers, one could argue that there is no real alternative to Feedburner.  But on the other hand:

I have a very simple solution. I use my own RSS feed I don’t need some other company providing a enhanced solution. I have never understood why people used feedburner at all. Getting statistics from a feed is elementary. There are several services out their that provide podcast statistics. Stupidity in giving someone else control over ones feed is something I will never get. I have no sympathy for those having feedburner issues.

Regardless, some leading bloggers have expressed outrage over Feedburner’s less-than-perfect reliability—see this recent rant by Michael Arrington.  But we call in the federales to “fix” the “problem”—if one properly apply that term to a free service beloved by (nearly all) bloggers everywhere just because it’s not absolutely, positively 100% reliable or instantaneous or simply because some people don’t like the idea of using yet another Google product, no matter how good it is—let’s see what Feedsqueezer, a soon-to-be-launched service, will offer.

Note:  The word “monopoly” is now commonly used to mean “control that makes possible the manipulation of prices.”  It’s not obvious what that would mean in the case of those Google services, that are both free to the user and not directly related to any price paid by, say an advertiser—as distinct from, say, Adwords or Adsense, where there are at least prices that might, in theory, be controlled.

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Wikipedia = End of the Search for Truth, or Just a Beginning?

by on January 22, 2009 · 6 comments

My problem with what Nick Carr is saying about Wikipedia here — as well as in his book The Big Switch — is that he always seems to assume that Wikipedia constitutes the totality of most searches for information online. I suppose it does for some people, but I have a hard time accepting the argument that everyone’s search for enlightenment ends there, even if Wikipedia does rank high in many search results today.

For me, Wikipedia is just a launch pad; a great starting point in the search for truth. I take much of what I read on Wikipedia with a large grain of salt, however, because I know not every entry is as trustworthy as others, and entries could change at any moment. But that’s true of much of what one finds online!  If one adopts a sort of caveat emptor attitude toward Wikipedia, and then uses it to seek out truth from alternative sources found in each entry, or from other searches, then were is the harm?  Only if one could show that the search for truth ends with Wikipedia would I be as concerned as Carr and other Internet pessimists and Wikipedia critics (like Lee Siegel and Andrew Keen). But I just don’t believe that is the case.

Moreover, it is impossible for me to believe that we have fewer authoritative sources of information at our disposal today than we did in the past.   Continue reading →

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Search Advertising Dropped 8% in 2008: Why Users Should Care

by on January 19, 2009 · 12 comments

The WSJ reports that a study will be released tomorrow noting an 8% drop in total “paid search” revenues in 2008.  Google’s Fourth Quarter results will be released Thursday.  While this is clearly bad news for Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft and other companies that sell ads next to the results of their search engines, it’s also terrible news for the Internet users who have come to take for granted not just these free search engines, but the other free services and content cross-subsidized by search ad revenue.  A quick look at the offerings pages of Google,  Yahoo! and Microsoft (downloads and some services) should remind you of a few of these ad-supported offerings.

What’s even worse for users is that search ad spending may be the “canary in the coalmine” for online advertising overall:  A drop in search ad spending may suggest that display ad revenue for 2008 may have fared even worse.  While search ad revenue funds offerings from search engine providers, display ad revenue is the bread & butter of millions of websites, from the “short head” (big websites like ESPN.com) to through the “long tail” (small websites).   As advertisers cut back on buying web ads, there will be less funding available for “Free!” culture—and we’ll all suffer from the resulting decline in creativity and innovation.  

Let’s hope 2009 is a better year for advertising—both search and display—than 2008.

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Microsoft, Google, the Innovator’s Dilemma and the Future of Search & Web Ads

by on January 17, 2009 · 143 comments

Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself).  Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market.  With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” The search marketbusiness—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.

In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is  twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online.  Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000.  But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program.  In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus.  By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover.  But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because  Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.” 

Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.

But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:

Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”

What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail.  The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete.   Continue reading →

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Google’s Growing Advertiser Base

by on January 11, 2009 · 6 comments

The NYT reports that Google has recently disclosed in an SEC filing that it had 1 million advertisers as of 2007.  Some analysts suggest that Google’s growing scale will lead to higher ad prices:

Ben Schachter, an analyst with UBS, said he expects the current number is likely to be between 1.3 million and 1.5 million. Google declined to comment on the current size of its advertising base. “It is a number that people have wanted to know for a long time,” Mr. Schachter said. More advertisers means more revenue — and more revenue, on average, for every search query — for a couple of reasons: a larger number of queries will have ads matched against them; and on popular queries, competition for placement will be more intense, and as a result, ad prices, which are set by auction, will be higher.

But is Google’s success really driving up ad prices?  The same piece also notes that:

Interestingly, each advertiser, on average, spent a little more than $16,000 a year on Google. That figure changed little between 2003 and 2007.

As one of the commenters on the piece noted:

If average advertiser expenses hasn’t really changed in the last 5 years, maybe Google’s argument that it’s not a monopoly because prices are determined by ad auctions, not Google’s search share, holds some weight.

Meanwhile, Google Watch notes Microsoft’s recent success in signing up Verizon, Dell, Sun and Hewlett-Packard as partners for Microsoft’s Live Search engine and asks whether Google’s success is driving potential partners into Microsoft’s arms, as Microsoft appears to be working harder to gain market share for its own search and advertising products.  So can Microsoft—and Yahoo!—regain momentum?

Perhaps 2009 will bring some answers to these questions—and more hard data about ad prices.  But whatever happens, it’s a safe bet that speculation and fierce argument will abound with every new development in the search/advertising wars.

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IE’s Browser Market Share Down by 8-10% in 2008

by on January 5, 2009 · 9 comments

Microsoft’s share of the browser market across all versions of Internet Explorer has dropped, by one estimate, dropped from 78.58%  in December 2007 to 68.15% in December 2008 (or by just under 8% in another estimate).

[IE’s] share dropped from 69.77% in November to 68.15% in December. [During the same period,] Firefox gained more than half a point and ended up at 21.34%, Safari approaches the [10%] hurdle with 7.93% and Chrome came in at 1.04%, the first time Google was able to cross the 1% mark.

This is particularly interesting: 

Since IE6 is used primarily within corporations, its market share is much higher during the week than it is on weekends. As a result, all other browsers gain on weekends and especially during a holiday. Because of that circumstance, Net Applications noted that the December numbers should be taken with a grain of salt. However, it is worth the note that IE6 achieved … market share numbers of about 28% during the week and about 21% on weekends in early 2008. In December, these numbers were down to about 20% during the week and 15% on weekends.    

So, Microsoft still has an established base among corporate users, where IT administrators  generally prevent employees from installing new applications (including browsers) and the sysadmins often don’t roll out alternative browsers across a corporate network for any one of several possible reasons, including:

  • They just don’t want to bother having to install, regularly upgrade and support another piece of software;
  • They may overestimate the security vulnerability of such alternative browsers compared to Internet Explorer;
  • The crustier sysadmins may not realize that today’s browsers are not only free for individual users, but also for corporate users–unlike the old Netscape Navigator; and
  • Corporate intranets may be designed for IE, in which case rolling out an alternative browser might cause confusion among less tech-savvy employees.

Microsoft may still have an advantage that could be considered “unfair,” but so what?   Continue reading →

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