Wireless & Spectrum Policy

Welcome to the first episode of TLF’s new podcast! Tech Policy Weekly from the Technology Liberation Front is a weekly discussion about technology policy from TLF’s learned band of contributors. It features some of the brightest and most provocative minds in the field of technology public policy commenting on the regulation of the internet, media, privacy, intellectual property, and all things tech.

The shows’s panelists this week are Jerry Brito, Tim Lee, Adam Thierer, and PJ Doland. Topics include,

  • Skype’s petition to the FCC asking for wireless net neutrality rules a la Tim Wu
  • The antitrust and media implications of the proposed XM-Sirius satellite radio merger
  • Is a spectrum commons really a third way between regulation and privatization?

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Two days ago, I posted a short essay expressing my strong reservations about the new Skype petition requesting that the FCC impose Carterfone-like regulations on wireless operators. James Gattuso followed up yesterday with a piece of his own. And this followed last week’s series of essays about Tim Wu’s “Wireless Net Neutrality” paper by Jerry Brito, Hance Haney, James Gattuso, Tim Lee, Scott Wallsten, and Randy May. (The Skype petition essentially asks the FCC to implement Prof. Wu’s ideas into law, so for purposes of this essay I will treat them as the same proposal.) I wanted to elaborate a bit more on this proposal because I think this issue is profoundly important to the future of innovation and competition in the wireless sector.

Burning the Village to Save It?
The fundamental question raised by the Skype-Wu proposal is whether America will continue to allow competition in wireless network architectures and business models to see which systems and plans (a) consumers truly prefer and that also (b) allow carriers to recoup fixed capital costs while (c) expanding and innovating to meet future needs. The Skype-Wu proposal would foreclose such marketplace experimentation by essentially converting cellular networks into a sort of quasi-commons and forcing private network operators to provide network access or services on someone else’s terms. That someone else, of course, is the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which will be tasked with devising rules and price regulations to ensure “fair and non-discriminatory” access / interconnection pricing.

In my opinion, when you get right down to it, this proposal is a declaration of surrender. That is, Skype and Prof. Wu almost seem to be saying that while it’s nice we’ve seen innovation at the core of the wireless sector over the past two decades, we now need to get on with the important business of establishing rules to ensure the maximum amount of output or innovation at the edge of networks while largely ignoring what happens at the core, or even prohibiting certain things from happening at the core. In other words, to maximize the freedom to innovate at the edge of networks, we must now restrict the freedom to innovate at the core in some ways.

In essence, therefore, this proposal represents a call for the forced commoditization of cellular networks and would necessitate at return to the rate-of-return regulatory methods of the past. It would freeze network innovation in place and stop of the clock on one of the great American success stories of the past quarter century. For these reasons, I will argue that it is essential it be rejected.

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Don’t look now, but it may be time to dig out those old bell bottoms and love beads from your closet. The calendar may say its 2007, but in Washington regulatory circles it may soon be 1968 all over again. You may remember 1968 as a year of turmoil–with anti-war protests, assassinations, and the election of Richard Nixon. Forget all that. At the FCC, it was the year of the Carterfone decision, in which the Bell System was banned from restricting equipment consumers could put on their phone lines. The same year, the Commission allocated the first frequencies for cell phone service.

Both decisions revolutioned the communications world: Carterphone opened the first crack in the previously iron-clad, legally-protected Bell System monopoly to competition, and the cell phone allocation planting the seed for today’s wireless services, which shattered the idea of telephone monopolies at its root.

These two regulatory threads of 1968 are now on a collision course. Yesterday,
Skype –the Internet phone company now owned by eBay– petitioned the FCC to apply the Carterfone decision to wireless carriers (see Adam’s excellent post on this.) The filing follows by less than a week a paper by Tim Wu, father of the term “net neutrality”, endorsing the same idea (discussed here, here, here, here and here.)

Skype–whose founders weren’t even born in 1968–see Carterfone in grand Jeffersonian terms, using the word “right” some 35 times. One practically expects to read of the right to life, liberty, and the right to use non-harmful devices and software on telecommunications networks. Carterfone, however, did not create a right. It created a regulation. A regulation that was justifed in the face of a legally-protected, comprehensive, vertically-integrated old-fashioned monopoly, but a regulation nonetheless. It makes no sense to saddle today’s competitive, innovative and growing cell phone market with the same regulation.

The battle over regulation of wireless networks promises to be a divisive one–in effect a new front in the larger war over neutrality regulation that has been raging for over a year At its heart are two vastly different visions of how best to create competition: one based on forced access and restrictions mandated by government, the other based on reducing barriers to the creation of alternative networks, with consumers–through the marketplace–deciding how they should best be run. Network managers throughout the economy–and consumers as well–should be watching this debate with interest.

It hasn’t even been a week since Tim Wu made such a splash with his “Wireless Net Neutrality” proposal and already a major corporation has run to the FCC asking for it to be implemented into law! (Tim, my old friend and occasional nemesis, you know how to get results!)

Today, Internet phone giant Skype filed a petition with the Federal Communications Commission “to confirm a consumer’s right to use Internet communications software and attach devices to wireless networks.” The 32-page filing repeats many of the arguments Tim Wu made in his paper about the supposed need for regulators to step in and impose Bell System-era device attachment rules to modern cell phone operators. Specifically, Skype wants the FCC “to create an industry-led mechanism to ensure the openness of wireless networks.” I’m not sure what that means but I am certain that entire forests will fall as the paperwork flies at the FCC in an attempt to interpret and implement these new regulations.

I disagree on so many levels with the Skype petition that I don’t know exactly where to begin, but luckily I don’t have to say much. I just need to point to the excellent critiques that my TLF colleagues and current and former PFF colleagues published last week in response to the Wu paper. Here’s a sampling:

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Gigi Sohn on XM-Sirius

by on February 20, 2007

Net neutrality being such a hot issue right now, we haven’t had a chance lately to agree with our friends at Public Knowledge. But when we do agree, we really agree. (Speaking for myself, that includes orphan works and fair use.) Today PK President Gigi Sohn blogs about the XM-Sirius merger and opposition to it by the NAB. The post is too good to excerpt only a piece, so here it is in its entirety–under a Creative Commons license, of course.

How is it that the National Association of Broadcasters, which is seeking regulatory relief from current media ownership caps, has the gumption to criticize the proposed merger of XM Satellite Radio and Sirius Satellite Radio? Their statement following the announced merger can be found here, but this is the part I like best:

When the FCC authorized satellite radio, it specifically found that the public would be served best by two competitive nationwide systems. Now, with their stock price at rock bottom and their business model in disarray…they seek a government bail-out to avoid competing in the marketplace.

If any industry knows how to “seek a government bail-out to avoid competing in the marketplace,” it is the broadcast industry. What is “must carry,” other than a government-granted cable-carriage easement for broadcasters? What is exclusive, free licensing of spectrum, other than government-granted protection from auctions and unlicensed uses of the public airwaves?

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Martin Cooper, the inventor of the cell phone, is giving a talk tomorrow on spectrum policy for the 21st Century as part of Tom Hazlett’s “Big Ideas About Information” lecture series. It’ll take place at George Mason University School of Law in Arlington, VA. More info here. According to Wikipedia,

Cooper is considered the inventor of the first portable handset and the first person to make a call on a portable cell phone in April 1973, to the bewilderment of passers-by in a road of New York. The first call he made was to his rival, Joel Engel, Bell Labs head of research. Cooper later revealed that watching Captain Kirk talking in his communicator on the tv-show Star Trek inspired him to research the mobile phone.

Fellow TLF-er Jerry Brito has just released an important new study on spectrum policy that is must-reading for those of you who monitor ongoing wireless policy battles. His new Stanford Technology Law Review article is entitled “The Spectrum Commons in Theory and Practice.” In it, he thoroughly deconstructs spectrum commons theory and debunks the myths propagated by Professors Lawrence Lessig, Yochai Benkler and others who believe that a spectrum commons offers us a “Third Way” approach to spectrum management that is both free of government control and highly efficient.

To the contrary, Brito argues, “A commons must be controlled either by private actors or by the government. There is no ‘third way.'” And “there is nothing that will make this new government regulation free from the same protracted and inefficient processes that have thus far plagued decisions about spectrum,” he finds. Brito pinpoints the fundamental flaw in the commons mindset in paragraph 28 of the paper:

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Satellite radio competitors XM and Sirius have announced their intention to merge their companies in a $13 billion deal. The deal will face some obstacles at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), but I think there are strong reasons for the agency to approve the deal immediately and unconditionally.

What are the consumer benefits that might arise from a satellite radio marriage? First and foremost, the survival of a vibrant and healthy satellite radio competitor is important to consumers.

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Today Lawrence Lessig released the second in his series of presentations about what Congress should do on internet policy. The first installment was about orphan copyrights, and I addressed it here. Today, Lessig writes about “deregulating spectrum,” which is an apt title if by deregulating you mean regulating. Lessig likens the current command-and-control system of spectrum regulation to communism, and I think he’s right. He goes on, however, to argue that a property system is no longer the right alternative to regulation.

Instead, Lessig suggests a market not in spectrum, but in devices that use free spectrum without causing interference to any other user. As he says in his presentation, this system would require “minimal rules governing the devices.” What he doesn’t say is who would set these “minimal rules” and what exactly would guarantee that these rules would remain minimal or even rational. The answer, as I explain in my new paper out this week from the Stanford Technology Law Review, is that government will set the rules, and the only tools that government has to make rules is its inefficient command-and-control processes. A “commons” model is not a third way between regulation and property, it is just another kind of regulation.

Lessig also exhibits lots of outrage at the fact that the current regulatory system is manipulated by special interests to suit their own purposes and not the interests of consumers generally. Well, how will things be any different when government goes about setting his “minimal rules”?

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I’ve got a write-up of Tim Wu’s paper over at Ars. Most of it’s a summary of Wu’s paper, but I do a bit of policy analysis near the end:

Surprisingly, Wu does not mention one reform that could alleviate what he identifies as the biggest barrier to entry in the wireless market: the high cost of spectrum. Various scholars have proposed that more spectrum be auctioned off to private firms for use in next-generation wireless services. That would make it feasible for more firms to enter the wireless marketplace, providing much-needed competition. Wu himself notes that the smallest of the national carriers, T-Mobile, also has the least restrictive policies. It is likely that if enough spectrum were made available to allow additional carriers to build nationwide networks, those carriers would tend to follow T-Mobile’s lead and build more open networks than the largest incumbents.

Wu also does not spend much time considering the feasibility of enforcing open access rules on wireless carriers. Although Carterfone is widely regarded as a success, some more recent attempts by the FCC to force incumbents to open their networks to competition have not been so successful. The FCC unsuccessfully attempted to force the Baby Bells to share their DSL lines with competitors during the Clinton administration, sparking nearly a decade of litigation that only concluded with Supreme Court’s 2005 Brand X decision. And the cable industry is fiercely resisting the FCC’s attempts to open up the market for cable boxes, a process that has has been raging for close to a decade with no end in sight. It is likely that the wireless industry would be equally resistent to any effort to forcibly open its network to new entrants.

With the debate over network neutrality regulations of wireline broadband providers sucking all the oxygen out of the room, it’s unlikely that Wu’s proposals will have an impact on the telecom debate during this session of Congress. But as wireless technologies become ever more ubiquitous, questions about whether and how to regulate the wireless industry will only become more frequent and more contentious.

I think the CableCard analogy would be particularly worth exploring in more detail. Wu actually cites it as a possible model for interoperability done right, but my reading of the situation is that so far, at least, it’s been less than a raging success. The first generation CableCard spec had an extremely limited feature set, and even more limited consumer interest. Approximately zero cable customers have actually requested CableCards from their cable companies. The FCC’s “integration ban” goes into effect this summer, which could enlarge the market for third-party CableCARD devices, but the jury is definitely still out, and it’s rather premature to be hailing it as a success. And remember that Congress first ordered the FCC to open up the set-top box market a decade ago.