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Slashdot recently linked to this comparison of the cost of Windows in Brazil and the US. This brings to mind a point I think I’ve seen Mike make: beyond the general point that libertarians should celebrate free software because it’s an example of non-coercive production of public goods, libertarians also have reasons to like free software because it’s more resistant to the coercive power of the state. When software is produced by a commercial company and sold in the marketplace, it’s relatively easy for the state to tax and regulate it. Commercial companies tend to be reflexively law-abiding, and they can afford the lawyers necessary to collect taxes or comply with complex regulatory schemes.

In contrast, free software will prove strongly resistant to state interference. Because virtually everyone associated with a free software project is a volunteer, the state cannot easily compel them to participate in tax and regulatory schemes. Such projects are likely to react to any attempt to tax or regulate them is likely to be met with passive resistance: people will stop contributing entirely rather than waste time dealing with the government.

Hence, free software thus has the salutary effect of depriving the state of tax revenue. But even better, free software is likely to prove extremely resistant to state efforts to build privacy-violating features into software systems. CALEA requires telecom infrastructure to include hooks for eavesdropping by government officials, but it will prove extremely difficult to get similar hooks added to free software. No one is likely to volunteer to add such a “feature”, and even if the state added it itself, it wouldn’t have any realistic way to force people to use its version.

Can a company have a Freudian slip? If it’s possible, L-1 Identity Solutions has commited one.

In a promotional brochure for REAL ID Act “solutions,” it implicitly touts the ability to track people by race and by political party. This is not required by the REAL ID Act, but it’s not barred by it either.

In my testimony to Congress and in a post here, I pointed out the concern that REAL ID could be used for racial tracking. Political party is a new one, but who knows what would happen should the system be implemented.

Excerpt of L1 REAL ID promotion

TimLee noted below some of the divisions of the libertarian IP debate into rights advocates and utilitarians.

 

The utilitarian/individual rights dichotomy is fascinating, but seems to me one can only push it so far before it collapses (I think it was Hayek who explores this collapse in more depth, too lazy to look it up right now). That’s because

 

a) classical liberal versions of utilitarianism tend not to discount the experience of single individuals as heavily as do more Benthamite utilitarians or law-and-econ game theorists (two examples, they rank consensual transactions highly, and Austrian-influenced thinkers would warn one to avoid of interpersonal utility comparisons);

 

and b) at bottom, no one is likely to give a fig for a set of individual rights that on the whole tend to lower standards of living, such that more babies with cleft palates are allowed to die, and so on.  [UPDATE: hmmm, I think that is overstating the case more than a little, people do tend to have a good bit of empathy for one another, but the general point is just that, the case for individual rights had better not run *against* raising standards of living as a general matter, or it will lose].

 

One of the strengths of classical liberalism has always been the twining together of concern about the growth of wealth and the shrinking of poverty with concern about rights—challenges to the Corn Laws, challenges to Jim Crow laws, and so on. The fact that the two twine together is not a coincidence. It is because *if* individuals have certain rights, natural or otherwise, it is because of some key features of human beings and human life in communities, which includes economic life. At bottom, the philosophical roots of both economic thinking and rights thinking will be closely related (e.g. Locke).

 

The reason that IP policy debates tend to run utilitarian is not just a result of the personal mindsets of the participants, either. One is dealing with tricky stuff. Many libertarian issues are “easy,” not in the sense of being “easy” as a political matter or of getting past people’s preconceptions, but in the sense that they do not require us to revisit the basics. Few of the arguments about free trade, price controls, education, social security, indecency, health markets, tax policy, involve reconceiving of the boundary lines of contract and property that constitute markets *and* that define individual rights within those markets. IP arguments—rather like arguments about abortion–do involve arguing about where those boundaries go. What kind of rights can one have in information? Where should the boundaries be exactly? How far can the analogy to property be carried? When one is arguing about the details of where the boundaries of rights should be, well, it is tricky to make arguments from individual rights because such arguments will tend to beg the question.* One generally cannot assume the boundaries in dispute.

 

Because the boundaries are in dispute, furthermore, this shifts one to thinking about what those boundaries could be at some point in the future, especially, in the very long run. Then, Rawlsian veil stuff happens. Individuals tend to fade out of this picture—they themselves no longer are clear where their own interest lies, and must think about rules in the abstract. (“Constitution interest” as opposed to “action interest”). Will they be producers or consumers? Buyers or Sellers? Minority or majority? Where will the technology go? The best consensus at that point will form around rules that seem to give everyone a fair shot (more Hayek). If that shifts the boundaries of rights, that’s okay—so long as it is not retroactive, and within bounds (and one can argue about where those bounds are, too, on and on , blah blah blah).

 

Another thought. Some of the IP debate seems to be about individual rights, but it is really about individual interests—long or short run. Many advocacy groups are strong on *short-run individual interests* in access, low-cost, and so on, and individual rights become a vehicle for advancing that (I wonder if underlying some of this is that there are a lot of  Act Utilitarians, as opposed to Rule utilitarians, kicking around here). Many tech companies are oriented to serving those interests. That’s fine. But if rights only track short-run interests, we’ve got a crummy theory of rights. 

 

Stopping now.

 

   

 

Ideology

by on May 2, 2008 · 40 comments

True or false: “Openness” is the dominenant ideology of Silicon Valley. Discuss.

Update: I should clarify that I mean “openness” in the technical sense of open standards, open platforms, open networks, open source, etc.

D.C.-based TLFers, if you haven’t seen it yet, The Singing Revolution has been held over for another week at the E Street Cinema. Find showtimes here.

Non-D.C.-based TLFers, check out The Singing Revolution Web site for upcoming showings in your town.

Here’s my earlier post on the movie.

A link to “The poor stand to lose from Anti-Patent Crusades,” by Franklin Cudjoe, out April 30, 2008, with a free-market think tank in Ghana.

http://en.afrik.com/article13423.html

A selection: Patents are actually a critical part of the solution. They protect the financial incentives that drive pharmaceutical companies to create innovative medications in the first place. It takes an average of US$800 million and 10-15 years to bring a new drug to the market. Patents ensure that pharmaceutical companies can recoup that enormous investment.

If countries start breaking patents, though, firms lose out on sales. And they’re less able to finance the development of new cures. That’s a blow to the public health efforts of all countries, rich and poor. Ghana’s
health Minister told me that he fails to see how people could hold antagonistic positions against pharmaceutical companies, because in his own words “if drugs are being made, then people must be sick somewhere-it is not for charity”.

Last week, Minnesota Governor Tim Pawlenty (R) vetoed a transportation bill that included a provision objecting to the federal REAL ID Act. The bill would have required the federal government to pay 95 percent of the cost of issuing national IDs before Minnesota would participate. Claiming political machinations were afoot, Pawlenty said that he preferred “something more reasonable like 50 or 60 percent.” One wonders what principle of federalism, liberty, or privacy could possibly support his willingness to accept a 50% unfunded surveillance mandate.

A much clearer vision will be on display next week when Governor Mark Sanford (R-SC) joins Senator Jon Tester (D-MT) here at the Cato Institute to discuss the REAL ID Act. South Carolina has barred itself from participating in the national ID system created by the Act, and Governor Sanford defiantly refused to ask the Department of Homeland Security for an extension of the compliance deadline earlier this year.

Senator Tester represents a state that has been similarly defiant. He is an original cosponsor of legislation that would repeal the REAL ID Act and restore the identification security provisions of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Protection Act, which REAL ID repealed.

The event is called The REAL ID Rebellion: Whither the National ID Law?, next Wednesday, May 7th, at noon, and it will be Webcast.

One of the more positive consequences of the whole Sydnor/Lessig debate is that it’s enticed the always-interesting David Friedman to weigh in on tech policy issues, giving me the opportunity to quote him in his entirety:

I’ve been trying for years to persuade Larry to admit to libertarian leanings. I’m not sure from comments here whether he actually did it while I wasn’t looking or is merely being accused of it. My interpretation of his attitude, long ago, was libertarian instincts hindered by a leftist self-image.

Consider his basic argument, a book or two back, for treating the net as a commons–by which he actually meant a commodity, since he wasn’t proposing zero cost access. It was that if the people in the middle, the ones transmitting the bits, got a veto over what sorts of bits they transmitted, that would make innovation very hard, since there would be too many people whose agreement you needed before doing anything.

I think he acknowledged–certainly he knew–that the counter argument was that what was being transmitted varied in ways that were relevant to the cost of transmitting it–burst vs steady stream, material where very low lag was important (real time games, distance surgery) vs material where it wasn’t (downloading), etc. So requiring the same cost for everything, or even specifying the cost structure, meant that some people were free to impose external costs on others without their consent. His conclusion depended on the judgment that the inefficiencies due to permitting that were less important than the inefficiencies due to the high transaction costs of innovation with the alternative system.

What didn’t seem to occur to him was that he had just sketched the argument against zoning. There too, the individual’s decisions–what sort of house to build, whether to use his land for residence or commerce, and the like–can impose external costs on others. There too, requiring the permission of those others, whether directly or via variances in zoning, makes innovation hard. The same argument Larry was making for the net as a commodity, applied to land use, is an argument for strong individual property rights and against land use control. Once you take seriously the point that forcing people to take account of all effects of their acts on others means nobody ever gets to do anything, you undercut a lot of the arguments for a wide variety of government interventions.

Quite so. I’ve said before that network neutrality (the technical principle, not the proposed legal regime) is the division of labor. The end-to-end principle allows decentralized decision-making on the Internet in precisely the same way that the price mechanism allows decentralized decision-making in the broader economy: by giving people a simple, predictable interface to the rest of the world that isn’t dependent on the whim of any central decision-maker.

ISPs that try to implement discriminatory network policies create the same kinds of problems as government officials that enact regulations: they often cause unintended consequences (like blocking Lotus Notes) and they cause people to waste resources evading the restrictions (as with BitTorrent header encryption).

Now, I should hasten to add that as I’ve written before, the fact that neutral networks have good properties doesn’t mean that mandating them is good public policy. Because of course a network neutrality rule would itself have unintended consequences and lead people (in this case ISPs) to waste resources trying to evade the rules. But if we’re talking about network design, rather than government regulation, it seems to me that libertarians ought to look favorably on decentralized networks mediated by the end-to-end principle for all the same reasons we look favorably on decentralized economies mediated by the price mechanism.

Over at Ars, I have an in-depth look at the White House’s email troubles. The administration is either spectacularly incompetent or going out of its way to avoid complying with the law:

When the Bush administration took office, it decided to replace the Lotus Notes-based e-mail system used under the Clinton Administration with Microsoft Outlook and Exchange. The transition broke compatibility with the old archiving system, and the White House IT shop did not immediately have a new one to put in its place.

Instead, the White House has instituted a comically primitive system called “journaling,” in which (to quote from a recent Congressional report) “a White House staffer or contractor would collect from a ‘journal’ e-mail folder in the Microsoft Exchange system copies of e-mails sent and received by White House employees.” These would be manually named and saved as “.pst” files on White House servers…

These deficiencies were repeatedly brought to the attention of White House systems administrators. In 2002 and 2003, they attempted to retrofit the old, Lotus Notes—based archiving system to work with the new Exchange-based email system. When this effort failed, they awarded a contract to Booz Allen Hamilton to design a new system, and to Unisys to implement it. According to McDevitt, the new system was set up and configured during 2005 and was “ready to go live” in August 2006. But the White House CIO, Theresa Payton, reportedly aborted the project in late 2006, citing perceived inadequacies with the system’s performance and its ability segregate official presidential correspondence from political or personal materials. McDervitt resigned in protest soon afterwards.

Payton claims that the White House is working on yet another archiving system. But until it’s completed—and it’s now looking increasingly unlikely that it will be operational before the end of the administration—the White House will lack an automated system for complying with the requirements of federal law.

Julian didn’t like Tom Sydnor’s paper on Lessig either. In particular, he went back and looked up the sections in Code in which Lessig ostensibly expressed sympathy for Communism. Here’s the rest of the story:

We learn that Lessig wrote, in the first edition of his book Code, of his “impulse to sympathize” with those on the left who are “radically skeptical” about using property rights in personal information to protect privacy. We do not learn that the long quotation that follows is Lessig’s summary of an anti-market view of which he declares himself “not convinced.” (Lessig originally endorsed a property right in personal data; he has since altered his view, and now supports treating Web sites’ privacy policies as binding contracts.)

Sydnor similarly presents selective quotations from a passage in Code where Lessig describes his impression of life in communist Vietnam as surprisingly free and unregulated in certain respects. Lessig’s point is that despite a formal ideology of state omnipotence, the lack of an effective architecture of control leaves many ordinary Vietnamese relatively unfettered in their day-to-day interactions; institutional structure often determines reality more powerfully than official philosophy. Possibly Lessig is mistaken about modern Vietnamese life, but Sydnor, in what seems like a willful misreading, deploys the anecdote to depict Lessig as a disciple of Ho Chi Minh.

And of course yesterday Mike pointed out that Lessig’s point about property rights and DDT wasn’t as outrageous as Tom seemed to think. These examples strikes me as a serious problem. One of the basic obligations of any scholar is to present one’s opponents’ quotes fairly and in context. If a scholar writes “I’m sympathetic to view X, but ultimately I find the arguments for it unconvincing,” it’s extremely misleading for someone to quote the first half of the sentence without mentioning the second half.

Likewise, Julian suggests that Tom’s summary of Fisher’s proposal leaves something to be desired:
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