Patricia Dunn, the chairman of HP’s board, is resigning. The news comes jut a couple of weeks after the public learned that she had used an illegal technique called “pretexting” to obtain the phone records of her fellow board members and nearly a dozen journalists.
So when a corporate executive illegally obtains the phone records of 2 dozen people in order to spy on them, she’s forced to resign in a matter of weeks. On the other hand, when a high-ranking government official does the same thing to as many as 200 million people, he gets a promotion. What’s wrong with this picture?
Via Patri Friedman, there’s a controversy brewing over the boundaries of online privacy. Ryan Singel at the Wired blog has a good summary:
A guy who identifies himself as Jason Fortuny, a 30 year old network administrator, posted a graphic ad on Seattle’s Craigslist, pretending to be a woman wanting some BDSM sex.
Not surprisingly, many men responded, many with photos and more than a few with pics of their genitals.
Some used their work accounts, provided their real names and gave out their cellphone numbers. One looks to be a contractor for Microsoft, while another used a .mil address to reply.
Fortuny, whose MySpace profile says he likes to “push people’s buttons” then posted all the photos and correspondence on what may be the web’s lamest wiki, Encyclopedia Dramatica.
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The Bush administration has been dealt another setback in litigation over its NSA surveillance program:
In this particular case, one of the plaintiffs, the Al-Haramain Islamic Foundation, claims that the government froze its assets during an investigation prompted by a warrantless wiretap, a claim that is verified by classified documentation (referred to in the judge’s decision as the Sealed Document) inadvertently given to the plaintiff. The government claims that national security would be threatened if the government confirms or denies the assertion that Al-Haramain was the subject of wireless eavesdropping. The basis for government’s argument extends from the belief that a suspect who knows himself to be a target of government surveillance could “change his pattern of behavior, jepordizing the ability to collection intelligence information.” The judge points out that the government’s argument is irrelevant in this case, because “the government already inadvertently disclosed the Sealed Document to plaintiffs, thus alerting the individuals or organizations mentioned in the document that their communications have been intercepted in the past.”
The government also claimed that, should the lawsuit be allowed to move forward, national security would be at risk, simply because certain details of the case could potentially be accumulated to reveal additional details. Known as the “mosaic” theory, the government’s argument is “that any disclosure of any information related to the Surveillance Program or the Sealed Document would tend to allow enemies to discern, and therefore avoid, the means by which surveillance takes place under the program.” The judge rejected this assertion, because he does not think that the case will necessitate public disclosure of “information regarding the al Qaeda threat” or “non-public details of the Surveillance Program.”
Any terrorist stupid enough not to worry about the U.S. government eavesdropping on him is probably stupid enough not to be a serious threat. And you could make the same argument about
any surveillance program.
Indeed, that’s why Congress set up FISA in the first place. They wanted to give the executive branch a leak-proof forum for getting judicial oversight of its top-secret surveillance activities. If the Bush administration had gone through the FISA process, or lobbied Congress to change the FISA process to accommodate their new program, they wouldn’t be in this situation. But instead, they chose to simply ignore the law and conduct their illegal surveillance program without judicial oversight. The chickens are now coming home to roost.
I’ve got a new article in the Hearland Institute’s IT&T News about the NSA’s spying programs:
An even bigger issue with mass surveillance by software is the way it would transform the principle of judicial oversight. Under current law, law enforcement officials must request a warrant from a judge for each suspect they wish to monitor. The judge examines the evidence for each suspect individually, and grants a warrant only if he or she finds probable cause that the suspect is guilty.
Automated surveillance, however, would involve a computer program monitoring tens of millions of individuals with no judicial oversight at all. Even more troubling, after the software had produced its list of suspects, the judge would be asked to approve human surveillance of the list the software produced, even though many of those on the list are probably innocent.
Constitutional rights depend on bright lines, so judges are not forced to make arbitrary judgment calls about when someone’s rights have been violated. But such bright lines would be extremely difficult to draw once the traditional “probable cause” standard has been abandoned.
This is a recurring pattern I’m noticing a lot in my public policy research. You can also see it the abuse of the “blight” loophole for eminent domain abuse. Because there’s no clear definition of the term, over time the exception has swallowed the rule. As a result, we get monstrosities like these. Secure rights require bright lines. And bright lines are impossible when surveillance decisions are made by computer programs with thousands of lines of code.
The current Cato Unbound, Mexicans in America, is the usual provocative and wide-ranging fare. There’s no lack of issues – or passion – in the debate about immigration.
One item in the current discussion that piques my interest – indeed, concerns me – is the formative consensus that “internal enforcement” of the immigration laws is a good idea.
University of Texas at Austin economics professor Stephen Trejo writes:
Given that most illegal immigrants come to the United States to work, why don’t we get serious about workplace enforcement? Retail stores are able to verify in a matter of seconds consumer credit cards used to make purchases. Why couldn’t a similar system be put in place to verify the Social Security numbers of employees before they are hired? . . . I suspect that we could do much more to control illegal immigration by directing technology and other enforcement resources toward the workplace rather than toward our porous southern border.
Doug Massey, co-director of the Mexican Migration Project at the Office of Population Research, Princeton University, has interesting information and ideas for reform to which he would adjoin “a simple employment verification program required of all employers to confirm the right to work.”
It does sound simple – until you step back and realize that the simple idea they’re talking about is giving the federal government the power to approve or disapprove every Americans’ job application. Does anyone think that this power, once adopted – and the technology put in place to administer it – will be limited to immigration law enforcement?
To do this, all people – not just immigrants, all people – would have to be able to prove their identity to federal standards, likely using some kind of bullet-proof identity document (even more secure than current law requires). That will soon be in place thanks to the REAL ID Act. Once we’re all carrying a bullet-proof identity document, do you think that its use will be limited to proof of identity for new employees?
It’s easy to see how facile acceptance of internal immigration law enforcement adds weight to arguments for expanded government control and tracking of all citizens. There are plenty of reasons to be concerned with internal enforcement, and the national ID almost certainly required to make that possible. Many of them are discussed in my book, Identity Crisis: How Identification is Overused and Misunderstood.
The TSA has posted a helpful web site detailing what now not allowed on airplanes:
We encourage everyone to pack gel-filled bras in their checked baggage. We recognize the sensitivity of the issue and we are reaching out to key women’s medical associations to assist passengers and make information available to them while respecting their privacy. Passengers with medical gel prosthetics will be permitted through the security checkpoint.
Please keep in mind, that while we can not provide an exhaustive list of items that covering all eventualities, all liquids, gels, or aerosols of any kind are prohibited at security checkpoints, in airport sterile areas, and aboard aircraft. You can pack these items in your checked baggage.
We ask for your cooperation in the screening process by being prepared before you arrive. We also ask that you follow the guidelines above and try not to over-think these guidelines. Please pack liquids, gels, and aerosols in your checked baggage even if you do not normally check a bag.
The last thing we’d want is
sheep passengers who think too much.
The most depressing thing about that web page is that the fact that they bothered to create it probably means these rules are not going to go away any time soon.
Wired News reporter Annalee Newitz has compiled a “top ten” list of privacy debacles.
It’s easy to quibble with the results, but I was delighted to see “The Creation of the Social Security Number” at #1. Our national identifier has used its government backing to push aside all others and enable government and corporate surveillance on a scale that never would have occured under natural conditions.
In Identity Crisis: How Identification is Overused and Misunderstood, I discuss how the uniform identification system we’ve built around the Social Security Number is insecure for individuals, making information about them too readily available to governments, corporations, and crooks.
The fix is nothing so ham-handed as banning uses of Social Security Numbers. Rather, it will be necessary to remake our identification systems so that they are diverse, competitive, and thus solicitous of individuals’ interests.
The Register has an in-depth analysis of the terrorists’ purported plan of attack:
It’s all right to mix the peroxide and acetone in one container, so long as it remains cool. Don’t forget to bring several frozen gel-packs (preferably in a Styrofoam chiller deceptively marked “perishable foods”), a thermometer, a large beaker, a stirring rod, and a medicine dropper. You’re going to need them.
It’s best to fly first class and order Champagne. The bucket full of ice water, which the airline ought to supply, might possibly be adequate – especially if you have those cold gel-packs handy to supplement the ice, and the Styrofoam chiller handy for insulation – to get you through the cookery without starting a fire in the lavvie.
Once the plane is over the ocean, very discreetly bring all of your gear into the toilet. You might need to make several trips to avoid drawing attention. Once your kit is in place, put a beaker containing the peroxide / acetone mixture into the ice water bath (Champagne bucket), and start adding the acid, drop by drop, while stirring constantly. Watch the reaction temperature carefully. The mixture will heat, and if it gets too hot, you’ll end up with a weak explosive. In fact, if it gets really hot, you’ll get a premature explosion possibly sufficient to kill you, but probably no one else.
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This weekend I had the opportunity to experience the TSA’s new, even more secure airline security policies. And boy are they irritating.
You’re still not allowed to bring any “liquids or gels” on the airplane. That includes beverages you purchase after you’ve made it through the security checkpoint. How that has any impact on terrorism is beyond me, especially since you’re not searched again as you’re boarding the plane, so a terrorist would simply ignore the rule.
Oh, and it appears that the requirement to take your shoes off has been promoted from a strong suggestion to a requirement.
But that’s not the most irritating part. I normally carry on my suitcase so i don’t have to deal with baggage claim at the end of my flight. But since I was bringing shaving cream with me, I was forced to check my luggage. I also had some wrapped books that were going to be a birthday present for my father. The TSA helpfully searched my bag and unwrapped the presents, leaving the wrapping paper in a crumpled stack atop the presents.
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The ACLU has prevailed at the district court level in its lawsuit against the NSA’s domestic wiretapping program. Presumably, the ruling will immediately be appealed.
The ruling caught me by surprise; I’d gotten used to the courts shying away from confrontations with the Bush administration over civil rights. I’m glad to see the judiciary taking a more assertive posture. Of course, in an ideal world, striking down the program would have been a foregone conclusion.
The judge sided with the government on the NSA’s other secret program, the one that data mines calling records. I tend to think that program is illegal too, although as Orin Kerr argued back in May, it’s not as clear-cut.
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