[Cross-Posted at Truthonthemarket.com]
I did not intend for this to become a series (Part I), but I underestimated the supply of analysis simultaneously invoking “search bias” as an antitrust concept while waving it about untethered from antitrust’s institutional commitment to protecting consumer welfare. Harvard Business School Professor Ben Edelman offers the latest iteration in this genre. We’ve criticized his claims regarding search bias and antitrust on precisely these grounds.
For those who have not been following the Google antitrust saga, Google’s critics allege Google’s algorithmic search results “favor” its own services and products over those of rivals in some indefinite, often unspecified, improper manner. In particular, Professor Edelman and others — including Google’s business rivals — have argued that Google’s “bias” discriminates most harshly against vertical search engine rivals, i.e. rivals offering search specialized search services. In framing the theory that “search bias” can be a form of anticompetitive exclusion, Edelman writes:
Search bias is a mechanism whereby Google can leverage its dominance in search, in order to achieve dominance in other sectors. So for example, if Google wants to be dominant in restaurant reviews, Google can adjust search results, so whenever you search for restaurants, you get a Google reviews page, instead of a Chowhound or Yelp page. That’s good for Google, but it might not be in users’ best interests, particularly if the other services have better information, since they’ve specialized in exactly this area and have been doing it for years.
I’ve wondered what model of antitrust-relevant conduct Professor Edelman, an economist, has in mind. It is certainly well known in both the theoretical and empirical antitrust economics literature that “bias” is neither necessary nor sufficient for a theory of consumer harm; further, it is fairly obvious as a matter of economics that vertical integration can be, and typically is, both efficient and pro-consumer. Still further, the bulk of economic theory and evidence on these contracts suggest that they are generally efficient and a normal part of the competitive process generating consumer benefits. Continue reading →