Antitrust & Competition Policy

A Quick Assessment of the FCC’s Appalling Staff Report on the AT&T Merger

by on December 2, 2011 · 7 comments

[Cross posted at Truth on the Market]

As everyone knows by now, AT&T’s proposed merger with T-Mobile has hit a bureaucratic snag at the FCC. The remarkable decision to refer the merger to the Commission’s Administrative Law Judge (in an effort to derail the deal) and the public release of the FCC staff’s internal, draft report are problematic and poorly considered. But far worse is the content of the report on which the decision to attempt to kill the deal was based.

With this report the FCC staff joins the exalted company of AT&T’s complaining competitors (surely the least reliable judges of the desirability of the proposed merger if ever there were any) and the antitrust policy scolds and consumer “advocates” who, quite literally, have never met a merger of which they approved.

In this post I’m going to hit a few of the most glaring problems in the staff’s report, and I hope to return again soon with further analysis.

As it happens, AT&T’s own response to the report is actually very good and it effectively highlights many of the key problems with the staff’s report. While it might make sense to take AT&T’s own reply with a grain of salt, in this case the reply is, if anything, too tame. No doubt the company wants to keep in the Commission’s good graces (it is the very definition of a repeat player at the agency, after all). But I am not so constrained. Using the company’s reply as a jumping off point, let me discuss a few of the problems with the staff report. Continue reading →

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Magical Thinking Triumphs at the FCC

by on November 28, 2011 · 8 comments

[Cross-posted at www.reason.org]

While shoppers were hitting the malls Friday–a fair percentage of them no doubt evaluating the many choices of wireless smartphones and service plans available–AT&T said it was withdrawing its FCC application to merge with T-Mobile.

AT&T’s move was in response to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski’s decision to refer the merger to an administrative law judge, coupled with a statement that he remains opposed to the $39 billion merger.

Many analysts see this as the beginning of the unraveling of the acquisition. Although AT&T said it plans to defend the deal in court against a Department of Justice antitrust suit, the company has taken accounting steps that signal it is prepared to pay Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile’s current parent, the $4 billion it pledged if it could not close the purchase by September 2012.

“The fat lady hasn’t sung yet,” said Craig Moffett, an investment analyst for Sanford C. Bernstein, as quoted by the Washington Post’s Cecilia Kang. “But she has taken the stage. And the band has begun to play.”

By itself, Genachowski’s move is a tremendous exercise of executive power, as an ALJ hearing would only occur if AT&T wins its suit with the DoJ or settles it satisfactorily. In essence, the FCC is attempting to craft an ad hoc court of appeals in order to abrogate a separate judicial ruling.

Continue reading →

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video: Panel on Governance of Social Media & Competition Law

by on November 13, 2011 · 1 comment

On Friday, both Josh Wright and I spoke on a panel at the Michigan State University’s conference on “Governance of Social Media.” Our particular panel focused on emerging competition policy issues affecting social media and social networking sites. Also joining us on the panel were Nicolas Economides of NYU and Michael Altschul of the CTIA. The video of the panel can be found here and I have also embedded it down below. [My remarks begin around the 23-min mark of the video.]

At the event, I presented my forthcoming paper on “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” which is currently out for peer review. I outlined the rising calls for treating social media or social networking sites as public utilities, essential facilities, or natural monopolies. Next, I briefly discussed some basic law and economics of public utility / essential facilities regulation. Third, I detailed six specific problems with efforts to classify these services as such. Finally, I briefly discussed regulatory proposals set forth by Professors Jonathan Zittrain and Tim Wu to apply traditional antitrust or public utility remedies to social media or information platforms. Specifically, I address Zittrain’s call for “API neutrality” (which would apply net neutrality-like principles at the applications and device layer) and Wu’s call for a “Separations Principle” (which would forcibly segregate information providers into three buckets: creators, distributors, and hardware makers). Watch the video for more details and see this for more critiques of the Zittrain and Wu proposals.

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Net Neutrality and Regulatory Reform

by on November 7, 2011 · 6 comments

The Senate might vote this week on Sen. Hutchison’s resolution of disapproval for the FCC’s net neutrality rules.  If ever there was a regulation that showed why independent regulatory agencies ought to be required to conduct solid regulatory analysis before writing a regulation, net neutrality is it.

For more than three decades, executive orders have required executive branch agencies to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis accompanying major regulations.  One of the first things the agency is supposed to do is identify the market failure, government failure, or other systemic problem the regulation is supposed to solve. The agency ought to demonstrate a problem actually exists to show that a regulation is actually necessary.

But the net neutrality rules have virtually no analysis of a systemic problem that actually exists, and no data demonstrating that the problem is real.  Instead, the FCC’s order outlines the incentives Internet providers might face to treat some traffic differently from other traffic, in a discussion heavily freighted with “could’s” and “may’s”.  Then it offers up just four familiar anecdotes that have been used repeatedly to support the claim that non-neutrality is a significant threat  (all four fit in paragraph 35 of the order).  The FCC asserts without support that Internet providers have incentives to do these things even if they lack market power, and indeed in a footnote it dispenses with the need to consider market power: “Because broadband providers have the ability to act as gatekeepers even in the absence of market power with respect to end users, we need not conduct a market power analysis.” (footnote 87)

Thus far, no administration of either party has sought to apply Regulatory Impact Analysis requirements to independent agencies. If administrations won’t, Congress should.

 

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Eric Schmidt, public choice scholar

by on October 12, 2011 · 2 comments

Over a week ago the Washington Post published an interview with Google’s Eric Schmidt to which I’ve been meaning to draw your attention. He’s reflecting on the relationship between Silicon Valle and D.C. days after his Senate testimony, and it’s incredibly candid, perhaps because as the Post noted, “He had just come from the dentist. And had a toothache.” Here are some choice quotes:

On getting told to testify:

So we get hauled in front of the Congress for developing a product that’s free, that serves a billion people. Okay? I mean, I don’t know how to say it any clearer. I mean, it’s fine. It’s their job. But it’s not like we raised prices. We could lower prices from free to…lower than free? You see what I’m saying?

On regulation:

And one of the consequences of regulation is regulation prohibits real innovation, because the regulation essentially defines a path to follow—which by definition has a bias to the current outcome, because it’s a path for the current outcome.

On the D.C. shakedown:

And privately the politicians will say, ‘Look, you need to participate in our system. You need to participate at a personal level, you need to participate at a corporate level.’ We, after some debate, set up a PAC, as other companies have.

On political startups:

Now there are startups in Washington. And these startups have the interesting property that they’re founded by people who were policymakers, let’s say in telecommunications. They’re very clever people, and they’ve figured out a way in regulation to discriminate, to find a new satellite spectrum or a new frequency or whatever. They immediately hired a whole bunch of lobbyists. They raised some money to do that. And they’re trying to innovate through the regulation. So that’s what passes for innovation in Washington.

There’s a real sense of exasperation that is almost absurd–that is, an exhausting attempt to find rationality in political decision making. Of course, there is rational decision making, it’s just on a different margin. Here is Schmidt on expanding H-1B visas:

I’m so tired of this argument. I’m tired of making it. I’ve been making it for twenty years. In the current cast of characters, the Republicans are on our side, our local Democrats support us because our arguments are obvious, and the other Democrats don’t—because they don’t get it. The president understands the argument and would like to support us, he says, but there are various political issues. That’s roughly the situation. That’s been true for twenty years, through different presidents and different leaders. It’s stupid.

The whole thing is worth reading.

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ACS Blog Debate on Google: Putting Consumer Welfare First in Antitrust Analysis of Google

by on October 6, 2011 · 0 comments

[I am participating in an online “debate” at the American Constitution Society with Professor Ben Edelman.  The debate consists of an opening statement and concluding responses.  Professor Edelman’s opening statement is here.  I have also cross-posted the opening statement at Truthonthemarket and Tech Liberation Front. This is my closing statement, which is also cross-posted at Truthonthemarket.]

Professor Edelman’s opening post does little to support his case.  Instead, it reflects the same retrograde antitrust I criticized in my first post.

Edelman’s understanding of antitrust law and economics appears firmly rooted in the 1960s approach to antitrust in which enforcement agencies, courts, and economists vigorously attacked novel business arrangements without regard to their impact on consumers.  Judge Learned Hand’s infamous passage in the Alcoa decision comes to mind as an exemplar of antitrust’s bad old days when the antitrust laws demanded that successful firms forego opportunities to satisfy consumer demand.  Hand wrote:

we can think of no more effective exclusion than progressively to embrace each new opportunity as it opened, and to face every newcomer with new capacity already geared into a great organization, having the advantage of experience, trade connections and the elite of personnel.

Antitrust has come a long way since then.  By way of contrast, today’s antitrust analysis of alleged exclusionary conduct begins with (ironically enough) the U.S. v. Microsoft decision.  Microsoft emphasizes the difficulty of distinguishing effective competition from exclusionary conduct; but it also firmly places “consumer welfare” as the lodestar of the modern approach to antitrust:

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ACS Blog Debate on Google: Retrograde Antitrust Analysis is No Fit for Google

by on October 6, 2011 · 0 comments

[I am participating in an online “debate” at the American Constitution Society with Professor Ben Edelman.  The debate consists of an opening statement and concluding responses.  Professor Edelman’s opening statement is here.  I have also cross-posted this opening statement at Truthonthemarket.]

The theoretical antitrust case against Google reflects a troubling disconnect between the state of our technology and the state of our antitrust economics.  Google’s is a 2011 high tech market being condemned by 1960s economics.  Of primary concern (although there are a lot of things to be concerned about, and my paper with Geoffrey Manne, “If Search Neutrality Is the Answer, What’s the Question?,” canvasses the problems in much more detail) is the treatment of so-called search bias (whereby Google’s ownership and alleged preference for its own content relative to rivals’ is claimed to be anticompetitive) and the outsized importance given to complaints by competitors and individual web pages rather than consumer welfare in condemning this bias.

The recent political theater in the Senate’s hearings on Google displayed these problems prominently, with the first half of the hearing dedicated to Senators questioning Google’s Eric Schmidt about search bias and the second half dedicated to testimony from and about competitors and individual websites allegedly harmed by Google.  Very little, if any, attention was paid to the underlying economics of search technology, consumer preferences, and the ultimate impact of differentiation in search rankings upon consumers.

So what is the alleged problem?  Well, in the first place, the claim is that there is bias.  Proving that bias exists — that Google favors its own maps over MapQuest’s, for example — would be a necessary precondition for proving that the conduct causes anticompetitive harm, but let us be clear that the existence of bias alone is not sufficient to show competitive harm, nor is it even particularly interesting, at least viewed through the lens of modern antitrust economics.

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ABA Roundtable Discussion Tomorrow on the AT&T/T-Mobile Merger

by on September 26, 2011 · 0 comments

[Cross posted at Truthonthemarket]

As I have posted before, I was disappointed that the DOJ filed against AT&T in its bid to acquire T-Mobile.  The efficacious provision of mobile broadband service is a complicated business, but it has become even more so by government’s meddling.  Responses like this merger are both inevitable and essential.  And Sprint and Cellular South piling on doesn’t help — and, as Josh has pointed out, further suggests that the merger is actually pro-competitive.

Tomorrow, along with a great group of antitrust attorneys, I am going to pick up where I left off in that post during a roundtable discussion hosted by the American Bar Association.  If you are in the DC area you should attend in person, or you can call in to listen to the discussion–but either way, you will need to register here.  There should be a couple of people live tweeting the event, so keep up with the conversation by following #ABASAL.

Panelists:
Richard Brunell, Director of Legal Advocacy, American Antitrust Institute, Boston
Allen Grunes, Partner, Brownstein Hyatt Farber Schreck, Washington
Glenn Manishin, Partner, Duane Morris LLP, Washington
Geoffrey Manne, Lecturer in Law, Lewis & Clark Law School, Portland
Patrick Pascarella, Partner, Tucker Ellis & West, Cleveland

Location: 
Wilson Sonsini Goodrich & Rosati, P.C. 1700 K St. N.W. Fifth Floor Washington, D.C. 20006

For more information, check out the flyer here.

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Top 10 Antitrust Fallacies to Watch for at Today’s Google Antitrust Hearing

by on September 21, 2011 · 8 comments

by Berin Szoka & Geoffrey Manne

In advance of today’s Senate Judiciary hearing, “The Power of Google: Serving Consumers or Threatening Competition?,” we’ve assembled a list of fallacies you’re likely to hear, either explicitly or implicitly:

  1. Competitors, not Competition.  Antitrust protects consumer welfare: competition, not competitors.  Competitors complain because a practice hurts them, but antitrust asks only whether a practice actually hurts consumers. The two are rarely the same.
  2. Big Is Bad. Being big (“success”) isn’t illegal.  Market share doesn’t necessarily create market power.  And even where market power does exist, antitrust punishes only its abuse.
  3. Burden-Shifting. Google, like any defendant, is presumed innocent until proven guilty.  So Google’s critics bear the burden of proving both that Google has market power and that it has abused that power to the detriment of consumers.  Yet, ironically, it’s Google at the table defending itself rather than the antitrust agencies explaining their concerns.
  4. Ignoring Error Costs. The faster technology moves, the greater the risk of a “false positive” and the more likely “false negatives” are to be mooted by disruptive innovation that unseats incumbents.  Thus, error costs counsel caution.
  5. Waving the Magic Wand.  Google’s critics often blithely assume that Google is “smart enough to figure it out” when it comes to implementing, or coping with, a wide range of proposed remedies.  But antitrust remedies, like all regulation, must be grounded in technological reality, and we must be realistic about real-world trade-offs.

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Can Any T-Mobile Buyer Pass an Antitrust Test?

by on September 12, 2011 · 2 comments

[Cross-posted at Reason.org]

In the wake of the Department of Justice’s lawsuit to stop the merger of AT&T and T-Mobile USA, there has been some discussion about where T-Mobile would end up if the government effort proved successful.

While debate continues whether a merged AT&T-T-Mobile would harm consumers, there is no disputing that T-Mobile itself is mired in business problems. For all the DoJ’s concern that T-Mobile remain in the market as a low-priced alternative for consumers, the company is short of the cash necessary to expand infrastructure at a pace to remain technologically competitive. Blocking the AT&T deal would not necessarily keep Deutsche Telekom, T-Mobile’s German parent, from seeking other buyers. Last week, Dave Goldman of CNN Money summed the situation up in “Without AT&T, T-Mobile is a White Elephant.” The facts he lays out are among the reasons the merger makes sense.

Yet let’s assume for a minute that the DoJ is successful in stopping the merger. A number of pundits both from both the business and the policy side have suggested other potential buyers could rescue T-Mobile. Sascha Segan at PC Magazine provided a good summary here.

Segan was just one of many analysts who pointed to Google, Apple and Comcast (or a cable company consortium) as potential T-Mobile buyers. There are numerous reasons as to why these companies might or might not make a bid. Yet what I find interesting the way several critics of the AT&T deal are almost giddy with the idea that one of these companies might jump at T-Mobile, noting that the entry of a deep-pocketed non-carrier might be a good development for the consolidating wireless industry.

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