Antitrust & Competition Policy

Why Do ISPs Impose Data Caps?

by on April 24, 2012 · 14 comments

There is a Senate Commerce Committee hearing today on online video, and our friends at Free Press, Consumers Union, Public Knowledge, and New America Foundation argue that it should be used to investigate ISP-imposed data caps.

If data caps had a legitimate economic justification, they might be just a necessary annoyance. But they do not have such a justification. Arbitrary caps and limits are imposed by multichannel video providers that also provide broadband Internet access, because the providers have a strong incentive and ability to protect their legacy, linear video distribution models from emerging online video competition.

As someone who uses an ISP with a data cap and who is a paid subscriber to three different online video services, you might think that I too would concerned about these caps. But to the contrary, I think there are some legitimate economic reasons ISPs might impose data caps, and I don’t see a reason to stop ISPs from setting the price and policies for the services they offer.

Continue reading →

SHARE: 14 comments

The Closing of the Spectrum Frontier

by on April 19, 2012 · 0 comments


Frederick Jackson Turner (1861-1932)

On Fierce Mobile IT, I’ve posted a detailed analysis of the NTIA’s recent report on government spectrum holdings in the 1755-1850 MHz. range and the possibility of freeing up some or all of it for mobile broadband users.

The report follows from a 2010 White House directive issued shortly after the FCC’s National Broadband Plan was published, in which the FCC raised the alarm of an imminent “spectrum crunch” for mobile users.

By the FCC’s estimates, mobile broadband will need an additional 300 MHz. of spectrum by 2015 and 500 MHz. by 2020, in order to satisfy increases in demand that have only amped up since the report was issued.  So far, only a small amount of additional spectrum has been allocated.  Increasingly, the FCC appears rudderless in efforts to supply the rest, and to do so in time. Continue reading →

SHARE: 0 comments

Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset

by on April 16, 2012 · 0 comments

In this new Money Morning article, “The Antitrust Curse: What Apple Can Learn From Microsoft, IBM,”  David Zeiler wonders whether the antitrust lawsuit filed against Apple and several book publishers by the U.S. Department of Justice last week could open the door to a broader case against Apple or, at a minimum, simply become a major distraction to the firm and it’s ability to innovate going forward. He uses IBM and Microsoft as case studies in this regard and notes that, “the problem with being in the DOJ’s gunsight is that it distracts management, makes the company hesitant to innovate, and blemishes the company’s public image.  While antitrust woes may not have been entirely responsible for Microsoft and IBM ceding their dominant positions in tech, they were clearly a major factor,” he says. “And worse for Apple, the e-book case could be just the beginning.”

Quite right. I raised the same concern in my recent Forbes column,”Regulatory, Antitrust and Disruptive Risks Threaten Apple’s Empire,” which Zeiler was kind enough to quote in his essay. In that piece, I argued:

Even if Apple beats back [the eBooks] investigation, broader questions are being raised about the company’s power that could invite a much broader investigation. The danger for Apple is that antitrust becomes an omnipresent threat that must be factored into all ongoing business decisions. Antitrust is a particular danger to Apple because the firm is highly vertically integrated and that integration is the source of many of their innovations.  As earlier tech titans like IBM and Microsoft learned, when antitrust hangs like the Sword of Damocles, every decision about how to evolve and innovate becomes a calculated gamble.

Regarding the earlier impact that antitrust Sword of Damocles had on Microsoft, Zeiler unearthed this terrific 2005 quote from Mark Kroese, a general manager of information services at the Microsoft Network, who described the impact of the MS antitrust case on innovation at the firm as follows: “Working at Microsoft today vs. five years ago is different,” Kroese said. “If anyone thinks the antitrust case hasn’t slowed us down, you’re wrong. If I want to meet with a products manager for Windows, there needs to be three lawyers in the room. We have to be so careful, we err on the side of caution. We are on such a fine line of conduct.” Regarding how antitrust chilled IBM, Zeiler cites veteran tech journalist Steve Wildstrom of Tech.pinions who noted,  “Twelve years of litigation were an enormous distraction in a time of rapid technological and business change. IBM management became cautious and over-lawyered, constantly looking over its shoulder-a condition that persisted for years after the case ended. The antitrust case was almost certainly a major cause of the serious decline of IBM in the late 1980s and early 90s,” Wildstrom said.

Of course, it is impossible to scientifically determine to what degree antitrust harassment contributed to either IBM or Microsoft’s inability to innovate and adapt to the rapidly changing market conditions. And let’s be clear: both IBM and MS have found ways to rebound and innovate in other ways. But one wonders what was lost in the process as the threat of antitrust constantly loomed and potentially chilled innovative efforts that could have kept both firms on the cutting-edge. Continue reading →

SHARE: 0 comments

New Client of the Regulatory State Expects Results

by on April 16, 2012 · 122 comments

When the federal government torpedoed the AT&T/T-Mobile USA merger in December pursuant to the current administration’s commitment to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement,” it created a new client in search of official protection and favors.

It was clear there is no way T-Mobile – which lost 802,000 contract customers in the fourth quarter – is capable of becoming a significant competitor in the near future.  T-Mobile doesn’t have the capital or rights to the necessary electromagnetic spectrum to build an advanced fourth-generation wireless broadband network of its own.

T-Mobile’s parent, Deutsche Telekom AG, has been losing money in Europe and expected its American affiliate to become self-reliant.  In 2008, T-Mobile sat out the last major auction for spectrum the company needs.

The company received cash and spectrum worth $4 billion from AT&T when the merger fell apart, from which T-Mobile plans to spend only $1.4 billion this year and next on the construction of a limited 4G network in the U.S.  But it must acquire additional capital and spectrum to become a viable competitor.

Unfortunately, every wireless service provider requires additional spectrum. “[P]rojected growth in data traffic can be achieved only by making more spectrum available for wireless use,” according to the President’s Council of Economic Advisers.  Congress recently gave the FCC new authority to auction more spectrum, but it failed – in the words of FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski – to “eliminate traditional FCC tools for setting terms for participation in auctions.”

Everyone fears it will take the FCC years to successfully conduct the next round of auctions while it fiddles “in the public interest.”  That’s why Verizon Wireless is seeking to acquire airwaves from a consortium of cable companies, and why T-Mobile will do anything to stop it.

Continue reading →

SHARE: 122 comments

The procompetitive story that could undermine the DOJ’s e-books antitrust case against Apple

by on April 12, 2012 · 2 comments

Did Apple conspire with e-book publishers to raise e-book prices?  That’s what DOJ argues in a lawsuit filed yesterday. But does that violate the antitrust laws?  Not necessarily—and even if it does, perhaps it shouldn’t.

Antitrust’s sole goal is maximizing consumer welfare.  While that generally means antitrust regulators should focus on lower prices, the situation is more complicated when we’re talking about markets for new products, where technologies for distribution and consumption are evolving rapidly along with business models.  In short, the so-called Agency pricing model Apple and publishers adopted may mean (and may not mean) higher e-book prices in the short run, but it also means more variability in pricing, and it might well have facilitated Apple’s entry into the market, increasing e-book retail competition and promoting innovation among e-book readers, while increasing funding for e-book content creators.

The procompetitive story goes something like the following.  (As always with antitrust, the question isn’t so much which model is better, but that no one really knows what the right model is—least of all antitrust regulators—and that, the more unclear the consumer welfare effects of a practice are, as in rapidly evolving markets, the more we should err on the side of restraint). Continue reading →

SHARE: 2 comments

Smartphones & Schumpeter

by on April 12, 2012 · 0 comments

Two weeks ago, I penned a column for Forbes about the astonishing rise and fall of BlackBerry (“Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?”), which somehow became the most widely-read and retweeted thing I’ve ever written in my life. I argued that BlackBerry’s story — indeed, the story of the entire U.S. smartphone sector — is the living embodiment of Schumpeterian creative destruction. Joseph Schumpeter’s “perennial gales of creative destruction” are blowing harder than ever in today’s tech economy and laying waste to those who don’t innovate fast enough, I argued, and nowhere is that more true than in the smartphone sector. I noted how, just five years ago, “BlackBerry” was virtually synonymous with “smartphones” and was considered one of the tech titans that seemed destined to dominate for many years to come. But now the BlackBerry’s days appear numbered and its parent company Research In Motion Ltd. is struggling for its very survival.

But there’s another company that I ignored in that essay that was also perched atop the mobile handset hill for a long time: Nokia. Here’s the horrifying opening lines from a Wall Street Journal story today about the company (“Nokia Crisis Deepens, Shares Plunge“):

Nokia Corp., long the biggest name in the cellphone business, is scrambling to stay relevant in the smartphone age. On Wednesday the company warned things will get worse before they get better, saying that competitors are rapidly eating into its sales in emerging markets such as China and India. Nokia also said its newest phone in the U.S. had a software glitch that is preventing some users from connecting to the Internet, marring its attempt to fight into the world’s most important smartphone market. The company’s American depositary shares slid 16% to a 15-year low of $4.24 in New York. Its market capitalization now stands at $16 billion, down from $90 billion five years ago.

It gets worse from there. The article continues on to document Nokia’s gradual slide and notes that, “like BlackBerry maker Research In Motion Ltd., Nokia is trying to re-establish its relevance in a market dominated by Apple Inc.’s iPhone and Google-powered devices. Both Nokia and RIM are working on new devices they hope will make a splash, even as Apple and Android work on improvements of their own.”

To put into context how remarkable this rapid reversal of fortunes is, you need to try remember what life was like just five years ago: Continue reading →

SHARE: 0 comments

Blocking Verizon/SpectrumCo Deal Would Harm, not Help, Consumers

by on March 27, 2012 · 0 comments

Yesterday, the International Center for Law and Economics and TechFreedom jointly filed comments [pdf] with the FCC on the Verizon SpectrumCo deal.  In the comments, ICLE Executive Director Geoffrey Manne and TechFreedom President Berin Szoka counter the primary arguments against the deal:

Critics lament the concentration of spectrum in the hands of one of the industry’s biggest players, but the assumption that concentration will harm to consumers is unsupported and misplaced.  Concentration of spectrum has not slowed the growth of the market; rather, the problem is that growth in demand has dramatically outpaced capacity.  What’s more: prices have plummeted even as the industry has become more concentrated.

While the FCC undeniably has authority to review the license transfers, the argument that the separate but related commercial agreements would reduce competition is properly the province of the Department of Justice.  That argument is best measured under the antitrust laws, not by the FCC under its vague “public interest” standard.  Indeed, if the FCC can assert jurisdiction over the commercial agreements as part of its public interest review, its authority over license transfers will become a license to regulate all aspects of business.  This is a recipe for certain mischief.

The need for all competitors, including Verizon, to obtain sufficient spectrum to meet increasing demand demonstrates that the deal is in the public interest and should be approved.

SHARE: 0 comments

new paper: The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities

by on March 19, 2012 · 0 comments

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Continue reading →

SHARE: 0 comments

How Scary is Wireless Duopoly?

by on March 15, 2012 · 19 comments

I’m puzzled by Harold Feld’s latest post. Last month, Harold laid out his argument that society faces a tradeoff between allocating the wireless spectrum to the highest bidder and maintaining competition in wireless services. I responded by showing geometrically that in most cases, efficient production is much more important than maximal competition; in economics, trapezoids are bigger than triangles.

Harold seemed to get it. My argument was only an intuitive one, but he admitted that he needed to be more rigorous to show that competition in the wireless industry is more important than lowering the cost of producing wireless services.



Today, Harold reprised nearly the same post, without additional economic rigor, and at greater length. So maybe you can see why I’m puzzled.

I continue to believe that trapezoids are bigger than triangles. But for this post, let’s put that issue to the side to focus on duopoly, of which Harold seems to have a visceral fear. He’s probably not alone.

Duopoly sounds really bad, because it’s 1 away from monopoly. But modern economists tend not to place too much emphasis on the number of competitors in an industry, at least not in isolation from other factors. For instance, it is well understood that under what is known as a Bertrand duopoly, economic profits to the firms are zero, and the price to consumers is as low as it is when there are many firms. That does not sound too scary, does it?

Continue reading →

SHARE: 19 comments

The DOJ’s Problematic Attack on Property Rights Through Merger Review

by on March 14, 2012 · 1 comment

The DOJ’s recent press release on the Google/Motorola, Rockstar Bidco, and Apple/ Novell transactions struck me as a bit odd when I read it.  As I’ve now had a bit of time to digest it, I’ve grown to really dislike it.  For those who have not followed Jorge Contreras had an excellent summary of events at Patently-O.

For those of us who have been following the telecom patent battles, something remarkable happened a couple of weeks ago.  On February 7, the Wall St. Journal reported that, back in November, Apple sent a letter[1] to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) setting forth Apple’s position regarding its commitment to license patents essential to ETSI standards.  In particular, Apple’s letter clarified its interpretation of the so-called “FRAND” (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms that ETSI participants are required to use when licensing standards-essential patents.  As one might imagine, the actual scope and contours of FRAND licenses have puzzled lawyers, regulators and courts for years, and past efforts at clarification have never been very successful.  The next day, on February 8, Google released a letter[2] that it sent to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), ETSI and several other standards organizations.  Like Apple, Google sought to clarify its position on FRAND licensing.  And just hours after Google’s announcement, Microsoft posted a statement of “Support for Industry Standards”[3] on its web site, laying out its own gloss on FRAND licensing.  For those who were left wondering what instigated this flurry of corporate “clarification”, the answer arrived a few days later when, on February 13, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released its decision[4] to close the investigation of three significant patent-based transactions:  the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, the acquisition of a large patent portfolio formerly held by Nortel Networks by “Rockstar Bidco” (a group including Microsoft, Apple, RIM and others), and the acquisition by Apple of certain Linux-related patents formerly held by Novell.  In its decision, the DOJ noted with approval the public statements by Apple and Microsoft, while expressing some concern with Google’s FRAND approach.  The European Commission approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility on the same day.
Continue reading →

SHARE: 1 comment

← Previous Entries

Next Entries →