Antitrust & Competition Policy

There are a lot of inaccurate claims – and bad economics – swirling around the Universal Music Group (UMG)/EMI merger, currently under review by the US Federal Trade Commission and the European Commission (and approved by regulators in several other jurisdictions including, most recently, Australia). Regulators and industry watchers should be skeptical of analyses that rely on outmoded antitrust thinking and are out of touch with the real dynamics of the music industry.

The primary claim of critics such as the American Antitrust Institute and Public Knowledge is that this merger would result in an over-concentrated music market and create a “super-major” that could constrain output, raise prices and thwart online distribution channels, thus harming consumers. But this claim, based on a stylized, theoretical economic model, is far too simplistic and ignores the market’s commercial realities, the labels’ self-interest and the merger’s manifest benefits to artists and consumers.

For market concentration to raise serious antitrust issues, products have to be substitutes. This is in fact what critics argue: that if UMG raised prices now it would be undercut by EMI and lose sales, but that if the merger goes through, EMI will no longer constrain UMG’s pricing power. However, the vast majority of EMI’s music is not a substitute for UMG’s. In the real world, there simply isn’t much price competition across music labels or among the artists and songs they distribute. Their catalogs are not interchangeable, and there is so much heterogeneity among consumers and artists (“product differentiation,” in antitrust lingo) that relative prices are a trivial factor in consumption decisions: No one decides to buy more Lady Gaga albums because the Grateful Dead’s are too expensive. The two are not substitutes, and assessing competitive effects as if they are, simply because they are both “popular music,” is not instructive. Continue reading →

That was the response of a friend currently in Rwanda who had issued a Facebook plea for someone to upload the weird “Innocence of Muslims” video to Dropbox.

“Oh, where is the stupid internet in Rwanda?????” she exclaimed.

In typical snark, I had asked, “What do you connect to Dropbox with? Tin-can on string?”

She actually has Internet access, but she finds YouTube so much less reliable than other platforms that she asks friends to upload YouTube videos elsewhere.

I anecdotally find YouTube videos to be clunky downloads compared to others. Quite naturally, I watch fewer videos on YouTube and more on other platforms. I don’t know, but guess, that Google has made some decision to economize on video downloads—a high percentage of people probably watch only the first third of any video, so why send them the whole thing right away?—and that its imperfect implementation has me watching the spinning “pause” wheel (or playing “snake”) routinely when I think a YouTube offering would be interesting.

Would the Google of five years have allowed that? It’s well known that Google recognizes speed as an important elements of quality service on the Internet.

And this is why antitrust action against Google is unwarranted. When companies get big, they lose their edge, as I’m guessing Google is losing its edge in video service. This opens the door to competitors as part of natural economic processes.

Just the other week, I signed up with Media.net and I’ll soon be running tests on whether it gets better results for me on WashingtonWatch.com than Google AdSense. So far so good. A human customer service representative navigated me through the (simple) process of opening an account and getting their ad code.

These are anecdotes suggesting Google’s competitive vulnerability. But you can get a more systematic airing of views at TechFreedom’s event September 28th: “Should the FTC Sue Google Over Search?

In my last post, I discussed an outstanding new paper from Ronald Cass on “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk.” As I noted, it’s one of the best things I’ve ever read about the relationship between antitrust regulation and the modern information economy. That got me thinking about what other papers on this topic that I might recommend to others. So, for what it’s worth, here are the 12 papers that have most influenced my own thinking on the issue. (If you have other suggestions for what belongs on the list, let me know. No reason to keep it limited to just 12.)

  1. J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, “Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,” 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2009).
  2. Geoffrey A. Manne &  Joshua D. Wright, “Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust,” 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics, (2010): 153
  3. Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?” (August 2009).
  4. Daniel F. Spulber, “Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation,” 4(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, (2008): 915.
  5. Ronald Cass, “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk,” 9(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming (Spring 2012)
  6. Richard Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 Antitrust Law Journal, (2001).
  7. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,”Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History,” 11(1) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (April 1995): 205-26.
  8. Robert Crandall and Charles Jackson, “Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (December 2010).
  9. Bruce Owen, “Antitrust and Vertical Integration in ‘New Economy’ Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (November 2010).
  10. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, “Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions,” 78 (1) Antitrust Law Journal (2012): 1-21.
  11. Thomas Hazlett, David Teece, Leonard Waverman, “Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, (November 21, 2011), No. 11-50.
  12. David S. Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two Sided Markets.”

Ronald Cass, Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Law, has penned the best paper on antitrust regulation that you will read this year, especially if you’re interested in the relationship between antitrust and  information technology sectors.  His paper is entitled, “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk,” and it makes two straightforward points:

  1. Antitrust enforcement has characteristics and risks similar to other forms of regulation.
  2. Antitrust authorities need to exercise special care in making enforcement decisions respecting conduct of individual dominant firms in high-technology industries.

Here are some highlights from the paper that build on those two points. Continue reading →

Adam Thierer, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, discuses recent calls for nationalizing Facebook or at least regulating it as a public utility. Thierer argues that Facebook is not a public good in any formal economic sense, and nationalizing the social network would be a big step in the wrong direction. He argues that nationalizing the network is neither the only nor the most effective means of solving privacy concerns that surround Facebook and other social networks. Nor is Facebook is a monopoly, he says, arguing that customers have many other choices. Thierer also points out that regulation is not without its problems including the potential that a regulator will be captured by the regulated network thus making monopoly a self-fulfilling prophecy.

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A cable TV monopoly is imminent and high prices loom, at least as far as the Associated Press is concerned.

That was the angle of a widely syndicated AP story last week reporting that in the second quarter of this year, landline phone companies lost broadband subscribers while cable companies gained market share.

Beneath the lead, Peter Svensson, AP technology reporter, wrote:

The flow of subscribers from phone companies to cable providers could lead to a de facto monopoly on broadband in many areas of the U.S., say industry watchers. That could mean a lack of choice and higher prices.

In the news business, the second graph is usually referred to as the “nut” graph. It encapsulates the significance of the story, that is, why it’s news.

It’s interesting that Svensson, with either support or input from his editors, jumped on the “de facto” monopoly angle. There could be any number of reasons why cable broadband is outpacing telco DSL, beginning with superior speed (to be fair, an aspect noted in the lead).

However, AP defaulted to the clichéd narrative that the telecom, Internet and media technology markets inevitably bend toward monopoly (see here, herehere and here for just as a sample). Moreover, that the money quote came from Susan Crawford, President Obama’s former special assistant for science, technology and innovation policy, and a vocal advocate of broad industry regulation, was all the more reason it should have been countered with some acknowledgement of the growing data on how consumer behavior is changing when it comes to TV viewing. Arguably, at least, the cable companies, far from heading toward monopoly, are sailing into competitive headwinds stirred up by video on demand services such as Netflix, Hulu and iTunes.

Continue reading →

As budget deficits have increased, public investment in our nation’s infrastructure has declined. In just the last four yours, the “United States has fallen sharply in the World Economic Forum’s ranking of national infrastructure systems,” from 6th in 2007-2008 to 16th in 2011-2012. Our roads, bridges, rail networks, and ports are all straining to handle demand, but due to budget concerns, lawmakers have little interest in increased funding. Continue reading →

I’ve argued (here and here, for instance) against worrying too much about the monopolization of Internet access. Broadband is pretty clearly an industry in which there are increasing returns to scale, and when returns to scale are severe enough, that results in natural monopoly. There are not clear welfare gains from regulatory solutions to natural monopoly problems generally, and broadband in particular is a case where many of the problems associated with monopolization are ameliorated by price discrimination.

Nevertheless, I accept that most people are not persuaded by this logic. Let me try a different tack, explaining what I would expect to see if profit-centered monopolists were really as bad for consumers as their critics claim.

The answer can be summed up in one word: mutuals. Mutual companies are not especially common in today’s economy, but they are worth pondering at some length. Mutuals are firms in which customers, in virtue of their ongoing patronage of the firm, are also its owners. A mutual company generally has no other shareholders to please, and it does not typically distribute dividends. Instead, if it makes a profit it will distribute it to its customers in the form of lower prices in the future.

Continue reading →

Is competition really a problem in the tech industry? That was the question the folks over at WebProNews asked me to come on their show and discuss this week. I offer my thoughts in the following 15-minute clip. Also, down below I have embedded a few of my recent relevant essays on this topic, a few of which I mentioned during the show.

It’s come to this. After more than a decade of policies aimed at reducing the telephone companies’ share of the landline broadband market, the feds now want to thwart a key wireless deal on the remote chance it might result in a major phone company exiting the wireline market completely.

The Department of Justice is holding up the $3.9 billion deal that would transfer a block of unused wireless spectrum from a consortium of four cable companies to Verizon Wireless, an arm of Verizon, the country’s largest phone company.

The rationale, reports The Washington Post’s Cecilia Kang, is that DoJ is concerned the deal, which also would involve a wireless co-marketing agreement with Comcast, Cox, Time Warner and Bright House Networks, the companies that jointly own the spectrum in question, would lead Verizon to neglect of its FiOS fiber-to-the-home service.

There’s no evidence that this might happen, but the fact that DoJ put it on the table demonstrates the problems inherent in government attempts to regulate competition.

Continue reading →