Statue at FTC Headquarters: “Man Controlling Trade” (We’re rooting for the horse!)
Adam Thierer and I have just released a new PFF paper entitled “Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?” (PDF) about the FTC’s new “Self-Regulatory Principles for Online Behavioral Advertising.” Adam lampooned some of the attitudes at play in this debate in a great rant yesterday.
But we give the FTC credit for resisting calls to abandon self-regulation, and for its thoughtful consideration of the danger in stifling advertising-the economic engine that has supported a flowering of creative expression and innovation online content and services. That said, we continue to have our doubts about the FTC’s approach, however-well intentioned:
- Where is this approach heading? Will a good faith effort to suggest best practices eventually morph into outright government regulation of the online advertising marketplace?
- What, concretely, is the harm we’re trying to address? We have asked this question several times before and have yet to see a compelling answer.
- What will creeping “co-regulation” mean for the future of “free” Internet services? Is the mother’s milk of the Internet-advertising-about to be choked off by onerous privacy mandates?
We stand at an important crossroads in the debate over the online marketplace and the future of a “free and open” Internet. Many of those who celebrate that goal focus on concepts like “net neutrality” at the distribution layer, but what really keeps the Internet so “free and open” is the economic engine of online advertising at the applications and content layers. If misguided government regulation chokes off the Internet’s growth or evolution, we would be killing the goose that laid the golden eggs.
The dangers of regulation to the health of the Internet are real, but the ease with which government could disrupt the economic motor of the Internet (advertising) is not widely understood-and therein lies the true danger in this debate. The advocates of regulation pay lip service to the importance of advertising in funding online content and services but don’t seem to understand that this quid pro quo is a fragile one: Tipping the balance, even slightly, could have major consequences for continued online creativity and innovation.
Continue reading →
Over the summer, I blogged about an FCC decision to ban Verizon’s practice of offering incentives to departing customers to get them to stay. Yesterday, the DC Circuit upheld that bad decision. When a customer of Verizon’s phone service decides to leave for a VOIP company, Verizon gets a notice that the number is being ported. When Verizon got notified that the customer was trying to leave, the company would offer her incentives such as “discounts and American Express reward cards” to stay.
This worked well for the customers, who got discounts if they stayed. It also worked well for Verizon, for whom it costs much more to find a replacement customer than to keep the current one. And it was really the best way to do so. If Verizon had given the incentives any time a customer threatened to leave, but didn’t start the process of doing so, then customers would just bluff to get the incentives. Verizon instead looked for a costly signal from the customer. And if Verizon had waited until after the port was already completed, it would cost the customer, Verizon, and the new carrier a lot of effort to switch back.
But the FCC banned Verizon’s efforts and yesterday the DC Circuit affirmed the Commission. I will follow with more details, once my summary of the case comes out in the March issue of Packets, the Center for Internet and Society’s publication summarizing important new internet cases. But for now, I should just note that the court hinted that the FCC’s reading of the statute it relied upon was a bit counterintuitive, but was compelled by Chevron v. NRDC to give the administrative agency great deference in its bad reading of the law. The court even noted that Verizon offered uncontroverted evidence “that continuation of its marketing program would generate $75–79 million in benefits for telephone customers over a five-year period.” Further, the court rejected Verizon’s First Amendment challenge, because the lower standard for commercial speech compelled the conclusion that Verizon’s sound marketing efforts didn’t deserve protection.
These precedents need to be revoked, or the growing administrative state will keep swallowing up more and more of our most important freedoms while preventing sensible and beneficial policies.
The WSJ reports on the intensifying economic pressure on local TV stations: declining viewership, ad revenue and the threat that national networks might go straight to cable.
Many stations are looking to the Internet for salvation:
Stations are scrambling to find new revenue streams. Some are testing out technology that will send their signals to cellphones and mobile devices, and beefing up their Web sites to boost online advertising. Others say rather than shrinking local news coverage, they’re expanding it, since it’s the only original content they still have…. Nexstar Broadcasting Group Inc., a Texas-based company that owns or manages 51 stations around the country, launched highly local “community” Web sites. Stations owned by NBC Universal are piping content and ads to TV screens in supermarkets, taxi cabs and their own Web sites.
“These tough times really force you to look at everything,” says John Wallace, president of NBC Local Media, the cadre of stations owned by NBC. “It remains to be seen how this is going to evolve, but I do believe there will be a market for local television well into the future.”
This ongoing series has focused on the growing substitutability of Internet-delivered video for traditional video distribution channels like cable and satellite. YouTube has recently begun exploring adding traditional television programming to its staggering catalogue of mostly amateur-generated content.
But now YouTube is going one step farther by exploring the possibility of signing Hollywood professionals to produce “straight-to-YouTube” content:
The deal would underscore the ways that distribution models are evolving on the Internet. Already, some actors and other celebrities are creating their own content for the Web, bypassing the often arduous process of developing a program for a television network. The YouTube deal would give William Morris clients an ownership stake in the videos they create for the Web site.
This kind of deal would make Internet video even more of a substitute for traditional subscription channels—thus further eroding the existing rationale for regulating those channels.
But what’s even most interesting about this development is that YouTube’s interest seems to be driven primarily by the possibility of reaping greater advertising revenues on such professional content than on its currently reaps from its vast, but relatively unprofitable, catalogue of user-generated content:
YouTube’s audience is enormous; the measurement firm comScore reported that 100 million viewers in the United States visited the site in October. But, in part because of copyright concerns, the site does not place ads on or next to user-uploaded videos. As a result, it makes money from only a fraction of the videos on the site — the ones that are posted by its partners, including media companies like CBS and Universal Music.
The company has shown interest in becoming a home for premium video in recent months by upgrading its video player and adding full-length episodes of television shows. But some major television networks and other media companies are still hesitant about showing their content on the site. The Warner Music Group’s videos were removed from the site last month in a dispute over pay for its content.
The WSJ reports that a study will be released tomorrow noting an 8% drop in total “paid search” revenues in 2008. Google’s Fourth Quarter results will be released Thursday. While this is clearly bad news for Google, Yahoo!, Microsoft and other companies that sell ads next to the results of their search engines, it’s also terrible news for the Internet users who have come to take for granted not just these free search engines, but the other free services and content cross-subsidized by search ad revenue. A quick look at the offerings pages of Google, Yahoo! and Microsoft (downloads and some services) should remind you of a few of these ad-supported offerings.
What’s even worse for users is that search ad spending may be the “canary in the coalmine” for online advertising overall: A drop in search ad spending may suggest that display ad revenue for 2008 may have fared even worse. While search ad revenue funds offerings from search engine providers, display ad revenue is the bread & butter of millions of websites, from the “short head” (big websites like ESPN.com) to through the “long tail” (small websites). As advertisers cut back on buying web ads, there will be less funding available for “Free!” culture—and we’ll all suffer from the resulting decline in creativity and innovation.
Let’s hope 2009 is a better year for advertising—both search and display—than 2008.
Jerry Yang’s departure as Yahoo! CEO opens the door to a renewed bid by Microsoft to buy Yahoo!’s search business (or Yahoo! itself). Such a merger could produce a significantly stronger challenger to Google in the search market. With this possibility in mind, the WSJ just ran a fascinating history of the “paid search” 
business—the placement of “contextually targeted” ads next to search engine results based on the search terms that produced those results.
In a nutshell, Microsoft failed to see (back in 1998-2003) the enormous potential of paid search—just as small start-ups (such as Google) were starting to develop the technology and business model that today account for a $12+ billion/year industry, which is twice the size of the display ad market and which supports a great deal of the online content and services we have all come to take for granted online. Microsoft first put its toe in the water of paid search with a small-scale partnership with Goto.com in 1999-2000. But this partnership failed because of internal resistance from the managers of Microsoft’s display-ad program. In 2000, Google launched Adwords and thus began its transformation from start-up into economic colossus. By 2002, Microsoft realized that it needed to catchup fast, and approached Goto.com (by then renamed Overture) about a takeover. But Microsoft ultimately chose in 2003 not to buy the startup because Bill Gates and Steve Ballmer “balked at Overture’s valuation of $1 billion to $2 billion, arguing that Microsoft could create the same service for less.”
Microsoft, meanwhile, spent the next 18 months deploying hundreds of programmers to build a search engine and a search-ad service, which it code-named Moonshot. The company launched its search engine in late 2004 and its search-ad system in May 2006.
But Microsoft’s ad system came too late:
Advertisers applauded Moonshot for its technical innovation. But Microsoft had trouble coaxing people to migrate to its search engine from Google; advertisers were unwilling to spend large sums on MSN’s search ads. By building a new system instead of buying Overture, Mr. Mehdi says, “we really delayed our time to market.”
What’s most fascinating about the piece is that it seems to suggest that Microsoft missed its opportunities to get into paid search not because it was “dumb,” “uninnovative” or a “bad” company, but for the same sorts of reasons that big, highly successful and even particularly innovative companies fail. The reasons companies generally succeed in mastering “adaptive” innovation of the technologies behind their established business models are the very reasons why such great companies struggle to encourage or channel the “disruptive” innovation that renders their core technologies and business models obsolete. Continue reading →
The NYT reports that Google has recently disclosed in an SEC filing that it had 1 million advertisers as of 2007. Some analysts suggest that Google’s growing scale will lead to higher ad prices:
Ben Schachter, an analyst with UBS, said he expects the current number is likely to be between 1.3 million and 1.5 million. Google declined to comment on the current size of its advertising base.
“It is a number that people have wanted to know for a long time,” Mr. Schachter said. More advertisers means more revenue — and more revenue, on average, for every search query — for a couple of reasons: a larger number of queries will have ads matched against them; and on popular queries, competition for placement will be more intense, and as a result, ad prices, which are set by auction, will be higher.
But is Google’s success really driving up ad prices? The same piece also notes that:
Interestingly, each advertiser, on average, spent a little more than $16,000 a year on Google. That figure changed little between 2003 and 2007.
As one of the commenters on the piece noted:
If average advertiser expenses hasn’t really changed in the last 5 years, maybe Google’s argument that it’s not a monopoly because prices are determined by ad auctions, not Google’s search share, holds some weight.
Meanwhile, Google Watch notes Microsoft’s recent success in signing up Verizon, Dell, Sun and Hewlett-Packard as partners for Microsoft’s Live Search engine and asks whether Google’s success is driving potential partners into Microsoft’s arms, as Microsoft appears to be working harder to gain market share for its own search and advertising products. So can Microsoft—and Yahoo!—regain momentum?
Perhaps 2009 will bring some answers to these questions—and more hard data about ad prices. But whatever happens, it’s a safe bet that speculation and fierce argument will abound with every new development in the search/advertising wars.
Debates about online privacy often seem to assume relatively homogeneous privacy preferences among Internet users. But the reality is that users vary widely, with many people demonstrating that they just don’t care who sees what they do, post or say online. Attitudes vary from application to application, of course, but that’s precisely the point: While many reflexively talk about the “importance of privacy” as if a monolith of users held a single opinion, no clear consensus exists for all users, all applications and all situations.
If a picture is worth a thousand words, this picture makes the point brilliantly—showing:
locations where [Flickr] users are more likely to post their photos as “public,” which is the default setting, in green. Places where Flickr users are more likely to put privacy controls on their photos show up in red.
Of course, geography is just one dimension across which users may vary in their attitudes about privacy, but the map makes the basic point about variation very well. Seeing what users actually do in real life says a lot more about their preferences than merely polling them about what they think they care about in the abstract—as my colleagues Solveig Singleton and Jim Harper argued brilliantly in their 2001 paper With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us (SSRN).
The Progress & Freedom Foundation has just launched the new Center for Internet Freedom. CIF offers an alternative to the proliferation of advocacy groups calling for government intervention online by offering timely analyses and critiques of proposals that diminish the vital role of free markets, free speech and property rights. We aim to drive the Internet policy debate in new directions by emphasizing a layered approach of technological innovation, user education, user self-help, industry self-regulation, and the enforcement of existing laws consistent with the First Amendment. Such an approach is a less restrictive—and generally more effective—alternative to increased regulation.
Here are some of the issues I’ll be working on as CIF’s Director in conjunction with my esteemed colleagues Adam Thierer, Adam Marcus, and adjunct fellows:
- Defending online advertising as the lifeblood of online content & services, especially in the “Long Tail”;
- Emphasizing market solutions to problems of privacy protection, especially regarding the use of cookies and packet inspection data;
- Protecting online speech and expression both in the U.S. and abroad;
- Defending Section 230 immunity for Internet intermediaries;
- Opposing online taxation and legal barriers to e-commerce and digital payments, especially at the state and local levels; and
- Ensuring that Internet governance remains transparent and accountable without hampering the evolution of the Internet.
By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer
Progress Snapshot 4.19 (PDF)
Since the fall of 2008, a debate has raged in Washington over “targeted online advertising,” an ominous-sounding shorthand for the customization of Internet ads to match the interests of users. Not only are these ads more relevant and therefore less annoying to Internet users than untargeted ads, they are more cost-effective to advertisers and more profitable to websites that sell ad space. While such “smarter” online advertising scares some—prompting comparisons to a corporate “Big Brother” spying on Internet users—it is also expected to fuel the rapid growth of Internet advertising revenues from $21.7 billion in 2007 to $50.3 billion in 2011-an annual growth rate of more than 24%. Since this growing revenue stream ultimately funds the free content and services that Internet users increasingly take for granted, policymakers should think very carefully about what’s really best for consumers before rushing to regulate an industry that has thrived for over a decade under a layered approach that combines technological “self-help” by privacy-wary consumers, consumer education, industry self-regulation, existing state privacy tort laws, and Federal Trade Commission (FTC) enforcement of corporate privacy policies.
In an upcoming PFF Special Report, we will address the many technical, economic, and legal aspects of this complicated policy issue-especially the possibility that regulation may unintentionally thwart market responses to the growing phenomenon of users blocking online ads.
We will also issue a three-part challenge to those who call for regulation of online advertising practices:
- Identify the harm or market failure that requires government intervention.
- Prove that there is no less restrictive alternative to regulation.
- Explain how the benefits of regulation outweigh its costs.
Continue reading →
The Technology Liberation Front is the tech policy blog dedicated to keeping politicians' hands off the 'net and everything else related to technology.