Articles by Jim Harper

Jim HarperJim is the Director of Information Policy Studies at The Cato Institute, the Editor of Web-based privacy think-tank Privacilla.org, and the Webmaster of WashingtonWatch.com. Prior to becoming a policy analyst, Jim served as counsel to committees in both the House and Senate.


Secrecy is Unsafe

by on July 5, 2007 · 2 comments

There’s a commendable piece called “Strictly Confidential” (summarized; full article behind paywall) by Jacob Shapiro in the current issue of Foreign Policy.

Shapiro makes an intelligent case that opening government improves security. “When government officials curb access to information,” he writes, “they cut themselves off from the brain power and analytical skills of a huge community of scientists, engineers, and security experts who are often far better at identifying threats, weaknesses, and solutions than any government agency.” Shapiro provides a couple of examples where openness has improved security systems.

“Putting information behind lock and key does not make targets safe from attack. It leaves security analysts unable to find solutions to other weaknesses in the future. It also leaves government and industry less motivated to find safeguards of their own.”

Good stuff.

This very fine Ars story on the emergence of contactless payments is a terrific opportunity to spot examples of people minding other people’s business.

Example 1, Federal Reserve minding consumers’ business: “The Federal Reserve sets rules for receipts, and last week the Feds said that purchases of $15 or less don’t even require a receipt now, let alone a signature.”

I’m sure the Federal Reserve cares, and I’m sure they’ve done a careful job, but I really think that the need for, and content of, receipts can be hashed out among buyers and sellers. I now wonder how many billions of receipts are handed out each year because of this “protection.” (If it’s one billion more than consumers actually want and need, think paper, ink, print mechanism, and a second or two of people’s time x 1,000,000,000 – costs all borne by consumers directly, or indirectly in the form of higher prices, without a commensurate benefit.)

Example 2, Security researchers minding credit card companies’ business: “Security researchers independent from credit card companies are sounding alarms, while the credit card companies themselves believe that they have the right balance of security and functionality.”

The researchers care, and they want the best possible system, but they’re security researchers. Almost by definition, they are going to overweight security.

Payment systems are actually supposed to balance many competing interests, security being just one. Others include convenience, level of repudiability, privacy, and so on. So long as the credit card associations bear the risk of loss (and in these low-dollar transacations, they do), security is the credit card associations’ problem.

(Yes, the costs of insecurity are also passed to merchants and consumers. The solution that will keep these costs in check, yet in balance with other demands on the system, is competition among credit card associations and among payment systems for both kinds of customers. The job of each credit card association is then to constantly tweak the mix of interests its products serve. With each tweak, it aims to bring more customers on board than it loses.)

If the researchers convince the Fed to hold up experimentation with RF payments, that’s two busy-bodies getting together to run transactions for which consumers, merchants, and credit card associations are supposed to be responsible.

When lines of authority break down, results suffer. No one is better positioned to balance risks than self-interested parties.

One of the themes I’ve been hitting a lot recently in talks on the subject is how going digital with identification is changing the meaning of being identified. IDing someone used to be a one-time interaction. It is becoming a record-keeping event.

Via Reason’s Hit and Run, here’s a story on how Tennessee is now requiring everyone to show ID to buy beer. The story shows how that’s ramping up surveillance.

There are plenty of absurdities. One is that really old people, who are obviously of-age, are having to show ID. The other – more subtle, but more important – is that people are showing ID to prove age. This violates the privacy protecting practice of “data minimization” – collecting only the information you need to serve your purpose. Tennessee law requires people to share identity information as well as age, violating the principle of data minimization daily, every time someone buys beer.

Live free or die.

Yesterday, the immigration reform bill stumbled over the bill’s REAL ID provisions, which attempt to revive the moribund U.S. national ID system. Apparently, REAL ID does not enjoy the support of a majority of Senators.

Though Senate procedure is quite murky to me, apparently the Baucus-Tester amendment, to strip REAL ID-related requirements from the immigration bill (being considered as one division of an omnibus amendment known as a “clay pigeon”), was the subject of a motion to table. (“Tabling” an amendment means setting it aside indefinitely, which usually means forever.) The motion failed.

Several Senators who support overall immigration reform voted against tabling the amendment. This means that including the REAL ID provisions in the bill is enough to kill it.

Though only time and further machinations will tell, it looks like REAL ID-based internal enforcement can not be a part of any immigration law reform bill that gets through Congress.

That’s good news for all the native born, law-abiding Americans who would have been treated as suspects and made subject to surveillance in a vain attempt to get at illegal aliens.

Update: It appears that a cloture vote on the bill has failed, meaning the Senate is not prepared to continue with the bill. The inclusion of REAL ID killed immigration reform.

UnRealID in Action

by on June 26, 2007 · 0 comments

There will be votes today and tomorrow on the REAL ID provisions in the Senate immigration bill.

The good folks at unRealID.com have put together a page to facilitate your communication with your Senators about these issues. If you have an opinion – and you should – this would be a good time to express it.

Here’s the first reporting I’ve seen on Title III of the Senate immigration bill. San Francisco Chronicle reporter Carolyn Lochhead writes:

A government that cannot issue passports to 3 million U.S. citizens in time for summer holidays is expected to create a vast work-authorization system for more than 7 million U.S. employers and eventually all 146 million U.S. workers that is quick, accurate and safe.

Up to now, there has been almost no public discussion, much less analysis, of this part of the Senate bill, though the House Immigration Subcommittee held a hearing on issues in electronic employment elgibility verification in April. There, I testified on the privacy and civil liberties concerns with such a system. Even yesterday, though, Senator Ted Kennedy appearing on Fox News Sunday touted the strong employment eligibility verification system in the Senate bill.

Broad immigration reform is needed, especially with increased legal avenues for immigration, but electronic employment eligibility verification will fail. The only question is how much damage will be done to law-abiding Americans’ privacy in the process.

Do the Math

by on June 22, 2007 · 0 comments

Identity card producer Digimarc has hired Janice Kephart to lobby for the REAL ID Act. That doesn’t surprise me. Indeed, I assumed she was working for them.

Kephart has worked to cash in on her service to the 9/11 Commission by opening a boutique ‘security’ lobbying firm. In my testimony to the Senate Judiciary Committee, I characterized her as part of the “do-overs” school of REAL ID advocacy. ‘If we could just do 9/11 again, maybe someone would have gotten suspicious and stopped the attack.’

The article in the Portland Business Journal about it was interesting because it points out that Digimarc is a Beaverton, Oregon company. And look at who is one of the few governors in the country supporting REAL ID: Ted Kulongoski of Oregon!

Worried about national security? Immigration control? Identity fraud? No, the governor is working to help an in-state company feed from the federal trough.

The very Department of Homeland Security that is seeking to require states to collect and share information on every driver and state ID card holder, including scanned copies of their birth certificates, “suffered more than 800 hacker break-ins, virus outbreaks and other computer security problems over two years, senior officials acknowledged to Congress.”

In one instance, hacker tools for stealing passwords and other files were found on two internal Homeland Security computer systems. The agency’s headquarters sought forensic help from the department’s own Security Operations Center and the U.S. Computer Emergency Readiness Team it operates with Carnegie Mellon University.

In other cases, computer workstations in the Coast Guard and the Transportation Security Administration were infected with malicious software detected trying to communicate with outsiders; laptops were discovered missing; and agency Web sites suffered break-ins.

. . . should be interesting.