Articles by Jerry Brito

Jerry is a senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, and director of its Technology Policy Program. He also serves as adjunct professor of law at GMU. His web site is jerrybrito.com.


On the podcast this week, Tim Harford, economist and senior columnist for the Financial Times, discusses his new book, Adapt: Why Success Starts With Failure. He argues that people and organizations have a poor record of getting things right the first time; therefore, the evolutionary process of trial and error is a difficult yet necessary process needed to solve problems in our complex world. Harford emphasizes the importance of embracing failure in a society focused on perfection. According to Harford, one can implement this process by trying different things in small doses and developing the ability to distinguish success and failures while experimenting. A design with failure in mind, according to Harford, is a design capable of adaptation.

Related Links

  • Adapt: Why Success Starts With Failure
  • “Tim Harford on failure”, Washington Post
  • “No, statistics are not silly, but their users . . .”, By Harford
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    In today’s Washington Post, Senators Lieberman, Collins and Carper [had an op-ed](http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/a-gold-standard-in-cyber-defense/2011/07/01/gIQAjsZk2H_story.html) calling for comprehensive cybersecurity legislation. If we don’t pass such legislation soon, they say, “The alternative could be a digital Pearl Harbor — and another day of infamy.”

    [Last time I checked](http://techliberation.com/2011/05/02/langevin-panetta-is-cyberdoom-certified/), Pearl Harbor left over two thousand persons dead and pushed the United States into a world war. There is no evidence that a cyber-attack of comparable effect is possible. Yet as [I write in TIME.com’s Techland](http://techland.time.com/2011/07/08/is-cyberwar-real-or-just-hype/), war rhetoric allows government to pursue avenues that might otherwise be closed:

    >The problem with the war metaphor is that treating a cyber attack as an act of war, rather than a crime, invites a different governmental response. In the offline world, vandalism, theft, and even international espionage are treated as crimes. When you detect them, you call law enforcement, who investigate and prosecute and, most importantly, do so while respecting your civil liberties. In war, these niceties can go out the window.

    >War changes the options available to government, says noted security expert Bruce Schneier. Things you would never agree to in peacetime you agree to in wartime. Referring to the warrantless wiretapping of Americans that AT&T allowed the NSA to conduct after 9/11, Schneier has said, “In peacetime if the government goes to AT&T and says, ‘Hey, we want to eavesdrop on everybody,’ AT&T says, ‘Stop, where’s your warrant?’ In wartime, AT&T says, ‘Use that closet over there, lock the door, and just put a do not disturb sign on it.’”

    Check out the [whole article](http://techland.time.com/2011/07/08/is-cyberwar-real-or-just-hype/) for more outrage.

    On the podcast this week, Daniel Solove, professor at the George Washington University Law School, discusses his new book Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security. He suggests that developments in technology do not create a mutually exclusive relationship between privacy and national security. Solove acknowledges the interest government has in maintaining security within our technological world; however, Solove also emphasizes the value of personal privacy rights and suggests that certain procedures, such as judicial oversight on governmental actions, can be implemented to preserve privacy. This oversight may make national security enforcement slightly less effective, but according to Solove, this is a worthwhile tradeoff to ensure privacy protections.

    Related Links

  • Nothing to Hide: The False Tradeoff Between Privacy and Security
  • I‘ve Got Nothing to Hide’ and Other Misunderstandings of Privacy, by Solove
  • “No rights left to lose: Destroying privacy in name of security in the age of terror”, The Daily

    To keep the conversation around this episode in one place, we’d like to ask you to comment at the web page for this episode on Surprisingly Free. Also, why not subscribe to the podcast on iTunes?

  • On the podcast this week, Pamela Samuelson, the Richard M. Sherman Distinguished Professor of Law at Berkeley Law School, discusses her new article in the Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts entitled, Legislative Alternatives to the Google Book Settlement.  Samuelson discusses the settlement, which was ultimately rejected, and highlights what she deems to be positive aspects. One aspect includes making out-of-print works available to a broad audience while keeping transaction costs low. Samuelson suggests encompassing these aspects into legislative reform. The goal of such reform would strike a balance that benefits rights holders, as well as the general public, while generating competition through implementation of a licensing scheme.

    Related Links

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    On the podcast this week, Ronald Rychlak, Mississippi Defense Lawyers Association Professor of Law and Associate Dean at the University of Mississippi School of Law, discusses his new article in the Mississipi Law Journal entitled, The Legal Answer to Cyber-Gambling. Rychlak briefly comments on the history of gambling in the United States and the reasons usually given to prohibit or regulate gambling activity. He then talks about why it’s so difficult to regulate internet gambling and gives examples of how regulators have tried to enforce online gambling laws, which often involves deputizing middlemen — financial institutions. Rychlak also discusses his legal proposal: create an official framework to endorse, regulate, and tax online gambling entities.

    Related Links

    To keep the conversation around this episode in one place, we’d like to ask you to comment at the web page for this episode on Surprisingly Free. Also, why not subscribe to the podcast on iTunes?

    On the podcast this week, Steven Levy, a columnist for Wired and author of the tech classic Hackers, among many other books, discusses his latest book, In The Plex: How Google Thinks, Works, and Shapes Our Lives. Levy talks about Googliness, the attribute of silliness and dedication embodied by Google employees, and whether it’s diminishing. He discusses Google’s privacy council, which discusses and manages the company’s privacy issues, and the evolution of how the company has dealt with issues like scanning Gmail users’ emails, scanning books for the Google Books project, and deciding whether to incorporate facial recognition technology in Google Goggles. Levy also talks about prospects for a Google antitrust suit and the future of Google’s relationship with China.

    Related Links

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    A couple of news items this week have vindicated some opinions I’d previously expressed here, and they’re all about Apple, so how can I can pass up the opportunity to note them, right?

    A while back [I wrote](http://techliberation.com/2010/11/04/how-closed-is-apple-anyway/) that as long as iOS devices had a standards-compliant browser, innovation would be safe:

    >Apple has come under fire by some supporters of an open internet and open software platforms such as Jonathan Zittrain and Tim Wu, who argue that Apple’s walled garden approach to devices and software will lead us to a more controlled and less innovative world. In particular, they point to the app store and Apple’s zealous control over what apps consumers are allowed to purchase and run on their devices. Here’s the thing, though: Every Apple device comes with a web browser. A web browser is an escape hatch from Apple’s walled garden. And Apple has taken a backseat to no one in nurturing an open web.

    This week comes word that the Financial Times, unhappy with having to give Apple a 30% cut of it’s subscription revenues, [has dropped its iOS app in favor of a web app](http://www.macrumors.com/2011/06/07/financial-times-wont-give-apple-a-cut-drops-ios-for-web-app/). Read the story; it’s quite interesting. As far as I can tell, the web app, written in cutting edge HTML5, is as good as the native app.

    The second piece of news is that [Apple has quietly backed down](http://www.macrumors.com/2011/06/09/apple-reverses-course-on-in-app-subscriptions/) from its controversial requirement that an in-app newspaper or magazine subscription be the “same price or less than it is offered outside the app”. “Apple also removed the requirement that external subscriptions must be also offered as an in-app purchase.”

    What this tells me is that the market works, and when companies make boneheaded moves, they can’t force users or publishers to go along with it by sheer will. Back when the subscription issue was blowing up I wrote that [Apple did not have the market power](http://techliberation.com/2011/02/21/is-apples-digital-subscription-plan-good-or-bad-for-consumers/) to make this stick:

    >Digital publishing is very much a contestable market. I hardly need to point out that the day after Apple’s announcement, [Google made public](http://news.cnet.com/8301-17938_105-20032217-1.html) its own very competitive subscription service. And while the iPad is ahead of the game right now, Android tablets are only now beginning to hit the market. If [declining iPhone market share](http://thenextweb.com/apple/2010/02/01/iphone-shedding-market-share-increasingly-competitive-market/) is any indication, Android will nip at Apple’s heels in the tablet space as well. And let’s not forget other formidable (and somewhat-formidable) competitors in the likes of HP’s WebOS, Microsoft-Nokia, and RIM.

    Let’s now talk about the real threat to app innovation. There’s news today that Apple has finally [caved in to political pressure](http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/06/09/apple-will-reject-d-u-i-checkpoints-apps/) from members of Congress and banned DUI checkpoint apps from the app store. RIM had already complied, and Google has yet to respond. You can see, though, how apps are more susceptible to nanny state meddling than to monopolization.

    The day many had expected is finally here. This Reuters headline says it all: [Senators seek crackdown on “Bitcoin” currency](http://www.baltimoresun.com/business/sns-rt-us-financial-bitcoitre7573t3-20110608,0,1767151.story).

    The main target of Sens. Chuck Schumer and Joe Manchin is Silk Road–the [online illicit drug bazaar](http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-drug-imaginable) run via the TOR network–but bitcoin, the currency of choice on Silk Road, is also in their sights. (Also, Sens. Roy Blunt and Claire McCaskill [are also getting in on the action.](http://www.fox2now.com/news/ktvi-missouri-lawmakers-want-to-shut-down-drug-dealing-website-20110607,0,2162224.story)) In [a recent letter](http://pastebin.com/VurF7dgr) Schimer and Manchin have asked the DOJ and DEA to shut down Silk Road, and “seize” the website’s domain. More to the point, in his press conference, [which you can watch here](http://www.wpix.com/videobeta/f76e263d-8ab3-4028-bf42-1b18c3eb9b5d/News/RAW-VIDEO-Sen-Schumer-On-Silk-Road), Schumer said that bitcoin is “an online form of money laundering used to disguise the source of money, and to disguise who’s both selling and buying the drug.”

    As the DOJ and DEA plan a response and this issue develops, I though I’d offer some initial thoughts:

    – Bitcoin is digital cash, and like any form of cash, it can be used for good or for ill. Because, like all cash, it is largely anonymous, it will be used by persons looking to evade official scrutiny. This could be contributing anonymously to unpopular causes like Wikileaks, but it could also mean buying drugs online. We don’t ban hard to trace paper cash because we understand that there’s nothing inherently bad about it; it’s what people do with it that’s can be problematic. Bitcoin should be treated the same way.

    That said about what I think ought to be, what’s really interesting is what will be regardless of normative values. That is, can Silk Road and bitcoin “cracked down”?

    – The federal government is no doubt going to go after Silk Road. This sets up another “natural experiment” like [the one presented by LulzSec taking bitcoin donations](http://techliberation.com/2011/06/03/bitcoin-silk-road-and-lulzsec-oh-my/). Given that the site exists as a [.onion an anonymous hidden service](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/.onion) via TOR, will the feds be able to find who’s behind it and shut it down? We’ll see. They certainly won’t be able to “seize the domain” as Schumer and Manchin’s letter suggests. If a year from now the site is still operating, will we be able to say that government does not “[possess any methods of enforcement we have true reason to fear.](http://www.wired.com/wired/if/declaration/)”

    – If the federal government seeks to go after bitcoin, it won’t be able to take down the network. That’s just impossible as far as I can tell. The weakest link in the bitcoin ecosystem, however, are the exchanges, like Mt Gox. These allow you to trade your bitcoins for dollars and vice versa. At this point, there’s not a lot you can buy with bitcoins, so the ability to trade them to a widely accepted currency is important.
    According to Gavin Andresen, the lead developer of the bitcoin project, Mt Gox “is careful to comply with all anti-money-laundering laws and regulations.” I’d love to know more about this. As far as I can tell, we know very little about who runs Mt Gox and how they comply with the law.

    – Even if the federal government is able to shut down Silk Road and exchanges like Mt Gox, we will quickly see others take their place. Silk Road will be supplanted by another anonymart ([to use Kevin Kelly’s phrase](http://www.kk.org/thetechnium/archives/2011/06/the_stealthy_an.php)), and we’ll see a replay of the drug war we know too well from meatspace. As for exchanges, we’ll see new ones pop up, likely in jurisdictions with liberal banking laws, and it will be interesting to see if Congress tries to make it illegal for financial institutions and payment processors to deal with them, just as they’ve made it illegal to deal with offshore online casinos. What I hope we’ll see emerge is a properly licensed and legally compliant domestic exchange that is as committed to fighting money laundering as Citibank. That would certainly help test bitcoin’s legality. This [great paper by Reuben Grinberg](http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1817857) that gives me hope that, for now at least, there’s nothing inherently illegal about trading bitcoins.

    On this week’s podcast, Larry Downes, who writes for CNet, blogs at Forbes.com and the Technology Liberation Front, and is the author of several books, including most recently, The Laws of Disruption, discusses enforcement of intellectual property rights online. Downes talks about the Protect IP Act, a bill recently introduced into Congress that aims to curtail infringement of intellectual property rights online by so-called rogue websites. Downes argues that forcing intermediaries to blacklist domain names has the potential to “break the internet.” He discusses how the rogue website problem could better be addressed and how the proposed bill could be improved.

    Related Links

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    Earlier this week, Adrian Chen wrote [a great exclusive](http://gawker.com/5805928/the-underground-website-where-you-can-buy-any-drug-imaginable) for Gawker about the online market for illicit drugs Silk Road. I strongly commend the piece to you. The site is only accessible via the [anonymizing router network TOR](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tor_(anonymity_network)), although it is [viewable using tor2web](https://ianxz6zefk72ulzz.tor2web.org/). Transactions are made using bitcoins, the virtual digital currency I’ve [previously](http://techland.time.com/2011/04/16/online-cash-bitcoin-could-challenge-governments/) [written](http://techliberation.com/2011/04/16/bitcoin-imagine-a-net-without-intermediaries/) about, and which I explain in a [new video for Reason.tv](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yYTqvYqXRbY&feature=youtu.be&t=16s) (below), also out this week.

    After his piece was published, Chen added the following addendum:

    >**Update:** Jeff Garzik, a member of the Bitcoin core development team, says in an email that bitcoin is not as anonymous as the denizens of Silk Road would like to believe. He explains that because all Bitcoin transactions are [recorded](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bitcoin#Transactions) in a public log, though the identities of all the parties are anonymous, law enforcement could use sophisticated network analysis techniques to parse the transaction flow and track down individual Bitcoin users.

    >”Attempting major illicit transactions with bitcoin, given existing statistical analysis techniques deployed in the field by law enforcement, is pretty damned dumb,” he says.

    I’ve been [asked](https://twitter.com/#!/elidourado/status/76088980852064257) by several folks about this: just how anonymous is bitcoin? My answer is that we don’t exactly know yet. Yes, all transactions are recorded in the public ledger that is the bitcoin network, but all that means is that you can see how many bitcoins were transferred from one account on the network to another account. This tells you nothing about the identity of the persons behind the accounts. Theoretically, you could identify just one person on the network and ask them (or coerce them) to identify the persons from whom they received payments, then go to those persons in turn and ask them who they accepted payment from, etc., until you’ve identified everyone, or just a person of interest. But you can imagine all the reasons this is impractical. More likely, a bitcoin user will be revealed through [identifying information inadvertently revealed](http://forum.bitcoin.org/index.php?topic=8.msg10621#msg10621) in the course of a transaction.

    That all said, it seems that this week has also brought us a “natural experiment” that might settle the issue. LulzSec, the hacker group responsible for the [recent PBS hack](http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/31/technology/31pbs.html), this week [announced](http://www.informationweek.com/news/security/attacks/229900111) that it has compromised the personal information of over a million Sony user accounts and has released a batch of 150,000. Here’s the thing: LulzSec is [accepting donations via Bitcoin](https://twitter.com/#!/LulzSec/status/76388576832651265) and [say they have received](https://twitter.com/#!/LulzSec/status/76667674947633152) over $100 so far. The group’s bitcoin receiving address is 176LRX4WRWD5LWDMbhr94ptb2MW9varCZP. Also, while in control of PBS.org, the group [offered vanity subdomains](https://twitter.com/#!/LulzSec/status/75159378801598464) (e.g. techliberation.pbs.org) for 2 BTC each.

    So, here’s a high-profile group the FBI and Secret Service are no doubt itching to get their hands on. A bitcoin receiving address for them is public. I guess we’ll find out how anonymous it is.