April 2017

There is reporting suggesting that the Trump FCC may move to eliminate the FCC’s complex Title II regulations for the Internet and restore the FTC’s ability to police anticompetitve and deceptive practices online. This is obviously welcome news. These reports also suggest that FCC Chairman Pai and the FTC will require ISPs add open Internet principles to their terms of service, that is, no unreasonable blocking or throttling of content and no paid priority. These principles have always been imprecise because federal law allows ISPs to block objectionable content if they wish (like pornography or violent websites) and because ISPs have a First Amendment right to curate their services.

Whatever the exact wording, there shouldn’t be a per se ban of paid priority. Whatever policy develops should limit anticompetitive paid priority, not all paid priority. Paid prioritization is simply a form of consideration payment, which is economists’ term for when upstream producers pay downstream retailers or distributors for special treatment. There’s economics literature on consideration payments and it’s an accepted business practice in many other industries. Further, consideration payments often benefit small providers and niche customers. Some small and large companies with interactive IP services might be willing to pay for end-to-end service reliability.

The Open Internet Order’s paid priority ban has always been short sighted because it attempts to preserve the Internet as it existed circa 2002. It resembles the FCC’s unfounded insistence for decades that subscription TV (ie, how the vast majority of Americans consume TV today) was against “the public interest.” Like the defunct subscription TV ban, the paid priority ban is an economics-free policy that will hinder new services. 

Despite what late-night talk show hosts might say, “fast lanes” on the Internet are here and will continue. “Fast lanes” have always been permitted because, as Obama’s US CTO Aneesh Chopra noted, some emerging IP services need special treatment. Priority transmission was built into Internet protocols years ago and the OIO doesn’t ban data prioritization; it bans BIAS providers from charging “edge providers” a fee for priority.

The notion that there’s a level playing field online needing preservation is a fantasy. Non-real-time services like Netflix streaming, YouTube, Facebook pages, and major websites can mostly be “cached” on servers scattered around the US. Major web companies have their own form of paid prioritization–they spend millions annually, including large payments to ISPs, on transit agreements, CDNs, and interconnection in order to avoid congested Internet links.

The problem with a blanket paid priority ban is that it biases the evolution of the Internet in favor of these cache-able services and against real-time or interactive services like teleconferencing, live TV, and gaming. Caching doesn’t work for these services because there’s nothing to cache beforehand. 

When would paid prioritization make sense? Most likely a specialized service for dedicated users that requires end-to-end reliability. 

I’ll use a plausible example to illustrate the benefits of consideration payments online–a telepresence service for deaf people. As Martin Geddes described, a decade ago the government in Wales developed such a service. The service architects discovered that a well-functioning service had quality characteristics not supplied by ISPs. ISPs and video chat apps like Skype optimize their networks, video codecs, and services for non-deaf people (ie, most customers) and prioritize consistent audio quality over video quality. While that’s useful for most people, deaf people need basically the opposite optimization because they need to perceive subtle hand and finger motions. The typical app that prioritizes audio, not video, doesn’t work for them.

But high-def real-time video quality requires upstream and downstream capacity reservation and end-to-end reliability. This is not cheap to provide. An ISP, in this illustration, has three options–charge the telepresence provider, charge deaf customers a premium, or spread the costs across all customers. The paid priority ban means ISPs can only charge customers for increased costs. This paid priority ban unnecessarily limits the potential for such services since there may be companies or nonprofits willing to subsidize such a service.

It’s a specialized example but illustrates the idiosyncratic technical requirements needed for many real-time services. In fact, real-time services are the next big challenge in the Internet’s evolution. As streaming media expert Dan Rayburn noted, “traditional one-way live streaming is being disrupted by the demand for interactive engagement.”  Large and small edge companies are increasingly looking for low-latency video solutions. Today, a typical “live” event is broadcast online to viewers with a 15- to 45-second delay. This latency limits or kills the potential for interactive online streaming services like online talk shows, pet cams, online auctions, videogaming, and online classrooms.

If the FTC takes back oversight of ISPs and the Internet it should, as with any industry, permit any business practice that complies with competition law and consumer protection law. The agency should disregard the unfounded belief that consideration payments online (“paid priority”) are always harmful.

Written with Christopher Koopman and Brent Skorup (originally published on Medium on 4/10/17)

Innovation isn’t just about the latest gee-whiz gizmos and gadgets. That’s all nice, but something far more profound is at stake: Innovation is the single most important determinant of long-term human well-being. There exists widespread consensus among historians, economists, political scientists and other scholars that technological innovation is the linchpin of expanded economic growth, opportunity, choice, mobility, and human flourishing more generally. It is the ongoing search for new and better ways of doing things that drives human learning and prosperity in every sense — economic, social, and cultural.

As the Industrial Revolution revealed, leaps in economic and human growth cannot be planned. They arise from societies that reward risk takers and legal systems that accommodate change. Our ability to achieve progress is directly proportional to our willingness to embrace and benefit from technological innovation, and it is a direct result of getting public policies right.

The United States is uniquely positioned to lead the world into the next era of global technological advancement and wealth creation. That’s why we and our colleagues at the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University devote so much time and energy to defending the importance of innovation and countering threats to it. Unfortunately, those threats continue to multiply as fast as new technologies emerge. Continue reading →

Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Ajit Pai today announced plans to expand the role of economic analysis at the FCC in a speech at the Hudson Institute. This is an eminently sensible idea that other regulatory agencies (both independent and executive branch) could learn from.

Pai first made the case that when the FCC listened to its economists in the past, it unlocked billions of dollars of value for consumers. The most prominent example was the switch from hearings to auctions in order to allocate spectrum licenses. He perceptively noted that the biggest effect of auctions was the massive improvement in consumer welfare, not just the more than $100 billion raised for the Treasury. Other examples of the FCC using the best ideas of its economists include:

  • Use of reverse auctions to allocate universal service funds to reduce costs.
  • Incentive auctions that reward broadcasters for transferring licenses to other uses – an idea initially proposed in a 2002 working paper by Evan Kwerel and John Williams at the FCC.
  • The move from rate of return to price cap regulation for long distance carriers.

More recently, Pai argued, the FCC has failed to use economics effectively. He identified four key problems:

  1. Economics is not systematically employed in policy decisions and often employed late in the process. The FCC has no guiding principles for conduct and use of economic analysis.
  2. Economists work in silos. They are divided up among bureaus. Economists should be able to work together on a wide variety of issues, as they do in the Federal Trade Commission’s Bureau of Economics, the Department of Justice Antitrust Division’s economic analysis unit, and the Securities and Exchange Commission’s Division of Economic and Risk Analysis.
  3. Benefit-cost analysis is not conducted well or often, and the FCC does not take Regulatory Flexibility Act analysis (which assesses effects of regulations on small entities) seriously. The FCC should use Office of Management and Budget guidance as its guide to doing good analysis, but OMB’s 2016 draft report on the benefits and costs of federal regulations shows that the FCC has estimated neither benefits nor costs of any of its major regulations issued in the past 10 years. Yet executive orders from multiple administrations demonstrate that “Serious cost-benefit analysis is a bipartisan tradition.”
  4. Poor use of data. The FCC probably collects a lot of data that’s unnecessary, at a paperwork cost of $800 million per year, not including opportunity costs of the private sector. But even useful data are not utilized well. For example, a few years ago the FCC stopped trying to determine whether the wireless market is effectively competitive even though it collects lots of data on the wireless market.

To remedy these problems, Pai announced an initiative to establish an Office of Economics and Data that would house the FCC’s economists and data analysts. An internal working group will be established to collect input within the FCC and from the public. He hopes to have the new office up and running by the end of the year. The purpose of this change is to give economists early input into the rulemaking process, better manage the FCC’s data resources, and conduct strategic research to help find solutions to “the next set of difficult issues.”

Can this initiative significantly improve the quality and use of economic analysis at the FCC?

There’s evidence that independent regulatory agencies are capable of making some decent improvements in their economic analysis when they are sufficiently motivated to do so. For example, the Securities and Exchange Commission’s authorizing statue contains language that requires benefit-cost analysis of regulations when the commission seeks to determine whether they are in the public interest. Between 2005 and 2011, the SEC lost several major court cases due to inadequate economic analysis.

In 2012, the commission’s general counsel and chief economist issued new economic analysis guidance that pledged to assess regulations according to the principal criteria identified in executive orders, guidance from the Office of Management and Budget, and independent research. In a recent study, I found that the economic analysis accompanying a sample of major SEC regulations issued after this guidance was measurably better than the analysis accompanying regulations issued prior to the new guidance. The SEC improved on all five aspects of economic analysis it identified as critical: assessment of the need for the regulation, assessment of the baseline outcomes that will likely occur in the absence of new regulation, identification of alternatives, and assessment of the benefits and costs of alternatives.

Unlike the SEC, the FCC faces no statutory benefit-cost analysis requirement for its regulations. Unlike the executive branch agencies, the FCC is under no executive order requiring economic analysis of regulations. Unlike the Federal Trade Commission in the early 1980s, the FCC faces little congressional pressure for abolition.

But Congress is considering legislation that would require all regulatory agencies to conduct economic analysis of major regulations and subject that analysis to limited judicial review. Proponents of executive branch regulatory review have always contended that the president has legal authority to extend the executive orders on regulatory impact analysis to cover independent agencies, and perhaps President Trump is audacious enough to try this. Thus, it appears Chairman Pai is trying to get the FCC out ahead of the curve.