Over at Ars, Julian sums up the state of the legislative battle over domestic eavesdropping:
The current wrangling continues a debate that began this summer with the hasty passage of the Protect America Act in response to a ruling by the FISA court—a ruling which the court has declined to release, but which is purported to have required intelligence agencies to acquire warrants when wiretapping conversations between foreign parties that were routed (and recorded) through US telecom switches. Eavesdropping on purely foreign communications had previously been unrestricted—primarily because, traditionally, the physical tap on foreign-to-foreign calls had occurred overseas, outside US jurisdiction. But the Protect America Act, which is due to expire in February, went beyond merely closing this “intelligence gap” and authorized a broad program of surveillance, under minimal court oversight, that permits Americans’ conversations with foreigners to be collected, so long as the American party to the communication was not “targeted” by an investigation. The bills now under consideration seek to establish a more permanent solution: the Intelligence Committee version of the FISA Amendment would remain in effect for six years, while the Judiciary Committee version sunsets in four.
While media attention has focused largely on the question of immunity for telecom firms, the additional limitations on surveillance contained in the Judiciary Committee’s version of the bill are, arguably, at least as significant. That bill would explicitly bar “bulk” or “vacuum cleaner” surveillance of international telecom traffic that is not directed at a particular person or telephone number. It would require individualized FISA court review whenever the collection of an American’s communications became a “significant purpose” of an investigation, whether or not that person was a “target” of the investigation. And it would provide for a congressional audit of past extrajudicial surveillance by the National Security Agency.
It’s a little depressing that the debate in the Senate will be between a bill that will do a significant amount of damage to civil liberties and one that will do a great deal of damage to civil liberties. As I understand it (although I haven’t read the Senate bills closely) the House version is better than either Senate bill, although even that is far from an ideal bill. Neither house appears to have seriously considered legislation that simply permitted warrantless surveillance of foreign-to-foreign communications as they passes through the United States, which is ostensibly the reason this legislation was needed in the first place.
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