After reading James DeLong’s defense of Patrick Ross’s CNET article on the DMCA, I have to admit that I was being unfair to call the article “incredibly confused.” I interpreted Patrick to be saying that the DMCA literally allows consumers to break contracts they’ve made with content providers. But after reading DeLong’s defense, it’s clear to me that what Patrick meant is that a digital rights management scheme is like a contract in the sense that it allows publishers to place various restrictions on the use of their intellectual property and sell it at different prices. While this isn’t literally a contract (as Patrick might concede) perhaps it’s contract-like device that allows certain beneficial transactions to occur (such as a limited-time online rental of a movie) that would otherwise be impossible.
There’s a kernel of truth to this argument. Certainly if a content producer knows that renting videos online will lead to rampant piracy and destroy the market for purchasing videos, the producer will be reluctant to offer a rental option. Consumers clearly don’t benefit from fewer choices.
But this analysis misses two important points. The first is philosophical: a DRM isn’t a contract, and in several important ways, it’s not even very similar to a contract. As I noted in my previous post, the DRM “contract” is entirely one-sided. Its terms are set by the publisher and the publisher has the power to unilaterally and retroactively change them. If Apple sells a song to a consumer, it is under no obligation to ensure that the DRM scheme enforces the terms stated at the time of sale. Apple is free to change or reduce the functionality available to the consumer (such as reducing the amount of burning permitted) and the consumer has absolutely no recourse.