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Fellow TLFer Julian Sanchez has written (twice) at Cato@Liberty on the big school-using-laptops-to-spy-on-kids case.

Indulging my contrarian habit, I’m taking a little bit of a different view, though not necessarily an inconsistent one. While it seems error to me that the school district issued laptops with a potentially invasive security system, failing to fully inform parents, I think a lot more facts have to come out before we reach legal conclusions.

I started to feel some contrary comin’ on when I read the lengthy commentary of a parent at the school, posted on a privacy colleague’s Facebook wall. Among other things, she said:

The minor in question is a truly bad kid. [cites supporting facts] He had broken two laptop computers and had been issued a loaner computer with the explicit instructions not to take it off school property. It disappeared from the school and when questioned he told the school it had been stolen from him. There is quite a bit of theft and laptops had been a target. The kids seemed to know about the security system in place, I didn’t know about it which I think was wrong — the school has apologized for this. The school activated the security system realized the computer was in use and the webcam took a still shot. The minor in question was sitting in front of the webcam, the rumor is with drugs. The photo was sent to the police which apparently was standard procedure for stolen property and not related to anything else.

Maybe the “drugs” were Mike & Ike’s candies. The plaintiff’s lawyer says so. (Consider the veracity of a kid explaining things to his parents and their counsel, though, and of a trial lawyer seeking to lead a class action.)

Sugar pills or not, if the laptop is AWOL from school—presumptively stolen—I don’t see that it would be unreasonable to use the security system to discover its location, and the camera to capture images of who is using it. If there are statutes that would prevent that, I think a court would find a way to avoid applying them, be it on the theory that the putative thief assumed the risk of being surveilled, unclean hands, or some other basis.

The reporting and commentary has been a little overwrought. Better facts will determine what law should apply. Parents at the school have started a Facebook group to discuss this and share the rest of the story given that the school district has, well, lawyered up.

I tipped a reporter at an outlet I respect about this parent’s version of events. The reporter was alternately dismissive of sources that weren’t “official” and highly defensive when I suggested that her writing and reporting appeared to be preserving controversy rather than getting to the bottom of things. So much for relying on media—even new media—for getting information out.

Maybe spun-up outrage will cause better policies in this area than would otherwise result. Maybe we’ll learn that the security system was used for routine, inappropriate spying on kids. But as a legal case, there’s a lot more to be learned before we should draw conclusions.

“Schools in Beijing are quietly removing the Green Dam filter, which was required for all school computers in July, due to complaints over problems with the software,” notes this Reuters report. Even though China backed down on their earlier requirement to have the Green Dam filter installed on all computers, according to Reuters “schools were still ordered by the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology to install the web filter, which Chinese officials said would block pornography and other unhealthy content.”  The Reuters article mentions a notice carried on the home page of one Beijing high school that reads: “We will remove all Green Dam software from computers in the school as it has strong conflicts with teaching software we need for normal work.”  The article also cites a school technology director, who confirmed that the software had been taken off most computers, as saying “It has seriously influenced our normal work.”

Ironically, many educators and librarians in the United States can sympathize since they currently live under similar requirements.  Under the Children’s Internet Protection Act (CIPA) of 2000, publicly funded schools and libraries must implement a mandatory filtering scheme or run the risk of losing their funding. As the Federal Communications Commission summarizes:

[CIPA] imposes certain types of requirements on any school or library that receives funding for Internet access or internal connections from the E-rate program… Schools and libraries subject to CIPA may not receive the discounts offered by the E-rate program unless they certify that they have an Internet safety policy and technology protection measures in place. An Internet safety policy must include technology protection measures to block or filter Internet access to pictures that are: (a) are obscene, (b) child pornography, or (c) harmful to minors (for computers that are accessed by minors).

Of course, nobody wants kids viewing porn in schools, but CIPA has been know the block far more than that and has become a real pain for many educators, librarians, and school administrators who have to occasionally get around these filters to teach their students about legitimate subjects. Anyway, I just find it ironic that some American lawmakers have been making a beef about mandatory Internet filtering by the Chinese when we have our own mandatory filtering regime right here in the states. For example, Continue reading →

On July 27th, The Progress & Freedom Foundation hosted a Capitol Hill panel discussion entitled “Online Child Safety, Privacy, and Free Speech: An Overview of Challenges in Congress & the States.” The event featured remarks from:

  • Parry Aftab, Executive Director, WiredSafety.org
  • Todd Haiken, Senior Manager of Policy, Common Sense Media
  • Jim Halpert, Partner, DLA Piper
  • Berin Szoka, Senior Fellow, The Progress & Freedom Foundation

We’ve just released the transcript of the event, which I have also pasted down below the fold in a Scribd document reader. Also, the audio for this event can be heard by clicking below:

Download mp3

Here is the full event description: Continue reading →

Larry MagidMy friend Larry Magid, the co-director of ConnectSafely.org (with Anne Collier) and founder of SafeKids.com, has a sharp new piece up at CBS News.com entitled, “Stop Cyberbullying with Education,” in which he rightly points out how “we need to be careful with legislation that would outlaw cyberbullying.”  He points out that although cyberbullying is “not an epidemic and it’s not killing our children”:

Bullying has always been a problem among adolescents and, sadly, so has suicide. In the few known cases of suicide after cyberbullying, there are other contributing factors. That’s not to diminish the tragedy or suggest that the cyberbullying didn’t play a role but–as with all online youth risk, we need to look at what else was going on in the child’s life. Even when a suicide or other tragic event doesn’t occur, cyberbullying is often accompanied by a pattern of offline bullying and sometimes there are other issues including long-term depression, problems at home, and self-esteem issues.

He goes on to provide some solid advice:

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Adam Thierer & I have just released a detailed examination (PDF) of brewing efforts to expand the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 to cover adolescents and potentially all social networking sites—an approach we call “COPPA 2.0.”

As Adam explained on Larry Magid’s CNET podcast, COPPA mandates certain online privacy protections for children under 13, most importantly that websites obtain the “verifiable consent” of a child’s parent before collecting personal information about that child or giving that child access to interactive functionality that might allow the child to share their personal information with others. The law was intended primarily to “enhance parental involvement in a child’s online activities” as a means of protecting the online privacy and safety of children.

Yet advocates of expanding COPPA—or “COPPA 2.0″—see COPPA’s verifiable parental consent framework as a means for imposing broad regulatory mandates in the name of online child safety and concerns about social networking, cyber-harassment, etc. Two COPPA 2.0 bills are currently pending in New Jersey and Illinois. The accelerated review of COPPA to be conducted by the FTC next year (five years ahead of schedule) is likely to bring to Washington serious talk of expanding COPPA—even though Congress clearly rejected covering adolescents age 13-16 when COPPA was first proposed back in 1998.

We’ll discuss some of the key points of our paper in a series of blog posts, but here are the top nine reasons for rejecting COPPA 2.0, in that such an approach would:

  • Burden the free speech rights of adults by imposing age verification mandates on many sites used by adults, thus restricting anonymous speech and essentially converging—in terms of practical consequences—with the unconstitutional Children’s Online Protection Act (COPA), another 1998 law sometimes confused with COPPA;
  • Burden the free speech rights of adolescents to speak freely on—or gather information from—legal and socially beneficial websites;
  • Hamper routine and socially beneficial communication between adolescents and adults;
  • Reduce, rather than enhance, the privacy of adolescents, parents and other adults because of the massive volume of personal information that would have to be collected about users for authentication purposes (likely including credit card data);

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My friend Anne Collier of Net Family News, one of America’s great sages on child safety issues, has produced a terrific list of reasons “Why Technopanics are Bad.”  Technopanics and moral panics are topics I’ve spent quite a bit of time commenting on here. (See 1, 2, 3, 4.) Anne is a rare voice of sanity and sensible advice when it comes to online child safety issues and I encourage you to read all her excellent work on the subject, including her book with Larry Magid, MySpace Unraveled: A Parent’s Guide to Teen Social Networking.  Anyway, here’s Anne’s list, and I encourage you to go over to her site and contribute your thoughts and suggestions about what else to add:

Technopanics are bad because they…
  • Cause fear, which interferes with parent-child communication, which in turn puts kids at greater risk.
  • Cause schools to fear and block digital media when they need to be teaching constructive use, employing social-technology devices and teaching new media literacy and citizenship classes throughout the curriculum.
  • Turn schools into barriers rather than contributors to young people’s constructive use.
  • Increase the irrelevancy of school to active young social-technology users via the sequestering or banning of educational technology and hamstring some of the most spirited and innovative educators.
  • Distract parents, educators, policymakers from real risks – including, for example, child-pornography laws that do not cover situations where minors can simultaneously be victim and “perpetrator” and, tragically, become registered sex offenders in cases where there no criminal intent (e.g., see this).
  • Reduce the competitiveness of US education among developed countries already effectively employing educational technology and social media in schools.
  • Reduce the competitiveness of US technology and media businesses practicing good corporate citizenship where youth online safety is concerned.
  • Lead to bad legislation, which aggravates above outcomes and takes the focus off areas where good laws on the books can be made relevant to current technology use.
  • Widen the participation gap for youth – technopanics are barriers for children and teens to full, constructive participation in participatory culture and democracy.

In a big post two months ago entitled “Age Verification Debate Continues; Schools Now at Center of Discussion,” I noted that there has been an important shift in the age verification debate: Schools and school records are increasingly being viewed as the primary mechanism to facilitate online identity authentication transactions. I pointed out that this raises two very serious questions: Do we want schools to serve as DMVs for our children? And, do we want more school records or information about our kids being accessed or put online?

Brad Stone of the New York Times has just posted an important article with relevance to this debate. In it, he points out that:

performing so-called age verification for children is fraught with challenges. The kinds of publicly available data that Web companies use to confirm the identities of adults, like their credit card or Social Security numbers, are either not available for minors or are restricted by federal privacy laws. Nevertheless, over the last year, at least two dozen companies have sprung up with systems they claim will solve the problem. Surprisingly, their work is proving controversial and even downright unpopular among the very people who spend their days worrying about the well-being of children on the Web. Child-safety activists charge that some of the age-verification firms want to help Internet companies tailor ads for children. They say these firms are substituting one exaggerated threat — the menace of online sex predators — with a far more pervasive danger from online marketers like junk food and toy companies that will rush to advertise to children if they are told revealing details about the users.

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This week, I have been up at Harvard University participating in another meeting of the Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF), of which I am a member. The ISTTF was organized earlier this year pursuant to an agreement between 49 state attorneys general (AGs) and social networking giant MySpace.com. A group of experts from academia, non-profit organizations, and industry were appointed to the Task Force, which is charged with evaluating the market for online child safety tools and methods and issuing a report on the matter to the AGs at the end of this year.  ISTTF members have been meeting privately and publicly in both Cambridge, MA and Washington, D.C. The Task Force has been very ably chaired by John Palfrey, co-director of Harvard’s Berkman Center for Internet & Society.

Although the ISTTF is looking at a wide variety of tools and methods associated with online child protection (ex: filters, monitoring tools, educational campaigns, etc.), many of the AGs who crafted the agreement with MySpace that led to the Task Force’s formation have made it clear that they are most interested in having the ISTTF evaluate age verification / online verification technologies.  In fact, at the start of this week’s session at Harvard Law School, AGs Martha Coakely of Massachusetts and Richard Blumenthal of Connecticut both spoke and made it abundantly clear they expect the Task Force to develop age and identify-verification tools for social networking sites (SNS). AG Blumenthal said we need to deal with “the dangers of anonymity” and repeated his standard line about online age verification: “If we can put a man on the moon, we can make the Internet safe.”  [Of course, putting a man on the moon took hundreds of billions of dollars and a decade to accomplish, but never mind that fact! Moreover, one could also argue that if we can put a man on the moon we can cure hunger, AIDS, and the common cold, but some things are obviously easier said than done. Finally, putting a man on the moon didn’t require all Americans or their kids to give up their anonymity or privacy rights in order to accomplish the feat!]

On many occasions here before, I have outlined various questions and reservations about proposals to mandate online age verification.  Last year, I also published a lengthy white paper on the issue and hosted a lively debate on Capitol Hill [transcript here] about this.  I also have discussed age verification in my book on parental controls and online child safety. [Braden Cox also talked about his experiences up at Harvard this week here, and CNet’s Chris Soghoian had a brutal assessment of this week’s proposals on his “Surveillance State” blog.]

In this essay, I will discuss the new fault lines in the debate over online age verification and outline where I think we are heading next on this front.  I will argue:

  • There is now widespread understanding that it is extraordinarily difficult to verify the ages and identities of minors online using the methods we typically use to verify adults. Because of this, age verification proponents are increasingly proposing two alternative models of verifying kids before they go online or visit SNS…
  • First, for those who continue to believe that we must do whatever we can to verify kids themselves, schools and school records are increasingly being viewed as the primary mechanism to facilitate that. This raises two serious questions: Do we want schools to serve as DMVs for our children? And, do we want more school records or information about our kids being accessed or put online?
  • Second, for those who are uncomfortable with the idea of verifying kids or using schools, or school records, to accomplish that task, parental permission-based forms of authentication are becoming the preferred regulatory approach. Under this scheme, which might build upon the regulatory model found in the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act of 1998 (COPPA), parents or guardians would be verified somehow and then would vouch for their children before they were allowed on a SNS, however defined.  But how do we establish a clear link between parents and kids?  And will parents be willing to surrender a great deal more information (about themselves and their kids) before their kids can go online? And, is it sensible to use a law that was meant to protect the privacy and personal information of children to potentially gather a great deal more information about them, and their parents?
  • It remains very unclear how either of those two verification methods would make children safer online. Indeed, that could actually make kids less safe by compromising their personal information and creating a false sense of security online for them and their parents.
  • It is highly unlikely the Internet Safety Technical Task Force will be able to reach consensus on this complicated, controversial issue. A small camp will likely flock to the sort of proposals mentioned above. Another, larger camp (including me) will flock to education-based approaches to child safety as well increased reliance on other parental empowerment tools and strategies, industry self-regulatory efforts, social norms, and better intervention strategies for troubled youth. But the age verification debate will go on and, as was the case over the past two years, the legal battleground will be state capitals across America, with AGs likely pushing for age verification mandates regardless of what the Task Force concludes.

Continue reading if you are interested in the details.

Continue reading →