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I’ve been commenting on yesterday’s Supreme Court decision in FCC v. Fox, and criticizing the logic of the majority’s decision the case, which was driven solely by procedural / admin law considerations. [See Part 3.]  I also discussed Justice Thomas’s very interesting concurring opinion, which took a serious look at the constitutional issues in play here and signaled his willingness to potentially overturn Red Lion and Pacifica. [See Part 4.]  In this fifth installment, I will briefly outline some of the dissenting arguments.

Justice Stephen Breyer penned a lengthy dissent and was joined by Justices Stevens, Souter and Ginsburg.  Like the Scalia majority decision, the Breyer dissent also focused on the procedural / APA-related issues at stake in the case.  Breyer, however, was not buying the FCC’s assertion that it had adequately justified its significant expansion of indecency enforcement in recent years.  Whereas the majority deferred to the agency and found “no basis in the Act or this Court’s opinions for a requirement that all agency change be subjected to more searching review,” the four dissenting justices saw things quite differently.  Breyer noted that while the “law grants those in charge of independent administrative agencies broad authority to determine relevant policy,” it “does not permit them to make policy choices for purely political reasons nor to rest them primarily upon unexplained policy preferences.”  He goes on to appropriately note that:

Federal Communications Commissioners have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from “‘the exercise of political oversight.’” [citations omitted] That insulation helps to secure important governmental objectives, such as the constitutionally related objective of maintaining broadcast regulation that does not bend too readily before the political winds. But that agency’s comparative freedom from ballot-box control makes it all the more important that courts review its decision making to assure compliance with applicable provisions of the law — including law requiring that major policy decisions be based upon articulable reasons.

Breyer goes on to restate much of what is already clear from the APA and all that surrounds it. “[A]n agency must act consistently. The agency must follow its own rules,” he notes.  Moreover:  Continue reading →

Breaking news: The Supreme Court as just ruled in the important First Amendment case of Federal Communications Commission v. Fox Television Stations and held in the government’s favor by a 5-4 vote. Decision is here.

My background info about the case is here and will publish some essays throughout the day as I digest the decision. Importantly, the case was decided squarely on procedural grounds, not constitutional grounds. However, Justice Thomas has some very important and interesting things to say about those constitutional issues in his separate concurrence. Coverage from AP, Reuters, and UPI.

The full decision can be viewed below in a Scribd reader:

[Supreme Court Decision] FCC v. Fox 07-582 http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=14715905&access_key=key-21fh1qa1sk7qthfi40is&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Anthony Prestia of Laws of Play, a blog dedicated to covering legal developments in the gaming industry, somehow got some face time with Supreme Court Justice Scalia and was able to ask for his feelings concerning the constitutionality of recent state video game legislation. “In particular,” Prestia says, “I asked him whether as an originalist he believed that state laws banning the sale of mature-rated video games to minors ran afoul of the First Amendment.” Here’s Prestia’s summary and analysis of Scalia’s answer:

In his most succinct reply of the day, Justice Scalia replied that he did believe such legislation was constitutional. He began by explaining his belief that sound constitutional precedent holds that minors may be subjected to prohibitions that adults are not–-he instantly drew the parallel to regulation of pornography sales. However, Justice Scalia emphasized that unprotected speech, such as obscenity–which he was unwilling to define for reasons that are immediately evident to any constitutional scholar–-can be prohibited from sale regardless of the purchaser’s age. I think the important thing to note here is that Justice Scalia did not suggest that violent and/or sexual content in games rises to the level of unprotected speech. In fact, he did not even suggest that video games themselves are not protected by the First Amendment despite his strict originalist beliefs.

That’s an interesting response in that Scalia’s latter comments imply that even older, more conservative judges are coming around to understanding how video games are a form of artistic expression deserving the protection of the First Amendment. But Scalia’s earlier suggestion that state laws banning sales of certain video games to minors maybe constitutional deserves a response.

Continue reading →