The New York Times today published my response to an oped by Senators Lindsey Graham & Elizabeth Warren calling for a new “Digital Consumer Protection Commission” to micromanage the high-tech information economy. “Their new technocratic digital regulator would do nothing but hobble America as we prepare for the next great global technological revolution,” I argue. Here’s my full response:

Senators Lindsey Graham and Elizabeth Warren propose a new federal mega-regulator for the digital economy that threatens to undermine America’s global technology standing.

A new “licensing and policing” authority would stall the continued growth of advanced technologies like artificial intelligence in America, leaving China and others to claw back crucial geopolitical strategic ground.

America’s digital technology sector enjoyed remarkable success over the past quarter-century — and provided vast investment and job growth — because the U.S. rejected the heavy-handed regulatory model of the analog era, which stifled innovation and competition.

The tech companies that Senators Graham and Warren cite (along with countless others) came about over the past quarter-century because we opened markets and rejected the monopoly-preserving regulatory regimes that had been captured by old players.

The U.S. has plenty of federal bureaucracies, and many already oversee the issues that the senators want addressed. Their new technocratic digital regulator would do nothing but hobble America as we prepare for the next great global technological revolution.

For my latest column in The Hill, I explored the European Union’s (EU) endlessly expanding push to regulate all facets of the modern data economy. That now includes a new effort to regulate artificial intelligence (AI) using the same sort of top-down, heavy-handed, bureaucratic compliance regime that has stifled digital innovation on the continent over the past quarter century.

The European Commission (EC) is advancing a new Artificial Intelligence Act, which proposes banning some AI technologies while classifying many others under a heavily controlled “high-risk” category. A new bureaucracy, the European Artificial Intelligence Board, will be tasked with enforcing a wide variety of new rules, including “prior conformity assessments,” which are like permission slips for algorithmic innovators. Steep fines are also part of the plan. There’s a lengthy list of covered sectors and technologies, with many others that could be added in coming years. It’s no wonder, then, that the measure has been labelled the measure “the mother of all AI laws” and analysts have argued it will further burden innovation and investment in Europe.

As I noted in my new column, the consensus about Europe’s future on the emerging technology front is dismal to put it mildly. The International Economy journal recently asked 11 experts from Europe and the U.S. where the EU currently stood in global tech competition. Responses were nearly unanimous and bluntly summarized by the symposium’s title: “The Biggest Loser.” Respondents said Europe is “lagging behind in the global tech race,” and “unlikely to become a global hub of innovation.” “The future will not be invented in Europe,” another analyst bluntly concluded.

That’s a grim assessment, but there is no doubt that European competitiveness is suffering today and that excessive regulation plays a fairly significant role in causing it. As I noted in my column, “the EU’s risk-averse culture and preference for paperwork compliance over entrepreneurial freedom” had serious consequences for continent-wide innovation.  I note in my recent column how:

After the continent piled on layers of data restrictions beginning in the mid-1990s, innovation and investment suffered. Regulation grew more complex with the 2018 General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), which further limits data collection and use. As a result of all the red tape, the EU came away from the digital revolution with “the complete absence of superstar companies.” There are no serious European versions of Microsoft, Google, Facebook, Apple or Amazon. Europe’s leading providers of digital technology services today are American-based companies.

Let’s take a look at a few numbers that illustrate what’s happened in Europe’s tech sector over the past quarter century. Here’s an old KPGM breakdown of market caps for public Internet companies over an important 20 year period, from 1995 to 2015, when the digital technology marketplace was taking shape. Besides the remarkable amount of churn over that period (with only Apple appearing on both lists), the other notable thing is the complete absence of any European companies in 2015.

Next, here’s a chart I constructed using CB Insights data for global unicorns ($billion valued companies) from 2010 up through early 2022. It shows how the U.S. dominates fully half the list with China having a 16% share, but all of the European Union’s firms equal just a 9 percent slice of the world’s share.

If you want to see a per capita breakdown of VC investment by country, here’s a handy Crunchbase News chart. While the U.S. is geographically much larger than Europe, a breakdown of VC funding on a per capita basis reveals that only Estonia ($915B) and Sweden ($700B) have startup investment on par with America ($808B). No other European country has even half as much per capita VC investment as the U.S., and most don’t even have a quarter as much.

As we enter the “age of AI,” what will the EU’s same regulatory model for mean for AI, machine learning, and robotics in Europe? We do have some early data on that, too. Here’s a breakdown of AI-related VC activity and AI unicorn in 2021 from the recent State of AI Report 2021, with European countries already trailing far behind:

Also, here’s some data on recent AI investment by region from the latest Stanford “AI Index Report 2022” which again highlights a gap that is only growing larger:

It’s important to listen to what actual AI innovators across the Atlantic have to say about the new EU regulatory efforts. Just last month, the UK-based Coalition for a Digital Economy (Coadec), an advocacy group for Britain’s technology-led startups, published a report entitled, “What do AI Startups Want from Regulation?” Coadec surveyed its members to gauge their feelings about the EU’s proposed approach to AI regulation, as well as the UK’s. 76% of those startups said that their business model would be either negatively affected or become infeasible if the UK were to echo the EU by making AI developers liable, and an equal percentage said they had varying concerns about whether it’s technically even feasible to make their datasets “free of errors,” as the EU looks set to demand. Respondents also said they feared that the new AI Act would be particularly burdensome to small and mid-size entrepreneurs because they cannot afford to deal with the costly compliance hassles like the larger competitors they face. This would end of being a replay of the burdens they faced from GDPR, which decimated small businesses. “The experience of GDPR demonstrated how unclear, complex and expensive regulations drove many startups out of business, and disproportionately impact startups that survived–GDPR compliance cost startups significantly more than it did the Tech Giants,” the Coadec report concluded.

At least those UK-based innovators might be in a slightly better position post-Brexit with the British government now looking to chart a different–and much less burdensome–governance approach for digital technologies. In fact, the UK government recently released a major policy document on “Establishing a Pro-Innovation Approach to Regulating AI,” which makes a concerted effort to distinguish its approach from the EU’s. “We will ask that regulators focus on high risk concerns rather than hypothetical or low risks associated with AI,” the report noted. “We want to encourage innovation and avoid placing unnecessary barriers in its way.” This is consistent with what the UK government has been saying on technology governance more generally. For example, in recent report advocating for Innovation Friendly Regulation, the UK government’s Regulatory Horizons Council argued that, when it comes to the regulation of emerging technologies like AI, “it is also necessary to consider the risk that the intervention itself poses.” “This would include the potential impact on benefits from a particular innovation that might be foregone; it would also include the potential creation of a ‘chilling effect’ on innovation more generally,” the Council concluded. Clearly, this approach to technology policy stands in stark contrast to the EU’s heavy-handed model. So, there is a chance that at least some innovators based in the UK can escape the EU’s regulatory hell.

What about AI innovators stuck on the European continent? What are they saying about the regulations they will soon face? The European DIGITAL SME Alliance, which is the largest network of small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs) in the European ICT sector, represents roughly 45,000 digital SMEs. In comments to the EC about the impact of the law, the Alliance highlighted how costly the AI Act’s conformity assessments and other regulations will be for smaller innovators. “This may put a burden on AI innovation” the Alliance argued, because smaller developers have limited financial and human resources of SMEs.” “[A] regulation that requires SMEs to make these significant investments, will likely push SMEs out of the market,” the group noted. “This is exactly the opposite of the intention to support a thriving and innovative AI ecosystem in Europe.” Moreover, “SMEs will not be able to pass on these costs to their customers in the final customer end pricing,” the Alliance correctly noted because, “[t[he market is global and highly competitive. Therefore, customers will choose cheaper solutions and Europe risks to be left behind in technology development and global competition.”

In March, the Alliance also hosted a forum on “The European AI Act and Digital SMEs,” which featured comments from some operators in this space. Some speakers were quite timid and you could sense that they might have feared pushing back too aggressively against the European Commission so as not to get on the bad side of regulators before the rules go into effect. But Mislav Malenica, Founder & CEO Mindsmiths didn’t pull any punches in his remarks. His company Mindsmiths is trying to build autonomous support systems in many different fields, but their ability to innovate and compete globally will be severely curtailed by the EU AI Act, he argued.

I usually don’t spend time transcribing people’s comments from events, but I went back and watched Malenica’s multiple times because his remarks are so powerful and I wanted to make sure others hear what he was saying. [Malenica’s opening comments during the event run from 42:29 to 49:34 of the video and then he has more to say during Q&A beginning at the 1:27:28 of the video.] Here’s a quick summary of a few of Malenica’s key points (listed chronologically):

• “I’m not sure we are doing everything we can do actually to create an environment that’s innovation friendly.”
• “we see a lot of uncertainty. We see fear.”
• “basically we won’t be able to get funding here.”
• while reading through the AI Act, he notes, “I don’t see start-ups being mentioned anywhere, and startups are the main vehicles of innovation.” […] “I find it very arrogant”
• if AI Act becomes law, “what we’ll do in Europe is we’ll create a new market and that’s the AI markets based on fear,” and in how to just build products that avoid the wrath of government or lawsuits.
• “we are really stifling innovation” and that means Europeans will have to import autonomous products from foreign companies instead of making them there.

Later, during in the Q&A period, Malenica notes how his first virtual currency startup had to use half it’s investment capital just dealing with regulatory compliance issues, and most venture capitalists wouldn’t get behind launching in Europe because of such legal hassles. He reflects upon what this mean for other innovators going forward as the EU prepares to expand their regulatory regime for AI sectors:

• “I don’t think we’re missing talent. That’s just a consequence” of all the regulation. “We are missing a sense that you have opportunities here. If you the opportunities here, then the talent will come, the funding will come, and so on because people see that they’ll be able to make money, they’ll be able to build companies, and so on.”
• “If we now take a look at the 10 biggest companies market capitalizations in the world, we’ll see that none of them comes actually from Europe” with U.S. tech companies dominating the list. “So, we missed that wave completely.” Why? “Because we didn’t inspire anyone to take action,” and that is about to happen for AI.
• “We need to decide if we are going to be a land of opportunities, or will we be just consumers of other people’s tech, the same we are right now” for digital software and services.
• “We’re already finding excuses for the loss” of the AI market, he argues.

Malenica’s comments are extraordinarily demoralizing if you care about innovation. Now, I’m an American and one way to look at this dismal situation is that, by hobbling its own startups and existing AI innovators, Europe is doing the U.S. another favor by essentially taking itself out of the running in next great global tech race. Europe’s actions may also mean that America gains many of their best and brightest if they come to the U.S. when looking to create the next great algorithmic service or application because they can’t do so in the EU. This is exactly what happened over the past few decades for Internet startups, Malenica noted.

But that’s dismal news in another sense. Europe is filled with brilliant innovators, highly-skilled talent, world-class educational institutions, and even many venture capitalists looking to invest in this arena. Unfortunately, the continent’s suffocating regulatory approach makes it nearly impossible for digital technology innovators to have a fighting chance. Through their heavy-handed policies, European officials have essentially declared their innovators “guilty until proven innocent.” And that means that Europeans and the rest of the world are being deprived of many important life-enriching and life-saving AI applications that those innovators could create. Technological innovation is not a zero-sum game that only one country can “win.” Innovation drives growth and prosperity and lifts all boats as its benefits spread throughout the world. When European innovators prosper, people all over the world prosper along with them.

Is there any chance the European Commission softens its stance toward emerging technologies and looks to adopt a more flexible governance approach that instead treats AI innovators as innocent until proven guilty? I think it is extremely unlikely that will happen because, as Malenica noted, European technology policy is too rooted in fear of disruption and extreme risk-aversion. EU officials are forgetting that the most important lesson from the history of technological innovation is there can be no progress without some risk-taking and corresponding disruption. My favorite quote about the relationship between risk-taking and human progress comes from Wilbur Wright who, along with his brother, helped pioneer human flight. “If you are looking for perfect safety,” Wright said, “you would do well to sit on a fence and watch the birds.” European policymakers are essentially forcing their best and brightest innovators to sit on the fence and watch the rest of the world fly right past them on the digital technology and AI front. The ramifications for the continent will be disastrous. Regardless, as I noted in concluding my recent Hill column, Europe’s approach to AI “shouldn’t be the model the U.S. follows if it hopes to maintain its early lead in AI and robotics. America should instead welcome European companies, workers and investors looking for a more hospitable place to launch bold new AI innovations.”

Alas, European officials appear ready to ignore the deleterious impact of their policies on innovation and competition and instead make regulation their leading export to the world. In fact, the European Commission will soon open a San Francisco office to work more closely with Silicon Valley companies affected by EU tech regulation. European leaders have basically surrendered on the idea of home-grown innovation and are now plowing all their energies into regulating the rest of the world’s largest digital technology companies, most of which are headquartered in the United States. It’s no wonder, then, that The Economist magazine concludes that, “Europe is the free-rider continent” that “has piggybacked on innovation from elsewhere, keeping up with rivals, not forging ahead.” Instead, “the cuddly form of capitalism embraced in Europe has markedly failed to create world-beating companies,” the magazine argues.

European officials want us to believe that they are somehow doing the world a favor by being its global tech regulator, when instead the are simply solidifying the power of the largest digital tech companies, who are the only ones with enough resources–mainly in the form of massive legal compliance teams–to live under the EU’s innovation-crushing regulations. Sadly, many US policymakers hate our own home-grown tech companies so much now, that they are willing to let this happen. In a better world, those American lawmakers would stand up to European officials looking to bully tech innovators and we would reject the innovation-killing recipe that the EU is cooking up for AI markets and expects the rest of the world to eat.

Additional Reading on AI & Robotics:

• Adam Thierer, “How Science Fiction Dystopianism Shapes the Debate over AI & Robotics,” Discourse, July 26, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Why is the US Following the EU’s Lead on Artificial Intelligence Regulation?” The Hill, July 21, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “Algorithmic Auditing and AI Impact Assessments: The Need for Balance,” Medium, July 13, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “What I Learned about the Power of AI at the Cleveland Clinic,” Medium, May 6, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, Governing Emerging Technology in an Age of Policy Fragmentation and Disequilibrium, American Enterprise Institute (April 2022).
• Adam Thierer, “How to Get the Future We Were Promised,” Discourse, January 18, 2022.
• Adam Thierer, “A Global Clash of Visions: The Future of AI Policy,” The Hill, May 4, 2021.
• Adam Thierer, “A Brief History of Soft Law in ICT Sectors: Four Case Studies,” Jurimetrics, Vol. 61 (Fall 2021): 79-119.
• Adam Thierer, “Artificial Intelligence Governance in the Obama–Trump Years,” IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society, Vol, 2, Issue 4 (2021).
• Adam Thierer, “The Worst Regulation Ever Proposed,” The Bridge, September 2019.
• Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees & Adam Thierer, “Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future,” Colorado Technology Law Journal, Vol. 17 (2018).
• Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, “No New Tech Bureaucracy,” Real Clear Policy, September 10, 2020.
• Adam Thierer, “OMB’s AI Guidance Embodies Wise Tech Governance,” Mercatus Center Public Comment, March 13, 2020.
• Adam Thierer, “Europe’s New AI Industrial Policy,” Medium, February 20, 2020.
• Adam Thierer, “Trump’s AI Framework & the Future of Emerging Tech Governance,” Medium, January 8, 2020.
• Adam Thierer, “Soft Law: The Reconciliation of Permissionless & Responsible Innovation,” Chapter 7 in Adam Thierer, Evasive Entrepreneurs & the Future of Governance (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 2020): 183-240.
• Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer, “Counterpoint: Regulators Should Allow the Greatest Space for AI Innovation,” Communications of the ACM, Volume 61, Issue 12, (December 2018): 33-35.
• Adam Thierer, Andrea O’Sullivan & Raymond Russell, “Artificial Intelligence and Public Policy,” Mercatus Research (2017).
• Adam Thierer, “Shouldn’t the Robots Have Eaten All the Jobs at Amazon By Now?” Technology Liberation Front, July 26, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “Are ‘Permissionless Innovation’ and ‘Responsible Innovation’ Compatible?” Technology Liberation Front, July 12, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “The Growing AI Technopanic,” Medium, April 27, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “The Day the Machines Took Over,” Medium, May 11, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “When the Trial Lawyers Come for the Robot Cars,” Slate, June 10, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, “Learning by Doing,” the Process of Innovation & the Future of Employment,” Technology Liberation Front, September 25, 2015.
• Adam Thierer, “Problems with Precautionary Principle-Minded Tech Regulation & a Federal Robotics Commission,” Medium, September 22, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.

Here’s a new episode of the James Madison Institute “Policy Gone Viral” podcast in which my former Mercatus Center colleague Andrea O’Sullivan and I discuss the future of technological innovation and the public policies governing it. The video is embedded below or you can listen to just the audio here.

Here’s yesterday’s full launch event video for the release of my new book, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Governance: How Innovation Improves Economies and Governments. My thanks to Matthew Feeney, Director of the Project on Emerging Technologies at the Cato Institute, for hosting the discussion and sorting through audience questions. The video is below and some of the topics we discussed are listed down below:

This week, the Trump Administration proposed a new policy framework for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies that attempts to balance the need for continued innovation with a set of principles to address concerns about new AI services and applications. This represents an important moment in the history of emerging technology governance as it creates a policy vision for AI that is generally consistent with earlier innovation governance frameworks established by previous administrations.

Generally speaking, the Trump governance vision for AI encourages regulatory humility and patience in the face of an uncertain technological future. However, the framework also endorses a combination of “hard” and “soft” law mechanisms to address policy concerns that have already been raised about developing or predicted AI innovations.

AI promises to revolutionize almost every sector of the economy and can potentially benefit our lives in numerous ways. But AI applications also raise a number of policy concerns, specifically regarding safety or fairness. On the safety front, for example, some are concerned about the AI systems that control drones, driverless cars, robots, and other autonomous systems. When it comes to fairness considerations, critics worry about “bias” in algorithmic systems that could deny people jobs, loans, or health care, among other things.

These concerns deserve serious consideration and some level of policy guidance or else the public may never come to trust AI systems, especially if the worst of those fears materialize as AI technologies spread. But how policy is formulated and imposed matters profoundly. A heavy-handed, top-down regulatory regime could undermine AI’s potential to improve lives and strengthen the economy. Accordingly, a flexible governance framework is needed and the administration’s new guidelines for AI regulation do a reasonably good job striking that balance.

Background

Last February, the White House issued Executive Order 13859, on “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.” The Order announced the creation of the “American AI Initiative,” an effort to “focus the resources of the Federal government to develop AI.” It prioritized investments in AI-focused research and development (R&D), building a workforce ready for the AI era, international engagement on AI priorities, and the establishment governance standards for AI systems to “help Federal regulatory agencies develop and maintain approaches for the safe and trustworthy creation and adoption of new AI technologies.”

Regarding that last objective, Order 13589 required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop a framework and set of principles for federal agencies to follow when considering the development of regulatory and non‑regulatory approaches for AI. Importantly, the Order also specified that the framework should seek to “advance American innovation” and “reduce barriers to the use of AI technologies in order to promote their innovative application while protecting civil liberties, privacy, American values, and United States economic and national security.”

That resulted in the memorandum sent to heads of federal departments and agencies this week entitled, “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications” (hereinafter AI Guidance). The draft version of the AI Guidance specifies that “federal agencies must avoid regulatory or non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth.” More specifically:

“Agencies must avoid a precautionary approach that holds AI systems to such an impossibly high standard that society cannot enjoy their benefits. Where AI entails risk, agencies should consider the potential benefits and costs of employing AI, when compared to the systems AI has been designed to complement or replace.”

But the AI Guidance is certainly not a call for comprehensive deregulation or the abandonment of all AI federal oversight. The memorandum’s very title reflects an understanding that existing laws and agency rules will continue to play a role in guiding the development of AI, machine-learning, and autonomous systems.

Accordingly, and consistent with past executive orders and OMB regulatory guidance documents for federal agencies, the AI Guidance establishes a set of ten principles that agencies must take into consideration when considering AI policy:

1. Public trust in AI: Requiring that “the government’s regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to AI promote reliable, robust, and trustworthy AI applications, which will contribute to public trust in AI.”
2. Public participation: Agencies must provide “ample opportunities for the public to provide information and participate in all stages of the rulemaking process.”
3. Scientific integrity and information quality: Agencies should “leverage scientific and technical information and processes” to build trust and ensure data quality and transparency.
4. Risk assessment and management: Acknowledging that “all activities involve tradeoffs,” the AI Guidance requires that “a risk-based approach should be used to determine which risks are acceptable and which risks present the possibility of unacceptable harm, or harm that has expected costs greater than expected benefits.”
5. Benefits and costs: As part of those risk assessments, agencies must “carefully consider the full societal costs, benefits, and distributional effects before considering regulations related to the development and deployment of AI applications. Such consideration will include the potential benefits and costs of employing AI, when compared to the systems AI has been designed to complement or replace, whether implementing AI will change the type of errors created by the system, as well as comparison to the degree of risk tolerated in other existing ones.”
6. Flexibility: OMB encourages agencies to “pursue performance-based and flexible approaches that can adapt to rapid changes and updates to AI applications.”
7. Fairness and non-discrimination: Acknowledging that “in some instances, introduce real-world bias that produces discriminatory outcomes or decisions that undermine public trust and confidence in AI,” the AI Guidance requires agencies to consider “issues of fairness and non-discrimination with respect to outcomes and decisions produced by the AI application at issue.”
8. Disclosure and transparency: Agencies are encouraged to consider how greater “transparency and disclosure can increase public trust and confidence in AI applications.”
9. Safety and security: Agencies are required to “promote the development of AI systems that are safe, secure, and operate as intended, and encourage the consideration of safety and security issues throughout the AI design, development, deployment, and operation process.”
10. Interagency coordination: The guidance makes it clear that a “coherent and whole-of-government approach to AI oversight requires interagency coordination.”

Soft Law Ascends

Importantly, the AI Guidance also encourages agencies to be open to “non-regulatory approaches to AI” governance and specifies three particular models:

• Sector-specific policy guidance or frameworks: OSTP writes that “agencies should consider using any existing statutory authority to issue non-regulatory policy statements, guidance, or testing and deployment frameworks, as a means of encouraging AI innovation in that sector.” The memorandum also notes that this can include “work done in collaboration with industry, such as development of playbooks and voluntary incentive frameworks.”
• Pilot programs and experiments: The document encourages the use of “pilot programs that provide safe harbors for specific AI applications” which “could produce useful data to inform future rulemaking and non-regulatory approaches.”
• Voluntary consensus standards: Before regulating, the AI Guidance encourages agencies to consider how voluntary consensus standards, assessment programs, and compliance programs might be used to address policy concerns.

These represent “soft law” approaches to technological governance and they are becoming all the rage in technology policy discussions today. Soft law mechanisms are informal, collaborative, and constantly evolving governance efforts. While not formerly binding like “hard law” rules and regulations, soft law efforts nonetheless create a set of expectations about sensible development and use of technologies. Soft law can include multistakeholder initiatives, best practices and standards, agency workshops and guidance documents, educational efforts, and much more.

Soft law has become the dominant governance approach for emerging technologies because it is often better able to address the “pacing problem,” which refers to the growing gap between the rate of technological innovation and policymakers’ ability to keep up with it. As I have previously noted, the pacing problem is “becoming the great equalizer in debates over technological governance because it forces governments to rethink their approach to the regulation of many sectors and technologies.”

Not only do traditional legislative and regulatory hard law systems struggle to keep up with fast-paced technological changes, but oftentimes those older mechanisms are just too rigid and unsuited for new sectors and developments. That is definitely the case for AI, which is multi-dimensional in nature and even defies easy definition. Soft law offers a more flexible, adaptive approach to learning on the fly and cobbling together principles and policies that can address new policy concerns as they develop in specific contexts, without derailing potentially important innovations.

Building on Past Governance Frameworks

In this sense, the Trump administration’s AI Guidance borrows from past policy frameworks by marrying up a desire to promote an exciting new set of emerging technologies alongside the need for reasonable but flexible oversight and governance mechanisms. At a high level, the AI Guidance builds on many of the same principles that motivated the Clinton administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a statement of principles and policy objectives for the then-emerging Internet. The document, which was issued in July 1997, said that “governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible” and “avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce.”

The Framework was a clean break from the top-down regulatory paradigm that had previously governed traditional communications and media technologies. Clinton’s Framework insisted that, to the extent government intervention was needed at all, “its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.” The use of soft law and multistakeholder models was a key component of this vision, and those more flexible governance approaches were tapped by the subsequent administrations to address emerging tech policy concerns.

For example, the Obama administration considerably expanded the use of multistakeholder mechanisms and other soft law tools in response to the need of oversight of fast-moving technologies. The Obama administration had many different policy governance efforts underway for specific AI technologies and concerns, including workshops and multistakeholder efforts focused on the safety, security, and privacy-related issues surrounding “big data” systems, online advertising, connected cars, drones, and more.

Whereas the Obama administration was deeper in the weeds of the policy issues associated with specific AI and machine-learning applications, the Trump administration has sought to both build on those focused efforts while also stepping back to consider AI governance at the 30,000-foot level. In essence, the AI Guidance combines some of the aspirational elements found in the Clinton Framework alongside the Obama administration’s more targeted approach to consider specific policy concerns across many different sectors and technologies.

Trump’s AI Guidance adds an element of formality to this process regarding how federal agencies should address AI developments and formulate potential policy responses. It does so by counseling humility and even potential forbearance until all the facts are in. “Fostering innovation and growth through forbearing from new regulations may be appropriate,” the memorandum says. Agencies should consider new regulation only after they have reached the decision, in light of the foregoing section and other considerations, that Federal regulation is necessary.” Again, this is very much consistent with more general regulatory guidance issued by every administration since President Reagan was in office.

Flexible, Adaptive Governance is Key

The AI Guidance foreshadows the future of not only AI governance but the governance of many other emerging technologies. Hard law will continue to provide a backstop and have a role in guiding technological developments. Toward that end, efforts like the new AI Guidance are important because it represents an effort to “regulate the regulators” by placing some ground rules on how they go about applying old law to new developments.

But soft law governance is where the real action is at, both for AI and almost all emerging technologies today. The Trump AI Guidance reflects the extent to which soft law has become the dominant governance paradigm for modern tech sectors. As my colleagues Jennifer Huddleston and Trace Mitchell have noted, soft law is already effectively the law of the land for driverless cars, for example. After years of congressional wrangling over a federal autonomous vehicle regulatory framework—one that has widespread bipartisan support, no less—we still do not have a law on the books. Instead, the Department of Transportation has been cobbling together informal “rules of the road” through informal guidance documents that have been “versioned” as if they were computer software (i.e., Version 1.0, 2.0, 3.0). Version 4.0 of the DoT guidance for automated vehicles was just released this week.

That is the same approach that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has taken with the privacy guidelines it developed. NIST’s Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management is also versioned like software. And many other federal agencies, especially the Federal Trade Commission, have tapped a wide variety of soft law tools—such as agency workshops and workshop reports that recommended privacy best practices for various technologies. Meanwhile, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has used multistakeholder processes to address privacy concerns surrounding a wide range of technologies, including drones and facial recognition. NIST, FTC, and NTIA have undertaken these informal governance efforts because, despite over a decade of debate, Congress still has not advanced comprehensive federal privacy legislation. For better or worse, soft law has filled that governance gap.

Addressing Likely Objections from Left & Right

Many people of varying ideological dispositions will object to the growing role of soft law as the primary governance tool for emerging technology policy. Some conservatives will cringe at the sound of giving regulators greater leeway to address amorphous policy concerns, fearing that it will result in unconstrained exercises of unaccountable, extra-constitutional power.

Some of those concerns are valid, but they fail to account for the fact that the prospects for agency downsizing or deregulation they prefer are extremely limited. Practically speaking, the administrative state isn’t going anywhere. In some cases, agencies can actually do some real good by encouraging innovators to think about how to “bake-in” sensible best practices to preemptively address concerns about the privacy, safety, security, and fairness of various AI systems. Better those concerns be addressed in more flexible, adaptive fashion than by a heavy-handed, overly-rigid regulatory approach. Soft law offers that possibility, even if legitimate concerns remain about agency accountability and transparency.

Many to the left of center will be critical of this governance approach as well, but on very different grounds. As Associated Press reporter Matt O’Brien notes, “the vagueness of the principles announced by the White House is unlikely to satisfy AI watchdogs who have warned of a lack of accountability as computer systems are deployed to take on human roles in high-risk social settings, such as mortgage lending or job recruitment.”

These concerns actually are addressed in several of the OSTP’s ten principles, including those which stress the need for fairness and non-discrimination, information quality, public participation, disclosure and transparency, and safety and security. Yet many on the left will claim these principles merely pay lip service to these values and that what is really needed is a full-blown regulatory regime and some sort of corresponding new federal AI agency, which would preemptively determine which AI technologies would be allowed into the wild.

Already, an Algorithmic Accountability Act was introduced in Congress last year that would ask the FTC to take a more active role in policing “inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting consumers” that may have resulted from “automated decision systems.” Meanwhile, some academics have called for the creation of a Federal Robotics Commission or a National Algorithmic Technology Safety Administration to preemptively oversee new AI developments.

The problem with overly-precautionary regulation of that sort could potentially unduly limit AI innovation and the many benefits it entails. There may be some AI applications that pose serious and immediate risks to humanity and which require preemptive restraints on their development and use. Autonomous military and law enforcement applications are the most obvious examples. But most AI applications do not rise to that same level of regulatory concern, and other governance approaches are required to balance the use and misuse of them. This is why a more open and flexible governance approach is needed. Moreover, the old regulatory system just cannot keep up anymore, and it is ill-suited to address most policy concerns in a timely or efficient fashion.

Cristie Ford, and advocate of greater regulatory oversight for fintech, notes in her latest book that the problem with “old-style Welfare State regulation” is that it is “a clumsy, blunt instrument for achieving regulatory objectives” due to its reliance upon “one-size-fits-all mandates, prohibitions, and penalties.” Ford acknowledges what many other regulatory advocates are reluctant to admit:  public policies toward fast-paced technology sectors can no longer be governed effectively using the Analog Era’s top-down, command-and-control regulatory processes. Far too many federal agencies rely on a “build-and-freeze model” of regulation that puts rules in stone to deal with one sets of issues one day, but then either fails to eliminate them later when they become obsolete or to reform those rules to bring them in line with new social, economic, and technical realities.

If we hope to encourage continued innovation in sectors that could produce profoundly important, life-enriching technologies, America’s regulatory approach for AI and emerging technology needs to move away from “build-and-freeze” and toward “build-and-adapt.” Regulation is still needed, but the old regulatory toolkit is badly broken. For better or worse, soft law is going to fill the resulting governance gap, regardless of objections from some on the left or the right. Pragmatic policymaking is going to carry the day for emerging technology governance.

Conclusion

The Trump Administration AI Guidance represents a continuation and extension of this trend toward more flexible, adaptive governance approaches for emerging technologies. It offers a pragmatic vision that builds on the policies and paradigms of the past, while also encouraging fresh thinking about how best to balance the need for continued innovation alongside the various concerns about disruptive technological change.

There are many challenging issues that lie ahead and the new AI Guidance cannot provide bright-line answers to all the hypothetical questions that people want answered today. No one possesses a crystal ball that will allow them to forecast the technological future. Only ongoing trial-and-error experimentation and policy improvisation will allow us to find sensible solutions. A policy approach rooted in humility, flexibility, and forbearance will help ensure that America’s regulatory policies continue to promote both innovation and the public good.

[This essay originally appeared on the AIER blog on May 23, 2019 under the title, “Spring Cleaning for the Regulatory State.”]

Spring is in full blossom, and many of us are in the midst of our annual house-cleaning ritual. A regular deep clean makes good sense because it makes our living spaces more orderly and gets rid of the gunk and grime that has amassed over the past year.

Unfortunately, governments almost never engage in their own spring-cleaning exercise. Statutes and regulations continue to accumulate, layer by layer, until they suffocate not only economic opportunity, but also the effective administration of government itself. Luckily, some states have realized this and have taken steps to help address this problem.

Mountains of Regulations

First, here are some hard facts about regulatory accumulation:

• Red tape grows: Since the first edition of his annual publication Ten Thousand Commandments in 1993, Wayne Crews has documented how federal agencies have issued 101,380 rules. Other reports find agency staffing levels jumped from 57,109 to 277,163 employees from 1960 to 2017, while agency budgets swelled in real terms from $3 billion in 1960 to $58 billion in 2017 (2009$).
• Nothing ever gets cleaned up: A Deloitte survey of U.S. Code reveals that 68 percent of federal regulations have never been updated and that 17 percent have only been updated once. If a company never updated its business model, it would fail eventually. But governments get away with doing the same thing without any fear of failure. “If it were a country, U.S. regulation would be the world’s eighth-largest economy, ranking behind India and ahead of Italy,” Crews notes.
• The burden of regulatory accumulation is getting worse: “The estimate for regulatory compliance and economic effects of federal intervention is $1.9 trillion annually,” Crews finds, which is equal to 10 percent of the U.S. gross domestic product for 2017. When federal spending is added to regulatory costs are added to federal spending, Crews finds, the burden equals $4.173 trillion, or 30 percent of the entire economy. Mercatus Center research has found that “economic growth in the United States has, on average, been slowed by 0.8 percent per year since 1980 owing to the cumulative effects of regulation.” This means that “the US economy would have been about 25 percent larger than it actually was as of 2012” if regulation had been held to roughly the same aggregate level it stood at in 1980.

In sum, the evidence shows that the red tape is growing without constraint, hindering entrepreneurship and innovation, deterring new investment, raising costs to consumers, limiting worker opportunities/wages, and undermining economic growth.

Regulations accumulate in this fashion because the administrative state is on autopilot. Legislatures pass broad statutes delegating ambiguous authority to agencies. Bureaucrats are then free to roll the regulatory snowball down the hill until it has become so big that its momentum cannot be stopped.

The Death of Common Sense

Policy makers enact new rules with the best of intentions, of course, but we should not assume that the untrammeled growth of the regulatory state produces positive results. There is no free lunch, after all. Every regulation is a restriction on opportunities for experimentation with new and potentially better ways of doing things. Sometimes such restrictions make sense because regulations can pass a reasonable cost-benefit test. It would be foolish to assume that all regulations on the books do.

Spring cleaning for the regulatory state, therefore, should be viewed as an exercise in “good governance.” The goal is not to get rid of all regulations. The goal is to make sure that rules are reasonable and cost-effective so that the public can actually understand the law and get the highest value out of their government institutions.

Philip K. Howard, founder and chair of the nonprofit coalition Common Good and the author of The Death of Common Sense, has written extensively about how regulatory accumulation has become a chronic problem. “Too much law,” he argues, “can have similar effects as too little law.” “People slow down, they become defensive, they don’t initiate projects because they are surrounded by legal risks and bureaucratic hurdles,” Howard notes. “They tiptoe through the day looking over their shoulders rather than driving forward on the power of their instincts. Instead of trial and error, they focus on avoiding error.”

In such an environment, risk-taking and entrepreneurialism are more challenging and economic dynamism suffers. But regulatory accumulation also hurts the quality of government institutions and policies, which become fundamentally incomprehensible or illogical. “Society can’t function when stuck in a heap of accumulated mandates of past generations,” Howard concludes. This is why an occasional regulatory house cleaning is essential to unleash economic opportunity and improve the functioning of our democratic institutions.

Regulatory House Cleaning Begins

Reforms to address this problem are finally happening. In a series of new essays, my colleague James Broughel has documented how several states — including Idaho, Ohio, Virginia, and New Jersey — are undertaking serious efforts to get regulatory accumulation under control. They are utilizing a variety of mechanisms, including “regulatory reduction pilot programs” and “red tape review commissions.” Recently, Idaho actually initiated a sunset of its entire regulatory code and will now try to figure out how to clean up its 8,200 pages of regulations containing 736 chapters of state rules.

Meanwhile, other states are undertaking serious reform in one of the worst forms of regulatory accumulation: occupational licenses. The Federal Trade Commission notes that roughly 30 percent of American jobs require a license today, up from less than 5 percent in the 1950s. Research by economist Morris Kleiner and others finds that “restrictions from occupational licensing can result in up to 2.85 million fewer jobs nationwide, with an annual cost to consumers of $203 billion.” And many of the rules do not even serve their intended purpose. A major 2015 Obama administration report on the costs of occupational licensing concluded that “most research does not find that licensing improves quality or public health and safety.”

Arizona, West Virginia, and Nebraska are among the leaders in reforming occupational-licensing regimes using a variety of approaches. In some cases, the reforms sunset licensing rules for specific professions altogether. Other proposals grant workers reciprocity to use a license they obtained in another state. Finally, some states have proposed letting most professions operate without any license at all but then requiringall, but then require them to make it clear to consumers that they are unlicensed.

The Need for a Fresh Look

Sunsets are not silver-bullet solutions, and the recent experience with sunsetting and “de-licensing” requirements at the state level has been mixed because many legislatures ignore or circumvent requirements. Nonetheless, sunsets can still help prompt much-needed discussions about which rules make sense and which ones no longer do.

Sunsets can be forward-looking, too. I have proposed that when policy makers craft new laws, especially for fast-paced tech sectors, they should incorporate a clause that what we might think of as “the Sunsetting Imperative.” It would demand that any existing or newly imposed technology regulation should include a provision sunsetting the law or regulation within two years. Reforms like these are also sometimes referred to as “temporary legislation” or “fresh look” requirements. Policy makers can always reenact rules that are still relevant and needed.

By forcing a periodic spring cleaning, sunsets and fresh-look requirements can help stem the tide of regulatory accumulation and ensure that only those policies that serve a pressing need remain on the books. There is no good reason for governments not to clean up their messes on occasion, just like the rest of us have to.

In recent months, my colleagues and I at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University have published a flurry of essays about the importance of innovation, entrepreneurialism, and “moonshots,” as well as the future of technological governance more generally. A flood of additional material is coming, but I figured I’d pause for a moment to track our progress so far. Much of this work is leading up to my next on the freedom to innovate, which I am finishing up currently.

• Adam Thierer, “Deep Technologies & Moonshots: Should We Dare to Dream?” Medium , September 7, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “The Right to Pursue Happiness, Earn a Living, and Innovate,” The Bridge , September 20, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Is It “Techno-Chauvinist” & “Anti-Humanist” to Believe in the Transformative Potential of Technology?” Medium , September 18, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “How Technology Expands the Horizons of Our Humanity,” Medium, November 19, 2018.
• “Evasive Entrepreneurs and Permissionless Innovation: An Interview with Adam Thierer,” The Bridge , September 11, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Making the World Safe for More Moonshots,” The Bridge , February 5, 2018.
• Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, “A Non-Partisan Way to Help Workers and Consumers,” The Bridge , September 25, 2018.
• Adam Thierer and Trace Mitchell, “The Many Forms of Entrepreneurialism,” The Bridge , August 30, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “Evasive Entrepreneurialism and Technological Civil Disobedience: Basic Definitions,” The Bridge , July 20, 2018, 
• Adam Thierer, “The Pacing Problem and the Future of Technology Regulation,” The Bridge , August 8, 2018.
• Adam Thierer, “The Pacing Problem, the Collingridge Dilemma & Technological Determinism,” Technology Liberation Front, August 16, 2018.
• Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer, “3D Printers, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Tech Regulation,” The Bridge , August 1, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees, “The Regulatory Name Game,” The Bridge , September 13, 2018.
• Jennifer Skees, “Do You Need a License to Innovate?”, The Bridge , June 29, 2018. 
• Adam Thierer and Jennifer Skees, “Lemonade Stands and Permits,” The Bridge , August 20, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees and Adam Thierer, “Pennsylvania’s Innovative Approach to Regulating Innovation,” The Bridge , September 5, 2018.
• Jennifer Huddleston Skees & Trace Mitchell, “Transportation 3.0”, The Bridge , August 29, 2018. 
• Jennifer Skees & Trace Mitchell, “Will The Electric Scooter Movement Lose Its Charge?” The Bridge , July 18, 2018. 
• Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell, “The Many Flavors of Food Entrepreneurialism,” The Bridge, September 26, 2018. 
• Jennifer Skees, “Should You Be Able to Fix Your Own iPhone,” Plain Text , June 18, 2018, https://readplaintext.com/should-you-be-able-to-fix-your-own-iphone-b4157e6cd23

Some older essays on related topics

• Adam Thierer, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, 2nd ed. (Arlington, VA: Mercatus Center at George Mason University, 2016).
• Adam Thierer, “Wendell Wallach on the Challenge of Engineering Better Technology Ethics,” Technology Liberation Front, April 20, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, “Are “Permissionless Innovation” and “Responsible Innovation” Compatible?” Technology Liberation Front, July 12, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “Does “Permissionless Innovation” Even Mean Anything?” Technology Liberation Front, May 18, 2017.
• Adam Thierer, “What Does It Mean to “Have a Conversation” about a New Technology?,” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• Adam Thierer, “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” August 23, 2013.
• Adam Thierer, “Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change” Medium, June 30, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “Book Review: Calestous Juma’s “Innovation and Its Enemies”  Technology Liberation Front, July 29, 2016.
• Adam Thierer, “Embracing a Culture of Permissionless Innovation,” Cato Online Forum, November 17, 2014.
• Adam Thierer, “Defining ‘Technology’” Technology Liberation Front, originally published April 29, 2014, last updated July 2017.
• Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Skees & Adam Thierer, “Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future,” February 5, 2018, (Forthcoming – Colorado Technology Law Journal).

by Adam Thierer & Trace Mitchell

[originally published on The Bridge on August 30, 2018.]

What is an entrepreneur?

While it may seem straightforward, this question is deceptively complex. The term can be used in many different ways to describe a variety of individuals who engage in economic, political, or even social activities. Entrepreneurs affect almost every aspect of modern society. While most people probably have a general sense of what is meant when they hear the term entrepreneur, it can be difficult to provide a precise definition. This is due in no small part to the fact that some of the primary thinkers who have given substance to the term have placed their focus on different aspects of entrepreneurialism.

How Economists Talk About Entrepreneurs

Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter thought that the purpose of an entrepreneur was “to reform or revolutionize the pattern of production by exploiting an invention.”  Schumpeterian entrepreneurs are highly creative, disruptive innovators who challenge the status quo in order to bring about new economic opportunities. American economist Israel Kirzner viewed the defining characteristic of entrepreneurs as “alertness.” Kirznerian entrepreneurs are individuals who are able to identify the ways in which a market could be moved closer to its equilibrium, such as recognizing a gap in knowledge between different economic actors.

In the time since Schumpeter and Kirzner helped lay the groundwork, a number of George Mason University-affiliated scholars have made major contributions to our understanding of entrepreneurialism. Don Boudreaux, Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin, and Virgil Storr, Stefanie Haeffele and Laura Grube, have offered a merged view of Schumpeterian and Kirznerian entrepreneurialism, showing the significant overlap between the two approaches.

In this new way of looking at the issue, entrepreneurs are crucial to innovation, economic growth, and societal change. They are dynamic actors who respond to incentives and market signals. “Greater discovery and innovation are the benchmarks of dynamic competition,” note Ellig and Lin, “not the driving down of price to marginal cost.”

Productive and Unproductive Entrepreneurs

But are all of these dynamic entrepreneurs good for society? Among modern economists and political scientists, there is a general consensus that Schumpeterian-Kirznerian entrepreneurs are individuals who either find or create value within society. In recent decades, therefore, scholars have focused on applying those insights more broadly and developing a more robust way to categorize different types of entrepreneurial activity.

Another American economist, William Baumol, drew an important distinction between  productive and unproductive entrepreneurs. He described productive entrepreneurs as people engaged in enterprising activity that generates value within society, such as the creation of new and innovative technologies. However, he also found that entrepreneurs could be unproductive if they did not create value or actively harmful if they destroyed value. “Indeed, at times the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical existence that is actually damaging to the economy.” For Baumol, entrepreneurs are not defined as individuals who develop new methods of creating value but rather “persons who are ingenious and creative in finding ways that add to their own wealth, power, and prestige.”

Entrepreneurs in the Political Arena

An individual who is highly skilled at lobbying a particular governmental agency might be considered an entrepreneur, but that does not mean they are necessarily contributing value to society overall. Some scholars refer to this as political entrepreneurialism. Economists Peter Boettke and Christopher Coyne define political entrepreneurs as, “individuals who operate in political institutions and who are alert to profit opportunities created by those institutions.” Utah State University professors Randy Simmons, Ryan Yonk and Diana Thomas observe how such entrepreneurs seek specific rewards or privileges from political institutions and interactions through “alertness to previously unnoticed rent-seeking opportunities.” ‘Rent-seeking’ is an economic concept where one person or group is able to derive certain benefits from a particular institutional arrangement without actually creating value for others.

Our Mercatus Center colleague Matthew Mitchell has documented the “long list of privileges that governments occasionally bestow upon particular firms or particular industries.” Mitchell offers a taxonomy of the sort of privileges that political entrepreneurs seek. They include: “monopoly status, favorable regulations, subsidies, bailouts, loan guarantees, targeted tax breaks, protection from foreign competition, and noncompetitive contracts.”

All of these privileges could qualify as a form of Baumol’s “unproductive entrepreneurship” or, in the extreme, what he called destructive entrepreneurialism. Professors Sameeksha Desai, Zoltan Acs and Utz Weitzel define destructive entrepreneurship as “wealth-destroying (such as the destruction of inputs for production activities).” Whereas unproductive entrepreneurship “seeks to redistribute from one individual to another individual,” Boettke and Coyne note, “destructive entrepreneurship reduces the total surplus in an attempt by the entrepreneur to increase his own wealth.” Outright theft and violent conflict over resources are examples of destructive entrepreneurship.

When policymakers reward political destructive or unproductive entrepreneurs, it has profound effects on the well-being of ordinary people and entire nations.

Evasive and Regulatory Entrepreneurs

Not all political entrepreneurs are necessarily out to gain privileges from government at the expense of others, however. Some entrepreneurs are more interested in simply gaining greater freedom to innovate. Scholars have used the terms evasive entrepreneurs or regulatory entrepreneurs to describe such actors. Researchers Niklas Elert and Magnus Henrekson define evasive entrepreneurialism as “profit-driven business activity in the market aimed at circumventing the existing institutional framework by using innovations to exploit contradictions in that framework.” GMU economists Christopher Coyne and Peter Leeson argue that “[e]vasive activities include the expenditure of resources and efforts in evading the legal system or in avoiding the unproductive activities of other agents.” Regulatory entrepreneurs, according to legal scholars Elizabeth Pollman and Jordan Barry, are innovators who “are in the business of trying to change or shape the law” and are “strategically operating in a zone of questionable legality or breaking the law until they can (hopefully) change it.”  Evasive or regulatory entrepreneurs generally adopt a “permissionless innovation” approach to both business and political activities.

Generally speaking, evasive and regulatory entrepreneurs are synonymous, although regulatory entrepreneurialism implies a more active intent to change policy through entrepreneurial acts. Evasive entrepreneurs might also be ignorant of what the law says, whereas regulatory entrepreneurs, by definition, understand how the law negatively affects their efforts and seek to change policy through their actions.

However, both evasive and regulatory entrepreneurs are distinct from what economists Alexandre Padilla and Nicolas Cachanosky call indirectly productive entrepreneurs. They argue that regulation often creates unintended consequences which lead to new entrepreneurial opportunities. Indirectly productive entrepreneurs seize upon these opportunities by finding ways to mitigate the costs associated with specific regulations. Unlike regulatory entrepreneurs, who desire to change policy, or evasive entrepreneurs, who seek to avoid it, indirectly productive entrepreneurs create value by reducing the harm caused by policies. For example, the Transportation Safety Administration (TSA) has a policy prohibiting passengers from bringing liquids on an airplane unless they are kept in a container that is smaller than 3.4 ounces. As a response, several indirectly productive entrepreneurs have created “TSA Approved” containers for shampoo, mouthwash, and other toiletries that make it easier for passengers to comply with the regulation.

Social Entrepreneurs

There is also a growing acknowledgment that entrepreneurial behavior can transcend economic or political activities. Mercatus scholars have defined social entrepreneurs as individuals who engage in “innovative, social value-creating activity that can occur within or across the nonprofit, business, or government sectors.”  Social entrepreneurial activities are not typically in pursuit of compensation or profit, but that need not always be the case and “the distinction between social and commercial entrepreneurship is not dichotomous, but… a continuum ranging from purely social to purely economic,” they note.

Some sort of social mission drives this type of entrepreneurship, and social entrepreneurialism will often incorporate what MIT economist Eric von Hippel refers to as “free innovation.” He defines a free innovation as “a functionally novel product, service, or process that (1) was developed by consumers at private cost during their unpaid discretionary time (that is, no one paid them to do it) and (2) is not protected by its developers, and so is potentially acquirable by anyone without payment—for free.”  A good example of free innovation would be social entrepreneurs using 3D printers and open source designs to voluntarily create prosthetics for children with limb deficiencies.

Conclusion

As this brief survey reveals, there are many different forms of entrepreneurialism. Individuals can act in an entrepreneurial fashion in pursuit of many different objectives: profits, fame, social or legal change, or even personal or organizational privileges that come at the expense of others. Clearly, not all forms of entrepreneurialism produce socially beneficial outcomes. Policymakers should seek to foster and reward Schumpeterian-Kirznerian entrepreneurs given the positive implications for innovation and economic growth and avoid falling into the trap of rewarding political entrepreneurs, who instead seek to game laws and regulations to their own advantage.

Given the extensive research and academic literature inherent to this subject, we’ve curated a list of selected readings below.

Further Reading

Austin, J., Stevenson, H., & Wei-Skillern, J. (2006). Social and Commercial Entrepreneurship: Same, Different, or Both?  Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, 30(1), 370-384. Retrieved from https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1111/j.1540-6520.2006.00107.x

Baumol, W. (1968). Entrepreneurship in Economic Theory.  The American Economic Review,58(2), 64-71. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/1831798?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents

Baumol, W. (1990). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive and Destructive.  Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), 893-921. Retrieved from https://www.jstor.org/stable/2937617?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents.

Boettke, P. J., & Coyne, C. J. (2009). Context Matters: Institutions and Entrepreneurship.  Foundations and Trends in Entrepreneurship, 5(3), 135-209. Retrieved from https://www.nowpublishers.com/article/Details/ENT-018.

Boudreaux, D. (1994), Schumpeter and Kirzner on Competition and Equilibrium. In P. Boetkke & D. Prychitko (Eds.),  The Market Process: Essays in the Contemporary Austrian Economics (pp. 52-61). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar. Retrieved from http://cafehayek.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Heres-a-paper-that-I-wrote-back-in-1986-or-1987.-In-it-I-attempt-to-explain-how-non-price-competition-can-be-equilibrating..pdf

Coyne, C. J., & Leeson, P. T. (2004). The Plight of Underdeveloped Countries.  Cato Journal, 24(3), 235-249. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=869123

Desai, S., & Acs, Z. J. (2007). A theory of destructive entrepreneurship. Jena Economic Research Papers no. 85, Friedrich-Schiller University and Max Planck Institute of Economics, Jena, Germany, October, Retrieved from https://www.econstor.eu/bitstream/10419/25657/1/553834517.PDF

Dees, J. G. (2001), ‘The meaning of Social Entrepreneurship’. The Fuqua School of Business, Center for the Advancement of Social Entrepreneurship.

Desai, S., Acs, Z.J., and Weitzel, U. (2013), “A model of destructive entrepreneurship: insight for conflict and post-conflict recovery,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 57, No. 1, pp. 20–40, Retrieved from https://repository.ubn.ru.nl/bitstream/handle/2066/170796/170796.pdf

Elert, N. & Henrekson, M. (2016). Evasive Entrepreneurialism.  Small Business Economics, 47(1), 95-113. Retrieved from http://www.ifn.se/wfiles/wp/wp1044.pdf.

Ellig, J. & Lin, D. (2001). A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories. In J. Ellig (Ed.),  Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues (pp. 16-44). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Retrieved from https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/dynamic-competition-and-public-policy/taxonomy-of-dynamic-competition-theories/C536918DD453ADB34A47F48EDA6D21B7.

Hippel, E. V. (2017).  Free Innovation. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. Retrieved from https://mitpress.mit.edu/books/free-innovation.

Kirzner, I. M. (2009). The Alert and Creative Entrepreneur: A Clarification.  Small Business Economics, 32(2), 145-152. Retrieved from https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11187-008-9153-7

Lucas, D. S. & Fuller, C. S. (2015). Entrepreneurship: Productive, Unproductive, and Destructive—Relative to What?  Journal of Business Venturing Insights, 7, 45-49. Retrieved from https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352673417300033.

Mitchell, M. D. (2012). The Pathology of Privilege: The Economic Consequences of Government Favoritism.  Mercatus Center. Retrieved from https://www.mercatus.org/publication/pathology-privilege-economic-consequences-government-favoritism.

Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1991) “The Allocation of Talent: Implications for Growth,” The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 106(2): 503-530. Retrieved from http://www.nber.org/papers/w3530

Murphy, K.M., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R.W. (1993) “Why is rent-seeking so costly to growth?” American Economic Review Papers and Proceedings, 83 (2): 409-414. Retrieved from https://scholar.harvard.edu/shleifer/publications/why-rent-seeking-so-costly-growth

Padilla, A. & Cachanosky, N. (2016). Indirectly Productive Entrepreneurship.  Journal of Enterprise and Public Policy, 5(2), 161–175. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2584741.

Pollman, E. & Barry, J. M. (2017). Regulatory Entrepreneurship.  Southern California Law Review, 90, 383-448. Retrieved from https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2741987.

Schumpeter, J. (1942, 2008).  Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (3rd ed.). New York, NY: HarperCollins Publishers. Retrieved from https://www.amazon.com/Capitalism-Socialism-Democracy-Joseph-Schumpeter/dp/0061561614.

Simmons, R. T., Yonk, R. M., & Thomas, D. W. (2011). Bootleggers, Baptists, and Political Entrepreneurs: Key Players in the Rational Game and Morality Play of Regulatory Politics.  The Independent Review, 15(3), 367-381. Retrieved from http://www.independent.org/pdf/tir/tir_15_03_3_simmons.pdf.

Storr, V., Haeffele, S., & Grube, L. (2015). The Entrepreneur as a Driver of Social Change. In  Community Revival in the Wake of Disaster (pp. 11-31) New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan. Retrieved from https://www.palgrave.com/us/book/9781137286086

Thierer, A. (2018). Evasive Entrepreneurialism and Technological Civil Disobedience: Basic Definitions,  The Bridge. Retrieved from https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/evasive-entrepreneurialism-and-technological-civil-disobedience-basic-definitions

Thierer, A. (2016).  Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. Retrieved from https://www.mercatus.org/publication/permissionless-innovation-continuing-case-comprehensive-technological-freedom

Thierer, A. (2017). You’re in Joseph Schumpeter’s economy now.  Learn Liberty, Retrieved from http://www.learnliberty.org/blog/youre-in-joseph-schumpeters-economy-now

The future of emerging technology policy will be influenced increasingly by the interplay of three interrelated trends: “innovation arbitrage,” “technological civil disobedience,” and “spontaneous private deregulation.” Those terms can be briefly defined as follows:

• “Innovation arbitrage” refers to the idea that innovators can, and will with increasingly regularity, move to those jurisdictions that provide a legal and regulatory environment more hospitable to entrepreneurial activity. Just as capital now fluidly moves around the globe seeking out more friendly regulatory treatment, the same is increasingly true for innovations. And this will also play out domestically as innovators seek to play state and local governments off each other in search of some sort of competitive advantage.
• “Technological civil disobedience” represents the refusal of innovators (individuals, groups, or even corporations) or consumers to obey technology-specific laws or regulations because they find them offensive, confusing, time-consuming, expensive, or perhaps just annoying and irrelevant. New technological devices and platforms are making it easier than ever for the public to openly defy (or perhaps just ignore) rules that limit their freedom to create or use modern technologies.
• “Spontaneous private deregulation” can be thought of as de facto rather than the de jure elimination of traditional laws and regulations owing to a combination of rapid technological change as well the potential threat of innovation arbitrage and technological civil disobedience. In other words, many laws and regulations aren’t being formally removed from the books, but they are being made largely irrelevant by some combination of those factors. “Benign or otherwise, spontaneous deregulation is happening increasingly rapidly and in ever more industries,” noted Benjamin Edelman and Damien Geradin in a Harvard Business Review article on the phenomenon.[1]

I have previously documented examples of these trends in action for technology sectors as varied as drones, driverless cars, genetic testing, Bitcoin, and the sharing economy. (For example, on the theme of global innovation arbitrage, see all these various essays. And on the growth of technological civil disobedience, see, “DOT’s Driverless Cars Guidance: Will ‘Agency Threats’ Rule the Future?” and “Quick Thoughts on FAA’s Proposed Drone Registration System.” I also discuss some of these issues in the second edition of my Permissionless Innovation book.)

In this essay, I want to briefly highlight how, over the course of just the past month, a single company has offered us a powerful example of how both global innovation arbitrage and technological civil disobedience— or at least the threat thereof—might become a more prevalent feature of discussions about the governance of emerging technologies. And, in the process, that could lead to at least the partial spontaneous deregulation of certain sectors or technologies. Finally, I will discuss how this might affect technological governance more generally and accelerate the movement toward so-called “soft law” governance mechanisms as an alternative to traditional regulatory approaches.

Comma.ai Case Study, Part 1: The Innovation Arbitrage Threat

The company I want to highlight is Comma.ai, a start-up that had hoped to sell a $999 after-market kit for vehicles called the “Comma One,” which “would give average, everyday cars autonomous functionality.”[2] Created by famed hacker George Hotz, who as a teenager gained notoriety for being the first person to unlock an iPhone in 2007, the Comma One represents an attempt to create autonomous vehicle tech “on the cheap” by using off-the-shelf cameras and GPS technology combined with a healthy dose of artificial intelligence technology.

But regulators at the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), the federal agency responsible for road safety and automobile regulation, were none too happy to hear about Hotz’s plan to unleash his technology into the wild without first getting their blessing. On October 27, the agency fired off a nastygram to Hotz saying: “We are concerned that your product would put the safety of your customers and other road users at risk. We strongly encourage you to delay selling or deploying your product on the public roadways unless and until you can ensure it is safe.”

Hotz responded on Twitter promptly and angrily. After posting the full NHTSA letter, he said, “First time I hear from them and they open with threats. No attempt at a dialog.” In a follow-up tweet, he said, “Would much rather spend my life building amazing tech than dealing with regulators and lawyers. It isn’t worth it.” And then he announced that, “The comma one is cancelled. comma.ai will be exploring other products and markets. Hello from Shenzhen, China.” A flood of news articles followed about Hotz’s threat to engage in this sort of global innovation arbitrage by bolting US shores.[3]

Incidentally, what Hotz and Comma.ai were proposing to do with Comma One—i.e., deploy autonomous vehicle tech into the wild without prior regulatory approval—was recently done by Otto, a developer of autonomous trucking technology. As Mark Harris reported on Backchannel:

When Otto performed its test drive — the one shown in the May video — it did so despite a clear warning from Nevada’s Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) that it would be violating the state’s autonomous vehicle regulations. When the DMV realized that Otto had gone ahead anyway, one official called the drive “illegal” and even threatened to shut down the agency’s autonomous vehicle program.”[4]

While Nevada regulators were busy firing off angry letters, Otto was busy doing even more testing in others states (like Ohio), which are eager to make their jurisdictions a testbed for autonomous vehicle innovation.[5] In fact, just recently, Ohio Gov. John Kasich announced the creation of the “Smart Mobility Corridor,” which, according to the Dayton Daily News, will be “a 35-mile stretch of U.S. 33 in central Ohio that runs through Logan County. Officials say that section of U.S. 33 will become a corridor where technologies can be safely tested in real-life traffic, aided by a fiber-optic cable network and sensor systems slated for installation next year.”[6]

This is an example of innovation arbitrage will increasingly take root here domestically as well as abroad, and some states (or countries) will use inducements in an effort to lure innovators to their jurisdictions.

Anyway, let’s get back to the Comma One case study. I don’t want to get too sidetracked regarding the merits of the concerns raised by NHTSA in its letter to Hotz and the implications of the agency’s threats for innovation in this space. But EFF board member Brad Templeton did a nice job addressing that issue in an essay about NHTSA’s letter that threatened Comma. As Templeton observed:

I will presume the regulators will say, “We only want to scare away dangerous innovation” but the hard truth is that is a very difficult thing to judge. All innovation in this space is going to be a bit dangerous. It’s all there trying to take the car — the 2nd most dangerous legal consumer product — and make it safer, but it starts from a place of danger. We are not going to get to safety without taking risks along the way.[7]

This gets to the very real trade-offs in play in the debate over driverless car technology and its regulation. In fact, my Mercatus Center colleague Caleb Watney and I recently filed comments [8] with NHTSA addressing the agency’s recently proposed “Federal Automated Vehicles Policy.”[9] We stressed the potentially deleterious implications of prior regulatory restraints on autonomous vehicle innovation by stressing the horrific real-world baseline we live with today, in which over 35,000 people dying on US roadways in 2015 (roughly 96 people per day) and 94 percent of all those crashes being attributable to human error.

Caleb and I noted that, by imposing new preemptive constraints on the coding of superior autonomous driving technology, “NHTSA’s proposed policy for automated vehicles may inadvertently increase the number of total automobile fatalities by delaying the rapid development and diffusion of this life-saving technology.” Needless to say, if that comes to pass, it would be a disaster because “automation on the roads could be the great public-health achievement of the 21st century.”[10]

In our filing, Caleb and I estimated that, “If NHTSA’s proposed premarket approval process slows the deployment of HAVs by 5 percent, we project an additional 15,500 fatalities over the course of the next 31 years. At 10 percent regulatory delay, we project an additional 34,600 fatalities over 33 years. And at 25 percent regulatory delay, we project an additional 112,400 fatalities over 40 years.[11]

So, needless to say, this is a very big deal.

But let’s ignore all those potential foregone benefits for the moment and just stick with the question of whether Hotz’s threat to engage in a bit of global innovation arbitrage (by moving to China or somewhere else) could work, or at least affect policy in some fashion. I think it absolutely could be an effective threat both because (a) policymakers really do want to do everything they can to achieve greater road safety, and (b) the auto sector remains a hugely important industry for the United States, and one that policymakers will want to do everything in their power to retain on our shores.

Moreover, as Templeton observes that “Comma is not the only company trying to build a system with pure neural networks doing the actual steering decisions.” Even if NHTSA succeeds in bringing Comma to heel, there will be others who will follow in its footsteps. It might be a firm like Otto, but there are many other players in this space today, including big dogs like Tesla and Google. If ever there was a truly global technology industry, it the automotive sector. Autonomous vehicle innovation could take root and blossom in almost any country in the world, and many countries will be waiting with open arms if America screws up its regulatory process.

As Templeton concludes:

The USA and California led the way in robocars in part because it was unregulated. In the USA, everything is permitted unless it was explicitly forbidden and nobody thought to write “no robots” in the laws. Progress in other countries where everything is forbidden unless it is permitted was much slower. The USA is moving in the wrong direction.[12]

Comma.ai Case Study, Part 2: The Technological Civil Disobedience Threat

But an interesting thing happened on the way to Comma’s threatened exodus. On November 30, the firm announced that it would now be open sourcing the code for its autonomous vehicle technology. Reporters at The Verge noted that, during a press conference:

Hotz said that Comma.ai decided to go open source in an effort to sidestep NHTSA as well as the California DMV, the latter of which he said showed up to his house on three separate occasions. “NHTSA only regulates physical products that are sold,” Hotz said. “They do not regulate open source software, which is a whole lot more like speech.” He went on to say that “if the US government doesn’t like this [project], I’m sure there are plenty of countries that will.”[13]

So here we see Hotz combining the threat of still potentially taking the project offshore (i.e., global innovation arbitrage) with the suggestion that by open-sourcing the code for Comma One he might be able to get around the law altogether. We might consider that an indirect form of technological civil disobedience.

Incidentally, Hotz may not be aware of the fact that NHTSA is in the process of making a power-play to become a driverless car code cop. While Hotz is technically correct that, under current law, NHTSA officials “do not regulate open source software, which is a whole lot more like speech,” NHTSA’s recent Federal Automated Vehicles Policy claimed that the agency “has authority to regulate the safety of software changes provided by manufacturers after a vehicle’s first sale to a consumer” while also suggesting that the agency “may need to develop additional regulatory tools and rules to regulate the certification and compliance verification of such post-sale software updates.”^[14]

Needless to say, this proposal has important ramifications for not only Comma, but all other firms in this sector. Consider the implications for Tesla’s “autopilot” mode, which is really little more than a string of constantly-evolving code it pushes out to offer greater and greater autonomous driving functionality.  How would that iterative process work if every time Tesla wanted to make a little tweak to its code it had to run to Washington and file paperwork with NHTSA petitioning for permission to experiment and improve their systems? And then think about all the smaller innovators out there who want to be the next Elon Musk or George Hotz but do not yet have the resources or political connections in Washington to even go through this complex and costly process.

In any event, I have no idea if Hotz or Comma.ai will follow through with any of these threats or be successful in doing so. It may be the case that he is just blowing off smoke and that he and his firm will end up staying in the U.S. and perhaps even later reversing course on the decision to open source the Comma code. But to the extent that innovators like Hotz even hint that they might split the country or open source their code to avoid burdensome regulatory regimes, it can have an influence on future policy decisions. Or at least it should.

New Tech Realities & Their Policy Implications

Indeed, the increasing prevalence of global innovation arbitrage and technological civil disobedience raise some interesting issues for the governance of emerging technologies going forward. The traditional regulatory stance toward many existing sectors and technologies will be challenged by these realities. That’s because most of those traditional regulatory systems are highly precautionary, preemptive, and prophylactic in character. They generally opt for policy solutions that are top-down, overly rigid, and bureaucratic.

Of course, in the past, many innovators (especially smaller scale entrepreneurs) really couldn’t do much to avoid similar regulatory systems where they existed. You either fell into line, or else! It wasn’t always clear what “or else!” would entail, but it could range from being denied a permit/license to operate, waiting months or years for rules to emerge, dealing with fines or other penalties, or some combination of all those things. Or perhaps you would just give up on your innovative idea altogether and exit the market.

But the world has changed in some important ways in recent years. Many of the underlying drivers of the digital revolution—massive increases in processing power, exploding storage capacity, steady miniaturization of computing, ubiquitous communications and networking capabilities, the digitization of all data, and more—are beginning to have a profound impact beyond the confines of cyberspace.^[15] As venture capitalist Marc Andreessen explained in a widely read 2011 essay about how “software is eating the world”:

More and more major businesses and industries are being run on software and delivered as online services—from movies to agriculture to national defense. Many of the winners are Silicon Valley-style entrepreneurial technology companies that are invading and overturning established industry structures. Over the next 10 years, I expect many more industries to be disrupted by software, with new world-beating Silicon Valley companies doing the disruption in more cases than not. Why is this happening now? Six decades into the computer revolution, four decades since the invention of the microprocessor, and two decades into the rise of the modern Internet, all of the technology required to transform industries through software finally works and can be widely delivered at global scale.^[16]

We can add to this list of a new realities the more general problem of technology accelerating at an unprecedented pace. This is what philosophers of technology call the “pacing problem.”  In his new book,  A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control, Wendell Wallach concisely defined the pacing problem as “the gap between the introduction of a new technology and the establishment of laws, regulations, and oversight mechanisms for shaping its safe development.” “There has always been a pacing problem,” Wallach correctly observed, but like other philosophers, he believes that modern technological innovation is accelerating much faster than it was in the past.[17]

What are the ramifications of all this for policy? As technology lawyer and consultant Larry Downes has noted, lawmaking in the information age is now inexorably governed by the “law of disruption” or the fact that “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”[18] This law is “a simple but unavoidable principle of modern life,” he said, and it will have profound implications for the way businesses, government, and culture evolve. “As the gap between the old world and the new gets wider,” he argues, “conflicts between social, economic, political, and legal systems” will intensify and “nothing can stop the chaos that will follow.”[19]

The end result of the “law or disruption” and a world relentlessly governed by the ever-accelerating “pacing problem” is that it will be harder than ever to effectively control emerging technologies using traditional legal and regulatory systems and mechanisms. And this makes it even more likely that the related threats of global innovation arbitrage and various forms of technological civil disobedience will become more regular fixtures in debates about many emerging technologies.

New Governance Models

How one reacts to these new realities will depend upon their philosophical disposition toward innovative activities more generally.

Consider first those adhering to a more “precautionary principle” mindset, which I have defined in my recent book as those who believe “that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.”[20]

Needless to say, the precautionary principle crowd with be dismayed by these new trends and perhaps even decry them as “lawlessness.” Some of these folks seem to be in denial about these new realities and pretend that nothing much has changed. Yet, I have found that most precautionary principle-oriented advocates, and even many regulatory agencies themselves, tend to acknowledge these new realities. But they remain very uncertain about how best to respond to them, often just suggesting that we’ll all need to just try harder to impose new and better regulations on a more expedited or streamlined basis.

Of course, those of us who generally embrace the alternative policy vision for technological governance—“permissionless innovation”—are going to be more accepting of the new technological realities I have described, and we will perhaps even work to defend and encourage them. But while I count myself among this crowd, we cannot ignore the fact that many serious challenges will arise when innovation outpaces law or can easily evade it.

There is some middle ground here, although it is very messy middle ground.

The era of technocratic, top-down, one-size-fits-all regulatory regimes is fading, or at least being severely strained. We will instead need to craft flexible and adaptive policies going forward that are bottom-up, flexible, and evolutionary in character.

What that means in practice is that a lot more “soft law” and informal governance mechanisms will become the new norm. I wrote about this new policy environment in my recent essay, “DOT’s Driverless Cars Guidance: Will ‘Agency Threats’ Rule the Future?” as well as this lengthy review of Wendell Wallach’s latest book about technology ethics.  Along with Gary Marchant of the Arizona State University law school, Wallach recently published an excellent book chapter on “Governing the Governance of Emerging Technologies,” which discussed these soft law mechanisms, which include: “codes of conduct, statements of principles, partnership programs, voluntary programs and standards, certifications programs and private industry initiatives.”[21]

Their chapter appears in an important collection of essays that Gary Marchant edited with Kenneth W. Abbott and Braden Allenby entitled, Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies.

What is interesting about the chapters in that book is that seemingly widespread consensus now exists among experts in this field that some combination of these soft law mechanisms are likely to become the primary mode of technological governance for the indefinite future.  This is because, as Marc A. Saner points out in a different chapter of that book, “the control paradigm is too limited to address all the issues that arise in the context of emerging technologies.”[22] By the control paradigm, he generally means traditional administrative regulatory agencies and processes. He and other contributors in the book all seem to agree that the control problem paradigm “has its limits when diffusion, pacing and ethical issues associated with emerging technologies become significant, as is often the case.”[23]

And so the traditional command-and-control ways will gradually give way to a new paradigm for emerging technology governance. In fact, as I noted in my recent essay on driverless cars, we see this happening quite a bit already. “Multistakeholder processes” are already all the rage in the world of emerging technologies and their governance. In recent years, we have seen the White House and various agencies (such as the FTC, NTIA, FDA, and others) craft multistakeholder agreements or best practice guidance documents for technologies as far ranging as:

• Drones & privacy
• Sharing economy
• Internet of Things
• Driverless cars
• Big data
• Artificial intelligence
• Cross-device tracking
• Native advertising
• Online data collection
• Mobile app transparency and security
• Mobile apps for kids
• Mobile medical apps
• Online health advertising
• 3D printing
• Facial recognition

And that list is not comprehensive. I know I am missing other multistakeholder efforts, best practices, or industry guidance documents that have been crafted in recent years.

Of course, many challenging issues need to be sorted out here, most notably: how transparent and accountable will these soft law systems be in practice? How will they be enforced? And what will happen to all those existing laws, regs, and agencies that will continue to exist? More generally, it is worth asking whether we can more closely study these various multistakeholder arrangements and soft law governance mechanisms and determine if there are certain principles or strategies that could be applicable across a wide class of technologies and sectors. In other words, can we a do a better job of “formalizing the informal,” without falling right back into the trap of trying to impose rules in a rigid, top-down, one-size-fits-all fashion?

Conclusion

Those are just a few of the hard questions we will need to consider going forward. For now, however, I think it is safe to conclude that we will no longer see much “law” being made for emerging technologies, at least not in the traditional sense of the term. Thanks to the new technological realities I have described here—and the relentless reality of the “pacing problem” more generally—I believe we are witnessing a wide-ranging and quite profound transformation in how technology is governed in our modern world. And I believe this movement away from traditional “hard law” and toward “soft law” governance mechanisms is likely to accelerate due to the increasing prevalence of innovation arbitrage, technological civil disobedience, and spontaneous private deregulation.

The ramifications of this transformation will be studied by philosophers, legal theorists, and political scientists for many decades to come. But we are still in the early years of this momentous transformation in technological governance and we will continue to struggle to figure out how to make it all work, as messy as it all may be.

[ Note: This essay is condensed from a manuscript I have been working on about The Rise of Technological Civil Disobedience. I’m not sure I will ever get around to finishing it, however, so I thought I would at least post this piece for now. In a subsequent essay, which is also part of that draft manuscript, I hope to discuss how this process might play out for technologies that are “born free” versus those that are “born in captivity.” That is, how likely is it that the trends I discuss here will take hold for technologies that have no pre-existing laws or agencies, while other technologies that are born into a regulatory environment are potentially doomed to be pigeonholed into those old regulatory regimes? What are the chances that the latter technologies can escape captivity and gain the freedom the other technologies already enjoy? How might technology-enabled “spontaneous private deregulation” be accelerated for those sectors? Is that always desirable? Again, I will leave these questions for another day. Scholars and students who are interested in these topics can feel free to contact me if they are interested in discussing them as well as potential paper ideas. Regardless of how you feel about these trends, these issues are ripe for intellectual exploration.]

[1]     Benjamin Edelman and Damien Geradin, “Spontaneous Deregulation,” Harvard Business Review, April 2016, https://hbr.org/2016/04/spontaneous-deregulation.

[2]     Megan Geuss, “After mothballing Comma One, George Hotz releases free autonomous car software,” Ars Technica, November 30, 2016, http://arstechnica.com/cars/2016/11/after-mothballing-comma-one-george-hotz-releases-free-autonomous-car-software.

[3]     See: “NHTSA Scared This Self-Driving Entrepreneur Off the Road,” Bloomberg Technology, October 28, 2016, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-28/nhtsa-scared-this-self-driving-entrepreneur-off-the-road; Sean O’Kane, “George Hotz cancels his self-driving car project after NHTSA expresses concern,” The Verge, October 28, 2016, http://www.theverge.com/2016/10/28/13453344/comma-ai-self-driving-car-comma-one-kit-canceled; Brad Templeton, “Comma.ai cancels comma-one add-on box after threats from NHTSA,” Robohub, October 31, 2016, http://robohub.org/comma-ai-cancels-comma-one-add-on-box-after-threats-from-nhtsa.

[4]     Mark Harris, “How Otto Defied Nevada and Scored a $680 Million Payout from Uber,” Backchannel, November 28, 2016,  https://backchannel.com/how-otto-defied-nevada-and-scored-a-680-million-payout-from-uber-496aa07f5ba2#.9rmtb29bl

[5]     Larry E. Hall, “Otto Self-Driving Truck Tests in Ohio; Violated Nevada Regulations,” Hybrid Cars, November 29, 2016, http://www.hybridcars.com/otto-self-driving-truck-tests-in-ohio-violated-nevada-regulations.

[6]     Kara Driscoll, “Ohio to create ‘smart’ road for driverless trucks,” Dayton Daily News, November 30, 2016, http://www.daytondailynews.com/business/ohio-create-smart-road-for-driverless-trucks/25qC7uYjz9rE96q6YFVUUK.

[7]     Brad Templeton, “Comma.ai cancels comma-one add-on box after threats from NHTSA,” Robohub, October 31, 2016, http://robohub.org/comma-ai-cancels-comma-one-add-on-box-after-threats-from-nhtsa/

[8]     Adam Thierer and Caleb Watney, “Comment on the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy,” November 22, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311065194_Comment_on_the_Federal_Automated_Vehicles_Policy.

[9]     National Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA), Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, September 2016.

[10]   Adrienne LaFrance, “Self-Driving Cars Could Save 300,000 Lives per Decade in America,” Atlantic, September 29, 2015

[11]   Adam Thierer and Caleb Watney, “Comment on the Federal Automated Vehicles Policy,” November 22, 2016, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/311065194_Comment_on_the_Federal_Automated_Vehicles_Policy.

[12]   Templeton.

[13]   Sean O’Kane and Lauren Goode, “George Hotz is giving away the code behind his self-driving car project,” The Verge, November 30, 2016, http://www.theverge.com/2016/11/30/13779336/comma-ai-autopilot-canceled-autonomous-car-software-free.

^[14]   NHTSA, Federal Automated Vehicles Policy, 76.

[15]   Adam Thierer, Jerry Brito, and Eli Dourado, “Technology Policy: A Look Ahead,” Technology Liberation Front, May 12, 2014, http://techliberation.com/2014/05/12/technology-policy-a-look-ahead.

[16]   Marc Andreessen, “Why Software Is Eating the World,” Wall Street Journal, August 20, 2011, http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.

[17]   Wendell Wallach, A Dangerous Master: How to Keep Technology from Slipping beyond Our Control (New York: Basic Books, 2015), 60.

[18]   Larry Downes, The Laws of Disruption: Harnessing the New Forces That Govern Life and Business in the Digital Age 2 (2009).

[19]   Id.

[20]   Thierer, Permissionless Innovation, at 1.

[21]   Gary E. Marchant and Wendell Wallach, “Governing the Governance of Emerging Technologies,” in Gary E. Marchant, Kenneth W. Abbott & Braden Allenby (eds.), Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013), 136.

[22]   Marc A. Saner,  “The Role of Adaptation in the Governance of Emerging Technologies,” in Gary E. Marchant, Kenneth W. Abbott & Braden Allenby (eds.), Innovative Governance Models for Emerging Technologies (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2013), 106.

[23]   Ibid., at 94.

Sen. Warren makes many interesting points about the dangers of regulatory capture, but the heart of her argument about how to deal with the problem can basically be summarized as ‘Let’s Build a Better Breed of Bureaucrat and Give Them More Money.’  In her own words, she says we should “limit opportunities for ‘cultural’ capture'” of government officials and also “give agencies the money that they need to do their jobs.”

It may sound good in theory, but I’m always a bit perplexed by that argument because the implicit claims here are that:

(a) the regulatory officials of the past were somehow less noble-minded and more open to corruption than some hypothetical better breed of bureaucrat that is out there waiting to be found and put into office; and

(b) that the regulatory agencies of the past were somehow starved for resources and lacked “the money that they need to do their jobs.”

Neither of these assumptions is true and yet those arguments seem to animate most of the reform proposals set forth by progressive politicians and scholars for how to deal with the problem of capture.

I think it’s wishful thinking at best and willful ignorance of history at worst. First, people–including regulators–were no different in the past than they are today. We are not magically going to find a more noble lot who will walk into office and be immune from these pressures. If anything, you could make the argument that the regulators of the early Progressive Era were less susceptible to this sort of influence because they were riding a wave of impassioned regulatory zeal that accompanied that period. I don’t buy it, but it’s more believable tale than the opposite story.

Secondly, if you think that the problem of regulatory capture is solved by simply giving agencies more money, you’ve got it exactly backwards. Regulated interests go to where the power and money is. They find it and influence it. You can deny it all you want, but that’s what history shows us. So long as we are delegating broad administrative powers to administrative agencies and then sending them big bags of enforcement money at the same time, special interests will seek and find ways to influence that process.

Is that too grim of a statement on the modern administrative state? No, it’s simply a perspective informed by history; a history that has best been told, incidentally, by progressive scholars and critics! And yet they all too often don’t seem willing to learn the lessons of that history.

The cycle of influence doesn’t end just because you try to erect more firewalls to keep the special interests out. Where power exists, they will  always find a way to flex their muscle. It’s only really a question if you want this activity to be over or under the table. The whole “get-all-the-money-out-of-politics” fiction is, well, just that–a fiction. It’s a fine-sounding fairly tale that we continue to repeat again and again and yet nothing much ever changes. And, yet, a whole hell of lot of smart people continue to believe in that fairy tale if for no other reason than they can’t possible live with the idea that perhaps the only way to get this problem under control is to limit the underlying discretion and power of regulatory agencies to begin with.

On a better, more optimistic note, I want to highlight one argument Sen, Warren made in her essay with which I find myself in wholehearted agreement: We need more simple rules. As she correctly notes:

Complex rules take longer to finalize, are harder for the public to understand, and inevitably contain more special interest carve-outs that favor big business interests over small businesses and individuals. Complex rules are also more reliant on industry itself to provide additional detail and expertise—and that means more opportunities for capture. Simple works better.

Amen to all that! This is an issue I address in Chapter 6 of my recent book,  Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. In subjection F beginning on pg. 140, I explain why policymakers should “Rely on ‘Simple Rules for a Complex World’ When Regulation Is Needed.” I build that section around the insights of Philip K. Howard and Richard Epstein. Howard, who is chair of Common Good and the author of The Rule of Nobody, notes:

Too much law . . can have similar effects as too little law. People slow down, they become defensive, they don’t initiate projects because they are surrounded by legal risks and bureaucratic hurdles. They tiptoe through the day looking over their shoulders rather than driving forward on the power of their instincts. Instead of trial and error, they focus on avoiding error. Modern America is the land of too much law. Like sediment in a harbor, law has steadily accumulated, mainly since the 1960s, until most productive activity requires slogging through a legal swamp. It’s degenerative. Law is denser now than it was 10 years ago, and will be denser still in the next decade. This growing legal burden impedes economic growth.

That’s exactly why we need, to borrow the title of Richard Epstein’s 1995 book of the same name, “simple rules for a complex world.” As I argue in my book:

This is why flexible, bottom-up approaches to solving complex problems. . .  are almost always superior to top-down laws and regulations. For example, we have already identified how social norms and pressure from the public, media, or activist groups can “regulate” behavior and curb potential abuses. And we have seen how education, awareness-building, transparency, and empowerment-based efforts can often help alleviate the problems associated with new forms of technological change. But there are other useful approaches that can be tapped to address or alleviate concerns or harms associated with new innovations. To the extent that other public policies are needed to guide technological developments, simple legal principles are greatly preferable to technology-specific, micromanaged regulatory regimes. Ex ante (preemptive and precautionary) regulation is often highly inefficient, even dangerous. Prospective regulation based on hypothesizing about future harms that may never materialize is likely to come at the expense of innovation and growth opportunities. To the extent that any corrective action is needed to address harms, ex post measures, especially via the common law, are typically superior.

I itemized those “simple rules” and solutions in another recent piece (“What 20 Years of Internet Law Teaches Us about Innovation Policy“). They include both formal mechanisms (property and contract law, torts, class action activity, and other common law tools) and informal strategies (ongoing voluntary negotiations, multistakeholder agreements, industry self-regulatory best practices and codes of conduct, education and transparency efforts, and so on). We should exhaust those sorts of solutions first before turning to administrative regulation. And then we should subject such regulatory proposals to a strict benefit-cost analysis (BCA). As I note in my Permissionless Innovation book,

All new proposed regulatory enactments should be subjected to strict BCA and, if they are formally enacted, they should also be retroactively reviewed to gauge their cost-effectiveness. Better yet, the sunsetting guidelines recommended above should be applied to make sure outdated regulations are periodically removed from the books so that innovation is not discouraged.

If Sen. Warren is serious about crafting more sensible “simple” rules and working to end the problem of regulatory chapter, this is a better approach than simply trying, yet again, to build a better breed of bureaucrat.

On the whiteboard that hangs in my office, I have a giant matrix of technology policy issues and the various policy “threat vectors” that might end up driving regulation of particular technologies or sectors. Along with my colleagues at the Mercatus Center’s Technology Policy Program, we constantly revise this list of policy priorities and simultaneously make an (obviously quite subjective) attempt to put some weights on the potential policy severity associated with each threat of intervention. The matrix looks like this: [Sorry about the small fonts. You can click on the image to make it easier to see.]

I use 5 general policy concerns when considering the likelihood of regulatory intervention in any given area. Those policy concerns are:

1. privacy (reputation issues, fear of “profiling” & “discrimination,” amorphous psychological / cognitive harms);
2. safety (health & physical safety or, alternatively, child safety and speech / cultural concerns);
3. security (hacking, cybersecurity, law enforcement issues);
4. economic disruption (automation, job dislocation, sectoral disruptions); and,
5. intellectual property (copyright and patent issues).

I realize that some of these five categories could be sub-divided and refined. I also understand that these five groupings may not encapsulate the full range of potential policy issues out there, but I’ve tried to avoid having too many categories to keep this as conceptually tidy as is possible. However, I might need to add a separate category for civil rights and disabilities-related policy issues eventually. Likewise, “psychological considerations” might deserve its own category because they do not necessarily perfectly fit into either the privacy or safety buckets right now, even though that’s where I have them currently. For example, some privacy activists call for regulation of “big data” and large databases based on fears about how all that data collection makes people feel about themselves. I consider that a privacy-related concern now, but you could imagine that being in a separate category. Meanwhile, there’s long been calls to regulate various types of media content (music, movies, video games, online porn, etc) based on the psychological impact they have on children. Those “media effects” theories have always been considered a child safety issue, which is where I currently have them slotted, but they could probably be its own category that also included concerns about distraction and addiction (which could come to haunt VR technologies in the future).

Anyway, my colleagues and I use this current matrix to help us determine what we should be paying more attention to and what sort of scholarly outputs are needed to address regulatory threats on each front. Generally speaking, this is the portfolio of issues I try to stay on top of full-time at Mercatus as part of our ongoing “Permissionless Innovation” project.

Several people who have seen that matrix in my office tell me I should do something more with it, but I’m not really sure what that something would be. In any event, I thought it might make sense to post it here to give others a feel for the current set of emerging tech policy issues that interest us at Mercatus. I will try to upload new versions of the matrix as that giant whiteboard in my office morphs over time and the list of technologies and regulatory threats changes or grows.

Incidentally, I am often asked to explain the relative weights I’ve assigned to each potential regulatory threat, so I will try to justify some of those rankings here briefly. (Again, it’s all quite subjective and I’m always open to hearing the case for tweaking the rankings.)

• Big Data / Online Marketing / the Internet of Things (IoT): Privacy is the #1 policy threat for these sectors. From a public policy perspective, what unifies these technologies is a growing concern about how expanding private sector data collection efforts could affect our privacy or reputations. We’ve already seen a flurry of legislative and regulatory activity here in the U.S. aimed at placing restrictions on data collection or use. And it goes without saying that other countries, especially in Europe, already impose a wide variety of controls on data collection in the name of privacy protection. There also exists a variety of closely-related security concerns here. But the rise of IoT technologies have introduced safety concerns into the mix in a major way, too. That’s especially true because of the large number of Big Data services and IoT devices that are health and medical related.  Taken together, this is the issue set I spend the majority of my time covering because the privacy and security implications of a data-driven economy already occupies the attention of countless regulatory activists and public policymakers across the globe. I think that will continue to be the case for many years to come.
• Robotics: Safety concerns tend to be the biggest driver of calls for regulation of robotic and autonomous technology. For example, new laws and regulations are already being proposed for driverless cars based on fears about the hacking of connected vehicles. And commercial drones attract policy attention based on safety-related concerns such as whether a drone could strike an airplane, or even just fall on our heads. Proposals have been floated to mandate the equivalent of DRM for drones, which would force drone innovators to embed federally-approved technological controls into their systems designating where they are allowed to fly. Even if most of these concerns are overstated or are currently being dealt with, we can expect more safety-related policy proposals for robotic tech in coming years.  Economic concerns would be a close second here due to the increasing worry that robots will eat all our jobs. At least so far, however, that concern has tended to be more of an academic nature rather than a public policy consideration. And it remains unclear what the policy prescription would be in this regard without becoming a neo-Luddite, “smash-the-machines” sort of proposal. That could change in coming years, however. It all depends on the labor market situation over time. Meanwhile, academics are floating the idea of a Federal Robotics Commission to provide greater policy “expertise” in the form of yet another technocratic Beltway bureaucracy.
• Additive manufacturing / 3D printing: Safety is probably the #1 concern here, although depending on what type of 3D-printed object we are talking about, it could be the case that intellectual property concerns will be a bigger driver of calls for regulatory intervention. A lot of the policy-related concerns around 3D printing today are being driven by worries over things like 3D-printed guns. That’s mostly a safety concern, of course. But it we are talking about the replication of branded commercial objects (3D-printed toys or other things, for example), then IP tends to be the bigger concern. The question of product liability also looms large here and it remains unclear how claims might be sorted out when there are fewer large, deep-pocketed intermediaries to go after in a world of decentralized production. Hopefully, those liability norms will be left to the courts and common law to sort out over time, but I wouldn’t be surprised to see more calls for preemptive legislative interventions here in both directions: i.e., some will call legislators to impose greater liability on certain parties while others will push to immunize intermediaries from punishing forms of liability for the downstream actions of others (like a Sec. 230 norm for 3D printing).
• Medical tech innovation: It goes without saying that traditional safety concerns will drive policy for advanced medical technologies, just as they have for earlier drugs, devices, and treatments. As software continues to “eat the world” and invade the world of health and medicine, regulators are increasingly going to be trying to figure out how to pigeonhole new technologies into old regulatory constructs. That’s why I have been watching how the FDA continues to deal with 3D-printed prosthetics and mobile medical apps on our smartphones. Eventually, the continuing decentralized democratization of 3D printing (driven by rapidly falling costs) will collide with old medical device regulatory realities and a century’s worth of FDA command-and-control style regulation. Oh my, what a fight that will be! And then chemical printers will become more widespread and this issue will get even more intense. The policy fight here is even more interesting because of all the thorny ethical issues pertaining to the rise of embeddable technology, biohacking, and genome innovation. I have a feeling that my policy portfolio will shift rapidly in this direction in coming years as the modern info-tech revolution spreads to the world of medicine and health. I already have two new papers coming out on these issues in the next few weeks.
• Sharing economy: Economic disruption is clearly the big policy issue here. Specifically, many policymakers and incumbent industries aren’t very happy about new entrants coming into their sectors and offering consumers services without strictly complying with traditional regulations. But safety issues often pop up in these debates when regulators or advocates claim we can’t trust sharing economy operators. What’s particularly interesting about this space is how these policy battles are playing out at almost every level of government: federal, state, local, and international. At least thus far, sharing economy innovators tend to be winning most of those battles. But the fight continues.
• Crypto & Bitcoin: I think safety would probably be the biggest issue here, in the sense that policymakers fear a world of unregulated crypto and decentralized blockchain applications are a world in which the “bad guys” will be able to use those technologies to harm the public in some fashion. We’ve heard this all before, of course, but (going all the way back to the Clipper Chip wars) you can always bank on law enforcement officials resorting to Chicken Little claims about terrorists and child predators thriving in a world of unregulated crypto. In many ways, this is the most important of all these policy fights because if the government can regulate crypto and blockchain technologies, it severely undermines the fabric of almost all the other technologies and platforms discussed herein. This is why the current debate over government-mandated “backdoors” is so important; it has profound ramifications for every other tech regulation debate that follows.
• Immersive Tech (VR and augmented reality): This is an amorphous and evolving area that I am getting increasingly interested in, but the policy issues here have yet to come into clear focus. However, when Google Glass was launched, there was a brief technopanic of sorts over its privacy and security ramifications. Those concerns have subsided a bit as Google Glass has seemingly faded away (probably because of its high price point more than because of its privacy concerns), but I suspect that future iterations of augmented reality technologies will raise similar concerns. That will especially be true as more sophisticated biometric (and facial recognition) capabilities are integrated into them. Academics are already wondering how to enforce “notice and consent” privacy norms and rules in a world where everyone is wearing miniature body cams and heads-up displays in their sunglasses. I’m not sure it’s even possible, but that debate will continue and include all sorts of calls for technological controls. OK, that’s augmented reality, but what about virtual reality technologies? I think safety concerns could drive some policy proposals as critics grow concerned about the psychological implications of people (especially kids) spending more and more time in immersive virtual worlds. In that sense, we might see a replay of the earlier debate over violent video games and/or video game addition. But it remains to be seen.

Incidentally, I use this matrix and provide more context to it in my big presentation on “Permissionless Innovation & the Clash of Visions over Emerging Technologies.” [It’s embedded below.] And I discuss most of these issues in more detail in my book, Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom. I am in the process of finishing up the second edition of that book and will be expanding the case studies about the issues discussed above. Finally, I discussed many of these policy threats during my recent appearance on the Andreessen Horowitz podcast.

Update 10/2/15: For another take on various new technology trends and the potential policy issues they raise, check out this report from the World Economic Forum, Deep Shift: Technology Tipping Points and Societal Impact. The WEF report identifies 21 technology “shifts” and then groups them into six “mega-trend” categories. Almost all these issues are on my matrix above, but the WEF report provides some nice additional context on why each technology trend will be so disruptive.

With each booth I pass and presentation I listen to at the 2014 International Consumer Electronics Show (CES), it becomes increasingly evident that the “Internet of Things” era has arrived. In just a few short years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has gone from industry buzzword to marketplace reality. Countless new IoT devices are on display throughout the halls of the Las Vegas Convention Center this week, including various wearable technologies, smart appliances, remote monitoring services, autonomous vehicles, and much more.

This isn’t vaporware; these are devices or services that are already on the market or will launch shortly. Some will fail, of course, just as many other earlier technologies on display at past CES shows didn’t pan out. But many of these IoT technologies will succeed, driven by growing consumer demand for highly personalized, ubiquitous, and instantaneous services.

But will policymakers let the Internet of Things revolution continue or will they stop it dead in its tracks? Interestingly, not too many people out here in Vegas at the CES seem all that worried about the latter outcome. Indeed, what I find most striking about the conversation out here at CES this week versus the one about IoT that has been taking place in Washington over the past year is that there is a large and growing disconnect between consumers and policymakers about what the Internet of Things means for the future.

When every device has a sensor, a chip, and some sort of networking capability, amazing opportunities become available to consumers. And that’s what has them so excited and ready to embrace these new technologies. But those same capabilities are exactly what raise the blood pressure of many policymakers and policy activists who fear the safety, security, or privacy-related problems that might creep up in a world filled with such technologies.

But at least so far, most consumers don’t seem to share the same worries. Instead, they are too busy shouting “More, More, More!” IoT technologies have generated enormous interest and every projection I’ve seen so far shows that explosive growth can be expected across all classes of devices. ABI Research estimates that there are more than ten billion wirelessly connected devices in the market today and more than thirty billion devices expected by 2020. Last year Cisco projected that by 2020 thirty-seven billion intelligent things will be connected and communicating but has now apparently revised that estimate upward to 40 or 50 billion. Thus, we are well on the way to a world where “everyone and everything will be connected to the network.”

Yet, it remains unclear what the IoT public policy landscape will look like in coming years and what disposition lawmakers and regulators will adopt toward these new amazing new technologies. Two distinct policy disposition are clashing over what approach should govern the future of innovation in this space.

I discussed this tension during a CES panel this morning on “The Internet of Things and the Home of the Future.” It featured outstanding opening remarks by FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, who made the case for regulatory humility and focusing on how these new technologies can empower individuals in important new ways. “The Internet has evolved in one generation from a network of electronically interlinked research facilities in the United States to one of the most dynamic forces in the global economy, in the process reshaping entire industries and even changing the way we interact on a personal level,” she noted. “And the Internet of Things offers the promise of even greater progress ahead for consumers and competition.” I strongly encourage you to read Commissioner Ohlhausen’s entire speech. It is terrific and sets exactly the right tone for these discussions.

After Commissioner Ohlhausen spoke, we had a panel discussion that was expertly moderated by tech policy guru Larry Downes and which included remarks from Robert M. McDowell (Hudson Institute), Jeff  Hagins, (Smart Things), Robert Pepper (Cisco), Marc Rogers (Lookout), and me.

When I spoke, I described the future of the Internet of Things as a grand battle of two alternative worldviews: the “precautionary principle” and “permissionless innovation.” The “precautionary principle” refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions. The other worldview, “permissionless innovation,” refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed later.

I’ll soon be releasing a new eBook about this conflict of visions. The book will be called, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom” and it should be out in the next few weeks. In it, I will explain how precautionary principle thinking is increasingly creeping into modern information technology policy discussions, explain how that is dangerous and must be rejected, and argue that policymakers should instead unapologetically embrace and defend the permissionless innovation vision — not just for the Internet but also for all new classes of networked technologies and platforms.

This intellectual tension is already evident in debates over the Internet of Things. While we are still very early in this debate, we can expect rising calls for preemptive regulatory controls on IoT technologies based on various safety, security, and especially privacy rationales.  If the precautionary principle mentality wins out and trumps the permissionless innovation ethos that has already powered the first wave of the digital revolution, it will have profound ramifications.

As I’ll note in my forthcoming eBook, preserving and extending the permissionless innovation ethos to the Internet of Things is not about “protecting corporate profits” or assisting any particular technology, industry sector, or set of innovators. Rather, preserving an environment in which permissionless innovation can flourish is about ensuring that individuals as both citizens and consumers continue to enjoy the myriad benefits that accompany an open, innovative information ecosystem. More profoundly, this general freedom to innovate is essential for powering the next great wave of industrial innovation and rejuvenating our dynamic, high-growth economy. Even more profoundly, this is about preserving social and economic freedom more generally while rejecting the central-planning mentality and methods that throughout history have stifled human progress and prosperity.

Safety, security, and privacy problems will continue to persist, of course, and we should work to find practical, “bottom-up” solutions to them. As I detail in my eBook, education and empowerment, social pressure, societal norms, voluntary self-regulation, transparency efforts, and targeted enforcement of existing legal norms (especially through the common law) are almost always superior to “top-down,” command-and-control regulatory edits and bureaucratic schemes of a “Mother, May I” (i.e., permissioned) nature. Preemptive technological controls of that sort would limit new innovation in this space and sacrifice the many benefits that will flow to consumers from continued experimentation.

Those who advocate precautionary regulatory approaches to the Internet of Things should think through to consequences of preemptively prohibiting technological innovation and realize that not everyone shares their same values, especially pertaining to privacy, which is a highly subjective concept that is often difficult to legislate around. We should instead find ways work with together to seek out those practical, bottom-up solutions that will help individuals, institutions, and society learn how to better cope with technological change over time. Using this approach, we can embrace our dynamic future together without doing permanent damage to our innovative minds and economy.

Tomorrow, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will host an all-day workshop entitled, “Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World.” [Detailed agenda here.] According to the FTC: “The workshop will focus on privacy and security issues related to increased connectivity for consumers, both in the home (including home automation, smart home appliances and connected devices), and when consumers are on the move (including health and fitness devices, personal devices, and cars).”

Where is the FTC heading on this front? This Politico story by Erin Mershon from last week offers some possible ideas. Yet, it still remains unclear whether this is just another inquiry into an exciting set of new technologies or if it is, as I worried in my recent comments to the FTC on this matter, “the beginning of a regulatory regime for a new set of information technologies that are still in their infancy.”

First, for those not familiar with the “Internet of Things,” this short new report from Daniel Castro & Jordan Misra of the Center for Data Innovation offers a good definition:

The “Internet of Things” refers to the concept that the Internet is no longer just a global network for people to communicate with one another using computers, but it is also a platform or devices to communicate electronically with the world around them. The result is a world that is alive with information as data flows from one device to another and is shared and reused for a multitude of purposes. Harnessing the potential of all of this data for economic and social good will be one of the primary challenges and opportunities of the coming decades.

The report continues on to offer a wide range of examples of new products and services that could fulfill this promise.

What I find somewhat worrying about the FTC’s sudden interest in the Internet of Things is that it opens to the door for some regulatory-minded critics to encourage preemptive controls on this exciting new wave of digital age innovation, based almost entirely on hypothetical worst-case scenarios they have conjured up. And plenty of those boogeyman scenarios are floating around already because the Internet of Things has created a potential perfect storm of four major information policy concerns: online safety, privacy, security, and even intellectual property issues. You can find concerned critics from each of those quarters already wringing their hands about what the Internet of Things means for their pet issues.

This is why in both my filing to the agency and in an upcoming eBook, I discuss the danger of letting “precautionary principle” reasoning trump the alternative paradigm of “permissionless innovation.” As I’ve explained here before as well in this longer law review article, the precautionary principle generally holds that, because a given new technology could pose some theoretical danger or risk in the future, public policies should control or limit the development of such innovations until their creators can prove that they won’t cause any harms.

The problem with letting such precautionary thinking guide policy is that it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, and human prosperity. Under an information policy regime guided at every turn by a precautionary principle, technological innovation would be impossible because of fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios would trump all other considerations. Social learning and economic opportunities become far less likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

For these reasons, to the maximum extent possible, the default position toward new forms of technological innovation should be innovation allowed. This policy norm is better captured in the well-known Internet ideal of “permissionless innovation,” or the general freedom to experiment and learn through trial-and-error experimentation.

Which leads back to the FTC workshop tomorrow. Which path will the agency head down? If the recent comments of FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez are any indication, there is certainly a healthy appetite for precautionary principle policymaking, at least as it pertains to “big data.” As I noted here in a critique of one of her recent speeches, Chairwoman Ramirez has offered “a rather succinct articulation of precautionary principle thinking as applied to modern data collection practices.”

She worried that “‘big data’ leads to the indiscriminate collection of personal information,” and that “the indiscriminate collection of data violates the First Commandment of data hygiene: Thou shall not collect and hold onto personal information unnecessary to an identified purpose. Keeping data on the offchance that it might prove useful is not consistent with privacy best practices,” she continued, and she went on to argue that “Information that is not collected in the first place can’t be misused” and then suggests a parade of horribles that will befall if such data collection is allowed at all.  So, it would not be surprising to see her extend that sort of precautionary reasoning to the Internet of Things since all those fears would apply equally to it.

A better approach can be found in some remarks delivered by Ramirez’s fellow FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen. In an important speech last month entitled, “The Internet of Things and the FTC: Does Innovation Require Intervention?” Ohlhausen noted that, “The success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the freedom to experiment with different business models, the best of which have survived and thrived, even in the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and competitors.” This reflects Ohlhausen’s general embrace of permissionless innovation reasoning and a rejection of the precautionary principle mindset articulated by FTC Chairwoman Ramirez.

More importantly, in her speech, Commissioner Ohlhausen went on to highlight another crucial point about why the precautionary mindset is dangerous when enshrined into laws or regulations. Put simply, many elites and regulatory advocates ignore regulator irrationality or regulatory ignorance. That is, they spend so much time focused on the supposed irrationality of consumers and their openness to persuasion or “manipulation” that they ignore the more concerning problem of the  irrationality or ignorance of those who (incorrectly) believe they are always in the best position to solve every complex problem. Regulators simply do not possess the requisite knowledge to perfectly plan for every conceivable outcome. This is particularly true for information technology markets, which generally evolve much more rapidly than other sectors, and especially more rapidly that law itself.

That insight leads Ohlhausen to issue a wise word of caution to her fellow regulators:

It is [] vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technologies with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and others about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the marketplace, identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider whether existing laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before assuming that new rules are required.

That is absolutely right and this again makes it clears how Commissioner Ohlhausen’s approach to technological innovation is consistent with the permissionless innovation approach while Chairwoman Ramirez’s is based on precautionary principle thinking. This conflict of visions dominates almost all policy debates over new technology today, even if it is not always on such vivid display as it is in this case.

This also makes it abundantly clear just what is at stake as the FTC embarks on its exploration of the Internet of Things. Will we continue to embrace and defend the philosophy that made America’s digital economy the envy of the world (i.e., “permissionless innovation”), or will we be paralyzed by fear of the unknown and hypothetical worst-case scenarios.  As I have said here many times before, living in constant fear of such worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon them — means that best-cast scenarios will never come about.

So, stay tuned. The fight over the Internet of Things promises to be one of the most important public policy battles in the technology policy arena for many years to come.

This issue will be the focus of my forthcoming eBook, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom,” but until that is released, here are a few other recommended readings on the topic:

Blog posts:

• “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” Technology Liberation Front, March 4, 2013.
• “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• “Planning for Hypothetical Horribles in Tech Policy Debates,” Technology Liberation Front, August 6, 2013.
• “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.
• “Edith Ramirez’s ‘Big Data’ Speech: Privacy Concerns Prompt Precautionary Principle Thinking,” Technology Liberation Front, August 29, 2013.
• “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed,” Technology Liberation Front, April 29, 2011.
• “Copyright, Privacy, Property Rights & Information Control: Common Themes, Common Challenges,” Technology Liberation Front, April 10, 2012.
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013.

Testimony / Filings:

• Senate Testimony on Privacy, Data Collection & Do Not Track, April 24, 2013
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FTC in Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things, May 31, 2013.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to FAA on commercial domestic drones (with Jerry Brito and Eli Dourado) , April 23, 2013.

Journal articles & book chapters:

• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, (2013): 309-386.
• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36, (2013): 409-455.
• “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates ,” George Mason University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 2013): 1055-1105.

I’m pleased to announce the release of my latest law review article, “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates.” It appears in the new edition of the George Mason University Law Review. (Vol. 20, No. 4, Summer 2013)

This is the second of two complimentary law review articles I am releasing this year dealing with privacy policy. The first, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” was published in Vol. 36 of the Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy this Spring. (FYI: Both articles focus on privacy claims made against private actors — namely, efforts to limit private data collection — and not on privacy rights against governments.)

My new article on benefit-cost analysis in privacy debates makes a seemingly contradictory argument: benefit-cost analysis (“BCA”) is extremely challenging in online child safety and digital privacy debates, yet it remains essential that analysts and policymakers attempt to conduct such reviews. While we will never be able to perfectly determine either the benefits or costs of online safety or privacy controls, the very act of conducting a regulatory impact analysis (“RIA”) will help us to better understand the trade-offs associated with various regulatory proposals.

However, precisely because those benefits and costs remain so remarkably subjective and contentious, I argue that we should look to employ less-restrictive solutions — education and awareness efforts, empowerment tools, alternative enforcement mechanisms, etc. — before resorting to potentially costly and cumbersome legal and regulatory regimes that could disrupt the digital economy and the efficient provision of services that consumers desire. This model has worked fairly effectively in the online safety context and can be applied to digital privacy concerns as well.

The article is organized as follows. Part I examines the use of BCA by federal agencies to assess the utility of government regulations. Part II considers how BCA can be applied to online privacy regulation and the challenges federal officials face when determining the potential benefits of regulation. Part III then elaborates on the cost considerations and other trade-offs that regulators face when evaluating the impact of privacy-related regulations. Part IV discusses alternative measures that can be taken by government regulators when attempting to address online safety and privacy concerns. This article concludes that policymakers must consider BCA when proposing new rules but also recognize the utility of alternative remedies such as education and awareness campaigns, to address consumer concerns about online safety and privacy.

I’ve embedded the full article down below in a Scribd reader, but you can also download it from my SSRN page and my Mercatus author page.

A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates by Adam Thierer

Last week on his personal blog, Peter Fleischer, Global Privacy Counsel for Google, posted an interesting essay entitled “We Need a Better, Simpler Narrative of US Privacy Laws.” Fleischer says that Europe has done a better job marketing its privacy regime to the world than the United States and argues that “The US has to figure out how to explain its privacy laws on the global stage” since “Europe is convincing many countries around the world to implement privacy laws that follow the European model.” He notes that “in the last year alone, a dozen countries in Latin America and Asia have adopted euro-style privacy laws [while] not a single country, anywhere, has followed the US model.” Fleischer argues that this has ramifications for long-term trade policy and global Internet regulation more generally.

I found this essay very interesting because I deal with some of these issues in my latest law review article, “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing” (Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, vol. 36, no. 2, Spring 2013). In the article, I suggest that the U.S. does have a unique privacy regime and it is one that is very similar in character to the regime that governs online child safety issues. Whether we are talking about online safety or digital privacy, the defining characteristics of the U.S. regime are that it is bottom-up, evolutionary, education-based, empowerment-focused, and resiliency-centered. It focuses on responding to safety and privacy harms after exhausting other alternatives, including market responses and the evolution of societal norms.

The EU regime, by contrast, is more top-down in character and takes a more static, inflexible view of privacy rights. It tries to impose a one-size-fits-all model on a diverse citizenry and it attempts to do so through heavy-handed data directives and ongoing “agency threats.” It is a regime that makes more sweeping pronouncements about rights and harms and generally recommends a “precautionary principle” approach to technological change in which digital innovation is more “permissioned.”

Put simply, the U.S. regime is reactive in character while the E.U. regime is more preemptive.  The U.S. system focuses on responding to safety and privacy problems using a more diverse toolbox of solutions, some of which are governmental in character while others are based on evolving social and market norms and responses. To be clear, law does enter the picture here in the U.S., but it does so in a very different way than it does in the E.U.  Fleischer actually explains that point quite nicely in his essay:

[W]hat is the US model?  People in the privacy profession know that the US has a dense “patchwork” model of privacy laws: every individual US State has numerous privacy laws, the Federal government has numerous sectoral laws, and numerous other “non-privacy” laws, like consumer protection laws, are regularly invoked in privacy matters.  Regulators in many corners of government, ranging from State attorneys general, to the Federal Trade Commission, and armies of class action lawyers inspect every privacy issue for possible actions.

Indeed, in my new law review article, I summarize the litany of cases the FTC has brought recently on the data security and privacy front using its authority under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act to police “unfair and deceptive” practices. State AGs are active on this front as well, and there is plenty of class action activity every time there’s a privacy or data security screw-up.

Meanwhile, public officials continue to work collaboratively with privacy advocates, corporations, and educators to develop better education and awareness-building efforts, including “best practices” on safety, security, and privacy issues.

For more details on this U.S. model, please consult pages 436-454 of my article, in which I provide a comprehensive overview of what I refer to as America’s “3-E Approach” to dealing with online safety and digital privacy concerns. The “3-Es” refer to education, empowerment, and targeted enforcement of existing legal standards. As I note in the article:

[America’s “3-E Approach”] does not imagine it is possible to craft a single, universal solution to online safety or privacy concerns. It aims instead to create a flexible framework that can help individuals cope with a world of rapidly evolving technological change and constantly shifting social and market norms as they pertain to information sharing.

But what frustrates Fleischer is that the U.S model still doesn’t translate into a simple narrative for international audiences:

How on earth do you explain US privacy laws to an international audience?  How do you explain the role of class action litigation to people in countries where it doesn’t even exist?  The US privacy law narrative is convoluted. That’s a pity, since almost all of the global privacy professionals with whom I’ve discussed this issue agree with me that the sum of all the individual parts of US privacy laws amounts to a robust legal framework to protect privacy.  (I didn’t say “perfect”, since laws never are, and I’m not grading them either.) By contrast, Europe’s privacy narrative is simple and appealing.  Its laws are very general, aspirational, horizontal and concise.  Critics could say they’re also inevitably vague, as any high-level law would have to be.  But, like the US Bill of Rights, they have a sort of simple and profound universality that has inspired people around the world.  And they are enforced (at least, on paper) by a single, identifiable, specialist regulator.

I understand the frustration Fleischer is expressing here regarding how to frame the U.S. model for broader audiences. But the crucial point here is that, as he correctly notes, “the sum of all the individual parts of US privacy laws amounts to a robust legal framework to protect privacy,” even if it is the case that we will never achieve anything near perfection when it comes to online privacy (or online safety for that matter). But it is unfortunate that Fleischer ignores the many other moving pieces at work here that are important to the U.S. system, especially the diverse array of educational and awareness-building efforts as well as the astonishing array of empowerment tools that currently exist to help user protect their privacy to the degree they desire.

Of course, it should also be obvious that the U.S. regime is never going to appeal to a global audience as much as Europe’s privacy regime for the same reason that many other U.S. policy regimes don’t appeal to certain countries or their leaders: Our systems aren’t regulatory enough in character for them! But while those top-down, centralized, preemptive regulatory regimes will almost always be more “aspirational, horizontal and concise” — and, therefore, have greater appeal to activist-minded lawmakers and regulators — that also means those regimes will likely leave less breathing room for social evolution (i.e., evolving norms about safety and privacy) and economic innovation (new digital goods and services that potentially disrupt those regulatory expectations). That has real consequences for long-term growth and overall consumer welfare.

Regardless, to the extent we need “a better, simpler narrative for U.S. privacy policy” as Fleischer suggests, I believe we can boil it down to a few words: bottom-up, evolutionary, flexible, and reactive. What this means for public policy is clear: We need diverse tools and solutions for a diverse citizenry, while leaving plenty of breathing room for ongoing innovation and the evolution of social norms and market responses. Whether it’s online safety or digital privacy, public policy should take into account the extraordinary diversity of citizen needs and tastes and leave the ultimate decision about acceptable online content and interactions to them. We should look to educate and empower citizens so that they can make decisions about their online safety and privacy for themselves so that policymakers are not constantly trying to make decisions on their behalf.

This is a model worth defending, even if it is sometimes hard to delineate its contours.  Please read my HJLPP article for a fuller exploration of that model and a defense of it.

Here’s a presentation I’ve been using lately for various audiences about “Cronyism: History, Costs, Case Studies and Solutions.” In the talk, I offer a definition of cronyism, explain its origins, discuss how various academics have traditionally thought about it, outline a variety of case studies, and then propose a range of solutions. Readers of this blog might be interested because I briefly mention the rise of cronyism in the high-tech sector. Brent Skorup and I have a huge paper in the works on that topic, which should be out early next year.

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

This may be the best speech by a regulator that you will read in your entire life. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Commissioner Robert McDowell delivered an address in Rome today entitled, “The Siren Call of “Please Regulate My Rival”: A Recipe for Regulatory Failure.” I highly recommend it (and not just because I’m cited in it!) It is infused with important insights about the ugly downsides of excessive regulation of technology markets.

McDowell is an astute student of regulatory history and he documents how, despite the best of intentions, economic regulation has often been turned into a tool that industry exploits for their own narrow interests. Sadly, examples of such “regulatory capture” are rampant, as I have documented here before. McDowell notes that many telecom and media companies “suffer from the ‘please regulate my rival’ malady of an industry that has been regulated too much and for too long.  History is replete with such scenarios,” he says, “and the desire for more regulation for competitors always ends badly for the incumbent regulated industry in the form of unintended and harmful consequences.” That is exactly right.

I strongly encourage you to read the entire speech, but if you only have time to read one thing, make it the powerful and poetic closing paragraphs, which I have reprinted below:

“Regulating my rival” is a seductive notion for many, but it only lures its victims to rocky shores before revealing itself as a perilous Siren call.  Telecom companies should not look to regulate their “rivals,” Internet content and applications companies, down to their level – especially not through an intergovernmental body.

Instead, network operators should seek deregulation by their home governments to allow them full flexibility to produce and price freely in competitive markets.  In fact, as history shows us, attempting to regulate rivals will only produce unintended consequences that will harm the companies advocating regulation.  More importantly, consumers end up losing the most.  In short, the opposite of what is desired will occur, something called “regulatory failure.”  No government, let alone an intergovernmental body, can make economic and engineering decisions in lightning fast Internet time.  Nor can any government mandate innovation.  But new rules can undermine investment, innovation and job creation all too easily.

Despite these realities, resisting the temptation to regulate is difficult for many.  Furthermore, deregulation can seem counterintuitive to some.  We always hear talk of “market failure,” but we rarely see analyses of “regulatory failure.”  Perhaps that is why, in the words of Professor Adam Thierer, “regulation always spreads.” As world economies contract and government debt mounts, repeating the same government actions of regulating more and spending more of the public’s money will only produce the same results: shrinking economies and growing debt.  It is time to reverse these trends, but doing so will require tremendous political courage.

We can start by avoiding any expansion of regulation to the Internet.  Its phenomenal success can be traced directly to its voluntary and self-governing structure, the result of a multi-stakeholder process free from top-down governmental influences.  In fact, policy makers should head in the opposite direction of the proposals outlined earlier. We should learn from the voluntary, bottom-up, self governance approach in the image of the non-hierarchical Internet itself, and look to apply this successful model elsewhere.  Revolutionizing public policy through a fundamental modernization of legacy laws to clear away unnecessary regulatory obstructions will uncork the flow of investment capital, spark innovation, drive economic growth and propel job creation.  Couldn’t today’s world economy benefit from such positive and constructive change?

On the other hand, dragging rivals down to the lowest common denominator of overly regulated international telecom companies will enshrine mediocrity at best, and, at worst, snuff out incentives to take risks and reap the resulting rewards, therefore killing opportunities to revitalize moribund economies and improve the human condition.

Thank you, Commissioner McDowell, for speaking the truth and reminding the world that the actual history of telecom and media regulation has been a miserable, cronyist, anti-consumer fiasco.  This is exactly why we need to comprehensively deregulate these markets right now while also making sure that creeping cronyism and “regulate my rival” politics do not spread to new tech sectors.

This week I will again be attending the Family Online Safety Institute’s excellent annual summit. The 2-day affair brings together some of the world’s leading experts on online safety and privacy issues. It’s a great chance to learn about major developments in the field. As I was preparing for the session I am moderating on Thursday, I thought back to the first FOSI annual conference, which took place back in 2007. What is remarkable about that period compared to now is that there was a flurry of legislative and regulatory activity related to online child safety then that we simply do not see today.

In fact, just 3 1/2 years ago, John Morris of the Center for Democracy and Technology and I compile a legislative index [summary here] that cataloged the more than 30 legislative proposals that had been introduced in the the 110th session of Congress. There was also a great deal of interest in these issues within the regulatory community. Finally, countless state and local measures related to online safety and speech issues had been floated. Today, by contrast, it is hard for me to find any legislative measures focused on online safety regulation at the federal level, and I don’t see much activity at the agency level either. I haven’t surveyed state and local activity, but it seems like it has also died down.

Generally speaking, I think this is a good development since I am opposed to most proposals to regulate online speech, expression, or conduct. But let’s ignore the particular wisdom of such measures and ask a simple question: What explains the decline in Internet safety legislation and online content regulation? I believe there are three possible explanations:

1) The effectiveness of education and awareness-building strategies

I would like to believe that all the efforts made by various groups and individuals (including myself) to encourage policymakers to adopt  “Educate & Empower” approaches over “Legislative & Regulate” approaches are finally bearing fruit. The first instinct for many policymakers is to legislate immediately and then worry about the consequences later (if at all). But such approaches, no matter how well-intentioned, often backfire and have myriad unintended consequences (including the problem addressed next). So, perhaps it is the case that lawmakers and regulators are finally coming to realize that education and awareness approaches — married to empowerment-based efforts — are actually the more sensible approach compared to a flurry of legislative measures that ultimately accomplish very little.

2) The deterrent effect of inevitable and lengthy constitutional challenges

Here are two things I know for certain: First, almost every Internet-related measure faces a constitutional challenge, typically on First Amendment grounds (but sometimes also on Sec. 230 grounds). Second, most of those challenges succeed. I don’t have hard stats to back up this assertion, but I’d bet that there are few areas of modern law that have witnessed a higher percentage of successful constitutional challenges in recent years than the field of cyberlaw.  Taking that as a given, one must assume that at some point it becomes a deterrent to additional state action in this field.  Why waste years legislating and regulating if it is all enjoined and then overturned a short time later?

3) Resurgence of privacy as major policy issue and the emergence of cybersecurity as a policy issue

It could also be that case that privacy policy crowds out congressional interest in online safety legislation. In fact, it seems like these issues often move in opposing waves. When a wave of online safety legislative and regulatory activity is cresting, interest in privacy policy seems to fall. That certainly seemed to be the case between roughly 2005 and 2008 when online safety dominated congressional debates and privacy was hardly on the radar.  Today the reverse is true. Privacy has been the dominant Internet policy issue of the past year or so. It is sucking all the oxygen out of the room — whether that room is a congressional hearing room, a regulatory agency event, or even academic conferences.

Importantly, cybersecurity has rapidly emerged as a major new fault line in Internet policy debates. It, too, is eating up a lot of the “attention bandwidth” available among policymakers today.  And intellectual property matters always seem to be percolating out there.

It is my belief that because some of these Net policy issues are so complicated, policymakers are sometimes discouraged from doing a “deep dive” on them. To the extent they do, it seems unlikely that lawmakers are willing to invest serious time in more than a couple of these arcane matters at one time. Also, don’t forget how busy the relevant committees (Commerce and Judiciary) are with other, not tech policy-related matters. On any given legislative day, they could be handling a wide range of other policy issues that crowd out the amount of attention they can devote to Net policy matters, which are often far down the list of legislative priorities. Again, I’m generally pretty happy about that fact! I’d rather lawmakers go slow on these issues, whether the slow pace of the action is intentional or not.

So, what do you think? Are there other possible explanations for why we’ve seen less activity on the online safety / Internet content regulation front in recent years?

I absolutely loved this quote about the dangers of regulatory capture from Holman Jenkins in today’s Wall Street Journal in a story (“Let’s Restart the Green Revolution“) about how misguided agricultural / environmental policies are hurting consumers:

When some hear the word “regulation,” they imagine government rushing to the defense of consumers. In the real world, government serves up regulation to those who ask for it, which usually means organized interests seeking to block a competitive threat. This insight, by the way, originated with the left, with historians who went back and reconstructed how railroads in the U.S. concocted federal regulation to protect themselves from price competition. We should also notice that an astonishingly large part of the world has experienced an astonishing degree of stagnation for an astonishingly long time for exactly such reasons.

I’ve just added it to my growing compendium of notable quotations about regulatory capture.  It’s essential that we not ignore how — despite the very best of intentions —  regulation often has unintended and profoundly anti-consumer / anti-innovation consequences.

I’m going to close out my series of essays about Tim Wu’s new book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, by discussing his proposed solutions.  In the first five essays in the series, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] I’ve critiqued Wu’s look at information history as well as his use of terms like “market failure,” “laissez-faire” and “open” vs. “closed.”  I argued there’s a great deal of over-simplification, even outright distortion, in his use of those terms throughout the book.

Anyway, let’s run through the basics of the book once more before getting to Wu’s proposed solutions.  By my reading of The Master Switch, Wu’s argument essentially goes something like this:

• Information industries go through cycles. After a period of “openness” and competition, they tend to drift toward “closed,” corporate-controlled, anti-consumer models and outcomes.
• The resulting “monopolists” then block much innovation, competition, and free speech.
• Consequently, “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible.”
• Moreover, information industries are more important than all others (“information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries”) and even traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.” (p. 303).
• Thus, special rules should apply to information-related sectors of our economy.

Again, I’ve challenged some of these assertions in my previous essays, specifically, Wu’s incomplete history of cycles and the fact that he greatly underplays the role of governments in “locking-in” sub-optimal market structures or, worse yet, creating those structures through misguided public policies or regulatory capture.  Wu discusses some of those factors in his book, but he tends to regard them as secondary to the inquiry, whereas I believe they are crucial to understanding how most “closed” or anti-competitive scenarios develop or endure. Instead, Wu simplistically suggests that “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible,” even though no such state of affairs has ever existed within communications or media industries. They have been subjected to varying levels of indirect influence or direct control almost since their inception.

Regardless, what does Tim Wu want done about the problems he has (mis-)diagnosed?

What Wu Wants: A “Constitutional” Approach to Private Regulation

Broadly speaking, Wu wants to counter what he regards as “the danger of private power,” “the Lockean sanctification of private property,” and the fact that “American economic life [has] been built mostly on freewheeling capitalism.” (p. 300)  More specifically, he wants to end the “cycle” he describes of markets moving from supposedly open to closed.

To do so, he proposes what he calls a “constitutional” approach to private marketplace regulation.  In reality, it would be a massive, unprecedented, and highly destructive information sector industrial policy that would substitute the Rule of Man for the Rule of Law.  But let’s hear how Wu describes it:

What I propose is not a regulatory approach but rather a constitutional approach to the information economy. By that I mean a regime whose goal is to constrain and divide all power that derives from the control of information. Specifically, what we need is something I would call a Separations Principle for the information economy. A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance between each of the major functions or layers in the information economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another. At the same time, Separations Principle stipulates one other necessity: that the government also keep its distance and not intervene in the market to favor any technology, network monopoly, or integration of the major functions of an information industry.”  (p. 302, emphasis in original)

Wu calls this a “constitutional approach” because he models it on the separations of power found in the U.S. Constitution, such as the separation of church and State, as well as the separation of powers between branches of government.  Wu makes a few additional assertions:

• “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)
• But Wu believes that pain or cost is worth it because of the “corrupting effect of vertically integrated power.” (p. 305)
• “You cannot serve two masters, and the objectives of creating information are often at odds with those of disseminating it,” he says. (p. 305)
• Specifically, he claims the Separations Principle would better protect free speech and entrepreneurial freedom. On the former: “It is a recognition that the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.” On the latter: “The Separations Principle protects entrepreneurial freedom by preventing stagnation and repression of business innovation, especially with the help of the state.” (p. 306)

There’s a lot to unpack here including Wu’s stunning claim that his Separations Principle doesn’t represent a regulatory regime, as well as his rather incredible belief that government meddling and machinations could be kept in check under this regime.

First, however, Wu deserves credit for coming clean about just how radical his proposal is.

Constitutional Limits on Governments vs. Private Actors

Wu admits that “It would be quite radical today even to contemplate imposing on the economy the kind of safeguards that the Constitution places on the political system.” (p. 301)  A few pages later he notes that “The Separations Principle… requires a certain breadth and ambition in its application.” (p. 308)

I’m glad Wu was willing to at least acknowledge the radicalness of his proposal.  But, as he is prone to do throughout the book, he raises an important potential objection only to quickly walk away from it.  In this case, however, it’s completely understandable why Wu wouldn’t want to continue this inquiry: His proposal really is “quite radical” since it is completely at odds with America’s constitutional heritage of individual liberty and limited government.

Let’s go back to Civics 101.  We require that governments live under certain constraints and the Rule of Law because we recognize that governments possess the unique ability to fine, punish, and imprison citizens.  Moreover, escape from government’s tentacles is difficult, if not impossible. A constitutional system is required, therefore, to limit government’s role over our lives and the economy.

By contrast, we do not impose similar constraints on individuals — or on individuals when they work collaboratively in organizations or corporations — primarily because we believe there should be a presumption of liberty in most human affairs.  Freedom is the default position.  We value freedom because it allows humans to exercise their free will and live a life of their own choosing — and that includes the freedom to pursue happiness by making money in a business venture.  Our nation’s founders saw the wisdom in this even before we had a grand historical clash between communism and capitalist systems.  From that experience, however, we now have undisputed proof that social and economic freedoms are closely linked, and that when humans are free, they prosper.  The other reason we default to freedom for private individuals and organizations is because the possibility of “escape” exists from undesirable social or economic situations.

Wu doesn’t bother slowing down to appreciate these distinctions. He gives occasional lip service to the dangers of excessive government power:

Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive. (p. 308)

Quite right. Yet, as I pointed out in this earlier essay, there’s seemingly never any serious lesson to be drawn from that conclusion.  Wu just marches right along in his narrative and ignores that “disgrace” and its relationship to “the cycle.”

The crucial point here is that Wu doesn’t fully appreciate the qualitative difference between State power and corporate power.  Instead — consistent with many “media access” theorists who came before him — he largely equates those forms of power or even makes private power out to be the more significant threat to personal liberties and freedom of speech.  Again, we hear statements like “the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.”

The problem with this is that (a) history shows it’s simply not true and (b) the corrective remedies such a theory counsels would require a massive enhancement of State power to counter the supposed threats of private power, which (c) would create an even bigger threat to human liberty since only the State can fine, imprison, and truly foreclose speech.

So, I’ll stick with traditional “constitutionalism,” thank you very much!  Tim Wu’s “constitutionalism,” by contrast, is the Rule of Man, not the Rule of Law.  Specifically, it would be the rule of a handful of unelected men (and women) down at the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or whatever other regulatory bureaucracies Wu would empower under this approach.   And, as we’ll see next, that approach is truly audacious in its scope.

Practical Considerations: An Unprecedented Information Control Regime

OK, let’s forget about all that philosophical and legalistic mumbo-jumbo.  After all, most people these days don’t really give a hoot about constitutional limitations or the first principles associated with our nation’s founding. Let us instead explore the Bold New World of information regulation that Wu wants imposed on the high-tech economy and consider its complexity and costs.  Wu is a bit short on details about how policymakers should go about constructing a “Separations” regime, or how it will work in practice, but he does suggest that Net neutrality regulation and expanded antitrust oversight are at least two of the core elements. But he says that will not be enough.

Despite the fact that Wu admits the FCC “has on occasion let itself become the enemy of the good, effectively a tool of repression,” Wu seems to suggest the agency will continue to have “day-to-day authority over the information industries.” (p. 309) Of course, the FCC’s role is currently limited mostly to older sectors of the information economy, but Wu seems to suggest that role should be expanded considerably.  Yet, FCC oversight isn’t enough either, Wu says.  He argues that “what is needed is not only an FCC institutionally committed to a Separations Principle but also a structural arrangement to guard against such deviations, including congressional oversight as well as attention and corrections from other branches of government.”

Here the “breadth and ambition in its application” associated with Wu’s Separations Principal becomes more apparent. We are talking about layers upon layers of regulation. More importantly, the key attribute of Wu’s Separations Principle is that it is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  He explicitly rejects the idea that marketplace experimentation should be allowed and that ex post administrative proceedings or antitrust enforcement will be good enough. “[T]here is the problem of taking an after-the-fact approach to a commodity so vital to our basic liberties,” he argues. (p. 204) Thus, Wu’s approach represent a return to the sort of anticipatory, “Mother, May I” regulatory regime America was supposed to be turning away from following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

What’s most bizarre about Wu’s call for such a preemptive “Separations” approach is his insistence that it is not a regulatory approach.  It’s hard to know whether this is an astonishing bit of hubris or just plain naiveté.  I hate to suggest it, but I think Wu is perfectly aware of just how regulatory his system would be in practice; he just doesn’t want to admit it.  After all, for there to be “separations” of various segments of the information sector, someone would need to determine who and what belongs in which bucket.  Wu suggests we’ll need at least three buckets. To repeat, he says his Separations Principle “would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another.”  Let’s put some labels on these buckets:

• Bucket #1: Information Creators
• Bucket #2: Information Distributors
• Bucket #3: Information Hardware Makers

These would essentially become three of the new “titles” (or regulatory sections) of a forthcoming “Information Economy Separations Act.” (I’m assuming Wu understands it would take an act of Congress to implement this sweeping regime, although he never makes that clear.  Or perhaps he would just prefer the FCC “reclassify” the entire information economy by regulatory fiat? Who knows.  Again, he never really sweats the details on this important point.)

Regardless, the problem with these conceptually neat classifications is that don’t conform to our fast-paced, highly dynamic Information Age economy.  There is a fluidity of innovation and market activity that Wu utterly fails to appreciate.  I suppose it’d be easy to throw a couple of players into these buckets and tell them to stay put.  We could tell T-Mobile, for example, that they could be a wireless information distributor and absolutely nothing else; we could tell Discovery Networks, they could be a content creator and absolutely nothing else; and we could tell Intel, you can be a chip maker and absolutely nothing else.

But not every existing information sector actor or technology is so neatly compartmentalized. Moreover, Wu’s framework also begs the question: Would firms that currently have integrated operations and investments in multiple fields be forced to divest control of various operations to come in line with Wu’s Separations Principle?   Here are a few scenarios to consider (and with each example, ask yourself the question: What’s the harm here to would justify the sort of “separations” regime Wu proposes?):

• Cox Enterprises has a wide variety of content and distribution properties including: broadband services, cable TV channels and distribution systems, newspapers, radio stations, advertising and direct mail divisions, and AutoTrader.com.  How many pieces does the firm need to be split into to comply with Wu’s new “Separations” regime?
• Should an ISP be allowed to develop or offer (or directly integrate into their service) free anti-virus software and parental control technologies since that’s not part of the underlying distribution service? Nearly every major ISP does so already today.
• Even though the experiment was ultimately a failure, should Google have been allowed to break out of the search market and give the handheld device business a shot with the Nexus One?  Likewise, should Google be allowed to continue its experiment with local fiber or wi-fi networks even though it is so clearly outside their traditional line of business?  Finally, should the FCC have disallowed Google’s bid in the 700 MHz spectrum auction back in 2008 since it would have meant the firm was formally entering the information distribution business?
• Which bucket is Microsoft in as a traditional OS and software provider?  Regardless, was it a mistake to allow them to jump into the video game console marketplace with the Xbox many years ago?   Should MS have been forbidden from creating the Zune since it too was a digital device outside of Microsoft’s core field?  Should MS be allowed to have a content division that develops games or other content for its operating systems even though they might be considered two separate information markets?
• Sony produces movie and video game content but also develops hardware (video game consoles, televisions, music players, phones, etc.) on which that content can be played. Should that be illegal? Would they have to divest some of these divisions once Wu’s system went into effect?
• Apple is the ultimate example of an information hardware manufacturer that has not only diversified its hardware offerings from PCs to iPods, iPhones and iPads, but also become a (if not the) leading information distributor for digital music, movies, television shows, podcasts, books and audiobooks through iTunes.  The company’s Apps store also makes it a key distributor of software.  What bucket is it in?
• Should Amazon be allowed to be both the biggest online marketplace as well as the manufacturer of a device (the Kindle) that offers access to that store?

I could go on and on, but here’s the crucial point: Creating firewalls between the buckets Wu proposes would be a nightmare and would entail incessant regulatory interventions to make sure the walls weren’t breached.  As suggested above, the very act of regulatory line-drawing would be mind-bogglingly complex.  More importantly, each new information sector innovation would suddenly be subjected to a regulatory classification proceeding.

Wu is essentially saying there are few integrative efficiencies or other economic benefits associated with cross-sector deals or cross-platform technological developments.  Again, he dismisses the notion with one line: “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)  Well, that’s nice… except that this regulatory system would upend the U.S. information economy as we know it!  His Separations Principle is an unprecedented regulatory wrecking ball that would do untold destruction to the American economy in the name of creating a system of information apartheid. Wu also completely ignores the litigation nightmare that would ensue once the government started forcing the divestiture of various lines of business.  After all, many companies would likely have valid “takings” claims here under the Fifth Amendment.

But even if we could get beyond all that, we’d have to consider how this regime would work going forward.  Let’s consider a hypothetical example.  Virtual reality is an emerging field of our information economy that promises to experience rapid growth in coming years.  A number of companies are currently developing content and devices that will help bring a veritable Star Trek holodeck experience to our living rooms sometime very soon.  The market is still in a great deal of flux and it remains unclear which technologies will prevail or which developers and device makers will prosper.  One thing we know for certain, however: it’s a hugely complex and expensive undertaking.  VR technologies aren’t like creating a YouTube video of your cat playing a piano. There are significant costs associated with developing VR content and devices. Distributing VR bits over networks will, no doubt, be quite complicated as well.  Now, imagine two scenarios (which, for all I know, may already be playing out in the marketplace today):

• Scenario 1: A partnership is announced between some cutting-edge VR companies that have different core competencies in this field.  One of the companies is developing holographic imaging devices to project immersive environments directly into your living room or workspace.  Another of the partners is developing games that would take advantage of those new holographic imaging innovations.  And a third partner in the deal is developing software that will help manage the real-time, high-bandwidth flow of VR bits across broadband lines.  Under Wu’s Separations Principle, would this deal be illegal?
• Scenario 2: All of the activities discussed above are being handled by a single, integrated firm.  Is that illegal under Wu’s Separations Principle?

Now, it would be easy to dismiss this scenario with a casual wave of the hand and a ‘we’ll-figure-it-out-later’ attitude.  But consider the fact that deals and developments like this are happening every single minute of the day our modern information economy.  One wonders how regulators would even be expected to keep track of it all.  And they would have to keep track of it all because, again, Wu’s Separations Principle is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  His regulatory regime is going to have to come to grips with that fact that innovation happens. Markets evolve. People want to experiment and do bold new things. They tinker. They develop. They pitch. They deal. And so on.  As that dynamic process unfolds every day across the high-tech economy, Wu’s Separations Principle will be put to the test and necessitate a regulatory proceeding of some sort to determine what is permitted and what is verboten.  Meanwhile, the very uncertainty associated with Wu’s regime would delay and discourage investment in the field and formation of the partnership/venture necessary to successfully bring VR to market

Astonishingly, however, Wu argues that “a Separations regime would take much of the guesswork and impressionism, and indeed the influence trafficking, out of the oversight of information industries.” (p. 307) That’s a doozy of a claim.  To the extent his Separations Principle eliminates “guesswork” and creates more regulatory certainty, it would only do so by creating rigid artificial barriers to market entry and innovation across the information economy.  That’s “certainty” that we can live without.

Conclusion

Over on Amazon.com, I was interested to see Tim Wu post a glowing review of Kevin Kelly’s important new book, What Technology Wants (which I will be reviewing here next).  Kelly’s book argues that we should think of technology, or what he calls “the Technium,” as a “force” or even a living “organism” that has a “vital spirit” and which “has its own wants” and “a noticeable measure of autonomy.”  I think Kelly goes a bit far, but to the extent one buys into the notion that technology is like an organism, Tim Wu’s Information Industrial Policy would kill that organism.  Or, it would at least severely stunt its continued growth and evolution.

Because his information industry policy is every bit as “radical” as he suggests and would require, as he also admits, “a certain breadth and ambition in its application,” it is essential we reject this innovation-killing regulatory regime.  The health of the high-tech economy, the global competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector, and the long-term welfare of consumers depends upon it.

How many times can FCC Commissioner Michael Copps declare the Internet dead?  Like a fire-and-brimstone preacher bombastically bellowing sermons warning of the impending End Times, Commissioner Copps has made a hobby out of declaring the Internet dead and buried unless drastic steps are taken right now to save cyberspace! The problem is, he’s being saying this for the past decade and yet, despite generally laissez-faire policy in this arena, the Internet is still very much alive and well.

His biggest beef, of course, is Net Neutrality regulation—or the current lack thereof.  He fears that without such a “Mother, May I” regulatory regime in place, the whole cyber-world is heading for eternal damnation.  Echoing the fears of other Internet hyper-pessimists, Copps concocts grand conspiracy stories of nefarious corporate schemers hell-bent on quashing our digital liberties and foreclosing all Internet freedom.

Way back in 2003, for example, Comm. Copps delivered a doozy of a sermon at the New America Foundation entitled, “The Beginning of the End of the Internet.” In the speech, Copps lamented that the “Internet may be dying” and only immediate action by regulators can save the day. Copps laid on the sky-is-falling rhetoric fairly thick: “I think we are teetering on a precipice . . . we could be on the cusp of inflicting terrible damage on the Internet. If we embrace closed networks, if we turn a blind eye to discrimination, if we abandon the end-to-end principle and decide to empower only a few, we will have inflicted upon one of history’s most dynamic and potentially liberating technologies shackles that make a mockery of all the good things that might have been.”

But that’s hardly the only such fire-and-brimstone sermon that Rev. Comm. Copps has delivered about the death of the Internet. In one speech after another over the past decade, he has cast our future in lugubrious, foreboding terms.  At risk of making my PFF colleague Adam Marcus suicidal, I asked him to download, compile, and search through every speech and official statement that Michael Copps has delivered since 2001 [they’re all here], and then tabulate how many times he uttered various terms of gloom and doom.  Here are the results:

Who knew the end was so near?!  Of course, it isn’t really. Again, the problem for Commissioner Copps and the other cyber-worry warts is that the cyber-sky is most definitely not falling. There’s more innovation across all layers of the Net than ever before.  In fact, despite the recent economic downturn, the digital sector has been a rare bright spot.  Pick just about any metric (devices, applications, broadband speeds, etc.) and you’ll see great improvements over the past decade. Could some metrics be even better?  Sure.  But can we at least agree that, contra Copps, the sky isn’t even close to falling?

On the other hand, if Commissioner Copps feels the need to persist with the “Net is Dying” meme, I’d at least encourage him to broaden his vocabulary a bit.  I mean, there are plenty of other good terms from which to choose, as John Cleese once taught us.

http://www.youtube.com/v/4vuW6tQ0218?fs=1&hl=en_US

C-SPAN is really quite incredible when you think about it.  When I was growing up in the 70s, there was nothing like it. Like most other Americans, my informational inputs about national news and politics were limited to what a couple of old white dudes in bad suits delivered each night around 6:30 on the three VHF channels I had access to. And no national newspapers were delivered to my small town in rural Illinois, so I had to rely on crummy local papers to fill the void via whatever national reporting they offered, which wasn’t much.

And then came C-SPAN.  C-SPAN alone covers more political and civic-minded activity in the course of a week than most of us probably came into contact with in our entire lives just 30 years ago. Consider these data points, which Peter Kiley, Vice President of C-SPAN Networks was kind enough to help me aggregate. In the 2009 calendar year, C-SPAN provided the following amount of first run programming across their three channels:

• 8,438 overall hours of programming;
• 2,709 hours of House & Senate floor activity; and,
• 1,222 hours of House & Senate committee hearings.

Moreover, C-SPAN recently created the C-SPAN Video Library, which archives 23 years worth (1987-on) of fully searchable (and free) video content, including:

• 161,000 overall hours of programming;
• 56,600 hours of House & Senate floor activity; and,
• 20,152 of House & Senate committee hearings.

That’s incredible. But here’s what’s more impressive: Many people fail to realize that C-SPAN is a private, non-profit company that is provided as a public service by cable industry contributions. It receives no government or taxpayer contributions. From 1979-2009, total license fees paid by cable & satellite companies to support C-SPAN totaled $922 million. That’s what brings you this amazing, unprecedented civic resource.

OK, let me step back and explain why I started thinking about C-SPAN.  I’ve been invited to testify at a Federal Communications Commission hearing this Thursday on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” I suspect that one of the laments we’ll hear from some of the participants is the old “deliberative democracy is dead” line. Debates about public interest regulation often take on a mythical tone as regulatory advocates wax nostalgic about some supposedly Golden Era of Civic Engagement when we were all better informed and publicly active. It’s pure rubbish, as I showed in my 2005 book, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership. (See chapter 4, “Democracy, Civic Discourse, and the ‘Public Interest.'”)

Nonetheless, the myth persists and often leads to calls for aggressive regulation of media markets in the name of serving “the public interest.” Regulatory advocates typically claim that government must intervene and layer on regulatory mandates if citizens are to have access to the requisite amount of political programming or civic-minded content necessary for deliberative democracy to survive.

But is there really any shortage political programming or civic-minded content from which to choose today? C-SPAN’s existence alone seems to prove the contrary, but it’s hardly the only platform through which such content is available. Let’s not forget about what the Internet has made available to us. It has given us unprecedented access to public affairs information—local, state, national, and international.

But here’s the thing that a lot of “public interest” advocates always seem to ignore: Regardless of how much beneficial civic content is out there, you can’t make people watch, listen, or read it if they don’t want to. “Today, the scarce resource is attention, not programming,” notes Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law. “Given the proliferation of consumer filtering and choice, these kinds of interventions are of questionable efficacy. Consumers equipped with digital selection and filtering tools are likely to avoid content they do not demand no matter what the regulatory efforts to force exposure.” [Ellen P. Goodman, “Proactive Media Policy in an Age of Content Abundance,” in Philip M. Napoli, ed., Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics (2007) at 370, 374.]

And there is no reason to believe this situation has ever been different or will ever change. Writing in 1922, famed journalist Walter Lippmann noted that, “it is possible to make a rough estimate only of the amount of attention people give each day to informing themselves about public affairs,” but “the time each day is small when any of us is directly exposed to information from our unseen environment.” [Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922), p. 53, 57.]  Of course, in Lippmann’s day, one could have reasonable argued that was because such content simply wasn’t available to the masses. Today, by contrast, the content is available, it’s just that we have a lot of other informational and entertainment outputs vying for our attention.

Absent truly repressive measures to limit choices or forcibly alter consumer media consumption patterns, it will be impossible for policymakers to force the masses to pay attention to what they want them to see or hear in an age of abundant media content and unrestricted choice. “[R]egulation cannot, in a liberal democracy, force viewers to consumer media products they do not think they want in the name of the public interest,” argues Goodman.

Luckily, public officials need not resort to such repressive steps. Even if we only access C-SPAN on rare occasions, or browse political information on the Net at random intervals in the days leading up to an election, that’s more information than we ever had at our disposal in those mythical “good ‘ol days.” We should be celebrating this fact, but I suspect a lot of people at the FCC’s hearing on Thursday will be bemoaning it instead.

The Parents Television Council (PTC) released a new report today entitled Women in Peril: A Look at TV’s Disturbing New Storyline Trend. The report argues that “by depicting violence against women with increasing frequency, or as a trivial, even humorous matter, the broadcast networks may ultimately be contributing to a desensitized atmosphere in which people view aggression and violence directed at women as normative, even acceptable,” said PTC President Tim Winter.  As evidence the report cites… Nicole Kidman.  OK, it cites more than Nicole Kidman, but the 7-page report and accompanying press release does seem to place a lot of stock in the fact that, while being questioning by a House Foreign Affairs subcommittee hearing about violence against women overseas, “Ms. Kidman conceded that Hollywood has probably contributed to violence against women by portraying them as weak sex objects, according to the Associated Press.”  I’m not sure what Ms. Kidman was doing testifying before Congress on the matter of violence against women overseas — dare I suggest some congressmen were out for another photo-op with a Hollywood celeb? — but the better question is whether Ms. Kidman’s opinion has any bearing on the question of what relationship, if any, there is between televised violence and real-world violence against women. (Incidentally, if she really feels passionately about all this, is she prepared to go back and recut some of her old scenes in “Dead Calm,” “To Die For,” and “Eyes Wide Shut“?)

But let’s not nitpick about the credentials Ms. Kidman brings to the table or whether it makes any sense for PTC to elevate her opinions to proof of theory when it comes to a supposed connection between depictions of violence against women in film or television and real world acts of violence against women. PTC, however, suggests that’s exactly what is going on today. They allude to a few lab studies which are of the “monkey see, monkey do” variety — where the results of artificial lab experiments are used to claim that watching depictions of violence will turn us all into killing machines, rapists, robbers, or just plain ol’ desensitized thugs.

There’s just one problem with such studies, and the PTC report:  Reality.  Whatever lab experiments might suggest, the evidence of a link between televised media violence and the real-world equivalent just does not show up in the data. The FBI produces ongoing Crime in the United States reports that document violent crimes trends. Here’s what the data tells us about overall violent crime, forcible rape, and juvenile violent crime rates over the past two decades: They have all fallen.  Perhaps most impressively, the juvenile crime rate has fallen an astonishing 36% since 1995.

Now, let me be perfectly clear about something.  When analyzing such things it is vitally important to recall one of the first rules of statistical analysis: correlation does not necessarily equal causation. This works in both directions. Even if an increase in real-world violence was closely tracking depictions of violence on television or in video games, it wouldn’t necessarily mean there is a connection. But it would also be wrong to state that, on its own, an inverse correlation (with the trends moving in opposite directions) meant that there was absolutely no connection between these things.

At the margin, I believe that some media can have negative impacts on some people. Certainly, in heavy enough doses, watching non-stop depictions of sex or violence probably would have some sort of negative effect on some people — loss of sleep, if nothing else. Perhaps more.

Then again, I just cannot entirely dismiss the real-world evidence being so starkly at odds with the “monkey see, monkey do” theories bandied about by PTC and some researchers or regulatory proponents. At a minimum, the real-world evidence should at least call into question the “world-is-going-to-hell” sort of generalizations made by proponents of increased media regulation, who all too often make casual inferences about the relationship between media exposure and various social indicators. Such a causal relationship is even more dubious today since all Americans, especially youngsters, are surrounded by a much wider variety of media than ever before. Even though television viewing has gone down slightly in recent years, it has been due to the rise of other media substitutes that command the attention of children, including the Internet, cell phones and video games. Overall, therefore, it appears that children are “consuming” as much, if not more, media than ever before. One would think that if depictions of violence in media really were leading to increased aggression among youth it would start showing up in some of these indicators at some point. But that’s just not occurring. [If you’re interested, I’ve discussed all these issues at much greater detail here, here, here, and here.]

Another argument I often here is: ‘Well, the numbers would be even better if not for media violence!’  But there’s just no way to prove that one way or the other. Would the juvenile crime rate be down 46% instead of the 36% decrease we’ve actually since 1995?  I don’t know. Nobody can know. But I certainly hope that media critics and regulatory proponents aren’t so foolish as to suggest that the crime rate would drop to zero if we just forced everybody to watch “Mary Poppins” all day long.

Finally, let’s assume that the PTC is right and that depictions of violence against women are on the rise on TV. I can actually accept that statement. With all the forensic science shows and crime dramas on TV today, it’s clear that some of the plot lines are going to involve people dying in some fashion and many of those people will be women. And yes, some of the depictions will get pretty gritty. “Fringe” and the various “CSI” shows are clearly showing things we didn’t see on “Quincy” back in the day. (Bring back Jack Klugman! He was awesome.)

But, hey, culture has changed.  Envelopes have been pushed a bit.  A little less is left to the imagination.  But most of us can live with that fact.  Indeed, many of us actually enjoy that fact!  And for those who do not share that worldview or who have heightened sensitivities about depictions of violence in TV shows, movies, or games, I would like to tell them that I really do understand and appreciate where they are coming from.

Yet, there are many other ways you can deal with that without forcing us all to forgo content we might enjoy consuming. And, you guessed it, this is where I remind the world for the umpteenth time that I have written a whole book about parental control tools and methods! [The shameless self-promotion never ends here, folks!]  In fact, part of the reason I have invested so much time in that project — and my ongoing efforts to get companies and other third parties to expand the range of tools, ratings, and other information that we have access to — is because I genuinely want to make sure that those individuals and families who have different needs and values than I have the ability to craft their own “household media standard.”   I want each family to be empowered to make media content decisions for themselves such that they can find the media content they want and discard all the rest. Luckily, that is the world we increasingly live in today. Parents have more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.

I know that some critics including the PTC feel that the tools aren’t good enough, but I just don’t buy it. Sure, there’s always some room for improvement regarding parental control tools and rating systems, but the existing panoply of tools and methods offer families unprecedented control over their media consumption habits. And that includes tools and methods which enable them to find enriching and educational content, which we have more of than ever before.

I understand PTC doesn’t share my worldview on these matters.  But the difference between us is that they want to take something away from me (the right to watch certain types of content) while I want to give something to them (the ability to block that which they find distasteful).  To be fair, however, their report did not rush to the regulatory solution, even though they did call for more hearings and they warn that:

if the television industry is unwilling or unable to take serious steps to reduce or tone down such graphic images, then we will urge the Congress and the FCC, by virtue of their regulatory authority over the public airwaves, to step in and take action.

The problem is, I don’t think PTC will ever rest until all this content is removed from the airwaves altogether, even if millions of Americans actually enjoy that programming.  Again, the better solution is for PTC to work with others to improve the tools and methods available to families to more effectively make this decision for themselves.  I certainly don’t want others making these determinations for my wife and me and our two kids.  We’ve got the job handled, thank you very much.

I’ll be heading to Oxford University this week to participate in an Oxford Internet Institute (OII) forum on the subject of “Child Protection, Free Speech and the Internet: Mapping the Territory and Limitations of Common Ground.”  It’s being led by several experts from the OII as well as my good friends John Morris and Leslie Harris of the Center for Democracy & Technology (CDT).  The aims of this forum are:

• To facilitate a dialogue between NGOs campaigning to protect respectively, child protection and children’s rights online, and freedom of speech and other civil liberties online.
• To promote a better understanding of each others’ positions, to share perspectives and information with a view to identifying areas of common ground and areas of disagreement.
• To identify any shared policy goals, and possible tools to support the achievement of those goals.
• To publicize the findings of the forum in international policy debates about Internet governance and regulation.

Conference participants were asked to submit a 2-3 pg summary of their views on a couple of questions that will be discussed at this event.  I have listed those questions, and my answers, down below the fold.  It’s my best attempt to date to succinctly outline my views about how to balance content concerns and free speech issues going forward. 

What is the nature of your interest or experience in this field?

I have spent the last 18 years covering the intersection of child safety concerns and free speech issues at four different think tanks.  In recent years, I have tied together all my research in a constantly updated Progress & Freedom Foundation special report entitled, “Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods.” The 4^th edition of this 250-page report was released in August.

Are there particular values or principles which underlie your work?

The goal of my research has been to explore the tension between free speech and child protection and to identify methods of striking a sensible balance between these two important values.   It is my hope and belief that we are now in a position to more fully empower parents such that government regulation of content and communications will be increasingly unnecessary.

In the past, it was thought to be too difficult for families to enforce their own “household standard” for acceptable content. Thus, many believed government needed to step in and create a baseline “community standard” for the entire citizenry.  Unfortunately, those “community standards” were quite amorphous and sometimes completely arbitrary when enforced through regulatory edicts.  Worse yet, those regulatory standards treated all households as if they had the same tastes or values—which is clearly not the case in most pluralistic societies.

If it is the case that families now have the ability to effectively tailor media consumption and communications choices to their own preferences—that is, to craft their own “household standard”—then the regulatory equation can and should change.  Regulation can no longer be premised on the supposed helplessness of households to deal with content flows if families have been empowered and educated to make content determinations for themselves.  Luckily, that is the world we increasingly live in today. Parents have more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.

Going forward, our goal should be to ensure that parents or guardians have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information.  Optimally, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block objectionable materials, but also to more easily find content they feel is appropriate for their families. In my work, I refer to this as the “household empowerment vision.”

Will we ever be able to achieve a world of perfect parental control over all online content and communications?  That is unlikely since both content and technology will continuously evolve and make that goal elusive. But government regulation of speech should yield where less restrictive alternatives such as household-based controls and strategies exist.  Given the value associated with free speech and the danger of government censorship, these alternatives need not be perfect to be preferable to government regulation.

What are the issues/policies or laws which you see as most problematic in terms of creating or illustrating a conflict between online child protection and free speech?

It is essential that policymakers resist the temptation to extend traditional broadcast industry regulatory statutes and standards to new media outlets and digital technologies.  In a world of media convergence and increasing user empowerment, traditional regulatory rationales make increasingly less sense.  Nonetheless, many ongoing social problems and challenges remain to achieving the “household empowerment vision” I outlined above, including:

• The “lack of awareness” problem: Some parents remain unaware of empowerment tools.
• The “bad parent” problem: Some parents don’t use tools even when aware of them.
• The “bad neighbor” problem: “Good” parents fear what happens when their kids visit other kids with more permissive parents.
• The “generation gap” problem: Kids sometimes know more about new digital technologies than their parents.
• The “technological surprise” problem: Rapid emergence and diffusion of new digital technologies can catch some parents by surprise.
• The “bad corporate actor” problem: Most companies self-regulate, but a handful push the boundaries of good taste in ways that create social concerns that reflect on industry generally.
• The “user-generated content” problem: Even when “professional” content can be managed, it is difficult to control “amateur” expression and creations.
• The “peer-on-peer bullying” problem: While many are concerned about predators, the real online safety problem turns out to be cyber-bullying among peers.

Because of these ongoing social challenges or concerns, legal and regulatory proposals will continue to be put forward. But each has serious downsides:

• Future of filtering: Centralized, network-based or decentralized, user-based?  The former creates serious censorship threats, as we see in China and other repressive states. The latter is more consistent with the household empowerment vision.
• Middleman deputization: Should online intermediaries be required to police the Net for various social ills?  If so, as hand-maidens of the state, they could become over-zealous speech regulators.
• Universal content ratings: Can policymakers mandate unified (or “scientific”) content media ratings?  Doing so puts regulators in a position to dictate content standards—for better or worse.  Moreover, this does nothing to address user-generated “amateur” content.
• Mandatory online age / identity verification: Potentially threatens anonymity, privacy, and free speech rights.  Moreover, to the extent “bad guys” continue to get into “secured” environments it creates a false sense of security for parents and kids.
• Expanded data retention: Although it would help facilitate some law enforcement goals, it also gives rise to new privacy and data breach risks.

Might any of these conflicts be avoidable, e.g. through the use of improved legislative instruments or greater clarity and accountability in processes of self-regulation?

For the above reasons, it makes more sense to put our energies into finding new self-regulatory mechanisms, social norms, and user empowerment strategies to solve ongoing social problems instead of focusing on regulatory solutions or mandates.  Instead of providing greater clarity, legislative instruments are more likely to instead create greater ambiguity, or at least uncertainty, for content creators and consumers alike. This is because, as was noted above, “community standards” are notoriously subjective; they are ham-handed attempts to gloss over the diverse needs and values of a diverse citizenry. By contrast, self-regulation, social norms, and empowerment strategies are evolutionary in character and more responsive to differences among cultures and households.

What are the issues where you think there might be most scope for finding some common ground?

In two words: empowerment and education. Because reliance on legislation is perilously difficult and enforcement of regulatory mandates is complicated (and sometimes impossible in an increasingly borderless world), efforts to better empower families and educate both kids and parents offer the most sensible path forward.  All stakeholders involved in child safety and free speech debates can generally agree that empowerment efforts, media literacy programs, awareness-building programs, and so on, are both effective and unobjectionable.

At the international level, are there certain key principles which we ought to be defending above all others?

Because of the “values clash” at the international level, it’s hard to imagine we’ll ever achieve consensus on some of these issues.  Countries vary widely in their sensitivities about speech, making any attempt to devise “universal principles” complicated.  For example, Europeans generally deride America’s prudish ways when it comes to matters of sexuality or “indecency.”  By contrast, most Americans cannot understand European concerns about “hate speech” or violently-themed media.  Meanwhile, governments in many other parts of the world are still busy trying to quell political or religious dissent.  “Harmonization” among those competing cultural norms remains complicated, therefore, and it would be a mistake if international harmonization was accomplished by sacrificing free speech rights for countries and cultures who cherish them.

Whatever you think about this messy dispute between AT&T and Google about how to classify web-based telephony apps for regulatory purposes — in this case, Google Voice — the key issue not to lose site of here is that we are inching ever closer to FCC regulation of web-based apps!  Again, this is the point we have stressed here again and again and again and again when opposing Net neutrality mandates: If you open the door to regulation of one layer of the Net, you open up the door to the eventual regulation of all layers of the Net.

You might not buy that story initially but if you doubt it then I invite you to read just about any history of American broadcast media regulation over the course of the past seven decades. (You might want to start with Krattenmaker & Powe’s Regulating Broadcast Programming or Jonathan Emord’s Freedom, Technology, and the First Amendment). In such histories you will find a common theme: Once regulation of media and communications platforms gets underway, the natural progression of things is uni-directional — Up!  That is, when new questions arise about how to “deal with” a new service, network, platform, or technology, the general tendency is the “regulate up” instead of “deregulating down.”  When regulators are given a greater say about the contours of markets as technologies evolve and/or converge, we shouldn’t be surprised that their first instinct is to “bring them into the fold.”

And, sadly, that is exactly what is likely to occur eventually with Google Voice. The only really interesting question is what else regulators start mucking with in the search and applications layer once they get their hands on it.  And if you still insist that I am being overly paranoid about “regulatory creep” and the prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into the Federal Information Commission, then consider what the agency had to say about cloud computing in paragraph 60 (pg. 21) of the FCC’s recent Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry, which was launched on August 27th:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

Wow, who knew that the FCC even had the authority to oversee or regulate the cloud, right?  Well, they don’t. But, again, this is exactly how things have unfolded before: Throw statutory authority to the wind and slowly start extending the agency’s regulatory tentacles into new areas, services, technologies, platforms, and networks.  In this case, you can just imagine how some folks will use that FCC language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice!) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces.”  Indeed, that’s pretty much what AT&T is suggesting in their letter to the FCC this week.

In a post yesterday over at the Google Public Policy Blog, my old friend Rick Whitt of Google insists that Google Voice is different than a traditional common carrier telecom service and that it doesn’t belong in the same regulatory bucket as those older voice services.  To Rick and my other friends at Google, I have only one thing to say about that argument: Good luck with that!  My prediction: Within two to three years you’ll be under the FCC’s thumb.

Again, I very much hope I am proven wrong. But I know that I won’t be wrong because neither side is going to back down in the escalating net neutrality war of mutually assured destruction.  “Regulating up” will carry the day and become, once again, our new telecom M.A.D. policy.

What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation? [pdf]

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point No. 16.19

Anyone who has spent time following debates about speech and privacy regulation comes to recognize the striking parallels between these two policy arenas. In this paper we will highlight the common rhetoric, proposals, and tactics that unite these regulatory movements. Moreover, we will argue that, at root, what often animates calls for regulation of both speech and privacy are two remarkably elitist beliefs:

1. People are too ignorant (or simply too busy) to be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or,
2. All or most people share essentially the same values or concerns and, therefore, “community standards” should trump household (or individual) standards.

While our use of the term “elitism” may unduly offend some understandably sensitive to populist demagoguery, our aim here is not to launch a broadside against elitism as Time magazine culture critic William H. Henry once defined it: “The willingness to assert unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”^[1] Rather, our aim here is to critique that elitism which rises to the level of political condescension and legal sanction. We attack not so much the beliefs of some leaders, activists, or intellectuals that they have a better idea of what it in the public’s best interest than the public itself does, but rather the imposition of those beliefs through coercive, top-down mandates.

That sort of elitism—elitism enforced by law—is often the objective of speech and privacy regulatory advocates. Our goal is to identify the common themes that unite these regulatory movements, explain why such political elitism is unwarranted, and make it clear how it threatens individual liberty as well as the future of free and open Internet. As an alternative to this elitist vision, we advocate an empowerment agenda: fostering an environment in which users have the tools and information they need to make decisions for themselves and their families.

I. The Elitism of Speech Regulation

First, consider how those two elitist beliefs identified above are on display when lawmakers or regulatory advocates make efforts to control speech or content.^[2] Calls to regulate free speech are often premised on the belief that something must be done to “protect The Children.”^[3] Personal and parental responsibility ^[4] are regarded as inadequate safeguards ^[5] since some parents will inevitably fall down on the job by not adequately shielding their children’s eyes and ears from potentially objectionable (or supposedly harmful) speech. Therefore, government must regulate content that is indecent, profane, excessively violent, and so on. The definition of those things is then left to unelected bureaucrats and judges to make on our behalf.

But it’s not just about “The Children.” Some regulatory advocates believe that even the choices made by consenting adults must be disregarded because some people fail to understand the supposedly destructive nature of the speech they are consuming. Government must act to protect people from making what some regulatory advocates regard as destructive or even immoral choices that could bring harm to them or their loved ones.

In sum, regulatory advocates are essentially saying that people cannot be trusted or left to their own devices and, therefore, government must intervene and establish a baseline “community standard” on behalf of the entire citizenry to tell them what‘s best for them.^[6] Even if those citizens have tools and information at their disposal to make sensible decisions about objectionable content, that’s not good enough because they might not do the job properly. Government must do it for them!

II. The Elitism of Privacy Regulation

This same mentality motivates calls for privacy regulations. Those who call for government interventions to “protect privacy” often claim that people too willingly surrender personal information about themselves and that they don’t understand the adverse consequences of those actions.^[7] Alternatively, regulatory advocates claim that advertising and marketing efforts are inherently “manipulative” and that people do not realize they are being duped into surrendering personal information or into buying products or services they supposedly don’t need.^[8] Of course, those regulatory advocates rarely pause to explain to us how it is that they were not also duped and manipulated by the same things—again revealing their deeply-rooted elitism! (As discussed below, this makes it clear how the psychological phenomenon of “third-person effect hypothesis” is driving much of this debate.)

“Protecting The Children” is also used as a rhetorical cover for regulation here, but not as often in debates over speech controls.^[9] Instead, regulatory advocates mostly focus on adults who are presumed not to know what is in their own best interest—necessitating paternalistic government intervention on their behalf.

III. Intellectual Schizophrenia on Both the Left & Right

What is particularly interesting about all this is the way these two issues expose a sort of intellectual schizophrenia at work on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum. Left-leaning policymakers and intellectuals typically decry censorship efforts (except where “commercial speech,” “hate speech” and “bias” are at issue), but are quick to rally around proposals to layer privacy regulations on the Internet. The opposite is often true of many on the Right of the political spectrum: They typically declare privacy regulations to be paternalistic and antithetical to free enterprise (or perhaps just erosive of efforts to legislate morality),^[10] but in the next breath advocate controls on content they find objectionable.

Few on either side stop to consider the relationship between speech and privacy. In fact, they are but two sides of the same coin. After all, what is your “right to privacy” but a right to stop me from observing you and speaking about you?^[11] “Protecting privacy,” therefore, typically means restricting speech rights in the process. Advocates of privacy regulation often insist that the use, processing and collection of information are “conduct” unprotected by the First Amendment, but in fact, the First Amendment broadly protects the gathering and distribution of information as part of the process of communication (“speech”).^[12] Similarly, attempts to “clean up” speech or “protect The Children,” often require regulations that would betray the privacy of adults by expanding the role of government, and impose serious burdens on businesses and markets—such as age verification mandates ^[13] or extensive data retention requirements.^[14]

IV. Common Tactics & Regulatory Mechanisms

The two movements also share common political tactics and regulatory approaches. Privacy advocates generally favor “opt-in” mandates as the federal “baseline standard” for any website collecting information about users, especially their browsing habits (regardless of whether the information is “personally identifiable”). In other words, the law would create a property right in such “personal information” (ironically, many advocates of this approach criticize or reject intellectual property.) In a similar vein, many advocates of speech controls push for mandatory parental control tools or restrictive default settings.^[15] That is, if government won’t censor speech outright, regulatory advocates want lawmakers to at least (1) require that media, computing and communications devices be shipped to market with parental controls embedded or included (as proposed in Australia and with China’s “Green Dam” filter),^[16] and possibly, (2) that such controls be defaulted to their most restrictive position—forcing users to opt-out of the controls later if they want to consume media rated above a certain threshold.

More sophisticated advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation will likely argue that their paternalism is less elitist or intrusive because they merely want to “nudge” the public into making “better” decisions. Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein (director of President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, responsible for analyzing most new federal regulations) popularized this approach with their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Based on behavioral economics studies, they argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve decision-making without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[17]

In this regard, Sunstein and Thaler’s approach parallels the work of Lawrence Lessig, one of the most influential Internet policy thinkers. Lessig has argued that the “architecture” of “code” (how software is written) “regulates” all online activities and requires government oversight and intervention to keep in check. Otherwise, he warned ominously a decade ago, “Left to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control.”^[18] Lessig’s hyper-pessimistic predictions have proven unwarranted, however. Far from fostering a world of “perfect control,” code and cyberspace have proven remarkably difficult to regulate, but nonetheless has generally benefited consumers and citizens without centralized direction.^[19] Still, Lessig, Sunstein, and others of this ilk persist in their advocacy of “nudges” of many varieties to impose their will on cyberspace through mandates from above.

But while it might be possible to define “better decisions” and argue that poor choice architecture leads people to choose things they clearly don’t want in contexts like investment decisions and mortgages, how can elites know what other people really want in highly subjective contexts like privacy and speech? Should they rely on opinion polls—the highly subjective results of which depend heavily on “choice architecture” of question-crafting—to guess what the right default should be?^[20] Was the Chinese proposal to mandate deployment of “Green Dam” just a harmless “nudge” because users weren’t barred from uninstalling the filtering software that must accompany their computers (i.e., “opting-out”)? The problem becomes even more difficult where trade-offs among competing values are inevitable. For example, data collection about Internet users raises privacy concerns for some but benefits all, creating more funding for “free” content (i.e., speech) and services users prefer by making more valuable the advertising that supports online publishers. In short, regulations of speech and privacy are likely to be pure paternalism, even when billed as “libertarian paternalism as Thaler and Sunstein label their approach.^[21]

What might be called “regulatory blackmail” is also a time-honored tradition among both advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation. When censorship advocates have previously been impeded by the First Amendment, they have worked behind the scenes with lawmakers or regulatory agencies to use indirect pressure and strong-arming tactics to extract “voluntary concessions” from companies or others.^[22] For example, in 2004, the FCC strong-armed radio giant Clear Channel into agreeing to a “voluntary” consent decree that involved taking Howard Stern off the air.^[23] Similarly, in 2008, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio finally agreed to set aside 4% of their system capacity for use by politically favored racial minorities (a kind of speech control) as a “voluntary condition” of their merger—after the FCC had sat on their application for nearly 16 months.^[24] This race-based preference would have been unconstitutional if the FCC had imposed it directly.^[25] While the FTC has been far less prone to such abuse and actually plays a key role in holding companies to their promises, its current Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, has hung the “regulatory sword of Damocles” over the heads of the online advertising industry, threatening them with a “day of reckoning” if he doesn’t get what he wants from industry self-regulatory efforts.”^[26] The sword could actually fall if the FTC turns self-regulation into the European model of “co-regulation,” where the government steers and industry simply rows.^[27]

V. The Crisis Mentality that Drives Regulation

Speech and privacy regulatory advocates share another trait in common: an affinity for the use of a crisis mentality as a method of spurring political action. In his 1995 book The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy, political philosopher and economist Thomas Sowell formulated a model that he argued drives ideological crusades to expand government power over our lives and economy. “The great ideological crusades of the twentieth-century intellectuals have ranged across the most disparate fields,” noted Sowell. But what they all had in common, he argued, was “their moral exaltation of the anointed above others, who are to have their different views nullified and superseded by the views of the anointed, imposed via the power of government.”^[28] These government-expanding crusades shared several key elements, which Sowell identified as follows:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society, a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many, in response to the prescient conclusions of the few.
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes.

We see this model at work on a daily basis today with our government’s various efforts to reshape our economy, but the model is equally applicable to debates over speech controls and privacy regulation. In particular, the various “technopanics”^[29] we have witnessed in recent years fit this model. For example, consider how this model plays out in the debate over online social networking:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [online sexual predators], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [such as mandatory online age verification ^[30] or the Deleting Online Predators Act ^[31]] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [must stop kids and adults from being online together on same sites], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [some state Attorneys General].^[32]
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [child safety researchers and others are told that their research is meaningless or offbase].^[33]

We also see this model in play in other debates, such as efforts to regulate “excessively violent” video games and television programming.^[34] And consider how this model plays out on the privacy front:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [amorphous privacy violations], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [“baseline federal privacy regulation”] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [anyone who shares information online], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [a handful of privacy advocacy groups].
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [any suggestion that privacy concerns are being overblown and that most information-sharing is socially beneficial is dismissed out-of-hand].

Worse yet, regulatory intervention in these cases simply begets more and more intervention to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions.^[35] Thus, the “crisis” cycle never ends.

VI. Third-Person Effect Hypothesis as an Explanation

Something more profound than simple political elitism seems to be at work here, however. A phenomenon psychologists refer to as the “third-person effect hypothesis” can explain many calls for government intervention, especially in the media world.^[36] Simply stated, speech and privacy critics sometimes seem to only see and hear in media or communications what they want to see and hear—or what they don’t want to see or hear. When they encounter perspectives or preferences that are at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and come to believe that government must “do something” to correct those perspectives. Many people desire regulation because they think it will be good for others, not necessarily for themselves. The regulation they desire has a very specific purpose in mind: “re-tilting” speech or market behavior in their desired direction.

The third-person effect hypothesis was first formulated by W. Phillips Davison in a seminal 1983 article:

In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.^[37]

Davison used this hypothesis to explain how media critics on both the Left and Right seemed to simultaneously find “bias” in the same content or reports when they couldn’t possibly both be correct. In reality, their own personal preferences were biasing their ability to fairly evaluate that content. Davison’s article prompted further research by many other psychologists, social scientists, and public opinion experts to test just how powerful this phenomenon was in explaining calls for censorship and other social phenomena.^[38] In these studies, third-person effect has been shown to be the primary explanation for why many people fear—or even want to ban—various types of speech or expression, including news,^[39] misogynistic rap lyrics,^[40] television violence,^[41] video games,^[42] and pornography.^[43] In each case, the subjects surveyed expressed strong misgivings about allowing others to see or hear too much of the speech or expression in question, but greatly discounted the impact of that speech on themselves. Such studies thus reveal the strong paternalistic instinct behind proposals to regulate speech. As Davison notes:

Insofar as faith and morals are concerned… it is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor’s friends are usually safe from the pollution. It is the general public that must be protected. Or else, it is youthful members of the general public, or those with impressionable minds.^[44]

It’s easy to see how this same phenomenon is at work in debates about privacy. Regulatory advocates imagine their preferences are “correct” (right for everyone) and that the masses are being duped by external forces beyond their control or comprehension, even though the advocates themselves are somehow immune from the brain-washing and privy to some higher truth that the hoi polloi simply cannot fathom. Again, this is Sowell’s “Vision of the Anointed” at work.

Consider the flare-up in 2004 over the introduction of Gmail, Google’s free email service. At a time when Yahoo! mail (then as now the leading webmail provider) offered customers less than 10 megabytes of email storage, Gmail offered an astounding gigabyte of storage that would grow over time (now over 7 GB). Rather than charging some users for more storage or special features, Google paid for the service by showing advertisements next to each email “contextually” targeted to keywords in that email—a far more profitable form of advertising than “dumb banner” ads previously used by other webmail providers.^[45] Self-appointed (or, to extend Sowell’s framework, “self-anointed”) privacy advocates howled that Google was going to “read users’ email,” and led a crusade to ban such algorithmic contextual targeting.^[46] Thierer responded to these critics by pointing out that the service was purely voluntary and noted:

you don’t speak for me and a lot of other people in this world who will be more than happy to cut this deal with Google. So do us a favor and don’t ask the government to shut down a service just because you don’t like it. Privacy is a subjective condition and your value preferences are not representative of everyone else’s values in our diverse nation. Stop trying to coercively force your values and choices on others. We can decide these things on our own, thank you very much.^[47]

Interestingly, however, the frenzy of hysterical indignation about Gmail was followed by a collective cyber-yawn: Users increasingly understood that algorithms, not humans, were doing the “reading” and that, if they didn’t like it, they didn’t have to use it. Today, nearly 150 million of people around the world use Gmail, and it has a steadily growing share of the webmail market. Even though cyber-consumers have embraced the service, some privacy advocates persist in their effort to shut down Gmail. They appear determined to stop at nothing to impose their will on others—the essence of political elitism—even if that means cutting off free email service for 150 million people!^[48]

A similar debate has played out more recently regarding targeted online advertising in general. Advertising on search engines is, much like Gmail, targeted “contextually” based on search terms entered by users and most advertising on other websites is based on the nature of content on a site or page. But certain data is collected about users as they browse to make that advertising more effective—by measuring its performance, reducing fraud, preventing over-exposure, etc. Some privacy advocates have insisted that industry self-regulation of such practices (even if enforced by the FTC) is inadequate and have called for preemptive regulation. They are even more offended by “behavioral advertising” which allows publishers whose content would have little value as the basis for contextually targeting advertising on their own sites to compete for more highly valued advertising by showing ads to users based on other sites they’ve visited. In both cases, data collection can increase the funding available to publishers to produce more of the content and services preferred by users, thus conferring an enormous indirect benefit on users, but also directly benefits users by increasing the relevance of the advertising they see.^[49] For some of the more extreme advocates of privacy regulation, however, there are no trade-offs, only absolutist “solutions:” To them, privacy is so obviously desirable that they feel at ease in deciding what’s best for everyone else. Such absolutists often respond with righteous indignation and conspiratorial fulmination when challenged to identify the harm against which they’re protecting consumers, while disdainfully dismissing all talk of the benefits of online advertising as self-serving industry propaganda.^[50]

VII. The Principled Alternative: Trust People & Empower Them

There is an alternative to this elitist mentality: freedom and personal responsibility. Individuals should be permitted to live a life of their own, even if they sometimes make mistakes or choices that are at odds with what elites think is best for them. ^[51]

Of course, the world isn’t perfect. In an ideal world, adults would be fully empowered to tailor speech and privacy decisions to their own values and preferences. Specifically, in an ideal world, adults (and parents) would have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information. Importantly, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block the things they don’t like—objectionable content, annoying ads or the collection of data about them—while also finding the things they want.

Achieving that ideal is likely impossible, but the good news is that we are moving closer to it with each passing day. Citizens have more tools and methods at their disposal than ever before which enable them to make decisions for themselves and their families. And this is true for both parental controls ^[52] and privacy controls.^[53]

Of course, some speech and privacy elitists will argue that we can’t trust empowerment tools ( e.g., filters, rating systems, or other controls) that are created by companies or other affected parties. But rather than trying to enhance those tools and educate users about how to use them, these elitists skip right past user empowerment and channel their energies into regulations that would impose a top-down, one-size-fits all standard on all adults and families—or even into trying to craft the perfect “nudge” that will help users make what elites believe to be the “right” decisions. Of course, these tools can, and should, be improved. Those groups worried about speech/content and privacy issues should focus on how we might drive such protections from the bottom-up by empowering individuals instead of government bureaucrats. The goal in both cases should be a “let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom” approach, which offers diverse tools and strategies for our diverse citizenry.^[54] We need not accept “one-size-fits” all approaches, whether they be regulatory mandates or “nudges,” based on the presumption that elites know best.

Finally, it is vital not to lose sight of what’s ultimately at stake here. If regulatory approaches trump the empowerment agenda we have described, the future of a free and open Internet—indeed, as technology converges, the future of all media—is at risk.^[55] By imposing technological solutions from the top-down that can never keep pace with technological change, regulation necessarily forecloses freedom and innovation.^[56] By contrast, individual empowerment allows innovation to flourish. The better approach across the board is education, not regulation.^[57] Empowerment, not elitism, is the path forward. The digital elite should be leading this effort by developing and promoting technologies of empowerment, not crafting regulatory mandates to force their will upon us.^[58]

#

Adam Thierer is a Senior Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation and the director of its Center for Digital Media Freedom. Berin Szoka  is a Senior Fellow with PFF and the Director of PFF’s Center for Internet Freedom.

[1] . William A. Henry, In Defense of Elitism (1995) at 2-3.

[2] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Congress, Content Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, Progress Snapshot 4.4, Feb. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html. Like American courts, we use the term “speech” as a broad catch-all for communications, including both actual speaking as well as other forms of transmitting, as well as receiving, information (“content”).

[3] . See generally Adam Thierer, Don’t Scapegoat Media, USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.24scapegoatmedia.html; Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the Children, “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001); Karen Sternheimer, It’s Not the Media: The Truth about Pop Culture’s Influence on Children (2003); Karen Sternheimer, Kids These Days: Facts and Fictions about Today’s Youth (2006).

[4] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, FCC Violence Report Concludes that Parenting Doesn’t Work, PFF Blog, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2007/04/fcc_violence_re.html.

[5] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sen. Rockefeller Gives Up on Parenting at Senate Violence Hearing, PFF Blog, June 26, 2007, blog.pff.org/archives/2007/06/sen_rockefeller_1.html.

[6] . Adam Thierer, Conservatives, Porn, and “Community Standards,” The Technology Liberation Front, March 2, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/02/conservatives-porn-and-community-standards.

[7] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.19onlinetargeting.html.

[8] . Jeff Chester, for decades the great gadfly of American advertising, has decried “the system … developed to track each and every one of us and our behavior for one-on-one marketing efforts” as “manipulative, intrusive and un-democratic.” Wendy Melillo, Q&A: Chester Writes the Book on Privacy, Dec. 11, 2007, www.gfem.org/node/227. For instance, Chester and other leading “privacy advocates” ridicule the idea of smart phones as a “liberating technology” and insist that,

Despite the glowing words about customization and personalized service, what marketers and advertisers are increasingly offering consumers is merely the illusion of free choice. Mobile operators offer their various options and services, not on an individual basis, but preconfigured according to segmented demographic profiles.

Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Complaint and Request for Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Mobile Marketing Practices, Jan. 13, 2009 (emphasis original), www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCmobile_complaint0109.pdf. See generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?, Progress on Point 16.2, Feb. 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.

[9] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, Progress on Point 16.11, May 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf.

[10] . The Supreme Court has used a “right to privacy” to strike down laws against the use of contraception by married couples, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[11] . Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop7.15freedomofspeech.pdf.

[12] . See , Amicus Brief for Association Of National Advertisers, Cato Institute, Coalition For Healthcare Communication, Pacific Legal Foundation And The Progress & Freedom Foundation In Support Of Appellants, IMS Health v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv(L), 09-2056-cv(CON) (2nd Cir. 2009), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/071309-Brief-Amici-Curiae-ANA-et-al-Second-Circuit-(09-1913-cv).pdf.

[13] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No Easy Solutions, Progress on Point No. 14.5, March 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ pops/pop14.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdfAdam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Statement Regarding the Internet Safety Technical Task Force’s Final Report to the Attorneys General, Jan. 14, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/090114ISTTFthiererclosingstatement.pdf; Nancy Willard, Why Age and Identity Verification Will Not Work—And is a Really Bad Idea, Jan. 26, 2009, www.csriu.org/PDFs/digitalidnot.pdf; Jeff Schmidt, Online Child Safety: A Security Professional’s Take, The Guardian, Spring 2007, www.jschmidt.org/AgeVerification/Gardian_JSchmidt.pdf.

[14] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate, PFF Blog, June 26, 2006, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2006/06/mandatory_data.html

[15] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Perils of Mandatory Parental Controls and Restrictive Defaults, Progress on Point 14.4, Apr. 11, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.4defaultdanger.pdf.

[16] . Adam Thierer, China’s Green Dam Filter and the Threat of Rising Global Censorship, PFF Blog, June 17, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/06/chinas_green_dam_filter_and_threat_of_rising_globa.html

[17] . They define choice architecture as follows: “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.” Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[18] . Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 6.

[19] . See Adam Thierer, Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control,” Cato Unbound, May 2009, www.cato-unbound.org/2009/05/08/adam-thierer/code-pessimism-and-the-illusion-of-perfect-control

[20] . See Solveig Singleton & Jim Harper, With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us, 2001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299930.

[21] . As Cato Institute scholar Will Wilkinson has argued, the book’s “agreeably banal doctrine of choice-preserving helpfulness” blurs the lines between paternalism and libertarianism, and thus “the thrust of the conceptual renovation behind the term libertarian paternalism is to empower, not limit, political elites.” Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way,” Reason, October 2008, www.reason.com/news/show/128916.html. See also Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sunstein’s “Libertarian Paternalism” is Really Just Paternalism, PFF Blog, April 7, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/04/sunsteins_liber.html.

[22] . See Robert Corn-Revere, “’Voluntary’ Self-Regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism,” in Rationales & Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997), at 183-208.

[23] . Telecom Policy Report, Commission Settles Indecency Charges, But At What Cost?, June 30, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_25_2/ai_n6091525.

[24] . See Adam Thierer, XM-Sirius, Regulatory Blackmail, and Diversity, June 17, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/06/xmsirius_regula.html.

[25] . See Comments of W. Kenneth Ferree on Implementation of Sirius-XM Merger Condition, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, MB Docket No. 07-57, March 30, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/033009siriusXMconditionfiling.pdf.

[26] . See Szoka & Adam Thierer, supra note 8 at 3.

[27] . See id. at 2.

[28] . Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (1995) at 5.

[29] . Alice Marwick, To Catch a Predator? The MySpace Moral Panic, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6-2, June 2008, www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2152/1966; Wade Roush, The Moral Panic over Social Networking Sites, Technology Review, Aug. 7, 2006, www.technologyreview.com/communications/17266; Anne Collier, Why Techopanics are Bad, Net Family News, April 23, 2009, www.netfamilynews.org/2009/04/why-technopanics-are-bad.html; Adam Thierer, Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics,’ Inside ALEC, July 2009, at 16-17, www.alec.org/am/pdf/Inside_July09.pdf; Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare, PFF Blog, June 10, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/07/10/technopanics-and-the-great-social-networking-scare.

[30] . Supra note 13.

[31] . In the 109th Congress, former Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on social networking sites in public schools and libraries. DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a lopsided 410-15 vote, but failed to pass the Senate. The measure was reintroduced just a few weeks into the 110th Congress by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the ranking minority member and former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. It was section 2 of a bill that Sen. Stevens sponsored titled the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act” (S. 49), but was later removed from the bill. See Declan McCullagh, Chat Rooms Could Face Expulsion, CNet News.com, July 28, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6099414.html?part=rss&tag=6099414&subj=news.

[32] . See Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, MySpace Receives More Pressure to Limit Children’s Access to Site, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006, online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115102268445288250-YRxkt0rTsyyf1QiQf2EPBYSf7iU_20070624.html; Susan Haigh, Conn. Bill Would Force MySpace Age Check, Yahoo News.com, March 7, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17502005.

[33] . See, e.g., Letter of Henry McMaster, Attorney General, South Carolina to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Attorney General Roy Cooper Regarding Internet Safety Task Force (“ISTTF”) Report, January 14, 2009, www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/2009/internetsafetyreport.pdf

[34] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Games and “Moral Panic,” PFF Blog, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/01/video_games_and_moral_panic.html ; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Fact and Fiction in the Debate over Video Game Regulation, Progress Snapshot 13.7, March 2006, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.7videogames.pdf.

[35] . “All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, at 858 (3rd ed. 1963) (1949).

[36] . See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 119-123, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf (Explaining how the third-person effect serves as a powerful explanation for the heated backlash that followed an FCC effort to moderately liberalize media ownership rules in 2003-04).

[37] . W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, Spring 1983, at 3.

[38] . For the best overview of third-person effect research, see Douglas M. McLeod, Benjamin H. Detenber, and William P. Eveland., Jr., Behind the Third-Person Effect: Differentiating Perceptual Processes for Self and Other, 51 Journal of Communication, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2001, at 678-695.

[39] . Vincent Price, David H. Tewksbury & Li-Ning Huang, Third-person Effects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, Journalism & Mass Communications Quarterly, Vol. 74, at 525-540.

[40] . Douglas M. McLeod, William P. Eveland & Amy I. Nathanson, Support for Censorship of Violent and Misogynic Rap Lyrics: And Analysis of the Third-Person Effect, Communications Research, Vol. 24, 1997, at 153-174.

[41] . Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-Person Effect, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 8, 1996, at 163-186.

[42] . James D. Ivory, Addictive, But Not For Me: The Third-Person Effect and Electronic Game Players’ Views Toward the Medium’s Potential for Dependency and Addiction, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aug. 2002.

[43] . Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography, Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1995, at 27-38

[44] . Supra note 37 at 14. Along these lines, a December 2004 Washington Post article documented the process by which the Parents Television Council, a vociferous censorship advocacy group, screens various television programming. One of the PTC screeners interviewed for the story talked about the societal dangers of various broadcast and cable programs she rates, but then also noted how much she personally enjoys HBO’s “The Sopranos” and “Sex and the City,” as well as ABC’s “Desperate Housewives.” Apparently, in her opinion, what’s good for the goose is not good for the gander! See Bob Thompson, Fighting Indecency, One Bleep at a Time, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2004, at C1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49907-2004Dec8.html.

[45] . See Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price at 112-118 (2009).

[46] . See Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, to California Attorney General Lockyer, May 3, 2004, http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/agltr5.3.04.html.

[47] . See email from Adam Thierer to Declan McCullaugh on Politech Email discussion group, April 30, 2004, http://lists.jammed.com/politech/2004/04/0083.html (emphasis added).

[48] . See Complaint and Request for Injunction of the Electronic Privacy Information Center against Google, Inc., March 17, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf; see also Ryan Radia, Should the FTC Shut Down Gmail and Google Docs Because of an Already-Fixed Bug?, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 18, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/18/should-the-ftc-shut-down-gmail-and-google-docs-because-of-an-already-fixed-bug/.

[49] . See Berin Szoka & Mark Adams, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Benefits of Online Advertising & the Costs of Regulation, PFF Working Paper, forthcoming.

[50] . Anti-advertising crusader Jeff Chester often resorts to questioning the motives of those who question whether his regulatory prescriptions would actually benefit consumers, see, e.g., http://techliberation.com/2009/06/17/behavioral-advertising-industry-practices-hearing-some-issues-that-need-to-be-discussed/#comment-11698840. See generally Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (2007).

[51] . “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1859, 1986) at 72.

[52] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection, Special Report, Version 4.0, Summer 2009, www.pff.org/parentalcontrols.

[53] . Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Privacy Solutions, PFF Blog, Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/privacy_solutions.

[54] . Comments of Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, In the Matter of Implementation of the Child Save Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming; MB Docket No. 09-26, April 16, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/041509-%5bFCC-FILING%5d-Adam-Thierer-PFF-re-FCC-Child-Safe-Viewing-Act-NOI-(MB-09-26).pdf.

[55] . See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age, Engage, Feb. 20, 2009, www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_ThiererEngage101.pdf

[56] . “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich von Hayek, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Essence of Hayek, (Hoover Inst., 1984), at 276.

[57] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Two Sensible, Education-Based Legislative Approaches to Online Child safety, Progress Snapshot 3.10, Sept. 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.10safetyeducationbills.pdf.

[58] . See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Google, CDT, Online Advertising & Preserving Persistent User Choice Across Ad Networks Through Plug-ins, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 13, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/ 03/13/google-cdt-online-advertising-preserving-persistent-user-choice-across-ad-networks-through-plug-ins/.

Adam Thierer noted in mid-December that the FCC was considering allowing the experimental use of cellphone jammers in prison.  The FCC just issued (PDF) a Special Temporary Authorization to allow the DC Department of Corrections to test a cell phone jamming technology.

This technology sounds like an excellent solution to a serious problem:  The illicit use of cell phones inside correctional facilities by prisoners across the country.  In particular, the technology appears to be “directional,” meaning that unlike traditional jammers, which simply block signals within a certain radius around the jammer, this technology appears to be capable of blocking signals inside the confines of a particular room or building.  In fact, I’m sure millions of Americans would love to see such technologies implemented in cinemas, theatres, and other performing arts venues across the country.  I, for one, am tired of having the exquisite acoustic delicacies of Bach interrupted by annoying ring tones, such as  the (painfully) immortal “Who Let the Dogs Out?”

So Much for The Rule of Law

But there’s one important problem: The FCC isn’t waiving a rule here against cell phone jammer. unless I’m missing some subtle statutory quirk, they’re essentially “waiving” a statute—specifically 47 U.S.C. 333:

No person shall willfully or maliciously interfere with or cause interference to any radio communications of any station licensed or authorized by or under this chapter or operated by the United States Government.

You don’t need to be an administrative lawyer to know that agencies can’t just ignore acts of Congress—no matter how good the policy reason for the waiver is. That’s a big part of what the “rule of law” means.  Period.  Do not pass ‘Go’.  Do not collect $3,101.09 (today’s equivalent of $200 in 1935, when Monopoly debuted).

Fortunately, as noted in the WSJ article Adam cited, at least one legislator realizes this and thinks it’s worth fixing:  U.S. Rep. Kevin Brady (R., Texas) told the Journal that his office is “drafting the necessary legislation to remove this outdated FCC roadblock.”  The FCC, of course, sped right past that particular roadblock.  But then, what should we expect from an agency that has, under its outgoing (and none-too-soon!) chairman Kevin Martin, simply disregarded statutory limits on its authority when it found Comcast in violation of the agency’s non-binding net neutrality principles this summer?  (My PFF colleague Barbara Esbin has eloquently condemned this violation of the rule of law in, “The Law is Whatever the Nobles Do: Undue Process at the FCC” (PDF).)

Now, when Congress considers this question, let us hope that they draw the right lesson from this episode:   Whatever the wisdom of outright bans on particular technologies, writing such bans into statutes is a really bad idea.  At least if such decisions were left up to regulatory agencies, they would have the flexibility to decide when to depart from a general ban.  Thus, the best approach would be to repeal the ban altogether.  The FCC probably already has the authority to ban jammers under Section 302a, which provides that:

The Commission may, consistent with the public interest, convenience, and necessity, make reasonable regulations:

(1) governing the interference potential of devices which in their operation are capable of emitting radio frequency energy by radiation, conduction, or other means in sufficient degree to cause harmful interference to radio communications…

A Legislative Solution

Now, if Rep. Brady wanted to establish an orderly procedure for replacing Section 333’s outright ban on cell phone jammers with a more reasonable, and flexible, rule, the bill repealing Section 333 might also simply give the FCC the authority to issue Special Temporary Authorizations like the one the FCC just issued to the DC Department of Corrections—but also require that the agency complete a rule-making proceeding within, say, a year to establish new regulations specifying precisely which jammers would be banned.  At a minimum, the new regulations could achieve legally what the FCC is trying to achieve illegally:   banning cell phone jammers except for use in correctional facilities and only subject to certain technical requirements intended to ensure that the jamming was sufficiently “directional” not to obstruct cell phone reception nearby such facilities.

But if such directional jamming is really possible, why not allow the use of jammers in performance venues?  Of course, some consumers might not actually prefer to suffer through a few stray ring-tones during a movie if it means being able to receive calls on vibrate or text messages or email in case of emergency.  But I’d rather leave that decision to private property owners and consumers.  These are not questions Congress should attempt to answer:  Those answers would necessarily be enshrined in statute, and therefore very difficult to change.  Instead, these decisions should be left up to the FCC and resolved through the normal rule-making process.  If the initial rule-making bans private uses of jammers, at least there would be an established procedure whereby the rule could be more easily changed in the future, as technology develops.

A Future Without a Jammer Ban

With all such technologies banned today, there is probably little incentive to develop better jamming technology that can be more carefully tailored.  But if at least some uses of jamming technology were allowed, there would be a market that could drive the development of better jamming technologies in the future.  So if the FCC’s concern were that today’s jammers caused unacceptable levels of unintentional interference to cell phone networks, that problem might yet be solved through technological innovation.

Lest anyone argue that once any use of jammers was allowed, the “cat” would be “out of the bag”—resulting in the disruption of cell phone networks by pranksters, criminals or even terrorists—let me simply suggest Googling “cell phone jammer.” It may not be legal, but Americans can already buy cell phone jammers.  The reality is that, without a global totalitarian state, or at least completely sealed borders (an impossibility), completely banning any technology is impossible.

Since today’s ban—and harsh penalties—seems to work well enough to protect cell networks from widespread disruption—or even occasional disruption sufficient to attract attention—it’s not unreasonable to think we might get by just fine if we kept those same penalties in place under a new rule that carefully circumscribed which private users would be allowed to use which technologies.  Perhaps then we might all be able to enjoy a movie, concert or other performance in peace—if we chose to.

The Alternative

Many people would probably prefer that solution over the alternative:  incorporating into cell phones the kind of  “digital manners policy” (DMP) technology recently patented by Microsoft that would allow a DMP transmitter to order all devices within range that have a DMP receiver to turn off their ring tones, etc.  There’s something to be said for Microsoft’s solution from a technical perspective:  The DMP could be set to allow me to continue to receive text messages, use the vibrate setting for calls, or use the wireless data network.  So a DMP transmitter would certainly be a less blunt instrument than a cell phone jammer.  But it wouldn’t be entirely effective unless every cell phone had a DMP chip, which means that the only way to “make the ringing stop!” would be to mandate the adoption of such technology by cell phone managers, banning the sale of non-compliant cell phones, and—if we really wanted to be thorough—sending out the cell-phone Gestapo to round up all the old, non-compliant cell phones out there.

I’m not suggesting any nefarious intent on Microsoft’s part.  Like Hamlet (” There is nothing either good or bad, but  thinking makes it so“), I don’t believe a technology can be inherently evil.  Indeed, even partial adoption of DMP technologies in cell phones would certainly help solve our “crisis of digital manners.”  But I’m more than a little uncomfortable with the idea of creating this kind of architecture of control, by which a third party (not me or the carrier) could manipulate the settings of my cell phone.  The potential for abuse of that technology seems even scarier than the potential for abuse of jammers.  Even if Microsoft limited the DMP chip’s interface with the cell phone to controlling, say, ring volume or vibrate settings, I’d have to wonder what a good hacker could do with that kind of technology.  So while I wouldn’t suggest banning DMPs either, I would hate to see DMP technologies become industry standard merely because the FCC refused to reconsider its decades-old outright ban on radio jammers.

Rep. Brady, our nation turns its lonely eyes (and even more annoyed ears) to you.

The introduction below was originally written by Berin Szoka, but now that I (Adam Marcus) am a full-fledged TLF member, I have taken authorship.

Adam Marcus, our exceptionally tech-savvy new research assistant at PFF, has published his first piece at the PFF blog, which I reprint here for your edification.

Today Google’s DC office hosted an interesting panel on cloud computing.  What was missing was a good definition of what “cloud computing” actually is.

While Wikipedia has its own broad definition of cloud computing, many think of cloud computing more narrowly as strictly web-based for which clients need nothing but a web browser. But that definition doesn’t cover things like Skype and SETI@home.  And just because PFF has implemented Outlook Web Access so we can access the Exchange server via the Web, doesn’t necessarily mean we’ve implemented what most people might think of as “cloud computing.”  Yet these are all variations on a common theme, which leads me to propose my own basic definition: any client/server system that operates over the Internet.

To understand the potential policy and legal issues raised by cloud computing so-defined, one must break down the discussion into a 4-part grid.  One axis is divided into private data ( e.g., email) and public data (e.g., photo sharing).  The other axis is divided into data hosted on a single server or centralized server farm and data hosted on multiple computers in a dynamic peer-to-peer network (e.g., BitTorrent file sharing).

There are also a great number of peer-to-peer cloud computing projects that don’t require the sharing of user data.  SETI@home may be the most well-known example:  When the Search for Extra-Terrestrial Intelligence (SETI) project lost its funding and could no longer afford the massive servers it used to process the data from its radiotelescopes, it realized that it could distribute the work to Internet users in the form of a screensaver (thus the SETI work would only be done when a user’s computer was idle).

It is encouraging to see that Congress is no longer considering simply outlawing cloud computing (which used to be called distributed computing), but if there is to be an intelligible debate about policy responses to cloud computing, we must define our terms and realize that policies beneficial to some forms of cloud computing may complicate-sometimes fatally, in business terms-other forms.  For example, regulations imposed on companies storing users’ personal data may stymie peer-to-peer backup applications like Wuala, which distributes each user’s backup data to other users, but uses encryption to prevent users from accessing the data they’re storing for others. Wuala might be forced to close down if regulations requiring companies to keep records for a set period of time or follow separate procedures for minors were interpreted to apply to each Wuala user.

As Georgetown CCT professor Mike Nelson explained at the Google workshop, technology generally follows a clear evolution in the following steps: from hardware to software to people to organizations to policy.  It’s taken a long time to educate lawmakers about the Internet.  Today’s panelists all seemed to agree that cloud computing could be “the next big thing.”  That necessarily means that the education process for lawmakers needs to start all over again, explaining the ways in which cloud computing is similar to prior technologies, the ways it’s different, and the salient differences among the four broad categories of cloud computing described above.  Until that’s done, any talk of legislation in this area is simply premature.