This week, the Trump Administration proposed a new policy framework for artificial intelligence (AI) technologies that attempts to balance the need for continued innovation with a set of principles to address concerns about new AI services and applications. This represents an important moment in the history of emerging technology governance as it creates a policy vision for AI that is generally consistent with earlier innovation governance frameworks established by previous administrations.

Generally speaking, the Trump governance vision for AI encourages regulatory humility and patience in the face of an uncertain technological future. However, the framework also endorses a combination of “hard” and “soft” law mechanisms to address policy concerns that have already been raised about developing or predicted AI innovations.

AI promises to revolutionize almost every sector of the economy and can potentially benefit our lives in numerous ways. But AI applications also raise a number of policy concerns, specifically regarding safety or fairness. On the safety front, for example, some are concerned about the AI systems that control drones, driverless cars, robots, and other autonomous systems. When it comes to fairness considerations, critics worry about “bias” in algorithmic systems that could deny people jobs, loans, or health care, among other things.

These concerns deserve serious consideration and some level of policy guidance or else the public may never come to trust AI systems, especially if the worst of those fears materialize as AI technologies spread. But how policy is formulated and imposed matters profoundly. A heavy-handed, top-down regulatory regime could undermine AI’s potential to improve lives and strengthen the economy. Accordingly, a flexible governance framework is needed and the administration’s new guidelines for AI regulation do a reasonably good job striking that balance.

Background

Last February, the White House issued Executive Order 13859, on “Maintaining American Leadership in Artificial Intelligence.” The Order announced the creation of the “American AI Initiative,” an effort to “focus the resources of the Federal government to develop AI.” It prioritized investments in AI-focused research and development (R&D), building a workforce ready for the AI era, international engagement on AI priorities, and the establishment governance standards for AI systems to “help Federal regulatory agencies develop and maintain approaches for the safe and trustworthy creation and adoption of new AI technologies.”

Regarding that last objective, Order 13589 required the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) and the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) to develop a framework and set of principles for federal agencies to follow when considering the development of regulatory and non‑regulatory approaches for AI. Importantly, the Order also specified that the framework should seek to “advance American innovation” and “reduce barriers to the use of AI technologies in order to promote their innovative application while protecting civil liberties, privacy, American values, and United States economic and national security.”

That resulted in the memorandum sent to heads of federal departments and agencies this week entitled, “Guidance for Regulation of Artificial Intelligence Applications” (hereinafter AI Guidance). The draft version of the AI Guidance specifies that “federal agencies must avoid regulatory or non-regulatory actions that needlessly hamper AI innovation and growth.” More specifically:

“Agencies must avoid a precautionary approach that holds AI systems to such an impossibly high standard that society cannot enjoy their benefits. Where AI entails risk, agencies should consider the potential benefits and costs of employing AI, when compared to the systems AI has been designed to complement or replace.”

But the AI Guidance is certainly not a call for comprehensive deregulation or the abandonment of all AI federal oversight. The memorandum’s very title reflects an understanding that existing laws and agency rules will continue to play a role in guiding the development of AI, machine-learning, and autonomous systems.

Accordingly, and consistent with past executive orders and OMB regulatory guidance documents for federal agencies, the AI Guidance establishes a set of ten principles that agencies must take into consideration when considering AI policy:

1. Public trust in AI: Requiring that “the government’s regulatory and non-regulatory approaches to AI promote reliable, robust, and trustworthy AI applications, which will contribute to public trust in AI.”
2. Public participation: Agencies must provide “ample opportunities for the public to provide information and participate in all stages of the rulemaking process.”
3. Scientific integrity and information quality: Agencies should “leverage scientific and technical information and processes” to build trust and ensure data quality and transparency.
4. Risk assessment and management: Acknowledging that “all activities involve tradeoffs,” the AI Guidance requires that “a risk-based approach should be used to determine which risks are acceptable and which risks present the possibility of unacceptable harm, or harm that has expected costs greater than expected benefits.”
5. Benefits and costs: As part of those risk assessments, agencies must “carefully consider the full societal costs, benefits, and distributional effects before considering regulations related to the development and deployment of AI applications. Such consideration will include the potential benefits and costs of employing AI, when compared to the systems AI has been designed to complement or replace, whether implementing AI will change the type of errors created by the system, as well as comparison to the degree of risk tolerated in other existing ones.”
6. Flexibility: OMB encourages agencies to “pursue performance-based and flexible approaches that can adapt to rapid changes and updates to AI applications.”
7. Fairness and non-discrimination: Acknowledging that “in some instances, introduce real-world bias that produces discriminatory outcomes or decisions that undermine public trust and confidence in AI,” the AI Guidance requires agencies to consider “issues of fairness and non-discrimination with respect to outcomes and decisions produced by the AI application at issue.”
8. Disclosure and transparency: Agencies are encouraged to consider how greater “transparency and disclosure can increase public trust and confidence in AI applications.”
9. Safety and security: Agencies are required to “promote the development of AI systems that are safe, secure, and operate as intended, and encourage the consideration of safety and security issues throughout the AI design, development, deployment, and operation process.”
10. Interagency coordination: The guidance makes it clear that a “coherent and whole-of-government approach to AI oversight requires interagency coordination.”

Soft Law Ascends

Importantly, the AI Guidance also encourages agencies to be open to “non-regulatory approaches to AI” governance and specifies three particular models:

• Sector-specific policy guidance or frameworks: OSTP writes that “agencies should consider using any existing statutory authority to issue non-regulatory policy statements, guidance, or testing and deployment frameworks, as a means of encouraging AI innovation in that sector.” The memorandum also notes that this can include “work done in collaboration with industry, such as development of playbooks and voluntary incentive frameworks.”
• Pilot programs and experiments: The document encourages the use of “pilot programs that provide safe harbors for specific AI applications” which “could produce useful data to inform future rulemaking and non-regulatory approaches.”
• Voluntary consensus standards: Before regulating, the AI Guidance encourages agencies to consider how voluntary consensus standards, assessment programs, and compliance programs might be used to address policy concerns.

These represent “soft law” approaches to technological governance and they are becoming all the rage in technology policy discussions today. Soft law mechanisms are informal, collaborative, and constantly evolving governance efforts. While not formerly binding like “hard law” rules and regulations, soft law efforts nonetheless create a set of expectations about sensible development and use of technologies. Soft law can include multistakeholder initiatives, best practices and standards, agency workshops and guidance documents, educational efforts, and much more.

Soft law has become the dominant governance approach for emerging technologies because it is often better able to address the “pacing problem,” which refers to the growing gap between the rate of technological innovation and policymakers’ ability to keep up with it. As I have previously noted, the pacing problem is “becoming the great equalizer in debates over technological governance because it forces governments to rethink their approach to the regulation of many sectors and technologies.”

Not only do traditional legislative and regulatory hard law systems struggle to keep up with fast-paced technological changes, but oftentimes those older mechanisms are just too rigid and unsuited for new sectors and developments. That is definitely the case for AI, which is multi-dimensional in nature and even defies easy definition. Soft law offers a more flexible, adaptive approach to learning on the fly and cobbling together principles and policies that can address new policy concerns as they develop in specific contexts, without derailing potentially important innovations.

Building on Past Governance Frameworks

In this sense, the Trump administration’s AI Guidance borrows from past policy frameworks by marrying up a desire to promote an exciting new set of emerging technologies alongside the need for reasonable but flexible oversight and governance mechanisms. At a high level, the AI Guidance builds on many of the same principles that motivated the Clinton administration’s Framework for Global Electronic Commerce, a statement of principles and policy objectives for the then-emerging Internet. The document, which was issued in July 1997, said that “governments should encourage industry self-regulation and private sector leadership where possible” and “avoid undue restrictions on electronic commerce.”

The Framework was a clean break from the top-down regulatory paradigm that had previously governed traditional communications and media technologies. Clinton’s Framework insisted that, to the extent government intervention was needed at all, “its aim should be to support and enforce a predictable, minimalist, consistent and simple legal environment for commerce.” The use of soft law and multistakeholder models was a key component of this vision, and those more flexible governance approaches were tapped by the subsequent administrations to address emerging tech policy concerns.

For example, the Obama administration considerably expanded the use of multistakeholder mechanisms and other soft law tools in response to the need of oversight of fast-moving technologies. The Obama administration had many different policy governance efforts underway for specific AI technologies and concerns, including workshops and multistakeholder efforts focused on the safety, security, and privacy-related issues surrounding “big data” systems, online advertising, connected cars, drones, and more.

Whereas the Obama administration was deeper in the weeds of the policy issues associated with specific AI and machine-learning applications, the Trump administration has sought to both build on those focused efforts while also stepping back to consider AI governance at the 30,000-foot level. In essence, the AI Guidance combines some of the aspirational elements found in the Clinton Framework alongside the Obama administration’s more targeted approach to consider specific policy concerns across many different sectors and technologies.

Trump’s AI Guidance adds an element of formality to this process regarding how federal agencies should address AI developments and formulate potential policy responses. It does so by counseling humility and even potential forbearance until all the facts are in. “Fostering innovation and growth through forbearing from new regulations may be appropriate,” the memorandum says. Agencies should consider new regulation only after they have reached the decision, in light of the foregoing section and other considerations, that Federal regulation is necessary.” Again, this is very much consistent with more general regulatory guidance issued by every administration since President Reagan was in office.

Flexible, Adaptive Governance is Key

The AI Guidance foreshadows the future of not only AI governance but the governance of many other emerging technologies. Hard law will continue to provide a backstop and have a role in guiding technological developments. Toward that end, efforts like the new AI Guidance are important because it represents an effort to “regulate the regulators” by placing some ground rules on how they go about applying old law to new developments.

But soft law governance is where the real action is at, both for AI and almost all emerging technologies today. The Trump AI Guidance reflects the extent to which soft law has become the dominant governance paradigm for modern tech sectors. As my colleagues Jennifer Huddleston and Trace Mitchell have noted, soft law is already effectively the law of the land for driverless cars, for example. After years of congressional wrangling over a federal autonomous vehicle regulatory framework—one that has widespread bipartisan support, no less—we still do not have a law on the books. Instead, the Department of Transportation has been cobbling together informal “rules of the road” through informal guidance documents that have been “versioned” as if they were computer software (i.e., Version 1.0, 2.0, 3.0). Version 4.0 of the DoT guidance for automated vehicles was just released this week.

That is the same approach that the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has taken with the privacy guidelines it developed. NIST’s Privacy Framework: A Tool for Improving Privacy through Enterprise Risk Management is also versioned like software. And many other federal agencies, especially the Federal Trade Commission, have tapped a wide variety of soft law tools—such as agency workshops and workshop reports that recommended privacy best practices for various technologies. Meanwhile, the National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) has used multistakeholder processes to address privacy concerns surrounding a wide range of technologies, including drones and facial recognition. NIST, FTC, and NTIA have undertaken these informal governance efforts because, despite over a decade of debate, Congress still has not advanced comprehensive federal privacy legislation. For better or worse, soft law has filled that governance gap.

Addressing Likely Objections from Left & Right

Many people of varying ideological dispositions will object to the growing role of soft law as the primary governance tool for emerging technology policy. Some conservatives will cringe at the sound of giving regulators greater leeway to address amorphous policy concerns, fearing that it will result in unconstrained exercises of unaccountable, extra-constitutional power.

Some of those concerns are valid, but they fail to account for the fact that the prospects for agency downsizing or deregulation they prefer are extremely limited. Practically speaking, the administrative state isn’t going anywhere. In some cases, agencies can actually do some real good by encouraging innovators to think about how to “bake-in” sensible best practices to preemptively address concerns about the privacy, safety, security, and fairness of various AI systems. Better those concerns be addressed in more flexible, adaptive fashion than by a heavy-handed, overly-rigid regulatory approach. Soft law offers that possibility, even if legitimate concerns remain about agency accountability and transparency.

Many to the left of center will be critical of this governance approach as well, but on very different grounds. As Associated Press reporter Matt O’Brien notes, “the vagueness of the principles announced by the White House is unlikely to satisfy AI watchdogs who have warned of a lack of accountability as computer systems are deployed to take on human roles in high-risk social settings, such as mortgage lending or job recruitment.”

These concerns actually are addressed in several of the OSTP’s ten principles, including those which stress the need for fairness and non-discrimination, information quality, public participation, disclosure and transparency, and safety and security. Yet many on the left will claim these principles merely pay lip service to these values and that what is really needed is a full-blown regulatory regime and some sort of corresponding new federal AI agency, which would preemptively determine which AI technologies would be allowed into the wild.

Already, an Algorithmic Accountability Act was introduced in Congress last year that would ask the FTC to take a more active role in policing “inaccurate, unfair, biased, or discriminatory decisions impacting consumers” that may have resulted from “automated decision systems.” Meanwhile, some academics have called for the creation of a Federal Robotics Commission or a National Algorithmic Technology Safety Administration to preemptively oversee new AI developments.

The problem with overly-precautionary regulation of that sort could potentially unduly limit AI innovation and the many benefits it entails. There may be some AI applications that pose serious and immediate risks to humanity and which require preemptive restraints on their development and use. Autonomous military and law enforcement applications are the most obvious examples. But most AI applications do not rise to that same level of regulatory concern, and other governance approaches are required to balance the use and misuse of them. This is why a more open and flexible governance approach is needed. Moreover, the old regulatory system just cannot keep up anymore, and it is ill-suited to address most policy concerns in a timely or efficient fashion.

Cristie Ford, and advocate of greater regulatory oversight for fintech, notes in her latest book that the problem with “old-style Welfare State regulation” is that it is “a clumsy, blunt instrument for achieving regulatory objectives” due to its reliance upon “one-size-fits-all mandates, prohibitions, and penalties.” Ford acknowledges what many other regulatory advocates are reluctant to admit:  public policies toward fast-paced technology sectors can no longer be governed effectively using the Analog Era’s top-down, command-and-control regulatory processes. Far too many federal agencies rely on a “build-and-freeze model” of regulation that puts rules in stone to deal with one sets of issues one day, but then either fails to eliminate them later when they become obsolete or to reform those rules to bring them in line with new social, economic, and technical realities.

If we hope to encourage continued innovation in sectors that could produce profoundly important, life-enriching technologies, America’s regulatory approach for AI and emerging technology needs to move away from “build-and-freeze” and toward “build-and-adapt.” Regulation is still needed, but the old regulatory toolkit is badly broken. For better or worse, soft law is going to fill the resulting governance gap, regardless of objections from some on the left or the right. Pragmatic policymaking is going to carry the day for emerging technology governance.

Conclusion

The Trump Administration AI Guidance represents a continuation and extension of this trend toward more flexible, adaptive governance approaches for emerging technologies. It offers a pragmatic vision that builds on the policies and paradigms of the past, while also encouraging fresh thinking about how best to balance the need for continued innovation alongside the various concerns about disruptive technological change.

There are many challenging issues that lie ahead and the new AI Guidance cannot provide bright-line answers to all the hypothetical questions that people want answered today. No one possesses a crystal ball that will allow them to forecast the technological future. Only ongoing trial-and-error experimentation and policy improvisation will allow us to find sensible solutions. A policy approach rooted in humility, flexibility, and forbearance will help ensure that America’s regulatory policies continue to promote both innovation and the public good.

Over at the Mercatus Center Bridge blog, Trace Mitchell and I just posted an essay entitled, “A Non-Partisan Way to Help Workers and Consumers,” which discusses the new Federal Trade Commission’s (FTC) Economic Liberty Task Force report on occupational licensing.

We applaud the FTC’s calls for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, but regret the missed opportunity to address root problem of excessive licensing more generally. But while FTC is right to push for greater occupational licensing uniformity and portability, policymakers need to confront the sheer absurdity of licensing so many jobs that pose zero risk to public health & safety. Licensing has become completely detached from risk realities and actual public needs.

As the FTC notes, excessive licensing limits employment opportunities, worker mobility, and competition while also “resulting in higher prices, reduced quality, and less convenience for consumers.” These are unambiguous facts that are widely accepted by experts of all stripes. Both the Obama and Trump Administrations, for example, have been completely in league on the need for comprehensive  licensing reforms.

Trace and I argue that we need serious occupational reforms built on the idea of the “right to earn a living” that must pass this test: “All occupational regulations shall be limited to those demonstrably necessary and carefully tailored to fulfill legitimate public health, safety, or welfare objectives.”  Also, all licensing authorities should be put on the clock and be required, within one year, to reassess the wisdom of all existing licenses to ensure they meet that test. If not, they are repealed or reformed.

In recent testimony in Texas, our Mercatus Center colleague Matthew Mitchell has also discussed other reform options, including the “Occupational Board Reform Act,” which recently passed in Nebraska. The goal of the law is to “protect the fundamental right of an individual to pursue a lawful occupation;.” They key provision of the Act demands that state actors:

use the least restrictive regulation which is necessary to protect consumers from undue risk of present, significant, and substantiated harms that clearly threaten or endanger the health, safety, or welfare of the public when competition alone is not sufficient and which is consistent with the public interest;

That’s an excellent approach to reform and when combined with the Right to Earn a Living Act, policymakers can begin to reverse the protectionist, anti-competitive licensing schemes that encumber entrepreneurs and workers across the land.

In forthcoming work, I hope to more fully develop the connection between the right to earn a living, the need for comprehensive licensing reform, and the freedom to innovate more generally. In the meantime, hop over to The Bridge to read our new essay on how the FTC report helps advance this cause..

It’s becoming clearer why, for six years out of eight, Obama’s appointed FCC chairmen resisted regulating the Internet with Title II of the 1934 Communications Act. Chairman Wheeler famously did not want to go that legal route. It was only after President Obama and the White House called on the FCC in late 2014 to use Title II that Chairman Wheeler relented. If anything, the hastily-drafted 2015 Open Internet rules provide a new incentive to ISPs to curate the Internet in ways they didn’t want to before. 

The 2016 court decision upholding the rules was a Pyrrhic victory for the net neutrality movement. In short, the decision revealed that the 2015 Open Internet Order provides no meaningful net neutrality protections–it allows ISPs to block and throttle content. As the judges who upheld the Order said, “The Order…specifies that an ISP remains ‘free to offer ‘edited’ services’ without becoming subject to the rule’s requirements.” 

The 2014 White House pressure didn’t occur in a vacuum. It occurred immediately after Democratic losses in the November 2014 midterms. As Public Knowledge president Gene Kimmelman tells it, President Obama needed to give progressives “a clean victory for us to show that we are standing up for our principles.” The slapdash legal finessing that followed was presaged by President Obama’s November 2014 national address urging Title II  classification of the Internet, which cites the wrong communications law on the Obama White House website to this day.

The FCC staff did their best with what they were given but the resulting Order was aimed at political symbolism and acquiring jurisdiction to regulate the Internet, not meaningful “net neutrality” protections. As internal FCC emails produced in a Senate majority report show, Wheeler’s reversal that week caught the non-partisan career FCC staff off guard. Literally overnight FCC staff had to scrap the “hybrid” (non-Title II) order they’d been carefully drafting for weeks and scrape together a legal justification for using Title II. This meant calling in advocates to enhance the record and dubious citations to the economics literature.  Former FCC chief economist, Prof. Michael Katz, whose work was cited in the Order, later stated to Forbes that he suspected the “ FCC cited my papers as an inside joke, because they know how much I think net neutrality is a bad idea.” 

Applying 1934 telegraph and telephone laws to the Internet was always going to have unintended consequences, but the politically-driven Order increasingly looks like an own-goal, even to supporters. Former FCC chief technologist, Jon Peha, who supports Title II classification of ISPs almost immediately raised the alarm that the Order offered “massive loopholes” to ISPs that could make the rules irrelevant.  This was made clear when the FCC attorney defending the Order in court acknowledged that ISPs are free to block and filter content and escape the Open Internet regulations and Title II. These concessions  from the FCC surprised even AT&T VP Hank Hultquist:

Wow. ISPs are not only free to engage in content-based blocking, they can even create the long-dreaded fast and slow lanes so long as they make their intentions sufficiently clear to customers.

So the Open Internet Order not only permits the net neutrality “nightmare scenario,” it provides an incentive to ISPs to curate the Internet. Despite the activist PR surrounding the Order, so-called “fast lanes”–like carrier-provided VoIP, VoLTE, and IPTV–have existed for years and the FCC rules allow them.  The Order permits ISP blocking, throttling, and “fast lanes”–what remains of “net neutrality”?

Prof. Susan Crawford presciently warned in 2005: 

I have lost faith in our ability to write about code in words, and I’m confident that any attempt at writing down network neutrality will be so qualified, gutted, eviscerated, and emptied that it will end up being worse than useless.

Aside from some religious ISPs, ISPs don’t want to filter Internet content. But the Obama FCC, via the “net neutrality” rules, gives them a new incentive: the Order deregulates ISPs that filter. ISPs will fight the rules because they want to continue to offer their conventional Internet service without submitting to the Title II baggage. This is why ISPs favor scrapping the Order–not only is it the FCC’s first claim to regulate Internet access, if the rules are not repealed, ISPs will be compelled to make difficult decisions about their business models and technologies in the future.

The Obama Administration has just released a draft “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015.” Generally speaking, the bill aims to translate fair information practice principles (FIPPs) — which have traditionally been flexible and voluntary guidelines — into a formal set of industry best practices that would be federally enforced on private sector digital innovators. This includes federally-mandated Privacy Review Boards, approved by the Federal Trade Commission, the agency that will be primarily responsible for enforcing the new regulatory regime.

Many of the principles found in the Administration’s draft proposal are quite sensible as best practices, but the danger here is that they could soon be converted into a heavy-handed, bureaucratized regulatory regime for America’s highly innovative, data-driven economy.

No matter how well-intentioned this proposal may be, it is vital to recognize that restrictions on data collection could negatively impact innovation, consumer choice, and the competitiveness of America’s digital economy.

Online privacy and security is vitally important, but we should look to use alternative and less costly approaches to protecting privacy and security that rely on education, empowerment, and targeted enforcement of existing laws. Serious and lasting long-term privacy protection requires a layered, multifaceted approach incorporating many solutions.

That is why flexible data collection and use policies and evolving best practices will ultimately serve consumers better than one-size-fits all, top-down regulatory edicts. Instead of imposing these FIPPs in a rigid regulatory fashion, privacy and security best practices will need to evolve gradually to new marketplace realities and be applied in a more organic and flexible fashion, often outside the realm of public policy.

Regulatory approaches, like the Obama Administration’s latest proposal, will instead impose significant costs on consumers and the economy. Data is the fuel that powers our information economy. Privacy-related mandates that curtail the use of data to better target or personalize new services could raise costs for consumers. There is no free lunch. Something has to pay for all the wonderful free sites and services we enjoy today. If data can’t be used to cross-subsidize those services, prices will go up.

Data regulations could also indirectly cost consumers by diminishing the abundance of content and culture now supported by the data-driven economy. In other words, even if prices and paywalls don’t go up, quantity or quality could suffer if data collection is restricted.

Data regulations could also hurt the competitiveness of domestic markets and the global competitive advantage that America’s tech sector has in this space. That regulatory burden would fall hardest on smaller operators and new start-ups. Today’s “app economy” has given countless small innovators a chance to compete on even footing with the biggest players. Burdensome data collection restrictions could short-circuit the engine that drives entrepreneurial innovation among mom-and-pop companies if ad dollars get consolidated in the hands of only the larger companies that can afford to comply with new rules.

We don’t want to go down the path the European Union charted in the 1990s with heavy-handed data directives. That suffocated high-tech entrepreneurialism and innovation there. America’s Internet sector came to be the envy of the world because our more flexible, light-touch regulatory regime leaves more breathing room for competition and innovation compared to Europe’s top-down regime. We should not abandon that approach now.

Finally, the Obama Administration’s proposal deals exclusively with private sector data collection and has nothing to say about government surveillance activities. The Administration would be wise to channel its energies into that far more significant privacy problem first.

Additional Reading from Adam Thierer of the Mercatus Center

Law Review Articles:

• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 36, No. 2, (2013).
• “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates,” George Mason Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, (2013).
• “Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem,” Maine Law Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2014).
• “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 21 (2015).
• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2013).

Testimony / Filings

• Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee on the Internet of Things, February 11, 2015.
• Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee on Privacy, Data Collection & Do Not Track, April 24, 2013.
• Filing to the Federal Trade Commission on Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things, May 31, 2013.
• Filing to the Federal Trade Commission on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, February 22, 2011.

President Obama recently announced his wish for the FCC to preempt state laws that make building public broadband networks harder. Per the White House, nineteen states “have held back broadband access . . . and economic opportunity” by having onerous restrictions on municipal broadband projects.

Much of the White House announcement misrepresents the situation. Most of these so-called state restrictions on public broadband are reasonable considering the substantial financial risk public networks pose to taxpayers. Minnesota and Colorado, for instance, require approval from local voters before spending money on a public network. Nevada’s “restriction” is essentially that public broadband is only permitted in the neediest, most rural parts of the state. Some states don’t allow utilities to provide broadband because utilities have a nasty habit of raising, say, everyone’s electricity bills because the money-losing utility broadband network fails to live up to revenue expectations. And so on.

The US government has spent billions on broadband, and much of it goes to public broadband networks. The activists’ response to the carriers, who obviously complain about this “competition,” is essentially, “maybe now you’ll upgrade and compete harder.”

Public networks are unwise and costly. Every dollar diverted to some money-losing public network is one less to use on worthy societal needs. There are serious problems with publicly-funded retail broadband networks. A few come to mind:

1. The economic benefits of municipal broadband are dubious. A recent Mercatus economics paper by researcher Brian Deignan showed disappointing results for municipal broadband. The paper uses 23 years of BLS data from 80 cities that have deployed broadband and analyzes municipal broadband’s effect on 1) quantity of businesses; 2) employee wages; and 3) employment. Ultimately, the data suggest municipal broadband has almost zero effect on the private sector.

On the plus side, municipal broadband is associated with a 3 percent increase in the number of business establishments in a city. However, there is a small, negative effect on employee wages. There is no effect on private employment but the existence of a public broadband network is associated with a 6 percent increase in local government employment. The substantial taxpayer risk for such modest economic benefits leads many states to reasonably conclude these projects aren’t worth the trouble.

2. There are serious federalism problems with the FCC preempting state laws. Matthew Berry, FCC Commissioner Pai’s chief of staff, explains the legal risks. Cities are creatures of state law and states have substantial powers to regulate what cities do. In some circumstances, Congress can preempt state laws, but as the Supreme Court has held, for an agency to preempt state laws, Congress must provide a clear statement that the FCC is authorized to preempt. Absent a clear statement from Congress, it’s unlikely the FCC could constitutionally preempt state laws regulating municipal broadband.

3. Broadband networks are hard work. Tearing up streets, attaching to poles, and wiring homes, condos, apartments is expensive and time-consuming. It costs thousands of dollars per home passed and the take-up rates are uncertain. Truck-rolls for routine maintenance and customer service cost hundreds of dollars per pop. Additionally, broadband network design is growing increasingly complex as several services converge to IP networks. Interconnection requires complex commercial agreements. Further, carriers are starting to offer additional services using software-defined networks and network function virtualization. I’m skeptical that city managers can stay cutting-edge years into the future. The costs for failed networks will fall to taxpayers.

4. City governments are just not very good at supplying triple play services, as the Phoenix Center and others have pointed out. People want phone, Internet, and television in one bill (and video-on-demand service). Cities will often find that there is a lack of interest in a broadband connection that doesn’t also provide traditional television as well. Google Fiber (not a public network, obviously) initially intended to offer only broadband service. However, they quickly found out that potential subscribers wanted their broadband and video bundled together into one contract. The Google Fiber team had to scramble to put together TV packages consumers are accustomed to. If the very competent planners at Google Fiber weren’t aware of this consumer habit, the city planners in Moose Lake and Peoria budgeting for municipal broadband may miss it, too. Further, city administrators are not particularly good at negotiating competitive video bundles (municipal cable revealed this) because of their small size and lack of expertise.

5. A municipal network can chase away commercial network expansion and investment. This, of course, is the main complaint of the cable and telco players. If there is a marginal town an ISP is considering serving or upgrading, the presence of a “public competitor” makes the decision easy. Competing against a network with ready access to taxpayer money is senseless.

6. When cities build networks where ISPs already are serving the public, ISPs do not take it laying down, either. ISPs use their considerable size and industry expertise to their advantage, like adding must-have channels to basic cable packages. The economics are particularly difficult for a city entering the market. Broadband networks have high up-front costs but fairly low marginal costs. This makes price reductions by incumbents very attractive in order to limit customer defections to the entrant. Dropping the price or raising the speeds in neighborhoods where the city builds and frustrating city customer acquisition is a common practice. You can look back at the late 1990s when municipal cable was briefly popular. Cities often hemorrhaged tax dollars when faced with hard-ball tactics and their penetration rates never reached the optimistic projections.

There are other complications that turn public broadband into expensive boondoggles. People often say in surveys they would pay more for ultra-fast broadband but when actually offered it, many refuse to pay higher prices for higher speeds, particularly when the TV channels offered in the bundle are paltry compared to the “slower” existing providers. When cities do lose money, and they often do, a utility-run broadband network will often cross-subsidize the failing broadband service. Electric utility customers’ dollars are, say, then diverted to maintaining broadband. Further, private carriers can drag lawsuits out to prevent city networks. And your run-of-the-mill city contractor corruption and embezzlement are also possibilities.

I can imagine circumstances where municipal broadband makes sense. However, the President and the FCC are doing the public a disservice by promoting widespread publicly-funded broadband in violation of state laws. This political priority, combined with the probable Title II order next month, signals an inauspicious start to 2015.

Jerry Ellig, senior research fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, discusses the the FCC’s lifeline assistance benefit funded through the Universal Service Fund (USF). The program, created in 1997, subsidizes phone services for low-income households. The USF is not funded through the federal budget, rather via a fee from monthly phone bills — reaching an all-time high of 17% of telecomm companies’ revenues last year. Ellig discusses the similarities between the USF fee and a tax, how the fee fluctuates, how subsidies to the telecomm industry have boomed in recent years, and how to curb the waste, fraud and abuse that comes as a result of the lifeline assistance benefit.

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Related Links

• Jerry Ellig’s Biography Mercatus Center
• Benefits, Costs and other Important Stuff-Demystifying Regulatory Analysis Ellig, Mercatus Center
• The Future of Regulation Ellig, Pepperdine University School of Public Policy

Adam Thierer, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center discusses his recent working paper with coauthor Brent Skorup, A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector. Thierer takes a look at how cronyism has manifested itself in technology and media markets — whether it be in the form of regulatory favoritism or tax privileges. Which tech companies are the worst offenders? What are the consequences for consumers? And, how does cronyism affect entrepreneurship over the long term?

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Related Links

• A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector, Thierer
• Video: A History of Cronysim and Capture in the Information Technology Sector, Thierer
• Adam Thierer Biography, Mercatus Center
• Adam Thierer on Anti-Tech Grump Evgeny Morozov, Thierer

A few days ago, the big news in the telecom world was that President Obama again ordered federal agencies to share and sell their spectrum to expand commercial mobile broadband use. This effort is premised on the fact that agencies use their gifted airwaves poorly while demand for mobile broadband is surging. While the presidential memorandum half-heartedly supports clearing out agencies from some bands and selling it off, the focus of the memo is shared access, whereby federal agencies agree to allow non-federal users to use the same spectrum bands with non-interfering technologies.

The good news is that there is no mention of PCAST’s 2012 recommendation to the president to create a 1000 MHz “superhighway” of unlicensed federal spectrum accessed by sensing devices. This radical proposal would replace the conventional clearing-and-auction process with a spectrum commons framework reliant on unproven sensing technologies. Instead of consumers relying on carriers’ spectrum for mobile broadband, this plan would crudely imitate (in theory) wifi on steroids, where devices would search out access over a huge portion of valuable spectrum, avoiding federal users. Its omission in the recent memo likely means the unlicensed superhighway won’t be pursued.

Still, this doubling-down on other forms of dynamic spectrum sharing is unfortunate for several reasons. First, it mostly entrenches the disastrous status quo by acceding to federal agencies’ claims that they can’t be safely moved. Giving federal agencies free spectrum decades ago was a costly mistake that needs to be corrected through pricing and through clearing. By throwing their hands up and saying that clearing and auctioning federal spectrum is too difficult and sharing is the best alternative, the administration forces us to suffer for the mistakes of the past.

Second, sharing, as envisioned in the memo, will not be accomplished quickly or extensively. Whatever technologies come out of this–there are several options, which only adds research delays–will be constrained by what interference risks the agencies accept. Engineering tests and simulations cannot answer this question; it is an economic and political question, and the economics is very distorted as it is. Federal agencies and particularly the military are very jealous of their spectrum. And who can blame them, since their wireless systems are often used for communications and training exercises that, if not directly protecting the lives of civilians, employees, and soldiers, are an important component of preparation for combat. But this jealousy means agencies are not good at sharing wireless bandwidth.

For “sharing skeptics,” UWB’s experiences illuminates our concerns. Ultrawideband (UWB) is a wireless low-power technology used for radar and data services and, beginning in 1989, its proponents sought regulatory approval to share federal spectrum for UWB commercial applications. UWB uses huge portions of spectrum but is very low power–transmissions from a cellphone are millions of times more powerful than UWB transmissions. Even then, UWB applicants were subjected to a process that can only be described as Kafka-esque as it went–for 13 years–agency to agency, submitting filings and completing interference tests, attempting to show that the technology would not threaten federal operations, before it finally got approval. Indicative of agency foot-dragging, a UWB manufacturer noted,

It took NTIA nearly a year to obtain internal sign off by government users of spectrum to approve with conditions the requests for waivers submitted by [UWB] companies. This despite the fact that the devices . . . were lifesaving instruments for public safety and law enforcement personnel, and all 2500 devices requested, if operating together in a single room, would emit less than one quarter the power of a cell phone.

That same UWB applicant made over 100 trips to DC in 6 years and spent millions of dollars to push his technology. Another large UWB company backed by Intel went out of business in the meantime. To be clear, the technologies contemplated in the memo are different from UWB, but UWB is not alone and the institutional resistance will be the same for future sharing technologies. There will be extensive tests, frequent denials, delays, and billions of dollars of continued waste of underused federal spectrum.

I have no doubt the heads of NTIA and DoD favor making mobile broadband more available to consumers. But it is also their duty to ensure that military and federal systems work well all the time. Given these two priorities (faster mobile downloads of cat videos versus public safety and military training), guess which one the NTIA and agencies will favor? What probability of service disruption will federal agencies tolerate? The answer–as we’ve seen in previous sharing attempts–is vanishingly small. That means if any technologies are approved for sharing on federal bands–a process that will take years–they will be likely constrained by very conservative technical criteria and low-power operations.

The memo’s best recommendation is exploring “incentives” (that is, pricing) for federal agencies to relinquish spectrum. Blair Levin–who worked on the FCC’s 2010 National Broadband Plan–voiced support for creating a “GSA for spectrum” at a Washington Post forum this week, and hopefully this sentiment will become a priority. Until agencies are paying market prices for this valuable resource, attempts to force agencies to share are bound to run into these problems since there is no way to analyze the economic tradeoffs.

But a GSA for spectrum is a long ways off and I suspect the regulatory risks and delays in the interim, combined with the poor economics of the permitted technologies, will scare away most investment. Whatever does emerge will be a poor substitute for the robust wireless networks we see everyday on our smartphones using exclusively licensed commercial spectrum, which is why the memo’s focus on sharing–not clearing and auctioning–is sorry news.

For more on proposals for reclaiming federal spectrum through clearing and auctioning, please see my hot-off-the-presses Mercatus working paper.

Declan McCullagh, chief political correspondent for CNET and former Washington bureau chief for Wired News, discusses recent leaks of NSA surveillance programs. What do we know so far, and what more might be unveiled in the coming weeks? McCullagh covers legal challenges to the programs, the Patriot Act, the fourth amendment, email encryption, the media and public response, and broader implications for privacy and reform.

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Related Links

• Snowden: NSA snoops on U.S. phone calls without warrants, McCullagh
• Snowden: Feds can’t plug leaks by ‘murdering me’, McCullagh
• Feds: Power grid vulnerable to cyber threats, McCullagh

This morning I spoke at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce event on “Responsible Data Uses: Benefits to Consumers, Businesses and the Economy.” In preparing for the event, I dusted off some old working notes for speeches I had delivered at other events about privacy policy and “big data” and expanded them a bit to account for recent policy developments. For what it’s worth, I figured I would post those notes here.  (I apologize about the informality but I never write out my speeches, I just work from bullet points.)

—————–

Benefits of “Big Data”

• “big data” has numerous micro- and macroeconomic benefits
• Micro benefits:
  • data aggregation of all varieties has powerful social and economic benefits that are sometimes invisible to consumers and citizens but are nonetheless enjoyed by them
  • big data can positively impact the 3 key micro variables – quality, quantity & price – and benefit consumers / citizens in the process

• Macro benefits:
  • Data is the lifeblood of the information economy and it has an increasing bearing on the global competitiveness of companies and countries
  • In the old days, when we talked about comparative and competitive advantage, the focus was on natural resources, labor, and capital.
  • Today, we increasingly talk about another variable: information
  • Data is increasing one of the most important resources that can benefit economic growth, innovation, and the competitive advantage of firms and nations.

Privacy Concerns

• of course, “big data” also raises big privacy concerns for many groups and individuals
• this has led to calls for regulatory action and virtually all levels of government – federal, state, local, and international – are considering expanded controls on data collection and aggregation

America’s Privacy Regime

• I want to address what I regard as the most powerful myth that governs this debate
• namely, I speak of the myth that America doesn’t have a privacy framework that can balance these goals and concerns about “big data” and data collection in general
• we hear various advocates say that America needs a new privacy regime, and many of these advocates suggest that that regime should more like Europe’s

Europe’s Regime

• first, what is that European regime?
  • a more preemptive top-down approach / data “directives” / stringent requirements on data use
  • basically, under the EU regime, privacy trumps almost all other considerations, regardless of cost or complexity.
  • It’s more of a “Mother, May I” regime in which innovation needs to be “permissioned”

• what’s wrong with European approach?
  • We can relate this back to the question of competitive advantage
  • The European approach leaves less room for innovative uses of data and ongoing marketplace experimentation
  • There’s also some evidence that this regime might influence industry structure and competitiveness as well as the quality and quantity of choices for the consumer
  • Anecdotally-speaking, we can ask ourselves this simple question: Can any of us name a global leader in the modern digital economy that was born in Europe?
  • I suppose there are a few, but I struggle to name them
  • Now, why is that?
  • It could be high taxes and the lack of healthy market for venture capital.
  • But it also must have something to do with regulatory structure that Europe has adopted.

America’s Current Advantages

• Regardless, here’s what we do know: America’s digital economy innovators and social media operators are household names across the globe. Our firms are the envy of the world
• Moreover, while many sectors of the U.S. economy are struggling, I bet if you stopped the average Joe in the street and asked them to name one sector of America’s economy that is currently thriving and an example of innovation that others should emulate, most of them would probably mention information technology and the digital economy.
• Again, many factors may contribute to our current success relative to Europe but certainly our “light-touch” legal and regulatory approach must have had some bearing on that outcome

America’s Privacy Regime

• So, what exactly is America’s privacy regime?
• Again, some say we don’t have one and that regulation is, therefore, needed
• I beg to differ
• America does have a privacy regime; it is one that is:
  • governed by a set of evolutionary norms,
  • ongoing online marketplace interactions and experiments, contractual negotiations,
  • public and press pressures,
  • self-regulatory systems,
  • educational efforts and user empowerment,
  • personal responsibility,
  • and targeted legal enforcement and the use of state torts when true harms can be demonstrated.

•   compared with Europe, our legal regime:
• More bottom-up enforcement
• Issue-specific / Sectoral approach to addressing
• Relies on common law / case law / torts
• States have role; often more stringent than fed law
• evolving industry Self-regulation

• That’s been the uniquely American approach to privacy protection and we should not abandon it lightly.

It’s the Same Regime We’ve Used to Address Online Safety

• Importantly, it’s largely the same approach we have taken in this country toward online speech and child safety matters.
• There, too, we have focused on what I call the “3-E” approach:
  • Education
  • Empowerment, and
  • Enforcement against particularly bad apples

• Thus, in both the online child safety space as well as the privacy policy space, we have made great strides in pushing both personal responsibility and corporate responsibility as the first line of defense, not the last.
• Now, it has always been true, and will always be the case, that “more can be done.”
• Consumers could do more: We need to constantly encourage consumers to take more care to protect the personal data they care most about and to take steps to safeguard that which they do not want collected in the first place
• Companies could do more: And we also need to constantly encourage companies who collect data to take greater steps to:
  • first consider asking permission to collect and use that data
  • second, to be transparent about what data they are collection and what they are using it for
  • and third, to ensure adequate safeguards are in place to guard against unauthorized use of that data

The Difference between the Traditional American Model & the Emerging “Co-Regulatory” Model

• in a sense, this vision tracks the Obama Administration’s proposed model for privacy and data collection
• but here’s the difference: the Obama Administration wants to force this process in a more heavy-handed way by involving various federal agencies in the day-to-day management of how all these decisions get made
• in essence, it’s a small but certain step toward the European model of “co-regulation”
  • government steers, industry rows
  • “multi-stakeholder process”
  • Everyone has a “seat at the table”
  • But we don’t need “a table” if the table is being set by government
  • there’s nothing wrong with truly voluntary “multi-stakeholder” processes, but when the government is the one setting the “seats at the table” and talking about enforcing the “codes” that the committee comes up with, it opens the door to a co-regulation model  that has some real dangers:
    • If every decision about how information is used or aggregated becomes the equivalent of a committee decision — with everyone “at the table” getting a vote or a veto – then it will almost certainly be the case that less innovation occurs
    • The process could lack traditional democratic accountability / due process if more of an “agency threats” model evolves out of this.  After all, if certain officials are in charge of who gets a “seat at the table” and also responsible for enforcing whatever is decided “at the table,” it raises the question of how much pressure they can bring to bear on the process. (File this under “regulation by raised eyebrow”).
    • Any way you cut it, regulation by committee (in this case, the “multistakeholder” process) could become the equivalent of a tax on innovation and have detrimental impacts on the quality and price of online services

Conclusion

• For these reasons, we should instead continue to rely on the uniquely American model of privacy policy that balances diverse goals and values in a more spontaneous, evolutionary, and voluntary way without incessant government oversight and intervention.
• Again, the traditional American model isn’t perfect and sometimes we will need targeted statutes, torts, and even FTC (Sec. 5) enforcement to handle the bad apples out there who cause the most serious problems in terms of privacy violations or data breeches.
• But that more targeted approach to enforcement, along with the education and empowerment-based approaches I have outlined, can adapt to new challenges in this space and the child safety space while also ensuring our global competitive advantage is not sacrificed in the process.
• To sum up: let’s not casually trade in the American model for Europe’s. America’s more flexible, evolutionary model of privacy protection has served us well so far and can adapt to balance competing needs without crushing our innovative information economy or America’s global competitiveness.

Additional Reading:

• my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation
• my recent Forbes oped, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan“
• Initial Thoughts on FTC’s Final Privacy Report
• video & slides from Hill Briefing on Online Privacy Policy
• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has just released its final privacy framework proposal, “Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change.” The agency released a draft report with the same title back in late 2010 and then asked for comments. [Here were my comments to the agency.] The FTC’s final report comes just a month after the Obama Administration released its 50-page privacy framework, Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World, which included a privacy “bill of rights.” That report was primarily driven by the Department of Commerce. [I penned a Forbes column about that report the day it was released.]  The new FTC report is fairly consistent with the earlier Commerce Department report.  Here are some of the key themes or recommendations from the final FTC report:

• rooted in a set of baseline privacy principles with a strong push for “privacy by design,” more consumer choice, and better transparency.
• along with Dept of Commerce, the agency will work with industry to develop privacy codes of conduct and then give them teeth with possibility of FTC enforcement.
• pushes for industry to pursue voluntary “Do Not Track” mechanism, which to the agency apparently means “do not collect” any info.
• calls on Congress to pass data security legislation and legislation “to provide greater transparency for, and control over, the practices of information brokers.” Also, “to further increase transparency, the Commission calls on data brokers that compile data for marketing purposes to explore creating a centralized website where data brokers could (1) identify themselves to consumers and describe how they collect and use consumer data and (2) detail the access rights and other choices they provide with respect to the consumer data they maintain.”
• the agency will host a workshop later this year to discuss privacy withing “large platform providers.” The report notes: “To the extent that large platforms, such as Internet Service Providers, operating systems, browsers, and social media, seek to comprehensively track consumers’ online activities, it raises heightened privacy concerns.”
• the agency is also stepping up oversight on mobile privacy issues.
• the agency says it “generally supports the exploration of efforts to develop additional mechanisms, such as the ‘eraser button’ for social media,” but stops short of saying it should be mandated at this time.

Some of my initial random thoughts about the FTC report:

Not as bad as it could have been…

Overall, the FTC’s final privacy report not as heavy-handed as it could have been. There’s no sweeping, immediate effort to impose a top-down privacy regime or “Data Directive” that some of us feared would put the FTC in a position to become a full-blown Data Protection Agency and regulate every facet of the information economy.

… but “self-regulation” sure sounds a lot like European-style “co-regulation.”

Nonetheless, it doesn’t mean that can’t happen. It is clear that the new FTC and Commerce privacy reports signal the next step in the Obama Administration’s gradual move toward more of a “co-regulation” model for Internet governance on the privacy front. The Administration seems to favor a “government steers, industry rows” model for privacy policy that assigns a broad oversight role to federal regulators allowing them to “nudge” the tech industry in certain directions with the stern but amorphous “do this or else” sword of Damocles hanging over industry “self-regulatory” decisions on this front.

In his dissenting statement, Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch makes this point (on C-8):

The Report also acknowledges that it is intended to serve as a template for legislative recommendations. Moreover, to the extent that the Report’s “best practices” mirror the Administration’s privacy “Bill of Rights,” the President has specifically asked either that the “Bill of Rights” be adopted by the Congress or that they be distilled into “enforceable codes of conduct.” As I testified before the same subcommittee, this is a “tautology;” either these practices are to be adopted voluntarily by the firms involved or else there is a federal requirement that they be adopted, in which case there can be no pretense that they are “voluntary.” It makes no difference whether the federal requirement is in the form of enforceable codes of conduct or in the form of an act of Congress. Indeed, it is arguable that neither is needed if these firms feel obliged to comply with the “best practices” or face the wrath of “the Commission” or its staff.

Columbia Law School professor and former FTC adviser Tim Wu refers to this as an “agency threats” model of governance. That’s generally what the FTC is endorsing here. Intimidation is often a very effective regulatory policy. Thus, I hope we can dispense with this silly notion that this process represents truly voluntary self-regulation.  Ask yourself this: If the FTC and Dept of Commerce had instead proposed this same framework for overseeing private media ratings or online speech “codes of conduct,” would anyone seriously call it “voluntary” or “self-regulatory”?  I don’t think so. We’d understand that these implied threats constituted a form of indirect speech control. The only difference in this case–as I have noted here many times before–is that a bit of selective morality is in play when it comes to privacy policy; many of those who oppose regulation-via-intimidation in other contexts are, unfortunately, positively giddy about when it comes to privacy! And so we have arrived at the point where these tactics have become favored information control mechanisms in some contexts but not others.

Trade-offs associated with regulation still must be considered.

If the Obama Administration’s new co-regulatory model results in the sort of de facto regulatory regime that many wanted them to just impose forcefully right from the start, then we are right back at the same point we were before in terms of the trade-offs between information sharing and the largely unregulated economy of “free” online sites and services. As I noted in my filing to the FTC in this matter: ” There is no free lunch. While well-intentioned, government regulation that attempts to create a cost-free opt-out for data collection and targeted online advertising will likely have damaging unintended consequences. In terms of direct costs to consumers, Do Not Track could result in higher prices for service as paywalls go up or, at a minimum, advertising will become less relevant to consumers and, therefore, more “intrusive” in other ways.” To be clear, we could get this result even in absence of a top-down regulatory regime if the FTC and Commerce are able to use threats to accomplish their same regulatory objectives.

“Harmonization” is overrated.

The final FTC report continues the Obama Admin’s misguided obsession with “global harmonization” in terms of achieving more consistent international privacy norms and regulations. As I have noted before, this is an epic blunder. If our norms aren’t the same as Europe’s or the rest of the world’s, some might point out that’s why our Internet sector is better positioned and more highly regarded than the rest of the planet’s online sectors and operators! Even if you don’t accept that premise, you should be skeptical of the wisdom of doing whatever it takes to make America’s privacy policies more consistent with the regulatory models others follow. Sometimes when it comes to global standards and “harmonization,” the better approach is to just go our own way.

The FTC has been doing plenty without additional regulatory authority.

Ironically, the report opens with two pages (p. ii-iii) of “developments since issuance of the preliminary report,” listing the many ways the FTC has been active on this front over the past year in the absence of expanded authority. That includes major actions against two tech titans, Google and Facebook, which included the FTC slapping 20-year privacy audits on them. The FTC also lists many other enforcement actions (via COPPA, FCRA, and  general Sec. 5 authority) and other educational steps it has taken over the past year.  All of which begs the question: Why, then, do we need to expanded federal regulation and enhanced agency power over the information economy?

Does anyone still care about personal responsibility?

Sadly, the report doesn’t have much to say about the role of personal responsibility in this context. It does note that “All stakeholders should expand their efforts to educate consumers about commercial data privacy practices.” That’s good. But had this been an agency report on child safety issues, I have to imagine that the agency would have pointed out that best practices begin at home. As I noted in my filing to the agency, “For some reason, when the topic of debate shifts from concerns about potentially objectionable content to the free movement of personal information, personal responsibility and self-regulation become the last option, not the first.  . . . those who advocate personal responsibility and industry self-regulatory approaches to free-speech and child-protection issues should be advancing the same position with regards to privacy. . . . it is not unreasonable to expect privacy-sensitive consumers to exercise some degree of personal responsibility to avoid unwanted content or communications in this context, just as they must in the context of objectionably content or online child safety.”   Again, the Obama Administration doesn’t seem very interested in pushing personal responsibility as the first order of business with regards to online privacy the way it has for online safety issues.  That’s a real shame.

There is another way.

In closing, I continue to believe that privacy is best governed by a set of evolutionary norms, ongoing online marketplace interactions and experiments, contractual negotiations, public pressures, educational efforts, user empowerment, personal responsibility, and targeted legal enforcement and the use of state torts when true harms can be demonstrated. That’s been the uniquely American approach to privacy protection and we should not abandon it lightly.

I’ll try to update this post after I read through the report a second time but wanted to just get these initial thoughts out for now.

Additional Reading:

• my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation
• my recent Forbes oped, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan“

other TLF essays…

• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

Over at Forbes I have posted some thoughts on the new privacy framework (Consumer Data Privacy in a Networked World) that the Obama Administration released today. In my essay, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan,” I hammer home the same point I’ve made here before many times: Regulation is not a costless exercise. No matter how well-intentioned regulatory proposals may be, they can often have unforeseen, unintended consequences. This is equally true for privacy controls. I discuss how a new privacy regulatory regime could drive up prices for services that currently are free or inexpensive, limit new digital services and innovations, create barriers to entry for new entrants and entrepreneurs, negatively impact the competitiveness of existing U.S. Internet operators, and, more generally, increase the horizons of government power over the Internet.

For a more detailed analysis of these issues, I encourage you to check out my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation. Also, here are few TLF essays that summarize my skepticism about expanded privacy controls:

• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

You wouldn’t think that policymakers need to be reminded that technological progress raises living standards and creates new (and better) employment opportunities. Alas, some comments President Obama made in a speech last week seemed to link technology to job losses. “There are some structural issues with our economy where a lot of businesses have learned to become much more efficient with a lot fewer workers,” he said. “You see it when you go to a bank and you use an ATM, you don’t go to a bank teller, or you go to the airport and you’re using a kiosk instead of checking in at the gate.”

In an essay in today’s Wall Street Journal, one of my Mercatus Center colleagues Russ Roberts, a professor of economics at George Mason University, brilliantly deconstructs this logic and points out why technology doesn’t destroy jobs:

Somehow, new jobs get created to replace the old ones. Despite losing millions of jobs to technology and to trade, even in a recession we have more total jobs than we did when the steel and auto and telephone and food industries had a lot more workers and a lot fewer machines. Why do new jobs get created? When it gets cheaper to make food and clothing, there are more resources and people available to create new products that didn’t exist before. Fifty years ago, the computer industry was tiny. It was able to expand because we no longer had to have so many workers connecting telephone calls. So many job descriptions exist today that didn’t even exist 15 or 20 years ago. That’s only possible when technology makes workers more productive.

Read the whole thing. Great stuff.

Over at MediaFreedom.org, a new site devoted to fighting the fanaticism of radical anti-media freedom groups like Free Press and other “media reformistas,” I’ve started rolling out a 5-part series of essays about “The Battle for Media Freedom.” In Part 1 of the series, I defined what real media freedom is all about, and in Part 2 I discussed the rising “cyber-collectivist” threat to media freedom.  In my latest installment, I offer an analytical framework that better explains the major differences between the antagonists in the battle over media freedom.

Understanding the Origins of Political Struggles

In his many enlightening books, Thomas Sowell, a great economist and an even better political scientist, often warns of the triumph of good intentions over good economics. It’s a theme that F.A. Hayek and Milton Friedman both developed extensively before him. But Sowell has taken this analysis to an entirely differently level in books like A Conflict of Visions: Ideological Origins of Political Struggles, and The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy . Sowell teaches us that no matter how noble one’s intentions might be, it does not mean that those ideas will translate into sound public policy. Nonetheless, since “the anointed” believe their own intentions are pure and their methods are sound, they see nothing wrong with substituting their will for the will of millions of individuals interacting spontaneously and voluntarily in the marketplace. The result is an expansion of the scope of public decision-making and a contraction of the scope of private, voluntary action. As a result, mandates replace markets, and freedom gives way central planning.

Sowell developed two useful paradigms to help us better understand “the origins of political struggles.” He refers to the “constrained” versus “unconstrained” vision and separates these two camps according to how they view the nature of man, society, economy, and politics:

The Unconstrained Nature of the Cyber-Collectivist Vision

Sowell’s taxonomy provides a useful frame of reference for today’s debate over communications and media policy. The unconstrained vision crowd here might best be labeled “cyber-collectivists.” This collectivism is not necessarily the hard-edged Marxist brand of collectivism of modern times. It is more the collectivism of Plato’s rule by “philosopher kings” as much as it is modern European “social democrat” collectivism. It generally rejects outright State ownership of the means of production, although there are some exceptions. (Free Press founder Robert McChesney, for example, would go much further than most other collectivists in having the State intervene and directly control or even own media and communications outlets and infrastructure).

Like their many “unconstrained” intellectual predecessors, what unifies the cyber-collectivists is the belief that the State should have a hand in guiding market outcomes toward a “fairer” end. The cyber-collectivists, for example, get indigestion over unequal patterns whether we are talking audience shares or technological diffusion. They are quick to allege “market failure” when some of their preferred media voices only capture miniscule audience shares (even when it’s just the result of consumer demand in action). And when some people or communities gain access to a network or new technology quicker than others, they are often quick to conclude some nefarious plot by greedy capitalists must be to blame.

Of course, in reality, this is just the way things in a free society have always worked. “Liberty upsets patterns” the late Harvard University philosopher Robert Nozick taught us in his 1974 masterpiece “Anarchy, State, and Utopia.” What Nozick meant was that there is a fundamental tension between liberty and egalitarianism such that when people are left to their own devices, some forms of inequality would be inevitable and persistent throughout society. Correspondingly, any attempt to force patterns, or outcomes, upon society requires a surrender of liberty.

All of this is equally true for media and communications policy. Just as there will never be perfect equality of outcomes in the provision of homes, cars, or incomes, there will never be perfect equality of tech gadgets or audience shares for media speakers / outlets.

Speech Redistributionism

The cyber-collectivists are not content with that, however. Just as they call for a redistribution of wealth to rectify the supposed injustice of unequal incomes, so too they call for “something to be done” to “balance” outcomes and ensure “fairer” outcomes. We might call this “media redistributionism” or even “speech redistributionism.”

Consider, for example, a proposal set forth by Cass Sunstein, the prolific University of Chicago law professor (and now Obama Administration official). In his 2001 book Republic.com, in which he suggests that government should consider requiring “electronic sidewalks” in cyberspace to encourage more balance on Internet websites. The state would impose the equivalent of “must carry” mandates on popular or partisan websites, forcing them to carry links to opposing viewpoints. In the name of “media access” or “fairness,” Sunstein and others are apparently willing to let the state impose tyrannical mandates on private website operators, forcing them to open their private property to use by others. Essentially it’s a Fairness Doctrine for the Internet Age.

Elsewhere Sunstein has argued in favor of greater “public interest” regulation to actually change public attitudes and tastes, claiming that there “is a large difference between the public interest and what interests the public.” [See: Television and the Public Interest, 88 California Law Review 499, 501 (2000).] He and many other cyber-collectivist scholars claim that they have a better idea of what interests the public. Essentially, the public doesn’t know what’s best for them, so someone else must tell them—and potentially even force supposedly better choices upon them. For example, Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law, and currently an adviser to the Federal Communications Commission, believes that, “a proactive media policy must not only correct a poorly functioning market, but also provide diversions around existing media markets and tastes. Proactive media policy can do this by changing consumer wants.”

The thought of having government “change consumer wants” is positively Orwellian and raises the obvious question: according to who’s tastes and values? The viewing and listening public has a broad array of interests and desires that cannot be easily gauged by congressional lawmakers, and certainly not by five unelected bureaucrats at the FCC. As media scholar Benjamin Compaine has correctly noted, “[i]n democracies, there is no universal ‘public interest.’ Rather there are numerous and changing ‘interested publics.’”

And, more practically, how should such goals be accomplished in an age of information abundance? The sheer scale and volume of media activity taking place across an unprecedented variety of communications platforms makes it difficult to imagine how a scarcity-era regulatory regime will be applied going forward. Are we going to have speech patrols standing on every cyber-corner policing the Net for “fairness” violations or determining what is and isn’t “in the public interest”?

Opportunity, Not Outcome, Is What Matters Most

Those of us who subscribe to a more “constrained vision” understand that what is really important is equality of media opportunity, not equality of media outcomes. A focus on the latter is both foolish and destructive. It is foolish because media equality is an impossibility absent extreme measures, which in turn explains why it is destructive. We would need totalitarian government controls on media outputs and consumption in order to achieve anything remotely close to “balance” or “equality” in terms of media results. What counts most is that people have a chance to be heard, not whether millions are listening or whether there is a perfect distribution of digital technology.

Again, that is not enough for the unconstrained visionaries who guide the cyber-collectivist movement. They want action and they want results and they want them now! And, they will always remind us, they have the best of intentions, so we should just trust them. The problem is, intentions + action = control. When they say “something to be done” that is usually code (excuse the pun) for heavy-handed government action to control the messy, un-patterned outcomes of a free marketplace.

And so we arrive at the critical difference between the cyber-freedom and the cyber-collectivist movements: Those of us who adhere to a more constrained view of nature, society and economy (i.e., the cyber-freedom movement) believe that liberty is the default position and that it generally trumps other values. Supposed “market failures” (or “code failures,” as the case may be) are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by the coerced, top-down, governmental solutions that the cyber-collectivists call for. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s). Finally, and quite importantly, we in the cyber-freedom movement are not so quick to cry “market failure!” and call in the code cops. We understand that those messy, un-patterned market outcomes are the result of an evolutionary process or trial-and-error and that society and economy benefit from the resulting learning process.

Sure, there may be times when governments may need to intervene at the margins, but we would counsel against abrupt and incessant interventions to correct every supposed “market failure” or “unfair” outcome. After all, those interventions will simply beget more and more interventions to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions. There is simply no sugar-coating the reality that, no matter how well-intentioned, more and more media control is the inevitable prescription.

In my next installment in this series, I will detail the cyber-collectivist blueprint for radical media redistributionism by outlining this movement’s goals and its proposed methods of control.

Last Thursday I shared my thoughts in two short (<5 min) RussiaToday interviews on on President Obama's big speech about NASA and his long-overdue cancellation of NASA’s white elephant known as “Ares I” rocket. (See Jeff Foust’s analysis here and here.) I was sorry to see the Administration decide to preserve the Orion capsule as a lifeboat for the International Space Station, but as I indicate below, I can’t really blame them for feeling they had to “throw a bone” to the Congressional lions defending that program and the jobs it created (using tax dollars that killed far more jobs, of course—a classic “seen v. unseen” problem).

But as I note below, the far more important good news is that, if Obama gets his way, NASA would finally buy crew launch services to ISS and for future deep space missions from the private sector (expanding its limited COTS program) instead of building its own rockets and capsule for this purpose. This decision is easily single best thing the Administration has done thus far. They have a tough fight ahead with the few members of Congress who actually care about this—who just so happen to be the ones whose districts will face job cuts when dead-end, wasteful make-work programs are canceled. The irony here is just too thick: Many of the same kinds of folks who’ve been decrying Obama as a socialist (not unjustly, in my opinion) now attack him on nationalist grounds for trying to turn part of our ultra-socialist space program over to the private sector.

http://www.youtube.com/v/-0Da2fyzBus&hl=en_US&fs=1& Here’s another clip:

As mentioned last week, in a new series of essays, PFF scholars will be examining proposals that would have the government play a greater role in sustaining struggling media enterprises, “saving journalism,” or promoting more “public interest” content. With many traditional media operators struggling, and questions being raised about how journalism in particular will be supported in the future, Washington policymakers are currently considering what role government can and should play in helping media providers reinvent themselves in the face of tumultuous technological change wrought by the Digital Revolution. We will be releasing 6 or 7 essays on this topic leading up to our big filing in the FCC’s “Future of Media” proceeding (deadline is May 7^th).  And here’s a podcast Berin Szoka and I did providing an overview of the series.

In the first installment of the series, Berin and I critiqued an old idea that’s suddenly gained new currency: taxing media devices or distribution systems to fund media content. In the second installment, “The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 2: Broadcast Spectrum Taxes to Subsidize Public Media,” I discuss proposals to impose a tax on broadcast spectrum licenses to funnel money to public media projects or other “public interest” content or objectives. Such a tax would be fundamentally unfair to broadcasters, who are struggling for their very survival in the midst of unprecedented marketplace turmoil.  Moreover, such a tax is unnecessary in light of the many other sources of “public interest” programming available today. Finally, even if the government creates or subsidizes wonderful, civic- and culturally-enriching content, there’s no way to force people to consume it.  Nor should government force such media choices upon the public. There’s no good reason for government to be socially-engineering media choices through taxes.

I’ve attached the entire essay down below.

The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 2: Broadcast Spectrum Taxes to Subsidize Public Media

PFF Progress on Point 17.2 [PDF]

by Adam Thierer*

In an ongoing series of essays, we‘re discussing proposals to have the government play a greater role in the media sector in the name of sustaining struggling enterprises or “saving journalism.”  Washington policymakers are currently considering what, if any, role government can and should play in assisting media operators, supporting journalism, or expanding public media.  For example, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently kicked off a new “Future of Media” effort with a workshop on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era.” Likewise, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has hosted two workshops on “How Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?”  Meanwhile, the Senate has already held hearings about “the future of journalism,” and Senator Benjamin L. Cardin (D-MD) recently introduced the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become nonprofit organizations in an effort to help them stay afloat—but also curtail their political editorializing.

Part 1 of this series examined proposals to fund media content via a tax on consumer electronics, broadband service, or cell phone bills.^[1] Other essays will address proposals to tax private advertising revenues to support public media; directly subsidize out-of-work journalists; expand postal subsidies; and to prop up or bail out failing media entities.  A wrap-up essay will then focus on some potentially constructive policy reforms that could assist media enterprises without a massive infusion of state support or regulation of the press.

This essay will discuss proposals to impose a tax on broadcast spectrum licenses to funnel money to public media projects or other “public interest” content or objectives.^[2] Such a tax would be fundamentally unfair to broadcasters, who are struggling for their very survival in the midst of unprecedented marketplace turmoil.  Moreover, such a tax is unnecessary in light of the many other sources of “public interest” programming available today. Finally, even if the government creates or subsidizes wonderful, civic- and culturally-enriching content, there’s no way to force people to consume it.  Nor should government force such media choices upon the public. There’s no good reason for government to be socially-engineering media choices through taxes.

Why the “Public Interest” Regulatory Regime Can’t Continue

There’s always been a bit of mythology surrounding so-called “public interest” regulation of broadcasting in America.^[3] Those who advocate expansive regulatory obligations for licensed radio and television operators typically claim they’re directing the content or character of broadcasting toward a nobler end—a sort of noblesse oblige for the Information Age.  At times, their rhetoric takes on a fairy-tale quality as lawmakers and regulatory advocates speak of “the public interest” in reverential and fantastic terms, all the while deftly evading any attempt to define the term.  Indeed, while public interest regulation has been considered the cornerstone of communications and media policy since the 1930s, at no time during these seven decades has the term been adequately defined.[4]

Former FCC Commissioner Glen Robinson has argued that the public interest standard “is vague to the point of vacuousness, providing neither guidance nor constraint on the agency’s action.”^[5] And Nobel Prize-winning economist Ronald Coase argued 50 years ago that “The phrase… lacks any definite meaning.  Furthermore, the many inconsistencies in commission decisions have made it impossible for the phrase to acquire a definite meaning in the process of regulation.”^[6]

And that is still true today.  Simply put, the public interest standard is not really a “standard” at all since it has no fixed meaning; the definition of the phrase has shifted with the political winds to suit the whims of those in power at any given time.[7] Nonetheless, the public interest regulatory regime remains with us and continues to apply to licensed broadcast radio and television operators.

Regardless of the rationale used to advance public interest regulation—public spectrum ownership, licensing, scarcity,^[8] pervasiveness,^[9] or “public enlightenment”—it is hard to explain why we have singled out broadcasters for unique regulatory obligations while operators of other media platforms have been given a free pass.  Such regulatory asymmetry is more difficult to justify today in light of rising competition for many new platforms and players.^[10] And it is difficult to believe that Congress or the FCC could concoct a constitutionally-defensible rationale for extending “public interest” regulation to new media platforms.^[11] Indeed, efforts to do so for both old (newspapers, print) and new (Internet, video games) media have failed when tested in the courts.  And, practically speaking, even if expansion of the old regime was desirable, it would be exceedingly difficult to do so in light of the sheer scale and volume of new media that would need to be covered.^[12]

Spending Money Instead of Imposing Mandates?

The combination of these factors has forced many traditional public interest regulatory advocates to reconsider the wisdom—or at least the practicality—of the old broadcasting regime.  One alternative that has received increasing attention in recent years would see broadcasters largely relieved of their public interest obligations and charged instead an annual fee for their use of the airwaves.  The proceeds from such a spectrum fee or tax would then be used to subsidize a variety of programs or content.  For example:

• Henry Geller, a former FCC general counsel, first advocated such a spectrum fee scheme as a method of financing more public broadcasting programming.^[13]
• Likewise, Charles Firestone, executive director of the Aspen Institute’s Communications and Society Program, has argued that the scheme could fund “educational programs for children, free political spots on an equal opportunities basis, public service announcements, or other programming that the Government wants.”[14]
• American Enterprise Institute scholar Norman Ornstein has advocated that the money be spent on a “Public Square” channel to “focus on local and national politics, policy issues, debates, campaigns, and other vital issues.”^[15]
• Elsewhere, along with Paul Taylor, Ornstein has said the money raised from such fees might be spent to ensure greater election coverage or to subsidize political advertising.^[16]
• Leonard Downie, Jr., Vice President at Large of The Washington Post, and Michael Schudson, a Professor at the Columbia University Graduate School of Journalism, have advocated the creation of a “Fund for Local News” that “would make grants for advances in local news reporting and innovative ways to support it.”^[17] The Fund would make grants to news organizations through “Local News Fund Councils” and would be financed by “fees paid by radio and television licensees, or proceeds from auctions of telecommunications spectrum, or new fees imposed on Internet service providers.”^[18]
• Most recently, Robert W. McChesney and John Nichols, authors of the new book The Death and Life of American Journalism, have proposed a 7% tax on broadcasters, which they estimate would generate $3-6 billion annually.  They would use it to fund some combination of all of the above items and far more, including welfare for journalists.^[19]

A Spectrum Tax as a Regulatory Reparations Policy

We might think of spectrum tax proposals as a sort of reparations policy for the regulatory sins of the past.  That is, broadcast spectrum fees are typically pitched as a way to “repay the public” for use of the spectrum that broadcasters obtained originally at no charge.  As Charles Firestone explains, in theory, the spectrum fee proposal:

provides a specific dollar value to the trade-off that has traditionally marked the public trusteeship theory of broadcast regulation. That is, for the initial grant and/or exclusive use of a valuable frequency, protected against interference or encroachment by governmental enforcement mechanisms, the broadcaster serves the needs and interests of the local audience service area.[20]

But like the “public interest” standard itself, spectrum taxes are also an idea whose time has passed.^[21] Broadcast spectrum fees make little sense today, even if the notion might have made some sense two or three decades ago as a method of monetizing public interest obligations.

First, using spectrum fees as a reparations policy today fails to “punish” those who originally got their spectrum free-of-charge.  The vast majority of broadcast spectrum licenses have traded hands in the secondary market for lucrative sums.  In many cases, those television and radio properties have traded hands numerous times.  Thus, the current spectrum-holders who would be taxed are generally not the beneficiaries of any “windfall,” but have instead paid competitive market prices for the spectrum they use that should be roughly commensurate with the economic value of that spectrum (at least for the limited range of uses allowed by the FCC).

Second, although broadcasting remains an important medium, its once-supreme relevance has eroded significantly over the past three decades.  Even Norm Ornstein, a defender of broadcast spectrum fees, has noted that “Over-the-air broadcasting is a dinosaur.  It’s not going to last very long.”^[22] Although that might be hyperbole, it’s certainly true that whatever weight the broadcast medium might have had in the past, that is now ancient history.

For most of the past century, broadcasting was a fairly stable industry that did not witness business model-shattering types of changes.  As its very name implies, broadcasting attracted broad audiences.  Consequently, returns were stable, even substantial at times.  Today, however, stability has given way to volatility.  The entire media marketplace is in a state of seemingly constant upheaval.  Long-standing industry players are shedding assets or even disappearing as underdogs rapidly enter the sector and become big dogs overnight.  This has become a textbook example of Schumpeterian “creative destruction” in action.^[23]

Consider what this has meant for broadcasters in terms of audience share and advertising revenues.  Start with broadcast television.  The television audience has grown increasingly fragmented since the 1950s.  The top shows on TV during that era ( e.g., “I Love Lucy”) garnered 40-50% of the viewing audience.  By the 1970s, the top broadcast TV shows (e.g., “All in the Family”) were pulling in roughly 30% of the audience.  Today, however, with so many other media options vying for our increasingly scarce attention, the top shows on television (e.g., “American Idol”) are lucky to break 15% and most shows rarely break single digits.

The “problem” is growing competition for eyeballs.  Broadcasters face a growing array of rivals: cable and satellite multi-channel distributors; DVDs and Netflix; VOD and online video; video game platforms; and much more.  According to Nielsen Media Research, the “Big 3” networks of the past (ABC, CBS, NBC), which held 90% of the primetime market in 1980, control only 30% share today.  In terms of total day shares, cable blew past broadcast television at the turn of the century and never looked back.  The advertising situation is equally bleak for television broadcasters.  According to McCann Erickson Worldwide, broadcast television’s overall share of media advertising revenues dipped below 20% back in 1990 and continues to fall steadily, standing at approximately 15% today.

Unsurprisingly, the financial outlook for the broadcast TV sector is bleak.  “Almost all the indicators for local TV are pointing down,” notes the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism in its annual State of the News Media report.  It continues:

Revenue, too, was in a free fall.  Ad revenue is always lower in a year without federal elections or the Olympics, but the drop in 2009 was especially severe even with the unexpected bounty of political spending on health care legislation.  Revenues were estimated to have fallen by 22% from the year before.  The last two non-election years, by contrast, recorded much smaller declines: 5% in 2005 and 6% in 2007.  Looking ahead, most market analysts project revenues to grow only slightly, in the 3%-to-5% range in 2010, but that is hardly taken as good news given that it is a year that will include both the off-year elections and winter Olympic games.^[24]

In light of the recent turmoil, some major network television executives are now thinking about doing what was unthinkable just a decade ago: casting off their local broadcast affiliates and repurposing their content on alternative media platforms ( e.g., cable, satellite, Internet). For example, in early 2009, CBS Corp. President and CEO Les Moonves told an investor conference that moving all CBS network programming to cable and satellite platforms would be “a very interesting proposition.”^[25] If television networks start following their audience in the continuing mass exodus to alternative distribution platforms, how would local broadcast affiliates pay for a new federal spectrum fee? Even if that scenario does not develop, local television broadcasters face an uncertain future, and likely declining revenues for some time to come.

The situation for broadcast radio operators is even grimmer.  The competition for our ears has never been more intense with satellite radio, non-commercial radio, iPods and MP3 players, online radio, downloadable music, podcasting, etc. with terrestrial broadcasters for audience share.  As a result, radio operators have seen their audiences dwindle and their revenues nose-dive. According to Arbitron, time spent listening to radio has dropped for every age demographic they’ve measured for the past decade.  And BIA Financial Network notes that while the radio revenue growth rate ran between 7% and 14% during the late 1990s, the industry hasn’t seen growth above 3% since 2002 and in recent years growth has rarely broken 1%.  Furthermore, the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism reports that:^[26]

• Total radio revenue was down 18% in 2009 from 2008, according to the Radio Advertising Bureau.
• Local and national radio advertising—the biggest sources of revenue for radio—were both down and projected to continue falling at least through 2011.  There was growth in online advertising, but not enough to make up for the loss of on-air advertising.
• National and local advertising fell by 20% and 19% respectively in 2009 compared to 2008.  Local advertising has always been radio’s lifeblood.
• Online advertising revenue saw a 13% increase in 2009, but represented only 3% of industry advertising revenue and was not enough to offset the losses in other categories.
• Off-air revenues, such as billboards and concert sponsorships, fell 9% in 2009 compared to 2008, to 1.3 billion.  While these revenues currently make up only a small part of radio revenue, the continued decline of national and local advertising may add to their importance.

Again, can struggling radio broadcasters absorb the added burden of a new national spectrum tax in light of their precarious situation? Indeed, it’s numbers like these that usually leads intervention-minded analysts to advocate subsidies, not taxes, for some struggling media entities!

Where Would the Money Go?

Questions also surround the pool of funds that would be amassed through the creation of a broadcast spectrum fee.  Given the declining fortunes of the broadcast industry, it seems unlikely the fee would generate as much revenue as some proponents might imagine. Let’s assume, however, that the spectrum levy netted respectable sums.  How would those funds be used?

America’s recent experience with spectrum auction proceeds suggests that Congress would first look to use a spectrum fee to pay for federal spending priorities or pay off past budget deficits instead of channeling those funds to new “public square” or “public interest” initiatives.  But, for the sake of argument, let’s assume Congress honored a pledge to use the broadcast fee only for its intended purpose.  What exactly counts as a “public square” or “public interest” initiative, and who would be in charge of it?

Some proponents of a spectrum fee seem to long for a world in which everything looks or sounds like a combination of National Public Radio, the Public Broadcasting Service, and cable “public access” channels.  But regardless of the quality of such networks or the programming on them, the viewing and listening public has shown a clear desire for programming of a very different nature.  While critics might lament what they regard as the “low-brow” entertainment or supposedly lower-quality news seen or heard on some commercial networks or stations, there is no denying that citizens tune in to commercial programs in very large numbers.  Whether regulatory advocates care to admit it, supply and demand are at work in America’s media marketplace and citizens vote with their eyes and ears all the time.  Media scholar Ben Compaine, co-author of Who Owns the Media?, focuses on the real issue here, choice:

If large segments of the public choose to watch, read, or listen to content from a relatively small number of media companies, that should not distract policy makers from the key word there: choose. … It may indeed be that at any given moment 80 percent of the audience is viewing or reading or listening to something from the 10 largest media players.  But that does not mean it is the same 80 percent all the time, or that it is cause for concern.^[27]

Commenting on efforts to make the modern media landscape look more like PBS or NPR, Compaine notes: “Content might well be different.  But it wouldn’t necessarily be better.… This might work only in a … world of enforced equality, where no democracy of content was allowed, where the voice of the audience was not heard.”^[28] He notes that PBS is instructive in this regard since, even in the days when it only had three primary rivals, it could rarely get the attention of more than 2% of the total TV audience.  And as television journalist Jeff Greenfield has noted, “[W]hen you no longer need the skills of a safecracker to find PBS in most markets, you have to realize that the reason people aren’t watching is that they don’t want to.”^[29]

Simply put, in a world of unlimited options and freedom of media choice, there’s just no way to force the audience to tune in.^[30] Absent truly repressive measures to limit choice or alter consumer media consumption patterns, it will be impossible for policymakers to force the masses to pay attention to what they want them to see or hear in an age of abundant media content and unrestricted choice.  “[R]egulation cannot, in a liberal democracy, force viewers to consume media products they do not think they want in the name of the public interest,” argues Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law.^[31]

Our Many “Public Squares”

More importantly, there seems to be little need for a new spectrum fee for “public interest” content or a “public square” channel in light of the explosion of civic-oriented and culturally enriching programming on both traditional and new media platforms.  In essence, we now have many “public square” channels.

For example, the growth of news channels and programs (CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, Current TV, many financial news networks, and more) and international news outlets (BBC America, CNN International, etc.) has been well-documented.  Most notable in this regard is the stunning success of the cable industry’s C-SPAN network and its sister properties.^[32] But these cable news channels and programs are also a growing force online as well.  “Like their television programs, the major cable news channels’ websites attracted record viewership in 2008, driven in a large part by the political and economic news of the year,” reports the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism.^[33] Moreover, these cable news sites “have also evolved into true multimedia destinations.  All now feature video archives, RSS feeds and features for accessing the sites on mobile devices.  They all offer live streaming content.”^[34] Meanwhile, C-SPAN recently created the C-SPAN Video Library,[35] which archives 23 years worth (1987-on) of fully searchable (and free) video content, including: 161,000 overall hours of programming; 56,600 hours of House & Senate floor activity; and, 20,152 hours of House & Senate committee hearings.[36]

Americans have many other ways of finding important news and civic information online.  The 2008 presidential election serves as a dramatic illustration of how voters have become better informed and how candidates have exciting new ways to connect with them.  The Pew Internet & American Life Project found that “some 74% of Internet users—representing 55% of the entire adult population—went online in 2008 to get involved in the political process or to get news and information about the election.”^[37] And President Barack Obama’s unprecedented use of new media tools during 2008 is often credited with helping to propel him into the White House.  Millions of Americans made their views known about various issues on sites such as Obama’s Change.gov website.  Wired reported that “Obama’s online success dwarfed [Senator John McCain’s], and proved key to his winning the presidency.”^[38]

Volunteers used Obama’s website to organize a thousand phone-banking events in the last week of the race—and 150,000 other campaign-related events over the course of the campaign.  Supporters created more than 35,000 groups clumped by affinities like geographical proximity and shared pop-cultural interests.  By the end of the campaign, myBarackObama.com chalked up some 1.5 million accounts.  And Obama raised a record-breaking $600 million in contributions from more than three million people, many of whom donated through the web.^[39]

Four years earlier, Joe Trippi, former campaign manager of Howard Dean’s 2004 presidential campaign and the author of The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, The Internet, and The Overthrow of Everything, had noted that the Dean campaign’s heavy use of new, interactive media and communications technologies was, “a sneak preview of coming attractions—the interplay between new technologies and old institutions.  The end result will be massive communities completely redefining our politics, our commerce, our government, and the entire public fabric our culture.”^[40] He concluded: “what we are seeing—at its core—is a political phenomenon, a democratic movement that proceeds from our civic lives and naturally spills over in the music we hear, the clothes we buy, the causes we support.”^[41] President Obama’s campaign certainly seems to have been proof of that.

Of course, all this comes in addition to the stunning proliferation of user-generation media such as blogs, discussion boards, listservs, social networking sites, Twitter, You Tube, and so on.  Dan Gillmor, author of We the Media: Grassroots Journalism By the People, For the People, notes just how profound the impact of new media and citizen journalism will be:

Tomorrow’s news reporting and production will be more of a conversation, or a seminar.  The lines will blur between produces and consumers, changing the role of both in ways we’re only beginning to grasp now.  The communications network itself will be a medium for everyone’s voice, not just the few who can afford to buy multimillion-dollar printing presses, launch satellites, or win the government’s permission to squat on the public’s airwaves.^[42]

Likewise, in its recent State of the News Media 2010 report, the Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism reported that “Citizen journalism at the local level is expanding rapidly and brimming with innovation.”^[43] The report also noted that:

highly promising citizen and alternative sites are emerging daily.  Imaginative news formats, partnerships, formats, technological capabilities and passionate supporters of journalism values offer significant reasons for optimism as journalism continues its mission to inform citizens, make their lives better and nurture democratic processes.^[44]

Conclusion

In light of these developments, it’s hard to take seriously the charge that “deliberative democracy” is somehow on the decline in America and that the imposition of a spectrum fee to create a government-controlled “public square channel” or more “public interest” content in general would actually change the constitution of news, culture, or civic engagement in any significant way.  And even if government creates or subsidizes wonderful, civic- and culturally-enriching content, there’s no way to force people to consume it.

Finally, regardless of how spectrum fee proceeds might be spent, the proposal raises fundamental fairness issues for broadcasters.  Indeed, it is doubly insulting for them.  Not only has public broadcasting and non-commercial media been siphoning off more and more market share in recent years, but this proposal would impose a new tax on private broadcasters to fund those competitors (or some other media outlets) at a time when broadcasters are struggling for their very existence.  If Congress imposed a spectrum fee on broadcasters, it would essentially be signing a death warrant for the medium.  It’s hard to see how that’s in “the public interest.”

Related PFF Publications

• The Wrong Way to Reinvent Media, Part 1: Taxes on Consumer Electronics, Mobile Phones & Broadband, Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, PFF Progress on Point 17.1, March 2010.
• Testimony at FCC’s Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era”, Adam Thierer, March 2010.
• Public Option for Press Should Get the Red Pen, Adam Thierer, The Daily Caller, Jan. 2010.
• Chairman Leibowitz’s Disconnect on Privacy Regulation & the Future of News, Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka, Progress Snapshot 6.1, Jan. 13, 2010.
• Socializing Media in Order to Save It, Adam Thierer, City Journal, March 2009.
• A Manifesto for Media Freedom, Adam Thierer & Brian Anderson, 2008.
• Media Ownership Proceedings, W. Kenneth Ferree, Testimony before the Federal Communications Commission, Nov. 3, 2009.
• Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership, Adam Thierer, June 2005.

[2] This essay is condensed from a chapter that appeared in a new book from Congressional Quarterly Press. See: Resolved, Broadcasters Should be Charged a Spectrum Fee to Finance Programming in the Public Interest, Pro: Norm Ornstein, Con: Adam Thierer, in Richard J. Ellis and Michael Nelson, Debating Reform: Conflicting Perspectives on How to Fix the American Political System (2010) at 53-69.

[3] See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Understanding the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 85-104, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf.

[4] Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Why Expansion of the FCC’s Public Interest Regulatory Regime is Unwise, Unneeded, Unconstitutional, and Unenforceable, Testimony Before the Federal Communications Commission Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era,” March 4, 2010, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2010/2010-03-04-Thierer_Remarks_at_FCC_Hearing.pdf.

[5] Glen O. Robinson, The Federal Communications Act: An Essay on Origins and Regulatory Purpose, in A Legislative History of the Communications Act of 1934 3, 14 (Max D. Paglin ed., 1989). Likewise, Lawrence J. White has noted that, “The ‘public interest’ is a vague, ill-defined concept. Under the ‘public interest’ banner the Congress and the FCC have established far too many protectionist, anticompetitive, anti-innovative, inflexible, output-limiting regulatory regimes and have unnecessarily infringed on the First Amendment rights of broadcasters.” See Lawrence J. White, Spectrum for Sale, The Milken Institute Review (June 2001) at 38. See also William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC, 38 Emory Law Journal 715, 716 (1989).

[6] Ronald H. Coase, The Federal Communications Commission, 2 J. L. & Econ. 1, 8–9 (1959). Even supporters of broadcast regulation such as Paul Taylor and Norman Ornstein admit that, “neither in the 1927 [Radio] Act nor in the 1934 [Communications] Act, nor subsequently, did Congress define clearly what actions by broadcasters would represent managing their stations in the public interest.” Paul Taylor & Norman Ornstein, New America Foundation, A Broadcast Spectrum Fee for Campaign Finance Reform, Spectrum Series Working Paper No. 4, (2002) at 6.

[7] See Adam Thierer, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 85-104; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf; Adam Thierer, Is the Public Served by the Public Interest Standard? The Freeman, Vol. 46, No. 9, Sept. 1996, at 618-20, www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/is-the-public-served-by-the-public-interest-standard; William T. Mayton, The Illegitimacy of the Public Interest Standard at the FCC, 38 Emory Law Journal, 1989, at 715-69.

[8] See John W. Berresford, Federal Communications Commission, The Scarcity Rationale for Regulating Traditional Broadcasting: An Idea Whose Time Has Passed, FCC Media Bureau, Staff Research Paper No. 2005-2, (March 2005) www.fcc.gov/ownership/materials/already-released/scarcity030005.pdf. Berresford refers to the scarcity rationale as “outmoded,” “based on fundamental misunderstandings of physics and economics,” and “no longer valid.”

[9] Adam Thierer, Why Regulate Broadcasting : Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age, 15 CommLaw Conspectus (Summer 2007) at 431-482; http://commlaw.cua.edu/articles/v15/15_2/Thierer.pdf.

[10] See Adam Thierer & Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics.

[11] Thierer, supra note 4.

[12] Id. at 7-12.

[13] “By taking some modest fee from commercial broadcasters for their use of the public spectrum in lieu of the public trustee obligation, noncommercial television could be adequately funded to deliver high-quality public service programming.” Henry Geller, Geller to FCC: Scrap the Rules, Try a Spectrum Fee, Current.org, Oct. 30, 2000, www.current.org/why/why0020geller.shtml. Also see Henry Geller, Promoting the Public Interest in the Digital Era, Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 55, No. 3, 2003, www.law.indiana.edu/fclj/pubs/v55/no3/Geller.pdf.

[14] Charles M. Firestone, The Aspen Institute, The Spectrum Check Off Alternative to Public Interest Regulation of Broadcasters, www.aspeninstitute.org/policy-work/communications-society/papers-interest/-spectrum-check-alternative-public-interest-regul

[15] See Ornstein supra 2 at 61. Also see Remarks of Norman Ornstein at George Mason University event, The Gore Commission, 10 Years Later: The Public Interest Obligations of Digital TV Broadcasters in Perfect Hindsight, Oct. 3, 2008, www.iep.gmu.edu/documents/Ornstein.doc.

[16] Paul Taylor and Norman Ornstein, New America Foundation, A Broadcast Spectrum Fee for Campaign Finance Reform, Spectrum Series Working Paper #4, June 2002, www.newamerica.net/files/IssueBrief5.FreeAirTime.TaylorOrnstein.pdf.

[17] Leonard Downie, Jr. & Michael Schudson, The Reconstruction of American Journalism, Columbia Journalism Review, Oct. 20, 2009, at 92, available at www.scribd.com/doc/21268382/Reconstruction-of-Journalism.

[18] Id.

[19] See Robert W. McChesney & John Nichols, The Death and Life of American Journalism (2010) at 209-10.

[20] Firestone, supra note 14.

[21] Adam Thierer and Wayne Crews, Cato Institute, Just Don’t Do It: The Digital Opportunities Investment Trust (DO IT) Fund, Cato TechKnowledge, No. 35, May 6, 2002, www.cato.org/tech/tk/020506-tk.html

[22] Quoted in Neil Hickey, TV’s Big Stick: Why the Broadcast Industry Gets What it Wants in Washington, Columbia Journalism Review, September/October 2002, p. 53.

[23] See Thierer & Eskelsen, supra note 7.

[24] Pew Project For Excellence in Journalism, Local TV, The State of the News Media 2010, March 2010, www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/local_tv_summary_essay.php.

[25] Michael Grotticelli, Local TV Stations Face Uncertain Future, Broadcast Engineering, Feb. 23, 2009, http://broadcastengineering.com/news/local-stations-face-uncertain-future-0223.

[26] Pew Project for Excellence in Journalism, Audio – Traditional Broadcast and Broadcast Online, The State of the News Media 2010, March 2010, www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/audio_traditional_broadcast.php.

[27] Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, at 33, http://reason.com/archives/2004/01/01/domination-fantasies

[28] Id.

[29] Quoted in Thomas G. Krattenmaker and Lucas A. Powe, Jr., Regulating Broadcast Programming (1994) at 314.

[30] Ellen P. Goodman of the Rutgers-Camden School of Law argues: “Given the proliferation of consumer filtering and choice, these kinds of interventions are of questionable efficacy. Consumers equipped with digital selection and filtering tools are likely to avoid content they do not demand no matter what the regulatory efforts to force exposure.” Ellen P. Goodman, “Proactive Media Policy in an Age of Content Abundance,” in Philip M. Napoli, ed., Media Diversity and Localism: Meaning and Metrics (2007) at 370, 374.  And there is no reason to believe this situation has ever been different or will ever change. Writing in 1922, famed journalist Walter Lippmann noted that, “it is possible to make a rough estimate only of the amount of attention people give each day to informing themselves about public affairs,” but “the time each day is small when any of us is directly exposed to information from our unseen environment.” Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion (1922), p. 53, 57.

[31] Id. at 374.

[32] Importantly, many people fail to realize that C-SPAN is a private, non-profit company that is provided as a public service by cable industry contributions. It receives no government or taxpayer contributions. From 1979-2009, total license fees paid by cable & satellite companies to support C-SPAN totaled $922 million. See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, C-SPAN, Civic-Minded Programming & Public Interest Regulation, PFF Blog, March 2, 2010, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2010/03/c-span_civic-minded_programming_public_interest_re.html

[33] Cable TV, in State of the News Media 2009, www.stateofthemedia.org/2009/narrative_cabletv_digitaltrends.php?media=7&cat=6/#key6

[34] Id.

[35] www.c-spanvideo.org/videoLibrary

[36] See Thierer, supra note 28. See also Brian Stelter, C-Span Puts Full Archives on the Web, New York Times, March 15, 2010,  www.nytimes.com/2010/03/16/arts/television/16cspan.html

[37] Aaron Smith, The Internet’s Role in Campaign 2008, The Pew Internet & American Life, April 15, 2009, www.pewinternet.org/Reports/2009/6–The-Internets-Role-in-Campaign-2008.aspx

[38] Sarah Lai Stirland, Propelled by Internet, Barack Obama Wins Presidency, Wired.com, Nov. 4, 2008,  www.wired.com/threatlevel/2008/11/propelled-by-in

[39] Id.

[40] Joe Trippi, The Revolution Will Not Be Televised: Democracy, The Internet, and The Overthrow of Everything (2004), at 203. [emphasis original].

[41] Id.

[42] Dan Gillmor, We the Media: Grassroots Journalism By the People, For the People (2004), at xiii.

[43] Pew Project For Excellence in Journalism, Introduction, State of the News Media 2010, March 2010,   www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/overview_intro.php

[44] Pew Project For Excellence in Journalism, Community Journalism, State of the News Media 2010, March 2010,  www.stateofthemedia.org/2010/specialreports_community_journalism.php

Wrong Way to Reinvent Media Part 2 – Broadcast Spectrum Taxes [Thierer- PFF] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

This morning at the Newseum in Washington, DC, U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham Clinton delivered remarks on Internet freedom and the future of global free speech and expression. [Transcript is here + video.] It will go down as a historic speech in the field of Internet policy since she drew a bold line in the cyber-sand regarding exactly where the United States stands on global online freedom. Clinton’s answer was unequivocal: “Both the American people and nations that censor the Internet should understand that our government is committed to helping promote Internet freedom.” “The Internet can serve as a great equalizer,” she argued. “By providing people with access to knowledge and potential markets, networks can create opportunities where none exist.”

Unfortunately, however, “the same networks that help organize movements for freedom… can also be hijacked by governments to crush dissent and deny human rights.”  Echoing Winston Churchill’s famous “iron curtain” speech, Sec. Clinton argued that “With the spread of these restrictive practices, a new information curtain is descending across much of the world.”  She noted that virtual walls are replacing traditional walls in many nations as repressive regimes seek to squash the liberties of their citizenry.  That’s why the Administration’s bold stand in favor of online freedom is so essential.

Importantly, Sec. Clinton made it clear that the Obama Administration is ready to commit significant resources to this effort. She said that, over the next year, the State Department plans to work with others to establish a standing effort to promote technology and will invite technologists to help advance the cause through a new “innovation competition” that will promote circumvention technologies and other technologies of freedom. Sec. Clinton also challenged private companies to stand up to censorship globally and challenge foreign governments when they demand controls on the free flow of information or digital technology.

That is particularly important because Secretary Clinton’s speech comes on the heels of the recent news that Google and at least 30 other Internet companies were the victims of cyberattacks in China, which raises profound questions about the future of online freedom and cybersecurity. Sec. Clinton’s remarks will make it clear to online operators that the U.S. government stands prepared to back them up when they challenge the censorial policies of repressive foreign regimes.

It’s also worth noting that, back in October, Secretary Clinton took a bold stand on global religious defamation policies, which are becoming a growing international concern from a free speech perspective. I praised her for that speech here and noted how important it was that Administration officials put issues such as freedom of religious worship and freedom of speech and expression front and center in future foreign diplomacy efforts. With today’s speech, Sec. Clinton and the Obama Administration have again risen to that challenge by making it clear that these issues will now be part of future diplomatic efforts and discussions.

At one point she joked that somewhere in the world a foreign government official was trying to censor her speech as she delivered it! But she’s right: Plenty of foreign government are still aggressively attempting to censor the Net and to repress digital technologies every second of the day. To put things in perspective, just yesterday, the OpenNet Initiative (ONI) reported that more than half a billion Internet users are being filtered worldwide. And if you want a country-by-country synopsis of just how bad things are, check out the amazing report, Access Denied: The Practice and Policy of Global Internet Filtering, which is compiled by several scholars involved in the ONI project.

To understand the profound (and somewhat ironical) historical significance of Sec. Clinton’s speech today, you need to remember that less than 15 years ago in this country we had a heated debate over whether American citizens should even be allowed to use encryption technology, or if the government should “hold the keys” to such technologies. Luckily, the “Clipper Chip” wars ended when Hillary’s husband and his Administration basically gave up in its efforts to pursue it further. Moreover, I can’t help but recall what Mrs. Clinton said after the White House sex scandal erupted back in 1998 and the details spread rapidly across the Internet: “We are all going to have to rethink how we deal with [the Internet], because there are all these competing values,” she said. “Without any kind of editing function or gatekeeping function, what does it mean to have the right to defend your reputation?”  It seems like Mrs. Clinton has come a long way, so much so that she is now defending technologies — and is apparently willing to even subsidize technologies — that will allow citizens to evade “gatekeepers” of all sorts.

I also appreciated Sec. Clinton’s quip that “once you’re on the internet, you don’t need to be a tycoon or a rock star to have a huge impact on society.”  She repeatedly argued in her speech that the Internet has empowered every man, woman, and child to be heard and to make a difference in this world.  Amen.  But those opportunities for each of us to make a difference can only be realized if governments worldwide are willing to let them happen. I’ve always generally agreed with John Gilmore’s famous quip that “the Net interprets censorship as damage and routes around it.”  Nonetheless, I’m not a quixotic utopian when it comes to these things. I’m enough of a realist to understand that if governments put enough effort into the task, they can quash networks and silence a great deal of expression.  However, it’s a far more difficult undertaking today than it was in the past. The sheer volume and scope of online activity alone makes it an enormous undertaking.

Could we be on the verge of “the end of censorship” as I have wondered here before? Probably not any time soon, but thanks to the bold vision and steps that Secretary Clinton and Obama Administration announced today, we are a little bit closer.

Additional Reading / Listening:

• an NPR report about the issue this morning featuring Alec Ross, Sec. Clinton’s Senior Advisor for Innovation at the U.S. Department of State
• 21st Century Statecraft – Diplomacy in the Age of Facebook and Twitter – also w/ Alec Ross
• Freedom on the Net: A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media (Freedom House Publication)
• 2009 Report on International Religious Freedom
• Global Network Initiative Statement on U.S. Secretary of State Clinton’s Address on Internet Freedom
• Larry Magid (CNet.com) podcast on the speech
• thoughts from Craig Mundie, Chief Research and Strategy Officer at Microsoft
• more about the speech from New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, Reuters, Ars Technica, Huffington Post,

In a letter to the editor of the Washington Post last week, former FTC Commissioner Thomas Leary responded to a Post article describing the FTC’s suit against Intel as a  “major step for President Obama,” consistent with his campaign promise to “reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.”  Leary responded indignantly to this characterization by declaring:

People seem to forget that the FTC is a bipartisan independent agency. As a Republican FTC commissioner appointed by a Democratic president, I can vouch for the agency’s independence. During my service from 1999 to 2005 in the administrations of presidents Bill Clinton and George Bush, I never received a direct or indirect policy recommendation on a pending matter from anyone in the White House or from any of the people in Congress who had actively supported me.

Leary’s leeriness about political encroachment on the FTC illustrates the depth of abiding faith in independent regulatory agencies as standing truly apart from the day-to-day politics of Washington—especially when the might of the regulatory state is being wielded against a particular company in quasi-judicial prosecutions, such as antitrust enforcement actions. But if the independence of the FTC is this important, what about the independence of the Federal Communications Commission, with its broad jurisdiction over the media and tools of free speech?

Leary would probably be appalled at the politicization of the FCC in recent years. Bush’s second FCC chairman, Kevin Martin, was infamous for his political Machiavellianism and widely despised by the communications law bar. By contrast, when it became clear that Obama’s high-tech advisor Julius Genachowski would succeed Martin as FCC Chairman shortly before Obama’s inauguration, he received a chorus of applause from a wide range of philosophical perspectives, including from our former president at PFF, Ken Ferree:

Julius Genachowski is an outstanding choice to chair the Commission.  He is knowledgeable, experienced, and presumably will have the ear of the most influential people within the Administration.

While no one would compare the eminently likable Genachowski to Martin, his relationship to the Obama administration appears unprecedented in its closeness, and one must ask whether that’s a good thing for the head of a supposedly “independent” regulatory agency or integrity of that agency’s decision-making. At the end of November, the White House took the unprecedented step of releasing its visitor logs through the end of August—a major step towards the kind of transparency candidate Obama promised on the campaign trail. But the logs also revealed something remarkable: that Genachowski had visited the White House 47 times, making him the visitor with the third-most visits out of 1,786 total visitors.  This pattern is astonishing when one considers that no other agency head racked up more than five visits, and only a handful of independent agency heads visited at all, as Adam Thierer and I noted.

While most of these visits (39) occurred while Genachowski was technically serving as lead technology advisor to the new administration, it was clear even before Obama’s inauguration that Genachowski would be chairman, and 31 of those visits occurred between his formal nomination and confirmation. A further eight visits occurred after his Senate confirmation, when he was officially FCC Chairman—but even that far exceeded visits by other agency heads, and occurred during what are generally the two slowest months Washington, July and August.  So it will be very interesting indeed to see how much more visits Genachowski has logged since August when the White House releases updated visitor logs, as it has promised to do “in December 2009.” That clock is winding down rapidly!

So what’s the big deal? As Adam Thierer and I noted in October:

at least in theory, “independent agencies” are supposed to be just that: independent.  They aren’t part of any Cabinet-level department and are supposed to be insulated from direct, day-to-day political pressure through bipartisan commissions, fixed terms, and safeguards against presidential removal.  At least that was always the “progressive ideal”: independent, “scientific” expert agencies and officials.

Think back to Leary’s comment as a former Republican Commissioner—defending an enforcement action taken by a now Democratic-led FTC with a palpable outrage that anyone should question the independence of his successors or try to cast the FTC’s enforcement actions in a partisan light:

[Over six years] I never received a direct or indirect policy recommendation on a pending matter from anyone in the White House or from any of the people in Congress who had actively supported me.

Leary’s vision of agency independence is so profoundly different from Genachowski’s apparent practice that one might think Leary was describing how regulatory agencies operated in a different century or on a different planet. At the very least, Genachowski’s close relationship with the Obama administration will make it difficult, if not impossible, for anyone on the outside to clearly demarcate between Genachowski’s decisions as Chairman and the Administration’s agenda—as Leary could do for the FTC. That means the many contentious issues the FCC will deal with in the coming years (e.g., net neutrality and potentially broader regulation of the applications and services layers of the Internet) will likely become increasingly partisan issues—which is a recipe for poor policy-making, especially given how highly technical some of those issues are.

This dynamic is most disturbing when it involves the FCC above all other “independent” regulatory agencies, as we noted:

whose extensive media regulations give it leverage that has been used to squelch political opposition to past administrations. Even liberal Democrats, such as Alfred Kahn, a Carter appointee, have long recognized that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to “regulatory capture” by special interests.  That’s why the FCC requires disclose of all “ex parte” meetings between Commissioners or staff and “interested parties” outside government.  Genachowski’s predecessors, Kevin Martin and Michael Powell, were both criticized by Democrats for their close ties to the Bush administration, largely because of fears that special interests were influencing FCC decisions through the White House.  Had either Republican visited the White House half as often as Genachowski, there would have likely been howls from the Left about “undue influence.”

And even more disturbing when it involves this hyper-activist FCC, with a sweeping view of its own jurisdiction:

Under Genachowski, the FCC has essentially asserted jurisdiction over the entire Internet, recently inquiring about regulation of online television, video games, Google Voice, cloud computing, the Apple apps store, and resurrecting railroad-era concepts of common carriage “neutrality” in ways that could ultimately apply not only to broadband, but also to search engines, social networking, and devices.  As we’ve warned, Chairman Genachowski is leading us down the road of vastly increased government meddling across cyberspace.  That regulatory apparatus will inevitably be used as a tool of politics, if not by this administration, then by another less noble one in the near future—which might explain why some in this administration are so keenly interested in Chairman Genachowski’s FCC.

Ultimately, the health of any democracy depends on the independence of its media from political meddling. After free speech rights guaranteed by the First Amendment and due process rights guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment, the independence of the FCC from direct political pressure has been perhaps the greatest bulwark of freedom of the press in America. Discard that all that  and it’s not hard to see how we could someday, perhaps under some future president, see headlines like this one the Land of the Free: ” Venezuela: Chávez Won’t Renew TV Station’s License.”

If Genachowski, an exceptionally well-qualified technocrat, wants to avoid being seen as the “Cat’s Paw” for a highly ideological administration with a broad agenda of reinventing a radically more “Progressive” America, he would do well to ask “What Would Leary Do?” and be a lot more leery of even creating the impression of taking any “direct or indirect policy recommendation” from the White House.

If Democrats don’t like the sound of ” Palin Won’t Renew TV Station’s License” (or “Gingrich Won’t Renew Google’s Search Engine License“), they had better start remembering that every action taken by this administration and its appointed independent agency heads will set precedents for presidents they may loathe as much as, say, Richard Nixon, whose abuse of the FCC’s “Fairness Doctrine” as an instrument of censorship is legendary.

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka

Move over, health care reform, climate change, and the economy. Judging by White House visits by various government agency heads, the Obama administration instead appears preoccupied with the re-regulation of communications, media, and the Internet. The Administration has just released logs of all visitors to the White House and Executive Office Buildings from Obama’s inauguration through August—including a staggering 47 visits by Federal Communications Commission (FCC) Chairman Julius Genachowski. By contrast, no other major agency head logged more than five visits.  Chairman Genachowski obviously has an audience with those at the highest levels of power, including the President himself, but this raises questions about just how “independent” this particular regulator and his agency really are.

Unprecedented Transparency by White House

The Administration deserves credit for releasing these visitor logs, which offer unprecedented transparency into the White House’s workings.  Unfortunately, the logs lack visitors’ affiliation and title, making it difficult to discern subtle patterns.  Furthermore, each entry indicates only one “visitee” and the total number of people involved.  Full disclosure requires identifying all meeting participants. Nonetheless, President Obama’s gesture is a great first step toward improved government accountability.

This openness allows us to ask questions we couldn’t pose for previous administrations—such as why the FCC head seems to have unparalleled access to the White House.  Lacking data from previous administrations, it’s difficult to make direct comparisons with previous FCC Chairmen, but the sheer number of visits by Chairman Genachowski leaves no doubt about his uniquely close involvement with the White House.

Given the ongoing economic/financial crisis, you might think that the President and White House officials would be meeting regularly with the heads of other independent agencies, such as the Federal Reserve, Securities and Exchange Commission, Small Business Administration, Federal Trade Commission, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and National Labor Relations Board.  But not one of those agency heads appears to have logged a visit through August.  Climate change?  Just a single visit with the EPA Administrator.

And Cabinet-level officials?  Just 23 visits among 21 officials.  How is that possible, you might ask?  Apparently, Obama held just one full Cabinet meeting in the first seven months of his presidency (in May)—followed by a second meeting in November (well after the logs end). So, while President Obama and White House staffers were too busy to meet with Cabinet-level officials, they always made time for Chairman Genachowski.  Indeed, of the 1,786 visitors listed, only two logged more visits than Genachowski: Bancorp CEO Richard Davis (56) and Lee Sachs (61), Deputy Treasury Secretary.

President Obama appears as the “visitee” for two of Genachowski’s many visits, but could have met with him along with others if someone else was listed as the visitee.  More telling is that only 7 of his 47 visits included more than 10 attendees, and 25 were one-on-one—meaning that the FCC Chairman usually had a personal audience or a small audience.

Why all this attention for such a relatively obscure regulatory agency?  Genachowski served as Obama’s Technology Advisor during the campaign, the transition, and the beginning of the administration.  Eight of his 47 visits occurred before his long-anticipated nomination as FCC Chairman was announced on March 3, with 31 more before his June 29 confirmation.  Only eight occurred after his confirmation, but July and August are generally Washington’s slowest months, so it will be interesting to see just how many more visits he’s racked up since August when the administration releases updated logs.  Probably far more than any other independent agency head: Even his eight visits in July and August are remarkable compared to the near complete lack of visits by other agency heads.

How Independent?

Why care?  Well, at least in theory, “independent agencies” are supposed to be just that: independent.  They aren’t part of any Cabinet-level department and are supposed to be insulated from direct, day-to-day political pressure through bipartisan commissions, fixed terms, and safeguards against presidential removal.  At least that was always the “progressive ideal”: independent, “scientific” expert agencies and officials.

Of course, it was always more mythology than reality, since bureaucratic management is rarely “scientific” and these agencies are routinely subjected to blatant political pressure from White House officials and Congress.  Any history of America’s broadcast sector includes stories of political meddling at the FCC—often prompted by officials outside the agency.  Nonetheless, there are good reasons for maintaining a firewall between independent agencies and politicians—especially the FCC, whose extensive media regulations give it leverage that has been used to squelch political opposition to past administrations.

Even liberal Democrats, such as Alfred Kahn, a Carter appointee, have long recognized that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to “regulatory capture” by special interests.  That’s why the FCC requires disclose of all “ex parte” meetings between Commissioners or staff and “interested parties” outside government.  Genachowski’s predecessors, Kevin Martin and Michael Powell, were both criticized by Democrats for their close ties to the Bush administration, largely because of fears that special interests were influencing FCC decisions through the White House.  Had either Republican visited the White House half as often as Genachowski, there would have likely been howls from the Left about “undue influence.”

Interestingly, after his nomination, Chairman Genachowski met at least four times with Cass Sunstein, who now heads the Office of Information & Regulatory Policy (OIRA).  While Sunstein was not confirmed until September, their meetings raise important questions, since OIRA ultimately has final sign-off on the FCC’s regulations. Have the two continued to meet since?  If so, one hopes it was not to discuss Sunstein’s disturbing proposal for “electronic sidewalks” for cyberspace—a “Fairness Doctrine” for the Internet!

Is This Good or Bad for the Internet?

The critical issue is whether the FCC’s special relationship with the administration is beneficial for America’s dynamic digital economy.  That depends on whether you like the sound of a “New Deal 2.0” because—with the exception of some genuinely laudable eGoverment/transparency initiatives and openness to real spectrum reform (to be discussed at PFF’s upcoming event with Blair Levin this Tuesday, December 2nd)—that’s generally what the administration is pushing for in communications and media policy: command-and-control central planning of high-tech, backed by massive infrastructure subsidies and the re-regulation of sectors that have thrived since deregulation.

Under Genachowski, the FCC has essentially asserted jurisdiction over the entire Internet, recently inquiring about regulation of online television, video games, Google Voice, cloud computing, the Apple apps store, and resurrecting railroad-era concepts of common carriage “neutrality” in ways that could ultimately apply not only to broadband, but also to search engines, social networking, and devices.  As we’ve warned, Chairman Genachowski is leading us down the road of vastly increased government meddling across cyberspace.  That regulatory apparatus will inevitably be used as a tool of politics, if not by this administration, then by another less noble one in the near future—which might explain why some in this administration are so keenly interested in Chairman Genachowski’s FCC.

FOXNews.com has just published an editorial that I penned about Monday’s net neutrality announcement from the FCC.

Does Obama Want to Control the Internet?

by Ryan Radia

The federal government may gain broad new powers to regulate Internet providers next month if Federal Communications Commission Chairman Julius Genachowski gets his way. In a milestone speech on Monday, Genachowski proposed sweeping new regulations that would give the FCC the formal authority to dictate application and network management practices to companies that offer Internet access, including wireless carriers like AT&T and Verizon Wireless.

Genachowski’s proposed rules would make good on a pledge that President Obama made in his campaign to enshrine net neutrality as law. The announcement was met with cheers by a small but vocal crowd of activists and academics who have been pushing hard for net neutrality for years. But if bureaucrats and politicians truly care about neutrality, they would be wise to resist calls to expand the government’s power over private networks. Instead, policymakers should recognize that it is far more important for government to remain neutral to competing business models — open, closed, or any combination thereof.

Consider the Apple iPhone. The remarkably successful smartphone has arguably been a game-changer in the wireless world, having sold tens of millions of handsets since its 2007 launch and spurring dozens of would-be “iPhone killers” in the process. If you listen to net neutrality advocates’ mantra, you would assume the iPhone must be a wide open device with next to no restrictions. You would be mistaken. In fact, the iPhone is a prototypical “walled garden.” Apple vets every single iPhone app, and Apple reserves the right to reject iPhone apps if they “duplicate [iPhone] functionality” or “create significant network congestion.”

Why, then, has the iPhone enjoyed such popularity? It’s because consumer preferences are diverse and constantly evolving. Most users, it seems, do not place openness on the same pedestal that net neutrality advocates do. Proprietary platforms like the iPhone have advantages of their own– a cohesive, centrally-managed user experience, for one– but have disadvantages as well.

In the battle between open and closed devices, wireless subscribers have voted with their wallets. So far, they have preferred the iPhone over open source devices like the “Google phone.” In the intensely competitive wireless market, the iPhone’s success shows that innovation can occur, and even thrive, within the confines of proprietary ecosystems like the iPhone.

But under the FCC’s proposed neutrality rules, the iPhone and similar devices that place limits on the content and applications that users can access would likely be against the law.

To be sure, the virtues that neutrality proponents espouse– open access, transparency, democracy, and the like — are all legitimate, even important values. Arguably, the open nature of the Internet has been instrumental in fostering many of the innovations that consumers enjoy today. But it is wrong to assume, as neutrality proponents do, that today’s “capital-I” Internet is the end all, be all network, and that the future of global communications ought not include some proprietary elements.

Technological innovation is an unpredictable beast. Networks for transmitting data that have yet to emerge — so-called “splinternets” — may well reshape the nature of global communications in years ahead. One need only look to the FCC’s widely criticized telephone and cable regulations to witness how rigid federal mandates can thwart high-tech evolution and steer the market in unnatural directions.

Fortunately, not all hope is lost for consumers. A group of Republican Senators, led by Sen. Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-Texas), have announced that they will lead a charge in Congress to thwart the FCC’s push for neutrality. And if the FCC bites off more than it can chew and enacts overly broad rules, network providers may well challenge the agency in court. Only two weeks ago, the FCC was sharply repudiated by a federal circuit court for ignoring the facts in its regulation of the cable industry.

If net neutrality ultimately goes through, the threat to infrastructure wealth creation is serious. When regulators gain new powers, they rarely cede them in response to marketplace changes without a fight. Under a neutrality regime, the telecom industry would likely retreat, take fewer risks, and divert investment toward more fruitful pursuits. It’s no coincidence that the Internet, a sanctuary of governmental restraint, has spawned such unparalleled innovation. In the relentlessly fast-moving digital age, regulatory intervention is a recipe for entrenching the status-quo.

Ryan Radia is an information policy analyst at the Competitive Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C.

Two great articles today about the dangers of government getting too involved in the newspaper business as the industry experiences serious marketplace difficulties. Slate’s Jack Shafer (“Saving Newspapers From Their Saviors“) and Mark Hopkins of Silicon Angle (“Obama Administration ‘Open’ to State Run Newspapers“) both raise concerns about President Obama’s recent comments hinting that he is open to legislation that might grant struggling news organizations tax breaks if they were to restructure as nonprofit businesses.

In a piece for the City Journal back in March entitled “Socializing Media in Order to Save It,” I discussed the specific proposal in question, Senator Benjamin L. Cardin’s (D-MD) bill, S. 673, the “Newspaper Revitalization Act,” which would allow newspapers to become nonprofit organizations in an effort to help them stay afloat. Importantly, however, the measure would also disallow political endorsements on their editorial pages as part of the deal.  In my essay, I pointed out how “If the FCC received grant-making authority to dole out subsidies to media operators… it’s hard to imagine how journalists won’t be expected to surrender something in exchange.”  And that something would be their journalistic independence.

Shafer and Hopkins raise similar concerns in their essays.  Hopkins shares my concern about undue government influence as a result of such a potential legislative quid pro quo:

[I]sn’t journalism supposed to be the lauded and independent “Fourth Estate,” free of bias and loyalty to any governmental institution? Obviously, bias is pervasive in the old Heritage Media, but assigning journalism governmental overlords will almost ensure that journalistic independence will end. A bailout is the only hope of continued existence for the majority of newspapers, since almost without exception they’re too proud or ignorant to fundamentally change the way their organizations operate to adapt to the new media ecosystem. If one examines the extent to which the government has structured their relationships with the large banking institutions and the automakers, it isn’t a great leap of logic to see how the interference will play out with newspapers (and who would be more aware of that than the journalists that have covered those stories?).

Indeed, the fact that the Cardin bill already proposes a prohibition on political editorializing doesn’t bode well for what the future might hold should government ride in to rescue some struggling papers.  What else might newspapers have to entertain?  Free ads for politicians? A Fairness Doctrine or mandatory right of reply for printed editorials? Censorship for hard-hitting political satire or comics?  Who knows, but it is impossible for me to believe that lawmakers won’t ask for something in return for bailing out news outlets.

Meanwhile, Slate’s Shafer does a nice job itemizing concerns raised by a wide variety of folks in the newspaper industry itself and he also notes how such media marketplace meddling could distort the emerging news playing field in dangerous ways:

The government’s attempt to prop up newspapers with rewrites of the tax code or Sarkozy-esque direct subsidies of government advertising and free subscriptions for young people interferes with the already-in-progress transition from print to digital news delivery that’s been accelerating for the past 15 years—or longer. Propping up troubled papers has a cost. It weakens the enterprises that are rising from below to compete with them to deliver advertising and, yes, deliver news. I can think of no better way to hinder the rise of such Web sensations as Politico and Talking Points Memo than rewriting the rules to benefit newspapers.

Great point.  Any way you cut it, federal meddling with the news business — even in the name of saving some traditional journalistic outlets — will likely have serious unintended consequences in the long run.  President Obama should just say no to newspaper bailouts.

Read Part II here

In February, Congress passed the Obama Administration’s “(Five Year) National Broadband Plan,” part of the so-called “Stimulus.” (As economist Russ Roberts put it, government “stimulus” is “like taking a bucket of water from the deep end of a pool and dumping it into the shallow end.”) The Plan transfers $7.2 billion from taxpayers to broadband providers in subsides to promote broadband build-out. More than 10,000 comments have been filed on the plan. Once you get past the constitutional nicety of whether Congress has the power to subsidize “internal improvements” like broadband (it doesn’t), you might wonder just how well your money will be spent by all these techno-supplicants for the latest craze in corporate welfare.

The good news is that these comments are available online. Hurray for transparency! The bad news is that… they’re available online—specifically on the FCC’s Electronic Comments Filing System (ECFS). Anyone who’s used the web more recently than 1998 will cringe the first time they try to use ECFS to find anything, as Jerry has noted. Apart from the cumbersome, highly unintuitive interface, the problem is that there’s no way to search the text of comments ! You can only search pre-defined fields like like “law firm,” and if you don’t enter a value in precisely the right way, you get nada.

Bill Cline, the Chief of the Reference Information Center for the FCC’s Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau tries hard to put the best face on this farce of e-government, explaining:

A docket number is key to using ECFS, and this link takes you to the ECFS retrieval form with the docket number for the National Broadband Plan, 09-51, already filled in.  Just hit “Retrieve Document List” to get a list of all filings.  Yes, there are lots of them, and you need to click on each individual filing to read it.  But there are many ways you can focus your search, which include:

• Entering the name of a specific individual whose comments you want to see in Field 4 (Filed on Behalf of)
• Narrowing your search to people in your community by using the “City,” “State,” or “Zip Code” fields
• Entering “FCC” in Field 5 – (Law Firm) – to see FCC filings.
• Clicking on the box in field 15 (Eliminate Brief Text Comments) to narrow the search considerably by retrieving only longer comments
• Finding comments for a specific public notice by using a date range on either side of the comment due dates

Keep in mind that this the Federal Communications Commission we’re talking about here.  Yet this antiquated system hasn’t been updated in nearly six years! You might think the problem was just funding: after all, someone would have to pay for a new database system, right?  Yes, but we don’t need a new system: All the FCC has to do is set its robots.txt file to stop blocking search crawlers, so that FCC comments would be included in Google search results, as Jerry has noted.

The real absurdity here is that we naively expect these same regulatory agencies—that can’t even make their own data available through free search engines or stream their own meetings properly—to keep pace with the rapid pace of innovation on the Internet. If only the comedic geniuses at Saturday Night Live had chosen to pick on bureaucrats instead of lawyers, we’d have “Unfrozen Caveman Regulator” instead of  “Unfrozen Caveman Lawyer.” Maybe that would have made it clear to Americans how silly it is to give the least technologically competent among us control over technology, innovation and creativity—or, even better, that no one central authority is smart enough to manage it, even one led by a guy as seemingly Twitterific as Barack Obama.

Obama’s picked some good people to pull government into the Web 2.0 era, but they’ll always be fighting against the tide of institutional inertia inherent in bureaucracy. In short, we may well see a significant upgrade in e-government in the next few years, but it won’t change the basic fact that government just can’t keep pace with technological change. One need not be a libertarian to accept that this basic fact makes the Internet “different.” Thus can even a non-libertarian be a cyber-libertarian of the Internet Exceptionalist variety.

This clip from Fox News shows why more reporters need to contact the experts here at TLF:

The “security expert” being interviewed in the clip, Robert Siciliano, doesn’t seem to understand what cookies do. He claims that “cookies closest cousin is spyware.” Siciliano also implies that the Obama Administration might somehow be in league with Google to gather our private information.

I think there may be some valid concerns with cookies being implemented on certain government sites, but this sort of hyperbole only feeds into the baseless fears that already exist about technology.

I should note that Judge Andrew Napolitano provides some interesting analysis on the topic after the Siciliano interview, which is included in the clip.

Hat tip: dvorak.org/blog

Maybe Obama should invite Google CEO Eric Schmidt and Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer over to the White House for a beer to settle the two companies’ differences!

http://www.youtube.com/v/Q0umKaGxkkE While he’s at it, Obama might want to invite Apple CEO Steve Jobs, too, since the common cause Apple and Google once made against Microsoft now seems to be giving way to increased rivalry between the two titans of Internet cool. Or how about Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg, given Facebook’s growing challenge to Google? Yahoo!’s Carol Bartz seems to get along much better with everyone than the boys in the group, so she’d probably help Obama keep things under control. The Internet industry’s war-of-all-against-all is reminiscent of Tom Lehrer‘s classic 1960s satire “National Brotherhood Week”:

The Obama administration has been greeted with enthusiasm by scientists who see the potential for “research-based policy.” Reason, not ideology, will govern. The New Scientist, among other zines, headlines “Let Science Rule: the Rational Way to Run Societies.” (May 28, p. 40-43) This is part of a larger theme: Behavioral economics is taking off.

One commonly offered example of policy fixes that are crying out for a research-based approach is sex education. Abstinence-only sex education programs are well-taxpayer–funded at the federal, state, and international level. And they don’t work, either for HIV prevention or pregnancy prevention. What advocates of abstinence perhaps forgot is that the social context in which abstinence was preached with some success to upper-middle-class Victorian young ladies (not the young men, even the Victorians had more sense than that) were perpetually accompanied by adult chaperones. (The result was horrendous… the innocent young ladies would ultimately be infected with venereal diseases by their husbands, and they and their babies would suffer and often die without ever being told what was wrong or how it could have been prevented–bringing us to an important chapter in U.S. free speech history, as the “birth controllers” and other advocates like Katharine Hepburn’s mother fought for an end to the silence). Done. Criminal law also could reap substantial benefits from a research-based approach. I have written elsewhere about the problems of ignoring deterrence research in copyright.

But it gets harder. The key problem: There is research, and then there is research. Much of it is done by advocates or just people who are careless with their assumptions. Some of these people might not even be aware of the extent to which they are advocates.

Examples: One is the EU FLOSS Report, which I was reading the other day. Some interesting data, but the authors are so busy making the case for open source they neglect key questions. Such as, just for example, how do you measure the contribution to GDP of volunteer labor? Can one simultaneously express concern (as the FLOSS report does) about the EU’s low levels of investment in software, and delight that open source reduces the amount that firms must spend in software research or on software? If one wishes to make the cheery prediction that increasing the take-up of open source software within Europe will close their innovation gap with the United States, shouldn’t one consider that perhaps the United States might simultaneously increase it’s take-up rate if it appears to be a good idea? Just why does the United States seem to be more innovative than Europe anyway?

And so on. On the problem of result-oriented studies, New Scientist quotes Laurence Moore of Cardiff University in the United Kingdom: “They’re almost designed to show that the idea is a good idea … Rigorous evaluations are perceived as threatening rather than supportive of better policy.”

Sound studies that run contrary to popular ideas are often simply ignored. Abstinence policy is one example. But the problem is not confined to conservatives. Another example is Head Start. This is the classic 1960’s early childhood research-based triumph. Except the only study showing lasting results from Head Start was an study designed by the originator of the program. Later studies continue to cite the original study, and to cite studies citing the original study, and so on. The results showing long term gains have never been replicated. This problem, too, is recognized: “Assessing social policies using randomised controlled trials did start to take off in the US from the 1960s to 1980s. But the practice has declined, partly because policy makers became disenchanted when the trials did not endorse their brainwaves, according to Sheila Bird, a statistician at the Medical Research Council Biostatistics Unit in Cambridge, UK.”

This raises the question of why politicians and many other policymakers stick with such determination to their agendas even in the face of contrary evidence. Another way of asking the same thing: What is ideology and what does it do for us? I offer some thoughts. Are people just dumb? Is it ego? People must “save face” and are unwilling to back down from a position once taken publicly?

Some of our willingness to go with general principles is a good thing. A vast amount of human experience gets summed up and expressed in the form of ideology. The United States Constitution is an ideological document. Yet it is also based on human experience with hundreds of years of monarchy, condensed into few words. One does not, and ought not, lightly set such things aside. Example: There is a not-well-enough-known Supreme Court case, Buchanan v. Worley. At issue was the constitutionality of racial segregation laws. The supporters of the laws were filed many research reports from highly progressive social scientists, purporting to prove that segregation was good for people. Quite rightly, the Supreme Court dismissed the research and favored the principle of equality in the eyes of the law. Segregation statutes were unconstitutional. Without the Court’s willingness to declare them so, the United States could have developed a full-blown apartheid system along the lines of South Africa.

Certainly it would be good to scrutinize the human experiences that go into our ideologies and rules of thumb carefully. But this cannot always be done. I do not wish to be a gulag guinea pig.

Also, there are general, as well as particular lessons to be drawn from research-based policy. One general lesson appears to be that many bright ideas fail. The excellent book Seeing Like A State elaborates on this theme. But there is another. Why is it the need for research-based policy so pressing and not, say, just for example, research-based ideas for small business or how to cook a good hard-boiled egg? Why is the need usually in the public sector, not the private sector? When research is needed in the private sector, such as medicine—why is it taken up readily, egos set aside, while the public sector has been so stubborn?

This is not merely an accident. In the private sector, failure often has natural and severe consequence for those who support or act on a bad idea. In government, failure often has no consequences except embarrassment for those who act on or support a bad idea. Research will continue to be ignored without accountability. Which brings us back to ideology; a gentle rule of thumb favoring action through the private sector, not the public sector, may be more research-based than some would like to think after all.

My original post is here at convergence law.com.

Our readers may be interested in this excellent WSJ article, Too Risky for Venture Capitalists: Why proposals for a government bailout were roundly rejected.  We should all take heart in the the fact that the venture capital community itself resoundingly opposed the notion of accepting a massive infusion of taxpayer money, especially Tom Friedman’s suggestion:

“You want to spend $20 billion of taxpayer money creating jobs?” Mr. Friedman wrote. “Fine. Call up the top 20 venture capital firms in America” and invest the money with them.

But I see three more reasons why those interested in technology policy should pay attention to this encouraging episode.

First, the groundswell of opposition seems to have been driven largely by the Internet, both as a vehicle for disseminating the bailout proposals and for voicing opposition to them:

Venture capitalists certainly agree that innovators and start-up companies, not bailed-out GMs or Chryslers, will create the new jobs. They rightly brag that almost 20% of U.S. gross domestic product is generated by companies built by venture capital, such as Intel, Apple and Google. Still, they almost universally panned the notion of taxpayer support. Their real-time rejection is an excellent example of how social media — here, the venture community dissecting a proposal online — can now quickly take down bad ideas.

Second, it should almost go without saying that venture capital is the fountainhead of innovation, especially the disruptive innovation that is constantly pushing the envelope of technology policy.  A healthy VC sector is the bedrock of a dynamic, free and innovative economy.  The VCs realize that this requires, more than anything else, avoiding the market distortions caused by government funding:

“The top venture firms don’t want, don’t need and are never going to take government money. The same is true of the top entrepreneurs,” Fred Wilson of New York’s Union Square Ventures wrote on his blog. “The worst firms, on the other hand, will gladly accept government money,” which would go to investors who can’t raise funds privately and to entrepreneurs whose ideas shouldn’t be funded. “It’s a problem of adverse selection….” The idea of direct government funding is also anathema because it would undermine market discipline. Pension funds, endowments and other institutional investors keep a close eye on how their invested money is doing. Venture firms can raise new funds only if their previous performance was good. Several venture capitalists pointed out the irony that government-funded venture capital could mean trading a credit bubble for another technology bubble. Artificially inflating the venture coffers through a government fund could risk repeating the debacle of 1999-2000, when too much money chased too few good ideas, resulting in the sharp deflation of the Internet bubble. 

Third, the VC community’s response should serve as a lesson for other industries, but particularly high-tech industries, about how the government subsidies they find attractive today in a time of intense pressure on their bottom lines could ultimately harm them.  Instead of jumping on bailout bandwagon, perhaps these industries ought to focus their lobbying efforts on some of the eminently sensible suggestions coming from the VC community, such as the following:

If policy makers want to help entrepreneurs and their investors, there’s no mystery about what’s needed. Immigration needs to be reopened. Venture capital is still available, but the U.S. is now a laggard in the other half of the equation, which is making sure the entrepreneur’s sweat, energy and risk-taking can ultimately pay off. Sarbanes-Oxley helped kill the market for public offerings, which had been a lucrative step for successful start-ups. Income taxes are going up, not down. And the U.S. capital gains tax rate of 15% contrasts with the 0% rate in Hong Kong, Singapore and even Germany, where there’s an understanding that these investments are made with income that’s already been taxed once.

I’ve warned about the dangers of subsidies to the high-tech industry, but I do recognize that the unintended consequences of  subsidizing technological innovation may far outstrip those of subsidizing technological infrastructure, which is what the Obama administration seems to be focused on.  Indeed, if one is going to spend taxpayer money on any subsidies in the name of “stimulus,” it’s difficult to think of a better way to spend that money than on promoting broadband deployment and adoption (however much of a myth it is that we are lagging behind the rest of the world in these areas).  

Still, no matter how worthy the objective, all subsidies distort markets. Few do as much damage as those showered on industries particularly based on risk—e.g., venture capital and financial markets.  But whatever these distortions, the Golden Rule still applies: he who has the gold, makes the rules!  With government subsidies, come government controls.

Looks like we can count on another tax landing on our cell phones soon thanks to the taxaholics in the Obama Administration.  According to Jeff Silva of RCR Wireless:

Though details on the Obama budget are few and far between, some information was made available. The administration estimates that spectrum license fees would raise $4.8 billion over the next 10 years.

Don’t be fooled into thinking that wireless carriers will just eat those fees.  Those fees will be coming to bill near you soon in the form of another stupid government tax burden on our wireless phones.

You know, because we’re not already paying enough in taxes on our phones.

(P.S.  I’m actually a little surprised that the “progressives” in this administration would support this proposal since a tax on mobile phones will end up being about as regressive as taxes can get.)

On this week’s show, we discuss government transparency—a topic a number of us here at the TLF have written about lately.  Among other things, we discuss:

• Why transparency is important
http://digg.com/tools/diggthis.js
• What data the government should provide and how
• Good and bad examples of transparency
• President Obama’s promise to have the most accountable administration in history
• Obama’s plans to appoint a Chief Technology Officer

My guests for this show are:

• TLFer Jerry Brito of the Mercatus Institute, who’s written extensively about transparency and has recently launched an e-Government project called StimulusWatch
• TLFer Jim Harper of the Cato Institute and WashingtonWatch.com, another very successful e-Government project, who’s asked some tough questions about the Administration’s implementation of e-Government thus far and led a great Cato policy forum on this issue (featuring Jerry, among others)
• John Wonderlich of the Sunlight Foundation, the leading e-Government non-profit whose “non-partisan mission [is to use] the revolutionary power of the Internet to make information about Congress and the federal government more meaningfully accessible to citizens”

You can subscribe to our podcast here or through iTunes here.  Or, you can play or download this podcast using the online player below.

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I can’t believe we’re actually asking whether Obama—the candidate who promised to bring the Federal government (and perhaps everyone else) into the Web 2.0 era whether they like it or not—will have a “personal computer.”

The “webiness” of Obama’s predecessors is just embarrassing:   

Clinton famously sent only two e-mails while he was president, one to test whether he could push the “send” button and one to John Glenn, sent while the former Ohio senator was aboard the space shuttle… During his presidency, George W. Bush didn’t have a personal log-in to the White House Internet server, nor did he have a personal whitehouse.gov e-mail address. (He gave up his private e-mail account, G94B@aol.com, just before his first inauguration.) When he did go online, there were some things he couldn’t access. During Bush’s tenure, the White House’s IT department blocked sites like Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, and most of MySpace. The ability to comment on blogs was blocked, as was certain content that was deemed offensive. According to David Almacy, who served as Bush’s director for Internet and e-communications from 2005-07, only two people had access to the iTunes store during that period: Almacy, who had to upload speeches to the site, and the president’s personal aide, so that he could download songs for Bush’s iPod.

Pipes and tubes, pipes and tubes, my friends…  

If Obama decides not to implement whatever legal or technical changes would be required for him to do something so simple as having a computer on his desk, I suppose we’ll know that he’s not really all that interested—at least on a personal level—in all his rhetoric about the power of the Internet to make government more transparent and accountable.  Let’s hope that doesn’t happen.

Just before the New Year, Mike Masnick reported:

It’s been well over five years since we first heard about a plan in Oregon to attach GPS devices to cars and tax drivers based on how much they drove and the idea hasn’t become any better in the intervening years… but apparently it’s still being pushed. Oregon’s governor is trying to move forward with the plan.  One of the reasons behind the bill has nothing to do with a more efficient way to tax drivers, but because the state is gaining less revenue from its gas tax since there are more fuel-efficient cars on the roads these days. Of course, rather than reward drivers for driving more fuel efficient cars, this sort of tax punishes them, and actually encourages the use of less fuel efficient vehicles. And, of course, that doesn’t even begin to get into the potential (and likely) privacy problems brought about by any system whereby the government has full access to a GPS system on your car.

This is a great example of the problems that often arise when trying to bring into the digital age areas of the economy monopolized or dominated by government.  There’s a clear (if imperfect) analogy here to Obama’s ambitious goal of digitizing health records:  both are great ideas that raise special privacy concerns because of the heavy involvement of government.  These privacy concerns are certainly not unwarranted:  I wouldn’t want the government to have access to my car’s location or my medical history at any given moment or a complete record of where I’ve driven or what doctors I’ve seen.  But just as relying on paper health records is clearly stupid (and dangerous), it would make a hell of a lot more sense for drivers to pay for road use depending on “where, when and how far they drove”—as in a small pilot project in the UK.

Today, state and Federal taxes on every gallon of gasoline are intended to serve two conflicting purposes—but do a poor job with both.  First, the taxes fund the cost of building and maintaining roads.  But the tax provides only a very rough proxy for how much driving Americans are doing, and says nothing about which roads are actually being used or when.  So government road planners have to guess at which roads need to be upgraded or where new roads are required.  Worse, the current system does nothing to encourage rational decisions on the part of drivers, who currently have no direct economic incentive (other than saving time) not to drive during rush hour or to use less-congested roads.

Second, the current tax system is what economists would call “Pigouvian“: it is intended to correct the negative externalities (air pollution) caused by driving.  But, again, taxing total gallons of gas consumed is a poor proxy for emissions.  As Cato’s Jerry Taylor points out (start podcast at 1:33), cars are already sufficiently computerized that if we really wanted to punish pollution through the tax system, we could directly tax emissions themselves by having each car keep track of unhealthy emissions and then uploading that data, say, at the car’s annual inspection.

So in a rational world, we’d abolish gasoline taxes entirely and institute user fees to fund the cost of roads & highways that reflect actual use.   If government insists on it, we could also tax emissions directly.  (We could make the whole transition revenue-neutral, lest this reform result in higher taxes/fees.)  Merely by reducing congestion, better economic incentives could significantly reduce air pollution.

If roads weren’t run by government monopolies, this kind of change would have happened a long time ago.  Although many people associate toll booths with road privatization, no private business would ever choose a technology as cumbersome (and costly) as toll booths if they had the option of using a system as seamless and invisible to the user as GPS-tracking or even existing transponder-based systems ( e.g.,  E-Z Pass, FasTrak).  Maybe there’s a more efficient or privacy-friendly option out there, or at least on the horizon.  I don’t know, but I suspect competing road operators would figure it out.

Some drivers might still be uncomfortable with the idea of a private company having access to their driving data, but that private company would have a strong incentive to compete for privacy-sensitive drivers by offering strong data protection policies (such as data anonymization and retention limits), which would of course be enforced under the FTC’s existing “unfair & deceptive trade practices.”

But because government has virtually monopolized the road system, we’re stuck with a terrible choice:

• Continue to use a “pricing” (tax) system from the 1950s when modern satellite and computer technology offers us clearly superior alternatives that could reduce congestion and pollution and perhaps even save lives; OR
• Risk putting the data created by those modern technologies directly into the government’s hands.

It’s a hard choice.  I don’t know what the right answer is—other than privatizing the roads, enforcing corporate privacy policies strictly under existing law, and increasing Fourth Amendment protections against government access to user data kept by companies.  Since road privatization is unlikely to happen in an era when we are (re)nationalizing core industries through bailouts, I suspect that we’ll end up having to choose either technology (with all its benefits)  or privacy, when we should be able to have both.

President Obama has talked about “investing” $50 billion in tax money over the next five years to subsidize the digitization of health records.  While one might hope that these records wouldn’t be directly accessible to government in the same way that driving records would be under the Oregon or UK projects, it’s by no means clear that this won’t be the case, given the Federal government’s dominant role in the health care sector.  If the Golden Rule (“He Who Has the Gold, Makes the Rules”) holds, increased government spending on health care across the board—whether in the name of e-Health or universal health—will surely lead to greater government control of the health care system.  That will probably mean greater access to e-health records.  If politicians can access FBI files of their opponents, they’ll probably abuse access to health care records, too.  No safeguards are ever perfect, of course, and invasions of privacy would happen if the data were kept by private companies, but at least those companies would be accountable in court, in the court of public opinion and in the marketplace if they allowed such violations by their employees or corporate partners, or simply failed to protect such a “honey pot” of data.

I’d like to see the most modern technology used across the board—whether it’s for roads or health care.  I just don’t want the real Big Brother—government—to have access to that information, a problem that is only going to increase as government’s role in our lives grows.