I have a new R Street Institute policy study out this week doing a deep dive into the question: “Can We Predict the Jobs and Skills Needed for the AI Era?” There’s lots of hand-wringing going on today about AI and the future of employment, but that’s really nothing new. In fact, in light of past automation panics, we might want to step back and ask: Why isn’t everyone already unemployed due to technological innovation?

To get my answers, please read the paper! In the meantime, here’s the executive summary:

To better plan for the economy of the future, many academics and policymakers regularly attempt to forecast the jobs and worker skills that will be needed going forward. Driving these efforts are fears about how technological automation might disrupt workers, skills, professions, firms and entire industrial sectors. The continued growth of artificial intelligence (AI), robotics and other computational technologies exacerbate these anxieties. Yet the limits of both our collective knowledge and our individual imaginations constrain well-intentioned efforts to plan for the workforce of the future. Past attempts to assist workers or industries have often failed for various reasons. However, dystopian predictions about mass technological unemployment persist, as do retraining or reskilling programs that typically fail to produce much of value for workers or society. As public efforts to assist or train workers move from general to more specific, the potential for policy missteps grows greater. While transitional-support mechanisms can help alleviate some of the pain associated with fast-moving technological disruption, the most important thing policymakers can do is clear away barriers to economic dynamism and new opportunities for workers.

I do discuss some things that government can do to address automation fears at the end of the paper, but it’s important that policymakers first understand all the mistakes we’ve made with past retraining and reskilling efforts. The easiest thing to do to help in the short-term is clear away barriers to labor mobility and economic dynamism, I argue. Again, read the study for details.

For more info on other AI policy developments, check out my running list of research on AI, ML robotics policy.

My previous column focused on driverless car innovation moving overseas, and earlier installments discussed genetic testing, drones, and the sharing economy. Now another drone-related example has come to my attention, this time from New Zealand. According to the New Zealand Herald:

Aerial pizza delivery may sound futuristic but Domino’s has been given the green light to test New Zealand pizza delivery via drones. The fast food chain has partnered with drone business Flirtey to launch the first commercial drone delivery service in the world, starting later this year.

Importantly, according to the story, “If it is successful the company plans to extend the delivery method to six other markets – Australia, Belgium, France, The Netherlands, Japan and Germany.” That’s right, America is not on the list. In other words, a popular American pizza delivery chain is looking overseas to find the freedom to experiment with new delivery methods. And the reason they are doing so is because of the seemingly endless bureaucratic foot-dragging by federal regulators at the FAA.

Some may scoff and say, ‘Who cares? It’s just pizza!’ Well, even if you don’t care about innovation in the field of food delivery, how do you feel about getting medicines or vital supplies delivered on a more timely and efficient basis in the future? What may start as a seemingly mundane or uninteresting experiment with pizza delivery through the sky could quickly expand to include a wide range of far more important things. But it will never happen unless you give innovators a little breathing room–i.e., “permissionless innovation”–to try new and different ways of doing things.

Incidentally, Flirtey, the drone deliver company that Domino’s partnered with in New Zealand, is also an American-based company. On the company’s website, the firm notes that: “Drones can be operated commercially in a growing number of countries. We’re in discussions with regulators all around the world, and we’re helping to shape the regulations and systems that will make drone delivery the most effective, personal and frictionless delivery method in the market.”

That’s just another indication of the reality that global innovation arbitrage is at work today. If the U.S. puts it head in the sand and lets bureaucrats continue to slow the pace of progress, America’s next generation of great innovators will increasingly look offshore in search of patches of freedom across the planet where they can try out their exciting new products and services.

BTW, I wrote all about this in Chapter 3 of my Permissionless Innovation book. And here’s some additional Mercatus research on the topic.

Additional  Reading

• How to Destroy American Innovation: The FAA & Commercial Drones, Oct. 6, 2014
• Permissionless Innovation & Commercial Drones, February 4, 2015.
• DRM for Drones Will Fail, January 28, 2015.
• Regulatory Capture: FAA and Commercial Drones Edition, January 16, 2015.
• Global Innovation Arbitrage: Commercial Drones & Sharing Economy Edition, December 9, 2014.
• Filing to FAA on Drones & “Model Aircraft”, Sept. 23, 2014
• Private Drones & the First Amendment, Sept. 19, 2014
• [TV interview] The Beneficial Uses of Private Drones, March 28, 2014
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FAA on integration of drones into the nation’s airspace, April 23, 2o13
• Eli Dourado, Deregulate the Skies: Why We Can’t Afford to Fear Drones, Wired, April 23, 2013
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014)
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014)

In a terrific little essay on “Local Economic Revival and The Unpredictability of Technological Innovation,” Michael Mandel, the chief economic strategist at the Progressive Policy Institute, makes several important points regarding the fundamental folly for future forecasting efforts as it pertains to new innovations. He notes, for example:

There are plenty of candidates for the “next big thing,” ranging from the Internet of Things to additive manufacturing to artificial organ factories to autonomous cars to space commerce to Elon Musk’s hyperloop. Each of these has the potential to revolutionize an industry, and to create many thousands or even millions of jobs in the process–not just for the highly-educated, but a whole range of workers. Yet the problem–and the beauty–is that technological innovation is fundamentally unpredictable, even at close range. Consider this: The two most important innovations of the past decade, economically, have been the smartphone and fracking. The smartphone transformed the way that we communicate and hydraulic fracturing has driven down the price of energy, not to mention shifting the geopolitical balance of power.

But few saw the smartphone and fracking revolutions coming, he notes. The pundits and the press were too focused on technologies of the past.

In fact, as I noted in a case study in the 2nd edition of my book,  Permissionless Innovation (p. 50-51), various pundits denigrated Apple and Google’s entry into the smartphone business because many industry analysts believed the market was mature. After all, in the early and mid-2000s, the big names of the mobile world were Palm, Blackberry, Motorola, and Nokia. And their market power seemed unassailable. Thus, as perplexing as it sounds now, the common wisdom in the mid-2000s regarding Apple and Google’s potential entry into the smartphone business was that, if they dare tried, they were destined to fail miserably!

For example, in December 2006, Palm CEO Ed Colligan summarily dismissed the idea that a traditional personal computing company could compete in the smartphone business. “We’ve learned and struggled for a few years here figuring out how to make a decent phone,” he said. “PC guys are not going to just figure this out. They’re not going to just walk in.” Similarly, in January 2007, Microsoft CEO Steve Ballmer laughed off the prospect of an expensive smartphone without a keyboard having a chance in the marketplace: “Five hundred dollars? Fully subsidized? With a plan? I said that’s the most expensive phone in the world and it doesn’t appeal to business customers because it doesn’t have a keyboard, which makes it not a very good e-mail machine.” (Quotes from John Paczkowski, “Apple: How Do You Say ‘Eat My Dust’ in Finnish?” All Things D, November 11, 2009.)

Even better, in March 2007, computing industry pundit John C. Dvorak insisted that “Apple Should Pull the Plug on the iPhone,” because he believed the mobile handset business was already locked up by the era’s major players. “This is not an emerging business,” Dvorak said. “In fact it’s gone so far that it’s in the process of consolidation with probably two players dominating everything, Nokia Corp. and Motorola Inc.”

Just a few years later, of course, Nokia’s profits and market share plummeted, and Google had purchased the struggling Motorola. Meanwhile, Palm was dead, Blackberry was languishing, and Microsoft continued to struggle to win back market share lost to Apple and Google. So much for tech prophecy!

Tech pundits also usually fail when forecasting the professions of the future. As I noted in Chapter 5 of my  Permissionless Innovation book (p. 101-2):

It’s also worth noting how difficult it is to predict future labor market trends. In early 2015, Glassdoor, an online jobs and recruiting site, published a report on the 25 highest paying jobs in demand today. Many of the job titles identified in the report probably weren’t considered a top priority 40 years ago, and some of these job descriptions wouldn’t even have made sense to an observer from the past. For example, some those hotly demanded jobs on Glassdoor’s list include software architect (#3), software development manager (#4), solutions architect (#6), analytics manager (#8), IT manager (#9), data scientist (#15), security engineer (#16), quality assurance manager (#17), computer hardware engineer (#18), database administrator (#20), UX designer (#21), and software engineer (#23). Looking back at reports from the 1970s and ’80s published by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics, the federal agency that monitors labor market trends, one finds no mention of these computing and information technology-related professions because they had not yet been created or even envisioned. So, what will the most important and well-paying jobs be 30 to 40 years from now? If history is any guide, we probably can’t even imagine many of them right now.

Indeed, as Mandel concludes in his new essay, history tells us that, “the next big job-creating innovation isn’t likely to announce itself in bold letters before it arrives. Just because the next big thing isn’t obvious today doesn’t mean it won’t be obvious a year from now.”

Today’s tech pundits would be wise to remember that insight when making forecasts about a future that is, as Mandel suggests, so “fundamentally unpredictable, even at close range.”

Along with colleagues at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, I am releasing two major new reports today dealing with the regulation of the sharing economy. The first report is a 20-page filing to the Federal Trade Commission that we are submitting to the agency for its upcoming June 9th workshop on “The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators.” We have been invited to participate in that event and I will be speaking on the fourth panel of the workshop. The filing I am submitting today for that workshop was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman and Matt Mitchell.

The second report we are releasing today is a new 47-page working paper entitled, “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the ‘Lemons Problem.'” This study was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson, and Chris Kuiper.

I will summarize each report briefly here.

In our new filing to the FTC, we address the five questions the Commission set forth in its workshop annoucement. Those five questions are as follows:

• How can state and local regulators meet legitimate regulatory goals (such as protecting consumers, and promoting public health and safety) in connection with their oversight of sharing economy platforms and business models, without also restraining competition or hindering innovation?
• How have sharing economy platforms affected competition, innovation, consumer choice, and platform participants in the sectors in which they operate? How might they in the future?
• What consumer protection issues—including privacy and data security, online reviews and disclosures, and claims about earnings and costs—do these platforms raise, and who is responsible for addressing these issues?
• What particular concerns or issues do sharing economy transactions raise regarding the protection of platform participants? What responsibility does a sharing economy platform bear for consumer injury arising from transactions undertaken through the platform?
• How effective are reputation systems and other trust mechanisms, such as the vetting of sellers, insurance coverage, or complaint procedures, in encouraging consumers and suppliers to do business on sharing economy platforms?

We provide detailed answers to each of these questions as well as one additional major question that was not posed by the Commission in its workshop notice but which is, no doubt, on the minds of many at the agency and outside it: What should the FTC do about state and local barriers to entry and innovation that might be thwarting the growth of the sharing economy? (I blogged about that issue here a couple of weeks ago and our filing includes that discussion.)

Please take a look at our filing for detailed answers to each of these questions. (Incidentally, our filing is an extension of an earlier working paper that Koopman, Mitchell, and I released late last year on “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change.”) But, to briefly highlight the thrust of our argument, here’s a passage from our new filing:

As the debate surrounding the sharing economy moves forward, policymakers must keep in mind that merely because regulations were once justified on the grounds of consumer protection does not mean they accomplished those goals or that they are still needed today. Even well-intentioned policies must be judged against real-world evidence. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many traditional consumer protection regulations hurt consumers; in the words of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, they are often “cumbersome, and some are just plain protectionist.” Markets, competition, reputational systems, and ongoing innovation often solve problems better than regulation when they are given a chance to do so. There are two reasons for this. First, market imperfections create powerful profit opportunities for entrepreneurs who are able to find ways to correct them. Second, regulatory solutions too often undermine competition and lock in inefficient business models.

We continue on to explain exactly why that is the case, while also offering some constructive solutions to other issues that are on the minds of regulators.

Meanwhile, the new working paper we are releasing today provides much greater detail on the fifth of the five questions the FTC posed in its workshop notice regarding reputation systems and other trust mechanisms. Here is the abstract from the paper:

This paper argues that the sharing economy—through the use of the Internet and real time reputational feedback mechanisms—is providing a solution to the lemons problem that many regulators have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an overview of the sharing economy and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons theory as well as the various regulatory solutions proposed to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section III discusses the relationship between reputation and trust and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses how the evolution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the reputational feedback mechanisms of the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new realities affect public policy and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this rationale to regulate in the name of consumer protection might, in fact, make consumers worse off. This has ramifications for the current debate over regulation of the sharing economy.

We believe that our research makes it clear “how the sharing economy relies upon—and has helped spur the growth of—sophisticated reputational feedback mechanisms that facilitate online trust and commerce, overcoming many of the information asymmetries that seemed intractable… just a generation ago. In combination with online review services and other information-sharing technologies enabled by the Internet,” we conclude, “these reputational tools can help create more effective, and largely self-regulating, markets that provide more information to more individuals than ever before.”

We look forward to continuing engagement with officials at the FTC and other policymakers at the federal, state, and even international level on these issues. We hope our research will help legislators and regulators find sensible ways to adjust policy for the sharing economy so as not to derail the sort of “permissionless innovation” that has thus far powered this exciting sector and produced the many pro-consumer benefits flowing from it. Check out our filing and new paper for more details.

The sharing economy is growing faster than ever and becoming a hot policy topic these days. I’ve been fielding a lot of media calls lately about the nature of the sharing economy and how it should be regulated. (See latest clip below from the Stossel show on Fox Business Network.) Thus, I sketched out some general thoughts about the issue and thought I would share them here, along with some helpful additional reading I have come across while researching the issue. I’d welcome comments on this outline as well as suggestions for additional reading. (Note: I’ve also embedded some useful images from Jeremiah Owyang of Crowd Companies.)

1) Just because policymakers claim that regulation is meant to protect consumers does not mean it actually does so.

1. Cronyism/ Rent-seeking: Regulation is often “captured” by powerful and politically well-connected incumbents and used to their own benefit. (+ Lobbying activity creates deadweight losses for society.)
2. Innovation-killing: Regulations become a formidable barrier to new innovation, entry, and entrepreneurism.
3. Unintended consequences: Instead of resulting in lower prices & better service, the opposite often happens: Higher prices & lower quality service. (Example: Painting all cabs same color destroying branding & ability to differentiate).

2) The Internet and information technology alleviates the need for top-down regulation & actually does a better job of serving consumers.

1. Ease of entry/innovation in online world means that new entrants can come in to provide better options and solve problems previously thought to be unsolvable in the absence of regulation.
2. Informational empowerment: The Internet and information technology solves old problem of lack of consumer access to information about products and services. This gives them monitoring tools to find more and better choices. (i.e., it lowers both search costs & transaction costs). (“To the extent that consumer protection regulation is based on the claim that consumers lack adequate information, the case for government intervention is weakened by the Internet’s powerful and unprecedented ability to provide timely and pointed consumer information.” – John C. Moorhouse)
3. Feedback mechanisms (product & service rating / review systems) create powerful reputational incentives for all parties involved in transactions to perform better.
4. Self-regulating markets: The combination of these three factors results in a powerful check on market power or abusive behavior. The result is reasonably well-functioning and self-regulating markets. Bad actors get weeded out.
5. Law should evolve: When circumstances change dramatically, regulation should as well. If traditional rationales for regulation evaporate, or new technology or competition alleviates need for it, then the law should adapt.

3) Sharing economy has demonstrably improved consumer welfare. It provides:

1. more choices / competition
2. more service innovation / differentiation
3. better prices
4. higher quality services  (safety & cleanliness /convenience / peace of mind)
5. Better options & conditions for workers

4) If we need to “level the (regulatory) playing field,” best way to do so is by “deregulating down” to put everyone on equal footing; not by “regulating up” to achieve parity.

1. Regulatory asymmetry is real: Incumbents are right that they are at disadvantage relative to new sharing economy start-ups.
2. Don’t punish new innovations for it: But solution is not to just roll the old regulatory regime onto the new innovators.
3. Parity through liberalization: Instead, policymakers should “deregulate down” to achieve regulatory parity. Loosen old rules on incumbents as new entrants challenge status quo.
4. “Permissionless innovation” should trump “precautionary principle” regulation: Preemptive, precautionary regulation does not improve consumer welfare. Competition and choice do better. Thus, our default position toward the sharing economy should be “innovation allowed” or permissionless innovation.
5. Alternative remedies exist: Accidents will always happen, of course. But insurance, contracts, product liability, and other legal remedies exist when things go wrong. The difference is that ex post remedies don’t discourage innovation and competition like ex ante regulation does. By trying to head off every hypothetical worst-case scenario, preemptive regulations actually discourage many best-case scenarios from ever coming about.

5) Bottom line = Good intentions only get you so far in this world.

1. Just because a law was put on the books for noble purposes, it does not mean it really accomplished those goals, or still does so today.
2. Markets, competition, and ongoing innovation typically solve problems better than law when we give them a chance to do so.

[P.S. On 9/30, my Mercatus Center colleague Matt Mitchell posted this excellent follow-up essay building on my outline and improving it greatly.]

Additional Reading

• Randolph J. May & Michael J. Horney, “The Sharing Economy: A Positive Shared Vision for the Future,” Free State Foundation, Perspectives from FSF Scholars, Vol. 9, No. 26, July 30, 2014.
• R.J. Lehmann, “The Sharing Economy Will Thrive Only If Government Doesn’t Strangle It,” Reason, August 2, 2014.
• Andrew Moylan and R.J. Lehmann, “Five Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy,” R Street, Policy Study No. 26, July 2014.
• Eli Lehrer & Andrew Moylan, “Embracing the Peer-Production Economy,” National Affairs, 2014, p. 51-63.
• Arun Sundararajan, “Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy,” Wired, October 22, 2012.
• Matthew Mitchell and Michael Farren, “If you Like Uber, You Would’ve Loved the Jitney,” LA Times, July 12, 2014.
• Daniel M. Rothschild, “How Uber and Airbnb Resurrect ‘Dead Capital,’” The Umlaut, April 9, 2014.
• Daniel M. Rothschild, “Renters and Rent-Seeking in San Francisco,” Technology Liberation Front, April 15, 2014.
• [podcast] Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy, EconTalk, July 7, 2014.
• video of Michael Munger talk on the Sharing Economy, September 25, 2014.
• John C. Moorhouse, “Consumer Protection Regulation and Information on the Internet,” in Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein (eds), The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues (Cato Institute, 2003).
• Rachel Bostman, What’s Mine is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (2010).
• Jeremiah Owyang, A Glossary of Emerging Terms in the Collaborative Economy, August 29, 2014

Patrick Byrne, CEO of Overstock.com, discusses how Overstock.com became one of the first online retail stores to accept Bitcoin. Byrne provides insight into how Bitcoin lowers transaction costs, making it beneficial to both retailers and consumers, and how governments are attempting to limit access to Bitcoin. Byrne also discusses his project DeepCapture.com, which raises awareness for market manipulation and naked short selling, as well as his philanthropic work and support for education reform.

Download

Related Links

• For Overstock CEO, Bitcoin Isn’t Just A Publicity Stunt, Forbes
• Meet Patrick Byrne: Bitcoin Messiah, CEO of Overstock, Scourge of Wall Street, Wired
• UBS, in Theory, a Conspiracy to Naked Short “Tens of Millions” of Shares, Deepcapture

Jack Schinasi discusses his recent working paper, Practicing Privacy Online: Examining Data Protection Regulations Through Google’s Global Expansion published in the Columbia Journal of Transnational Law. Schinasi takes an in-depth look at how online privacy laws differ across the world’s biggest Internet markets — specifically the United States, the European Union and China. Schinasi discusses how we exchange data for services and whether users are aware they’re making this exchange. And, if not, should intermediaries like Google be mandated to make its data tracking more apparent? Or should we better educate Internet users about data sharing and privacy? Schinasi also covers whether privacy laws currently in place in the US and EU are effective, what types of privacy concerns necessitate regulation in these markets, and whether we’ll see China take online privacy more seriously in the future.

Download

Related Links

• Practicing Privacy Online: Examining Data Protection Regulations Through Google’s Global Expansion, SSRN
• Journal of Transnational Law, Columbia University

Yesterday it was my privilege to speak at a Free State Foundation (FSF) event on “Ideas for Communications Law and Policy Reform in 2013.” It was moderated by my friend and former colleague Randy May, who is president of FSF, and the event featured opening remarks from the always-excellent FCC Commissioner Robert McDowell.

During the panel discussing that followed, I offered my thoughts about the problem America continues to face in cleaning up communications and media law and proposed a few ideas to get reform done right once and for all. I don’t have time to formally write-up my remarks, but I thought I would just post the speech notes that I used yesterday and include links to the relevant supporting materials. (I’ve been using a canned version of this same speech at countless events over the past 15 years. Hopefully lawmakers will take up some of these reforms some time soon so I’m not using this same set of remarks in 2027!)

I) The fundamental problem we face in the world of communications and media policy today is easy and diagnose and, at least in theory, easy to remedy.

The Problem= asymmetrical regulation / “unlevel playing field”

• Policymakers are imposing different regulatory policies on different layers of the modern information ecosystem. (This is sometimes referred to as the “regulatory silos” problem.)
• Regulatory silos and unlevel playing fields create 3 additional problems. They:

1. are unfair to those players who suffer under more onerous rules;
2. threaten to roll the old onerous rules on newer and less regulated speech and communications platforms and technologies; and,
3. create uncertainty and threatens investment and innovations.

The Solution (again, simple in theory but not in political reality) = level the playing field by deregulating down to achieve parity instead of regulating up

II) Let’s get more concrete about how to accomplish that sort of liberalization and level the playing field. Three simple reform ideas can help:

1. “MFN clause for communications and media policy”: To the extent Congress continues to place ground rules on the information sector at all, it should consider borrowing a page from trade law by adopting the equivalent of a “Most Favored Nation” (MFN) clause for communications and media policy. In a nutshell, this policy would state that: “Any operator seeking to offer a new service or entering a new line of business, should be regulated no more stringently than its least regulated competitor.” Such a MFN for communications would ensure that regulatory parity exists within this arena as the lines between existing technologies and industry sectors continue to blur. Placing everyone on the same deregulated level playing field should be at the heart of telecommunications policy to ensure non-discriminatory regulatory treatment of competing providers and technologies at all levels of government. In other words, to level the proverbial playing field properly, we should “deregulate down” instead of regulating up to place everyone on equal footing.
2. “Moore’s Law” for information technology laws and regulations: With information markets evolving at the speed of Moore’s Law, public policy must as well. Toward that end, every new technology proposal should include a provision sunsetting the law or regulation 18 months to 2 years after enactment. And this principle should apply retroactively so that old rules are sunset on a rapid timetable. If Congress deems them vital, they can always be reauthorized. [See my Forbes column on this proposal.]
3. Comprehensive FCC reform, downsizing & defunding: You can’t truly deregulate communications and media markets if the primary regulator (the FCC  in this case) remains large and is constantly growing its budget and responsibilities. Regulators exist to regulate! Only by downsizing and defunding them can we truly deregulate these markets. (Alfred Kahn and the Democrats taught us that in the late 1970s when the comprehensively deregulated airline and transportation markets and then moved to abolish the agencies that oversaw those sectors as well. They understood that the very existence of those agencies was a major contributing factor to economic inefficiency and crony capitalism.)

III) If wasn’t that long ago that this sort of an approach was considered the model for how to move forward

Following the lead of the Democrats who deregulated airlines and transportation sectors in the late 1970s, a number of scholars in the 1990s and 2000s devised comprehensive reform proposals for communications and media markets. (Two old PFF projects built on this):

• “The Telecom Revolution”: May 1995 proposal from @ a dozen different free-market think tank analysts to replace the FCC with a much smaller agency.
• “Digital Age Communications Act” project (“DACA”): a 2005-06 set of proposals from over 50 non partisan academics to make the FCC behave more like the FTC. [See this paper by Ray Gifford for a concise summary of the project and all the proposals).

Generally speaking, both projects focused on same 5 reform objectives:

1. Replacing the amorphous “public interest” standard with a consumer welfare standard, which is more well-established in field of antitrust law
2. Eliminate regulatory silos and level the playing field through deregulation
3. Comprehensively reform spectrum not just through more auctioning but through clear property rights
4. Reform universal service by either voucherizing it or devolving it to the States and let them run their own telecom welfare programs
5. Significantly reforming & downsizing the scope of the FCC’s power of the modern information economy

• If we can get those 5 things done, we will have accomplished true deregulation of America’s information marketplace.  What we don’t want is another fiasco like the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which represented an effort at managed competition. That law intentionally avoided providing clear deregulatory guidance and instead delegated broad and remarkably ambiguous authority to the FCC. This left the most important deregulatory decisions to the FCC and, not surprisingly, the agency did a very poor job of following through with a serious liberalization agenda.
• Again, regulators generally don’t deregulate themselves! It is against their self-interest. Congress must impose restraint on the agency and limit (or, better yet, end) its powers.

IV) Some will say communications & media markets are too important to deregulate. But the exact opposite is true.

• America’s Founders thought media was important enough that they made sure that the First Amendment clearly stated that “Congress shall make no law” as it pertains to freedom of speech and the press. They got it exactly right.
• We need to return to that Constitutional prime directive for information markets and start removing the layers of unjust and unnecessary regulation that have encumbered these markets for the past 100 years. America’s communications and media policy should once again be the First Amendment, not the Communications Act of 1934 or the Telecom Act of 1996.
• What we need, to borrow the title of Richard Epstein’s book of the same title, is “simple rules for a complex world.”  Those simple rules include: the law of contract, torts and common law, anti-fraud statutes, etc.
• Such simple rules can govern our complex information ecosystem the same way they govern every other sector of our capitalist economy. We don’t need a sector-specific regulator or body of regulation for communications, media, and the Internet.

[Video clip of my remarks from the FSF panel follows.]

In my last post, I discussed an outstanding new paper from Ronald Cass on “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk .” As I noted, it’s one of the best things I’ve ever read about the relationship between antitrust regulation and the modern information economy. That got me thinking about what other papers on this topic that I might recommend to others. So, for what it’s worth, here are the 12 papers that have most influenced my own thinking on the issue. (If you have other suggestions for what belongs on the list, let me know. No reason to keep it limited to just 12.)

1. J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, “Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,” 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2009).
2. Geoffrey A. Manne &  Joshua D. Wright, “Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust,” 6 Journal of Competition Law & Economics, (2010): 153
3. Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?” (August 2009).
4. Daniel F. Spulber, “Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation,” 4(4) Journal of Competition Law & Economics, (2008): 915.
5. Ronald Cass, “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk ,” 9(2) Journal of Law, Economics and Policy, Forthcoming (Spring 2012)
6. Richard Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 Antitrust Law Journal, (2001).
7. Stan J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis,”Path Dependence, Lock-in, and History,” 11(1) Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, (April 1995): 205-26.
8. Robert Crandall and Charles Jackson, “Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (December 2010).
9. Bruce Owen, “Antitrust and Vertical Integration in ‘New Economy’ Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (November 2010).
10. Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, “Dynamic Analysis and the Limits of Antitrust Institutions,” 78 (1) Antitrust Law Journal (2012): 1-21.
11. Thomas Hazlett, David Teece, Leonard Waverman, “Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, (November 21, 2011), No. 11-50.
12. David S. Evans, “The Antitrust Economics of Two Sided Markets.”

Writing over at the conservative Big Government blog (part of the Breitbart.com network of blogs), someone who goes by the pseudonym “Capitol Connection” has posted an editorial about the debate over retransmission consent reform that is full of misinformation and misguided policy prescriptions, at least if you believe is truly limited government. The piece is entitled, “Big Cable Would Prefer if You Paid Their Bills,” and the problems are almost immediately evident from that headline alone.  First, what is a supposedly small government-oriented blog doing using a silly label like “Big Cable” to describe a vigorously competitive sector of our capitalist economy? Using terms like “Big Cable” is a silly lefty tactic. Second, no one in the cable industry is proposing anyone “pay their bills” except for the customers who enjoy their services. Isn’t a fee for service part of capitalism?

Anyway, that’s just the problem with the title of the essay. Sadly, the rest of the piece is filled with even more erroneous information and arguments about the retransmission consent regulatory process as well as the bill that aims to reform that process, “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act” (H.R. 3675 and S. 2008). That bill, which is sponsored by Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC) and Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA), represents a comprehensive attempt to deregulate America’s heavily regulated video marketplace. In a recent Forbes oped, I argued that the DeMint-Scalise effort would take us “Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming” by eliminating a litany of archaic media regulations that should have never been on the books to begin with. The measure would:

• eliminate: “retransmission consent” regulations (rules governing contractual negotiations for content);
• end “must carry” mandates (the requirement that video distributors carry broadcast signals even if they don’t want to);
• repeal “network non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity” regulations (rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with broadcasters outside their local communities);
• end various media ownership regulations; and
• end the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a “duty to deal” upon content owners to the benefit of video distributors.

This represents genuine and much-needed deregulation of a market that has been encumbered with far too much top-down control and micro-management by the FCC over the past several decades. To be clear, none of these rules apply to any other segment of our modern information economy. Every day of the week, deals are cut between content creators and distributors in many other segments of the media industry without these rules encumbering the process. The DeMint-Scalise bill is an attempt to get big government out of the way and let these deals be cut in a truly free market without regulators putting their thumb on the scale in one direction or the other.

Thus, it came as a bit of a shock to me to see a blog that rails against and is self-titled Big Government suggesting that we should retain a form of big government regulation! Indeed, the author gets the intent of the DeMint-Scalise bill exactly backward. The author says the The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act:

would strip broadcasters of their ability to negotiate in the free marketplace. Some cable operators, it turns out, would love to provide Americans with the quality content American broadcast companies churn out. They just don’t happen to want to pay for it.

The author of the piece also says that cable industry representatives:

are lobbying in Washington for key provisions in legislation that would that would allow the Federal government to intervene in what is otherwise a sound, private sector marketplace that benefits consumers each and every day. And they’re doing so under the guise of “deregulation.”

This is all utter poppycock. While I am sure that the cable industry would love to get all that content free of charge, that’s not what the DeMint-Scalise bill would do. It doesn’t end free-market contracting; it bolsters it. Again, the bill would get the government out of the business of setting rules for how these deals get cut and instead allow these big boys to come to the bargaining table and hammer out these deals on their own.  That is called deregulation and true capitalism!

The author of the misguided Big Government editorial seems to be resting their case on a letter that the American Conservative Union (ACU) sent to members of Congress in late March. I addressed the claims found in that letter in this essay and pointed out that ACU had almost everything exactly backward. Both the ACU letter and the Big Government essay just keep erroneously assuming that the end of the regulatory retrans process means that “broadcasters [will] be forced to simply give away their signals and content.” Again, nothing could be further from the truth. As I noted in my response to the ACU letter:

nothing in this bill forces content creators or broadcasters to deal their content to other distributors. And nothing in the bill gives those other video distributors the right to freely distribute content without the permission of its owners. In sum, the bill does not repeal copyright law — it only repeals the compulsory licensing rules that force content owners to deal their programming against their consent on government regulated terms.  That means copyright is actually strengthened under this bill and that content owners have more bargaining power than they do today. Thus, the ACU is horribly mistaken in asserting that the DeMint-Scalise bill would “allow an uncompensated use of broadcast signals and content.” The exact opposite is the case.

Finally, if nothing else convinces the folks at the Big Government blog and the ACU of the error in their thinking, consider this: The preservation of the current retransmission consent regime and all its corresponding regulations means the preservation and growth of the Federal Communications Commission as a federal regulatory agency overseeing the information economy. Is that a truly free market-oriented position? Do we need federal bureaucrats overseeing free market contractual negotiations in this or any other sector? Because that’s what the law allows today. By contrast, the DeMint-Scalise bill offers us the chance to finally get real deregulation rolling and get FCC downsizing back on track. You will never get a smaller FCC by advocating the retention of regulation.

Thus, I think it’s pretty clear which approach is the most liberty-enhancing. I hope, therefore, that the ACU and the folks at the Big Government blog will reconsider their position.

Andrew Orlowski of The Register (U.K.) recently posted a very interesting essay making the case for treating online copyright and privacy as essentially the same problem in need of the same solution: increased property rights. In his essay (“‘Don’t break the internet’: How an idiot’s slogan stole your privacy“), he argues that, “The absence of permissions on our personal data and the absence of permissions on digital copyright objects are two sides of the same coin. Economically and legally they’re an absence of property rights – and an insistence on preserving the internet as a childlike, utopian world, where nobody owns anything, or ever turns a request down. But as we’ve seen, you can build things like libraries with permissions too – and create new markets.” He argues that “no matter what law you pass, it won’t work unless there’s ownership attached to data, and you, as the individual, are the ultimate owner. From the basis of ownership, we can then agree what kind of rights are associated with the data – eg, the right to exclude people from it, the right to sell it or exchange it – and then build a permission-based world on top of that.”

And so, he concludes, we should set aside concerns about Internet regulation and information control and get down to the business of engineering solutions that would help us property-tize both intangible creations and intangible facts about ourselves to better shield our intellectual creations and our privacy in the information age. He builds on the thoughts of Mark Bide, a tech consultant:

For Bide, privacy and content markets are just a technical challenges that need to be addressed intelligently.”You can take two views,” he told me. “One is that every piece of information flowing around a network is a good thing, and we should know everything about everybody, and have no constraints on access to it all.” People who believe this, he added, tend to be inflexible – there is no half-way house. “The alternative view is that we can take the technology to make privacy and intellectual property work on the network. The function of copyright is to allow creators and people who invest in creation to define how it can be used. That’s the purpose of it. “So which way do we want to do it?” he asks. “Do we want to throw up our hands and do nothing? The workings of a civilised society need both privacy and creator’s rights.”  But this a new way of thinking about things: it will be met with cognitive dissonance. Copyright activists who fight property rights on the internet and have never seen a copyright law they like, generally do like their privacy. They want to preserve it, and will support laws that do. But to succeed, they’ll need to argue for stronger property rights. They have yet to realise that their opponents in the copyright wars have been arguing for those too, for years. Both sides of the copyright “fight” actually need the same thing. This is odd, I said to Bide. How can he account for this irony? “Ah,” says Bide. “Privacy and copyright are two things nobody cares about unless it’s their own privacy, and their own copyright.”

These are important insights that get at a fundamental truth that all too many people ignore today: At root, most information control efforts are related and solutions for one problem can often be used to address others. But there’s another insight that Orlowski ignores: Whether we are discussing copyright, privacy, online speech and child safety, or cybersecurity, all these efforts to control the free flow of digitized bits over decentralized global networks will be increasingly complex, costly, and riddled with myriad unintended consequences. Importantly, that is true whether you seek to control information flows through top-down administrative regulation or by assigning and enforcing property rights in intellectual creations or private information.

Let me elaborate a bit (and I apologize for the rambling mess of rant that follows).

Parallels in Debates over Copyright & Privacy Protection

In several essays here over the past few years I have attempted to draw parallels between the battles over protecting digital copyright and online privacy, as well as battle over online safety/speech and cybersecurity. Here are a few of those essays in case you’re interested in seeing the evolution of my thinking about this:

• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• SOPA & Selective Memory about a Technologically Incompetent Congress
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?

In those essays I have argued that a combination of selective morality and wishful thinking are at work in the information policy world these days. In essence, people hate Internet regulation… until they love it! Here’s how I summarized that fact during the debate over SOPA:

… conservatives rush out and breathlessly denounce each and every effort to impose Net neutrality regulation because of the danger of empowering an already over-zealous bunch of bumbling bureaucrats at the FCC. (And I agree with them.) Yet, with their next breath many conservatives praise SOPA even though it also empowers government to muck with the inner workings of the Internet. Some of those conservatives are also turning a blind eye to the growing appetite of the defense/security community to meddle with the Net’s architecture in the name of avoiding any number of non-catastrophes. Meanwhile, the liberals decry SOPA and want it stopped at all costs. There’s never been a copyright protection measure they liked, of course, but each time one pops up we hear them claim that our analog era Congress is not well-positioned to be designing industrial policy schemes for the Internet. (And I generally agree with them.) But most liberals do a complete 180 whenever online privacy or Net neutrality regulations are the subject of congressional inquiry. Suddenly, the cyber-oafs in Congress are considered veritable technocratic philosopher kings who we should trust to guard our cyber-freedoms to lead us to the digital promised land.

Again, it’s both selective morality and wishful thinking. It’s selective morality in that some folks think certain values are sacrosanct and deserving of a “by-any-means-necessary” enforcement attitude, yet they are often just as likely to denounce similar information control efforts when it comes to issues or values they don’t give a damn about.  And it is wishful thinking in that you can’t run around insisting that “information wants to be free” in some contexts but then express outrage when something that you want to bottle up turns out to “just want to be free” as well!

But the important takeaway here is that, consistent with what Orlowski argues, I believe that online copyright and privacy are essentially the same problem: It’s an information control problem.

Potential Costs of Control

Once you start thinking about Internet policy debates as a single issue — namely, information control — you can begin to investigate the potential costs of control in a somewhat more objective fashion. Of course, challenging issues remain:

1. Which method of control should we choose? On one hand, there are many varieties of administrative regulation, technical infrastructure controls, and device mandates. On the other hand, there are property rights and liability / tort schemes. And there are many hybrid enforcement models, such as increasingly popular “co-regulation” models, government standard-setting, and “nudging” of system defaults. Each method will entail different costs and trade-offs.
2. What metric(s) should we use when attempting to determine whether the benefits of control exceed the costs? Ask any advocate of information control about whether the costs might exceed the benefits of regulation for their pet issue and they will typically suggest that either (a) there are no costs or that (b) the benefits dwarf any costs that may exist. But all too often the benefits they identify are extremely subjective and amorphous in character (“privacy,” “safety,” and “security” are hard to quantify, after all) while the costs are very real and increasingly substantial.

In my view, these practical questions are increasingly the most interesting issues to explore in the field of cyberlaw and digital economics. We can debate the normative or ethical considerations until we’re all blue in the face and ready to rip each other’s heads off, but I am less and less interested in such squabbles. Instead, I keep coming back to the question of how we’ll go about controlling info flows and how much effort and resources it makes sense to expend in pursuit of each of the values identified above. Some of the specific considerations I find myself asking in every paper I write these days include:

(A) Will the proposed form of information control tie us up in the courts forever, lead to increasingly onerous and unworkable liability norms, and end up yielding outrageous litigation costs?

(B) Will the proposed form of information control require a significant increase in regulatory bureaucracy? How many levels of government will need to be involved in the proposed enforcement scheme? How many new offices and officials will need to be empowered in the hope of achieving some measure of control?

(C) What are the alternatives to the proposed form of information control? Are there less costly or less restrictive means of addressing the concern in question? For example, education and empowerment effort are often an effective way to address many online safety and digital privacy concerns. Can we use those methods in conjunction with social norms, public pressure, self-regulation, informal contracting, and other methods to address these and other concerns?

For me, the costs associated with the A & B are increasing so rapidly that I almost always default to C as the better approach. Importantly, although A & B will be less onerous or costly when the solution is of the increased property-ization variety than of the administrative regulation variety, that does not mean property rights-based solutions for information are costless. Indeed, I increasingly find myself concluding that C solutions are more cost-effective even compared to increased property rights.

Practical Advice Once You Accept the Increasing Costs & Complications of Control

At this point, readers may be thinking: “Wait a minute, this dude is just some kooky libertarian who doesn’t want any form of information control, so he’s just trying to rationalize anarchy here.” No, I’m not. I certainly favor less control across the board than most people, but I also understand that there are times, at the margin, when some forms of “control” are necessary. But my views on the wisdom of control are heavily influenced by the costs of control. The costs of control — broadly defined — are a key factor in every cost-benefit analysis I do related to the wisdom of Net regulation and information control methods — even when one of those methods is increased “property-ization.” And because I have come to believe that those costs are going up and that most information control efforts will not work well in practice, I have boiled down my advice on this front to two simple principles:

1. Choose your info control battles wisely. Figure out where the most serious harms or threats lie and then target the info control solution accordingly and forget about the rest. For example, in child safety debates, that would mean going after child porn rings but leaving run-of-the-mill adult porn alone entirely. In copyright, it would mean nailing the largest commercial mass piracy sites but accepting a certain amount of casual sharing. In the field of personal info, it means singling out health and financial information and data for special protections and likely giving up on most other forms of info control. And so on. In essence, these are where the greatest potential harms lie that most people would consider intolerable. As you move further away from such issues, the case for control becomes harder and harder and the costs will almost certainly exceed the benefits.
2. Have a good backup plan in mind when those info control plans fail anyway. That backup plan should generally be based on education, empowerment, coping strategies, and resiliency. Again, these are the “C” solutions mentioned above. [I developed this model more robustly in the second half of this recent paper.] This approach won’t be perfect but it will likely be what you’ll end up relying on anyway, so you better start thinking about plowing more resources into this alternative approach even while you’re trying to devise info control mechanisms.

Let me just say a brief word to my market-oriented friends who are dismayed by my inclusion of property rights in the mix of “information control” efforts. I’m a big believer in the importance of property rights in many contexts, but context does matter. More specifically, physicality matters. It is easy to create property rights in tangible goods and almost always right to do so. Property rights in intangible ideas and creations raise special issues, however. Because ideas are non-rivalrous and have public good qualities, it makes property-ization more complicated and less effective. Property rights in facts can also come into conflict with other values and more well-established rights, especially freedom of speech and expression.

On the privacy front, Eugene Volokh made this point in his famous 2000 law review article, “Freedom of Speech, Information Privacy, and the Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People from Speaking About You,” when he noted that, “The difficulty[with] the right to information privacy — the right to control other people’s communication of personally identifiable information about you — is a right to have the government stop people from speaking about you. And the First Amendment (which is already our basic code of “fair information practices”) generally bars the government from “control[ling the communication] of information,” either by direct regulation or through the authorization of private lawsuits.” That doesn’t mean free speech values should always trump privacy values, but denying this tension is just plain silly. If you want to propertytize all personal information, then you better be prepared to explain how that plays out in practice. How far are you prepared to go to ban the dissemination of facts? Would you place prior restraint on the press to accomplish it? Would you ban a historian from writing a biographies that reveal intimate facts about the subject? Would you shut down all the online sites and services that rely on a certain amount of personal information to fuel their free offerings?

Likewise, copyright law was far more effective in the analog age when we were still pressing music on vinyl and plastic. As soon as digitization become widespread, it was pretty much game over for traditional copyright law and now we are off and running with all sorts of convoluted and increasingly costly regulatory regimes. It’s not that I don’t want these some of these schemes to work — I’ve been a long-time copyright defender — but, again, the practicality of control simply must be considered here. I am not will to “pay any price, bear any burden” in defense of protecting intellectual property rights even as I remain outraged by the staggering amount of free-riding at work every single second of the day on the Internet. So, adopting the framework I outlined about, we might try targeted solutions to go after the biggest of those freeloaders — commercial mass piracy hubs — but we should generally avoid the sort of ham-handed technical control methods we saw in SOPA and other fights, like the broadcast flag battle among others. But, generally speaking, property rights just aren’t going to work as well in this space going forward. I’ve come to believe that the best hope lies in massive consolidation of content and conduit. In other words, pipe and device owners need to buy out all the content-creating industries and just embed a small fee in their monthly services to cross-subsidize content. This is essentially a private collective licensing solution and it is not unprecedented. Nor is it perfect. It will be very leaky. Plenty of piracy will still take place. But it will probably offer creators a better chance of finding a sustainable revenue stream than the current system does. The old copyright system that served them and us so well is dying and they had better start thinking of alternatives like this. Of course, antitrust law may never allow it, so I could be wasting my breath here. (Just look at all the grief that antitrust officials both here and abroad are giving Apple and eBook sellers for working together even though that it probably the best scheme devised in recent memory to sustain publishing in an age of mass piracy. Policymakers should be encouraging more of that sort of thing, not punishing it.)

An Uncertain Future

So, to wrap up… I can imagine a future in which both heavy-handed, top-down info control efforts and property / liability solutions are failing almost universally because of the ubiquitous, instantaneous, quicksilver-like flow of information across decentralized digital networks. Some utopians will argue that such a world will be better in every way than the one we live in today. I do not share such hyper-optimism. While I believe that, on balance, the free flow if information generally benefits society, I also understand how it creates enormous angst and intractable challenges for many. It’s a world in which copyright is a hollow shell of its former self that offers creators very little protection for their expressive works. And it’s a world in which personal privacy is harder to safeguard with each passing day because no matter how hard we try to property-tize facts about ourselves, that enforcement model simply breaks down at some point or becomes socially and economically intolerable. As with copyright, efforts to property-tize personal information will lose the battle against data sharing. As computer scientist Ben Adida argued in his essay, “(Your) Information Wants to be Free,” “unfortunately, information replication doesn’t discriminate: your personal data, credit cards and medical problems alike, also want to be free. Keeping it secret is really, really hard.”

Indeed, and it is growing harder by the day. Contrary to what Orlowski suggests, therefore, this isn’t a simple engineering problem. I wish it were as easy as he suggests to build “permissions-based markets” because they could have real benefits for individuals and society. But it is most certainly not that simple. It is far more costly and complicated than ever to devise workable information control schemes on one hand and “permissions-based” property rights schemes on the other. In some cases, I might still be willing to try the latter, but unlike Orlowski, I just don’t place much faith in the success of the endeavor.

Sometimes free-marketeers are branded “free market fundamentalists” or something similar by their ideological opponents. The implication is that our preference for a society in which free people interact voluntarily to organize society’s resources is an irrational desire or a religion. I’m sure there’s a similar epithet we give to nanny staters—oh, there’s one, “nanny staters”—who we believe to have excessive faith in government solutions.

Market processes have decent theoretical explanations, such as Friedrich Hayek’s essay, “The Use of Knowledge in Society.” It’s not the easiest read, but lovers of the Internet, who see the genius of its decentralization, should see similar genius in markets as a method for discovering society’s wants and uniting to achieve them—without coercion.

From time to time, we also point out examples of how market processes work to deliver even intangible goods like privacy. So, for example, I noted market pressure against Facebook’s privacy-invasive “beacon” advertising system in 2007. Berin pointed out in 2008 that market forces caused Google to remove an oppressive clause from the Chrome end user license agreement. Google competitor Cuil made a run at the search behemoth based on privacy that year, something I noted briefly then (and Ryan and I discussed in the comments). I’ve also noted the failure of many to find true market failures.

As Cuil illustrates, not every privacy play works, but companies routinely pitch the public on the privacy merits of their products and the demerits of others’. It’s not a highly visible process, but it sometimes gets a little more visible when it fails. So thank you, Facebook, for a big #FAIL in the privacy competition area this week. You provide us a nice lesson in one of the ways markets work to meet consumer privacy demands.

You see, Facebook hired PR firm Burson-Marsteller to do a whisper campaign on the privacy demerits of a Google product called Social Circle. By pushing the story of privacy problems with a Google effort in the social networking space, Facebook hoped to thwart a competitor that it fears. Success would also be a success for privacy protection. If Google were doing something wrong, and Facebook were to make the case to the public, Google would lose face and it would lose business. Most importantly, a privacy-invasive product—as determined by public consensus—would recede. Markets often work by silently shunning products that don’t cut it. (Again, hard to see if you’re not looking for it, or if you’re committed to disbelieving it.)

Facebook appears not to have succeeded. Prickly privacy advocate Chris Soghoian outed the Burson-Marsteller campaign. Dan Lyons of the Daily Beast cornered Facebook into confessing its role in the attack on Google. And privacy commentator Kashmir Hill gives the privacy issues with Social Circle a “meh.”

When it happens differently, you get a change in a service like Social Circle—the way Facebook changed “beacon” and Google changed the Chrome EULA. These are anecdotes, and they reflect but one element of the market processes that shape products and services. But it’s something that “market denialists” should consider as they dig deep to explain to themselves and others how various mechanisms in our society work.

You have to read all the way to the end to get exactly what the New York Times is getting at in its Sunday editorial, “Netizens Gain Some Privacy.”

Congress should require all advertising and tracking companies to offer consumers the choice of whether they want to be followed online to receive tailored ads, and make that option easily chosen on every browser.

That means Congress—or the federal agency it punts to—would tell authors of Internet browsing software how they are allowed to do their jobs. Companies producing browser software that didn’t conform to federal standards would be violating the law.

In addition, any Web site that tailored ads to their users’ interests, or the networks that now generally provide that service, would be subject to federal regulation and enforcement that would of necessity involve investigation of the data they collect and what they do with it.

Along with existing browser capabilities (Tools > Options > Privacy tab > cookie settings), forthcoming amendments to browsers will give users more control over the information they share with the sites they visit. That exercise of control is the ultimate do-not-track. It’s far preferable to the New York Times‘ idea, which has the Web user issuing a request not to be tracked and wondering whether government regulators can produce obedience.

[I got enough push-back to a recent post arguing the existence of market nimbleness in the browser area that I’m unsure of the thesis I expressed there. The better explanation of what’s going on may be that regulatory pressure is moving browser authors and others to meet the peculiar demands of the pro-regulatory community. The reason they have waited to act until now is because they do not perceive consumers’ interests to be met by protections against tailored advertising. The question of what meets consumers’ interests won’t be answered if regulation supplants markets, of course.]

I was just digging through some old files and came across a quote that I found entertaining. Back in 2003, when he was still president and chief operating officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said with reference to Microsoft, AOL-Time Warner, and Comcast:  “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”  At the time, some media worrywarts made great hay of Mel’s quip and claimed, as Gene Kimmelman of Consumers Union argued at the time, that it proved how “Media moguls themselves admit their desire to avoid real competition within their industry.”

Utter rubbish. In fact, just six years after Karmazin spoke those words, Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has crumbled (even Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment got divorced!), and Comcast is now squaring off against telco and online video competitors that were unfathomable at the time (not to mention traditional satellite TV competitors.)  In the meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and today, as CEO of Sirius XM, is struggling to find a way to make the satellite radio universe survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath thanks to unforeseen competition from online music services and a little thing called the iPod!

It’s proof positive that media markets and digital technologies always evolve faster than most people — even smart industry titans like Karmazin — anticipate.

From the satirical Book Titles if They Were Written Today:

Then: The Wealth of Nations Now:  Invisible Hands: The Mysterious Market Forces That Control Our Lives and How to Profit from Them

Funny how empowering consumers to choose for themselves is “manipulative.” Oh, right, I forgot: people are stupid and/or lazy, so so elites should chose for them!

One of the reasons that so many of us here take issue with proposals to expand regulation of communications, broadband, and media markets is because we have studied the horrendous inefficiencies of economic regulation in practice. We oppose regulatory proposals not because of a “blind faith” in free markets, but because we understand that even when markets stumble they correct themselves quicker and more efficiently than regulatory systems do. One can profess the supposed theoretical benefits of enlightened “public interest” regulation all they want, but the facts are the facts. And the facts do not support the proposition that government regulation generally enhances consumer welfare.

In that regard, Tim Lee’s new Net neutrality report for Cato does a nice job of surveying some of the past unintended consequences of regulation. Also, even though it is now 10 years old, I highly recommend “Economic Deregulation and Customer Choice” by Jerry Ellig and Robert Crandall. It’s an outstanding overview of why economic regulation of various industries failed consumers so miserably in the past.

But if you want even more shocking proof of how horrendously inefficient communications regulation can be in practice, then you must read my PFF colleague Barbara Esbin’s two essays this week on the Universal Service Fund (USF): “The High Cost of USF Support,” and “More FCC Support Fund Follies.” In these two essays, Esbin walks the reader through various grim reports and statistics that have been released recently documenting the failures of the USF.

Her first essay notes how a recent FCC Inspector General report found that the USF “High Cost” fund is spiraling out of control. According to a FCC press release, that report found that “a program is at risk if the erroneous payment rate exceeds 2.5% and the amount of erroneous payments is greater than $10 million. The estimated erroneous payment rate for the High Cost Program (“HCP”) was 23.3%. The previous estimate was 16.6%. Total estimated erroneous payments were $ 971.2 million as compared with the previous estimate of erroneous payments of $617.8 million. Accordingly, the FCC-OIG concluded that the High Cost Fund program is “at risk” under applicable [..] criteria.”

Esbin puts these shocking results in perspective:

“At risk” is a surely a euphemism for a program that loses in “erroneous payments” nearly one out of every four dollars collected from telephone subscribers. In 2007, pursuant to FCC rules, telephone consumers were effectively taxed over $4 billion for the high-cost portion of the USF. Thus, nearly $1 billion dollars of subscriber money went out the door in “erroneous payments.” As the report makes clear, erroneous payments include both over- and underpayments, and also instances where the agency is unable to discern whether a payment was proper as a result of “lack of documentation.” The report’s conclusions state that the “rate of improper overpayments is 22.8%, and the proportion of improper overpayments out of total improper payments is 98.2%.” To be considered “erroneous,” an payment “need not be the result of fraudulent misrepresentation, or a corrupt administrative process.” “Nor does it necessarily exclude those factors as potential causes of erroneous payments.” Significantly, nor are “the erroneous payments . . . necessarily recoverable from recipients by process of law.” Fabulous. Not only has nearly $1 billion in erroneous overpayments gone missing, but even if final audits indicate where it has gone, it may not be recoverable! Among the interesting results of this preliminary report are the identified causes of erroneous payments. According to Table 2 of the report, 50% of the causes of erroneous payments can be attributed nearly equally to two factors: either “Inadequate Documentation” (25.3%) or “Inadequate Auditee Processes and/or Policies and Procedures” (24.6%). Another 10% “Disregarded FCC Rules” and 12% had “Applicant/Auditee Weak Internal Controls.” That is, roughly 75% of the erroneous overpayments can be attributed to poor bookkeeping, inadequate internal controls and “disregard” of FCC rules. This is stunning information. No wonder it made its appearance the day before Thanksgiving.

But wait, things get worse. So much worse. In Esbin’s second essay, she notes that:

On Monday, the OIG released its Semi-Annual Report to Congress, discussing the full range of audit activities conducted from April 1, 2008 to September 30, 2008. Thus we learn that in addition to the loss of nearly $1 billion in erroneous overpayments to the High Cost program, another fund the FCC is ultimately responsible for, the “Telecommunications Relay Service” (TRS) Fund, which provides funds for a variety of telephone transmission services for those with hearing and speech disabilities, also appears to be at risk for substantial overpayments due to the lack of adequate controls. Since 1993, according to the FCC’s website, the Commission’s rules have required that each common carrier providing voice transmission services provide TRS throughout its service area. All providers of interstate telecommunications services contribute to the TRS Fund, and TRS providers recover the costs of providing interstate services from the Fund on a minutes-of-use basis. Intrastate TRS funding is generally administered by the states, although some intrastate TRS offerings are supported by the interstate TRS Fund. The current TRS Fund Administrator is the National Exchange Carrier Association (NECA). Although NECA directly manages the Fund, the FCC sets the Fund size and carrier contribution factor annually and is ultimately responsible for Fund oversight. When the TRS Fund started, it disbursed about $31 million, growing to over $38 million by 1999. Since 1999, the OIG report states that the TRS Fund has increased approximately 50-80% each year, to reach $637 million for the Fund’s fiscal year from July, 2007 to June, 2008. The size of the fund for the current fiscal year is $850 million, a 26% increase over the previous fiscal year. That is, in roughly ten years the TRS Fund has ballooned from $38 million to $850 million! What, if any, other communications service has seen 50-80% growth in costs per year?

Indeed, that is a shocking degree of waste and inefficiency by just about any standard. And Esbin goes on to document specific examples of this waste and inefficiency in action within the TRS Fund. It’s shocking stuff and doesn’t make for pleasant reading if you care about good government.

Barbara is actually much more tempered and tolerant than me when it comes to what to do about all this. She recommends a lot more reform and oversight. If you ask me, however, then entire USF program should be dismantled immediately and any future support deemed necessary should be distributed directly to consumers at the state level in the form of a welfare payment. After all, at root, that’s what universal service is: a communications industry welfare program, but one in which most of the support flows to companies instead of individuals. And that makes it one of the most insanely misguided and inefficient regulatory / subsidization systems known to man. 13 years ago, in one of the very first things that PFF ever published ( The Telecom Revolution: An American Opportunity) I was advocating exactly this sort of a plan along with a dozen other think tank colleagues. (And we also set forth another, less radical reform plan than the “voucher-ize & devolve” plan I favored).

But no one listened. Business as usual continued. And so the endless waste and inefficiencies continue. Somebody will have to remind me how any of this benefits consumer welfare. I can’t see how anyone could make such a case, and I would hope the USF follies serve as a cautionary tale for how the best of intentions are meaningless when it comes to what regulation actually means in practice. Because it sure ain’t pretty.

But hey, it’ll all be different going forward right? We just need to have faith in the media reformistas and the Net neutralitistas.  If we click our heels together enough time and just wish hard enough, all our dreams can come true.

Sure.

Information Week has an article in its September 29th issue that illustrates why regulatory interventions to temper Google’s dominance are folly – things like antitrust scrutiny of the Yahoo! deal. But it takes a little understanding of how markets work.

The article lists all kinds of innovative startups that plan to challenge Google and take the field of search in all kinds of new directions. “The burst of activity over the past 12 months is more befitting a land rush than a market dominated by one powerhouse,” it says. Read it. There’s lots of interesting stuff going on.

But it’s not going just because. It’s going on because there’s a dominant player in the market. It’s going on because venture capitalists, innovators, and entrepreneurs can see the large profit that Google is making, and they want a piece of it. Excess profits act as an invitation and a spur to others, bringing new businesses and business ideas to that market.

If profits are “managed” and “brought under control” by curtailing a company’s ability to make deals (like Google would make with Yahoo!), that signal – that there is money to be made here – dissipates. Fewer innovators come to the market.

A second signal also goes out: “If you come up with something truly revolutionary in this field, we’re going to reward you with a haircut.” That dissuades investors – telling them that high profits will not come to them if they produce something great.

It’s a shame that the federal government is working to stanch the flow of innovation coming to search by going after Google.