On March 19th, I had the chance to debate Franklin Foer at a Patrick Henry College event focused on the question, “Is Big Tech Big Brother?” It was billed as a debate over the role of technology in American society and whether government should be regulating media and technology platforms more generally.  [The full event video is here.] Foer is the author of the new book, World Without Mind: The Existential Threat of Big Tech, in which he advocates a fairly expansive regulatory regime for modern information technology platforms. He is open to building on regulatory ideas from the past, including broadcast-esque licensing regimes, “Fairness Doctrine”-like mandates for digital intermediaries, “fiduciary” responsibilities, beefed-up antitrust intervention, and other types of controls. In a review of the book for Reason, and then again during the debate at Patrick Henry University, I offered some reflections on what we can learn from history about how well ideas like those worked out in practice.

My closing statement of the debate, which lasted just a little over three minutes, offers a concise summation of what that history teaches us and why it would be so dangerous to repeat the mistakes of the past by wandering down that disastrous path again. That 3-minute clip is posted below. (The audience was polled before and after the event and asked the same question each time: “Do large tech companies wield too much power in our economy, media and personal lives and if so, should government(s) intervene?” Apparently at the beginning, the poll was roughly Yes – 70% and No – 30%, but after the debated ended it has reversed, with only 30% in favor of intervention and 70% against. Glad to turn around some minds on this one!)

via ytCropper

I finally got around to reading this interesting little paper by Justus Haucap and Ulrich Heimeshoff published by the Düsseldorf Institute for Competition Economics entitled, “Google, Facebook, Amazon, eBay: Is the Internet Driving Competition or Market Monopolization?”  It offers a nice snapshot of the current state of play in several online sectors and surveys much of the relevant economic literature on the issue of antitrust and information technology markets. The authors also familiarize readers with the basic economic concepts that are hotly debated in the field of digital economics, including: network effects, switching costs, multi-homing, and economies of scale.

What I particularly like about their paper is that it struggles with the two competing narratives that dominate debates over digital age economics. Here’s how Haucap and Heimeshoff put it in the introduction:

On the one hand, it is rather obvious that many very successful Internet-based companies are nearly monopolists. Google, Youtube, Facebook, and Skype are typical examples for Internet firms who dominate their relevant markets and who leave only limited space for a relatively small competitive fringe. Furthermore, most of these providers do not generate content themselves, but “only” provide access to different content on the Internet. On the other hand, the crucial question from a competition policy perspective is not so much whether these firms have such a dominant position today, but rather why they have such a large market share and whether this is a temporary or non-temporary phenomenon. Do these Internet monopolies enjoy a dominant position because they are protected from competition though barriers to entry or do they just enjoy the profits of superior technology and innovation? Are we observing some sort of Schumpeterian competition where one temporary monopoly is followed by another, with innovation as the driving competitive force, or are we dealing with monopoly firms that mainly try to foreclose their markets through anticompetitive behavior?

Faithful readers know from my past rantings here on this blog, in Forbes columns, and in various working papers, that I am firmly in the latter (“Schumpeterian competition”) camp. For example, in a column on “‘Tech Titans’ and Schumpeter’s Vision,” I argued that:

Simply put, we now live in Joseph Schumpeter’s economy. The Austrian-born economist had the digital economy figured out seven decades ago. Cascading waves of continuous change, or what Schumpeter called the “perennial gales of creative destruction,” reverberate all around us in the tech economy. Innovative risk-takers are constantly shaking things up and displacing yesterday’s lumbering, lethargic giants. In markets built largely upon binary code, the pace and nature of change has become hyper-Schumpeterian: unrelenting and utterly unpredictable.

In another column (“The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy“), I explained the Schumpeterian paradigm in this fashion:

Austrian economist Joseph Schumpeter explained long ago that competition and technological innovation often spring from the quest for the prize of market power. “In capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization,” he argued. This is competition that “strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other,” he argued, because the “ever-present threat” of dynamic, disruptive change “disciplines before it attacks.”

In an online symposium on “Competition in Online Search” hosted by the Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog, I documented the recent history of turbulent, Schumpeterian change in the digital economy. Some examples I offered by walking backward in time:

• Just five years ago, MySpace dominated social networking and had The Guardian wondering, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” A short time later, MySpace lost its early lead and became a major liability for owner Rupert Murdoch. Murdoch paid $580 million for MySpace in 2005 only to sell it for $35 million in June 2011.
• Just six to eight years ago, the mobile landscape was ruled by Palm, BlackBerry, Nokia, and Motorola. Palm is now all but dead and BlackBerry is trying to stay afloat while Nokia and Motorola had to cut deals with Microsoft and Google respectively in order to survive.
• Just 10 years ago, AOL’s hegemony in online services was thought to be unassailable, especially after its merger with Time Warner. But the merger quickly went off the rails and AOL’s online “dominance” quickly evaporated. Losses grew to over $100 billion and the entire deal unraveled within just a few years as AOL’s old dial-up, walled-garden business model had been completely superseded by broadband and the new Web 2.0 world.
• Just 12 years ago, Yahoo! and AltaVista were the go-to companies for online search. No one turns to them first today when they go looking for information online.
• And just 15 years ago, Microsoft was on everyone’s mind. Today, the firm is struggling to remain part of cocktail party chatter when the topic of modern Tech Titans is discussed. For example, a recent Fast Company cover story on “The Great Tech War of 2012” only mentioned Microsoft in passing. The rise of search, social media, and cloud computing represented disruptive shifts that Microsoft wasn’t prepared for, although the company continues to innovate and remain relevant.

From this evidence, I have argued that Schumpeter’s “gales of creative destruction” have rarely blown harder through any sector of our economy. Even when some “tech titans” rise to the top of the mountain and win the race for the prize of market power, their reign tends to be brief and is immediately challenged by others looking to knock them off their perch. This is also why it is so essential that policymakers not disrupt this Schumpeterian process with preemptive antitrust strikes or misguided regulatory interventions. The quest for the prize is what drives the most important forms of market competition and innovation. As Justice Scalia argued in a notable 2004 Supreme Court antitrust-related decision (Trinko): “the opportunity to charge monopoly prices—at least for a short period—is what attracts ‘business acumen’ in the first place; it induces risk taking that produces innovation and economic growth.”

Schumpeterian thinking remains as controversial today as it did during his lifetime, but I think it perfectly explains the cycles of competition and innovation we at see at work in the modern digital economy. So, what conclusion do Haucap and Heimeshoff come to in their paper?

It is not possible to generalize with respect to the degree of competition in online markets. While some markets tend to lean towards high concentration ratios, the strong market position of Google and Facebook do not necessarily need to be longlasting. . .  In the case of Facebook, multi-homing is not too costly so that there is scope for further competition. The entry of Google+ in 2011 is an interesting development for competition, but the further development remains to be seen. In contrast, eBay has managed to hold on to its dominant position in the market for private online auctions which is difficult to contest, as sellers’ reputations are not transferable across platforms. . . . . If direct and indirect network effects play an important role in a particular online market, it is not clear ex ante whether a monopoly or a dominant market position is actually good or bad from an efficiency perspective. While some authors . . . . argue for a stronger market regulation of eBay, there are also good and valid counter-arguments, based on innovation incentives. In fact, many online markets have been characterized by a large degree of Schumpeterian competition where one dominant player follows the other. A notable exception has only been eBay which has managed to hold on to its dominant position for more than a decade now. Still, a more interventionist approach beyond the application of general competition law rules appears not to be warranted so far.

The authors’ focus on eBay is interesting. As I noted on Twitter the other day, I would agree that eBay is a bit of anomaly when it comes to digital age competition. eBay is really only digital platform that’s been able to maintain lasting dominance in its field (online auctions). Over the past 12 years, it has not been significantly disrupted like other digital providers and platforms. But two caveats are in order here.

First, eBay actually does face credible competition at the margin for particular goods. For example, I am a car fanatic. I have moved 6 cars on eBay over the past decade. But I have also used Cars.com and AutoTrader.com to work deals or at least research cars I would later buy or sell on eBay. Likewise, I’m obsessed with consumer electronics, especially home theater gear. I can find plenty of great deals on eBay, but I also shop at dozens of other sites (some high-end retailers like Crutchfield; others are trading sites just for home theater stuff). And the same is true for many other types of products. There’s an endless assortment of places online to find apparel and media content, for example.  And heck, Amazon is a pretty big dog that eBay must contend with in several sub-markets. And there are plenty of other competitors that keep eBay’s market power in check despite its continued dominance of the “online auction” marketplace, however you choose to define it.

Second, even if you think eBay has serious dominance in its market, what of it? Haucap and Heimeshoff note that a few scholars have called for greater regulation of eBay, but there has never been a serious push by academics or policymakers to drop the antitrust hammer on eBay’s head. And the reason is simple: It is impossible to make a case that eBay is harming consumer welfare. In fact, eBay’s “market power” helps consumers by greatly diminishing search and transaction costs. How many of us want to go sign up for a dozen different sites when we hope to auction off our old comic book or baseball card collection? Not me. I know that eBay will guarantee me the best chance to maximize the profit margin on my old junk by bringing together the largest universe of potential buyers all in one spot.  If eBay ever tried to gouge users with outrageous listing fees or restrictive trading rules, I think we’d see other firms look to break into the market fairly quickly. The tough question is whether there would be any way to port over our reputational history / rankings to other sites.  Probably not, but I still don’t think that ends the threat of potential entry or innovation, especially at the margin for really popular goods.

Taken together, these two points make it clear that the online auction marketplace is what economists would call a “contestable market.” The looming threat of entry at the margin keeps eBay on its toes and their “market power” in check.

Anyway, I encourage you to read the Haucap and Heimeshoff paper. It’s quite interesting and I think they are right to conclude that “a more interventionist approach beyond the application of general competition law rules appears not to be warranted so far.” Finally, if you really enjoy this topic and want to read some of the best literature in the field, you might want to check out my list of “The 12 Best Papers on Antitrust & the Digital Economy” that I put together last Fall.

Additional Reading:

• “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset” (Technology Liberation Front, Apr. 16, 2012)
• “The 12 Best Papers on Antitrust & the Digital Economy” (Technology Liberation Front, Sept. 6, 2012)
• “The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy” (Forbes, June 29, 2012)
• “‘Tech Titans’ and Schumpeter’s Vision” (Forbes, Aug. 22, 2011)
• “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” (Forbes)
• “Smartphones & Schumpeter” (Technology Liberation Front, Apr. 12, 2012)
• “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (Mecratus working paper; w/ Brent Skorup)
• “Competition in Online Search” (Antitrust & Competition Policy Blog symposium entry, May 21, 2012)
• “On Fast Firms, Slow Regulators, Antitrust & the Digital Economy” (Technology Liberation Front, July 6, 2012)
• “Gary Reback’s Antitrust Love Letter,” (Technology Liberation Front, Sept. 20, 2009.)
• “What is “Optimal Interoperability”? A Review of Palfrey & Gasser’s’“Interop,’” (Technology Liberation Front, June 11, 2012)
• “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters” (Technology Liberation Front, Feb. 1, 2011)
• “Thoughts on Tim Wu’s Master Switch, Part 2 (On “Cycles” & “Market Failure”)” (Technology Liberation Front, Oct. 26, 2010)

[UPDATE: 2/14/2013: As noted here, this paper was published by the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology in their Winter 2013 edition. Please refer to that post for more details and cite this final version of the paper going forward.]

I’m pleased to report that the Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my huge new white paper, “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle.” I’ve been working on this paper for a long time and look forward to finding it a home in a law journal some time soon.  Here’s the summary of this 80-page paper:

Fear is an extremely powerful motivating force, especially in public policy debates where it is used in an attempt to sway opinion or bolster the case for action. Often, this action involves preemptive regulation based on false assumptions and evidence. Such fears are frequently on display in the Internet policy arena and take the form of full-blown “technopanic,” or real-world manifestations of this illogical fear. While it’s true that cyberspace has its fair share of troublemakers, there is no evidence that the Internet is leading to greater problems for society. This paper considers the structure of fear appeal arguments in technology policy debates and then outlines how those arguments can be deconstructed and refuted in both cultural and economic contexts. Several examples of fear appeal arguments are offered with a particular focus on online child safety, digital privacy, and cybersecurity. The  various  factors  contributing  to  “fear  cycles”  in these policy areas are documented. To the extent that these concerns are valid, they are best addressed by ongoing societal learning, experimentation, resiliency, and coping strategies rather than by regulation. If steps must be taken to address these concerns, education and empowerment-based solutions represent superior approaches to dealing with them compared to a precautionary principle approach, which would limit beneficial learning opportunities and retard technological progress.

The complete paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader.

Technopanics and Threat Inflation [Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center]

I’m going to close out my series of essays about Tim Wu’s new book, The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires, by discussing his proposed solutions.  In the first five essays in the series, [1, 2, 3, 4, 5] I’ve critiqued Wu’s look at information history as well as his use of terms like “market failure,” “laissez-faire” and “open” vs. “closed.”  I argued there’s a great deal of over-simplification, even outright distortion, in his use of those terms throughout the book.

Anyway, let’s run through the basics of the book once more before getting to Wu’s proposed solutions.  By my reading of The Master Switch, Wu’s argument essentially goes something like this:

• Information industries go through cycles. After a period of “openness” and competition, they tend to drift toward “closed,” corporate-controlled, anti-consumer models and outcomes.
• The resulting “monopolists” then block much innovation, competition, and free speech.
• Consequently, “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible.”
• Moreover, information industries are more important than all others (“information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries”) and even traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.” (p. 303).
• Thus, special rules should apply to information-related sectors of our economy.

Again, I’ve challenged some of these assertions in my previous essays, specifically, Wu’s incomplete history of cycles and the fact that he greatly underplays the role of governments in “locking-in” sub-optimal market structures or, worse yet, creating those structures through misguided public policies or regulatory capture.  Wu discusses some of those factors in his book, but he tends to regard them as secondary to the inquiry, whereas I believe they are crucial to understanding how most “closed” or anti-competitive scenarios develop or endure. Instead, Wu simplistically suggests that “the purely economic laissez-faire approach… is no longer feasible,” even though no such state of affairs has ever existed within communications or media industries. They have been subjected to varying levels of indirect influence or direct control almost since their inception.

Regardless, what does Tim Wu want done about the problems he has (mis-)diagnosed?

What Wu Wants: A “Constitutional” Approach to Private Regulation

Broadly speaking, Wu wants to counter what he regards as “the danger of private power,” “the Lockean sanctification of private property,” and the fact that “American economic life [has] been built mostly on freewheeling capitalism.” (p. 300)  More specifically, he wants to end the “cycle” he describes of markets moving from supposedly open to closed.

To do so, he proposes what he calls a “constitutional” approach to private marketplace regulation.  In reality, it would be a massive, unprecedented, and highly destructive information sector industrial policy that would substitute the Rule of Man for the Rule of Law.  But let’s hear how Wu describes it:

What I propose is not a regulatory approach but rather a constitutional approach to the information economy. By that I mean a regime whose goal is to constrain and divide all power that derives from the control of information. Specifically, what we need is something I would call a Separations Principle for the information economy. A Separations Principle would mean the creation of a salutary distance between each of the major functions or layers in the information economy. It would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another. At the same time, Separations Principle stipulates one other necessity: that the government also keep its distance and not intervene in the market to favor any technology, network monopoly, or integration of the major functions of an information industry.”  (p. 302, emphasis in original)

Wu calls this a “constitutional approach” because he models it on the separations of power found in the U.S. Constitution, such as the separation of church and State, as well as the separation of powers between branches of government.  Wu makes a few additional assertions:

• “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)
• But Wu believes that pain or cost is worth it because of the “corrupting effect of vertically integrated power.” (p. 305)
• “You cannot serve two masters, and the objectives of creating information are often at odds with those of disseminating it,” he says. (p. 305)
• Specifically, he claims the Separations Principle would better protect free speech and entrepreneurial freedom. On the former: “It is a recognition that the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.” On the latter: “The Separations Principle protects entrepreneurial freedom by preventing stagnation and repression of business innovation, especially with the help of the state.” (p. 306)

There’s a lot to unpack here including Wu’s stunning claim that his Separations Principle doesn’t represent a regulatory regime, as well as his rather incredible belief that government meddling and machinations could be kept in check under this regime.

First, however, Wu deserves credit for coming clean about just how radical his proposal is.

Constitutional Limits on Governments vs. Private Actors

Wu admits that “It would be quite radical today even to contemplate imposing on the economy the kind of safeguards that the Constitution places on the political system.” (p. 301)  A few pages later he notes that “The Separations Principle… requires a certain breadth and ambition in its application.” (p. 308)

I’m glad Wu was willing to at least acknowledge the radicalness of his proposal.  But, as he is prone to do throughout the book, he raises an important potential objection only to quickly walk away from it.  In this case, however, it’s completely understandable why Wu wouldn’t want to continue this inquiry: His proposal really is “quite radical” since it is completely at odds with America’s constitutional heritage of individual liberty and limited government.

Let’s go back to Civics 101.  We require that governments live under certain constraints and the Rule of Law because we recognize that governments possess the unique ability to fine, punish, and imprison citizens.  Moreover, escape from government’s tentacles is difficult, if not impossible. A constitutional system is required, therefore, to limit government’s role over our lives and the economy.

By contrast, we do not impose similar constraints on individuals — or on individuals when they work collaboratively in organizations or corporations — primarily because we believe there should be a presumption of liberty in most human affairs.  Freedom is the default position.  We value freedom because it allows humans to exercise their free will and live a life of their own choosing — and that includes the freedom to pursue happiness by making money in a business venture.  Our nation’s founders saw the wisdom in this even before we had a grand historical clash between communism and capitalist systems.  From that experience, however, we now have undisputed proof that social and economic freedoms are closely linked, and that when humans are free, they prosper.  The other reason we default to freedom for private individuals and organizations is because the possibility of “escape” exists from undesirable social or economic situations.

Wu doesn’t bother slowing down to appreciate these distinctions. He gives occasional lip service to the dangers of excessive government power:

Again and again in the histories I have recounted, the state has shown itself an inferior arbiter of what is good for the information industries. The federal government’s role in radio and television from the 1920s through the 1960s, for instance, was nothing short of a disgrace…. Government’s tendency to protect large market players amounts to an illegitimate complicity … [particularly its] sense of obligation to protect big industries irrespective of their having become uncompetitive. (p. 308)

Quite right. Yet, as I pointed out in this earlier essay, there’s seemingly never any serious lesson to be drawn from that conclusion.  Wu just marches right along in his narrative and ignores that “disgrace” and its relationship to “the cycle.”

The crucial point here is that Wu doesn’t fully appreciate the qualitative difference between State power and corporate power.  Instead — consistent with many “media access” theorists who came before him — he largely equates those forms of power or even makes private power out to be the more significant threat to personal liberties and freedom of speech.  Again, we hear statements like “the disposition of firms and industries is, if anything, more critical than the actions of the state in controlling who gets heard.”

The problem with this is that (a) history shows it’s simply not true and (b) the corrective remedies such a theory counsels would require a massive enhancement of State power to counter the supposed threats of private power, which (c) would create an even bigger threat to human liberty since only the State can fine, imprison, and truly foreclose speech.

So, I’ll stick with traditional “constitutionalism,” thank you very much!  Tim Wu’s “constitutionalism,” by contrast, is the Rule of Man, not the Rule of Law.  Specifically, it would be the rule of a handful of unelected men (and women) down at the Federal Communications Commission, the Federal Trade Commission, or whatever other regulatory bureaucracies Wu would empower under this approach.   And, as we’ll see next, that approach is truly audacious in its scope.

Practical Considerations: An Unprecedented Information Control Regime

OK, let’s forget about all that philosophical and legalistic mumbo-jumbo.  After all, most people these days don’t really give a hoot about constitutional limitations or the first principles associated with our nation’s founding. Let us instead explore the Bold New World of information regulation that Wu wants imposed on the high-tech economy and consider its complexity and costs.  Wu is a bit short on details about how policymakers should go about constructing a “Separations” regime, or how it will work in practice, but he does suggest that Net neutrality regulation and expanded antitrust oversight are at least two of the core elements. But he says that will not be enough.

Despite the fact that Wu admits the FCC “has on occasion let itself become the enemy of the good, effectively a tool of repression,” Wu seems to suggest the agency will continue to have “day-to-day authority over the information industries.” (p. 309) Of course, the FCC’s role is currently limited mostly to older sectors of the information economy, but Wu seems to suggest that role should be expanded considerably.  Yet, FCC oversight isn’t enough either, Wu says.  He argues that “what is needed is not only an FCC institutionally committed to a Separations Principle but also a structural arrangement to guard against such deviations, including congressional oversight as well as attention and corrections from other branches of government.”

Here the “breadth and ambition in its application” associated with Wu’s Separations Principal becomes more apparent. We are talking about layers upon layers of regulation. More importantly, the key attribute of Wu’s Separations Principle is that it is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  He explicitly rejects the idea that marketplace experimentation should be allowed and that ex post administrative proceedings or antitrust enforcement will be good enough. “[T]here is the problem of taking an after-the-fact approach to a commodity so vital to our basic liberties,” he argues. (p. 204) Thus, Wu’s approach represent a return to the sort of anticipatory, “Mother, May I” regulatory regime America was supposed to be turning away from following the passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.

What’s most bizarre about Wu’s call for such a preemptive “Separations” approach is his insistence that it is not a regulatory approach.  It’s hard to know whether this is an astonishing bit of hubris or just plain naiveté.  I hate to suggest it, but I think Wu is perfectly aware of just how regulatory his system would be in practice; he just doesn’t want to admit it.  After all, for there to be “separations” of various segments of the information sector, someone would need to determine who and what belongs in which bucket.  Wu suggests we’ll need at least three buckets. To repeat, he says his Separations Principle “would mean that those who develop information, those who control the network infrastructure on which it travels, and those who control the tools or venues of access must be kept apart from one another.”  Let’s put some labels on these buckets:

• Bucket #1: Information Creators
• Bucket #2: Information Distributors
• Bucket #3: Information Hardware Makers

These would essentially become three of the new “titles” (or regulatory sections) of a forthcoming “Information Economy Separations Act.” (I’m assuming Wu understands it would take an act of Congress to implement this sweeping regime, although he never makes that clear.  Or perhaps he would just prefer the FCC “reclassify” the entire information economy by regulatory fiat? Who knows.  Again, he never really sweats the details on this important point.)

Regardless, the problem with these conceptually neat classifications is that don’t conform to our fast-paced, highly dynamic Information Age economy.  There is a fluidity of innovation and market activity that Wu utterly fails to appreciate.  I suppose it’d be easy to throw a couple of players into these buckets and tell them to stay put.  We could tell T-Mobile, for example, that they could be a wireless information distributor and absolutely nothing else; we could tell Discovery Networks, they could be a content creator and absolutely nothing else; and we could tell Intel, you can be a chip maker and absolutely nothing else.

But not every existing information sector actor or technology is so neatly compartmentalized. Moreover, Wu’s framework also begs the question: Would firms that currently have integrated operations and investments in multiple fields be forced to divest control of various operations to come in line with Wu’s Separations Principle?   Here are a few scenarios to consider (and with each example, ask yourself the question: What’s the harm here to would justify the sort of “separations” regime Wu proposes?):

• Cox Enterprises has a wide variety of content and distribution properties including: broadband services, cable TV channels and distribution systems, newspapers, radio stations, advertising and direct mail divisions, and AutoTrader.com.  How many pieces does the firm need to be split into to comply with Wu’s new “Separations” regime?
• Should an ISP be allowed to develop or offer (or directly integrate into their service) free anti-virus software and parental control technologies since that’s not part of the underlying distribution service? Nearly every major ISP does so already today.
• Even though the experiment was ultimately a failure, should Google have been allowed to break out of the search market and give the handheld device business a shot with the Nexus One?  Likewise, should Google be allowed to continue its experiment with local fiber or wi-fi networks even though it is so clearly outside their traditional line of business?  Finally, should the FCC have disallowed Google’s bid in the 700 MHz spectrum auction back in 2008 since it would have meant the firm was formally entering the information distribution business?
• Which bucket is Microsoft in as a traditional OS and software provider?  Regardless, was it a mistake to allow them to jump into the video game console marketplace with the Xbox many years ago?   Should MS have been forbidden from creating the Zune since it too was a digital device outside of Microsoft’s core field?  Should MS be allowed to have a content division that develops games or other content for its operating systems even though they might be considered two separate information markets?
• Sony produces movie and video game content but also develops hardware (video game consoles, televisions, music players, phones, etc.) on which that content can be played. Should that be illegal? Would they have to divest some of these divisions once Wu’s system went into effect?
• Apple is the ultimate example of an information hardware manufacturer that has not only diversified its hardware offerings from PCs to iPods, iPhones and iPads, but also become a (if not the) leading information distributor for digital music, movies, television shows, podcasts, books and audiobooks through iTunes.  The company’s Apps store also makes it a key distributor of software.  What bucket is it in?
• Should Amazon be allowed to be both the biggest online marketplace as well as the manufacturer of a device (the Kindle) that offers access to that store?

I could go on and on, but here’s the crucial point: Creating firewalls between the buckets Wu proposes would be a nightmare and would entail incessant regulatory interventions to make sure the walls weren’t breached.  As suggested above, the very act of regulatory line-drawing would be mind-bogglingly complex.  More importantly, each new information sector innovation would suddenly be subjected to a regulatory classification proceeding.

Wu is essentially saying there are few integrative efficiencies or other economic benefits associated with cross-sector deals or cross-platform technological developments.  Again, he dismisses the notion with one line: “[T]he Separations Principle accepts in advance that some of the benefits of concentration and unified action will be sacrificed, even in ways that may seem painful or costly.” (p. 305)  Well, that’s nice… except that this regulatory system would upend the U.S. information economy as we know it!  His Separations Principle is an unprecedented regulatory wrecking ball that would do untold destruction to the American economy in the name of creating a system of information apartheid. Wu also completely ignores the litigation nightmare that would ensue once the government started forcing the divestiture of various lines of business.  After all, many companies would likely have valid “takings” claims here under the Fifth Amendment.

But even if we could get beyond all that, we’d have to consider how this regime would work going forward.  Let’s consider a hypothetical example.  Virtual reality is an emerging field of our information economy that promises to experience rapid growth in coming years.  A number of companies are currently developing content and devices that will help bring a veritable Star Trek holodeck experience to our living rooms sometime very soon.  The market is still in a great deal of flux and it remains unclear which technologies will prevail or which developers and device makers will prosper.  One thing we know for certain, however: it’s a hugely complex and expensive undertaking.  VR technologies aren’t like creating a YouTube video of your cat playing a piano. There are significant costs associated with developing VR content and devices. Distributing VR bits over networks will, no doubt, be quite complicated as well.  Now, imagine two scenarios (which, for all I know, may already be playing out in the marketplace today):

• Scenario 1: A partnership is announced between some cutting-edge VR companies that have different core competencies in this field.  One of the companies is developing holographic imaging devices to project immersive environments directly into your living room or workspace.  Another of the partners is developing games that would take advantage of those new holographic imaging innovations.  And a third partner in the deal is developing software that will help manage the real-time, high-bandwidth flow of VR bits across broadband lines.  Under Wu’s Separations Principle, would this deal be illegal?
• Scenario 2: All of the activities discussed above are being handled by a single, integrated firm.  Is that illegal under Wu’s Separations Principle?

Now, it would be easy to dismiss this scenario with a casual wave of the hand and a ‘we’ll-figure-it-out-later’ attitude.  But consider the fact that deals and developments like this are happening every single minute of the day our modern information economy.  One wonders how regulators would even be expected to keep track of it all.  And they would have to keep track of it all because, again, Wu’s Separations Principle is preemptive and prophylactic in character.  His regulatory regime is going to have to come to grips with that fact that innovation happens. Markets evolve. People want to experiment and do bold new things. They tinker. They develop. They pitch. They deal. And so on.  As that dynamic process unfolds every day across the high-tech economy, Wu’s Separations Principle will be put to the test and necessitate a regulatory proceeding of some sort to determine what is permitted and what is verboten.  Meanwhile, the very uncertainty associated with Wu’s regime would delay and discourage investment in the field and formation of the partnership/venture necessary to successfully bring VR to market

Astonishingly, however, Wu argues that “a Separations regime would take much of the guesswork and impressionism, and indeed the influence trafficking, out of the oversight of information industries.” (p. 307) That’s a doozy of a claim.  To the extent his Separations Principle eliminates “guesswork” and creates more regulatory certainty, it would only do so by creating rigid artificial barriers to market entry and innovation across the information economy.  That’s “certainty” that we can live without.

Conclusion

Over on Amazon.com, I was interested to see Tim Wu post a glowing review of Kevin Kelly’s important new book, What Technology Wants (which I will be reviewing here next).  Kelly’s book argues that we should think of technology, or what he calls “the Technium,” as a “force” or even a living “organism” that has a “vital spirit” and which “has its own wants” and “a noticeable measure of autonomy.”  I think Kelly goes a bit far, but to the extent one buys into the notion that technology is like an organism, Tim Wu’s Information Industrial Policy would kill that organism.  Or, it would at least severely stunt its continued growth and evolution.

Because his information industry policy is every bit as “radical” as he suggests and would require, as he also admits, “a certain breadth and ambition in its application,” it is essential we reject this innovation-killing regulatory regime.  The health of the high-tech economy, the global competitiveness of the U.S. technology sector, and the long-term welfare of consumers depends upon it.

I want to thank Tim Wu for continuing to engage in a discussion here about his book, The Master Switch, with his various comments to my ongoing rants.  After pouring out about 15,000 words over the past 4 days, I suspect I’m beginning to sound a bit like his cyber-stalker!  I feel a bit bad about this because I really do like Tim a lot and find him to be one of the all-around coolest and most laid-back guys in the Net policy business.  But, as I’ve noted in my ongoing series [see parts 1, 2, 3, & 4], we have profoundly different worldviews when it comes to information history and policy. And some of the recent comments he made to my 3^rd post deserve a serious response.

In one of those comments he asks, “The question, then, is how you get, essentially, limited, controlled government in regulatory affairs; how you duplicate, in some sense, the limits imposed on other dangerous gov’t functions like the army. I don’t think this is having things both ways; I think this is trying to learn from what has gone wrong in the past.”  In the other, he says: “The question I’m asking in the end of the book is whether we can do better; try to have rules against the worse forms abuse without a creeping regulation that turns into capture. I suspect you think that’s impossible, but I don’t.”

So, here’s my response (and I’m making it a new, dedicated post here instead of just a comment in an old thread because I feel we are getting to the heart of the difference between cyber-libertarians (like myself) and cyber-collectivists (or whatever Tim would call himself).

To be clear, I don’t think corporations are angels or that there is never a time when a market can’t be naturally subject to a great deal of control by one company or a handful of companies.  The difference between us comes down to two things primarily.

First, as I have already noted in a couple of these essays (especially this one), I believe regulatory capture, mismanagement, or other shenanigans have more to do with creating and / or maintaining “monopoly” or lasting / harmful “market power” than natural market forces.   By definition, a “purely economic laissez-faire approach” does not exist in markets characterized by regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement.  And you won’t ever get less regulatory capture and bureaucratic mismanagement by increasing the scope of government control over a market.

Second, to the extent that any company or set of companies is able to achieve “market power” is a largely natural fashion (think IBM in 70s or Microsoft in late 90s), I believe that markets can and do act to evolve around those situations quite rapidly, even more rapidly when the market is built on code.

I spent time developing these points in detail in this two-part debate [1, 2] with Lawrence Lessig, which I hope Prof. Wu will take the time to read since I went to great pains to clearly delineate the differences that separate our worldviews.  Ultimately, as I said there in response to Prof. Lessig, what really separates the cyber-libertarian and cyber-collectivist schools of thinking comes down to a belief that “market failures” or “code failures” are ultimately better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).

Does that mean cyber-libertarians believe everything will be all wine and roses in a truly free marketplace?  Absolutely not.  There will be short term spells of what many of us would regard as excessive market power.  The difference between us comes down to the amount of faith we would place in government actors versus market forces / evolution to better solve that problem.  We cyber-libertarians would obviously have a lot more patience with markets and technological change, and would be willing to wait and see how things work out.  We believe, as I have noted in my previous responses to Wu, that it is during what some regard as a market’s darkest hour when some of the most exciting disruptive technologies and innovation are developing.   We are bullish on what I have called experimental, evolutionary dynamism.  People don’t sit still; they respond to incentives, including short-term spells of “market power.”

Is this blind faith in the market?  I suspect Prof. Wu and others would accuse us of that.  But I would argue it isn’t blind faith but informed fact.  It’s interesting, for example, that one of the “information empires” Wu doesn’t spend much time on in his book is IBM.  Back in the 60s and 70s, (as I have documented here before) IBM was the big, bad dog of the computing world, with significant “market power” in mainframes — the only computers that really counted at the time.  Big Blue’s market power was achieved in a fairly natural way, however.  Importantly, there isn’t much regulatory capture or interference I could point to that helped cause or maintain the power IBM had. So, it’s certainly a better case study than others Wu uses in his book, most of which were subject to early meddling by government that tipped the balance in unnatural directions.

Anyway, back in the 1960’s, some folks at the time feared IBM might “leverage” their significant market power into new fields. As a result, the Department of Justice opened an antitrust case against Big Blue in 1969 that would become a 13-year quagmire, with little to show for all the legal wrangling by the time the case was abandoned in 1982.  Here’s how CNet staff writer Rachel Konrad summarized the fiasco back in 2000:

In January 1969, the government began a sweeping antitrust investigation into IBM’s dominance and attempted to break it into smaller companies that would compete against one another. During the six most critical years of the trial, from 1975 to 1980, the parties called 974 witnesses and read 104,400 pages of transcripts, according to Emerson Pugh’s 1995 book “Building IBM: Shaping an Industry and Its Technology.” The 13-year investigation, which required IBM to retain 200 attorneys at one point, fizzled in the early ’80s as the computing landscape shifted from mainframes to personal computers. The government abandoned the tainted effort entirely in 1982, as clones of the IBM PC eroded Big Blue’s dominance. But the company, still fearful of the watchful eye of the Justice Department, took pains to avoid the appearance of a monopoly long after it relinquished its hold on the market. People who worked for IBM in the ’80s and early ’90s said the company routinely fell victim to “pricing death strategy”–a reluctance to lower prices below cost, even on products that weren’t selling–to avoid what the government would call predatory pricing. By the mid-’80s, the company was in bad shape. The antitrust troubles, combined with ill-timed product failures such as the Future System, pinched revenues. The company began a nearly decade-long financial slide. In retrospect, the antitrust case against IBM seemed laughable.

IBM had become the victim of a classic “disruptive technology” paradigm shift that few could have foreseen in 1969.  As Peter Pitsch noted in his 1996 PFF book The Innovation Age, “In 1981 the Department of Justice was still pressing their case against IBM while market forces were about to lay waste to the company.” Pitsch continued:

IBM certainly did not expect to see PCs erode the market share and profitability of its venerable mainframe computers, but the fall of the old “big iron” machines was rapid and spectacular. The revenue of IBM’s mainframe unit fell from roughly $9 billion in 1990 to an estimated $4.5 billion in 1994… [T]he parties destined to become players in the PC revolution were unknown when the PC was introduced, and the experts’ predictions of a much-ballyhooed computer face-off between IBM and AT&T never materialized. Innovative companies that did not exist at the beginning of the revolution rose rapidly. Few people had ever heard of a small company named Microsoft. Nor had they heard of Intel, Novell, Compaq, Dell, or Netscape.

Pitsch went on to summarize how IBM’s manufacturing capacity was slashed in the years that followed and also notes that, astonishingly, “in the space of five years after 1987, IBM lost two thirds of its market value — more than $70 billion.”  In sum, new marketplace innovation and competition handled the short-term market power concern that antitrust regulators had about Big Blue.  Pitsch goes on to explain what the antitrust regulators missed:

A dominant firm can lose its “King of the Hill” status in two ways. First, if it does not continually improve, it will lose market share and profits to low-cost imitators. For example, the ability of low-end PC manufacturers to make IBM clones fostered robust price competition in the PC market. Second, today’s market leaders must worry that some established and well-financed competitor or possibly an upstart produce a technical breakthrough that will displace them. This situation reflects [the] fact that gains from innovation are so powerful and beneficial to consumers that they outweigh the higher prices dominant firms can charge. Indeed, attempts to eliminate these high profits by regulating prices would almost certainly disserve consumers even if the regulations dampened the incentives for innovation only slightly.

What Pitsch is talking about here is dynamic competition, not the static competition. And what the history of IBM shows is the power of evolutionary dynamism in action.  Markets are a learning experience; a “discovery process” as Austrian economists have taught us. Those of us who believe in dynamic competition and evolutionary dynamism see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, price competition, and so on. Experimentation and evolution happen if you let them happen.

Others, however – and I suspect this includes Prof. Wu – would argue that’s not good enough. They want action, and they want it now!  Every short-term hiccup deserves a policy response in the name of protecting “the public interest,” however they define it through regulation.  But what about the costs and trade-offs associated with early, preemptive, or prescriptive regulation?  What of the danger of regulation steering markets in unnatural or inefficient directions? The possibility of picking technological winners and losers, or technological lock-in?  The possibility of regulatory capture and the creation of a special interest, lobbying hell inside the Beltway?

Somehow these factors often go out the window for those who subscribe to the more static, snapshot-oriented view of markets and competition that is so prevalent in cyber-collectivist circles.  But the cyber-libertarian can’t let those go.  Those factors lie at the core of the problem, we would argue. Actions have consequences. Regulations have costs. And those costs typically outweigh the benefits of preemptive strikes by the State.

And that, at root, is what separates the cyber-libertarian and cyber-collectivist worldviews when it comes to concerns about “market power” and what to do about it.

[Jump to Part 6 in the series.]

It seems the whole web is incorporating social networking functionality. Microsoft recently led the way in incorporating functionality to search, allowing users to share search results they like with their social networking contacts directly from the search results page through Twitter and Facebook. I’ve also noted that it’s just a matter of time before the same thing happens with advertising—and that Facebook will likely lead the way.

Websites have long used social networking buttons to encourage visitors to join their Facebook group, follow them on Twitter, etc. Facebook recently made this even easier by creating a widget for pages that can easily be embedded on any site. So why is Facebook blocking advertisers from including social networking functionality in ads like this one? Facebook’s terms of service using the new Fan Box widget in ads. Facebook’s spokesperson told InsideFacebook.com:

We want Page owners to have an easy way to connect with fans both on and off of Facebook.  In order to protect the the Fan Box widget from being used for the wrong reasons, we do not allow it to be used in third party advertising.

InsideFacebook.com speculates:

it’s safe to assume that Facebook wants to protect the “Become a Fan” experience from becoming too intertwined with aggressive online ads that it hasn’t approved. One can imagine the variety of ways advertisers could (potentially misleadingly) push users to become a fan in an ad unit on a web site, then pollute their Facebook stream later. Facebook wants more control over that experience, even if it means partially restricting growth for Facebook Pages.

So why might policymakers be interested in this? Because, as Fred Vogelstein predicted in Wired this June, Facebook will likely someday soon expand beyond selling ads on its own site to selling ads on the wider Internet that incorporate social networking functionality like the “Become a fan” button above. There is a vast untapped market for online advertising, and if Facebook’s going to get a piece of it, they’ll have to offer something no other ad network can. If and when this happens, Facebook will likely get a lot of grief from the anti-advertising zealots, but this would actually be a good thing for consumers for five reasons:

1. Facebook would prove a powerful competitor to Google. The ability to offer what Google can’t is precisely the sort of “disruptive innovation” that could up-end Google’s current dominance of online advertising. Those who fear that Google is the be-all-and-end-all of online advertising will likely find that Google can’t “stay on top of the heap” forever because online services are so profoundly dynamic. Some likely complain that Facebook has an “unfair advantage” if it’s the only ad network that can supply ads using Facebook buttons, but in the topsy-turvy world of Internet competition, you have to fight “fire with fire”: The only way to unseat the current leaders is to find ways of exercising a bit of “market power.” That term sets off alarm bells in the heads of many who can’t bear the thought that competition should ever be “unfair” in any way. But competition, like life itself, is not fair: Denying Facebook the opportunity to sell ads would only retard innovation and reduce competition. Greater competition between ad networks would ultimately mean more revenue for publishers as well as increased pressure to compete for reputation among consumers in terms of better privacy practices.
2. Increasing the effectiveness of online advertising means more revenue for the publishers who might sell ads through Facebook, which in turn will increase the quantity and quality of ad-supported online content. In fact, even publishers who don’t sell their ad inventory through Facebook would benefit if overall ad prices go up.
3. More revenue for Facebook would allow the company to continue to innovate in building better social networking functionality for its users. As I said in my response to Vogelstein, “Facebook can’t keep losing money forever.”
4. For the same reasons that Facebook is so cautious today about allowing the use of their button in ads, they would likely provide very clear guidelines for any advertising they might sell on the wider web. Specifically, Facebook would have a strong incentive to policy for the kinds of deceptive uses InsideFacebook speculates about above.
5. In addition to any direct oversight exercised by Facebook, the “Social-ification” of advertising would also change the incentives of advertisers: If your goal is to get someone to “become a fan,” you have to be even more careful about the way you engage them.  Annoying ads that flash or blink might build awareness of your brand by overcoming ad-blindness, but they’re sure not going to be effective in getting people to “Fan” you! Facebook pages allow advertisers to build communities around their brands, which means engaging customers as, well, friends!

In short, we shouldn’t fear the kind of change that Vogelstein warns about.  If Facebook is really thinking about this, they’re probably taking the time to do this correctly, which means coming up with clear policies for advertisers as well as explaining to users what this means for them.

In a week in which neutrality regulation is making a lot of news, I hope that Robert Hahn and Hal Singer’s terrific new study, “Why the iPhone Won’t Last Forever and What the Government Should Do to Promote its Successor” gets some attention. It provides a wonderful overview of how dynamically competitive the mobile marketplace has been over the past two decades and why critics are wrong to get worked up about the short-term “dominance” of Apple’s iPhone. Here’s the abstract of their paper:

Because of the overwhelming, positive response to the iPhone as compared to other smart phones, exclusive agreements between handset makers and wireless carriers have come under increasing scrutiny by regulators and lawmakers. In this paper, we document the myriad revolutions that have occurred in the mobile handset market over the past twenty years. Although casual observers have often claimed that a particular innovation was here to stay, they commonly are proven wrong by unforeseen developments in this fast-changing marketplace. We argue that exclusive agreements can play an important role in helping to ensure that another must-have device will soon come along that will supplant the iPhone, and generate large benefits for consumers. These agreements, which encourage risk taking, increase choice, and frequently lower prices, should be applauded by the government. In contrast, government regulation that would require forced sharing of a successful break-through technology is likely to stifle innovation and hurt consumer welfare.

“New technologies often seemingly emerge from nowhere, but also frequently lose their luster quickly,” Hahn and Singer go on to argue. As evidence they cite the recent examples of Second Life and MySpace, which were hyped as potentially become dominant providers in their respective areas just a few years ago, but now are subjected to intense competition. “[T]he the mobile handset market is subject to these same disruptive forces,” they argue:

an iconic handset emerges, is quickly crowned the “winner,” and soon thereafter is replaced by another technology that was not even conceived of at the time the “winner” was launched. Many iPhone-inspired smartphones, including the Blackberry Storm and the HTC G1, could unseat the iPhone in the smartphone segment. We argue that heavy-handed regulation of such dynamic markets is likely to reduce welfare on net. The cost of erring through regulatory intervention—for example, by restricting voluntary private agreements that promote risk taking—can be significant. Delaying the benefits associated with innovation in mobile handsets could cost consumers dearly. In sum, exclusive contracts between handset makers and wireless carriers benefit consumers by encouraging innovation by both handset makers and wireless service providers that are vying for market share, and by enabling some handset makers to remain viable. These benefits take the form of greater variety of choices in handsets, greatly enhanced capabilities, and a more affordable range of device options. Banning exclusive contracts could have the unintended consequence of reducing innovation, reducing options, raising prices, and potentially establishing market dominance for an incumbent handset maker.

The End of Innovation?

In their excellent history of handset innovation over the past two decades, Hahn and Singer point out that there were many other “iconic” phones that some felt represented the end of the road in terms of innovation. I just love this quote they unearthed from a 1989 Fortune article about how the release of Motorola’s MicroTAC flip phone represented the apparent pinnacle of handset innovation: “Portable phones won’t get a lot smaller than this one. After all, they have to reach from your ear to your mouth.”

This highlights the myopia that sometimes accompanies technological forecasting and public policymaking.  We sometimes just can’t think “outside the box” and comprehend the ways in which technological devices or services might come along and leapfrog today’s market leaders. It gets back to the point I made in my recent book review of Gary Reback’s over-the-top ode to antitrust regulation, Free the Market:  Those who view markets through the lens of the a static competition, fixed-pie mentality always seem to live in fear of short term “market power” while those of us who believe in dynamic competition see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, price competition, and so on.  And the real problem with that static competition mentality is that it often leads to knee-jerk regulatory responses.  Here’s how I put it in my recent debate with Larry Lessig:

What concerns me about the way Prof. Lessig approaches these issues in Code and in his subsequent work is that he is far too quick to declare the debate over by labeling short-term.. hiccups as sky-is-falling market failures. The end result of such myopic techno-pessimism is the inevitable call for governments to intervene and “do something” to correct supposed [market] failures.

In other words, have a little faith and some patience.  Apple’s iPhone is today’s hottest handset, but it’s hardly the end of innovation in this marketplace.  And we certainly don’t need handset regulation or “device neutrality” as a solution to this non-problem.  Read Hahn and Singer’s dynamite new paper for a better understanding of why that’s the case.

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

As we noted in our intro to this ongoing series, Google’s tenth anniversary has passed with Googlephobia reaching new heights of hysteria.

But is Google really too big and dangerous, or are people just too lazy to find other alternatives to each of the wonderful services that Google offers?  If one is truly paranoid about the firm’s supposed dominance, it doesn’t take much effort to live a Google-free life. To prove it, we set out to find alternatives to each of the services that Google provides.  After awhile, we got a little tired of compiling alternatives in each category and just provided links for the additional choices at your disposal.  It’s tough to see what the fuss is about with the cornucopia of choices at our disposal.  If you don’t like Google, then just don’t use it or any of its services.  The choice is yours.

In each case, we’ve listed Google first, even though Google may not be the market leader ( e.g., Google’s relatively unknown social network Orkut).

Search Engines

• Google
• Microsoft Live Search
• Yahoo!
• Ask.com
• AltaVista
• Cuil
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_search_engines

eMail

• Google Gmail
• MSN Hotmail
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Yahoo!
• AOL
• others: www.emailaddresses.com/email_web.htm

Encyclopedia

• Knol (Google)
• Wikipedia
• Citizendium
• Microsoft Encarta
• Britannica Online
• World Book Online
• others: www.surfnetkids.com/encyclopedia.htm

Instant Messaging

• Google Talk
• Yahoo Messenger
• Windows Live Messenger (Microsoft)
• AOL AIM
• Jabber
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant_messaging#User_base

Web Browsers

• Chrome (Google)
• Firefox (Mozilla Foundation)
• Internet Explorer (Microsoft)
• Safari (Apple)
• Opera
• Flock
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_web_browsers

Social Networks

• Orkut (Google) – (not popular in the U.S.)
• Facebook
• Myspace
• Bebo
• LinkedIn
• Friendster
• LiveJournal
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Social_network_service

Mapping

• Google Maps
• Microsoft Live Search Maps
• MapQuest
• WikiMapia
• Google Earth
• Virtual Earth (Microsoft)
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_online_map_services

Mobile Search / Portal Services

• Google mobile
• Yahoo! mobile
• Microsoft Windows mobile & Mobile Live Search
• AOL Mobile

Video Hosting

• YouTube (Google)
• Google Video
• Flickr (Yahoo!)
• Yahoo Video
• Vimeo
• Photobucket
• BlipTV
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_sharing_websites

Photohosting

• Picasa (Google)
• Flickr (Yahoo!)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Photobucket
• Snapfish
• Shutterfly
• Imageshack
• AOL Pictures
• others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photo_sharing#Online_photo_sharing_websites

Document / Spreadsheet Creation

• Google Docs
• Microsoft Office
• OpenOffice
• ThinkFree Office
• EditGrid
• NumSum
• Zoho Sheet
• Zoho Writer
• ajaxWrite
• Glide Write
• others: www.editgrid.com/user/siulung/Web-based_Spreadsheets_Comparison_Matrix

Online File Storage

• Google Docs
• Windows Live SkyDrive (Microsoft)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• Mozy
• Buzzword (Adobe)
• Xdrive
• Box.net
• others: http://www.listible.com/list/online-file-storage

Blog hosting services

• Blogger (Google)
• Wordpress
• Windows Live Spaces (Microsoft)
• Skyrock (based in France, but bigger than WordPress and almost as big as Blogger)
• LiveJournal
• Note: many social networking services also have a blogging component
• others: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog_hosting_service#Developer-hosted

RSS blog feed aggregators

• Google Reader
• My MSN
• My Yahoo!
• NewsGator Online
• Bloglines
• FeedBucket
• others: dmoz.org/Computers/Software/Internet/Clients/WWW/Feed_Readers/Web_Based
• others: www.newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

WebClipping Services

• Google Notebook
• Digg
• Del.icio.us (Yahoo)
• Reddit
• Clipmarks
• Zotero
• WebResearch
• ScrapBook
• Diigo

News Aggregators

• Google News
• Yahoo News
• MSN News & MSNBC (Microsoft)
• News Directory.com
• Reuters
• CNN.com
• Digg
• Topix
• others: news.nettop20.com
• others: newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

Calendar Services

• Google Calendar
• Microsoft Outlook
• Lotus Notes
• Lightning/Sunbird (Mozilla Foundation)
• Apple .Mac/MobileMe
• others: www.calendarzone.com

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer as part of an ongoing series

With Google celebrating its 10th anniversary this week, many panicky pundits are using the occasion to claim that Google has become the Great “Satan” of the Internet.  Nick Carr wonders what the future holds for “The OmniGoogle.” The normally level-headed Mike Malone worries that Google is “turning into Big Brother.”  And Washington Post’s Rob Dubbin says that he can’t escape Google’s “tentacles,” even for just 24 hours.  Meanwhile, speculation abounds that the Justice Department is preparing a major antitrust lawsuit against Google concerning its advertising partnership with Yahoo! or perhaps even a broader suit concerning Google’s “dominance” of online advertising generally.

Carr quotes Google co-founder Sergey Brin’s now-famous 2003 interview:

I think people tend to exaggerate Google’s significance in both directions.  Some say Google is God.  Others say Google is Satan.  But if they think Google is too powerful, remember that with search engines, unlike other companies, all it takes is a single click to go to another search engine. People come to Google because they choose to.  We don’t trick them.

In the last five years, Google has become far more than just a search engine.  As Google’s suite of suite of complementary products continues to grow, so too does the specter of Google as an all-knowing and therefore all-powerful economic colossus.  Yet Google isn’t even close to being the sort of nefarious monopolist out to destroy user privacy at every turn, as some seem to imply—if not exclaim.  Indeed, in our view, the Net is overall a far better place because of the existence of Google and the many free services it provides consumers.

Our point is not that Google should be immune from criticism.  Indeed, healthy criticism of corporate actions plays a vital role in the free market by disciplining corporate policies and behavior—often thus providing an effective alternative to government regulation.  This is particularly important in the area of consumer privacy protection, as demonstrated by Google’s quick response to public concern about its Chrome EULA.

We hold no brief for Google and our aim is not to be Google apologists.  In fact, we’ve had more than a few run-ins with Google on many important policy issues in the past ( e.g., on net neutrality, spectrum policy, and the need for “baseline Federal privacy legislation”) and will likely continue to do so in the future.  We are always willing to engage serious, rational discussions about other policy issues involving Google, such as concerns about its alleged market power, but it seems to us that the hysteria about Google’s supposed dominance of the Internet is clouding rational discussion of the policy issues raised by Google, its innovations and its success.  Indeed, the creeping paranoia about all things Google-related that is most evident throughout the blogosphere (but that reaches far beyond it) has produced an environment that resembles nothing so much as a lynch mob:  Angry, short-tempered, out for corporate blood, and unwilling to engage in reasoned discussion.

The specter of Google’s market power driving—and confusing—so many of today’s Internet policy debates is reminiscent of the previous generation of conspiracy theories about how Microsoft, like the Borg (perhaps sci-fi’s scariest villains), would assimilate all in its path—forever controlling the digital revolution.  We don’t want Google to become the victim of the same regulatory & antitrust ordeal that Microsoft has endured over the past decade, with the kind of hysterical claims of Chicken Little-ism that drove a ten-year crusade against Microsoft.  Short-sighted, heavy-handed government intervention can cripple a creative company while doing little to actually benefit consumers because regulators cannot keep pace with technological change—perhaps the only constant fact in the every-changing digital world.

Of course, like all temporal things, Microsoft’s seemingly permanent “monopoly” has faded, and the bulk of the criticism it once faced has shifted focus to Google.  Microsoft continues to be the subject of many unfair attacks because of its success (a/k/a “dominance”) in the OS, office product, and browser markets.  Other companies have experienced similar attacks on a smaller scale:  Facebook and the once-angelic Apple have both been subject to increasing criticism for their success in certain sectors of the digital economy, customer complaints about openness ( e.g., “locked” devices or portability of social networking data) and privacy policies.  The hysteria surrounding Google is not unique in kind, yet it is clear that the mantle of “Great (digital) Satan” has clearly passed from Microsoft to Google.

Thus, we have decided to start a new series of essays on “Googlephobia” (a term that seems to have taken off in the spring of 2005, when the French government seriously proposed creating its own alternative to the Google search engine).  We’ve already penned a few essays on the topic here (as have a number of our TLF colleagues) and, therefore, our next installment in the series will be #5—in which we will outline the many competitors to Google’s many products.

But here are a few of our past essays on the topic, which clearly belong on the list even though they weren’t part of a series at the time:

• Market Forces At Work: The PR Backlash Against Google Chrome’s EULA, by Berin Szoka, September 4, 2008.
• “Cry [Censorship] and Let Slip the Dogs of [Regulation]!” – A Lesson in the Dangers of Googlephobia, by Berin Szoka, July 14, 2008.
• Google, California’s Privacy Policy Law & Our Sci-Fi Future, by Berin Szoka, June 4, 2008
• Is Google Evil? The Never-Ending Search for High-Tech Villainy, by Adam Thierer, June 30, 2005.

And here’s an oldie on the same topic:

• “Google as a Public Utility? No Results in This Search for Monopoly,” by Adam Thierer and Wayne Crews, November 14, 2003.