high-tech – Technology Liberation Front

Can Government Reproduce Silicon Valley Everywhere?

Adam Thierer — Sun, 12 Sep 2021 17:36:07 +0000

Wishful thinking is a dangerous drug. Some pundits and policymakers believe that, if your intentions are pure and you have the “right” people in power, all government needs to do is sprinkle a little pixie dust (in the form of billions of taxpayer dollars) and magical things will happen.

Of course, reality has a funny way of throwing a wrench into the best-laid plans. Which brings me to the question I raise in a new 2-part series for Discourse magazine: Can governments replicate Silicon Valley everywhere?

In the first installment, I explore the track record of federal and state attempts to build tech clusters, science parks & “regional innovation hubs” using state subsidies and industrial policy. This is highly relevant today because of the huge new industrial policy push at the federal level is building on top of growing state and local efforts to create tech hubs, science parks, or various other types of industrial “clusters.

At the federal level, this summer, the Senate passed a 2,300-page industrial policy bill, the “United States Innovation and Competition Act of 2021,” that included almost $10 billion over four years for a Department of Commerce-led effort to fund 20 new regional technology hubs, “in a manner that ensures geographic diversity and representation from communities of differing populations.” A similar proposal that is moving in the House, the “Regional Innovation Act of 2021,” proposes almost $7 billion over five years for 10 regional tech hubs. Meanwhile, the Biden administration also is pitching ideas for new high-tech hubs. In late July, the Commerce Department’s Economic Development Administration announced plans to allocate $1 billion in pandemic recovery funds to create or expand “regional industry clusters” as part of the administration’s new Build Back Better Regional Challenge. Among the possible ideas the agency said might win funding are an “artificial intelligence corridor,” an “agriculture-technology cluster” in rural coal counties, a “blue economy cluster” in coastal regions, and a “climate-friendly electric vehicle cluster.”

In my essay, I note that the economic literature on these efforts has been fairly negative, to put it mildly. There is no precise recipe for growing tech clusters, as most economists and business analysts note.

“Despite several attempts, Silicon Valley has not been successfully copied elsewhere,” notes Mark Zachary Taylor, author of “The Politics of Innovation: Why Some Countries Are Better Than Others at Science and Technology.” Judge Glock, a senior policy adviser with the Cicero Institute, offers a more blistering assessment of such efforts: “Almost every American state has tried to fund the creation of biotech clusters, projects that almost inevitably end with weeds growing through the parking-lot pavement and a trail of corrupt bargains.”

I then highlight the key findings from several major studies of these efforts, all of which make it clear that, as cluster scholars by Aaron Chatterji, Edward Glaeser and William Kerr noted in 2014 after gathering all the research conducted on the topic: existing evidence “suggests that the regional foundation for growth-enabling innovation is complex and that we should be cautious of single policy solutions that claim to fit all needs.” Furthermore, “even if clusters of entrepreneurship are good for local growth, it is less clear that cities or states have the ability to generate those clusters.”

I also highlight research from my Mercatus Center colleagues on “The Economics of a Targeted Economic Development Subsidy” documenting costs of state-level planning & case study of Foxconn fiasco. They summarize the fairly miserable track record of state and local mini-industrial policy efforts. As they note, the extensive economic literature on this matter finds that “the net effect of targeted economic development subsidies is likely to be negative” because “the taxes funding the subsidies will discourage more economic activity than will be encouraged by the subsidies themselves.” Similarly, Harvard Business School economist Josh Lerner evaluated dozens of similar targeted development efforts from around the globe in his 2009 book Boulevard of Broken Dreams: Why Public Efforts to Boost Entrepreneurship and Venture Capital Have Failed—and What to Do About It. He concluded that “for each effective government intervention, there have been dozens, even hundreds, of failures, where substantial public expenditures bore no fruit.”

In my essay, I also discuss the astonishing array of federal efforts to promote the geographic spread of high-tech sectors and jobs since 2000. Throughout Bush, Obama, Trump & Biden admins, there’s been a lot of spending, but not a lot of success. Just lots of new laws and bureaucracies:

In 2012, the Obama administration launched the multiagency Rural Jobs and Innovation Accelerator Challenge and Advanced Manufacturing Jobs and Innovation Accelerator Challenge. This occurred at roughly the same time President Obama was launching his Startup America initiative. He also signed the JOBS Act (Jump-start Our Business Startups) in 2012. All these efforts included various measures to support the spread of advanced manufacturing and high-tech startups across the U.S. But none of these efforts have borne much fruit so far.

In the second installment of this series, I explore better ways to encourage regional tech innovation and economic development without doubling down on failed programs of the past. Specifically, I explain why, when it comes to economic development efforts, policymakers would be wise to avoid the costly, ineffective “fun stuff” and refocus on time-tested “boring” strategies:

The boring approach to economic development seeks to promote an open innovation culture that is conducive to risk-taking, investment and growth without the need to extend targeted privileges to particular firms or industries. Such a culture comes down to a classic mix of simplified and equally applied taxes, streamlined permitting processes and sensible regulations, limits on frivolous lawsuits, and clear protection of contracts and property rights. As Matt Mitchell and I argued previously, policymakers need to resist the urge to go for broke with splashy policies and programs. They need to appreciate the benefits of generalized economic development policy (a.k.a. the boring approach) as opposed to far riskier targeted development efforts.

I also highlight recent research explaining how perhaps the simplest way to strengthen existing clusters, or give rise to new ones, is to make sure America’s immigration policies are hospitable to the best and brightest minds from across the globe.

And I note how, due to the problems associated with many other forms of government-sponsored R&D assistance, many scholars and policymakers are increasingly turning to the idea of government-sponsored competitions and prizes as a superior way to distribute R&D assistance.

With competitions, governments can set broad goals to help facilitate the search for important societal needs. The prizes then create a powerful incentive for innovators to pursue those goals, not only to win money, but also to gain recognition from peers and the public. Another alternative is just using lotteries to distribute R&D money instead of having agencies target grants. That at least avoids political shenanigans and paperwork delays, although it may not be a particularly effective approach.

There is also some good news is overlooked in today’s rush to make big industrial policy gambles: Venture capitalists and new startups are already spreading out naturally.

A 2021 study on “The State of the Startup Ecosystem” by Engine, a research and advocacy organization supporting startups, revealed that “as Series A funding grew over the last fifteen years, more of that growth has started to shift to areas located outside of the largest ecosystems.” Series A funding refers to the initial round of outside venture capitalist investment in startups. The report looked at Series A deals from 2003 to 2018 and found that “Series A rounds outside of the top five ecosystems grew nearly 900 percent, while the number of rounds outside of the top nine grew nearly tenfold.” Whereas Series A fundings outside of the top five ecosystems stood at 38% in 2003, they had jumped up to 43% in 2018. “The increase in deal location diversity over this period reflects an increasing spread in venture capital investment across the country and less centralization of investment in areas like Silicon Valley,” the report concluded.

Meanwhile, tech innovators and investors are increasingly engaging in innovation arbitrage as they move to cities and states across the nation that are more hospitable to entrepreneurial activities. Firms and investors are voting with their feet (and dollars) by flocking to areas where tech clusters can more naturally sprout because the general policy environment is sound.

But government efforts to artificially try to create regional innovation hubs in a top-down, technocratic fashion will almost certainly persist. As they do, some will argue that this time will be different! Perhaps, but it is more likely that the past is prologue; these new hubs will likely cause federal politicians to jockey for position to have their regions named one of the winners and get a big cut of all the new high-tech pork being served up by Washington. We can do better.

Jump over to Discourse to read both installments here and here.

Also, down below I list several other things I have written recently on industrial policy efforts more generally.

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Does the US Need a More Targeted Industrial Policy for AI & High-Tech?” Presentation for IHS Papers Workshop: Does America Need a New Industrial Policy?, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “Government Planning and Spending Won’t Replicate Silicon Valley,” Discourse, August 18, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “To Promote Tech Hubs Across the Country, Governments Should Focus on Improving the General Business Environment,” Discourse, September 9, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy as ‘Casino Economics‘,” The Hill, July 12, 2021.
Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.
Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.
Matthew D. Mitchell and Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy is a Very Old, New Idea,” Discourse, April 6, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy,’” Technology Liberation Front, September 3, 2020.
Adam Thierer, “Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts,” Technology Liberation Front, ongoing series.

Remembering the ‘Japan Inc.’ Industrial Policy Scare of the 1980s & 1990s

Adam Thierer — Tue, 29 Jun 2021 16:12:22 +0000

Discourse magazine has just published my latest essay, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse.” It is a short history of the hysteria surrounding the growth of Japan in the 1980s and early 1990s and its various industrial policy efforts. I begin by noting that, “American pundits and policymakers are today raising a litany of complaints about Chinese industrial policies, trade practices, industrial espionage and military expansion. Some of these concerns have merit. In each case, however, it is easy to find identical fears that were raised about Japan a generation ago.” I then walk through many of the leading books, opeds, movies, and other things from that past era to show how that was the case.

“Hysteria” is not too strong a word to use in this case. Many pundits and politicians were panicking about the rise of Japan economically and more specifically about the way Japan’s Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) was formulating industrial policy schemes for industrial sectors in which they hoped to make advances. This resulted in veritable “MITI mania” here in America. “U.S. officials and market analysts came to view MITI with a combination of reverence and revulsion, believing that it had concocted an industrial policy cocktail that was fueling Japan’s success at the expense of American companies and interests,” I note. Countless books and essays were being published with breathless titles and predictions. I go through dozens of them in my essay. Meanwhile, the debate in policy circles and Capitol Hill even took on an ugly racial tinge, with some lawmakers calling the the Japanese “leeches.” and suggesting the U.S. should have dropped more atomic bombs on Japan during World War II. At one point, several members of Congress gathered on the lawn of the U.S. Capitol in 1987 to smash Japanese electronics with sledgehammers.

All this hysteria about Japan and MITI bore little semblance to reality. In fact, as I note in the essay, the MITI industrial planning model fell apart after it made a host of horrible bad bets and the stock market tanked in the late 1980s. Corruption also became a huge problem within many state-led efforts. A 2000 report by the Policy Research Institute within Japan’s Ministry of Finance concluded that “the Japanese model was not the source of Japanese competitiveness but the cause of our failure.” MITI was renamed the Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry at about the same time, and its mission shifted more toward market-oriented reforms.

Industrial policy came to be viewed as a bit of a joke in America after that, but now it is back with a vengeance, thanks largely to the rise of Chinese economic power. Thus, because “we hear echoes from the Japan Inc. era debates in today’s policy discussions about China and industrial policy planning,” I end my essay with some lessons from the ‘Japan Inc.’ era for today’s industrial policy debates:

This similarity demonstrates the first lesson we can learn from the previous era: It is important to separate serious geopolitical and economic analysis from breathless fear-mongering and borderline xenophobia. The former has a serious place in policy discussions; the latter needs to be called out and shunned. After all, there are many legitimate worries about rising Chinese power, particularly when it involves Chinese Communist Party efforts to squash human rights domestically or to engage in industrial espionage, trade mercantilism and military adventurism abroad. Separating serious matters from trivial or imaginary ones is crucial, especially to help keep peace between nations. Avoiding hysteria is especially pertinent today with a wave of anti-Asian sentiment and attacks on the rise in the U.S. A second lesson from the Japan Inc. experience relates to today’s renewed interest in industrial policy: Forecasting the future of nations and economies—and trying to plan for it—is a tricky business. A huge range of variables affects global competitiveness and technological advancement. A nonexhaustive list of some of the most important factors would include legal and political stability, physical and intellectual property rights, tax burdens, competition policy, trade and investment laws, monetary policy, research and development efforts, and even demographic factors and access to certain natural resources. Understanding how these and other factors all work together is an inexact science. When targeted industrial policy mechanisms are added to the mix, it becomes even harder to untangle which variables are making the most difference. Both in the past and today, a less visible group of scholars has suggested that an embrace of entrepreneurialism and free trade was the fundamental factor driving Japanese economic expansion in the past and China’s amazing growth today. Openness to markets, they say, drove the enormous economic expansions—which also happened during times of much-needed catch-up modernization in both countries. But these perspectives have usually been shouted out of the room by louder voices, who either bombastically blast or praise industrial policy mechanisms as the prime mover in the economic rejuvenation of both nations. We need to tamp down on the magical thinking that governments can easily achieve technological innovation and economic growth by simply spinning a few industrial policy gauges. A few big bets may pay off, but that doesn’t justify governments engaging in casino economics regularly. History more often shows that grandiose industrial policy schemes simply result in cost overruns, cronyism and even corruption.

I also conclude by noting that:

Perhaps the most ironic indictment of industrial policy punditry lies in the way all the earlier books and essays about Japanese planning not only failed to forecast the many flops associated with it, but also did not foresee China as a potential future economic juggernaut. Korea, Singapore and Taiwan were mentioned as potential Asian challengers, but no one gave China much consideration. What might that tell us about the ability of experts to predict the future course of countries and economies? It is a reminder of the wisdom of another great Yogi Berra quote: “It’s tough to make predictions, especially about the future.”

You can read the entire piece, as well as several others listed below, over at Discourse.

Recent writing on industrial policy:

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Does the US Need a More Targeted Industrial Policy for AI & High-Tech?” Presentation for IHS Papers Workshop: Does America Need a New Industrial Policy?, forthcoming, July 23, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.
Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.
Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.
Matthew D. Mitchell and Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy is a Very Old, New Idea,” Discourse, April 6, 2021.
Adam Thierer, “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy,'” Technology Liberation Front, September 3, 2020.
“Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts,” Technology Liberation Front, ongoing series.

Skeptical Takes on Expansive Industrial Policy Efforts

Adam Thierer — Mon, 15 Mar 2021 17:09:11 +0000

[Last updated 3/25/22]

Industrial Policy is a red-hot topic once again with many policymakers and pundits of different ideological leanings lining up to support ambitious new state planning for various sectors — especially 5G, artificial intelligence, and semiconductors. A remarkably bipartisan array of people and organizations are advocating for government to flex its muscle and begin directing more spending and decision-making in various technological areas. They all suggest some sort of big plan is needed, and it is not uncommon for these industrial policy advocates to suggest that hundreds of billions will need to be spent in pursuit of those plans.

Others disagree, however, and I’ll be using this post to catalog some of their concerns on an ongoing basis. Some of the criticisms listed here are portions of longer essays, many of which highlight other types of steps that governments can take to spur innovative activities. Industrial policy is an amorphous term with many definitions of a broad spectrum of possible proposals. Almost everyone believes in some form of industrial policy if you define the term broadly enough. But, as I argued in a September 2020 essay “On Defining ‘Industrial Policy‘,” I believe it is important to narrow the focus of the term such that we can continue to use the term in a rational way. Toward that end, I believe a proper understanding of industrial policy refers to targeted and directed efforts to plan for specific future industrial outputs and outcomes.

The collection of essays below is merely an attempt to highlight some of the general concerns about the most ambitious calls for expansive industrial policy, many of which harken back to debates I was covering in the late 1980s and early 1990s, when I first started a career in policy analysis. During that time, Japan and South Korea were the primary countries of concern cited by industrial policy advocates. Today, it is China’s growing economic standing that is fueling calls for ambitious state-led targeted investments in “strategic” sectors and technologies. To a lesser extent, grandiose European industrial policy proposals are also prompting new US counter-proposals.

All this activity is what has given rise to many of the critiques listed below. If you have suggestions for other essays I might add to this list, please feel free to pass them along. FYI: There’s no particular order here.

Scott Lincicome and Huan Zhu, “Questioning Industrial Policy: Why Government Manufacturing Plans Are Ineffective and Unnecessary,” Cato Institute Working Paper, June 16, 2021.

[I]ndustrial policy – properly defined – has an extensive and underwhelming history in the United States, featuring high costs (seen and unseen), failed objectives, and political manipulation. Surely, not every U.S. industrial policy effort has ended in disaster, but facts here and abroad argue strongly against new government efforts to boost “critical” industries and workers and thereby fix alleged market failures. Such efforts warrant intense skepticism – skepticism that today is unfortunately in short supply.

Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy as Casino Economics,” The Hill, July 12, 2021.

While some government investments will always be necessary, policymakers engaging in casino economics means bad industrial policy bets and taxpayer money squandered on risky ventures best made by private actors. We need to keep Uncle Sam’s gambling habits in check.

Adam Thierer, “Thoughts on the America COMPETES Act: The Most Corporatist & Wasteful Industrial Policy Ever,” Technology Liberation Front, January 26, 2022.

As far as industrial policy measures go, the COMPETES Act is one of the most ambitious and expensive central planning efforts in American history. It represents the triumph of top-down, corporatist, techno-mercantilist thinking over a more sensible innovation policy rooted in bottom-up competition, entrepreneurialism, private investment, and free trade.

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Does the US Need a More Targeted Industrial Policy for AI & High-Tech?” Mercatus Center at George Mason University, Special Study, November 2021.

This paper considers how both the recent history of high-tech industrial policy efforts at the national and international level—as well as some state and local economic development efforts in the United States—might better inform the wisdom of proposed efforts for AI or other high-tech sectors. That history is spotted with some limited successes alongside a long string of costly failures. We explore the reasons for those failures and recommend that the US refocus on the policy prerequisites that helped give rise to the computing and internet revolutions: a more generalized approach to economic development rooted in light-touch regulation and taxation of emerging technology.

Samuel Gregg, “Can America Build A Broad-Based Economy?” Law & Liberty, March 1, 2022

Of course, if a government decides to put enough money and resources behind a given industrial policy, it will likely produce some results. Yet the same is true of the gambler. If she stays in the casino long enough and spends enough money, she will win a few hands of cards. But the odds are that she will also lose a great deal of money, especially if she is as inept a gambler as the government is maladroit at identifying industry trends or entrepreneurial opportunities. Moreover, just as a compulsive gambler’s behavior will have numerous negative effects on her family’s well-being, so too does industrial policy risk inflicting wider damage upon a nation’s economy and political system. The harms range from gross misallocations of resources to the rampant cronyism and rent-seeking that seems inseparable from industrial policy (which, I again note, its advocates studiously avoid discussing), to name just a few.

Phil Gramm & Mike Solon, “Peace Through Strength Requires Economic Freedom,” Wall Street Journal, March 1, 2022.

The America Competes Act is the House’s effort to outdo the Chinese Communist Party’s latest five-year plan. The 2,900-page bill would make an old Soviet commissar blush. [. . . ] America’s success in the world economy has never depended on industrial policy or government subsidies. It has come from the relative absence of government planning and subsidies. This is hardly news. The U.S. government provided support for the efforts of Samuel Langley, the greatest aviation expert of the 1890s, in his effort to make America first in powered flight. His manned Aerodrome flopped into the Potomac River. It was the Wright brothers, two unsubsidized but determined bicycle makers from Dayton, Ohio, who flew at Kitty Hawk, N.C., and changed the world.

Scott Lincicome, “Moving Fast and Breaking Things,” Capitolism, February 2, 2022.

Adam Thierer, “The Coming Industrial Policy Hangover,” The Hill, February 16, 2022.

In the rush to pass legislation, we’ve barely heard a peep about the $250-$350 billion price tag. This follows a massive splurge of recent government borrowing, which led to the U.S. national debt hitting another lamentable new record: $30 trillion. China already owns over $1 trillion of that debt, making one wonder if we’re really countering China by adopting a massive, new and unfunded industrial policy that they will end up financing indirectly.

Podcast: “What’s Wrong with Industrial Policy,” Hold These Truths with Rep. Dan Crenshaw, February 16, 2022.

Tad DeHaven and Adam Thierer, “ The Military-Industrial Complex Offers a Cautionary Tale for Industrial Policy Planning,” Discourse, March 25, 2022.

Wayne Crews, “What To Do Instead Of The America COMPETES Act,” Forbes, February 2, 2022.

All this spending and expansion of the federal government, atop which our leaders would lay the America COMPETES Act and doubtless its own accompanying guidebook, has massive, ignored regulatory effects. Trillions in government spending (”investment”) have altered and will alter the entire trajectory and competitive environment of industries engaged in large-scale enterprises and transactions. This removes vast swaths of business activity from free competitive enterprise altogether, and creates displacements and distortions such that the restoration of free enterprise becomes a near-impossible disentanglement. The result is, after 100 years of big government and seduction of and fusion with big business, the greatest endeavors—from infrastructure to artificial intelligence, from smart cities to space—now consist of “partnerships” with governments rather than free enterprise, at scales and at costs so gigantic they can only be ignored.

Adam Thierer, “‘Japan Inc.’ and Other Tales of Industrial Policy Apocalypse,” Discourse, June 28, 2021.

Perhaps the most ironic indictment of industrial policy punditry lies in the way all the earlier books and essays about Japanese planning not only failed to forecast the many flops associated with it, but also did not foresee China as a potential future economic juggernaut. [. . .] What might that tell us about the ability of experts to predict the future course of countries and economies?

Adam Thierer, “Can Government Reproduce Silicon Valley Everywhere?” Technology Liberation Front, September 12, 2021.

government efforts to artificially try to create regional innovation hubs in a top-down, technocratic fashion will almost certainly persist. As they do, some will argue that this time will be different! Perhaps, but it is more likely that the past is prologue; these new hubs will likely cause federal politicians to jockey for position to have their regions named one of the winners and get a big cut of all the new high-tech pork being served up by Washington.

Weifeng Zhong, “Beijing Can’t Make Sense of Biden’s China Strategy. Can Biden?” Washington Examiner, July 01, 2021.

America is not China, and it would be a fatal mistake to equate competing with China with imitating what China does. Doing so would risk the advantageous U.S. position as the world’s chief innovator, whose ideas are turned into products by vibrant private sectors both domestically and internationally.

Mike Watson, “Industrial Policy in the Real World,” National Affairs, Summer 2021.

Given the nature of industrial policymaking in the United States, there’s little reason to believe future attempts at industrial planning will result in a more coherent, rational, or strategic allocation of resources than they have in the past. [. . .] In short, industrial policy in the United States cannot be steered by a small group of enlightened individuals, because a small group of enlightened individuals will never be at the helm. Indeed, in some sense, there is no single “helm” to speak of.

Samuel Gregg, “Industrial Policy Mythology Confronts Economic Reality,” Law & Liberty, September 3, 2021.

If prizes in policy debates were given out for persistence, those advocating for more widespread use of industrial policy in America would be first in line. No matter how many times it is pointed out that they don’t understand the nature and workings of comparative advantage; or avoid acknowledging how industrial policy fosters rampant cronyism and corruption; or highlight what they consider examples of countries in which industrial policy has been employed successfully (only to have it demonstrated that it didn’t quite work out the way they suggested), they don’t give up.

Elizabeth Nolan Brown, “If This Is How America COMPETES, We’re Going to Lose,” Reason, January 26, 2022.

the bill can’t simply address one main issue or a few critical needs. Instead, it tries to insert the government into every aspect of all sorts of industries and markets and pretend that bureaucrats can solve complex social and cultural issues.

Chang-Tai Hsieh, “Countering Chinese Industrial Policy Is Counterproductive,” Project Syndicate, September 15, 2021.

US political leaders have long tried to counter Chinese industrial policy. And now they seem to have decided that the best way to do that is to emulate it. But their agenda betrays a profound lack of understanding of the unique challenge posed by China’s coupling of an authoritarian political regime with a dynamic market economy.

Adam Thierer, “Industrial Policy Advocates Should Learn from Don Lavoie,” Discourse, November 5, 2021.

“In light of the inherent deficiencies of central planning,” Lavoie said, “it might be argued that the U.S. should instead try to reduce current government interference with the competitive process to the absolute minimum consistent with other political goals.” It remains wise advice for today’s policymakers.

Anne O. Krueger, “America’s Muddled Industrial Policy,” CGTN, June 25, 2021.

Governments have a poor track record of identifying “winners” – be it a company or a category of technology – whereas private companies have proved better at transforming new discoveries into new products or cost savings. That is why the U.S. state traditionally has stuck to funding basic research.

Eric Boehm, “Massive Subsidies Won’t Solve the Semiconductor Supply Chain Crisis,” Reason, January 28, 2022.

Tracy C. Miller, “The Case for Limiting Government Semiconductor Subsidies,” The Hill, June 26, 2021.

Without the subsidies, firms would be more cautious about building or expanding foundries. If long-term production capacity is truly insufficient, high prices and anticipated profits give firms the right incentives to build or expand and satisfy demand at cost-covering prices.

Scott Lincicome, “The ‘Endless Frontier’ and American Industrial Policy,” Cato Institute Blog, May 26, 2021.

U.S. industrial policy has a long history of struggling to overcome political pressures, just as public choice predicts, and the EFA is no different. None of this means that all legislating is bad, or that politicians don’t at least occasionally vote in the national interest. Instead, the public choice framework simply adds another hurdle—along with things like the “knowledge problem,” seen and unseen costs, and misaligned incentives—to designing and implementing commercial policies specifically intended to beat the admittedly messy and imperfect situation that the market generates. It’s imperative that we understand these risks before supporting policies that, while they might look good on paper, could easily morph into a counterproductive boondoggle—one we’ve seen countless times with respect to U.S. industrial policy.

Daniel W. Drezner, “Is the United States capable of industrial policy in 2021?” Washington Post, June 14, 2021.

To believe that the United States can pursue a high-caliber industrial policy, however, requires assuming a more competent state than I have seen in the past decade.

Douglas Holtz-Eakin, “The Nicest Thing I Can Write About Supply Chain Policy,” The Daily Dish, June 10, 2021.

Nevertheless, the Senate just passed a provision for $50 billion to subsidize chip fabrication – something the president had requested – and the House will doubtlessly concur. That might seem like an industry victory, but wait until it realizes that the administration will assume it gives it the right to insist on union jobs, micromanage the design of chips, and dictate the pricing and distribution of the products. Good luck with that. As the definitive volume on policy analysis (Benjamin Franklin’s Poor Richard’s Almanack) put it, “He that lieth down with dogs shall rise up with fleas.”

Lipton Matthews, “Industrial Policy—a.k.a. Central Planning—Won’t Make America Great,” Mises Wire, November 5, 2021.

Although industrial policy is in vogue, the evidence suggests that it is not necessary for long-term development. Moreover, despite the popularity of industrial policy in China, America remains the world’s economic power, and by following China, it may lose this vaunted position.

Richard Beason, “Japanese Industrial Policy: An Economic Assessment,” National Foundation for American Policy, November 2021.

There is no evidence to support the claim that Japanese industrial policy during the 1955-1990 period enhanced growth rates by sector, industries with economies of scale (greater efficiency when produced in increased amounts), productivity growth or “competitiveness.” The reality of the political process and government spending priorities makes it very difficult for such policies to be effective. Furthermore, even if political pressures had not intervened, it seems questionable to suggest that government policymakers would be better than actual market participants in determining the most efficient allocation of resources to produce the best economic outcomes.

Douglas Irwin, “ Memo to the Biden administration on how to rethink industrial policy,” Peterson Institute for International Economics, October 2020.

The challenge for policymakers is to identify such industries without succumbing to the notion that every industry is vital to some public objective. For example, the goal of “economic security” is so broadly defined and open-ended that virtually every domestic producer could claim the need for government support on that basis. The risk is that ill-conceived government programs will encourage corrupt behavior in which industries benefit themselves without contributing to national welfare.

Jim Pethokoukis, “Will Biden’s embrace of industrial policy pay off?” AEI Blog, January 15, 2021.

The history of such efforts in advanced capitalist economies gives ample reason for skepticism about the effectiveness of such top-down government planning, from Japanese economic stagnation to the now-mothballed Concorde supersonic jet to France’s failed attempt to create a thriving tech sector. The Internet might seem like the exception that negates the rule, but what turned out to be a successful partnership of government and entrepreneurs didn’t arise out of some master plan from Washington. And what do even the smartest plans look like when filtered through the dodgy quality of American governance? Maybe as an excuse for cronyism and protectionism.

Adam Thierer & Connor Haaland, “Should the U.S. Copy China’s Industrial Policy?” Discourse, March 11, 2021.

America needs to embrace its already vibrant venture capital market, the benefits of basic science and prize competitions, and a light-touch regulatory approach instead of gambling taxpayer dollars on grandiose industrial policy schemes that would likely become boondoggles.

Connor Haaland & Adam Thierer, “Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?” Discourse, February 11, 2021.

Thus far, however, the Europeans don’t have much to show for their attempts to produce home-grown tech champions. Despite highly targeted and expensive efforts to foster a domestic tech base, the EU has instead generated a string of industrial policy failures that should serve as a cautionary tale for U.S. pundits and policymakers, who seem increasingly open to more government-steered innovation efforts.

Phil Levy & Christine McDaniel, “ Does the U.S. Need a Vigorous Industrial Policy?” Discourse, February 16, 2021.

we are certainly hearing new enthusiasm these days about industrial policy. It seems to have proponents or converts on both sides of the aisle. This either means that a new consensus has emerged, or it means that the term is being used so loosely that it has lost its original meaning. I’ll go with the latter; it now means different things to different people.

Wall Street Journal columnist Greg Ip discussing why “ The traditional skepticism toward industrial policy is well deserved.”

The traditional skepticism toward industrial policy is well deserved. Once Washington starts writing checks for semiconductors, other industries may get in line with the outcome determined more by political clout than economic merit. As in shipbuilding, the targeted companies may end up in perpetual need of federal protection and unable to compete internationally

David Ignatius, “The U.S. is quietly mobilizing its economy against China,” Washington Post, March 4, 2021.

The industrial policy the AI commission recommends could unlock talent and innovation. But if officials aren’t careful, government intervention could also afflict our best companies with the dead weight and dysfunction of our broken political system. We need government to spawn brainpower, not bureaucracy.

Veronique de Rugy, “Support for Industrial Policy is Growing,” AIER, January 18, 2020.

Looking at the federal government today tells me that the problems surrounding R&D programs in the past continue today, and will continue tomorrow, because they are simply a consequence of the normal functioning of government. It is hard to wish these problems away, even in the face of the private sector’s “imperfections.” Those arguing for more funding in R&D should proceed with caution.

Ben Reinhardt on concerns about The Endless Frontier Act

This bill is proposing to give money with risk-averse restrictions to a risk-averse organization (the NSF) to be dispersed among other risk-averse organizations (Universities) into a system with increasingly risk-averse incentives. Note that I’m not saying “it’s all fubar’d lets burn it to the ground!” but I am suggesting that instead of slamming on the accelerator, we should be asking “what would a tune-up and an oil change look like instead?”

Ryan Bourne, “Do Oren Cass’s Justifications for Industrial Policy Stack Up?” Cato Commentary, August 15, 2019.

Oren Cass asserts that markets cannot generally allocate resources efficiently by industry. Yet he provides no meaningful metrics to show this is the case, nor shows why his policies would deliver better outcomes. His two main claims about the benefits of a manufacturing sector — “stable employment” and “strong productivity growth” — are directly contradictory. A plethora of evidence suggests as countries’ get richer due to automation and technological improvements, they demand relatively more services, and so the industrial sector declines in employment terms.

Scott Lincicome, “ Manufactured Crisis: ‘Deindustrialization, Free Markets, and National Security,” Cato Policy Analysis No. 907, January 27, 2021.

This skepticism—mostly absent from Washington—is indeed warranted: analyses of the U.S. manufacturing sector and the relationship between trade and national security, as well as the United States’ long and checkered history of security‐related protectionism, undermine the theoretical justifications for imposing protectionism and industrial policy in the name of national defense. Instead, open trade, freer markets, and global interdependence will in almost all cases produce better outcomes in terms of national security and, most importantly, preventing wars and other forms of armed conflict.

Matthew Lau, “Trudeau government’s ‘industrial policy’ creates all the wrong incentives,” Toronto Sun, March 16, 2021.

What Should the FTC Do about State & Local Barriers to Sharing Economy Innovation?

Adam Thierer — Tue, 12 May 2015 20:21:02 +0000

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^{^[5]}

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . . In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7] In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1] See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2] Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3] Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets: Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4] Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5] Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6] Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7] Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8] Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9] Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10] See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name: Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11] Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12] Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13] North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14] Id.

[15] Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16] See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17] See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18] North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19] Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20] Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21] Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases. It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22] Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23] FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24] See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

New Paper on “A History of Cronyism & Capture in the Information Technology Sector”

Adam Thierer — Tue, 02 Jul 2013 13:48:02 +0000

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012. The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

DC’s LivingSocial Cronyism Experiment Already Going off the Rails

Adam Thierer — Thu, 29 Nov 2012 15:48:34 +0000

In July 2012, the D.C. Council approved the Social E-Commerce Job Creation Tax Incentive Act of 2012. The deal provided LivingSocial, a popular online coupon service, with corporate and property tax exemptions in Washington, D.C. worth approximately $32.5 million over five years beginning in 2015. Legislators feared that LivingSocial would relocate to areas with a lower tax rate. In exchange for the $32.5 million, LivingSocial said it would attempt to add 1,000 employees to its payroll (roughly doubling its number of employees in the District), although no contractual guarantee for job creation exists and even though the firm had never been profitable. Some of the few contractual obligations required for LivingSocial to receive these tax exemptions are that it must establish a program to mentor D.C. high school students, provide internships for D.C. students, and stay located in the District. LivingSocial must also ensure 50% of newly hired employees live in the District in order to receive the Act’s full $32.5 million in exemptions.

Just a few months after the deal was struck it had already become apparent just how risky of a bet the DC government has made with taxpayer dollars. In late November 2012, LivingSocial announced a net loss of $566 million for the third quarter and that hundreds of employees would be laid off. The promise to roughly doubling the size of its DC-based workforce seems fairly unlikely and some analysts doubt the company will survive much longer.

This serves as another case study for just how foolish it is for governments to make risky, taxpayer-backed bets on information tech companies. Sadly, it’s not the only case study in this regard. In a forthcoming white paper, Brent Skorup and I will be documenting the troubling rise of high-tech cronyism across America. Motorola, Apple, Facebook, Twitter, Groupon, film studios, video game makers, and many other information technology companies are lining up with hat in hand and asking for handouts or special favors from state and local governments. Tax credits and other tax code-based inducements (such as tax rebates) are being tapped increasingly by state and local lawmakers who hope to encourage investment by these companies.

This cronyist activity is troubling for many reasons. As Brent and I will argue, tax credits and other benefits for digital technology companies are particularly misguided since (a) the most successful companies certainly don’t need them; and (b) the smaller companies or startups that might benefit from them today probably present a very risky investment for taxpayers. Many of these companies may be here today but gone tomorrow. That appears it could be the case for LivingSocial.

Tax credits can also become a time-consuming morass for innovators and distract them from the entrepreneurial activities they should be focused on. A recent Wall Street Journal report noted that “many companies are saying ‘no, thanks’ and are likely paying more taxes than legally required,” because “the tax deductions are either too cumbersome or too confusing. In some cases, the cost of obtaining the tax benefit is greater than the benefit itself.”

Policymakers should leave such risky investments to venture capitalists and others so that taxpayers are not on the hook when things go off the rails, just as they already have in DC with LivingSocial. Generally speaking, the best industrial recruitment / retention efforts are simple rules, low taxes, and light-touch regulation. That’s how to attract and retain a base of serious high-tech innovators without putting taxpayers at risk when things go wrong as they so often will in this sector.

Update: Shortly after I posted this piece I was contacted by representatives of the D.C. Mayor’s office asking me to clarify for readers that LivingSocial cannot claim any of these tax benefits unless it has 1,000 employees in city and unless it creates a 200,000 sq. ft. headquarters inside the District. They also asked me to again stress (as I noted in the opening paragraph) that these benefits will not begin until 2015-16. The exact terms of the deal can be found in the first link provided above (click the bill name).

In theory, such strings and stipulations could help the DC government escape this mess before it becomes an embarrassing fiasco for the city, but I would argue that they should not be putting taxpayers at risk like this to begin with. Moreover, while more strings might seem to provide greater accountability, added requirements and red tape also create more hassle and costs for firms. As I noted in my essay, that can affect future innovation and entrepreneurialism. Special deals for risky tech ventures remains unwise public policy.

The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy [slideshow]

Adam Thierer — Sun, 18 Nov 2012 17:26:40 +0000

Here’s a presentation I delivered on “The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy” at the latest meeting of the Southern Economic Association this weekend. It outlines concerns about vertical integration in the tech economy and specifically addresses regulatory proposals set forth by Tim Wu (arguing for a “separations principle” for the tech economy) & Jonathan Zittrain (arguing for “API neutrality” for social media and digital platforms). This presentation is based on two papers published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University: “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (with Brent Skorup) & “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.”

The Best Paper on Antitrust that You Will Read This Year

Adam Thierer — Thu, 06 Sep 2012 14:41:14 +0000

Ronald Cass, Dean Emeritus of Boston University School of Law, has penned the best paper on antitrust regulation that you will read this year, especially if you’re interested in the relationship between antitrust and information technology sectors. His paper is entitled, “Antitrust for High-Tech and Low: Regulation, Innovation, and Risk,” and it makes two straightforward points:

Antitrust enforcement has characteristics and risks similar to other forms of regulation.
Antitrust authorities need to exercise special care in making enforcement decisions respecting conduct of individual dominant firms in high-technology industries.

Here are some highlights from the paper that build on those two points.

Antitrust Is Economic Regulation & Carries Many of the Same Risks

As I noted in my 2009 review of Gary Reback’s antitrust screed “Free the Market,” there are few things that frustrate me more than the myth that antitrust is somehow not a form of economic regulation. I hear this tired old argument trotted out time and time again, even by many conservatives. It’s utter bunk. Cass makes that abundantly clear in his paper. “Application of antitrust laws by government officials… has the same risks and problems associated with other forms of regulation, including other “fair play” regulations,” notes Cass. “It requires considerable information on how particular firms and particular markets work, on the effect of particular business practices, and on the costs and benefits of intervening to stop a particular practice as opposed to allowing market forces to limit its effects,” he says (p. 6-7).

Cass isn’t the only one who has made this point. As James Miller notes in this Federalist Society video (starting around the 18-minute mark), antitrust is not just a form of regulation but it often takes the form of a industrial policy scheme, complete with all its failings. Rick Rule agrees, noting how antitrust is a specialized form of regulation. Cass also appeared at that event and, starting around the 36-minute mark, makes his case for antitrust as just another form of regulation. If you want to watch the entire panel discussion, I’ve embedded the video down below.

Information Technology Markets are Highly Dynamic; Antitrust Can Hurt High-Tech Innovation

The more important takeaway from Cass’s excellent paper is that, precisely because antitrust regulation is haunted by many of the same problems as traditional economic regulatory controls, it is particularly ill-suited for fast-paced, rapidly-evolving information technology markets. “The problem arises in part because, while the concerns over network effects are dynamic, the principal tools for antitrust analysis – especially respecting definition of the relevant market – are static,” Cass observes. “These tools almost inevitably orient enforcers’ decisions toward excessive concern with one part of what, rightly understood, is a much larger competitive picture, even though the composition of the larger picture is difficult to predict. (p. 3) “Rather than demonstrating special caution in venturing into this set of cases, however, antitrust enforcers seem anxious to engage the leading high-technology firms while markets are evolving at a rapid pace,” he notes. (p. 2) Such intervention is particularly unwise, Cass argues, because:

These are markets where it is particularly difficult to maintain dominance, where sustained leadership over some time frame most likely indicates strong efficiencies (strong consumer value), and where innovations that are not yet recognized as significant can offer the strongest constraints on dominant firm behavior and the most important challenges to crafting a meaningful remedy that does more than disadvantage an individual contestant in a changing world. (p. 35)

The real danger of excessive antitrust is how it can force innovators to take their eye off the ball and spend more time trying to please policymakers than the general public. Cass notes:

If successful firms trying to stay on top in industries that can change rapidly and unpredictably often become targets for antitrust scrutiny, rational calculations of innovation costs (investments that help firms succeed) will necessarily include the (discounted) cost of contesting antitrust challenges as well as the costs of directly pursuing innovation. Antitrust inquiries can exact extraordinarily high costs from target firms, both in direct expenditures and in distraction from core business operations. That is true even for inquiries that do not result in suits, as enterprises facing the possibility of a long, expensive lawsuit (and, if the suit is lost, a potentially expensive and disruptive remedy) obviously will respond by trying both to persuade enforcement authorities that their conduct has been lawful and to avoid conduct that will increase the prospect of an action being filed. (p. 10)

Cass identifies IBM’s 13-year long antitrust ordeal as “the paradigmatic case for ill-conceived antitrust enforcement” where all these problems where on display. During the 13-year case, the government collected more than 750 million documents and required IBM to retain 200 attorneys at one point. (Read CNet staff writer Rachel Konrad’s summary of the fiasco from back in 2000). The DOJ finally abandoned the case in 1982 after it became clear how markets had evolved around whatever earlier “dominance” IBM had in mainframe markets. Namely, the desktop PC and software revolution had passed IBM (and clueless antitrust regulators) right by. “In the end,” notes Cass, “the case stands for the proposition that government officials, even with the benefit of extensive investigation and expertise, are unlikely to appreciate the most important sources of competition to enterprises that dominate a particular market and are especially prone to ill-advised interventions based on theoretical objections to market structure.” (p. 16) Worse yet, he notes, was the impact on IBM’s ability to innovate:

More significant than the draw on IBM’s funds were two other byproducts of the antitrust litigation: the distraction of its executives from planning and executing functions necessary to IBM’s long-term business interests, and the active discouragement of decisions that would have benefited the business but might have triggered further antitrust action. (p. 15)

As Peter Pitsch noted in his 1996 PFF book The Innovation Age, “In 1981 the Department of Justice was still pressing their case against IBM while market forces were about to lay waste to the company.” Pitsch noted that IBM’s manufacturing capacity was slashed in the years that followed and also notes that, astonishingly, “in the space of five years after 1987, IBM lost two thirds of its market value — more than $70 billion.” IBM has recovered and is a very different company today, of course. Yet, it seems clear that the DOJ’s antitrust industrial policy scheming decimated the firm’s chances of keeping pace with others digital technology leaders during the 80s and even 90s.

Cass notes that this same thing played out for Microsoft following its antitrust ordeal as the firm was forced to become extra cautious about how it innovated with regulators always staring over their shoulder. Yet, “it is plain that the real competitive threat to the company came from innovations that lay outside the market as government officials saw it,” Cass notes, since few were talking about search and social networking in the late 90s as a serious threat to Microsoft’s hegemony.

Lessons: Appreciate Dynamism and Be Careful about Market Definition

Cass leaves us with several lessons from the history he recounts. I’ll just cite a few passages here, but generally his lessons can be boiled down to: (1) before intervening, appreciate just how dynamic these information technology markets can be; and, relatedly, (2) be very careful about how you define markets for purposes of antitrust analysis. He notes, for example:

With this in mind, the overarching caution to antitrust enforcers that emerges from the cases reviewed above is against presuming that the obvious, common-sense boundaries around a market… appropriately set the field of vision for antitrust enforcement (much less the artificially circumscribed market definitions that enforcers will urge when a case has been initiated). The market boundaries that so often are taken for granted frequently fail to capture the most important sources of competition. That is true even in markets as “old-line” and seemingly simple as the auto market, but it is even more likely to be true in high-technology industries where, almost by definition, new innovations will revise established assumptions about how things are done. The market definition problem reflects more than the fact that officials so frequently cannot see changes coming that will dramatically alter competitive conditions in an industry. Almost no one, even those most intimately engaged in the industry itself, is apt to make good predictions about which technologies will succeed or what the ultimate scope of a new technology will be. (p. 28-9)
The more trenchant flaw in antitrust enforcement is not officials’ failure to identify specific market changes or specific companies that will dramatically rise or fall in value. Rather, the larger problem is that it is exceedingly difficult for government officials to discern the critical factors that explain what actually makes a particular firm dominant, the factors that affect the durability of dominance, or the kinds of change in the market (either on the demand side or the supply side) that could dramatically erode that dominance. (p. 28)
Despite the networks they have established, each of these businesses also is notable for the relative ease with which consumers can switch from one provider (or one technology) to another – allowing consumers to substitute one product or service for another or, in many cases, to add additional products or services from multiple providers at minimal or zero cost. (p. 31)

These lessons and themes have motivated all my thinking about how information technology policy should be formulated and the (very limited) role that antitrust regulation should play. Just about every other installment of my weekly Forbes column has dealt with such issues, including most notably these essays:

“Tech Titans & Schumpeter’s Vision,” (8/22/11)
“No One Owns A Techno Crystal Ball” (10/2/11)
“The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy” (6/29/12)
“Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” (4/1/12)
“Regulatory, Antitrust and Disruptive Risks Threaten Apple’s Empire” (4/8/12)
“Searching In Vain For An Antitrust Case Against Google” (6/30/12)
“Sunsetting Technology Regulation: Applying Moore’s Law to Washington” (3/25/12)

Anyway, please make sure to read the entire Cass paper. It’s a keeper. I know I will be citing it in virtually everything I write on the topic in coming months and years. In a follow-up post, I will offer a list of other important papers on antitrust and high-tech markets that you want to have on your reading list.

On Fast Firms, Slow Regulators, Antitrust & the Digital Economy

Adam Thierer — Fri, 06 Jul 2012 19:15:30 +0000

I liked the title of this new Cecilia Kang article in the Washington Post: “In Silicon Valley, Fast Firms and Slow Regulators.” Kang notes:

As federal regulators launch fresh investigations into Silicon Valley, their history of drawn-out cases has companies on edge. In taking on an industry that moves at lightening speed, federal officials risk actions that could appear to be too heavy-handed or embarrassingly outdated, some analysts and antitrust experts say.

For example, she cites ongoing regulatory oversight of Microsoft and MySpace, even though both companies have fallen from the earlier King of the Hill status in their respective fields. Kang notes that some “want the government to aggressively pursue abusive practices but question whether antitrust laws are too dated to rein in firms that are continually redefining themselves and using their dominance in one arena to press into others.”

Simply put, antitrust can’t keep up with an economy built on Moore’s Law, which refers to the rule of thumb that the processing power of computers doubles roughly every 18 months while prices remain fairly constant. This issue has been the topic of several of my Forbes columns over the past year, as well as several other essays I’ve written here and elsewhere. [See the list at bottom of this essay.] Moore’s Law has been a relentless regulator of markets and has helped keep the power of “tech titans” in check better than any Beltway regulator ever could. As I noted here before in my essay, “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset“:

modern tech markets are highly dynamic. There is no static end-state, “perfect competition,” or “market equilibrium” in today’s information technology marketplace. Change and innovation are chaotic, non-linear, and paradigm-shattering. Schumpeter said it best long ago when he noted how, “in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization… competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other,” he argued, because the “ever-present threat” of dynamic, disruptive change “disciplines before it attacks.”

Once we recognize the power of Moore’s Law to naturally regulate markets—and the corresponding danger of leaving Washington’s laws on the books too long—it should be clear why it is essential to align America’s legal and regulatory policies with the realities of modern tech markets. One way policymakers could do so, I argued in this old Forbes essay, is by literally applying the logic of Moore’s Law to all current and future laws and regulations through two simple principles:

Principle #1 – Every new technology proposal should include a provision sunsetting the law or regulation 18 months after enactment. Policymakers can always reenact the rule if they believe it is still sensible.
Principle #2 – Reopen all existing technology laws and regulations and reassess their worth. If no compelling reason for their continued existence can be identified and substantiated, those laws or rules should be repealed within 18 months. If a rationale for continuing existing laws and regs can be identified, the rule can be re-implemented and Principle #1 applied to it.

What should be the test for determining when technology laws and regulations are retained? That bar should be fairly high. Conjectural harms and boogeyman scenarios can’t be used in defense of new rules or the reenactment of old ones. Policymakers must conduct a robust cost-benefit analysis of all tech rules and then offer a clear showing of tangible harm or actual market failure before enactment or reenactment of any policy.

Of course, this doesn’t leave much room for antitrust law since it almost never moves that fast. But if you think that there is truth in Kang’s “Fast Firms, Slow Regulators” headline, what option do we have but to largely abandon the effort– especially when Moore’s Law and Schumpeterian “creative destruction” do such a better job of keep markets competitive and innovative?

Of course, some academic and regulatory activists like Columbia’s Tim Wu favor a very different sort of regime based on “agency threats” and a preemptive dismantling of the digital economy through the imposition of a “Separations Principle.” The Separations Principle would divide and strictly quarantine the various elements of the tech world — networks, devices, and content — such that vertical integration would become per se illegal. That’s certainly one way of dealing with the “Fast Firms, Slow Regulators” problem! Of course, it would handle that problem by essential decimating much of what makes the digital economy so dynamic and innovative. (I have a new paper coming out shortly that will documented why Wu’s remedy would be such a disaster in practice.)

In any event, it’s good that people are acknowledging that there is a problem here–that antitrust cannot keep pace with the pace of innovation we see in the tech economy–but we must be cautious that this insight does not lead to new or more destructive forms of regulatory adventurism. As I noted in last week’s Forbes column, “The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy,” there exists a tendency among many to take static snapshots of a sector at any given time and then leap to conclusions about “market power” or “oligopoly.” But competition is a process, not an end-point, and a more sophisticated understanding of the digital economy recognizes how often the borders between sectors are blurred or obliterated by dynamic, disruptive change. Churn is rampant and relentless. Thus, short-term measures of market power are often meaningless since firms can get very big very fast, but they can stumble and fall just as rapidly.

Anyway, if you care to read the very best papers written recently on this topic, you’ll want to check out:

Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, “Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust,” George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-54, February 16, 2010.
J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, “Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,” 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2009).
Thomas Hazlett, David Teece, Leonard Waverman, “Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, (November 21, 2011), No. 11-50.
Bruce Owen, “Antitrust and Vertical Integration in ‘New Economy’ Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (November 2010).
Daniel F. Spulber, “Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(4), 915 (2008).
Richard Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 927 (2001).
Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin, “A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories,” in Jerry Ellig (ed.), Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 16-44.

Als0 make sure to check out these classic works from ‘Austrian School’ economists:

Israel Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (University of Chicago Press, 1985).
F.A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. & Mario J. Rizzo, “Competition and Discovery,” in The Economics of Time and Ignorance (London: Routledge, 1985, 1996).

Finally, here are a few other essays I have penned on this issue:

“The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy,” Forbes, June 29, 2012.
“Sunsetting Technology Regulation: Applying Moore’s Law to Washington,” Forbes, May 25, 2012.
“Of “Tech Titans” and Schumpeter’s Vision,” Forbes, August 22, 2011.
“Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” Forbes, April 1, 2012.
“Gary Reback’s Antitrust Love Letter,” Technology Liberation Front, September 20, 2009.
“What is “Optimal Interoperability”? A Review of Palfrey & Gasser’s’“Interop,’” Technology Liberation Front, June 11, 2012.

Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset

Adam Thierer — Mon, 16 Apr 2012 16:03:16 +0000

In this new Money Morning article, “The Antitrust Curse: What Apple Can Learn From Microsoft, IBM,” David Zeiler wonders whether the antitrust lawsuit filed against Apple and several book publishers by the U.S. Department of Justice last week could open the door to a broader case against Apple or, at a minimum, simply become a major distraction to the firm and it’s ability to innovate going forward. He uses IBM and Microsoft as case studies in this regard and notes that, “the problem with being in the DOJ’s gunsight is that it distracts management, makes the company hesitant to innovate, and blemishes the company’s public image. While antitrust woes may not have been entirely responsible for Microsoft and IBM ceding their dominant positions in tech, they were clearly a major factor,” he says. “And worse for Apple, the e-book case could be just the beginning.”

Quite right. I raised the same concern in my recent Forbes column,”Regulatory, Antitrust and Disruptive Risks Threaten Apple’s Empire,” which Zeiler was kind enough to quote in his essay. In that piece, I argued:

Even if Apple beats back [the eBooks] investigation, broader questions are being raised about the company’s power that could invite a much broader investigation. The danger for Apple is that antitrust becomes an omnipresent threat that must be factored into all ongoing business decisions. Antitrust is a particular danger to Apple because the firm is highly vertically integrated and that integration is the source of many of their innovations. As earlier tech titans like IBM and Microsoft learned, when antitrust hangs like the Sword of Damocles, every decision about how to evolve and innovate becomes a calculated gamble.

Regarding the earlier impact that antitrust Sword of Damocles had on Microsoft, Zeiler unearthed this terrific 2005 quote from Mark Kroese, a general manager of information services at the Microsoft Network, who described the impact of the MS antitrust case on innovation at the firm as follows: “Working at Microsoft today vs. five years ago is different,” Kroese said. “If anyone thinks the antitrust case hasn’t slowed us down, you’re wrong. If I want to meet with a products manager for Windows, there needs to be three lawyers in the room. We have to be so careful, we err on the side of caution. We are on such a fine line of conduct.” Regarding how antitrust chilled IBM, Zeiler cites veteran tech journalist Steve Wildstrom of Tech.pinions who noted, “Twelve years of litigation were an enormous distraction in a time of rapid technological and business change. IBM management became cautious and over-lawyered, constantly looking over its shoulder-a condition that persisted for years after the case ended. The antitrust case was almost certainly a major cause of the serious decline of IBM in the late 1980s and early 90s,” Wildstrom said.

Of course, it is impossible to scientifically determine to what degree antitrust harassment contributed to either IBM or Microsoft’s inability to innovate and adapt to the rapidly changing market conditions. And let’s be clear: both IBM and MS have found ways to rebound and innovate in other ways. But one wonders what was lost in the process as the threat of antitrust constantly loomed and potentially chilled innovative efforts that could have kept both firms on the cutting-edge.

It’s not just Apple that faces similar threats today. Google is obviously another company increasingly mentioned as an antitrust target. Commenting of the dangers of a potential case against Google, Bernstein Research senior analyst Carlos Kirjner argues that “even if regulatory proceedings come to naught, the process has the potential, in the most extreme circumstances, to consume so much of the company’s energy that it can lead to important strategic missteps: many believe that Microsoft missed the boat on the Internet, and IBM on the importance of the personal computer, in large part because their management teams were focused on defending against the DoJ’s antitrust efforts.”

The better approach to disciplining tech firms and markets is to rely less on intervention and more on Schumpeter’s “perennial gales of creative destruction,” which are blowing harder than ever in our modern high-tech economy. In markets built largely upon binary code and governed by Moore’s Law, the pace and nature of change has become hyper-Schumpeterian: unrelenting and utterly unpredictable. Innovative risk-takers are constantly shaking things up and displacing yesterday’s lumbering, lethargic giants. Just ask some of the players that have been largely left in the dust, including AOL, AltaVista, MySpace, Palm, and others. Of course, there’s my favorite recent case study: Research In Motion’s BlackBerry smartphone. As I noted in my recent column, “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” BlackBerry was virtually synonymous with “smartphones” and was considered one of the tech titans that seemed destined to dominate for many years to come. But now the BlackBerry’s days appear numbered and its parent company Research In Motion Ltd. is struggling for its very survival.

Too many tech industry pundits today ignore these dynamic realities and instead rely a myopic analytical approach to the information economy that is fundamentally static in character. Many static equilibrium scholars in both the legal and economic profession tend to adopt a snapshot view of markets and innovation. Such critics often express an overly nostalgic view of the technological past while adopting an excessively gloomy view of the present and the chances for future progress.

But, a la Schumpeter, modern tech markets are highly dynamic. There is no static end-state, “perfect competition,” or “market equilibrium” in today’s information technology marketplace. Change and innovation are chaotic, non-linear, and paradigm-shattering. Schumpeter said it best long ago when he noted how, “in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization… competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other,” he argued, because the “ever-present threat” of dynamic, disruptive change “disciplines before it attacks.”

By contrast, the static equilibrium mindset is myopically fixated on short-term market share and price competition while ignoring “competition for innovation,” which is what matters most in the more dynamic Schumpeterian model. “Schumpeterian competition is primarily about active, risk-taking decision makers who seek to change their parameters,” note economists Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin. “It is about continually destroying the old economic structure from within and replacing it with a new one.” Thus, while static or “perfect competition” models assume away innovation and are preoccupied with equilibrium, dynamic models revolve around disequilibrium and assume that the only constant is change. What is most important to economic progress, therefore, is the ongoing process of constant experimentation and spontaneous discovery that allows new business models and organizational structures to emerge in response to market signals.

The other danger of the static equilibrium mindset is that the same new innovators and innovations that obtain success and scale quite rapidly as a result of this process are sometimes thought to possess problematic market power. Accusations of “monopoly” quickly follow. As Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase noted, “if an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent,” he argued. Of course, non-economists are just as likely—perhaps more likely—to make that same error. This is why a short-term fixation on market share and market power is so problematic.

Moreover, as Schumpeter also taught us, it is essential that uneven entrepreneurial gains be tolerated so that innovation can occur and be continuously incentivized. Economies need innovators to take risks because progress is born from it. Penalizing the risk-takers by trying to “level the playing field” through rash regulation or antitrust interventions will simply sap the entrepreneurial spirit from the marketplace, limit technological innovation, and diminish the possibility of progress and prosperity over the long-haul.

If you’d like a better understanding of this dynamic conception of competition and an explanation of why the static equilibrium mindset — especially in the antitrust field — is so horribly misguided, then I strongly recommend you begin your investigation with the following readings:

Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin, “A Taxonomy of Dynamic Competition Theories,” in Jerry Ellig (ed.), Dynamic Competition and Public Policy: Technology, Innovation, and Antitrust Issues (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001).
J. Gregory Sidak & David J. Teece, “Dynamic Competition in Antitrust Law,” 5 Journal of Competition Law & Economics (2009).
Geoffrey A. Manne & Joshua D. Wright, “Innovation and the Limits of Antitrust,” George Mason Law & Economics Research Paper No. 09-54, February 16, 2010.
Joshua D. Wright, “Antitrust, Multi-Dimensional Competition, and Innovation: Do We Have an Antitrust-Relevant Theory of Competition Now?” (August 2009).
Thomas Hazlett, David Teece, Leonard Waverman, “Walled Garden Rivalry: The Creation of Mobile Network Ecosystems,” George Mason University Law and Economics Research Paper Series, (November 21, 2011), No. 11-50.
Bruce Owen, “Antitrust and Vertical Integration in ‘New Economy’ Industries,” Technology Policy Institute (November 2010).
Daniel F. Spulber, “Unlocking Technology: Antitrust and Innovation,” Journal of Competition Law & Economics, 4(4), 915 (2008).
Richard Posner, “Antitrust in the New Economy,” 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 925, 927 (2001).

Also make sure to check out these classic works from Austrian School economists:

Israel Kirzner, Discovery and the Capitalist Process (University of Chicago Press, 1985).
F.A. Hayek, “Competition as a Discovery Procedure,” in New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and the History of Ideas (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1978).
Gerald P. O’Driscoll, Jr. & Mario J. Rizzo, “Competition and Discovery, in The Economics of Time and Ignorance (London: Routledge, 1985, 1996).

Did Antitrust Really Make a Difference in Major High-Tech Cases?

Adam Thierer — Mon, 10 Jan 2011 19:46:49 +0000

The Technology Policy Institute has released an interesting new study from Robert Crandall and Charles Jackson on “Antitrust in High-Tech Industries,” which takes a close look at the impact of antitrust law in the three most high-profile technology cases of the last half century: IBM, AT&T and Microsoft. Crandall and Jackson conclude:

In each of our three cases, the ultimate source of major changes in the competitive landscape appears to have been innovation and new technology — technology that was apparently not unleashed by the antitrust litigation. In each case, the government did not and probably could not see how technology would develop over time. Therefore, it was difficult for the government to design remedies that would accelerate competition when this competition developed from new technologies.

I enjoyed the paper and encourage others to read the entire thing. It’s very much in line with what we’ve written here in the past on the antitrust and high-tech markets. See, for example, my review of Gary Reback’s recent book on antitrust and high-tech markets. As I noted there, the crucial, ‘conflict of visions‘ issue comes down to an appreciation for dynamic competition and technological evolution over the sort of static competition, fixed-pie mindset that so many antitrust defenders espouse. Those of us who believe in dynamic competition see markets in a constant state of flux and expect that sub-optimal market developments or configurations are exactly the spark that incentivizes new form of market entry, innovation, technological disruption, price competition, and so on. But the static competition crowd looks at the same situation and imagines that the only hope is to wheel in the wrecking ball of antitrust regulation since they have little faith that things might change for the better. Moreover, they ignore the profound costs associated with such regulation and litigation. Crandall and Jackson’s paper explains why patience is the better policy.

Net Neutrality, Slippery Slopes & High-Tech Mutually Assured Destruction

Berin Szoka — Fri, 23 Oct 2009 15:45:17 +0000

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=21520140&access_key=key-19drbeeuatgv35za6chl&page=1&version=1&viewMode=list

Broadband as a Human Right (and a short list of other things I am entitled to on your dime)

Adam Thierer — Thu, 15 Oct 2009 04:35:18 +0000

Hey people. You owe me. All of you. You owe me free broadband. I am entitled to it, after all. That seems to be where our current FCC is heading, anyway. And hey, Finland’s just done it, and the supposed Silicon Valley capitalists at TechCrunch are giddy with delight about it. We’re apparently all just Scandinavian socialists at heart now.

Thus, I too have decided to throw in the towel on the idea of everyone carrying their own weight and picking up their own tab. So, get your wallets open and ready for me because I have lots and lots of things that I believe I have an inalienable right to receive free of charge from the government (i.e, “the people”; i.e., “YOU”). Please let me know which of the things on my high-tech wish list that you’ll be purchasing for me and I’ll check you off my registry so I don’t have to send the cops to your house to collect:

free broadband (fiber, Wi-Max, and whatever else is around the corner);
a couple of free new computers (and a really fast ones, thank you very much);
3 new HDTVs for my home (including one of those sweet new DLP projectors that usually cost about $10,000 bucks. And I’ll need you to pay for someone to help me install it. Or could you just come over and do that for me perhaps?);
3 free new DVRs for each new TV set that you are buying me (and could I get a nice universal remote to control everything, please);
a free subscription in my area to either DirecTV, Cox Cable, or Verizon FIOS TV (with all the premium channels and sports packages… and don’t forget the Playboy Channel!);
a free lifetime subscription to Netflix (or I guess I would settle for a free Blu-Ray player and some free movies);
free new wi-fi router and signal extenders for my home (N-standard please, none of that B or G garbage… too slow for me);
free mobile phone service for life + an iPhone + unlimited downloads in their app store (oh, could you have that iPhone autographed by Steve Jobs if you get a chance?);
free Playstation or XBox + lots of games (and if I could get one of those driving wheels to play my new Gran Turismo game that would be dandy); and finally,
free lifetime tech support when all this crap breaks down.

In closing, I thank you for your generosity. I mean, look, I know I don’t actually deserve any of this stuff, and that there’s no good reason that you should have to pay for my free-riding ways, and there’s obviously nothing in our Constitution to support all this, but hey… screw all that! This is my God-given birthright. I am entitled, baby! Now get busy thinking of how you are all going to start paying for me, you selfish bastards.

Apple, Spotify & the Threat of FCC High-Tech Regulation

Adam Thierer — Wed, 23 Sep 2009 14:06:37 +0000

Over at TechDirt, Mike Masnick has an interesting post asking “Why Did Apple Approve Spotify?” which builds on an AdAge column asking a similar question: “Did Apple Sacrifice ITunes With Latest Apps?” As the title of that AdAge piece suggests, some folks are wondering if Apple shot itself in the foot by approving Spotify, a music streaming app that some regard as a potential iTunes killer. I don’t really have any comment on the business angle here, rather, I wanted to just comment on Mike’s suggestion that one possible explanation for Apple’s approval of the app is that:

As we noted when the app was approved, Apple appears to be somewhat gunshy, following the FCC inquiry into why it “blocked” Google Voice on the iPhone (and, yes, Apple still insists it didn’t actually block the app, but Google says otherwise). Given the scrutiny, Apple probably realized that it was in for some serious political trouble if it blocked an app like Spotify, which would have received a lot of press attention. Oddly, the AdAge article doesn’t mention this at all.

Indeed, it is odd that AdAge didn’t bother mentioning that fact. But what I find doubly odd here is that nobody is even blinking an eye at the prospect of such political meddling with — or even possible FCC regulation of — Apple, iTunes, or music streaming market in general! Seriously, have we gotten to the point now in our Bold New World of Neutrality Regulation that innovative high-tech companies must live in fear of constant regulatory intervention even when they completely lack any statutory authority to play these games? Moreover, does anyone think that the a bunch of Beltway bureaucrats can micro-manage music and high-tech application markets and give us more options than we have today?

I know the prospect of such meddling makes some academics and regulatory activists groups happy, but I can’t see how this ends well for consumers or high-tech markets more generally. Regardless, for those of you who laugh when we suggest that the slippery slope of regulation is real, consider this case to be Exhibit A. Or perhaps it’s Exhibit B since the Google Voice spat with Apple was already moving the FCC in the direction of becoming a device regulator and applying “handset neutrality” principles that have no basis in law. It’s your anything-goes government at work.

The Fiction of Forced Access “Competition” Revisited

Adam Thierer — Mon, 14 Sep 2009 00:12:57 +0000

In a past life — that is, from roughly 1994-2004 — I spent an enormous amount of time countering the proponents of “open access” regulation for communications and high-tech networks. My work in that field culminated in the publication of a 2003 book with my old Cato colleague Wayne Crews entitled, What’s Yours is Mine: Open Access & the Rise of Infrastructure Socialism. We aimed to counter the efforts of bureaucrats and central planners to command technology companies and industry sectors to share networks, facilities, or specific technologies with rivals in the name of “competition.” Simply stated, sharing is not competing, and competition in the creation of networks is just as important as competition in the goods, services, and information that move across those networks. Moreover, there are property right considerations that come into play when governments seek to commandeer networks or take over network management decisions.

But let’s just stick to the economic issue here regarding the incentives created by the network-sharing mentality of the “forced access” movement and the fiction associated with the belief that network sharing can create competition. My old PFF colleague Randy May, who currently serves as President of the Free State Foundation, continues to cover developments in this field far closer than I do, and has always done much better work on the subject than me. Recently, Randy addressed some new fictions put forth by the radical Leftist activity group, the (Un-)Free Press who are, once again, spinning a revisionist history of telecom and media policy. Specifically, Free Press has recently suggested that in the late 1990s we lived in a veritable communications nirvana, with thousands of Internet Service Providers and/or “competitive exchange carriers” hotly “competing” for our business. Here’s how Randy May addresses this:

Let’s assume for the sake of argument that the 6000 figure for the number of independent ISPs is an indisputable fact. Nevertheless, I would not want the FCC’s development of a broadband plan to be “data driven” (in the wrong way) by this particular data point. Rather, I would want commissioners to understand that the 6000 ISPs existed merely at the sufferance of an agency policy of “managed competition” through regulated common carrier resale, and that such a “managed competition” policy does not provide incentives either for the incumbent providers to upgrade their networks or for the so-called “competitors” actually to build out their own network facilities. And I would want them to understand that, in the long run, which is what matters, consumers benefit more from facilities-based competition that supports sustainable competition than from managed resale that does not support sustainable competition.

As usual, Randy gets it exactly right. Of course, it is certainly true that if you don’t give a damn about facilities-based innovation and the growth of networks at the core, not just the periphery, then forced access regulation may seem preferable. If you want to treat the provision of broadband as a “plain vanilla” commoditized service, with just a basic level of service available from dozens of “competitors,” then forced access can maintain the illusion of “a market” for a time. Indeed, this is essential what many foreign governments are still doing today; squeezing as much juice out of the old lemons as possible and hoping for a miracle when infrastructure upgrades are needed. Some supporters of this regulatory model will say that government can always just pass a big tax increase or use a massive government outlay for new services, or something along those lines. But even if you think government spending on high-tech infrastructure is the sensible way to go — and it certainly doesn’t seem to be going so well these days — you still have to hope that government bureaucrats will do a better job of directing investments and innovation than private network managers. Again, if you can believe in that fairy tale, then forced access is just your ticket. But don’t be surprised when the bubble bursts and investment dries up. [For the complete story on how all this unfolded here in the U.S. over the past decades, see Jeff Eisenach’s PFF paper, “Broadband Policy: Does the U.S. Have It Right After All?”]

Of course, these battles live on with the Net neutrality wars as the forced access crowd seeks to assert more government control over broadband networks by regulating terms of service or even price (see 1, 2, 3, 4). I’ve become quite convinced that we’ll always have these forced access fights with us. The network or service in question might change — broadband networks, operating systems, search engines, whatever — but the battle about control over digital technologies and networks will continue. Here’s hoping that real Internet freedom prevails.

Antitrust Law Can’t Keep Up with High-Tech

Adam Thierer — Thu, 30 Jul 2009 01:13:05 +0000

A key point that Berin and I try to get across in our Forbes editorial today about the Yahoo!-Microsoft deal is that the high-tech marketplace evolves too rapidly for creaky Analog Era antitrust laws to keep up. We wanted to say more on that point in our piece, but we had a tight deadline (and a strict word limit!) Well, turns out that we really don’t need to do so now because Farhad Manjoo of Slate has done a better job than we ever could have making that point in this essay today entitled, “The Case Against the Case Against Google“:

But if the government was right on the facts [in the Microsoft case], it was wrong on the big picture. The theory behind the prosecution was that Microsoft’s mobster tactics would raise the price of software and slow down innovation. But that didn’t happen. In 2002, Microsoft settled the antitrust case with the Bush administration; it faced no substantial penalties for its years of bad behavior. At that point, it still looked unbeatable—it had the same OS monopoly, office-software monopoly, and Web-browser monopoly. And you know what happened? It got beat anyway. Many of Microsoft’s assets turned out not to matter, because upstarts like Google and old foes like Apple found ways to innovate around them.

Indeed, in many ways Microsoft’s size was a liability, not an asset. This is the classic innovator’s dilemma; the company was so intent on protecting its cash cows—it derives most of its revenue from two products, Windows and Office—that it was blind to opportunities in new markets. Microsoft couldn’t make a Web e-mail system like Gmail, because that would have threatened Outlook. And why should Microsoft bother with free online word processing apps when Office was doing so well? When journalist Steven Levy showed Bill Gates the first iPod, Gates’ first reaction was, “It’s only for Macintosh?” Gates saw the iPod through the lens of desktop computers; if the iPod connected only to Macs, it didn’t pose a threat to Microsoft. What he didn’t figure out was that the iPod would herald the iTunes Store, allowing Apple to become not only the most influential entertainment company in the world, but also the dominant software maker for mobile devices. Yes, the first iPod didn’t work on Windows. In time, it would help render Windows irrelevant.

Exactly right. Antitrust advocates have often failed to appreciate that markets are evolutionary and dynamic, and when those markets are built upon code, the pace and nature of change becomes unrelenting and utterly unpredictable.

Googlephobia: Part 5 – Google at Ten & Its Competition

Berin Szoka — Thu, 11 Sep 2008 22:30:51 +0000

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer

As we noted in our intro to this ongoing series, Google’s tenth anniversary has passed with Googlephobia reaching new heights of hysteria.

But is Google really too big and dangerous, or are people just too lazy to find other alternatives to each of the wonderful services that Google offers? If one is truly paranoid about the firm’s supposed dominance, it doesn’t take much effort to live a Google-free life. To prove it, we set out to find alternatives to each of the services that Google provides. After awhile, we got a little tired of compiling alternatives in each category and just provided links for the additional choices at your disposal. It’s tough to see what the fuss is about with the cornucopia of choices at our disposal. If you don’t like Google, then just don’t use it or any of its services. The choice is yours.

In each case, we’ve listed Google first, even though Google may not be the market leader ( e.g., Google’s relatively unknown social network Orkut).

Search Engines

Google
Microsoft Live Search
Yahoo!
Ask.com
AltaVista
Cuil
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_search_engines

eMail

Google Gmail
MSN Hotmail
Apple .Mac/MobileMe
Yahoo!
AOL
others: www.emailaddresses.com/email_web.htm

Encyclopedia

Knol (Google)
Wikipedia
Citizendium
Microsoft Encarta
Britannica Online
World Book Online
others: www.surfnetkids.com/encyclopedia.htm

Instant Messaging

Google Talk
Yahoo Messenger
Windows Live Messenger (Microsoft)
AOL AIM
Jabber
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Instant_messaging#User_base

Web Browsers

Chrome (Google)
Firefox (Mozilla Foundation)
Internet Explorer (Microsoft)
Safari (Apple)
Opera
Flock
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_web_browsers

Social Networks

Orkut (Google) – (not popular in the U.S.)
Facebook
Myspace
Bebo
LinkedIn
Friendster
LiveJournal
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Social_network_service

Mapping

Google Maps
Microsoft Live Search Maps
MapQuest
WikiMapia
Google Earth
Virtual Earth (Microsoft)
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_online_map_services

Mobile Search / Portal Services

Video Hosting

YouTube (Google)
Google Video
Flickr (Yahoo!)
Yahoo Video
Vimeo
Photobucket
BlipTV
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_video_sharing_websites

Photohosting

Picasa (Google)
Flickr (Yahoo!)
Apple .Mac/MobileMe
Photobucket
Snapfish
Shutterfly
Imageshack
AOL Pictures
others: en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Photo_sharing#Online_photo_sharing_websites

Document / Spreadsheet Creation

Online File Storage

Google Docs
Windows Live SkyDrive (Microsoft)
Apple .Mac/MobileMe
Mozy
Buzzword (Adobe)
Xdrive
Box.net
others: http://www.listible.com/list/online-file-storage

Blog hosting services

Blogger (Google)
Wordpress
Windows Live Spaces (Microsoft)
Skyrock (based in France, but bigger than WordPress and almost as big as Blogger)
LiveJournal
Note: many social networking services also have a blogging component
others: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blog_hosting_service#Developer-hosted

RSS blog feed aggregators

Google Reader
My MSN
My Yahoo!
NewsGator Online
Bloglines
FeedBucket
others: dmoz.org/Computers/Software/Internet/Clients/WWW/Feed_Readers/Web_Based
others: www.newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

WebClipping Services

News Aggregators

Google News
Yahoo News
MSN News & MSNBC (Microsoft)
News Directory.com
Reuters
CNN.com
Digg
Topix
others: news.nettop20.com
others: newsonfeeds.com/faq/aggregators

Calendar Services

Googlephobia: The Series

Berin Szoka — Thu, 11 Sep 2008 20:51:49 +0000

By Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer as part of an ongoing series

With Google celebrating its 10th anniversary this week, many panicky pundits are using the occasion to claim that Google has become the Great “Satan” of the Internet. Nick Carr wonders what the future holds for “The OmniGoogle.” The normally level-headed Mike Malone worries that Google is “turning into Big Brother.” And Washington Post’s Rob Dubbin says that he can’t escape Google’s “tentacles,” even for just 24 hours. Meanwhile, speculation abounds that the Justice Department is preparing a major antitrust lawsuit against Google concerning its advertising partnership with Yahoo! or perhaps even a broader suit concerning Google’s “dominance” of online advertising generally.

Carr quotes Google co-founder Sergey Brin’s now-famous 2003 interview:

I think people tend to exaggerate Google’s significance in both directions. Some say Google is God. Others say Google is Satan. But if they think Google is too powerful, remember that with search engines, unlike other companies, all it takes is a single click to go to another search engine. People come to Google because they choose to. We don’t trick them.

In the last five years, Google has become far more than just a search engine. As Google’s suite of suite of complementary products continues to grow, so too does the specter of Google as an all-knowing and therefore all-powerful economic colossus. Yet Google isn’t even close to being the sort of nefarious monopolist out to destroy user privacy at every turn, as some seem to imply—if not exclaim. Indeed, in our view, the Net is overall a far better place because of the existence of Google and the many free services it provides consumers.

Our point is not that Google should be immune from criticism. Indeed, healthy criticism of corporate actions plays a vital role in the free market by disciplining corporate policies and behavior—often thus providing an effective alternative to government regulation. This is particularly important in the area of consumer privacy protection, as demonstrated by Google’s quick response to public concern about its Chrome EULA.

We hold no brief for Google and our aim is not to be Google apologists. In fact, we’ve had more than a few run-ins with Google on many important policy issues in the past ( e.g., on net neutrality, spectrum policy, and the need for “baseline Federal privacy legislation”) and will likely continue to do so in the future. We are always willing to engage serious, rational discussions about other policy issues involving Google, such as concerns about its alleged market power, but it seems to us that the hysteria about Google’s supposed dominance of the Internet is clouding rational discussion of the policy issues raised by Google, its innovations and its success. Indeed, the creeping paranoia about all things Google-related that is most evident throughout the blogosphere (but that reaches far beyond it) has produced an environment that resembles nothing so much as a lynch mob: Angry, short-tempered, out for corporate blood, and unwilling to engage in reasoned discussion.

The specter of Google’s market power driving—and confusing—so many of today’s Internet policy debates is reminiscent of the previous generation of conspiracy theories about how Microsoft, like the Borg (perhaps sci-fi’s scariest villains), would assimilate all in its path—forever controlling the digital revolution. We don’t want Google to become the victim of the same regulatory & antitrust ordeal that Microsoft has endured over the past decade, with the kind of hysterical claims of Chicken Little-ism that drove a ten-year crusade against Microsoft. Short-sighted, heavy-handed government intervention can cripple a creative company while doing little to actually benefit consumers because regulators cannot keep pace with technological change—perhaps the only constant fact in the every-changing digital world.

Of course, like all temporal things, Microsoft’s seemingly permanent “monopoly” has faded, and the bulk of the criticism it once faced has shifted focus to Google. Microsoft continues to be the subject of many unfair attacks because of its success (a/k/a “dominance”) in the OS, office product, and browser markets. Other companies have experienced similar attacks on a smaller scale: Facebook and the once-angelic Apple have both been subject to increasing criticism for their success in certain sectors of the digital economy, customer complaints about openness ( e.g., “locked” devices or portability of social networking data) and privacy policies. The hysteria surrounding Google is not unique in kind, yet it is clear that the mantle of “Great (digital) Satan” has clearly passed from Microsoft to Google.

Thus, we have decided to start a new series of essays on “Googlephobia” (a term that seems to have taken off in the spring of 2005, when the French government seriously proposed creating its own alternative to the Google search engine). We’ve already penned a few essays on the topic here (as have a number of our TLF colleagues) and, therefore, our next installment in the series will be #5—in which we will outline the many competitors to Google’s many products.

But here are a few of our past essays on the topic, which clearly belong on the list even though they weren’t part of a series at the time:

Market Forces At Work: The PR Backlash Against Google Chrome’s EULA, by Berin Szoka, September 4, 2008.
“Cry [Censorship] and Let Slip the Dogs of [Regulation]!” – A Lesson in the Dangers of Googlephobia, by Berin Szoka, July 14, 2008.
Google, California’s Privacy Policy Law & Our Sci-Fi Future, by Berin Szoka, June 4, 2008
Is Google Evil? The Never-Ending Search for High-Tech Villainy, by Adam Thierer, June 30, 2005.

And here’s an oldie on the same topic:

“Google as a Public Utility? No Results in This Search for Monopoly,” by Adam Thierer and Wayne Crews, November 14, 2003.