I’ve been floating around in conservative policy circles for 30 years and I have spent much of that time covering media policy and child safety issues. My time in conservative circles began in 1992 with a 9-year stint at the Heritage Foundation, where I launched the organization’s policy efforts on media regulation, the Internet, and digital technology. Meanwhile, my work on child safety has spanned 4 think tanks, multiple blue ribbon child safety commissions, countless essays, dozens of filings and testimonies, and even a multi-edition book.

During this three-decade run, I’ve tried my hardest to find balanced ways of addressing some of the legitimate concerns that many conservatives have about kids, media content, and online safety issues. Raising kids is the hardest job in the world. My daughter and son are now off at college, but the last twenty years of helping them figure out how to navigate the world and all the challenges it poses was filled with difficulties. This was especially true because my daughter and son faced completely different challenges when it came to media content and online interactions. Simply put, there is no one-size-fits-all playbook when it comes to raising kids or addressing concerns about healthy media interactions.

Something Must Be Done!

My personal approach, as I summarized in my book on these issues, was to first and foremost do everything in my power to (a) keep an open mind about new media content and platforms, and (b) ensure an open line of ongoing communication with my kids about the issues they might be facing. Shutting down conversation or calling for others to come in and save the day were the worst two options, in my opinion. As I summarized in my book, “At the end of the day, there is simply no substitute for talking to our children in an open, loving, and understanding fashion about the realities of-this world, including the more distasteful bits.” This was my Parental Prime Directive, if you will. I just always wanted to make sure that my kids felt like they could talk to me about their issues, no matter how varied, horrible, or heart-breaking those problems might be.

When talking with other parents through the years, I’ve heard about their own unique concerns and struggles. Every family faces different challenges because no two kids or situations are alike. Moreover, the challenges can feel overwhelming in our modern world of information abundance, which is flush with ubiquitous communications and media options. Sometimes these parental frustrations can fester and grow into a sort of rage until you finally hear folks utter that famous phrase: Something must be done! And that “something” is often some sort of government regulation “for the children.”

Again, I get it. When all your best efforts to help or protect your kids don’t seem to work according to plan, it’s only natural to call for help. But there are very serious problems associated with calling on government for that help. When legislators and regulators are asked to play the role of National Nanny, it comes with all the same baggage that accompanies many other efforts by the government to intervene in our lives or control what people or organizations can say or do.

Conservative Contradictions

These are particularly sensitive issues for many conservatives, both because conservatives tend to have more heightened concerns about media content and online safety issues, and also because the steps they often recommend to address these issues can quickly come into conflict with their own first principles.

Let me run through six ways that support for media content controls and child safety regulations can sometimes run afoul of conservative principles.

1) It’s a rejection of personal responsibility

Again, I understand all too well how hard parenting can be. But that does not mean we should abdicate our parental responsibilities to the State. Conservatives have spent decades fighting government when it comes to broken schools and the supposed brainwashing many kids get in them. The rallying cry of conservatives has long been: Let us have a greater say in how we raise and educate our children because the State is failing us or betraying our values.

Thus, when conservatives suggest that the State should be making decisions for us as it pertains to anything the government says is a “child safety” issue, there is some serious cognitive dissonance going on there. In his humorous Devil’s Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce jokingly defined responsibility as, “A detachable burden easily shifted to the shoulders of God, Fate, Fortune, Luck or one’s neighbor. In the days of astrology it was customary to unload it upon a star.” For parental responsibility to actually mean something, it has to be more than a “detachable burden” that we unload upon government.

2) It’s an embrace of the administrative state & arbitrary rule by unelected bureaucrats

Beyond the classroom, conservatives have long been concerned about the specter of massive administrative agencies and armies of unelected bureaucrats controlling our lives from the shadows. I’ve spent decades working with conservative organizations and scholars trying to get the administrative state under some control to scale back its enormous power, arbitrary edicts, and costly burdens. Over-criminalization has become such a problem that, according to the Heritage Foundation, “regulatory offenses… have proliferated to the point that, literally, nobody knows how many federal criminal regulations exist today.” We’re all criminals of some sort in the eyes of the modern regulatory state.

Yet, when conservatives advocate the expansion of the administrative state through new “online safety” regulations, they are just making the over-criminalization problem worse, including by treating our own children as guilty parties for simply trying to access the primary media platforms of their generation and interact with their friends there. For example, calls to ban all teens from social media until they’re 18 would result in the most massive “forbidden fruit” nightmare in American history, with every teen suddenly becoming a criminal actor and working together to tunnel around bans using the same sort of VPNs and evasion technologies people in China and other repressive nations use to get around over-bearing speech policies. [See: “Again, We Should Not Ban All Teens from Social Media”]

Needless to say, all this regulation and bureaucratic empowerment would have massive negative externalities for online freedom more generally as the era of “permissionless innovation” is replaced by a new age of permission-slip regulation.

3) It’s a rejection of the First Amendment & free speech rights

Conservatives have spent many decades pushing for greater First Amendment-based freedoms as it pertains to religious liberty and or organizational/corporate speech issues. Thus, when conservatives seek to undermine free speech principles and jurisprudence in the name of child safety, it could undo everything conservatives have been fighting to accomplish in those other contexts.

Conservatives are understandably upset with some social media platforms for being too over-zealous with certain types of speech takedowns or de-platformings. But two wrongs don’t make a right, and they should not be calling on Big Government to be imposing its own editorial judgments in place of private actors. [See: “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“ and “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer.“]

4) It’s a rejection of property rights and freedom more generally

Related to the previous two points, conservatives have long upheld the sanctity of property rights in many different contexts. This includes the property rights that private establishments enjoy under the Constitution to generally decide how to structure their operations, who they will do business with, and how they will do so. Private organizations and religious institutions possess not only free speech rights in this regard, but property and contractual rights, too.

But when it comes to “child safety” mandates, some conservatives would toss all this out the window and undermine those rights, replacing them with burdensome regulatory mandates that tell private parties how to conduct their affairs. Again, there’s a lot of cognitive dissonance going on here and it could have serious blowback for conservatives when the property / contractual rights of other people or organizations are undermined on similar grounds.

5) It’s an embrace of frivolous lawsuits & the trial lawyers that bring them

The last time I checked, trial lawyers were not exactly the most conservative-friendly constituency. For many decades, conservatives have looked to advance tort reform, limit junk science and frivolous lawsuits, and make sure that the courts don’t engage in excessive judicial activism.

Unfortunately, many of the child safety regulations being proposed today would empower the regulatory state and trial lawyers at the same time. Many of the bills being floated open the door to open-ended litigation and potentially punishing liability for private platforms — and not just against deep-pocketed “Big Tech” companies. The fact is, once conservatives open the litigation floodgates based on amorphous accusations of potential online safety harms, they will be empowering the tort bar (one of the biggest supporters of the Democratic Party, no less) to launch a legal jihad against any and every media platform out there. Good luck putting that genie back in the bottle once you unleash it.

6) It’s an embrace of the same moral panic arguments your parents leveled against you

How quickly we forget the accusations our own parents and others leveled against us as children. Remember when video games were going to make us a lost generation of murderous youth? Or when rap and rock-and-roll music were going to send us straight to hell? Today, those kids are all grown up and trying to tell us that they are fine but it’s this latest generation that is doomed. It’s just an endless generational cycle of moral panics. [See: “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?” and “Confessions of a ‘Vidiot’: 50 Years of Video Games & Moral Panics”] Today’s conservatives need to remember that they, too, were once kids and somehow muddled through to adulthood.

The “3-E” Approach Is the Better Answer

At this point, some of the people who’ve read this far are screaming at the screen: “So, are you saying we should just do nothing!?”

Absolutely not. But it is important that we consider less onerous and more practical ways to address these challenging issues without falling prey to Big Government gimmicks that would undermine other important principles. We should start by acknowledging that there are no easy fixes or silver-bullet solutions. The plain truth of the matter is that the best solutions here can seem messy and unsatisfying to many because they require enormous ongoing efforts to mentor and assist our kids at a far deeper level than some folks are comfortable with.

For example, it is just insanely uncomfortable to have to speak with your kids about online bullying or harassment, pornography, violence in movies and games, hate speech, and so on. And I haven’t even mentioned the hardest things to talk to kids about: The daily news of the real world: wars, violence, tragic accidents, famines, etc. Honestly, the hardest conversations I’ve had to have with my kids were those about school shootings. By comparison, many other discussions about online content and interactions were much easier. To the extent that we’re attempting to measure and address negative media affects, I firmly believe that there a few things in this world more horrifying to kids — or harder to talk with them about — than the first 10 minutes of what’s on cable news each hour of the day.

Regardless, whether we’re talking about the potential “harms” or mass media or online content, we cannot pretend there exists a simple solution to any of it. Here’s the better approach.

I recently authored a study for the American Enterprise Institute on, “Governing Emerging Technology in an Age of Policy Fragmentation and Disequilibrium.” It was my attempt to sketch out a flexible, pragmatic, bottom-up set of governance principles for modern technology platforms and issues. In that report, I noted how “[t]he First Amendment constitutes a particularly high barrier to the use of hard law in the United States,” and that court challenges were likely to continue to block many of the regulatory efforts being floated today, just as been the case countless times before in recent decades. Thus, we need to have backup approaches to online safety beyond one-size-fits-all regulatory Hail Mary passes.

I have described that backup plan as the “3-E” approach or “layered approach” to online safety:

• Empowerment of parents: Parental controls cannot solve all the world’s problems. It’s better to view them as helpful speed bumps or emergency alerts for when things are going badly for your child. In the old days, we placed a lot of faith in filtering, and that still has a role along with other tools that help place some reasonable limits not only on content but also overall consumption. But the best types of parental empowerment are those that force conversations between parents and kids by allowing reasonable monitoring to happen that is scaled by age (as in more limits for younger kids until they are gradually relaxed over time). And other carrot-and-stick tools and approaches are incredibly useful in helping parents place smart limits on youth activity and overall consumption.
• Education of youth: Education is the strategy with the most lasting impact for online safety. Education and digital literacy provide skills and wisdom that can last a lifetime. Specifically, education can help teach both kids (and adults!) how to behave in — or respond to — a wide variety of situations. Building resiliency and encouraging healthy interactions is the goal.
• Enforcement of existing laws: There are many sensible and straightforward laws already in place that address more concrete types of harm and harassment. And we have lots of laws pertaining to fraud and unfair and deceptive practices. Sometimes these rules can be challenging (and time-consuming) to enforce, but they constitute an existing backstop that can handle most worst-case scenarios when other less-restrictive steps fall short. And we should certainly tap these existing remedies before advancing unworkable new regulatory regimes.

I noted in my AEI study that, between 2000 and 2010, six major online-safety task forces or blue-ribbon commissions were formed to study online-safety issues and consider what should be done to address them. Each of them recommended some variant of the “3-E” approach as they encouraged a variety of best practices, educational approaches, and technological-empowerment solutions to address various safety concerns. Self-regulatory codes, private content-rating systems, and a wide variety of different parental-control technologies all proliferated during this period. Many multi-stakeholder initiatives and other organizations were also formed to address governance issues collaboratively. There are countless groups doing important work on this front today, including my old friends at the Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI) among many others.

These organizations push for a layered approach to online safety and work closely with educators, child development experts, and other academics and activists to find workable solutions to new online safety challenges as they arise. Their work is never done, and at times it can feel overwhelming. But, again, it’s the nature of the task at hand. We all must work together to continuously devise new and better approaches to addressing these challenges, because they will be endless. But let’s please not expect that we can unload these responsibilities on government and expect regulators to somehow handle it for us.

Do the Ends Justify the Means When it Comes to Media & Content Control?

I could be wasting my breath here because I’ve been attempting to appeal to conservative principles that may be rapidly disappearing from the modern conservative movement. Donald Trump radically disrupted everything in American politics, but especially the Republican Party. Many so-called national conservatives now live by Trump’s central operating principle: The ends justify the means. The ends are “owning the libs” in any way possible. And “the libs” include not only anyone on the Left of the political spectrum, but even those individuals and institutions that Trumpian conservatives believe are “the enemy” and controlled by “liberal interests.” By their definition, this now includes virtually all large media and technology companies and platforms. Thus, when we turn to the means, it’s increasingly the case that just about anything goes — including many traditional conservative principles.

To see how far we’ve come, recall what President Ronald Reagan said 35 years ago when vetoing an effort to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine. “History has shown that the dangers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and compe­tition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee,” he said. At the time, President Reagan was confronted with some of the same arguments we hear today about media being too biased or conservatives not getting a fair shake. But he called upon his fellow conservatives to reject the idea that Big Government was the solution to such problems.

Unfortunately, Mr. Trump and some of his most loyal followers and even some major conservative groups today have largely given up on this logic and instead embraced regulation. While Trumpian conservatives love to decry everyone they oppose as “communists,” ironically it is this same group that is embracing a sort of communications collectivism as it pertains to modern media control. In the Trumpian worldview, media and tech platforms are useful only to the extent they carry out the will of the party — or at least the man on top of it.

These national conservatives have made a horrible miscalculation. Feeling aggrieved by Big Tech “bias,” or just feeling overwhelmed by things they don’t like about online platforms, they’ve decided that two wrongs make a right. In reality, two political wrongs never make a right, but they almost always combine to make government a lot bigger and more powerful.

It’s an incredibly naïve gamble almost certainly destined to fail, but they should ask themselves what it means if it works. This endless ratcheting effect will result in comprehensive state control of most channels of communications and information dissemination. Is this a game that you really think you can play better than the Lefties?

I’ll close by returning to one of Reagan’s favorite jokes. He always used to say that, “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” I would suggest that an even scarier version of that line would be, “We’re from the government and we’re here to help you parent your kids.”

Don’t let it be you uttering that line.

______________

Additional Reading

· Adam Thierer, “Again, We Should Not Ban All Teens from Social Media”

· Adam Thierer, “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?”

· Adam Thierer, “The Classical Liberal Approach to Digital Media Free Speech Issues”

· Adam Thierer, “Confessions of a ‘Vidiot’: 50 Years of Video Games & Moral Panics”

· Adam Thierer, “Left and right take aim at Big Tech — and the First Amendment“

· Adam Thierer, “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer“

· Adam Thierer, “Ongoing Series: Moral Panics / Techno-Panics”

· Adam Thierer, “No Goldilocks Formula for Content Moderation in Social Media or the Metaverse, But Algorithms Still Help”

· Adam Thierer, “FCC’s O’Rielly on First Amendment & Fairness Doctrine Dangers“

· Adam Thierer, “Conservatives & Common Carriage: Contradictions & Challenges“

· Adam Thierer, “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“

· Adam Thierer, “A Good Time to Re-Read Reagan’s Fairness Doctrine Veto“

· Adam Thierer, “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet“

· Adam Thierer, “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“

· Adam Thierer, “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“

· Adam Thierer, “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“

· Adam Thierer, “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“

· Adam Thierer, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools and Methods (2009).

Corbin Barthold invited me on Tech Freedom’s “Tech Policy Podcast” to discuss the history of antitrust and competition policy over the past half century. We covered a huge range of cases and controversies, including: the DOJ’s mega cases against IBM & AT&T, Blockbuster and Hollywood Video’s derailed merger, the Sirius-XM deal, the hysteria over the AOL-Time Warner merger, the evolution of competition in mobile markets, and how we finally ended that dreaded old MySpace monopoly!

What does the future hold for Google, Facebook, Amazon, and Netflix? Do antitrust regulators at the DOJ or FTC have enough to mount a case against these firms? Which case is most likely to have legs?

Corbin and I also talked about the of progress more generally and the troubling rise of more and more Luddite thinking on both the left and right. I encourage you to give it a listen:

It is my honor to have the lead paper in this new series. My 19-page essay is entitled, Governing Emerging Technology in an Age of Policy Fragmentation and Disequilibrium, and it represents my effort to concisely tie together all my writing over the past 30 years on governance trends for the Internet and related technologies. The key takeaways from my essay are:

• Traditional governance mechanisms are being strained by modern technological and political realities. Newer technologies, especially digital ones, are developing at an ever-faster rate and building on top of each other, blurring lines between sectors.
• Congress has failed to keep up with the quickening pace of technological change. It also continues to delegate most of its constitutional authority to agencies to deal with most policy concerns. But agencies are overwhelmed too. This situation is unlikely to change, creating a governance gap.
• Decentralized governance techniques are filling the gap. Soft law—informal, iterative, experimental, and collaborative solutions—represents the new normal for technological governance. This is particularly true for information sectors, including social media platforms, for which the First Amendment acts as a major constraint on formal regulation anyway.
• No one-size-fits-all tool can address the many governance issues related to fast-paced science and technology developments; therefore, decentralized governance mechanisms may be better suited to address newer policy concerns.

My arguments will frustrate many people of varying political dispositions because I adopt a highly pragmatic approach to technological governance. No matter what your preferred ideal state of affairs looks like in terms of technological governance, you’re bound to be disappointed by the way high-tech policy is unfolding today. Many people desire bright-letter hard law that has government(s) establishing comprehensive, precautionary regulation of various tech sectors. Others prefer a clearly defined but more light-touch policy regime for emerging technology. Alas, neither of these preferred hard law dispositions describe the world we live in today, nor will either of them likely govern the future. My essay outlines a variety of reasons why such hard law approaches are breaking down today, including general legislative dysfunctionalism, the endless delegation of power from Congress to regulatory agencies or the states, and the the intensifying “pacing problem” (i.e., the fact that technological change is happening at a must faster rate than policy change).

In light of this, I argue:

it is smart to think practically about alternative governance frameworks when traditional hard-law approaches prove slow or ineffective in addressing governance needs. It is also wise to consider alternative governance frameworks that might address the occasional downsides of disruptive technologies without completely foreclosing ongoing innovation opportunities the way many hard-law solutions would.

I also show that, whether anyone cares to admit it or not, we already live in a world of multiplying “soft law” mechanisms and decentralized governance approaches. I use the example of how these new governance trends are unfolding for autonomous vehicles, but note how we see decentralized governance approaches being utilized in many other sectors. This is equally true across the Atlantic where the United Kingdom is increasingly experimenting with new governance approached for emerging technologies.

What counts as “soft law” or “decentralized governance” is an open-ended and ever-changing topic of discussion. But I note that it, at a minimum, it includes: multi-stakeholder processes, experimental “sandboxes,” industry best practices or codes of conduct, technical standards, private certifications, agency workshops and guidance documents, informal negotiations, and education and awareness building efforts. I unpack these ideas in the essay in more detail.

For social media, soft law approaches are the current governance norm, even as hard law regulatory proposals continue to multiply rapidly. But I note that despite all that pressure for more formal regulatory governance of social media platforms, the First Amendment presents a formidable barrier to most of those proposals. Thus, soft law will continue to be the dominant governance approach here. I also conclude by predicting that that soft law will become the dominant approach for artificial intelligence, too, even as regulatory proposals multiply there as well.

I’ll have more to say about my paper and other papers in the AEI series in coming weeks and month. For now, I encourage you to jump over to the website AEI has set up for the series and take a look at my new paper.

Additional Reading :

• Ryan Hagemann, Jennifer Huddleston Skees, and Adam Thierer, “Soft Law for Hard Problems: The Governance of Emerging Technologies in an Uncertain Future,” Colorado Technology Law Journal 17 (2018): 37–130, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3118539.
• Adam Thierer, “Soft Law in U.S. ICT Sectors: Four Case Studies,” Jurimetrics 61, no. 1 (Fall 2020): 79–119, https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3777490.
• Adam Thierer, “Congress as a Non-Actor in Tech Policy,” Medium, February 4, 2020, https://medium.com/@AdamThierer/congress-as-a-non-actor-in-tech-policy-5f3153313e11.
• Adam Thierer, “The Pacing Problem and the Future of Technology Regulation,” Bridge, August 8, 2018, https://www.mercatus.org/bridge/commentary/pacing-problem-and-future-technology-regulation.
• Adam Thierer, “Artificial Intelligence Governance in the Obama–Trump Years,” IEEE Transactions on Technology and Society, Vol, 2, Issue 4, (2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=4013880.
• Adam Thierer, “Left and Right Take Aim at Big Tech—and the First Amendment,” Hill, December 8, 2021, https://thehill.com/opinion/technology/584874-left-and-right-take-aim-at-big-tech-and-the-first-amendment.
• Adam Thierer, “The Classical Liberal Approach to Digital Media Free Speech Issues,” Technology Liberation Front, December 8, 2021, https://techliberation.com/2021/12/08/the-classical-liberal-approach-to-digital-media-free-speech-issues.
• Adam Thierer, “The Great Deplatforming of 2021,” Discourse, January 14, 2021, https://www.discoursemagazine.com/politics/2021/01/14/the-great-deplatforming-of-2021.

What explains the rebirth of analog era media? Many people (including me!) predicted that vinyl records, turntables, broadcast TV antennas and even printed books seemed destined for the dustbin of technological history. We were so wrong, as I note in this new oped that has gone out through the Tribune Wire Service.

“Many of us threw away our record collections and antennas and began migrating from physical books to digital ones,” I note. “Now, these older technologies are enjoying a revival. What explains their resurgence, and what’s the lesson?”

I offer some data about the rebirth of analog era media as well as some possible explanations for their resurgence. “With vinyl records and printed books, people enjoy making a physical connection with the art they love. They want to hold it in their hands, display it on their wall and show it off to their friends. Digital music or books don’t satisfy that desire, no matter how much more convenient and affordable they might be. The mediums still matter.”

Read more here. Meanwhile, my own personal vinyl collection continues to grow without constraint! …

[Co-authored with Connor Haaland and originally published on The Bridge as, “Do Our Leaders Believe in Free Speech and Online Freedom Anymore?”]

A major policy battle has developed regarding the wisdom of regulating social media platforms in the United States, with the internet’s most important law potentially in the crosshairs. Leaders in both major parties are calling for sweeping regulation.

Specifically, President Trump and his presumptive opponent in the coming presidential election, former Vice President Joe Biden, have both called for “Section 230” of the Communications Decency Act to be repealed. Last week, the president took a misguided step in this direction by signing an executive order that, if fully carried out, will result in significantly greater regulation of the internet and of speech.

A Growing Call to Regulate Internet Platforms

The ramifications of these threats and steps could not be more profound. Without Section 230—also known as “the 26 words that created the internet”—we would have a much less advanced internet ecosystem. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube, and Wikipedia would have never grown as quickly. Indeed, the repeal of Section 230 means many fewer jobs, less information distribution, and, frankly, less joy.

Shockingly, by backing Trump’s recent push for regulating these internet platforms, many conservatives are betraying their own principles—the ones that support freedom of expression and the ability to run private businesses without government interference.

Section 230 limits the liability online intermediaries face for the content and communications that travel over their networks. The immunities granted by Section 230 let online speech and commerce flow freely, without the constant threat of legal action or onerous liability looming overhead for digital platforms. To put it another way, without this provision, today’s vibrant internet ecosystem likely would not exist.

For completely different reasons, however, Biden and Trump want it axed. “Section 230 should be revoked, immediately should be revoked, number one. For [Facebook CEO Mark] Zuckerberg and other platforms,” said Biden in a New York Times interview. Like many other Democrats, Biden wants social media platforms to do far more to block speech they find to be offensive in various ways. If they fail to do more, Biden and other Democrats want Sec. 230 revised or repealed.

In contrast, Trump and his allies want these same platforms to do far less to curate content. Although lacking any empirical evidence, they allege that massive anti-conservative bias exists across today’s most popular platforms. As a result, they want Sec. 230 gutted. “Repeal 230,” said Trump in a tweet. Tensions reached a boiling point last week following a public fight between the president and Twitter after the social networking platform on May 27 added a fact-check notice to one of the president’s tweets about the supposed dangers of mail-in voting.

Retaliating Against Social Media

On May 28, Trump struck back against Twitter by signing an executive order on “preventing online censorship.” The EO cited Twitter six times but also went after Facebook, Instagram, and YouTube by name. Paradoxically, it also noted that the “freedom to express and debate ideas is the foundation for all of our rights as a free people,” even though the order will result in arbitrary government rule over our free speech rights.

Indeed, Trump’s executive order runs afoul of traditional conservative principles in several ways:

1. It expands the power of the government by delegating more authority to the administrative state and expanding arbitrary bureaucratic rule and regulatory abuse. It encourages the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and the Federal Trade Commission to take a more active interest in content policy decisions, which is of dubious legality. Section 3 of the EO also says the Department of Justice “shall review the viewpoint-based speech restrictions imposed by each online platform identified in the report … and assess whether any online platforms are problematic vehicles for government speech due to viewpoint discrimination, deception to consumers, or other bad practices.” (emphasis added)

   What do other bad practices entail, and who in the government gets to make the call? It is not prudent to delegate authority over something as sacred as our rights to free speech to unelected government bureaucrats. Such power will stifle civil discourse and increase the possibility for special interests to co-opt the government by using its power for their own desires.

2. It undermines property rights of private companies by letting Big Government dictate how they use their business platforms. Carrying out the president’s executive order would amount to a taking of private property by the government, an action that conservatives have historically loathed. Our Founding Fathers considered property rights to be the cornerstone of a free and just society, yet Trump pays that fact little respect in this EO, running afoul of a centuries-old American tradition.

3. It will encourage frivolous lawsuits. By gutting Sec. 230, a law that protects online platforms from punishing liability for third-party speech, Trump’s EO would empower trial lawyers. We are already too litigious a country, filing over 80 million cases in state courts every year, and we do not need another reason to be in the courtroom. Repealing 230 would open the floodgates to endless lawsuits about online speech and clog up our judicial system, using resources that could be directed to more important matters.

4. It undermines free speech and would likely hurt conservative voices most. Trump’s executive order makes a mockery of the First Amendment by applying the Fairness Doctrine and net neutrality notions to social media, regulations that conservatives have vociferously opposed. A recent lawsuit filed by the Center for Democracy and Technology that seeks to challenge the EO alleges this exact point, saying it could chill free speech. In the past we have seen such concepts applied arbitrarily, harming free speech and media competition.

   For instance, our colleague Brent Skorup, has written on how the FCC exploited another arbitrary rule—the “public interest” standard. He points to the fact that a documentary portraying former Sen. John Kerry in a negative light was taken off the air thanks to the authority of the public interest standard as a paradigmatic example of how arbitrary regulatory power can harm free speech. The EO also undermines platforms that have greatly amplified conservative voices in recent years. On Facebook, for instance, 7 of the top 10 most cited news outlets were conservative. Meanwhile, Trump and other conservative leaders have tapped the power of Twitter to directly communicate with their base. The EO would therefore likely result in much conservative content being removed quickly to avoid legal hassles with regulators or the courts.

5. The combined effect of all these other factors will undermine the global competitiveness of US-based firms, potentially benefiting Chinese internet companies the most. Willingly giving up a comparative advantage would be foolish, considering how America’s tech companies are the envy of the world. Not only does the EO affect existing social platforms, but it could stifle innovation throughout the digital economy moving forward. Who wants to try and innovate in a field that is subject to regulations that can change on a president’s whim?

6. It could be used by future politicians against conservative platforms, like Fox News and other right-leaning outlets. This is clearly not the intent of Trump’s executive order, but that will eventually be the result nonetheless. Going forward, we will have different presidents with different political outlooks. When making laws, regulations, and executive orders, it is always important to consider how they could be applied by successive administrations with opposite political and ideological stripes.

Today’s social media platforms are not perfect, but it is impossible for them to please everyone. There is no Goldilocks formula whereby they can get speech policies just right and make everyone happy. Instead, the ideal policy for speech platforms is: Let a thousand flowers bloom. One-size-fits-all content management and community standards shouldn’t be the goal. We need diverse platforms and approaches for a diverse citizenry.

But when presidential candidates and their allies line up in support of repealing Sec. 230 and opening the door to speech controls, the end result will be homogenized conformity with the will of those in power. That’s a horrible result for a nation that values diversity of opinion and freedom of speech, and it will only end up hurting those who seek to change the conversation.

Also see: Brent Skorup, “The Section 230 Executive Order, Free Speech, and the FCC,” Technology Liberation Front, June 3, 2010.

President Trump and his allies have gone to war with social media sites and digital communications platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Google. Decrying supposed anti-conservative “bias,” Trump has even floated an Executive Order aimed at “Preventing Online Censorship,” that entails many new forms of government meddling with these private speech platforms. Section 230 is their crosshairs and First Amendment restraints are being thrown to the wind.

Various others have already documented the many legal things wrong with Trump’s call for greater government oversight of private speech platforms. I want to focus on something slightly different here: The surprising ideological origins of what Trump and his allies are proposing. Because for those of us who are old-timers and have followed communications and media policy for many decades, this moment feels like deja vu all over again, but with the strange twist that supposed “conservatives” are calling for a form of communications collectivism that used to be the exclusive province of hard-core Leftists.

To begin, the truly crazy thing about President Trump and some conservatives saying that social media should be regulated as public forums is not just that they’re abandoning free speech rights, it’s that they’re betraying property rights, too. Treating private media like a “public square” entails a taking of private property. Amazingly, Trump and his followers have taken over the old “media access movement” and given it their own spin.

Media access advocates look to transform the First Amendment into a tool for social change to advance specific political ends or ideological objectives. Media access theory dispenses with both the editorial discretion rights and private property rights of private speech platforms. Private platforms become subject to the political whims of policymakers who dictate “fair” terms of access. We can think of this as communications collectivism.

The media access movement’s regulatory toolkit includes things like the Fairness Doctrine and “neutrality” requirements, right-of-reply mandates, expansive conceptions of common carriage (using “public forum” or “town square” rhetoric), agency threats, and so on. Even without formal regulation, media access theorists hope that jawboning and political pressure can persuade private platforms to run more (or perhaps sometimes less) of the content that they want (or don’t) on media platforms.

The intellectual roots of the media access movement were planted by leftist media theorists like Jerome Barron, Owen Fiss in 1960s and 1970s, and later by Marxist communications scholar Robert McChesney. In 2005, I penned this short history of media access movement and explored its aims. I also wrote two old books with chapters on the dangers of media access theory and calls for collectivizing communications and media systems. Those books were: Media Myths (2005) and A Manifesto for Media Freedom (2008, w Brian C. Anderson). The key takeaway from those essays is that the media access movement comes down to control.

The best book ever written about dangers of media access movement was Jonathan Emord’s 1991, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment. He perfectly summarizes their goals (and now Trump’s) as follows:

• “In short, the access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model.”
• “Rather than understanding the First Amendment to be a guardian of the private sphere of communication, the access advocates interpret it to be a guarantee of a preferred mix of ideological viewpoints.
• “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.”

“This arrogant, elitist, anti-property, anti-freedom ethic is what drives the media access movement and makes it so morally repugnant,” I argued in that old TLF essay. That is still just as true today, even when it’s conservatives calling for collectivization of media.

It’s astonishing, yet nonetheless true, that the ideological roots of Trump’s anti-social media campaign lie in the works of those extreme Leftists and even media Marxists. He has just given media access theory his own unique nationalistic spin and sold this snake oil to conservatives.

There certainly could come a day where his opponents on the Left just take this media access playbook up again and suggest this is exactly what’s needed for Fox News and other right-leaning media outlets. If and when that does happen, Trump and other conservatives will have no one to blame but themselves for embracing this contemptible philosophical vision simply because it suited their short-term desires while they were in power.

I hope that conservatives rethink their embrace of communications collectivism, but I fear that Trump and his allies have already convinced themselves that the ends justify the means when it comes to advancing their causes or even just “owning the libs.” But there really is a strong moralistic slant to what Trump and many of his allies want. They think they are on the right side of history and that the opponents–including most media outlets and plaforms–are evil. Trump and his allies have repeatedly referred to the press as the “enemy of the American people” and endlessly lambasted social media platforms for not going along with his desires. This reflects a core tendency of all communications collectivists: a sort of ‘you’re-either-with-us-or-against-us’ attitude.

Steve Bannon scripted all this out back in 2018. Go back and read this astonishing CNN interview for a preview of what could happen next. Here’s the rundown:

>> Bannon said Big Tech’s data should be seized and put in a “public trust.” Specifically, Bannon said, “I think you take [the data] away from the companies. All that data they have is put in a public trust. They can use it. And people can opt in and opt out. That trust is run by an independent board of directors. It just can’t be that [Big Tech is] the sole proprietors of this data…I think this is a public good.” Bannon added that Big Tech companies “have to be broken up” just like Teddy Roosevelt broke up the trusts.” >> Bannon attacked the executives of Facebook, Twitter and Google. “These are run by sociopaths,” he said. “These people are complete narcissists. These people ought to be controlled, they ought to be regulated.” At one point during the phone call, Bannon said, “These people are evil. There is no doubt about that.” >> Bannon said he thinks “this is going to be a massive issue” in future elections. He said he thinks it will probably take until 2020 to fully blossom as a campaign issue, explaining, “I think by the time 2020 comes along, this will be a burning issue. I think this will be one of the biggest domestic issues.”

This is now Trump’s playbook. It’s incredibly frightening because, once married up with Trump’s accusations of election fraud and other imagined conspiracies, you can sense how he’s laying the groundwork to call into question future election results by suggesting that both traditional media and modern digital media platforms are just in bed with the Democratic party and trying to rig the presidential election. I don’t really want to think about what happens if this situation escalates to that point. These are very dark days for the American Republic.

In the US there is a tangle of communications laws that were added over decades by Congress as–one-by-one–broadcast, cable, and satellite technologies transformed the TV marketplace. The primary TV laws are from 1976, 1984, and 1992, though Congress creates minor patches when the marketplace changes and commercial negotiations start to unravel.

Congress, to its great credit, largely has left alone Internet-based TV (namely, IPTV and vMVPDs) which has created a novel “problem”–too much TV. Internet-based TV, however, for years has put stress on the kludge-y legacy legal system we have, particularly the impenetrable mix of communications and copyright laws that regulates broadcast TV distribution.

Internet-based TV does two things–it undermines the current system with regulatory arbitrage but also shows how tons of diverse TV programming can be distributed to millions of households without Congress (and the FCC and the Copyright Office) injecting politics into the TV marketplace.

Locast TV is the latest Internet-based TV distributor to threaten to unravel parts the current system. In July, broadcast programmers sued Locast (its founder, David Goodfriend) and in September, Locast filed its own suit against the broadcast programmers.

Many readers will remember the 2014 Aereo decision from the Supreme Court. Much like Aereo, Locast TV captures free broadcast TV signals in the markets it operates and transmits the programming via the Internet to viewers in that market. That said, Locast isn’t Aereo.

Aereo’s position was that it could relay broadcast signals without paying broadcasters because it wasn’t a “cable company” (a critical category in copyright law). The majority of the Supreme Court disagreed; Aereo closed up shop.

Locast has a different position: it says it can relay broadcast signals without paying because it is a nonprofit.

It’s a plausible argument. Federal copyright law has a carveout allowing “nonprofit organizations” to relay broadcast signals without payment so long as the nonprofit operates “without any purpose of direct or indirect commercial advantage.”

The broadcasters are focusing on this latter provision, that any nonprofit taking advantage of the carveout mustn’t have commercial purpose. David Goodfriend, the Locast founder, is a lawyer and professor who, apparently, sought to abide by the law. However, the broadcasters argue, his past employment and commercial ties to pay-TV companies mean that the nonprofit is operating for commercial advantage.

It’s hard to say how a court will rule. Assuming a court takes up the major issues, judges will have to decide what “indirect commercial advantage” means. That’s a fact-intensive inquiry. The broadcasters will likely search for hot docs or other evidence that Locast is not a “real” nonprofit. Whatever the facts are, Locast’s arbitrage of the existing regulations is one that could be replicated.

Nobody likes the existing legacy TV regulation system: Broadcasters dislike being subject to compulsory licenses; Cable and satellite operators dislike being forced to carry some broadcast TV and to pay for a bizarre “retransmission” right. Copyright holders are largely sidelined in these artificial commercial negotiations. Wholesale reform–so that programming negotiations look more like the free-market world of Netflix and Hulu programming–would mean every party has give up something they like improve the overall system.

The Internet’s effect on traditional providers’ market share has been modest to date, but hopefully Congress will anticipate the changing marketplace before regulatory distortions become intolerable.

Additional reading: Adam Thierer & Brent Skorup, Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation and Current Legislative Proposals (2014).

Slate recently published an astonishing piece of revisionist history under the title, “Bring Back the Golden Age of Broadcast Regulation,” which suggested that the old media regulatory model of the past would be appropriate for modern digital media providers and platforms. In the essay, April Glaser suggests that policymakers should resurrect the Fairness Doctrine and a host of old Analog Era content controls to let regulatory bureaucrats address Digital Age content moderation concerns.

In a tweetstorm, I highlighted a few examples of why the so-called Golden Era wasn’t so golden in practice. I began by noting that the piece ignores the troubling history of FCC speech controls and unintended consequences of regulation. That regime gave us limited, bland choices–and a whole host of First Amendment violations. We moved away from that regulatory model for very good reasons.

For those glorifying the Fairness Doctrine, I encourage them to read the great Nat Hentoff’s excellent essay, “The History & Possible Revival of the Fairness Doctrine,” about the real-world experience of life under the FCC’s threatening eye. Hentoff notes:

Others were harassed in ways that were both humorous and horrifying. For example, go back and review the amazing FCC (and FBI!) investigation of The Kingsmen’s song “Louie Louie,” due to fears about its unintelligible lyrics:

Or go back and read former CBS president Fred Friendly’s 1975 book (The Good Guys, the Bad Guys & the First Amendment) about abuses of the Fairness Doctrine during both Republican and Democratic administrations. This stuff from Kennedy years, which I summarized in old book, is quite shocking:

And then there was the “golden era” of broadcast regulation under Nixon, where regulatory harassment intensified to counter what had happened during Democratic administrations. Here’s Jesse Walker summarizing those dark days:

Also read Tom Hazlett on the Nixon years and all the broadcast meddling that happened on a ongoing basis. “License harassment of stations considered unfriendly to the Administration became a regular item on the agenda at White House policy meetings,” he notes. And then even the Smothers Brothers became victims!

This is how Tom Hazlett perfectly summarized the choice before us regarding whether to let regulatory bureaucracies decide what is “fair” in media. This is exactly the same question we should be asking today when people suggest reviving the old “golden era” media control regime.

Keep in mind, the examples of content meddling cited here most involve the Fairness Doctrine. Indecency rules, the Financial Interest and Syndication Rules, and other FCC policies gave politicians others levers of exerting influence and control over speech. The meddling was endless.

This was no “Golden Era” or broadcast regulation–unless, that is, you prefer bland, boring, limited choices and endless bureaucratic harassment of media. No amount of wishful thinking or revisionist history can counter the hard realities of that dismal era in our nation’s history. We should wholeheartedly and vociferously reject calls to resurrect it.

A series of recent studies have shown the centrality of social media bots to the spread of “low credibility” information online. Automated amplification, the process by which bots help share each other’s content, allows these algorithmic manipulators to spread false information across social media in seconds by increasing visibility. These findings, combined with the already rising public perception of social media as harmful to democracy, are likely to motivate some Congressional action regarding social media practices. In a divided Congress, one thing that seems to be drawing more bipartisan support is an antagonism to Big Tech.

Regulating social media to stop misinformation would mistake the symptoms of an illness for its cause. Bots spreading low quality content online is not a cause for declining social trust, but a result of it. Actions that explicitly restrict access to this type of information would likely result in the opposite of their intended effect; allowing people to believe more radical conspiracies and claim that the truth is censored.

A parallel for the prevalence of bots spreading information today is the high rates of media piracy that lasted from the late-1990s through the mid-2000s, but experienced a significant decline throughout this past decade (many of the claims by anti-piracy advocates of consistently rising US piracy fail to acknowledge the rise in file sizes of high quality downloads and the expansion of internet access, as a relative total of content consumption it was historically declining). Content piracy and automated amplification by bots share a relationship through their fulfillment of consumer demand. Just as nobody would pirate videos if there were not some added value over legal video access, bots would not be able to generate legitimate engagement solely by gaming algorithms. There exists a gap in the market to serve consumers the type of content that they desire in a convenient, easy-to-access form.

This fulfilment of market demand is what changed consumer interest in piracy, and it is what is needed to change interest in “low credibility” content. In the early days of the MP3 file format the music industry strongly resisted changing their business models, which led to the proliferation of file sharing sites like Napster. While lawsuits may have shut down individual file sharing sites, they did not alter the demand for pirated content, and piracy persisted. The music industry’s begrudging adoption of iTunes began to change these incentives, but pirated music streaming persisted. It was with legal streaming services like Spotify that piracy began to decline as consumers began to receive what they asked for from legitimate sources: convenience and cheap access to content. It is important to note that pirating in the early days was not convenient, malware and slow download speeds made it a cumbersome affair, but given the laggard nature of media industry incumbents, consumers sought it out nonetheless.

The type of content considered “low credibility” today, similarly, is not convenient, as clickbait and horrible formatting intentionally make such sites painful to use in order to maximize advertising dollars extracted. The fact that consumers still seek these sites out regardless is a testament to the failure of the news industry to cater to consumer demands.

To reduce the efficacy of bots in sharing content, innovation is needed in content production or distribution to ensure convenience, low cost, and subjective user trust. This innovation may come from the social media side through experimentation with subscription services less dependent on advertising revenue. It may come from news media, either through changes in how they cater content to consumers, or through changes in reporting styles to increase engagement. It may even come through a social transformation in how news is consumed. Some thinkers believe that we are entering a reputation age , which would shift the burden of trust from a publication to individual reporters who curate our content. These changes, however, would be hampered by some of the proposed means to curtail bots on social media.

The most prominent proposals to regulate social media regards applying traditional publisher standards to online platforms through the repeal of Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which in turn would make platforms liable for the content users post. While this would certainly incentivize more aggressive action against online bots – as well as a wide amount of borderline content – the compliance costs would be tremendous given the scale at which social media sites need to moderate content. This in turn would price out the innovators who would not be able to stomach the risks of having fewer bots than Twitter or Facebook, but still have some prevalent. Other proposals, such as the Californian ban on bots pretending to be human, reviving the Fairness Doctrine for online content, or antitrust action, range from unenforceable to counterproductive.

As iTunes, Spotify, Netflix, and other digital media platforms were innovating in the ways to deliver content to consumers, piracy enforcement gained strength to limit copyright violations, to little effect . While piracy as a problem may not have disappeared, it is clear that regulatory efforts to crack it down contributed little, since the demand for pirated content did not stem purely from the medium of its transmission. Bots do not proliferate because of social media, but because of declining social trust. Rebuilding that trust requires building the new, not constraining the old.

There has been an increasing outcry recently from conservatives that social media is conspiring to silence their voices.  Leading voices including President Donald Trump and Senator Ted Cruz have started calling for legislative or regulatory actions to correct this perceived “bias”. But these calls for fairness miss the importance of allowing such services to develop their own terms and for users to determine what services to use and the benefit that such services have been to conservatives.

Social media is becoming a part of our everyday lives and recent events have only increased our general awareness of this fact. More than half of American adults login to Facebook on a daily basis. As a result, some policymakers have argued that such sites are the new public square. In general, the First Amendment strictly limits what the government can do to limit speakers in public spaces and requires that such limits be applied equally to different points of view. At the same time, private entities are generally allowed to set terms regarding what speech may or may not be allowed on their own platforms.

The argument that modern day websites are the new public square and must maintain a neutral view point was recently rejected in a lawsuit between PraegerU and YouTube. Praeger believed that its conservative viewpoint was being silenced by YouTube decision to place many of its videos in “restricted mode.” In this case, the court found that YouTube was still acting as a private service rather than one filling a typical government role. Other cases have similarly asserted that Internet intermediaries have First Amendment rights to reject or limit ads or content as part of their own rights to speak or not speak. Conservatives have long been proponents of property rights, freedom of association, and free markets. But now, faced with platforms choosing to exercise their rights, rather than defend those values and compete in the market some “conservatives” are arguing for legislation or utilizing litigation to bully the marketplace of ideas into giving them a louder microphone. In fact, part of the purpose behind creating the liability immunity (known as Section 230) for such services was the principle that a variety of platforms would emerge with different standards and new and diverse communities could be created and evolve to serve different audiences.

A similar idea of a need for equal content was previously used by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and known as “the fairness doctrine”. This doctrine required equal access for groups or individuals wanting to express opposing views on public issues. In the 1980s Reagan era Republicans led the charge against this doctrine arguing that it violated broadcasters’ First Amendment rights and actually went against the public interest. In fact, many have pointed out that the removal of the fairness doctrine is what allowed conservative talk radio hosts like Rush Limbaugh to become major political forces.  In the 2000s, when liberals suggested bringing back the fairness doctrine, conservatives were aghast and viewed it was an attack on conservative talk radio.  Even now, President Trump has used social media as a way to deliver messaging and set his political agenda in a way that has never been done before. If anything, there are lower barriers to creating a new medium on the Internet than there are on the TV or radio airwaves. As a 2016 National Review article states if conservatives are concerned with how they are being treated by existing platforms, “The goal should not be to create neutral spaces; it should be to create non-neutral spaces more attractive than existing non-neutral spaces.” In other words rather than complaining that the odds are against them and demanding “equal time”, conservatives should try to compete by building more attractive platforms that promote the content moderation ideals they believe are best. But perhaps, the problem is they realize that ultimately difficult or unpopular content moderation decisions must be faced by any platform.

Content moderation is no easy task. Even for small groups differing beliefs can quickly result in grey areas that require difficult calls by an intermediary. For social media and other Internet intermediaries, when dealing with such issue on a scale of millions and a global diversity of what is and isn’t acceptable, content moderation becomes exponentially complicated. It is unsurprising that a rate of human and machine learning errors exist in making such decisions. AI might seem like a simple solution but such filters aren’t aware of the context in many cases. For example, a Motherboard article recently pointed out the difficulty that those with last names like Weiner and Butts face when trying to register for accounts on websites with AI filters to prevent offensive language. Leaving the task of content moderation to humans is both incredibly difficult on the moderators and may result in inconsistent results due to the large volume of content that must be moderated and differing interpretations of community standards. As Jason Koebler and Joseph Cox point out in their Motherboard article on the challenge of content moderation on a global scale that Facebook is dealing with, “If you take a single case, and then think of how many more like it exist across the globe in countries that Facebook has even less historical context for, simple rules have higher and higher chances of unwanted outcomes.” It is quite clear that if we as a society can’t decide on our own definitions of things like hate speech or bullying in many cases, how we can expect a third party public or private to make such decision in a way that satisfies every perspective?

The Internet has helped the world truly create a marketplace of ideas. The barriers to entry are rather low and the medium is constantly evolving. Because of social media and the Internet more generally conservative voices are able to reach a wider audience than before. Conservatives should be careful what they wish for with calls for “fairness,” because such power could actually prevent future innovation or new platforms and extend the status quo instead.

For decades, cities, the FCC, and Congress have mandated that cable TV operators carry certain types of TV programming, including public access channels, local broadcast channels, local public television, and children’s programming. These carriage mandates have generated several First Amendment lawsuits but cable operators have generally lost. Cable operators have junior varsity First Amendment rights and the content they distribute is more regulated than, say, newspapers, Internet service providers, search engines, and Netflix. I submitted public interest comments (with JP Mohler) to the FCC this week explaining why cable operators would likely win today if they litigated these cable carriage regulations.

Regulations requiring newspapers, book publishers, or Internet service providers to carry the government’s preferred types of content are subject to strict scrutiny, which means such regulations typically don’t survive. However, cable is different, the Supreme Court held in the 1994 Turner case. The Supreme Court said regulations about what cable operators must carry are subject to intermediate–not strict–scrutiny because cable operators (in 1994) possessed about 95% of the subscription TV market and nearly every household had a single choice for subscription TV–their local cable monopoly. In the words of the Supreme Court, cable’s content regulations “are justified by the special characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators.”

As a result, the FCC enforces “leased access” regulations that require cable operators to leave blank certain TV channels and give non-affiliated programmers a chance to use that channel capacity and gain viewership. Cable operators in the 1990s sued the FCC for enforcing these regulations in a 1996 case called Time Warner v. FCC. The DC Circuit relied on the 1994 Turner case and upheld the leased access rules.

Recently, however, the FCC asked whether First Amendment interests or TV competition requires giving these regulations another look. In our public interest comment, JP and I say that these rules have outlived their usefulness and cable operators would likely win a First Amendment lawsuit against the FCC today.

Two things have changed. First, cable operators have lost their “bottleneck monopoly power” that justified, in the eyes of the Supreme Court in 1994, giving cable operators weakened First Amendment protection.

Unlike in the 1990s, cable operators face significant competition in most local markets from satellite and telco TV providers. Over 99 percent of US households have at least three pay-TV options, and cable has lost over 15 million subscriber households since 2002. In 1997, when Turner II was decided, cable had over 90 percent of the pay-TV market. Cable operators’ market share has shrunk nearly every year since, and in 2015 cable had around 54 percent market share. This competitive marketplace has stimulated massive investment and choice in TV programming. The typical household has access to far more channels than in the past. Independent researchers found that a typical US household in 1999 received about 50 TV channels. By 2014, the typical household received over 200 TV channels. In 2018, there will be an estimated 520 scripted TV series available, which is up nearly 50 percent from just five years ago.

This emergence of TV competition and its beneficial effects in programming and consumer choice undermines the justification for upholding cable content regulations like leased access.

Second, courts are more likely to view the Supreme Court’s Denver decision about leased access regulations in a new light.  In Denver, the Supreme Court divided into concurrences as to the proper First Amendment category of cable operators, and whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should apply to the leased access laws at issue. The “Marks test” is the test lower courts use for determining the holding of a Supreme Court decision where there is no majority supporting the rationale of any opinion. Viewed through the lens of the prevailing Marks test, cable operators are entitled to “bookstore owner” status for First Amendment purposes:

Given that four justices in Denver concur that one of the potential bases for deciding cable’s First Amendment status is the classification of cable operators as bookstores and three justices concur that this classification is the definitive justification for the judgment, the narrowest grounds for resolving the issue is simply this latter justification. Under the prevailing Marks test, then, lower courts will apply strict scrutiny to the leased access rules in light of the Denver decision.

For these reasons, and the need to conserve agency resources for more pressing matters, like rural broadband deployment and spectrum auctions, we encourage the FCC to discontinue these regulations.

You can read our public interest comment about the leased access regulations at the Mercatus Center website.

Leased Access Mandates Infringe on the First Amendment Rights of Cable Operators, and the FCC Should Decline to Enforce the Regulations

With Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg in town this week for a political flogging, you might think that this is darkest hour for the social networking giant. Facebook stands at a regulatory crossroads, to be sure. But allow me to offer a cynical take, and one based on history: Facebook is potentially poised to score its greatest victory ever as it begins the transition to regulated monopoly status, solidifying its market power, and limiting threats from new rivals.

By slowly capitulating to critics (both here and abroad) who are thirsty for massive regulation of the data-driven economy, Facebook is setting itself up as a servant of the state. In the name of satisfying some amorphous political “public interest” standard and fulfilling a variety of corporate responsibility objectives, Facebook will gradually allow itself to be converted into a sort of digital public utility or electronic essential facility.

That sounds like trouble for the firm until you realize that Facebook is one of the few companies who will be able to sacrifice a pound of flesh like that and remain alive. As layers of new regulatory obligations are applied, barriers to new innovations will become formidable obstacles to the very competitors that the public so desperately needs right now to offer us better alternatives. Gradually, Facebook will recognize this and go along with the regulatory schemes. And then eventually they will become the biggest defender of all of it.

Welcome to Facebook’s broadcast industry moment. The firm is essentially in the same position the broadcast sector was about a century ago when it started cozying up to federal lawmakers. Over time, broadcasters would warmly embrace an expansive licensing regime that would allow all parties—regulatory advocates, academics, lawmakers, bureaucrats, and even the broadcasters themselves—to play out the fairy tale that broadcasters would be good “public stewards” of the “public airwaves” to serve the “public interest.”

Alas, the actual listening and viewing public got royally shafted in this deal. Broadcasters got billions of dollars’ worth of completely free beachfront spectrum along with protected geographic monopolies. Congressional lawmakers and the unelected bureaucrats at the FCC got power to tinker with broadcast content and received other special favors (like free airtime) from their cronies in the industry. People, money, and influence floated freely between the political and business realms until at some point there really wasn’t much distinction between them. Meanwhile, the public got stuck with bland fare and limited competition for their ears and eyes. The “public interest” ended up meaning many things during this time, but it rarely had much to do with what the public actually desired—namely, more and better options for a diverse citizenry.

Of course, much the same story played out in the U.S. telecommunications market a few decades prior to the broadcast industry making their deal with the devil. The early history of telecommunications in America was characterized by competition among a variety of local and regional rivals. But it was derailed by political shenanigans. Here are a few choice paragraphs about the cronyist origins of the Bell System monopoly from a law review article that Brent Skorup and I wrote back in 2013 [footnotes omitted]. As you read it, imagine how similar well-intentioned regulations might play out for Facebook:

… this intensely competitive, pro-consumer free-for-all would be derailed by AT&T’s brilliant strategy to use the government to accomplish what it could not in the free market: eliminate its rivals. In 1907, Theodore Newton Vail became AT&T’s president. He had a clear vision: achieving “universal service” (in the form of interconnected and fully integrated systems) by eliminating rivals and consolidating networks. Befriending lawmakers and regulators was a crucial component of this strategy. While many policymakers nominally supported the idea of competition, they were more preoccupied with achieving widespread, interconnected network coverage. Vail capitalized on that impulse. On December 19, 1913, the government and AT&T reached the “Kingsbury Commitment.” Named after AT&T vice president Nathan C. Kingsbury, who helped negotiate the terms, the agreement outlined a plan whereby AT&T agreed not to acquire any other independent companies while also allowing other competitors to interconnect with the Bell System. The Kingsbury Commitment was thought to be pro-competitive, yet it was hardly an altruistic agreement on AT&T’s part. Regulators did not interpret the agreement so as to restrict AT&T from acquiring any new telephone systems, but only to require that an equal number be sold to an independent buyer for each system AT&T purchased. Hence, the Kingsbury Commitment contained a built-in incentive for network swapping (trading systems and solidifying territorial monopolies) rather than continued competition.  “The government solution, in short, was not the steamy, unsettling cohabitation that marks competition but rather a sort of competitive apartheid, characterized by segregation and quarantine,” observe telecom legal experts Michael Kellogg, John Thorne, and Peter Huber.  Thus, the move toward interconnection, while appearing to assist independent operators, actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry. “Vail chose at this time to put AT&T squarely behind government regulation, as the quid pro quo for avoiding competition,” explains [Richard] Vietor.  “This was the only politically acceptable way for AT&T to monopolize telephony,” he notes.  AT&T’s 1917 annual report confirms this fact, stating, “[with a] combination of like activities under proper control and regulation, the service to the public would be better, more progressive, efficient, and economical than competitive systems.”

So much for “the public interest”! If the last century’s worth of communications and media regulation teaches us anything, it’s that good intentions only get you so far in this world. Many of the lawmakers and regulators who allowed themselves to be duped by big corporations asking for protection from competition probably thought they were doing the right thing. Those policymakers may even have believed that they were actually encouraging innovation and competition through some of their regulatory actions. Alas, things did not turn out that way. We the public were denied real, meaningful choices and innovations because of these misguided policies.

And so now it’s Facebook’s turn to become part of this sordid tale. Zuckerberg has already made it clear that he is open to regulation and that his firm would also start enforcing new European data rules globally. And after this week’s political circus in Congress, the floodgates will be wide open and everyone’s regulatory pet peeve will be up for political consideration, which is exactly what happened for broadcasters and communications in past decades.

Every crackpot idea under the sun will be on the table but the most extreme versions of those proposals will be beaten back just enough to ensure that Facebook can offer up its pound of sacrificial flesh each time without running the risk of killing the patient entirely. Again, this was always part of the broadcast and communications regulatory playbook as well. So long as they were guaranteed a fairly stable market return and protection from pesky new innovators, the firms were willing to go along with the deal.

The “deal” in this case between Facebook and regulators won’t be so explicitly cronyist as it was for broadcasters and communications companies, however. The days of price controls, rate-of-return regulation, and formal line of business restrictions are likely over. Everyone now recognizes that regulations creating formal barriers to innovation and entry are a bad idea and, as a result, they are usually rejected.

But laws and regulations can sometimes create informal or hidden barriers to innovation and entry, even when they are well-intentioned. And that’s what could happen here as this latest Facebook fiasco leads to calls for seeming innocuous things like transparency and disclosures requirements, restrictions on “bad speech,” advertising and data collection regulations, “fiduciary” responsibilities, “algorithmic accountability” efforts, and so on. Facebook hasn’t wanted to adopt some of these things in the past, but now they’ll be pushed aggressively to do so by policymakers and regulatory activists. As Zuckerberg and Facebook cozy up with policymakers and regulatory activists and begin talking about a “broader view of responsibility,” the transition to the firm’s next phase as a quasi-public utility will get underway.

The rich irony of all this is that the same regulatory advocates who are cheering on this week’s developments as well as the coming regulatory avalanche will be the ones howling the loudest if and when only Facebook is left standing in the social media universe. In fact, that’s already happened in Europe where policymakers and their burdensome top-down data protection regulations have driven most digital innovators and investors to other continents, leaving only Facebook, Google, and handful of other (mostly U.S.-based) companies left to regulate. And then European policymakers have the audacity to cry foul about the market power of these firms! It boggles the mind how European policymakers and regulatory advocates see zero connection between their heavy-handed approach to the Digital Economy and the corresponding lack of enough competitors in those sectors.

But none of that will make any difference to the regulatory advocates. They want that pound of flesh, and they are going to get it. And then in Facebook they will have a regulatory plaything to toy with for years to come.

What about the public? Will we really be any better off because of any of this? How many people will want to stick with Facebook if it becomes a digital public utility or a social media version of the Post Office? That sure doesn’t sound like much fun for us. But if the new regulations imposed on Facebook do end up hurting smaller rivals more and create barriers to new entry and innovation going forward, then it’s unclear whether it makes any difference what we want because the options just won’t be there for us.

With time, Facebook will not only become more comfortable with its new regulatory status for that reason but then in the name of ensuring a “level playing field,” the firm will simultaneously advocate that each and every new rule be applied to all its rivals. Again, this is how well-intentioned regulation ends up indirectly discouraging the very innovation and competitive options that we need. Broadcasters and communications companies played the “level playing field” card at every juncture to beat down new technologies and rivals.

Finally, at some point, don’t be surprised if all roads lead back to prices for digital services. Right now, social networking services like Facebook are free-of-charge to consumers and digital companies use advertising to support their services. Many regulatory advocates have suggested that this sort of business model is fundamentally incompatible with privacy and have wanted it strictly curtail if not ended altogether. Of course, if you ask the public how many of them would be willing to pay $19.95 a month for Facebook, you won’t get many takers.

I wrote a couple of law review articles talking about the “privacy paradox” and consumer “willingness to pay” for privacy more generally. All the evidence suggests that consumer willingness to pay for privacy is significantly lower than privacy advocates would prefer. But if in the name protecting privacy, prices get pushed or imposed as a matter of public policy, then we will have entered a truly surreal moment in the history of regulatory policy because we will have inverted the presumption that consumer welfare is better served by lower prices. Over the past century, the purpose of most public utility regulation was lower prices, higher quality, and more choice. The modern Digital Economy has largely achieved those goals without heavy-handed regulation. But now, with the emerging regulatory regime looming for Facebook and social media more generally, we might end up with a sort of bizarro policy world in which we make people pay more in the name of making them better off!

I hope I’m wrong about everything I’ve said here. It would be troubling if we enter an era of less competition, less innovation, and lower quality information services. But to borrow a quote from my favorite sci-fi show, “all of this has happened before, and all of this will happen again.” And regulatory history tends to repeat. We shouldn’t be surprised, therefore, when some forget the ugly history of public utility-style regulation or broadcast era “public interest” mandates and we find ourselves stuck right back in the hole that we’ve been trying to dig ourselves out of for so many decades.

Broadcast license renewal challenges have troubled libertarians and free speech advocates for decades. Despite our efforts (and our law journal articles on the abuse of the licensing process), license challenges are legal. In fact, political parties, prior FCCs, and activist groups have encouraged license challenges based on TV content to ensure broadcasters are operating in “the public interest.” Further, courts have compelled and will compel a reluctant FCC to investigate “news distortion” and other violations of FCC broadcast rules. It’s a troubling state of affairs that has been pushed back into relevancy because FCC license challenges are in the news.

In recent years the FCC, whether led by Democrats or Republicans, has preferred to avoid tricky questions surrounding license renewals. Chairman Pai, like most recent FCC chairs, has been an outspoken defender of First Amendment protections and norms. He opposed, for instance, the Obama FCC’s attempt to survey broadcast newsrooms about their coverage. He also penned an op-ed bringing attention to the fact that federal NSF funding was being used by left-leaning researchers to monitor and combat “misinformation and propaganda” on social media.

The silence of the Republican commissioners today about license renewals is likely primarily because they have higher priorities (like broadband deployment and freeing up spectrum) than intervening in the competitive media marketplace. But second, and less understood, is because whether to investigate a news station isn’t really up to them. Courts can overrule them and compel an investigation.

Political actors have used FCC licensing procedures for decades to silence political opponents and unfavorable media. For reasons I won’t explore here, TV and radio broadcasters have diminished First Amendment rights and the public is permitted to challenge their licenses at renewal time.

So, progressive “citizens groups” even in recent years have challenged license renewals for broadcasters for “one-sided programming.” Unfortunately, it works. For instance, in 2004 the promises of multi-year renewal challenges from outside groups and the risk of payback from a Democrat FCC forced broadcast stations to trim a documentary critical of John Kerry from 40 minutes to 4 minutes. And, unlike their cable counterparts, broadcasters censor nude scenes in TV and movies because even a Janet Jackson Superbowl scenario can lead to expensive license challenges.

These troubling licensing procedures and pressure points were largely unknown to most people, but, on October 11, President Trump tweeted:

“With all of the Fake News coming out of NBC and the Networks, at what point is it appropriate to challenge their License? Bad for country!”

With all of the Fake News coming out of NBC and the Networks, at what point is it appropriate to challenge their License? Bad for country!

— Donald J. Trump (@realDonaldTrump) October 11, 2017

So why hasn’t the FCC said they won’t investigate NBC and other broadcast station owners? It may be because courts can compel the FCC to investigate “news distortion.”

This is exactly what happened to the Clinton FCC. As Melody Calkins and I wrote in August about the FCC’s news distortion rule:

Though uncodified and not strictly enforced, the rule was reiterated in the FCC’s 2008 broadcast guidelines. The outline of the rule was laid out in the 1998 case Serafyn v. CBS, involving a complaint by a Ukrainian-American who alleged that the “60 Minutes” news program had unfairly edited interviews to portray Ukrainians as backwards and anti-Semitic. The FCC dismissed the complaint but DC Circuit Court reversed that dismissal and required FCC intervention. (CBS settled and the complaint was dropped before the FCC could intervene.)

The commissioners might personally wish broadcasters had full First Amendment protections and want to dismiss all challenges but current law permits and encourages license challenges. The commission can be compelled to act because of the sins of omission of prior FCCs: deciding to retain the news distortion rule and other antiquated “public interest” regulations for broadcasters. The existence of these old media rules mean the FCC’s hands are tied.

By Brent Skorup and Melody Calkins

Recently, the FCC sought comments for its Media Modernization Initiative in its effort to “eliminate or modify [media] regulations that are outdated, unnecessary, or unduly burdensome.” The regulatory thicket for TV distribution has long encumbered broadcast and cable providers. These rules encourage large, homogeneous cable TV bundles and burden cable and satellite operators with high compliance costs. (See the complex web of TV regulations at the Media Metrics website.)

One reason “skinny bundles” from online video providers and cable operators are attracting consumers is that online video circumvents the FCC’s Rube Goldberg-like system altogether. The FCC should end its 50-year experiment with TV regulation, which, among other things, has raised the cost of TV and degraded the First Amendment rights of media outlets.

The proposal to eliminate legacy media rules garnered a considerable amount of support from a wide range of commenters. In our filed reply comments, we identify four regulatory rules ripe for removal:

• News distortion. This uncodified, under-the-radar rule allows the commission to revoke a broadcasters’ license if the FCC finds that a broadcaster deliberately engages in “news distortion, staging, or slanting.” The rule traces back to the FCC’s longstanding position that it can revoke licenses from broadcast stations if programming is not “in the public interest.”
  Though uncodified and not strictly enforced, the rule was reiterated in the FCC’s 2008 broadcast guidelines. The outline of the rule was laid out in the 1998 case Serafyn v. CBS, involving a complaint by a Ukrainian-American who alleged that the “60 Minutes” news program had unfairly edited interviews to portray Ukrainians as backwards and anti-Semitic. The FCC dismissed the complaint but DC Circuit Court reversed that dismissal and required FCC intervention. (CBS settled and the complaint was dropped before the FCC could intervene.)
  “Slanted” and distorted news can be found in (unregulated) cable news, newspapers, Twitter, and YouTube. The news distortion rule should be repealed and broadcasters should have regulatory parity (and their full First Amendment rights) restored.


• Must-carry. The rule requires cable operators to distribute the programming of local broadcast stations at broadcasters’ request. (Stations carrying relatively low-value broadcast networks seek carriage via must-carry. Stations carrying popular networks like CBS and NBC can negotiate payment from cable operators via “retransmission consent” agreements.) Must-carry was narrowly sustained by the Supreme Court in 1994 against a First Amendment challenge, on the grounds that cable operators had monopoly power in the pay-TV market. Since then, however, cable’s market share shrank from 95% to 53%. Broadcast stations have far more options for distribution, including satellite TV, telco TV, and online distribution and it’s unlikely the rules would survive a First Amendment challenge today.


• Network nonduplication and syndicated exclusivity. These rules limit how and when broadcast programming can be distributed and allow the FCC to intervene if a cable operator breaches a contract with a broadcast station. But the (exempted) distribution of hundreds of non-broadcast channels (e.g., CNN, MTV, ESPN) show that programmers and distributors are fully capable of forming private negotiations without FCC oversight. These rules simply make licensing negotiations more difficult and invite FCC intervention.

Finally, we identify retransmission consent regulations and compulsory licenses for repeal. Because “retrans” interacts with copyright matters outside of the FCC’s jurisdiction, we encourage the FCC work with the Copyright Office in advising Congress to repeal these statutes. Cable operators dislike the retrans framework and broadcasters dislike being compelled to license programming at regulated rates. These interventions simply aren’t needed (hundreds of cable and online-only TV channels operate outside of this framework) and neither the FCC nor the Copyright Office particularly likes being the referees in these fights. The FCC should break the stalemate and approach the Copyright Office about advocating for direct licensing of broadcast TV content.

Title II allows the FCC to determine what content and media Internet access providers must transmit on their own private networks, so the First Amendment has constantly dogged the FCC’s “net neutrality” proceedings. If the Supreme Court agrees to take up an appeal from the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, which rejected a First Amendment challenge this summer, it will likely be because of Title II’s First Amendment deficiencies.

Title II has always been about handicapping ISPs qua speakers and preventing ISPs from offering curated Internet content. As former FCC commissioner Copps said, absent the Title II rules, “a big cable company could block access to an investigative report about its less-than-stellar customer service.” Tim Wu told members of Congress that net neutrality was intended to prevent ISPs from favoring, say, particular news sources or sports teams.

But just as a cable company chooses to offer some channels and not others, and a search engine chooses to promote some pages and not others, choosing to offer a curated Internet to, say, children, religious families, or sports fans involves editorial decisions. As communications scholar Stuart Benjamin said about Title II’s problem, under current precedent, ISPs “can say they want to engage in substantive editing, and that’s enough for First Amendment purposes.”

Title II – Bringing Broadcast Regulation to the Internet

Title II regulation of the Internet is frequently compared to the Fairness Doctrine, which activists used for decades to drive conservatives out of broadcast radio and TV. As a pro-net neutrality media professor explained in The Atlantic last year, the motivation for the Fairness Doctrine and Title II Internet regulation is the same: to “rescue a potentially democratic medium from commercial capture.” This is why there is almost perfect overlap between the organizations and advocates who support the Fairness Doctrine and those who lobbied for Title II regulation of the Internet.

These advocates know that FCC regulation of media has proceeded in similar ways for decades. Apply the expansive “gatekeeper” label to a media distributor and then the FCC will regulate distributor operations, including the content transmitted. Today, all electronic media distributors–broadcast TV and radio, satellite TV and radio, cable TV, and ISPs–whether serving 100 customers or 100 million customers, are considered “gatekeepers” and their services and content are subject to FCC intervention.

With broadband convergence, however, the FCC risked losing the ability to regulate mass media. Title II gives the FCC direct and indirect authority to shape Internet media like it shapes broadcast media. In fact, Chairman Wheeler called the Title II rules “must carry–updated for the 21st century.”

The comparison is apt and suggests why the FCC can’t escape the First Amendment challenges to Title II. Must-carry rules require cable TV companies to transmit all local broadcast stations to their cable TV subscribers. Since the must-carry rules prevent the cable operator editorial discretion over their own networks, the Supreme Court held in Turner I that the rules interfered with the First Amendment rights of cable operators.

But the Communications Act Allows Internet Filtering

Internet regulation advocates faced huge problem, though. Unlike other expansions of FCC authority into media, Congress was not silent about regulation of the Internet. Congress announced a policy in the 1996 update to the Communications Act that Internet access providers should remain “unfettered by State and Federal regulation.”

Regulation advocates dislike Section 230 because of its deregulatory message and because it expressly allows Internet access providers to filter the Internet.

Professor Yochai Benkler, in agreement with Lawrence Lessig, noted that Section 230 gives Internet access providers editorial discretion. Benkler warned that because of 230, “ISPs…will interject themselves between producers and users of information.” Further, these “intermediaries will be reintroduced not because of any necessity created by the technology, or because the medium requires a clearly defined editor. Intermediaries will be reintroduced solely to acquire their utility as censors of morally unpalatable materials.”  

Professor Jack Balkin noted likewise that “…§ 230(c)(2) immunizes [ISPs] when they censor the speech of others, which may actually encourage business models that limit media access in some circumstances.” 

Even the FCC acknowledges the consumer need for curated services and says in the Open Internet Order that Title II providers can offer “a service limited to offering ‘family friendly’ materials to end users who desire only such content.”

While that concession represents a half-hearted effort to bring the Order within compliance of Section 230, it simply exposes the FCC to court scrutiny. Allowing “family friendly” offers but not other curated offers is content-based distinction. Under Supreme Court RAV v. City of St. Paul, “[c]ontent-based regulations are presumptively invalid.”  Further, the Supreme Court said in US v. Playboy, content-based burdens must satisfy the same scrutiny as content-based bans on content. 

Circuit Split over the First Amendment Rights of Common Carriers

Hopefully the content-based nature of the Title II regulations are reason enough for the Supreme Court to take up an appeal. Another reason is that there is now a circuit split regarding the extent of First Amendment protections for common carriers.

The DC Circuit said that the FCC can prohibit content blocking because ISPs have been labeled common carriers.

In contrast, other courts have held that common carriers are permitted to block content on common carrier lines. In Information Providers Coalition v. FCC, the 9th Circuit held that common carriers “are private companies, not state actors…and accordingly are not obliged to continue…services of particular subscribers.” As such, regulated common carriers are “free under the Constitution to terminate service” to providers of offensive content. The Court relied on its decision a few years earlier in  Carlin Communications v. Mountain States Telephone and Telegraph Company that when a common carrier phone company is connecting thousands of subscribers simultaneously to the same content, the “phone company resembles less a common carrier than it does a small radio station” with First Amendment rights to block content. 

Similarly, the 4th Circuit in Chesapeake & Potomac Telephone Co. v. US held that common carrier phone companies are First Amendment speakers when they bundle and distribute TV programming, and that a law preventing such distribution “impairs the telephone companies’ ability to engage in a form of protected speech .” 

The full DC Circuit will be deciding whether to take up the Title II challenges. If the judges decline review, the Supreme Court would be the final opportunity for a rehearing. If appeal is granted, the First Amendment could play a major role. The Court will be faced with a choice: Should the Internet remain “unfettered” from federal regulation as Congress intended? Or is the FCC permitted to perpetuate itself by bringing legacy media regulations to the online world?

The FCC appears to be dragging the TV industry, which is increasingly app- and Internet-based, into years of rulemakings, unnecessary standards development and oversight, and drawn-out lawsuits. The FCC hasn’t made a final decision but the general outline is pretty clear. T he FCC wants to use a 20 year-old piece of corporate welfare, calculated to help a now-dead electronics retailer, as authority to regulate today’s TV apps and their licensing terms. Perhaps they’ll succeed in expanding their authority over set top boxes and TV apps. But as TV is being revolutionized by the Internet the legacy providers are trying to stay ahead of the new players (Netflix, Amazon, Layer 3), regulating TV apps and boxes will likely impede the competitive process and distract the FCC from more pressing matters, like spectrum and infrastructure.

In the 1996 Telecom Act, a provision was added about set top boxes sold by cable and satellite companies. In the FCC’s words, Section 629 charges the FCC “to assure the commercial availability of devices that consumers use to access multichannel video programming.”  The law adds that such devices, boxes, and equipment must be from “manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with any multichannel video programming distributor.” In English: Congress wants to ensure that consumers can gain access to TV programming via devices sold by parties other than cable and satellite TV companies.

The FCC’s major effort to effect this this law did not end well. To create a market for “non-affiliated equipment,” the FCC created rules in 1998 that established the CableCARD technology, a module designed to the FCC’s specifications that could be inserted into “nonaffiliated” set top boxes.

CableCARD was developed and released to consumers, but after years of complex lawsuits and technology dead ends, cable technology had advanced and few consumers demanded CableCARD devices. The results reveal the limits of lawmaker-designed “competition.” In 2010, 14 years after passage of the law and all those years of agency resources, fewer than 1% of pay-TV customers had “unaffiliated” set top boxes.

It’s a strangely specific statute with no analogues for other technology devices. Why was this law created? Multichannel News reporting in 1998, representative of other reports at the time, has some clues.

[Rep.] Bliley, whose district includes the headquarters of electronics retailer Circuit City, sponsored the provision that requires the FCC to adopt rules to promote the retail sale of cable set-top boxes and navigation devices. 

So it it was a small addition to the Act, presumably added at the behest of Circuit City, so that electronics retailers and device companies could sell more consumer devices.

The good news is that by the law’s straightforward terms and intent, mission: accomplished. Despite CableCARD’s failure, electronics retailers today are selling devices that give consumers access to TV programming. That’s because, increasingly, TV providers are letting their apps do much of the work that set top boxes do. Today, many consumers can watch TV programming by installing a provider’s streaming TV app on their device of their choice, manufactured and sold by dozens of companies, like Samsung, Apple, and Google, and retailers. Unfortunately, Circuit City shuttered its last stores in 2009 and wasn’t around to benefit.

But the new FCC proposal says, no, mission: not accomplished. There’s some interpretative gymnastics to reach this conclusion. The FCC says “devices” and “equipment” should be interpreted broadly in order to capture apps made by pay-TV providers. Yet, while “devices and equipment” is broad enough to capture software like apps, it is not broad enough to capture actual devices and equipment, like smartphones, smart TVs, tablets, computers, and Chromecasts that consumers use to access pay-TV programming.

This strained reading of statutory language will create a regulatory mess out of the evolving pay-TV industry, that already has labyrinthine regulations.

But if you look at the history of FCC regulation, and TV regulation in particular, it’s pretty unexceptional. Advocates for FCC regulation have long seen a competitive and vibrant TV marketplace as a threat to the agency’s authority.

As former FCC chairman Newton Minow warned in his 1995 book, Abandoned in the Wasteland, the FCC would lose its ability to regulate TV if it didn’t find new justifications:

A television system with hundreds or thousands of channels—especially channels that people pay to watch—not only destroys the notion of channel scarcity upon which the public-trustee theory rests but simultaneously breathes life and logic into the libertarian model.

Minow advocated, therefore, that the FCC needed to find alternative reasons to retain some control of the TV industry, including affordability, social inclusiveness, education of youth, and elimination of violence. Special interests have manufactured a crisis in TV–“monopoly control” [sic] of set top boxes by TV distributors. As Scott Wallsten and others have suggested, bundling a set top box with a TV subscription is likely not a competitive problem and the FCC’s remedies are unlikely to work. 

The FCC’s blinkered view of the TV industry is necessary because the US TV and media marketplace is blossoming. Consumers have never had more access to programming on more devices. More than 100 standalone streaming video-on-demand products launched in 2015 alone. T he major TV providers are going where consumers are and launching their own streaming apps. The market won’t develop perfectly to the Commissioners’ liking and there will be hiccups, but competition is vigorous, output and quality are high, and consumers are benefiting.

The FCC decision to devote its highly-educated agency staff and resources (which will balloon when challenged in court or during the app specification proceedings) to an arcane consumer issue with such cynical origins is a lamentable waste of agency resources.

This an agency that for decades has done a hundred things poorly. In an increasingly competitive telecom and media marketplace, it should instead do a handful of things well. (Commissioner Pai has proposed useful infrastructure reforms and Commissioner Rosenworcel has an interesting proposal, that I’ve written about, to deploy federal spectrum into commercial markets). Let’s hope the agency leadership reassesses the necessity the this proceeding before dragging the TV industry into another wild goose chase.

Related research: This week Mercatus released a paper by MA Economics Fellow Joe Kane and me about the FCC’s reinvention as a social and cultural regulator: “The FCC and Quasi–Common Carriage A Case Study of Agency Survival.”

I came across an article last week in the AV Club that caught my eye. The title is: “The Telecommunications Act of 1996 gave us shitty cell service, expensive cable.” The Telecom Act is the largest update to the regulatory framework set up in the 1934 Communications Act. The basic thrust of the Act was to update the telephone laws because the AT&T long-distance monopoly had been broken up for a decade. The AV Club is not a policy publication but it does feature serious reporting on media. This analysis of the Telecom Act and its effects, however, omits or obfuscates important information about dynamics in media since the 1990s.

The AV Club article offers an illustrative collection of left-of-center critiques of the Telecom Act. Similar to Glass-Steagall  repeal or Citizens United, many on the left are apparently citing the Telecom Act as a kind of shorthand for deregulatory ideology run amuck. And like Glass-Steagall repeal and Citizens United, most of the critics fundamentally misstate the effects and purposes of the law. Inexplicably, the AV Club article relies heavily on a Common Cause white paper from 2005. Now, Common Cause typically does careful work but the paper is hopelessly outdated today. Eleven years ago Netflix was a small DVD-by-mail service. There was no 4G LTE (2010). No iPhone or Google Android (2007). And no Pandora, IPTV, and a dozen other technologies and services that have revolutionized communications and media. None of the competitive churn since 2005, outlined below, is even hinted at in the AV Club piece. The actual data undermine the dire diagnoses about the state of communications and media from the various critics cited in the piece. 

Competition in Telephone Service

Let’s consider the article’s provocative claim that the Act gave us “the continuing rise of cable, cellphone, and internet pricing.” Despite this empirical statement, no data are provided to support this. Instead, the article mostly quotes progressive platitudes about the evils of industry consolidation. I suppose platitudes are necessary because on most measures there’s been substantial, measurable improvements in phone and Internet service since the 1990s. In fact, the cost-per-minute of phone service has plummeted, in part, because of the competition unleashed by the Telecom Act. (Relatedly, there’s been a 50-fold increase in Internet bandwidth with no price increase.)

The Telecom Act undid much of the damage caused by decades of monopoly protection of telephone and cable companies by federal and state governments. For decades it was accepted that local telephone and cable TV service were natural monopolies. Regulators therefore prohibited competitive entry. The Telecom Act (mostly) repudiated that assumption and opened the door for cable companies and others to enter the telephone marketplace. The competitive results were transformative. According to FCC data, incumbent telephone companies, the ones given monopoly protection for decades, have lost over 100 million residential subscribers since 2000. Most of those households went wireless only but new competitors (mostly cable companies) have added over 32 million residential phone customers and may soon overtake the incumbents. The chart below breaks out connections by technology (VoIP, wireless, POTs), not incumbency, but the churn between competitors is apparent.

Further, while the Telecom Act was mostly about local landlines, not cellular networks, we can also dispense with the AV Club claim that dominant phone companies are increasing cellphone bills. Again, no data are cited. In fact, in quality-adjusted terms, the price of cell service has plummeted. In 1999, for instance, a typical cell plan was for regional coverage and offered 200 voice minutes for about $55 per month (2015 dollars). Until about 2000, there was no texting (1999 was the first year texting between carriers worked) and no data included. In comparison, for that same price today you can find a popular plan that includes, for all of North America, unlimited texting and voice minutes, plus 10 GB of 4G LTE data. Carriers spend tens of billions of dollars annually on maintaining and upgrading cellular networks and as a result, millions of US households are dropping landline connections (voice and broadband) for smartphones alone.

Competition in Television and Media

The critics of cable deregulation completely misunderstand and misstate the role of competition in the TV industry. Media quality is harder to measure, but its not a stretch to say that quality is higher than ever. Few dispute that we are in the Golden Age of Media, resulting from the proliferation of niche programming provided by Netflix, podcasts, Hulu, HBO, FX, and others. This virtual explosion in programming came about largely because there are more buyers (distributors) of programming and more cutthroat competition for eyeballs.

Again, the AV Club quotes the Common Cause report: “Roughly 98 percent of households with access to cable are served by only one cable company.”  Quite simply, this is useless stat. Why do we care how many coaxial cable companies are in a neighborhood? Consumers care about outputs–price, programming, quality, customer service–and number of competitors, regardless of the type of transmission network, which can be cellular, satellite, coaxial cable, fiber, or copper.

Look beyond the contrived “number of coaxial competitors” measure and it’s clear that m ost c able companies face substantial competition. The Telecom Act is a major source of the additional competition, particularly telco TV. Since passage of the Telecom Act, cable TV’s share of the subscription TV market fell from 95% to nearly 50%.

The Telecom Act repealed a decades-old federal policy that largely prohibited telephone companies from competing with cable TV providers. Not much changed for telco TV until the mid-2000s, when broadband technology improved and when the FCC freed phone companies from “unbundling” rules that forced telcos to lease their networks to competitors at regulated rates. In this investment-friendly environment, telephone companies began upgrading their networks for TV service and began purchasing and distributing programming. Since 2005, telcos have attracted about 13 million households and cable TV’s market share fell from about 70% to 53%. Further, much of consumer dissatisfaction with TV is caused by legacy regulations, not the Telecom Act. If cable, satellite, and phone companies were as free as Netflix and Hulu to bundle, price, and purchase content, we’d see lower prices and smaller bundles. 

The AV Club’s focus on Clear Channel [sic] and now-broken up media companies is puzzling and must be because of the article’s reliance on the 2005 Common Cause report. The bête noire of media access organizations circa 2005 was Clear Channel, ostensibly the sort of corporate media behemoth created by the Telecom Act. The hysteria proved unfounded.

Clear Channel broadcasting was rebranded in 2014 to iHeartRadio and its operations in the last decade do not resemble the picture described in the AV Club piece, that of a “radio giant” with “more than 1200 stations.” While still a major player in radio, since 2005 iHeartRadio’s parent company went private, sold all of its TV stations and hundreds of its radio station, and shed thousands of employees. The firm has serious financial challenges because of the competitive nature of the radio industry, which has seen entry from the likes of Pandora, Spotify, Google, and Apple.

The nostalgia for Cold War-era radio is also strange for an article written in the age of Pandora, Spotify, iTunes, and Google Play. The piece quotes media access scholar Robert McChesney about radio in the 1960s:

Fifty years ago when you drove from New York to California, every station would have a whole different sound to it because there would be different people talking. You’d learn a lot about the local community through the radio, and that’s all gone now. They destroyed radio. It was assassinated by the FCC and corporate lobbyists.

This oblique way of assessing competition–driving across the country–is necessary because local competition was actually relatively scarce in the 1960s. There were only about 5000 commercial radio stations in the US, which sounds like a lot except when you consider the choice and competition today. Today, largely because of digital advancements and channel splitting, there are more than 10 times as many available broadcast channels, as well as hundreds of low-power stations. Combined with streaming platforms, competition and choice is much more common today. Everyone in the US can, with an inexpensive 3G plan and a radio, access millions of niche podcasts and radio programs featuring music, hobbies, entertainment, news, and politics.

The piece quotes the 2005 report, alarmed that “ just five companies—Viacom, the parent of CBS, Disney, owner of ABC, News Corp, NBC and AOL, owner of Time Warner—now control 75 percent of all primetime viewing.” Again, I don’t understand why the article quotes decade-old articles about market share without updates. There is no mention that Viacom and CBS split up in 2005 and NewsCorp. and Fox split in 2013. The hysteria surrounding NBC, AOL, and Time Warner’s failed commercial relationships has been thoroughly explored and discredited by my colleague Adam Thierer and I’ll point you to his piece. As Adam has also documented, broadcast networks have been losing primetime audience share since at least the late 1970s, first to cable channels, then to streaming video. And nearly all networks, broadcast and cable, are seeing significant drops in audience as consumers turn to Internet streaming and gaming. Market power and profits in media is often short lived.

The article then decries the loss of local and state news reporting. It’s strange to blame the Telecom Act for newspaper woes since shrinking newsrooms is a global, not American, phenomenon with well-understood causes (loss of classifieds and increased competition with Web reporting). And, as I’ve pointed out, the greatest source of local and state reporting is local papers, but the FCC has largely prohibited papers from owning radio and TV broadcasters (which would provide papers a piece of TV’s lucrative ad and retrans revenue) for decades, even as local newspapers downsize and fail. 

The article was a fascinating read if only because it reveals how many left-of-center prognostications about media aged poorly. Those on the right have their own problems with the Act, namely its vastly different regulatory regimes (“telecommunications,” “wireless,” “television”) in a world of broadband and convergence. But useful reform means diagnosing what inhibits competition and choice in media and communications markets. Much of the competitive problems in fact arise from the enforcement of natural monopoly restrictions in the past. Media and communications has seen huge quality improvements since 1996 because the Telecom Act rejected the natural monopoly justifications for regulation. The Telecom Act has proven unwieldy but it cannot be blamed for nonexistent problems in phone and TV.

The FCC’s transaction reviews have received substantial scholarly criticism lately. The FCC has increasingly used its license transaction reviews as an opportunity to engage in ad hoc merger reviews that substitute for formal rulemaking. FCC transaction conditions since 2000 have ranged from requiring AOL-Time Warner to make future instant messaging services interoperable, to price controls for broadband for low-income families, to mandating merging parties to donate $1 million to public safety initiatives.

In the last few months alone,

• Randy May and Seth Cooper of the Free State Foundation wrote a piece that the transaction reviews contravene rule of law norms.
• T. Randolph Beard et al. at the Phoenix Center published a research paper about how the FCC’s informal bargaining during mergers has become much more active and politically motivated in recent years.
• Derek Bambauer, law professor at the University of Arizona, published a law review article that criticized the use of informal agency actions to pressure companies to act in certain ways. These secretive pressures “cloak what is in reality state action in the guise of private choice.”

This week, in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, my colleague Christopher Koopman and I added to this recent scholarship on the FCC’s controversial transaction reviews.

We echo the argument that the FCC merger policies undermine the rule of law. Firms have no idea which policies they’ll need to comply with to receive transaction approval. We also note that the FCC is motivated to shift from formal regulation, which is time consuming and subject to judicial review, to “regulation by transaction,” which has fewer restraints on agency action. The FCC and the courts have put few meaningful limits on what can be coerced from merging firms. Many concessions from merging firms are policies that the FCC is simply unwilling to accomplish via formal rulemaking or, sometimes, is outright prohibited by law from regulating. Since a firm’s concessions in this coercive process are nominally voluntary, they typically can’t sue.

We point out, further, that the FCC has a potentially damaging legal issue on its hands. Since the agency is now extracting concessions related to content distribution and TV and radio programming, its transaction review authority may be presumptively unconstitutional and subject to facial First Amendment challenges. That means many parties can challenge the law, not simply the ones burdened by conditions (who fear FCC retaliation).

Content-neutral licensing laws, like the FCC’s transaction review authority, are presumptively unconstitutional when there’s a risk  that public officials will intimidate speakers about content. We cite for this proposition the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., a 1988 case striking down as unconstitutional a city requirement that newspapers seek a public interest determination from public officials before installing newsracks. As the Court said, for rules with a “nexus to expression,”

a facial [First Amendment] challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.

The public officials in City of Lakewood hadn’t even pressured newspapers about content; the mere potential for intimidation was a constitutional violation. If the agency’s authority was challenged, the FCC would be in worse shape than the public officials in City of Lakewood. Unlike those local officials, the FCC has used licensing to pressure firms to add certain types of programming. So the law certainly has the nexus to expression that the Supreme Court requires for a facial challenge.

We highlight, for instance, the many concessions related to content in the 2010 Comcast-NBCU merger. Comcast-NBCU conceded to create children’s, public interest, and Spanish-language TV and video-on-demand programming, relinquish editorial control over Hulu programming, and spend millions of dollars on digital literacy and FDA nutritional TV public service announcements. In that merger and many others, the FCC conditioned approval on compliance with open access and net neutrality policies. As I and others have pointed out, net neutrality rules also threaten free speech rights.

We conclude with some policy recommendations to avoid a constitutional problem for the FCC, including congressional repeal of the FCC’s transaction review authority. We point out that the FCC actually has Clayton Act authority to review common carrier mergers, but the FCC refuses to use it, likely because the agency views traditional competition analysis as too constraining. In our view, unless or until the FCC promulgates predictable guidelines about what is relevant in a transaction review and stays away from content distribution issues, the FCC’s transaction review authority is vulnerable to legal challenge.

For decades Congress has gradually deregulated communications and media. This poses a significant threat to the FCC’s jurisdiction because it is the primary regulator of communications and media. The current FCC, exhibiting alarming mission creep, has started importing its legacy regulations to the online world, like Title II common carrier regulations for Internet providers. The FCC’s recent proposal to “open up” TV set top boxes is consistent with the FCC’s reinvention as the US Internet regulator, and now the White House has supported that push.

There are a lot of issues with the set top box proposal but I’ll highlight a few. I really don’t even like referring to it as “the set top box proposal” because the proposal is really aimed at the future of TV–video viewing via apps and connected devices. STBs are a sideshow and mostly just provide the FCC a statutory hook to regulate TV apps. Even that “hook” is dubious–the FCC arbitrarily classifies apps and software as “navigation devices” but concludes that actual TV devices like Chromecast, Roku, smartphones, and tablets aren’t navigation devices. And, despite what activists say, this isn’t about “cable” either but all TV distributors (“MVPDs”) like satellite and telephone companies and Google Fiber, most of whom are small TV players.

First, the entire push for the proposal is based on the baseless notion that “charging monthly STB fees reveals that cable companies are abusing their market power.” I say baseless because cable companies have lost 14 million TV subscribers since 2002 to phone and satellite companies’ TV offerings (Verizon FiOS TV, Dish, Google Fiber, etc.), which suggests cable doesn’t have market power to charge anticompetitive prices. This is bolstered by the fact that the rates cable companies charge are consistent with what their smaller phone and satellite competitors charge for STBs. In fact, the STB monthly rates cable companies charge are pretty much identical to what municipal-owned and -operated TV stations charge. Even competing STB companies like TiVo charge monthly fees.

Second, as I’ve written, the FCC’s plans simply won’t work. The FCC tried “opening up” cable boxes for years with CableCard. That debacle resulted in ten years of regulations and FCC-directed standards and had only a marginal effect on the STB market. At conclusion, under 5% of the STB market went to “competitive” STB makers like TiVo. This latest plan has an even smaller chance of success because the FCC is not simply regulating cable boxes, but also boxes from satellite TV and IPTV distributors and their apps. The FCC is telling these hundreds of companies using dozens of technologies, codecs, and standards to develop interoperable standards so that other companies can retransmit the TV programming the MVPDs have bundled. It’s impractical and likely to fail, as Larry Downes noted in Recode, which is why the FCC provides few details about how this will work.

Third, what little progress the FCC does make in forcing MVPDs to make their TV programming accessible to competitors’ video apps and devices will tend to make broadband and TV less competitive. What the FCC is trying to do is force, say, Comcast’s TV programming to be available to certain application makers who want to retransmit that programming. So whatever streams to the Comcast Xfinity app will need to also work on competing apps if a competitor wants to re-bundle that programming.

The problem is that TV packages are how these companies compete and FCC rules will hinder that competitive process. TV distributors, including Netflix, purchase rights for sports and other programming to steal subscribers away from competitors. For instance, DirecTV attracts many customers solely because they have NFL Sunday Ticket and Amazon and Netflix original programming is a huge draw to their video services. TV programming and bundling that programming drives the competitive process. The Google Fiber folks likewise found out the importance of TV programming to compete. They planned originally to offer only broadband but came to find out there was little market for a broadband-only provider. Most people want TV packaged with broadband and Google was compelled by market forces to go out and purchase TV programming to attract customers. (On the other hand, some cable companies like Cable One are getting out of the TV game because programmers have significant leverage.)

Even non-MVPDs like mobile carriers and tech companies, including Twitter, Yahoo, and Facebook, are using TV programming to compete and they are investing big into video programming. Verizon Wireless has exclusive NFL programming, T-Mobile recently gave its subscribers a year of streaming access to most baseball games via a MLB.TV deal, and AT&T is giving mobile subscribers access to DirecTV programming. The point is, companies compete by experimenting with different service and program bundles. By forcing programming onto competing applications, devices, and platforms, the FCC short-circuits these competitive dynamics.

Fourth, speaking of purchasing rights, there is misinformation spreading about what TV access consumers are entitled to. For instance, there’s a recent Public Knowledge post that simply distorts the economics and law of TV licensing. Notably, the post says the FCC’s proposal “makes it easier for subscribers to control their own experience when accessing the programming that they…have paid for and to which they have lawful access.” This is simply false. Just because Walking Dead has been licensed for viewing on your television does not mean it’s lawful (or beneficial) for a TV competitor to take that same programming and send it to you via their own app.

Copyright holders re-sell the same programming to different distributors, sometimes several times over. Programmers have exclusive licensing deals with various distributors and device makers, so just because your cable contract allows you to watch it on your TV does not mean you have lawful access anywhere. For instance, the NFL has licensed Thursday Night NFL games to CBS and NBC for broadcast TV viewing, to the NFL Network for cable TV viewing, to Verizon Wireless for smartphone viewing, and to Twitter for computer viewing. Same programming, four different distribution technologies and five different companies. When programming can be easily repurposed, as the FCC would like, that upends entire business models of hundreds of media companies and distributors.

Further, it injects the FCC into copyright licensing issues. Put aside for the moment the debates, that the Public Knowledge post touches on, whether copyright holders are too restrictive. Whatever your views, reforming program licensing should come from Congress and the courts–not the FCC through this convoluted proposal. In fact, change via the courts is what Public Knowledge implicitly endorses. It was the courts–not the FCC–that made VCRs, DVRs, and DVR cloud storage legal in the face of copyright holder opposition. When the FCC last got involved in intervening in TV rights assignments in the 1960s and 1970s, the agency created broadcast retransmission rights, which have plagued communications and copyright law with complexity and lawsuits to this day.

Quite simply, the FCC is coercing companies to make their contracted-for TV content available to others who didn’t contract for it. This proposal will create a mess in television when implemented. It’s an unnecessary intervention into a marketplace–video programming–that is working. We are in what many media critics regard as the Golden Age of Television. That’s because there are so many TV distributors competing for programming. It’s a sellers’ market. The supposed problems here–high STB prices and copyright restrictiveness–are problems for competition agencies and the courts, respectively, not the FCC. The FCC wants to fix what’s not broken and start regulating apps and online video. It does nothing to improve the television market and simply makes more tech and media companies dependent on the FCC’s good graces for competitive survival.

With great fanfare, FCC Chairman Thomas Wheeler is calling for sweeping changes to the way cable TV set-top boxes work.

In an essay published Jan. 27 by Re/Code, Wheeler began by citing the high prices consumers pay for set-top box rentals, and bemoans the fact that alternatives are not easily available. Yet for all the talk and tweets about pricing and consumer lock-in, Wheeler did not propose an inquiry into set-top box profit margins, nor whether the supply chain is unduly controlled by the cable companies. Neither did Wheeler propose an investigation into the complaints consumers have made about cable companies’ hassles around CableCards, which under FCC mandate cable companies must provide to customers who buy their own set-top boxes.

In fact, he dropped the pricing issue halfway through and began discussing access to streaming content:

To receive streaming Internet video, it is necessary to have a smart TV, or to watch it on a tablet or laptop computer that, similarly, do not have access to the channels and content that pay-TV subscribers pay for. The result is multiple devices and controllers, constrained program choice and higher costs.

This statement seems intentionally misleading. Roku, Apple TV and Amazon Fire sell boxes that connect to TVs and allow a huge amount of streaming content to play. True, the devices are still independent of the set-top cable box but there is no evidence that this lack of integration is a competitive barrier.

A new generation of devices, called media home gateways (MHGs), is poised to provide this integration, as well as manage other media-based cloud services on behalf of consumers. This is where Wheeler’s proposal should be worrisome. He writes:

The new rules would create a framework for providing device manufacturers, software developers and others the information they need to introduce innovative new technologies, while at the same time maintaining strong security, copyright and consumer protections.

This sounds much more like a plan to dictate operating systems, user interfaces and other hardware and software standards for equipment that until now has been unregulated. Wheeler gives no explanation as to how his proposal will lead to lower prices or development of a direct-to-consumer sales channel.

[M]y proposal will pave the way for a competitive marketplace for alternate navigation devices, and could even end the need for multiple remote controls, allowing you to use one for all of the video sources you use.

What Wheeler really wants is FCC management of the transition from today’s set-top boxes to the media home gateways (MHGs) just beginning to appear on the market—a foray into customer premises equipment regulation unseen since the 1960s.

For good reason, the words “media home gateway” never appear in Wheeler’s Re/Code article. By avoiding mention of MHGs, he can play his “lack of competition” card, as he did in Thursday’s press briefing on his proposal.

There’s more than a whiff of misdirection here. Set-top boxes are a maturing market. An October 2015 TechNavio report forecasts the shipment volume of the global set-top box market to decline at a compound annual rate of 1.34 % over the period 2014-2019. By revenue, the market is expected to decline at a compound annual rate 1.36% during the forecast period. When consumers “cut the cable cord,” as some 21 million have, it’s set-top boxes that get unplugged.

At the same time, TechNavio forecasts the global MHG market to grow at a compound annual rate of 7.82% over the same period. Elsewhere, SNL Kagan’s Multimedia Research Group forecasts MHG shipments will exceed 24 million in 2017, up from 7.7 million in 2012. The long list of MHG manufacturers includes ActionTec, Arris, Ceva, Huawei, Humax, Samsung and Technicolor.

MHGs are the “alternative navigation devices” Wheeler coyly refers to in his Re/Code essay. These devices will replace the set-top boxes in use today, but because of their ability to handle Internet streaming, they are likely to be available through more than one channel. That’s why they only way to view Wheeler’s call to “unlock the set-top box” is as a pre-emptive move to extend the FCC’s regulation into the delivery of streaming media.

To be sure, if the FCC mandates integration of streaming options into cable-provided MHGs, streaming companies would gain stronger foothold into consumers’ homes, which would then allow them to share their apps, gather data on users, and, perhaps most lucratively of all, control the interface on which channels are displayed, as noted by The Verge’s Ashley Carman.

Yet the streaming companies that would appear to benefit most from this proposal have thus far been quiet. Perhaps because Wheeler has made no secret that he believes Apple TV, Amazon Fire and Roku are multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs), FCC-speak for “local cable companies.” Is his “unlock the box” plan precisely the opposite? Is it an effort to fold streaming aggregators into the existing cable TV regulatory platform, with all its myriad rules, regulations, legal obligations and—dare we say it—fees and surcharges? You might roll your eyes, but this is the only analysis in which the proposal, which focuses on “device manufacturers, software developers and others,” makes sense.

But does the FCC have the right to require cable companies to share customer data acquired through the infrastructure and software they built and own? It’s yet another iteration of the old unbundled network elements model that is consistently shot down by the courts yet one that the FCC can’t seem to get past.

Arcane details aside, the FCC should not be involved in directing evolution paths, operating software or other product features. It creates too much opportunity for lobbying and rent-seeking. History shows that when the government gets granularly involved in promoting technology direction, costs go up and innovation suffers as capital is diverted into politically-favored choices where it ends up wasted. The debacles with the Chevy Volt and Solera are just two recent examples of the dangers inherent when bureaucrats try to pick winners, or give a subset of companies in one industry an assist and the expense of others.

This post originally appeared Feb. 1, 2016 on the R Street Institute official blog.

Last Friday I attended a fascinating conference hosted by the Duke Law School’s Center for Innovation Policy about television regulation and competition. It’s remarkable how quickly television competition has changed and how online video providers are putting pressure on old business models.

I’ve been working on a project about competition in technology, communications, and media and one chart that stands out is one that shows increasing competition in pay television, below. Namely, that cable providers have lost nearly 15 million subscribers since 2002. Cable was essentially the only game in town in 1990 for pay television (about 100% market share). Yet today, cable’s market share approaches 50%. This competitive pressure accounts for some cable companies trying to merge in recent years.

Much of this churn by subscribers was to satellite providers but it’s the “telephone” companies providing TV that’s really had a competitive impact in recent years. Telcos went from about 0% market share in 2005 to 13% in 2014. This new competition can be tied to Congress finally allowing telephone companies to provide TV in 1996. However, these new services didn’t really get started until a decade ago when 1) digital and IP technology improved, and 2) the FCC made it clear by deregulating DSL ISPs that telephone companies could expect a market return for investing in fiber broadband nationwide.

UPDATE:

And below is market share data going back ten more years to 1994 using FCC data, which uses a slightly different measurement methodology (hence the kink around 2003-2004). I’ve also omitted market share of Home Satellite Dish (those large dishes you sometimes see in rural areas). Though HSD has negligible market share today, it had a few million subscribers in the mid-1990s. I may add HSD later.

At the same time FilmOn, an Aereo look-alike, is seeking a compulsory license to broadcast TV content, free market advocates in Congress and officials at the Copyright Office are trying to remove this compulsory license. A compulsory license to copyrighted content gives parties like FilmOn the use of copyrighted material at a regulated rate without the consent of the copyright holder. There may be sensible objections to repealing the TV compulsory license, but transaction costs–the ostensible inability to acquire the numerous permissions to retransmit TV content–should not be one of them.

Economists can devise situations where transaction costs are immense and compulsory licenses are needed for a well-functioning market. Today, as when the compulsory license was created, the conventional wisdom is that TV compulsory licenses are still needed to prevent market failure.

In the 1970s, cable companies were capturing broadcast channels and retransmitting it to their subscribers for free because, per the Supreme Court, cable was a passive transmitter and didn’t need copyright permission. In 1976, to correct this perceived unfairness, Congress amended the Copyright Act and said this cable retransmission did necessitate copyright authorization. To make it easier on cable systems (most of which were small, local operations), the law created a compulsory license to broadcast TV content like NBC, ABC, and CBS programming.

The compulsory license primarily does two things: it provides cable operators local TV content royalty-free and provides non-local (“distant”) content (imagine a DC cable company importing a WGN broadcast from Chicago) at regulated rates.

As the House report says:

The Committee recognizes…that it would be impractical and unduly burdensome to require every cable system to negotiate with every copyright owner whose work was retransmitted by a cable system.

The Copyright Office, early on, opposed the compulsory license and has called for the repeal of the compulsory license to broadcast TV content since 1981. As the Register of Copyrights said at a 2000 congressional hearing,

A compulsory license is not only a derogation of a copyright owner’s exclusive rights, but it also prevents the marketplace from deciding the fair value of copyrighted works through government-set price controls.

But when the issue of repeal comes up, many parties cite “significant transaction costs” as a problem with conventional, direct licensing. GAO echoed these objections in an April 2015 report,

we have previously found that obtaining the copyright holders’ permission for all this content would be challenging. Each television program may have multiple copyright holders, and rebroadcasting an entire day of content may require obtaining permission from hundreds of copyright holders. The transaction costs of doing so make this impractical for cable operators.

That sounds sensible but we have powerful contradictory evidence: for decades, hundreds of TV channels requiring the bundling of thousands of copyright licenses are distributed seamlessly and completely outside of the compulsory license regime.

So it’s a mystery to me why analysts still talk about the difficulty in acquiring copyright permission from hundreds or thousands of rights holders. TV distributors outside of the compulsory license scheme do these complex content acquisition deals routinely. Hundreds of non-broadcast channels–like ESPN, CNN, Bravo, HGTV, MTV, and Fox News–are distributed to tens of millions of households via private contractual agreements and without regulated compulsory licenses. TBS, uniquely, in the late 1990s went from a broadcast channel, subject to a compulsory license, to a cable channel distributed via direct licensing with no apparent ill effects. Analysts raising the transactions costs for keeping compulsory licenses, to my knowledge, never explain why the market failure they predict is absent for these hundreds of cable and satellite channels.

Further, while cable and satellite companies don’t need to negotiate broadcast TV copyrights because of the compulsory license, the FCC’s retransmission consent process, part of the 1992 Cable Act, requires these companies to negotiate payment to retransmit broadcast signals–signals that contain the underlying copyrighted content. This process, though bizarre and artificial, is essentially the same negotiation cable and satellite companies would need to enter into in a world without compulsory license.

Finally, online programming from distributors like Hulu, Netflix, and (potentially) Apple TV operate entirely outside of the retrans-compulsory copyright system and undermine the transaction costs objection. Netflix, for instance, doesn’t negotiate with every individual right holder like GAO and Congress imply is necessary in a non-compulsory license regime. Content aggregators and intermediaries, not regulation, streamline the rights acquisition process without the need for a compulsory license. The ostensibly burdensome transaction costs don’t stop Netflix from licensing over 10,000 titles worth around $9 billion.

Certainly, converting from compulsory licensing to direct licensing has issues. Changing legal regimes can be costly and there is a need to prevent anticompetitive withholding of content. Understandably, many cable and satellite distributors oppose repeal of compulsory licenses if the complex FCC system of retransmission consent and must carry are maintained. I tend to agree. Nevertheless, it’s time to strike the transaction cost argument from the policy discussion. The predicted market failure is overcome by market forces.

For more background on TV regulation, see Adam Thierer and Brent Skorup, Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation and Current Legislative Proposals (Mercatus working paper).

Congress is considering reforming television laws and solicited comment from the public last month. On Friday, I submitted a letter encouraging the reform effort. I attached the paper Adam and I wrote last year about the current state of video regulations and the need for eliminating the complex rules for television providers.

As I say in the letter, excerpted below, pay TV (cable, satellite, and telco-provided) is quite competitive, as this chart of pay TV market share illustrates. In addition to pay TV there is broadcast, Netflix, Sling, and other providers. Consumers have many choices and the old industrial policy for mass media encourages rent-seeking and prevents markets from evolving.

Dear Chairman Upton and Chairman Walden:

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Committee’s December 2014 questions on video regulation.

…The labyrinthine communications and copyright laws governing video distribution are now distorting the market and therefore should be made rational. Congress should avoid favoring some distributors at the expense of free competition. Instead, policy should encourage new entrants and consumer choice.

The focus of the committee’s white paper on how to “foster” various television distributors, while understandable, was nonetheless misguided. Such an inquiry will likely lead to harmful rules that favor some companies and programmers over others, based on political whims. Congress and the FCC should get out of “fostering” the video distribution markets completely. A light-touch regulatory approach will prevent the damaging effects of lobbying for privilege and will ensure the primacy of consumer choice.

Some of the white paper’s questions may actually lead policy astray. Question 4, for instance, asks how we should “balance consumer welfare and the rights of content creators” in video markets. Congress should not pursue this line of inquiry too far. Just consider an analogous question: how do we balance consumer welfare and the interests of content creators in literature and written content? The answer is plain: we don’t. It’s bizarre to even contemplate.

Congress does not currently regulate the distribution markets of literature and written news and entertainment. Congress simply gives content producers copyright protection, which is generally applicable. The content gets aggregated and distributed on various platforms through private ordering via contract. Congress does not, as in video, attempt to keep competitive parity between competing distributors of written material: the Internet, paperback publishers, magazine publishers, books on tape, newsstands, and the like. Likewise, Congress should forego any attempt at “balancing” in video content markets. Instead, eliminate top-down communications laws in favor of generally applicable copyright laws, antitrust laws, and consumer protection laws.

As our paper shows, the video distribution marketplace has changed drastically. From the 1950s to the 1990s, cable was essentially consumers’ only option for pay TV. Those days are long gone, and consumers now have several television distributors and substitutes to choose from. From close to 100 percent market share of the pay TV market in the early 1990s, cable now has about 50 percent of the market. Consumers can choose popular alternatives like satellite- and telco-provided television as well as smaller players like wireless carriers, online video distributors (such as Netflix and Sling), wireless Internet service providers (WISPs), and multichannel video and data distribution service (MVDDS or “wireless cable”). As many consumers find Internet over-the-top television adequate, and pay TV an unnecessary expense, “free” broadcast television is also finding new life as a distributor.

The New York Times reported this month that “[t]elevision executives said they could not remember a time when the competition for breakthrough concepts and creative talent was fiercer” (“Aiming to Break Out in a Crowded TV Landscape,” January 11, 2015). As media critics will attest, we are living in the golden age of television. Content is abundant and Congress should quietly exit the “fostering competition” game. Whether this competition in television markets came about because of FCC policy or in spite of it (likely both), the future of television looks bright, and the old classifications no longer apply. In fact, the old “silo” classifications stand in the way of new business models and consumer choice.

Therefore, Congress should (1) merge the FCC’s responsibilities with the Federal Trade Commission or (2) abolish the FCC’s authority over video markets entirely and rely on antitrust agencies and consumer protection laws in television markets. New Zealand, the Netherlands, Denmark, and other countries have merged competition and telecommunications regulators. Agency merger streamlines competition analyses and prevents duplicative oversight.

Finally, instead of fostering favored distribution channels, Congress’ efforts are better spent on reforms that make it easier for new entrants to build distribution infrastructure. Such reforms increase jobs, increase competition, expand consumer choice, and lower consumer prices.

Thank you for initiating the discussion about updating the Communications Act. Reform can give America’s innovative telecommunications and mass-media sectors a predictable and technology neutral legal framework. When Congress replaces industrial planning in video with market forces, consumers will be the primary beneficiaries.

Sincerely,

Brent Skorup Research Fellow, Technology Policy Program Mercatus Center at George Mason University

As 2014 draws to a close, we take a look back at the most-read posts from the past year at The Technology Liberation Front. Thank you for reading, and enjoy.

10. New York’s financial regulator releases a draft of ‘BitLicense’ for Bitcoin businesses. Here are my initial thoughts.

In July, Jerry Brito wrote about New York’s proposed framework for regulating digital currencies like Bitcoin.

My initial reaction to the rules is that they are a step in the right direction. Whether one likes it or not, states will want to license and regulate Bitcoin-related businesses, so it’s good to see that New York engaged in a thoughtful process, and that the rules they have proposed are not out of the ordinary.

9. Google Fiber: The Uber of Broadband

In February, I noted some of the parallels between Google Fiber and ride-sharing, in that new entrants are upending the competitive and regulatory status quo to the benefit of consumers.

The taxi registration systems and the cable franchise agreements were major regulatory mistakes. Local regulators should reduce regulations for all similarly-situated competitors and resist the temptation to remedy past errors with more distortions.

8. The Debate over the Sharing Economy: Talking Points & Recommended Reading

In September, Adam Thierer appeared on Fox Business Network’s Stossel show to talk about the sharing economy. In a TLF post, he expands upon his televised commentary and highlights five main points.

7. CES 2014 Report: The Internet of Things Arrives, but Will Washington Welcome It?

After attending the 2014 Consumer Electronics Show in January, Adam wrote a prescient post about the promise of the Internet of Things and the regulatory risks ahead.

When every device has a sensor, a chip, and some sort of networking capability, amazing opportunities become available to consumers…. But those same capabilities are exactly what raise the blood pressure of many policymakers and policy activists who fear the safety, security, or privacy-related problems that might creep up in a world filled with such technologies.

6. Defining “Technology”

Earlier this year, Adam compiled examples of how technologists and experts define “technology,” with entries ranging from the Oxford Dictionary to Peter Thiel. It’s a slippery exercise, but

if you are going to make an attempt to either study or critique a particular technology or technological practice or development, then you probably should take the time to tell us how broadly or narrowly you are defining the term “technology” or “technological process.”

5. The Problem with “Pessimism Porn”

Adam highlights the tendency of tech press, academics, and activists to mislead the public about technology policy by sensationalizing technology risks.

The problem with all this, of course, is that it perpetuates societal fears and distrust. It also sometimes leads to misguided policies based on hypothetical worst-case thinking…. [I]f we spend all our time living in constant fear of worst-case scenarios—and premising public policy upon them—it means that best-case scenarios will never come about.

4. Mark T. Williams predicted Bitcoin’s price would be under $10 by now; it’s over $600

Professor Mark T. Williams predicted in December 2013 that by mid-2014, Bitcoin’s price would fall to below $10. In mid-2014, Jerry commends Prof. Williams for providing, unlike most Bitcoin watchers, a bold and falsifiable prediction about Bitcoin’s value. However, as Jerry points out, that prediction was erroneous: Bitcoin’s 2014 collapse never happened and the digital currency’s value exceeded $600.

3. What Vox Doesn’t Get About the “Battle for the Future of the Internet”

In May, Tim Lee wrote a Vox piece about net neutrality and the Netflix-Comcast interconnection fight. Eli Dourado posted a widely-read and useful corrective to some of the handwringing in the Vox piece about interconnection, ISP market power, and the future of the Internet.

I think the article doesn’t really consider how interconnection has worked in the last few years, and consequently, it makes a big deal out of something that is pretty harmless…. There is nothing unseemly about Netflix making … payments to Comcast, whether indirectly through Cogent or directly, nor is there anything about this arrangement that harms “the little guy” (like me!).

2. Muddling Through: How We Learn to Cope with Technological Change

The second most-read TLF post of 2014 is also the longest and most philosophical in this top-10 list. Adam wrote a popular and in-depth post about the social effects of technological change and notes that technology advances are largely for consumers’ benefit, yet “[m]odern thinking and scholarship on the impact of technological change on societies has been largely dominated by skeptics and critics.” The nature of human resilience, Adam explains, should encourage a cautiously optimistic view of technological change.

1. Help me answer Senate committee’s questions about Bitcoin

Two days into 2014, Jerry wrote the most-read TLF piece of the past year. Jerry had testified before the Senate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee in 2013 as an expert on Bitcoin. The Committee requested more information about Bitcoin post-hearing and Jerry solicited comment from our readers.

Thank you to our loyal readers for continuing to visit The Technology Liberation Front. It was busy year for tech and telecom policy and 2015 promises to be similarly exciting. Have a happy and safe New Years!

There’s a small but influential number of tech reporters and scholars who seem to delight in making the US sound like a broadband and technology backwater. A new Mercatus working paper by Roslyn Layton, a PhD fellow at a research center at Aalborg University, and Michael Horney a researcher at the Free State Foundation, counter that narrative and highlight data from several studies that show the US is at or near the top in important broadband categories.

For example, per Pew and ITU data, the vast majority of Americans use the Internet and the US is second in the world in data consumption per capita, trailing only South Korea. Pew reveals that for those who are not online the leading reasons are lack of usability and the Internet’s perceived lack of benefits. High cost, notably, is not the primary reason for infrequent use.

I’ve noted before some of the methodological problems in studies claiming the US has unusually high broadband prices. In what I consider their biggest contribution to the literature, Layton and Horney highlight another broadband cost frequently omitted in international comparisons: the mandatory media license fees many nations impose on broadband and television subscribers.

These fees can add as much as $44 to the monthly cost of broadband. When these fees are included in comparisons, American prices are frequently an even better value. In two-thirds of European countries and half of Asian countries, households pay a media license fee on top of the subscription fees to use devices such as connected computers and TVs. …When calculating the real cost of international broadband prices, one needs to take into account media license fees, taxation, and subsidies. …[T]hese inputs can materially affect the cost of broadband, especially in countries where broadband is subject to value-added taxes as high as 27 percent, not to mention media license fees of hundreds of dollars per year.

US broadband providers, the authors point out, have priced broadband relatively efficiently for heterogenous uses–there are low-cost, low-bandwidth connections available as well as more expensive, higher-quality connections for intensive users.

Further, the US is well-positioned for future broadband use. Unlike many wealthy countries, Americans typically have access, at least, to broadband from telephone companies (like AT&T DSL or UVerse) as well as from a local cable provider. Competition between ISPs has meant steady investment in network upgrades, despite the 2008 global recession. The story is very different in much of Europe, where broadband investment, as a percentage of the global total, has fallen noticeably in recent years. US wireless broadband is also a bright spot: 97% of Americans can subscribe to 4G LTE while only 26% in the EU have access (which partially explains, by the way, why Europeans often pay less for mobile subscriptions–they’re using an inferior product).

There’s a lot to praise in the study and it’s necessary reading for anyone looking to understand how US broadband policy compares to other nations’. The fashionable arguments that the US is at risk of falling behind technologically were never convincing–the US is THE place to be if you’re a tech company or startup, for one–but Layton and Horney show the vulnerability of that narrative with data and rigor.

Even though few things are getting passed this Congress, the pressure is on to reauthorize the Satellite Television Extension and Localism Act (STELA) before it expires at the end of this year. Unsurprisingly, many have hoped this “must pass bill” will be the vehicle for broader reform of video. Getting video law right is important for our content rich world, but the discussion needs to expand much further than STELA.

Over at the American Action Forum, I explore a bit of what would be needed, and just how far the problems are rooted:

The Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) efforts to spark localism and diversity of voices in broadcasting stands in stark contrast to relative lack of regulation governing non-broadcast content providers like Netflix and HBO, which have revolutionized delivery and upped the demand for quality content. These amorphous social goals also have limited broadcasters. Without any consideration for the competitive balance in a local market, broadcasters are barred in what they can own, are saddled with various programming restrictions, and are subject to countless limitations in the use of their spectrum. Moreover, the FCC has sought to outlaw deals between broadcasters who negotiate jointly for services and ads.

In the effort to support specific “public interest” goals, the FCC has implemented certain regulations which have cabined both broadcasters and paid TV distributors. In turn, these regulations forced companies to develop in proscribed ways, and in turn prompted further regulatory action when they have tried to innovate. Speaking about this cat-and-mouse game in the financial sector, Professor Edward Kane termed the relationship, the “regulatory dialectic.”

But unwrapping the regulatory dialectic in video law will require a vehicle far more expansive than STELA. Ultimately, I conclude,

Both the quality of programming and the means of accessing it have undergone dramatic changes in the past two decades but the regulations have not. Consumer preferences and choices are shifting, which needs to be met by alterations in the regulatory regime. STELA is one part of the puzzle, but like so many other areas of telecommunication law, a comprehensive look at the body of laws ruling video is needed. It is increasingly clear that the laws governing programming must be updated to meet the 21st century marketplace.

On this site especially, there has been a vigorous debate on just what this framework would entail. For a more comprehensive look, check out:

• Geoffrey Manne’s testimony on STELA before the House of Representatives’ Energy and Commerce;
• Adam Thierer’s and Brent Skorup’s paper on video law entitled, “Video Marketplace Regulation: A Primer on the History of Television Regulation and Current Legislative Proposals”;
• Ryan Radia’s blog post entitled, “A Free Market Defense of Retransmission Consent”;
• Fred Campbell’s white paper on the “Future of Broadcast Television,” as well as his various posts on the subject;
• And Hance Hanley’s posts on video law.

Congressional debates about STELA reauthorization have resurrected the notion that TV stations “must provide a free service” because they “are using public spectrum.” This notion, which is rooted in 1930s government policy, has long been used to justify the imposition of unique “public interest” regulations on TV stations. But outdated policy decisions don’t dictate future rights in perpetuity, and policymakers abandoned the “public spectrum” rationale long ago.

All wireless services use the public spectrum, yet none of them are required to provide a free commercial service except broadcasters. Satellite television operators, mobile service providers, wireless Internet service providers, and countless other commercial spectrum users are free to charge subscription fees for their services.

There is nothing intrinsic in the particular frequencies used by broadcasters that justifies their discriminatory treatment. Mobile services use spectrum once allocated to broadcast television, but aren’t treated like broadcasters.

The fact that broadcast licenses were once issued without holding an auction is similarly irrelevant.  All spectrum licenses were granted for free before the mid-1990s. For example, cable and satellite television operators received spectrum licenses for free, but are not required to offer their video services for free.

If the idea is to prevent companies who were granted free licenses from receiving a “windfall”, it’s too late. As Jeffrey A. Eisenach has demonstrated, “the vast majority of current television broadcast licensees [92%] have paid for their licenses through station transactions.”

The irrelevance of the free spectrum argument is particularly obvious when considering the differential treatment of broadcast and satellite spectrum. Spectrum licenses for broadcast TV stations are now subject to competitive bidding at auction while satellite television licenses are not. If either service should be required to provide a free service on the basis of spectrum policy, it should be  satellite television.

Although TV stations were loaned an extra channel during the DTV transition, the DTV transition is over. Those channels have been returned and were auctioned for approximately $19 billion in 2008. There is no reason to hold TV stations accountable in perpetuity for a temporary loan.

Even if there were, the loan was  not free. Though TV stations did not pay lease fees for the use of those channels, they nevertheless paid a heavy price. TV stations were required to invest substantial sums in HDTV technology and to broadcast signals in that format long before it was profitable. The FCC required “rapid construction of digital facilities by network-affiliated stations in the top markets, in order to expose a significant number of households, as early as possible, to the benefits of DTV.” TV stations were thus forced to “bear the risks of introducing digital television” for the benefit of consumers, television manufacturers, MVPDs, and other digital media.

The FCC did not impose comparable “loss leader” requirements on MVPDs. They are free to wait until consumer demand for digital and HDTV content justifies upgrading their systems — and they are still lagging TV stations by a significant margin. According to the FCC, only about half of the collective footprints of the top eight cable MVPDs had been transitioned to all-digital channels at the end of 2012. By comparison, the DTV transition was completed in 2009.

There simply is no satisfactory rationale for requiring broadcasters to provide a free service based on their use of spectrum or the details of past spectrum licensing decisions. If the applicability of a free service requirement turned on such issues, cable and satellite television subscribers wouldn’t be paying subscription fees.

Shortly after Tom Wheeler assumed the Chairmanship at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), he summed up his regulatory philosophy as “competition, competition, competition.” Promoting competition has been the norm in communications policy since Congress adopted the Telecommunications Act of 1996 in order to “promote competition and reduce regulation.” The 1996 Act has largely succeeded in achieving competition in communications markets with one glaring exception: broadcast television. In stark contrast to the pro-competitive approach that is applied in other market segments, Congress and the FCC have consistently supported policies that artificially limit the ability of TV stations to compete or innovate in the communications marketplace.

Radio broadcasting was not subject to regulatory oversight initially. In the unregulated era, the business model for over-the-air broadcasting was “still very much an open question.” Various methods for financing radio stations were proposed or attempted, including taxes on the sale of devices, private endowments, municipal or state financing, public donations, and subscriptions. “We are today so accustomed to the dominant role of the advertiser in broadcasting that we tend to forget that, initially, the idea of advertising on the air was not even contemplated and met with widespread indignation when it was first tried.”

Section 303 of the Communications Act of 1934 thus provided the FCC with broad authority to authorize over-the-air subscription television service (STV). When the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals addressed this provision, it held that “subscription television is entirely consistent with [the] goals” of the Act. Analog STV services did not become widespread in the marketplace, however, due in part to regulatory limitations imposed on such services by the FCC. As a result, advertising dominated television revenue in the analog era.

The digital television (DTV) transition offered a new opportunity for TV stations to provide STV services in competition with MVPDs. The FCC had initially hoped that “multicasting” and other new capabilities provided by digital technologies would “help ensure robust competition in the video market that will bring more choices at less cost to American consumers.”

Despite the agency’s initial optimism, regulatory restrictions once again crushed the potential for TV stations to compete in other segments of the communications marketplace. When broadcasters proposed offering digital STV services with multiple broadcast and cable channels in order to compete with MVPDs, Congress held a hearing to condemn the innovation. Chairmen from both House and Senate committees threatened retribution against broadcasters if they pursued subscription television services — “There will be a quid pro quo.” Broadcasters responded to these Congressional threats by abandoning their plans to compete with MVPDs.

It’s hard to miss the irony in the 1996 Act’s approach to the DTV transition. Though the Act’s stated purposes are to “promote competition and reduce regulation, it imposed additional regulatory requirements on television stations that have stymied their ability to innovate and compete. The 1996 Act broadcasting provision requires that the FCC impose limits on subscription television services “so as to avoid derogation of any advanced television services, including high definition television broadcasts, that the Commission may require using such frequencies,” and prohibits TV stations from being deemed an MVPD. The FCC’s rules require TV stations to “transmit at least one over-the-air video programming signal at no direct charge to viewers” because “free, over-the-air television is a public good, like a public park, and might not exist otherwise.

These and other draconian legislative and regulatory limitations have forced TV stations to follow the analog television business model into the 21st Century while the rest of the communications industry innovated at a furious pace. As a result of this government-mandated broadcast business model, TV stations must rely on advertising and retransmission consent revenue for their survival.

Though the “public interest” status of TV stations may once have been considered a government benefit, it is rapidly becoming a curse. Congress and the FCC have both relied on the broadcast public interest shibboleth to impose unique and highly burdensome regulatory obligations on TV stations that are inapplicable to their competitors in the advertising and other potential markets. This disparity in regulatory treatment has increased dramatically under the current administration — to the point that is threatening the viability of broadcast television.

Here are just three examples of the ways in which the current administration has widened the regulatory chasm between TV stations and their rivals:

• In 2012, the FCC required only TV stations to post “political file” documents online, including the rates charged by TV stations for political advertising; MVPDs are not required to post this information online. This regulatory disparity gives political ad buyers and incentive to advertise on cable rather than broadcast channels and forces TV stations to disclose sensitive pricing information more widely than their competitors.
• This year the FCC prohibited joint sales agreements for television stations only; MVPDs and online content distributors are not subject to any such limitations on their advertising sales. This prohibition gives MVPDs and online advertising platforms a substantial competitive advantage in the market for advertising sales.
• This year the FCC also prohibited bundled programming sales by broadcasters only; cable networks are not subject to any limitations on the sale of programming in bundles. This disparity gives broadcast networks an incentive to avoid limitations on their programming sales by selling exclusively to MVPDs (i.e., becoming cable networks).

The FCC has not made any attempt to justify the differential treatment — because there is no rational justification for arbitrary and capricious decision-making.

Sadly, the STELA process in the Senate is threatening to make things worse. Some legislative proposals would eliminate retransmission consent and other provisions that provide the regulatory ballast for broadcast television’s government mandated business model  without eliminating the mandate. This approach would put a quick end to the administration’s “death by a thousand cuts” strategy with one killing blow. The administration must be laughing itself silly. When TV channels in smaller and rural markets go dark, this administration will be gone — and it will be up to Congress to explain the final TV transition.

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) recently sought additional comment on whether it should eliminate its network non-duplication and syndicated exclusivity rules (known as the “broadcasting exclusivity” rules). It should just as well have asked whether it should eliminate its rules governing broadcast television. Local TV stations could not survive without broadcast exclusivity rights that are enforceable both legally and practicably.

The FCC’s broadcast exclusivity rules “do not create rights but rather provide a means for the parties to exclusive contracts to enforce them through the Commission rather than the courts.” (Broadcast Exclusivity Order, FCC 88-180 at ¶ 120 (1988)) The rights themselves are created through private contracts between TV stations and video programming vendors in the same manner that MVPDs create exclusive rights to distribute cable network programming.

Local TV stations typically negotiate contracts for the exclusive distribution of national broadcast network or syndicated programming in their respective local markets in order to preserve their ability to obtain local advertising revenue. The FCC has long recognized that, “When the same program a [local] broadcaster is showing is available via cable transmission of a duplicative [distant] signal, the [local] broadcaster will attract a smaller audience, reducing the amount of advertising revenue it can garner.” (Program Access Order, FCC 12-123 at ¶ 62 (2012)) Enforceable broadcast exclusivity agreements are thus necessary for local TV stations to generate the advertising revenue that is necessary for them to survive the government’s mandatory broadcast television business model.

The FCC determined nearly fifty years ago that it is an anticompetitive practice for multichannel video programming distributors (MVPDs) to import distant broadcast signals into local markets that duplicate network and syndicated programming to which local stations have purchased exclusive rights. ( See First Exclusivity Order, 38 FCC 683, 703-704 (1965)) Though the video marketplace has changed since 1965, the government’s mandatory broadcast business model is still required by law, and MVPD violations of broadcast exclusivity rights are still anticompetitive.

The FCC adopted broadcast exclusivity procedures to ensure that broadcasters, who are legally prohibited from obtaining direct contractual relationships with viewers or economies of scale, could enjoy the same ability to enforce exclusive programming rights as larger MVPDs. The FCC’s rules are thus designed to “allow all participants in the marketplace to determine, based on their own best business judgment, what degree of programming exclusivity will best allow them to compete in the marketplace and most effectively serve their viewers.” (Broadcast Exclusivity Order at ¶ 125.)

When it adopted the current broadcast exclusivity rules, the FCC concluded that enforcement of broadcast exclusivity agreements was necessary to counteract regulatory restrictions that prevent TV stations from competing directly with MVPDs. Broadcasters suffer the diversion of viewers to duplicative programming on MVPD systems when local TV stations choose to exhibit the most popular programming, because that programming is the most likely to be duplicated. ( See Broadcast Exclusivity Order at ¶ 62.) Normally firms suffer their most severe losses when they fail to meet consumer demand, but, in the absence of enforceable broadcast exclusivity agreements, this relationship is reversed for local TV stations: they suffer their most severe losses precisely when they offer the programming that consumers desire most.

The fact that only broadcasters suffer this kind of [viewership] diversion is stark evidence, not of inferior ability to be responsive to viewers’ preferences, but rather of the fact that broadcasters operate under a different set of competitive rules. All programmers face competition from alternative sources of programming. Only broadcasters face, and are powerless to prevent, competition from the programming they themselves offer to viewers. (Id. at ¶ 42.)

The FCC has thus concluded that, if TV stations were unable to enforce exclusive contracts through FCC rules, TV stations would be competitively handicapped compared to MVPDs. ( See id. at ¶ 162.)

Regulatory restrictions effectively prevent local TV stations from enforcing broadcast exclusivity agreements through preventative measures and in the courts: (1) prohibitions on subscription television and the use of digital rights management (DRM) prevent broadcasters from protecting their programming from unauthorized retransmission, and (2) stringent ownership limits prevent them from obtaining economies of scale.

Preventative measures may be the most cost effective way to protect digital content rights. Most digital content is distributed with some form of DRM because, as Benjamin Franklin famously said, “an ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure.” MVPDs, online video distributors, and innumerable Internet companies all use DRM to protect their digital content and services — e.g., cable operators use the CableCard standard to limit distribution of cable programming to their subscribers only.

TV stations are the only video distributors that are legally prohibited from using DRM to control retransmission of their primary programming. The FCC adopted a form of DRM for digital television in 2003 known as the “broadcast flag”, but the DC Circuit Court of Appeals struck it down.

The requirement that TV stations offer their programming “at no direct charge to viewers” effectively prevents them from having direct relationships with end users. TV stations cannot require those who receive their programming over-the-air to agree to any particular terms of service or retransmission limitations through private contract. As a result, TV stations have no way to avail themselves of the types of contractual protections enjoyed by MVPDs who offer services on a subscription basis.

The subscription television and DRM prohibitions have a significant adverse impact on the ability of TV stations to control the retransmission and use of their programming. The Aereo litigation provides a timely example. If TV stations offered their programming on a subscription basis using the CableCard standard, the Aereo “business” model would not exist and the courts would not be tying themselves into knots over potentially conflicting interpretations of the Copyright Act. Because they are legally prohibited from using DRM to prevent companies like Aereo from receiving and retransmitting their programming in the first instance, however, TV stations are forced to rely solely on after-the-fact enforcement to protect their programming rights — i.e., protected and uncertain litigation in multiple jurisdictions.

Localism policies make after-the-fact enforcement particularly cost for local TV stations. The stringent ownership limits that prevent TV stations from obtaining economies of scale have the effect of subjecting TV stations to higher enforcement costs relative to other digital rights holders. In the absence of FCC rules enforcing broadcast exclusivity agreements, family owned TV stations could be forced to defend their rights in court against significantly larger companies who have the incentive and ability to use litigation strategically.

In sum, the FCC’s non-duplication and syndication rules balance broadcast regulatory limitations by providing clear mechanisms for TV stations to communicate their contractual rights to MVPDs, with whom they have no direct relationship, and enforce those rights at the FCC (which is a strong deterrent to the potential for strategic litigation). There is nothing unfair or over-regulatory about FCC enforcement in these circumstances. So why is the FCC asking whether it should eliminate the rules?