My colleague Wayne Brough and I recently went on the “Kibbe on Liberty” show to discuss how to discuss the state of free speech on the internet. We explained how censorship is a Big Government problem, not a Big Tech problem. Here’s the complete description of the show and the link to the full episode is below.

” With Elon Musk’s purchase of Twitter, we are in the middle of a national debate about the tension between censorship and free expression online. On the Right, many people are calling for government to rein in what they perceive as the excesses of Big Tech companies, while the Left wants the government to crack down on speech they deem dangerous. Both approaches make the same mistake of giving politicians authority over what we are allowed to say and hear. And with recent revelations about government agents leaning on social media companies to censor speech, it’s clear that when it comes to the online conversation, there’s no such thing as a purely private company.”

For more on this issues, please see: “The Classical Liberal Approach to Digital Media Free Speech Issues.”

I’ve been floating around in conservative policy circles for 30 years and I have spent much of that time covering media policy and child safety issues. My time in conservative circles began in 1992 with a 9-year stint at the Heritage Foundation, where I launched the organization’s policy efforts on media regulation, the Internet, and digital technology. Meanwhile, my work on child safety has spanned 4 think tanks, multiple blue ribbon child safety commissions, countless essays, dozens of filings and testimonies, and even a multi-edition book.

During this three-decade run, I’ve tried my hardest to find balanced ways of addressing some of the legitimate concerns that many conservatives have about kids, media content, and online safety issues. Raising kids is the hardest job in the world. My daughter and son are now off at college, but the last twenty years of helping them figure out how to navigate the world and all the challenges it poses was filled with difficulties. This was especially true because my daughter and son faced completely different challenges when it came to media content and online interactions. Simply put, there is no one-size-fits-all playbook when it comes to raising kids or addressing concerns about healthy media interactions.

Something Must Be Done!

My personal approach, as I summarized in my book on these issues, was to first and foremost do everything in my power to (a) keep an open mind about new media content and platforms, and (b) ensure an open line of ongoing communication with my kids about the issues they might be facing. Shutting down conversation or calling for others to come in and save the day were the worst two options, in my opinion. As I summarized in my book, “At the end of the day, there is simply no substitute for talking to our children in an open, loving, and understanding fashion about the realities of-this world, including the more distasteful bits.” This was my Parental Prime Directive, if you will. I just always wanted to make sure that my kids felt like they could talk to me about their issues, no matter how varied, horrible, or heart-breaking those problems might be.

When talking with other parents through the years, I’ve heard about their own unique concerns and struggles. Every family faces different challenges because no two kids or situations are alike. Moreover, the challenges can feel overwhelming in our modern world of information abundance, which is flush with ubiquitous communications and media options. Sometimes these parental frustrations can fester and grow into a sort of rage until you finally hear folks utter that famous phrase: Something must be done! And that “something” is often some sort of government regulation “for the children.”

Again, I get it. When all your best efforts to help or protect your kids don’t seem to work according to plan, it’s only natural to call for help. But there are very serious problems associated with calling on government for that help. When legislators and regulators are asked to play the role of National Nanny, it comes with all the same baggage that accompanies many other efforts by the government to intervene in our lives or control what people or organizations can say or do.

Conservative Contradictions

These are particularly sensitive issues for many conservatives, both because conservatives tend to have more heightened concerns about media content and online safety issues, and also because the steps they often recommend to address these issues can quickly come into conflict with their own first principles.

Let me run through six ways that support for media content controls and child safety regulations can sometimes run afoul of conservative principles.

1) It’s a rejection of personal responsibility

Again, I understand all too well how hard parenting can be. But that does not mean we should abdicate our parental responsibilities to the State. Conservatives have spent decades fighting government when it comes to broken schools and the supposed brainwashing many kids get in them. The rallying cry of conservatives has long been: Let us have a greater say in how we raise and educate our children because the State is failing us or betraying our values.

Thus, when conservatives suggest that the State should be making decisions for us as it pertains to anything the government says is a “child safety” issue, there is some serious cognitive dissonance going on there. In his humorous Devil’s Dictionary, Ambrose Bierce jokingly defined responsibility as, “A detachable burden easily shifted to the shoulders of God, Fate, Fortune, Luck or one’s neighbor. In the days of astrology it was customary to unload it upon a star.” For parental responsibility to actually mean something, it has to be more than a “detachable burden” that we unload upon government.

2) It’s an embrace of the administrative state & arbitrary rule by unelected bureaucrats

Beyond the classroom, conservatives have long been concerned about the specter of massive administrative agencies and armies of unelected bureaucrats controlling our lives from the shadows. I’ve spent decades working with conservative organizations and scholars trying to get the administrative state under some control to scale back its enormous power, arbitrary edicts, and costly burdens. Over-criminalization has become such a problem that, according to the Heritage Foundation, “regulatory offenses… have proliferated to the point that, literally, nobody knows how many federal criminal regulations exist today.” We’re all criminals of some sort in the eyes of the modern regulatory state.

Yet, when conservatives advocate the expansion of the administrative state through new “online safety” regulations, they are just making the over-criminalization problem worse, including by treating our own children as guilty parties for simply trying to access the primary media platforms of their generation and interact with their friends there. For example, calls to ban all teens from social media until they’re 18 would result in the most massive “forbidden fruit” nightmare in American history, with every teen suddenly becoming a criminal actor and working together to tunnel around bans using the same sort of VPNs and evasion technologies people in China and other repressive nations use to get around over-bearing speech policies. [See: “Again, We Should Not Ban All Teens from Social Media”]

Needless to say, all this regulation and bureaucratic empowerment would have massive negative externalities for online freedom more generally as the era of “permissionless innovation” is replaced by a new age of permission-slip regulation.

3) It’s a rejection of the First Amendment & free speech rights

Conservatives have spent many decades pushing for greater First Amendment-based freedoms as it pertains to religious liberty and or organizational/corporate speech issues. Thus, when conservatives seek to undermine free speech principles and jurisprudence in the name of child safety, it could undo everything conservatives have been fighting to accomplish in those other contexts.

Conservatives are understandably upset with some social media platforms for being too over-zealous with certain types of speech takedowns or de-platformings. But two wrongs don’t make a right, and they should not be calling on Big Government to be imposing its own editorial judgments in place of private actors. [See: “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“ and “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer.“]

4) It’s a rejection of property rights and freedom more generally

Related to the previous two points, conservatives have long upheld the sanctity of property rights in many different contexts. This includes the property rights that private establishments enjoy under the Constitution to generally decide how to structure their operations, who they will do business with, and how they will do so. Private organizations and religious institutions possess not only free speech rights in this regard, but property and contractual rights, too.

But when it comes to “child safety” mandates, some conservatives would toss all this out the window and undermine those rights, replacing them with burdensome regulatory mandates that tell private parties how to conduct their affairs. Again, there’s a lot of cognitive dissonance going on here and it could have serious blowback for conservatives when the property / contractual rights of other people or organizations are undermined on similar grounds.

5) It’s an embrace of frivolous lawsuits & the trial lawyers that bring them

The last time I checked, trial lawyers were not exactly the most conservative-friendly constituency. For many decades, conservatives have looked to advance tort reform, limit junk science and frivolous lawsuits, and make sure that the courts don’t engage in excessive judicial activism.

Unfortunately, many of the child safety regulations being proposed today would empower the regulatory state and trial lawyers at the same time. Many of the bills being floated open the door to open-ended litigation and potentially punishing liability for private platforms — and not just against deep-pocketed “Big Tech” companies. The fact is, once conservatives open the litigation floodgates based on amorphous accusations of potential online safety harms, they will be empowering the tort bar (one of the biggest supporters of the Democratic Party, no less) to launch a legal jihad against any and every media platform out there. Good luck putting that genie back in the bottle once you unleash it.

6) It’s an embrace of the same moral panic arguments your parents leveled against you

How quickly we forget the accusations our own parents and others leveled against us as children. Remember when video games were going to make us a lost generation of murderous youth? Or when rap and rock-and-roll music were going to send us straight to hell? Today, those kids are all grown up and trying to tell us that they are fine but it’s this latest generation that is doomed. It’s just an endless generational cycle of moral panics. [See: “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?” and “Confessions of a ‘Vidiot’: 50 Years of Video Games & Moral Panics”] Today’s conservatives need to remember that they, too, were once kids and somehow muddled through to adulthood.

The “3-E” Approach Is the Better Answer

At this point, some of the people who’ve read this far are screaming at the screen: “So, are you saying we should just do nothing!?”

Absolutely not. But it is important that we consider less onerous and more practical ways to address these challenging issues without falling prey to Big Government gimmicks that would undermine other important principles. We should start by acknowledging that there are no easy fixes or silver-bullet solutions. The plain truth of the matter is that the best solutions here can seem messy and unsatisfying to many because they require enormous ongoing efforts to mentor and assist our kids at a far deeper level than some folks are comfortable with.

For example, it is just insanely uncomfortable to have to speak with your kids about online bullying or harassment, pornography, violence in movies and games, hate speech, and so on. And I haven’t even mentioned the hardest things to talk to kids about: The daily news of the real world: wars, violence, tragic accidents, famines, etc. Honestly, the hardest conversations I’ve had to have with my kids were those about school shootings. By comparison, many other discussions about online content and interactions were much easier. To the extent that we’re attempting to measure and address negative media affects, I firmly believe that there a few things in this world more horrifying to kids — or harder to talk with them about — than the first 10 minutes of what’s on cable news each hour of the day.

Regardless, whether we’re talking about the potential “harms” or mass media or online content, we cannot pretend there exists a simple solution to any of it. Here’s the better approach.

I recently authored a study for the American Enterprise Institute on, “Governing Emerging Technology in an Age of Policy Fragmentation and Disequilibrium.” It was my attempt to sketch out a flexible, pragmatic, bottom-up set of governance principles for modern technology platforms and issues. In that report, I noted how “[t]he First Amendment constitutes a particularly high barrier to the use of hard law in the United States,” and that court challenges were likely to continue to block many of the regulatory efforts being floated today, just as been the case countless times before in recent decades. Thus, we need to have backup approaches to online safety beyond one-size-fits-all regulatory Hail Mary passes.

I have described that backup plan as the “3-E” approach or “layered approach” to online safety:

• Empowerment of parents: Parental controls cannot solve all the world’s problems. It’s better to view them as helpful speed bumps or emergency alerts for when things are going badly for your child. In the old days, we placed a lot of faith in filtering, and that still has a role along with other tools that help place some reasonable limits not only on content but also overall consumption. But the best types of parental empowerment are those that force conversations between parents and kids by allowing reasonable monitoring to happen that is scaled by age (as in more limits for younger kids until they are gradually relaxed over time). And other carrot-and-stick tools and approaches are incredibly useful in helping parents place smart limits on youth activity and overall consumption.
• Education of youth: Education is the strategy with the most lasting impact for online safety. Education and digital literacy provide skills and wisdom that can last a lifetime. Specifically, education can help teach both kids (and adults!) how to behave in — or respond to — a wide variety of situations. Building resiliency and encouraging healthy interactions is the goal.
• Enforcement of existing laws: There are many sensible and straightforward laws already in place that address more concrete types of harm and harassment. And we have lots of laws pertaining to fraud and unfair and deceptive practices. Sometimes these rules can be challenging (and time-consuming) to enforce, but they constitute an existing backstop that can handle most worst-case scenarios when other less-restrictive steps fall short. And we should certainly tap these existing remedies before advancing unworkable new regulatory regimes.

I noted in my AEI study that, between 2000 and 2010, six major online-safety task forces or blue-ribbon commissions were formed to study online-safety issues and consider what should be done to address them. Each of them recommended some variant of the “3-E” approach as they encouraged a variety of best practices, educational approaches, and technological-empowerment solutions to address various safety concerns. Self-regulatory codes, private content-rating systems, and a wide variety of different parental-control technologies all proliferated during this period. Many multi-stakeholder initiatives and other organizations were also formed to address governance issues collaboratively. There are countless groups doing important work on this front today, including my old friends at the Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI) among many others.

These organizations push for a layered approach to online safety and work closely with educators, child development experts, and other academics and activists to find workable solutions to new online safety challenges as they arise. Their work is never done, and at times it can feel overwhelming. But, again, it’s the nature of the task at hand. We all must work together to continuously devise new and better approaches to addressing these challenges, because they will be endless. But let’s please not expect that we can unload these responsibilities on government and expect regulators to somehow handle it for us.

Do the Ends Justify the Means When it Comes to Media & Content Control?

I could be wasting my breath here because I’ve been attempting to appeal to conservative principles that may be rapidly disappearing from the modern conservative movement. Donald Trump radically disrupted everything in American politics, but especially the Republican Party. Many so-called national conservatives now live by Trump’s central operating principle: The ends justify the means. The ends are “owning the libs” in any way possible. And “the libs” include not only anyone on the Left of the political spectrum, but even those individuals and institutions that Trumpian conservatives believe are “the enemy” and controlled by “liberal interests.” By their definition, this now includes virtually all large media and technology companies and platforms. Thus, when we turn to the means, it’s increasingly the case that just about anything goes — including many traditional conservative principles.

To see how far we’ve come, recall what President Ronald Reagan said 35 years ago when vetoing an effort to reinstate the Fairness Doctrine. “History has shown that the dangers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and compe­tition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee,” he said. At the time, President Reagan was confronted with some of the same arguments we hear today about media being too biased or conservatives not getting a fair shake. But he called upon his fellow conservatives to reject the idea that Big Government was the solution to such problems.

Unfortunately, Mr. Trump and some of his most loyal followers and even some major conservative groups today have largely given up on this logic and instead embraced regulation. While Trumpian conservatives love to decry everyone they oppose as “communists,” ironically it is this same group that is embracing a sort of communications collectivism as it pertains to modern media control. In the Trumpian worldview, media and tech platforms are useful only to the extent they carry out the will of the party — or at least the man on top of it.

These national conservatives have made a horrible miscalculation. Feeling aggrieved by Big Tech “bias,” or just feeling overwhelmed by things they don’t like about online platforms, they’ve decided that two wrongs make a right. In reality, two political wrongs never make a right, but they almost always combine to make government a lot bigger and more powerful.

It’s an incredibly naïve gamble almost certainly destined to fail, but they should ask themselves what it means if it works. This endless ratcheting effect will result in comprehensive state control of most channels of communications and information dissemination. Is this a game that you really think you can play better than the Lefties?

I’ll close by returning to one of Reagan’s favorite jokes. He always used to say that, “The nine most terrifying words in the English language are: I’m from the government and I’m here to help.” I would suggest that an even scarier version of that line would be, “We’re from the government and we’re here to help you parent your kids.”

Don’t let it be you uttering that line.

______________

Additional Reading

· Adam Thierer, “Again, We Should Not Ban All Teens from Social Media”

· Adam Thierer, “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?”

· Adam Thierer, “The Classical Liberal Approach to Digital Media Free Speech Issues”

· Adam Thierer, “Confessions of a ‘Vidiot’: 50 Years of Video Games & Moral Panics”

· Adam Thierer, “Left and right take aim at Big Tech — and the First Amendment“

· Adam Thierer, “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer“

· Adam Thierer, “Ongoing Series: Moral Panics / Techno-Panics”

· Adam Thierer, “No Goldilocks Formula for Content Moderation in Social Media or the Metaverse, But Algorithms Still Help”

· Adam Thierer, “FCC’s O’Rielly on First Amendment & Fairness Doctrine Dangers“

· Adam Thierer, “Conservatives & Common Carriage: Contradictions & Challenges“

· Adam Thierer, “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“

· Adam Thierer, “A Good Time to Re-Read Reagan’s Fairness Doctrine Veto“

· Adam Thierer, “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet“

· Adam Thierer, “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“

· Adam Thierer, “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“

· Adam Thierer, “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“

· Adam Thierer, “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“

· Adam Thierer, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools and Methods (2009).

On December 13th, I will be participating in an Atlas Network panel on, “Big Tech, Free Speech, and Censorship: The Classical Liberal Approach.” In anticipation of that event, I have also just published a new op-ed for The Hill entitled, “Left and right take aim at Big Tech — and the First Amendment.” In this essay, I expand upon that op-ed and discuss the growing calls from both the Left and the Right for a variety of new content regulations. I then outline the classical liberal approach to concerns about free speech platforms more generally, which ultimately comes down to the proposition that innovation and competition are always superior to government regulation when it comes to content policy.

In the current debates, I am particularly concerned with calls by many conservatives for more comprehensive governmental controls on speech policies enforced by various private platforms, so I will zero in on those efforts in this essay. First, here’s what both the Left and the Right share in common in these debates: Many on both sides of the aisle desire more government control over the editorial decisions made by private platforms. They both advocate more political meddling with the way private firms make decisions about what types of content and communications are allowed on their platforms. In today’s hyper-partisan world,” I argue in my Hill column, “tech platforms have become just another plaything to be dominated by politics and regulation. When the ends justify the means, principles that transcend the battles of the day — like property rights, free speech and editorial independence — become disposable. These are things we take for granted until they’ve been chipped away at and lost.”

Despite a shared objective for greater politicization of media markets, the Left and the Right part ways quickly when it comes to the underlying objectives of expanded government control. As I noted in my Hill op-ed:

there is considerable confusion in the complaints both parties make about “Big Tech.” Democrats want tech companies doing more to limit content they claim is hate speech, misinformation, or that incites violence. Republicans want online operators to do less, because many conservatives believe tech platforms already take down too much of their content.

This makes life very lonely for free speech defenders and classical liberals. Usually in the past, we could count on the Left to be with us in some free speech battles (such as putting an end to “indecency” regulations for broadcast radio and television), while the Right would be with us on others (such as opposition to the “Fairness Doctrine,” or similar mandates). Today, however, it is more common for classical liberals to be fighting with both sides about free speech issues.

My focus is primarily on the Right because, with the rise of Donald Trump and “national conservatism,” there seems to be a lot of soul-searching going on among conservatives about their stance toward private media platforms, and the editorial rights of digital platforms in particular.

In my new  Hill essay and others articles (all of which are listed down below), I argue there is a principled classical liberal approach to these issues that was nicely outlined by President Ronald Reagan in his 1987 veto of Fairness Doctrine legislation, when he said:

History has shown that the dan­gers of an overly timid or biased press cannot be averted through bureaucratic regulation, but only through the freedom and compe­tition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee.

Let’s break that line down. Reagan admits that media bias can be a real thing. Of course it is! Journalists, editors, and even the companies they work for all have specific views. They all favor or disfavor certain types of content. But, at least in the United States, the editorial decisions made by these private actors are protected by the First Amendment. Section 230 is really quite secondary to this debate, even though some Trumpian conservatives wrongly suggest that it’s the real problem here. In reality, national conservatives would need to find a way to work around well-established First Amendment protections if they wanted to impose new restrictions on the editorial rights of private parties.

But why would they want to do that? Returning to the Reagan veto statement, we should remember how he noted that, even if the First Amendment did not protect the editorial discretion of private media platforms, bureaucratic regulation was not the right answer to the problem of “bias.”  Competition and choice were the superior answer. This is the heart and soul of the classical liberal perspective: more innovation is always superior to more regulation.

For the past 30 years, conservatives and classical liberals were generally aligned on that point. But the ascendancy of Donald Trump created a rift in that alliance that now threatens to grow into a chasm as more and more Right-of-center people begin advocating for comprehensive control of media platforms.

The problems with that are numerous beginning with the fact that none of the old rationales for media controls work (and most of them never did). Consider the old arguments justifying widespread regulation of private media:

• “Scarcity” was the oldest justification for media regulation, but we live in the exact opposite world today, in which the most common complaint about media is the abundance of it!
• Conversely, the supposed “pervasiveness” of some media (namely broadcasting) was used as a rationale for government censorship in the past. But that, too, no longer works because in today’s crowded media marketplace and Internet-enabled world, all forms of communications and entertainment are equally pervasive to some extent.
• State ownership and licensing of spectrum was another rationale for control that no longer works. No digital media platforms need federal licenses to operate today. So, that hook is also gone. Moreover, the answer to the problem of government ownership of media is to stop letting the government own and control media assets, including spectrum.
• “Fairness” is another old excuse for control, with some regulatory advocates suggesting that five unelected bureaucrats at the Federal Communications Commission (or some other agency) are well-suited to “balance” the airing of viewpoints on media platforms. Of course, America’s disastrous experience with the Fairness Doctrine proved just how wrong that thinking was. [I summarize all the evidence proving that here.]

That leaves a final, more amorphous rationale for media control: ” gatekeeper” concerns and assertions that private media platforms can essentially become “state actors.” In the wake of Donald Trump’s “de-platorming” from Facebook and Twitter, many of his supporters began adopting this language in defense of more aggressive government control of private media platforms, including the possibility of declaring those platforms common carriers and demanding that some sort of amorphous “neutrality” mandates be imposed on them. But as Berin Szóka and Corbin Barthold of Tech Freedom note:

Where courts have upheld imposing common carriage burdens on communications networks under the First Amendment, it has been because consumers reasonably expected them to operate conduits. Not so for social media platforms. [. . . ] When it comes to the regulation of speech on social media, however, the presumption of content neutrality does not apply. Conservatives present their criticism of content moderation as a desire for “neutrality,” but forcing platforms to carry certain content and viewpoints that they would prefer not to carry constitutes a “content preference” that would trigger strict scrutiny. Under strict scrutiny, any “gatekeeper” power exercised by social media would be just as irrelevant as the monopoly power of local newspapers was in [previous Supreme Court holdings].

Put simply, efforts to stretch extremely narrow and limited common carriage precedents to fit social media just don’t work. We’ve already seen lower courts declare that recently when blocking the enforcement of new conservative-led efforts in Florida and Texas to limit the editorial discretion of private social media platforms. If conservatives really hope to get around these legal barriers to regulation, what would be needed would be a more far-reaching strike at the First Amendment itself. That would entail a jurisprudential revolution at the Supreme Court — reversing about a century of free speech precedents — or an some sort of an effort to amend the First Amendment itself. These things are almost certainly not going to occur.

But, again, this hasn’t stopped some conservatives from pitching extreme solutions in their efforts to regulate digital media at both the state and federal level. I discuss these efforts in previous essays on, “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality,“ “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet,“ and “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’.“ Perhaps some Trump-aligned conservatives understand that these legislative efforts are unlikely to work, but they continue to push them in an attempt to make life hell for tech platforms, or perhaps just to troll the Left and “own the Libs.”

On the other hand, some conservatives seem to really believe in some of the extreme ideas they are tossing around. What is particular troubling about these efforts is the way — following Trump’s lead — some conservatives, including even more mainstream conservative groups like the Heritage Foundation, are increasingly referring to private media platforms as “the enemy of the people.” That’s the kind of extremist language typically used by totalitarian thugs and Marxist lunatics who so hate private enterprise and freedom of speech that they are willing to adopt a sort of burn-the-village-to-save-it rhetorical approach to media policy.

And speaking of Marxists, here’s what is even more incredible about these efforts by some conservatives to use such rationales in support of comprehensive media regulation: It is all based on the “media access” playbook concocted by radical Leftist scholars a generation ago. As I summarized in my essay on, “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“:

Media access advocates look to transform the First Amendment into a tool for social change to advance specific political ends or ideological objectives. Media access theory dispenses with both the editorial discretion rights and private property rights of private speech platforms. Private platforms become subject to the political whims of policymakers who dictate “fair” terms of access. We can think of this as communications collectivism.

Media access doctrine is rooted in an arrogant, elitist, anti-property, anti-freedom ethic that suggest the State is a better position to dictate what can and cannot be said on private speech platforms. “It’s astonishing, yet nonetheless true,” I continued on in that essay, “that the ideological roots of Trump’s anti-social media campaign lie in the works of those extreme Leftists and even media Marxists. He has just given media access theory his own unique nationalistic spin and sold this snake oil to conservatives.” Yet, Trump and other national conservatives are embracing this contemptible doctrine because now more than ever the ends apparently justify the means in American politics. Nevermind that all this could come back to haunt them when the Left somehow leverages this regulatory apparatus to control Fox News or other sites and content that conservatives favor! Once media platforms are viewed as just another thing to be controlled by politics, the only question is which politics and how are those politics enforced? Certainly both the Left and the Right cannot both have their way given all that current divides them.

Finally, what is utterly perplexing about all this is how much thanks national conservatives really owe to the major digital platforms they now seek to destroy. As I noted in my new Hill op-ed:

There has never been more opportunity for conservative viewpoints than right now. Each day on Facebook, the top-10 most shared links are dominated by pundits such as Ben Shapiro, Dan Bongino, Dinesh D’Souza and Sean Hannity. Right-leaning content is shared widely on Twitter each day. Websites like Dailywire.com and Foxnews.com get far more traffic than the New York Times or CNN.

Thus, conservatives might be shooting themselves in the foot if they were able to convince more legislatures to adopt the media access regulatory playbook because it could have profound unintended consequences once the Left uses those tools to somehow restrict access to “hate speech” or “misinformation” — and then define it so broadly so as to include much of the top material posted by conservatives on Facebook and Twitter ever day.

Not all conservatives have drank the media access kool-aid. In the wake of Trump’s deplatforming from a few major sites, a wave of new Right-leaning digital services are being planned or have already launched. (Axios and Forbes recently summarized some of these efforts.) I don’t know which will of these efforts will succeed, but more competition and platform-building are certainly superior to current calls by some Trump supporters for government regulation of mainstream social media services.

Again, this is the old Reagan vision at its finest! We can achieve a better media landscape, “only through the freedom and compe­tition that the First Amendment sought to guarantee,” not through bureaucratic regulation. It remains the principled path forward.

Additional Reading :

• “Left and right take aim at Big Tech — and the First Amendment“
• “When It Comes to Fighting Social Media Bias, More Regulation Is Not the Answer“
• “FCC’s O’Rielly on First Amendment & Fairness Doctrine Dangers“
• “Conservatives & Common Carriage: Contradictions & Challenges“
• “The Great Deplatforming of 2021“
• “A Good Time to Re-Read Reagan’s Fairness Doctrine Veto“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Radical, Paternalistic Plan to Remake the Internet“
• “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“
• “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“
• “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“
• “The Not-So-SMART Act“
• “The Surprising Ideological Origins of Trump’s Communications Collectivism“

Older essays & testimony :

• Adam Thierer, “Why Regulate Broadcasting: Toward a Consistent First Amendment Standard for the Information Age,” Catholic University Law School, 15 CommLaw Conspectus (Summer 2007): 431-482.
• Adam Thierer, Testimony at FCC’s Hearing on “Serving the Public Interest in the Digital Era”, March 3, 2010.
• Adam Thierer, “FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age,” Federalist Society, Engage (Feb. 2009).

President Trump and his allies have gone to war with social media sites and digital communications platforms like Twitter, Facebook, and Google. Decrying supposed anti-conservative “bias,” Trump has even floated an Executive Order aimed at “Preventing Online Censorship,” that entails many new forms of government meddling with these private speech platforms. Section 230 is their crosshairs and First Amendment restraints are being thrown to the wind.

Various others have already documented the many legal things wrong with Trump’s call for greater government oversight of private speech platforms. I want to focus on something slightly different here: The surprising ideological origins of what Trump and his allies are proposing. Because for those of us who are old-timers and have followed communications and media policy for many decades, this moment feels like deja vu all over again, but with the strange twist that supposed “conservatives” are calling for a form of communications collectivism that used to be the exclusive province of hard-core Leftists.

To begin, the truly crazy thing about President Trump and some conservatives saying that social media should be regulated as public forums is not just that they’re abandoning free speech rights, it’s that they’re betraying property rights, too. Treating private media like a “public square” entails a taking of private property. Amazingly, Trump and his followers have taken over the old “media access movement” and given it their own spin.

Media access advocates look to transform the First Amendment into a tool for social change to advance specific political ends or ideological objectives. Media access theory dispenses with both the editorial discretion rights and private property rights of private speech platforms. Private platforms become subject to the political whims of policymakers who dictate “fair” terms of access. We can think of this as communications collectivism.

The media access movement’s regulatory toolkit includes things like the Fairness Doctrine and “neutrality” requirements, right-of-reply mandates, expansive conceptions of common carriage (using “public forum” or “town square” rhetoric), agency threats, and so on. Even without formal regulation, media access theorists hope that jawboning and political pressure can persuade private platforms to run more (or perhaps sometimes less) of the content that they want (or don’t) on media platforms.

The intellectual roots of the media access movement were planted by leftist media theorists like Jerome Barron, Owen Fiss in 1960s and 1970s, and later by Marxist communications scholar Robert McChesney. In 2005, I penned this short history of media access movement and explored its aims. I also wrote two old books with chapters on the dangers of media access theory and calls for collectivizing communications and media systems. Those books were: Media Myths (2005) and A Manifesto for Media Freedom (2008, w Brian C. Anderson). The key takeaway from those essays is that the media access movement comes down to control.

The best book ever written about dangers of media access movement was Jonathan Emord’s 1991, Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment. He perfectly summarizes their goals (and now Trump’s) as follows:

• “In short, the access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model.”
• “Rather than understanding the First Amendment to be a guardian of the private sphere of communication, the access advocates interpret it to be a guarantee of a preferred mix of ideological viewpoints.
• “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.”

“This arrogant, elitist, anti-property, anti-freedom ethic is what drives the media access movement and makes it so morally repugnant,” I argued in that old TLF essay. That is still just as true today, even when it’s conservatives calling for collectivization of media.

It’s astonishing, yet nonetheless true, that the ideological roots of Trump’s anti-social media campaign lie in the works of those extreme Leftists and even media Marxists. He has just given media access theory his own unique nationalistic spin and sold this snake oil to conservatives.

There certainly could come a day where his opponents on the Left just take this media access playbook up again and suggest this is exactly what’s needed for Fox News and other right-leaning media outlets. If and when that does happen, Trump and other conservatives will have no one to blame but themselves for embracing this contemptible philosophical vision simply because it suited their short-term desires while they were in power.

I hope that conservatives rethink their embrace of communications collectivism, but I fear that Trump and his allies have already convinced themselves that the ends justify the means when it comes to advancing their causes or even just “owning the libs.” But there really is a strong moralistic slant to what Trump and many of his allies want. They think they are on the right side of history and that the opponents–including most media outlets and plaforms–are evil. Trump and his allies have repeatedly referred to the press as the “enemy of the American people” and endlessly lambasted social media platforms for not going along with his desires. This reflects a core tendency of all communications collectivists: a sort of ‘you’re-either-with-us-or-against-us’ attitude.

Steve Bannon scripted all this out back in 2018. Go back and read this astonishing CNN interview for a preview of what could happen next. Here’s the rundown:

>> Bannon said Big Tech’s data should be seized and put in a “public trust.” Specifically, Bannon said, “I think you take [the data] away from the companies. All that data they have is put in a public trust. They can use it. And people can opt in and opt out. That trust is run by an independent board of directors. It just can’t be that [Big Tech is] the sole proprietors of this data…I think this is a public good.” Bannon added that Big Tech companies “have to be broken up” just like Teddy Roosevelt broke up the trusts.” >> Bannon attacked the executives of Facebook, Twitter and Google. “These are run by sociopaths,” he said. “These people are complete narcissists. These people ought to be controlled, they ought to be regulated.” At one point during the phone call, Bannon said, “These people are evil. There is no doubt about that.” >> Bannon said he thinks “this is going to be a massive issue” in future elections. He said he thinks it will probably take until 2020 to fully blossom as a campaign issue, explaining, “I think by the time 2020 comes along, this will be a burning issue. I think this will be one of the biggest domestic issues.”

This is now Trump’s playbook. It’s incredibly frightening because, once married up with Trump’s accusations of election fraud and other imagined conspiracies, you can sense how he’s laying the groundwork to call into question future election results by suggesting that both traditional media and modern digital media platforms are just in bed with the Democratic party and trying to rig the presidential election. I don’t really want to think about what happens if this situation escalates to that point. These are very dark days for the American Republic.

by Andrea O’Sullivan & Adam Thierer

This essay originally appeared on The Bridge on September 25, 2019.

It is quickly becoming one of the iron laws of technology policy that by attempting to address one problem (like privacy, security, safety, or competition), policymakers often open up a different problem on another front. Trying to regulate to protect online safety, for example, might give rise to privacy concerns, or vice versa. Or taking steps to address online privacy through new regulations might create barriers to new entry, thus hurting online competition.

In a sense, this is simply a restatement of the law of unintended consequences. But it seems to be occurring with greater regularity in the technology policy today, and it serves as another good reminder why humility is essential when considering new regulations for fast-moving sectors.

Consider a few examples.

Privacy vs security & competition 

Many US states and the federal government are considering data privacy regulations in the vein of the European Union’s wide-reaching General Data Privacy Regulation (GDPR). But as early experiences with the GDPR and various state efforts can attest, regulations aimed at boosting consumer privacy can often butt against other security and competition concerns.

Consider how the GDPR can be abused to undermine user security—and ultimately (and ironically) privacy itself. At this year’s Black Hat computer security conference, one researcher recently explained how the GDPR’s “right of access” provision—which mandates that companies give users their personal data—can be exploited by malicious actors to steal personally identifiable information. If a hacker is convincing enough, he or she can use “social engineering” to pose as the target and coax companies to divulge the information. Without GDPR’s mandated reporting infrastructure, such an attack would be much harder.

Nor are malicious actors even necessary for the GDPR to undermine security. In 2018, a customer requested their Alexa voice recordings from Amazon. The company sent the data to the wrong person in an apparent case of human error. If mighty Amazon cannot rise to the challenge of error-free GDPR compliance, what hope do smaller outfits have?

Perhaps the biggest story about the GDPR, however, has been its malign effects on competition. After all, the law earned its nickname—the “Google Data Protection Regulation”—for a reason. Titans like Google and Facebook have dominated European ad tech market since the advent of the GDPR because they can shoulder compliance risks in a way that smaller vendors cannot. More ad money has flowed to Google’s coffers as a result.

But the GDPR applies to far more than just ad tech. Ventures as varied as publishing and virtual tabletop dice rollers have been forced to shutter their digital doors rather than risk the wrath of European data authorities.

Similar stories emanate from the US. Illinois’ biometric privacy law, which governs the use of technologies like facial recognition and fingerprint scanning, led to the prohibition of Google’s Arts and Culture app which matched user-submitted photos with a classical work of art. If Google can’t hack it in the Land of Lincoln, how could a potential Google-slayer be expected to do so?

These are just the stories we hear about. A prematurely thwarted venture is unlikely to have a platform to voice their compliance problems. What is clear is that the data privacy laws enacted so far have had predictable negative impacts on security and competition, and that ill-defined “privacy fundamentalism” too often drives ill-fitting policies.

Safety vs. free speech & competition

Content moderation at scale is extremely challenging, especially as it relates to efforts to address “hate speech” and extremist viewpoints. On the one hand, free speech activists argue that onerous private content moderation policies can limit debate and punish certain viewpoints, particularly if a platform is a public default for expression. On the other hand, social justice activists contend that lax private standards can fuel the proliferation of conspiracy theories, radicalization, and violent rhetoric.

Recently, President Trump and some conservative lawmakers have been clamoring for greater regulatory controls of social media platforms in the name of “fairness” and countering supposed anti-conservative bias. Sens. Josh Hawley (R-MO) and Ted Cruz (R-TX), for example, have introduced a bill that would require platforms to submit their content moderation policies to regular regulatory audits. If a platform is deemed to be not “politically neutral,” it will lose its liability protections under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act.

This is reminiscent of the “fairness doctrine,” a long-standing Federal Communications Commission (FCC) policy that was a thinly-veiled attempt to influence the political content of broadcast programs. Conservatives rightly opposed such government involvement in content decisions in decades past, but with this new effort against technology platforms, many of them are repeating the mistakes of the past.

The history of the actual fairness doctrine serves as a cautionary tale here. Today the fairness doctrine is mostly remembered as an anti-conservative effort because of the attention paid to right-leaning talk radio. Former Kennedy administration official Bill Ruder admitted that their “massive strategy was to use the [fairness doctrine] to challenge and harass right-wing broadcasters, and hope that the challenges would be so costly to them that they would be inhibited and decide it was too costly to continue.”

But as testaments from previous broadcast leaders point out, the fairness doctrine was wielded against both “conservatives” and “liberals” depending on who was in power and what their objectives were. When the Nixon administration took office, they wielded the rule to muzzle broadcasters who criticized the White House. And the FCC also applied the doctrine against The Kingmen’s song “Louie Louie” for its suspiciously unintelligible lyrics.

The tension between policies to promote “safety” and government-protected rights to free speech can be literal, as well. Consider efforts to ban so-called “3-D printed guns.” Defense Distributed and other activists do not 3-D print and sell guns. Rather, they publish the schematics for others to print their own arms online. As with the encryption technologies we will discuss below, such code is probably First Amendment-protected speech, although the applications of the schematics may be considered “dual-use” (meaning with both civilian and military applications.) An outright ban on 3-D printed gun blueprints very clearly antagonizes the right to free speech in the US and could threaten innovation in other open source, peer-to-peer 3D-printed applications.

Safety vs. privacy & security

Efforts to promote “safety” can also too often backfire at the expense of privacy and security.

Perhaps the most dramatic and high-stakes illustration of this principle was the years-long legal drama that pitted law enforcement authorities against computer scientists in the so-called “Crypto Wars.” Although cryptographic technologies that conceal data for privacy or security have been around since the days of ancient Egypt—our own Founding Fathers are known to have communicated using ciphers—in the 20th century, they had mostly been limited to military and academic institutions.

The advent of public-key cryptography made these security techniques more accessible to the public for the first time. This was great news for information security: communications and devices could be made hardened to attacks, and people were given more privacy options. But law enforcement feared that criminals would use cryptography to cover their tracks. Thus, in the name of safety, law enforcement first tried banning cryptography as a dual use technology through munitions export controls. When that failed on First Amendment grounds, policymakers attempted to legislate “backdoors” into encryption protocols that would allow government access.

It is easy to see how outright bans or backdoors for encryption technologies could hurt privacy and security. Obviously, prohibiting the civilian use of a privacy and security technology limits privacy and security. But granting government access into encryption standards would ironically ultimately undermine safety as well. After all, if a government can get into an encryption standard, so might a malicious hacker. Although the “Crypto Wars” seemed settled in the 1990’s, these same debates have been cropping up again as more and more devices have default encryption technologies.

We can also think about mandated reporting requirements intended to promote public safety. Consider the “know your customer” rules imposed on financial institutions. To prevent ills like money laundering and financial fraud, banks and exchanges must keep detailed customer information on file. Yet this ostensibly “pro-safety” rule generates its own security and privacy risks. Banks must manage to responsibly store and protect this valuable customer data, lest their customers’ information get hacked and their identities stolen. This has sadly too often proven too tall an order, and third-party-managed personally identifiable information is exposed to outside parties all the time.

A similar problem arises with efforts to promote child safety online. Consider the debate over MySpace’s age verification efforts in the mid-2000s. Child safety advocates grew concerned over the risks facing children on new social media platforms. Young children lacking awareness of the dangers that could lurk online could unwittingly make friendships with predators posing as other children. So a movement grew to require these new platforms to verify age and identity with a government-provided identification card.

There were obvious technical problems. For starters, children that were young enough to fall under the age verification limit were unlikely to have a government-provided photo identification card. But beyond these simple administrative issues, there was the question of privacy and security. Could Myspace adequately protect the reams of sensitive data from outside breach? Might children actually be put more at danger should those items—which would likely include the children’s address—fall into the wrong hands? And should the government and social media platforms really be in the business of parenting to begin with? Might this actually create a “moral hazard” which leaves parents thinking that online spaces are safer than they actually are?

Tying it all together

In each of these instances, it probably seemed like there was no downside to newly proposed regulations. With time, however, the dynamic effects associated with those policies become evident, and often result in the opposite of what was intended, or the policies led to other problems that supporters did not originally envision.

The nineteenth-century French economic philosopher Frédéric Bastiat famously explained the importance of considering the many unforeseen, second-order effects of economic change and policy. Many pundits and policy analysts pay attention to only the first-order effects—what Bastiat called “the seen”—and ignore the subsequent and often “unseen” effects. Those unseen effects can have profound real-world consequences in the form of less technological innovation, diminished growth, fewer job opportunities, higher prices, diminished choices, and other costs.

Even when defenders of the failed interventions are forced to admit that their well-intentioned plans did not work out as planned, their response is typically of the  we-can-do-better variety. The result is usually just more regulation as one intervention begs another and another. As the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises taught us 70 years ago in his masterwork, Human Action:

“All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther…”

The lesson is clear: paternalistic public policies may sound sensible on the surface, but as Milton Friedman taught us long ago, “One of the great mistakes is to judge policies and programs by their intentions rather than their results. We all know a famous road that is paved with good intentions.”

Thirteen years ago I penned an essay entitled, “Your Soapbox is My Soapbox!” It was condensed from a 2005 book I had released at the same time called Media Myths. My research and writing during that period and for fifteen years prior to that was focused on the dangers associated with calls by radical Left-leaning media scholars and policy activists for a veritable regulatory revolution in the way information and communication technology (ICT) platforms were operated. They pushed this revolution using noble-sounding rhetoric like “fairness in coverage,” “right of reply,” “integrity of public debate,” “preserving the public square,” and so on. Their advocacy efforts were also accompanied by calls for a host of new regulatory controls including a “Bill of Media Rights” to grant the public a litany of new affirmative rights over media and communications providers and platforms.

But no matter how much the so-called “media access” movement sought to sugarcoat their prescriptions, in the end, what those Left-leaning scholars and advocates were calling for was sweeping state control of media and communications technologies and platforms. In essence, they wanted to socialize private soapboxes and turn them into handmaidens of the state.

Here’s the way I began my old “soapbox” essay:

Imagine you built a platform in your backyard for the purpose of informing or entertaining your friends of neighbors. Now further imagine that you are actually fairly good at what you do and manage to attract and retain a large audience. Then one day, a few hecklers come to hear you speak on your platform. They shout about how it’s unfair that you have attracted so many people to hear you speak on your soapbox and they demand access to your platform for a certain amount of time each day. They rationalize this by arguing that it is THEIR rights as listeners that are really important, not YOUR rights as a speaker or the owner of the soapbox. That sort of scenario could never happen in America, right? Sadly, it’s been the way media law has operated for several decades in this country. This twisted “media access” philosophy has been employed by federal lawmakers and numerous special interest groups to justify extensive and massively unjust regime of media regulation and speech redistributionism. And it’s still at work today.

That was 2005. What’s amazing today is that this same twisted attitude is still on display, but it is conservatives who are now the ring-leaders of the push to socialize soapboxes!

Conservatives were squarely against such soapbox socialism when I penned my earlier essay and book. During that time, they feared that the media access movement would devolve into a political witch hunt aimed at singling them out and eliminating the many new popular personalities and platforms that offered the public Right-of-center voices and viewpoints.

But it’s a new day in America and conservatives have now flipped this script and are using the media access movement playbook to call for massive state control over private media and technology platforms in the name of eradicating supposed “bias” against them and their views.

Apparently everyone’s a Media Marxist these days, beginning with President Trump! Claiming that there is some sort of grand anti-conservative conspiracy afoot, President Trump and many of his defenders are pushing for greater government control of the media and tech companies. The White House is apparently “taking a look” at the idea of regulating Google because it is part of the “fake news media.” (Over at TechDirt, Zach Graves has a thorough debunking of such nonsense.) Of course, this follows Trump’s seemingly endless jihad against older media outlets, especially large newspapers and cable news enterprises that he disfavors.

Meanwhile, a new White House “We the People” petition to “Protect Free Speech in the Digital Public Square” already has almost 40,000 signatures. “The internet is the modern public square,” the manifesto begins. It continues on to claims that “the free and open internet has become a controlled, censored space, monopolized by a few unaccountable corporations” and that “[b]y banning users from their platforms, those corporations can effectively remove politically unwelcome Americans from the public square.” It concludes with the following call to action: “The President should request that Congress pass legislation prohibiting social media platforms from banning users for First Amendment-protected speech. The power to block lawful content should be in the hands of individual users – not [Facebook’s] Mark Zuckerberg or [Twitter’s] Jack Dorsey.”

Such rhetoric and proposals are indistinguishable from what the Left-leaning media access advocates were calling for in the past.

Is “media Marxism” too strong a term to use in this regard? Well, the textbook definition of Marxism involves state control of the means of production. In the case of information platforms, control of the means of production would involve the forcible surrender of some combination of the underlying editorial control that the owners have over their speech platforms as well as potential state control of the algorithms and other technical foundations of digital platforms.

And so let’s hear from former White House strategist Steve Bannon commenting to CNN on what he thinks needs to be done next:

>> Bannon said Big Tech’s data should be seized and put in a “public trust.” Specifically, Bannon said, “I think you take [the data] away from the companies. All that data they have is put in a public trust. They can use it. And people can opt in and opt out. That trust is run by an independent board of directors. It just can’t be that [Big Tech is] the sole proprietors of this data…I think this is a public good.” Bannon added that Big Tech companies “have to be broken up” just like Teddy Roosevelt broke up the trusts.” >> Bannon attacked the executives of Facebook, Twitter and Google. “These are run by sociopaths,” he said. “These people are complete narcissists. These people ought to be controlled, they ought to be regulated.” At one point during the phone call, Bannon said, “These people are evil. There is no doubt about that.” >> Bannon said he thinks “this is going to be a massive issue” in future elections. He said he thinks it will probably take until 2020 to fully blossom as a campaign issue, explaining, “I think by the time 2020 comes along, this will be a burning issue. I think this will be one of the biggest domestic issues.” Bannon said the “#MeToo movement has brought the issue of consent front and center” and argued that “this is going to bring the issue of digital consent front and center.”

On one hand, Bannon no longer works in Trump’s White House, so perhaps it isn’t fair to say that his views and prescriptions are tantamount to the President’s views. But Bannon was saying similar things while he was in the White House with Trump and the President’s surrogates have been continuously upping their rhetoric to suggest that they are serious about moving against the ICT sector in some fashion.

So, apparently we now inhabit a Bizarro World where the Hard Right has replaced the Hard Left in the U.S. in the never-ending drama of speech control. In past decades, some conservatives favored media regulation, of course. In fact, in the heyday of the Fairness Doctrine, many leading conservative voices insisted that regulation was needed to counter supposed “liberal bias” in broadcasting. It was only when Rush Limbaugh and many other conservatives came along in the late 1980s / early 1990s and gained a significant audience on talk radio that conservative sympathy for the Fairness Doctrine completely disappeared. In fact, conservatives then became vociferous critics of the Doctrine and demanded a stake be driven through its heart. Eventually, they did just that.  But even during the time when some conservative pundits supported the Fairness Doctrine, that support was fairly limited and tepid. And you almost never heard conservatives supporting radical state control of the press as a solution to perceived bias.

Yet, here we are now with Trump and many of his allies floating proposals to treat information platforms as the equivalent of essential facilities or “public squares” which would have some sort of amorphous fiduciary obligations or “public interest” responsibilities to serve the public however politicians and bureaucrats in Washington see fit. That could entail anything from “search neutrality” to a new Fairness doctrine / right of reply mandate to a full-blown antirust breakup.

Like the Hard Left before them, the Hard Right has apparently come to view ICT platforms as just another part of the socio-political superstructure to be controlled from above to achieve their own ends. Trump and his allies have repeatedly referred to the press as the “enemy of the American people.” (His latest tweet using that phrase has already racked up almost 84,000 likes.) That’s totalitarian talk, and it softens the ground for the sort of takeover that Bannon and others desire. The “Fake News” that President Trump and his surrogates decry includes not just traditional journalism outlets but all forms of information production and dissemination. Trump wants them all to bend the knee before him. Because they won’t, apparently they are to be punished.

If Trump and his allies get their way, America would join the ranks of repressive states around the globe who seek to control speech platforms for their own ends. That sort of totalitarian impulse is repugnant to the values of a democratic republic that values open inquiry, freedom of speech and expression, press freedom, and the freedom to know about and report on the world around us.

As I concluded my earlier “soapbox” essay back in 2005:

This arrogant, elitist, anti-property, anti-freedom ethic is what drives the media access movement and makes it so morally repugnant. Freedom doesn’t begin by fettering the press with more chains, it begins by removing those that already exist and then erecting a firm wall between State and Press. The media access crowd has succeeded in breaching that wall with seven decades of misguided and unjust regulation of the press. The movement back toward a truly free press begins by understanding the error in their thinking, rejecting that reasoning, and then embracing, once again, the original vision of the First Amendment as a bulwark against government control of speech and the press.

In closing, this is a good moment for those on the moderate Left to reflect upon what they have enabled by sketching out and defending this intellectual blueprint for media control. The Left helped make the bed that Donald Trump is now getting cozy in. Many Hard Left scholars repeatedly told us that it was with the very best of intentions that they advocated more state control of the ICT sectors. There’s no bringing those radicals around to seeing the mistake they made. They will just double down on their proposals and claim that once “their team” gets back in power, all will be fine. It is utter poppycock, but they won’t care one bit.

The moderate Left, however, should be more sensible than that because they have been the great defenders of the First Amendment and freedom of speech in modern American history. And they understand that the danger of the slippery slope is very real when it comes to speech controls and how they might undermine our First Amendment heritage. When the moderate Left allows radical media theorists and regulatory advocacy groups to push extreme media control measures, however, they are creating speech control mechanisms that are very susceptible to being overtaken by their enemies and then used against them later on. And now we have a President who is doing exactly that.

It is a truly horrifying moment in the history of the American Republic. Hopefully we get through it and learn something from it.

A few states have passed Internet regulations because the Trump FCC, citing a 20 year US policy of leaving the Internet “unfettered by Federal or State regulation,” decided to reverse the Obama FCC’s 2015 decision to regulate the Internet with telephone laws.

Those state laws regulating Internet traffic management practices–which supporters call “net neutrality”–are unlikely to survive lawsuits because the Internet and Internet services are clearly interstate communications and FCC authority dominates. (The California bill also likely violates federal law concerning E-Rate-funded Internet access.) 

However, litigation can take years. In the meantime ISP operators will find they face fewer regulatory headaches if they do exactly what net neutrality supporters believe the laws prohibit: block Internet content. Net neutrality laws in the US don’t apply to ISPs that “edit the Internet.”

The problem for net neutrality supporters is that Internet service providers, like cable TV providers, are protected by the First Amendment. In fact, Internet regulations with a nexus to content are subject to “strict scrutiny,” which typically means regulations are struck down. Even leading net neutrality proponents, like the ACLU and EFF, endorse the view that ISP curation is expressive activity protected by First Amendment.

As I’ve pointed out, these First Amendment concerns were raised during the 2016 litigation and compelled the Obama FCC to clarify that its 2015 “net neutrality” Order allows ISPs to block content. As a pro-net neutrality journalist recently wrote in TechCrunch about the 2015 rules,  

[A] tiny ISP in Texas called Alamo . . . wanted to offer a “family-friendly” edited subset of the internet to its customers. Funnily enough, this is permitted! And by publicly stating that it has no intention of providing access to “substantially all Internet endpoints,” Alamo would exempt itself from the net neutrality rules! Yes, you read that correctly — an ISP can opt out of the rules by changing its business model. They are . . . essentially voluntary.

The author wrote this to ridicule Judge Kavanaugh, but the joke is clearly not on Kavanuagh.

In fact, under the 2015 Order, filtered Internet service was less regulated than conventional Internet service. Note that the rules were “essentially voluntary”–ISPs could opt out of regulation by filtering content. The perverse incentive of this regulatory asymmetry, whereby the FCC would regulate conventional broadband heavily but not regulate filtered Internet at all, was cited by the Trump FCC as a reason to eliminate the 2015 rules. 

State net neutrality laws basically copy and paste from the 2015 FCC regulations and will have the same problem: Any ISP that forthrightly blocks content it doesn’t wish to transmit–like adult content–and edits the Internet is unregulated.

This looks bad for net neutrality proponents leading the charge, so they often respond that the Internet regulations cover the “functional equivalent” of conventional (heavily regulated) Internet access. Therefore, the story goes, regulators can stop an ISP from filtering because an edited Internet is the functional equivalent of an unedited Internet.

Curiously, the Obama FCC didn’t make this argument in court. The reason the Obama FCC didn’t endorse this “functional equivalent” response is obvious. Let’s play this out: An ISP markets and offers a discounted “clean Internet” package because it knows that many consumers would appreciate it. To bring the ISP back into the regulated category, regulators sue, drag the ISP operators into court, and tell judges that state law compels the operator to transmit adult content.

This argument would receive a chilly reception in court. More likely is that state regulators, in order to preserve some authority to regulate the Internet, will simply concede that filtered Internet drops out of regulation, like the Obama FCC did.

As one telecom scholar wrote in a Harvard Law publication years ago, “net neutrality” is dead in the US unless there’s a legal revolution in the courts.  Section 230 of the Telecom Act encourages ISPs to filter content and the First Amendment protects ISP curation of the Internet. State law can’t change that. The open Internet has been a net positive for society. However, state net neutrality laws may have the unintended effect of encouraging ISPs to filter. This is not news if you follow the debate closely, but rank-and-file net neutrality advocates have no idea. The top fear of leading net neutrality advocates is not ISP filtering, it’s the prospect that the Internet–the most powerful media distributor in history–will escape the regulatory state.

Is code speech? That is one of the timeless questions that comes up again and again in the field of Internet law and policy. Many books and countless papers and essays have touched on this topic. Personally, I’ve always thought it was a bit silly that this is even a serious question. After all, if code isn’t speech, what the heck is it?

We humans express ourselves in many creative ways. We speak and write. We sing and dance. We paint and sculpt. And now we code. All these things are forms of human expression. Under American First Amendment jurisprudence, expression is basically synonymous with speech. We very tightly limit restrictions on speech and expression because it is a matter of personal autonomy and also because we believe that there is a profound danger of the proverbial slippery slope kicking in once we allow government officials to start censoring what they regard as offensive speech or dangerous expression.

Thus, we when creative people come up with creative thoughts and use computers and software to express them in code, that is speech. It is fundamentally no different than using a pencil and pad of paper to write a manifesto, or using a guitar and microphone to sing a protest song. The authorities might not like the resulting manifesto or protest song–in fact, they might feel quite threatened by it–but that fact also makes it clear why, in both cases, that expression is speech and that speech is worth defending. Moreover, the methods or mediums of speech production and dissemination–pencils, paper, guitars, microphones, etc.–are what Ithiel de Sola Pool referred to as “Technologies of Freedom.” They help people extend their voices and to communicate with the world, while also learning more about it.

Which brings us to the 3D printers and the code behind the open source blueprints that many people share to fabricate things with 3D printers.  Washington Post reporter Meagan Flynn was kind enough to call me last week and ask me to comment for a story she was putting together about the ongoing legal fights over 3D-printed firearms in generally and the efforts of Cody Wilson and Defense Distributed in particular. Wilson is a self-described crypto-anarchist who has landed in hot water with federal and state officials for making available open source blueprints for the 3D-printed firearms freely available to the public. Federal efforts aimed at stopping Wilson and Defense Distributed haven’t worked and now state attorneys general are seeking to impose legal restrictions on him.

Flynn’s WashPo article offered an outstanding overview of everything that is happening on this front, so I won’t rehash it all here. But I wanted to reproduce my portions of her story here and just add a few more thoughts. Here’s the block of the story that mentioned my thoughts:

Adam Thierer, who specializes in the intersection of free speech and technology at George Mason University’s Mercatus Center, said the debate over the computer code for the 3-D-printable guns is the same song he heard during the Crypto Wars — but more like a remix. Guns, of course, pose different risks than encryption technology. Thierer said he thinks the Defense Distributed code is almost certainly speech, but the question is whether the government can demonstrate a compelling interest to regulate it.

The problem with the states’ argument, he contended, is that it would be a “stretch” for the judge to decide that the computer code itself skirts the states’ gun laws, as those laws generally center on possession of actual guns. It would be easier for the states to regulate 3-D-printed guns themselves through new laws, he said, rather than seeking to regulate the code that creates them. “They would have to make the argument that the speech itself is essentially the device,” he said. “Nothing is stopping them from regulating firearms. But the underlying speech is not in their purview. There has to be a distinction made between the speech and the byproduct of speech.”

In our recent essay, “3D Printers, Evasive Entrepreneurs and the Future of Tech Regulation,” Andrea O’Sullivan and I offered more extensive discussion of the legal issues at play here. And in a 2016 law review article entitled, “Guns, Limbs, and Toys: What Future for 3D Printing?” my co-author Adam Marcus and I discussed several examples of how additive manufacturing and the “maker” revolution are making the governance of various emerging technologies quite challenging.

The key points my co-authors and I try to make in these articles is that:

1. These controversies aren’t going away; they are only going to expand as “evasive entrepreneurs” find new interesting ways to use 3D printers to express themselves.
2. Regardless of what is being produced with 3D printers, the code and blueprints behind them are speech and deserve protection. And under American free speech jurisprudence, such code will almost certainly win such protections from courts when legislators or regulators seek to censor or regulate them.
3. The better way to regulate 3D printing is to focus on the physical manifestations of speech/expression. That is, focus on the user and the use, not the speech behind it. As Marcus and I put it in our law review article, “the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of firearms, regardless of how they are manufactured.” The U.S. has an extensive array of federal and state firearm regulations, and they can and should continue to apply to 3D-printed weapons. Likewise, a 3D-printed prosthetic limb is still a medical device, and the Food and Drug Administration can regulate it according if it sees fit. But in neither case should the underlying speech (i.e., the code) behind such inventions be censored.

For decades, cities, the FCC, and Congress have mandated that cable TV operators carry certain types of TV programming, including public access channels, local broadcast channels, local public television, and children’s programming. These carriage mandates have generated several First Amendment lawsuits but cable operators have generally lost. Cable operators have junior varsity First Amendment rights and the content they distribute is more regulated than, say, newspapers, Internet service providers, search engines, and Netflix. I submitted public interest comments (with JP Mohler) to the FCC this week explaining why cable operators would likely win today if they litigated these cable carriage regulations.

Regulations requiring newspapers, book publishers, or Internet service providers to carry the government’s preferred types of content are subject to strict scrutiny, which means such regulations typically don’t survive. However, cable is different, the Supreme Court held in the 1994 Turner case. The Supreme Court said regulations about what cable operators must carry are subject to intermediate–not strict–scrutiny because cable operators (in 1994) possessed about 95% of the subscription TV market and nearly every household had a single choice for subscription TV–their local cable monopoly. In the words of the Supreme Court, cable’s content regulations “are justified by the special characteristics of the cable medium: the bottleneck monopoly power exercised by cable operators.”

As a result, the FCC enforces “leased access” regulations that require cable operators to leave blank certain TV channels and give non-affiliated programmers a chance to use that channel capacity and gain viewership. Cable operators in the 1990s sued the FCC for enforcing these regulations in a 1996 case called Time Warner v. FCC. The DC Circuit relied on the 1994 Turner case and upheld the leased access rules.

Recently, however, the FCC asked whether First Amendment interests or TV competition requires giving these regulations another look. In our public interest comment, JP and I say that these rules have outlived their usefulness and cable operators would likely win a First Amendment lawsuit against the FCC today.

Two things have changed. First, cable operators have lost their “bottleneck monopoly power” that justified, in the eyes of the Supreme Court in 1994, giving cable operators weakened First Amendment protection.

Unlike in the 1990s, cable operators face significant competition in most local markets from satellite and telco TV providers. Over 99 percent of US households have at least three pay-TV options, and cable has lost over 15 million subscriber households since 2002. In 1997, when Turner II was decided, cable had over 90 percent of the pay-TV market. Cable operators’ market share has shrunk nearly every year since, and in 2015 cable had around 54 percent market share. This competitive marketplace has stimulated massive investment and choice in TV programming. The typical household has access to far more channels than in the past. Independent researchers found that a typical US household in 1999 received about 50 TV channels. By 2014, the typical household received over 200 TV channels. In 2018, there will be an estimated 520 scripted TV series available, which is up nearly 50 percent from just five years ago.

This emergence of TV competition and its beneficial effects in programming and consumer choice undermines the justification for upholding cable content regulations like leased access.

Second, courts are more likely to view the Supreme Court’s Denver decision about leased access regulations in a new light.  In Denver, the Supreme Court divided into concurrences as to the proper First Amendment category of cable operators, and whether intermediate or strict scrutiny should apply to the leased access laws at issue. The “Marks test” is the test lower courts use for determining the holding of a Supreme Court decision where there is no majority supporting the rationale of any opinion. Viewed through the lens of the prevailing Marks test, cable operators are entitled to “bookstore owner” status for First Amendment purposes:

Given that four justices in Denver concur that one of the potential bases for deciding cable’s First Amendment status is the classification of cable operators as bookstores and three justices concur that this classification is the definitive justification for the judgment, the narrowest grounds for resolving the issue is simply this latter justification. Under the prevailing Marks test, then, lower courts will apply strict scrutiny to the leased access rules in light of the Denver decision.

For these reasons, and the need to conserve agency resources for more pressing matters, like rural broadband deployment and spectrum auctions, we encourage the FCC to discontinue these regulations.

You can read our public interest comment about the leased access regulations at the Mercatus Center website.

Leased Access Mandates Infringe on the First Amendment Rights of Cable Operators, and the FCC Should Decline to Enforce the Regulations

The FCC’s transaction reviews have received substantial scholarly criticism lately. The FCC has increasingly used its license transaction reviews as an opportunity to engage in ad hoc merger reviews that substitute for formal rulemaking. FCC transaction conditions since 2000 have ranged from requiring AOL-Time Warner to make future instant messaging services interoperable, to price controls for broadband for low-income families, to mandating merging parties to donate $1 million to public safety initiatives.

In the last few months alone,

• Randy May and Seth Cooper of the Free State Foundation wrote a piece that the transaction reviews contravene rule of law norms.
• T. Randolph Beard et al. at the Phoenix Center published a research paper about how the FCC’s informal bargaining during mergers has become much more active and politically motivated in recent years.
• Derek Bambauer, law professor at the University of Arizona, published a law review article that criticized the use of informal agency actions to pressure companies to act in certain ways. These secretive pressures “cloak what is in reality state action in the guise of private choice.”

This week, in the Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, my colleague Christopher Koopman and I added to this recent scholarship on the FCC’s controversial transaction reviews.

We echo the argument that the FCC merger policies undermine the rule of law. Firms have no idea which policies they’ll need to comply with to receive transaction approval. We also note that the FCC is motivated to shift from formal regulation, which is time consuming and subject to judicial review, to “regulation by transaction,” which has fewer restraints on agency action. The FCC and the courts have put few meaningful limits on what can be coerced from merging firms. Many concessions from merging firms are policies that the FCC is simply unwilling to accomplish via formal rulemaking or, sometimes, is outright prohibited by law from regulating. Since a firm’s concessions in this coercive process are nominally voluntary, they typically can’t sue.

We point out, further, that the FCC has a potentially damaging legal issue on its hands. Since the agency is now extracting concessions related to content distribution and TV and radio programming, its transaction review authority may be presumptively unconstitutional and subject to facial First Amendment challenges. That means many parties can challenge the law, not simply the ones burdened by conditions (who fear FCC retaliation).

Content-neutral licensing laws, like the FCC’s transaction review authority, are presumptively unconstitutional when there’s a risk  that public officials will intimidate speakers about content. We cite for this proposition the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publishing Co., a 1988 case striking down as unconstitutional a city requirement that newspapers seek a public interest determination from public officials before installing newsracks. As the Court said, for rules with a “nexus to expression,”

a facial [First Amendment] challenge lies whenever a licensing law gives a government official or agency substantial power to discriminate based on the content or viewpoint of speech by suppressing disfavored speech or disliked speakers.

The public officials in City of Lakewood hadn’t even pressured newspapers about content; the mere potential for intimidation was a constitutional violation. If the agency’s authority was challenged, the FCC would be in worse shape than the public officials in City of Lakewood. Unlike those local officials, the FCC has used licensing to pressure firms to add certain types of programming. So the law certainly has the nexus to expression that the Supreme Court requires for a facial challenge.

We highlight, for instance, the many concessions related to content in the 2010 Comcast-NBCU merger. Comcast-NBCU conceded to create children’s, public interest, and Spanish-language TV and video-on-demand programming, relinquish editorial control over Hulu programming, and spend millions of dollars on digital literacy and FDA nutritional TV public service announcements. In that merger and many others, the FCC conditioned approval on compliance with open access and net neutrality policies. As I and others have pointed out, net neutrality rules also threaten free speech rights.

We conclude with some policy recommendations to avoid a constitutional problem for the FCC, including congressional repeal of the FCC’s transaction review authority. We point out that the FCC actually has Clayton Act authority to review common carrier mergers, but the FCC refuses to use it, likely because the agency views traditional competition analysis as too constraining. In our view, unless or until the FCC promulgates predictable guidelines about what is relevant in a transaction review and stays away from content distribution issues, the FCC’s transaction review authority is vulnerable to legal challenge.

The success of the Internet and the modern digital economy was due to its open, generative nature, driven by the ethos of “permissionless innovation.” A “light-touch” policy regime helped make this possible. Of particular legal importance was the immunization of online intermediaries from punishing forms of liability associated with the actions of third parties.

As “software eats the world” and the digital revolution extends its reach to the physical world, policymakers should extend similar legal protections to other “generative” tools and platforms, such as robotics, 3D printing, and virtual reality.

In other words, we need a Section 230 for the “maker” movement.

The Internet’s Most Important Law

Today’s vibrant Internet ecosystem likely would not exist without “Section 230” (47 U.S.C. § 230) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996. That law, which recently celebrated its 20^th anniversary, immunized online intermediaries from onerous civil liability for the content and communications that travelled over their electronic networks.

The immunities granted by Section 230 let online speech and commerce flow freely, without the constant threat of legal action or onerous liability looming overhead for digital platforms. Without the law, many of today’s most popular online sites and services might have been hit with huge lawsuits for the content and commerce that some didn’t approve of on their platforms. It is unlikely that as many of them would have survived if not for Section 230’s protections.

For example, sites such as eBay, Facebook, Wikipedia, Angie’s List, Yelp, and YouTube all depend on Section 230 immunities to shield them from potentially punishing liability for the content that average Americans post to those sites. But Section 230 protects countless small sites and services just as much as those larger platforms and it has been an extraordinary boon to online commerce and speech.

Extending Immunities to Other General-Purpose Technologies: 3 Models

To foster generativity and permissionless innovation for the next wave of tech entrepreneurs, it may be necessary to immunize some intermediaries (i.e., platform providers or device manufacturers) from punishing forms of liability, or at least to limit liability in some fashion to avoid the chilling effect that excessive litigation can have on life-enriching innovation. Specifically, they should be immunized from liability associated with the ways third-parties use their platforms or devices to speak, experiment, or innovate.

“The past ten years have been about discovering new ways to create, invent, and work together on the Web,” noted Chris Anderson in his book Makers: The New Industrial Revolution. “The next ten years will be about applying those lessons to the real world.” But that can only happen if we get public policy right.

Thus, the creators of newer general-purpose technologies may need to receive certain limited immunizations from liability for the ways third-parties use their devices. If troublemakers use general-purpose technologies to do harm—i.e., cybersecurity violations, privacy invasions, copyright infringement, etc.—it is almost always more sensible to hold those problematic users directly accountable for their actions.

The other approach—holding those intermediaries accountable for the actions of third parties—will discourage innovators from creating vibrant, open platforms and devices that could facilitate new types of speech and commerce. Therefore, an embrace of permissionless innovation requires a rejection of such middleman deputization schemes.

There are three different existing immunity models we might consider applying to emerging general-purpose technologies.

Model #1: Section 230 & online services

The first model, of course, is Section 230 itself.  Section 230 stipulated that it is the policy of the United States “to promote the continued development of the Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media,” and “to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.” To accomplish that, the law made it clear that, “No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider.”

Since implementation of Section 230 two decades ago, courts have generally read this immunity fairly broadly, so much so that some critics have argued that 230’s scope has been enlarged well beyond congressional intent. Even if that is true, I believe that has been a net positive (excuse the pun) and that it is not only wise to preserve that sweeping immunity but extend it to other technologies and sectors.

Model #2: Firearm manufacturing

Another immunization model can be found in the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of 2005 (Pub. L. No. 109-92, 119 Stat. 2095). Although “lawsuits alleging negligent distribution plagued the firearm industry until 2005,” the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act “effectively ended the ‘gun tort’ era,” notes Peter Jensen-Haxel. The law did so by granting gun manufacturers immunities for such legal actions. (It would seem that, by extension, those who use 3D printers to create firearms will also be immunized from civil actions.)

Importantly, unlike Section 230, which provided broad immunity by default to all online platforms, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act applied to manufactures/sellers that fit into the certain qualifications (i.e., they get immunity if they comply with certain licensing rules, record keeping requirements, etc.). This tension between broad versus targeted immunity will become the subject of debate for emerging general-purpose technologies as scholars and policymakers contemplate optimal default liability rules.

Model #3: Vaccines

A final legal immunization model comes, ironically, from the world of medical immunizations. As part of the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 (42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to 300aa-34), Congress created The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, “after lawsuits against vaccine companies and health care providers threatened to cause vaccine shortages and reduce U.S. vaccination rates, which could have caused a resurgence of vaccine preventable diseases.”

As described by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, the program, “is a no-fault alternative to the traditional legal system for resolving vaccine injury petitions.” Thus, those suffering injuries from vaccines are able to seek compensation from this program instead of having to sue vaccine companies.

As Avery Johnson of the Wall Street Journal noted in 2009 article about the program, “A spate of lawsuits against vaccine makers in the 1970s and 1980s had caused dozens of companies to get out of the low-profit business, creating a public-health scare. The strategy worked and the public health implications have been sizable. Vaccines have driven huge reductions — and in the case of smallpox, for instance, complete eradications — of major childhood diseases.”

This model is obviously very different than Section 230 and the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act in that it includes a government-created compensation fund provided as an alternative to civil lawsuit remedies. In all likelihood, such a compensation fund would not be necessary for new general-purpose “maker” technologies or sectors.

Nonetheless, this model could, perhaps, have some relevance for certain narrow classes of those technologies. For example, 3D-printed medical devices might be one area where it would make sense to exempt from liability the creators of 3D printers and the platforms over which 3D printer blueprints are distributed. But if there is significant resulting harm from some of those devices or plans, it remains unclear how compensation would work and who would be picking up the tab for it. The National Vaccine Injury Compensation Program offers one potential answer, although it may not be wise to craft such a consumer-funded or taxpayer-supported program for other reasons. Even if creating a government-run compensation fund was eventually seen as a good idea, we cannot determine how big the fund should be until some actual harms occur.

Three Sectors to Cover

Next, we should consider which sectors or technologies should be eligible for such immunities.

I wish it was possible to craft some sort of “General-Purpose Technology Immunization Act” that would shield such platforms and technologies from onerous liability associated with third-party uses. Realistically, however, it is not likely such a broad-based regime could achieve political traction. There would just be too many opposing forces. Moreover, there may be some unique distinctions between technologies and sectors which necessitate specialized legal regimes.

In any event, I believe a good case can be made for adopting some sort of legal immunity regime for three specific technologies: Robotics, 3D printing, and immersive technology (i.e., virtual reality and augmented reality).

Robotics

Ryan Calo, professor of law at the University of Washington School of Law, has done important work on the law of robotics and he has suggested that such legal immunities may need to be extended to this field. In his 2011 Maryland Law Review article on “Open Robotics,” Calo made his case as follows:

To preempt a clampdown on robot functionality, Congress should consider immunizing manufacturers of open robotic platforms from lawsuits for the repercussions of leaving robots open.  Specifically, consumers and other injured parties should not be able to sue roboticists, much less recover damages, where the injury resulted from one of the following: (1) the use to which the consumer decided to put the robot, no matter how tame or mundane; (2) the nonproprietary software the consumer decided to run on the robot; or (3) the consumer’s decision to alter the robot physically by adding or changing hardware. This immunity would include lawful and unlawful uses of the robot. (p. 134) . . . The immunity I propose is selective: Manufacturers of open robots would not escape liability altogether. For instance, if the consumer runs the manufacturer’s software and the hardware remains unmodified, or if it can be shown that the damage at issue was caused entirely by negligent platform design, then recovery should be possible. The immunity I propose only applies in those instances where it is clear that the robot was under the control of the consumer, a third party software, or otherwise the result of end-user modification. Because this issue will not always be easy to prove, we should expect litigation at the margins. I am thus arguing for a compromise position: A presumption against suit unless the plaintiff can show the problem was clearly related to the platform’s design. (p. 136)

I find this entirely convincing and I also believe Calo is wise to begin with robotics as the first target for such legal immunization because such technologies are already being widely manufactured and deployed today.

These liability questions are already being widely debated, for example, in the field of autonomous systems and driverless cars in particular. I’d like to believe that the common law would sort out these things fairly quickly and that an efficient liability regime would emerge from autonomous technologies in short order.

Alas, because America lacks a “loser pays” rule, a perverse incentive exists for overly-zealous trial lawyers to file an avalanche of lawsuits at the first sign of any problem. This could significantly hamper the development of autonomous technologies, which have the potential to immediately decrease the staggering death toll associated with human error behind the wheel. Therefore, it may be necessary for Congress to craft some sort of limited immunity regime for autonomous technology makers to ensure that the development of these potential life-saving technologies is not discouraged by the looming threat of perpetual litigation.

3D Printing

3D printing would be my second choice for a general-purpose technology that should be covered by some sort of intermediary immunity model.

In a forthcoming law review article for the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Adam Marcus and I argue that “the manufacturers of 3D printing devices and the website operators hosting blueprints for 3D-printed objects may need to be protected from liability to avoid chilling innovation. In this sense, a ‘Section 230 for 3D printing’ might be needed.”

We discuss three specific ways that 3D printers could be used by third-parties in such a way that existing laws or regulations are implicated and someone might seek to bring action against the manufacturers of 3D printers or 3D printing marketplaces, like Shapeways or Thingiverse. These cases involve things like 3D-printed prosthetics, which could raise policy concerns at the Food and Drug Administration, and 3D-printed toys or sculptures, which could present intellectual property issues.

But perhaps the most interesting case study for liability purposes will be 3D-printed firearms, which are already raising a great deal of controversy. Marcus and I argue, once again, that “the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of firearms, regardless of how they are manufactured.” And because, as already noted, the Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act immunizes gun manufacturers from legal liability for third-party actions, it would seem logical that the law’s protections would extend to 3D-printed firearms. Moreover, Section 230 itself (and perhaps also the First Amendment) might also apply to 3D printing design schematics that appear on various websites or 3D printing marketplaces.

Generally speaking, Marcus and I argue, “imposing liability on third parties—sites hosting schematics, search engines, and manufacturers of devices—seems neither workable nor wise. There exists a broad spectrum of general-purpose technologies that can be used to facilitate criminal activity,” we note, such as cars, computers, or paper printers. But we don’t blame those intermediaries when those technologies are used by third parties in criminal acts. The same principle should apply to 3D printers.

Things get more complicated when intellectual property issues are brought into the debate. In an important 2014 article, “Patents, Meet Napster: 3D Printing and the Digitization of Things,” Deven R. Desai and Gerard N. Magliocca sketched out the potential case for some sort of limited immunity as it pertains to patent infringement and 3D printing. “An obstacle to the growth of 3D printing that Congress should consider addressing is that individuals who engage in that activity are strictly liable if they infringe a patent,” they note, but they continue on to add that:

Exempting personal 3D printing from patent infringement without undermining other aspects of the regulatory scheme will not be easy. It would not be a good idea for Congress to create a fair use exception for all patents or make infringement an intentional tort, as those changes would sweep too far. Targeting 3D printing itself is a possibility, but in that case the legislation would have to distinguish between personal and commercial activity, as there is no rationale for saying that all 3D printing leading to patent infringement, including what Fortune 500 firms do, should be permitted. Drawing that kind of line with a substantive legal standard, though, will generate years of litigation and may not effectively separate the good from the bad. One alternative, should Congress opt to give personal 3D printing some immunity, would be to set a relatively high minimum amount-in-controversy for federal jurisdiction over any [patent] infringement claims involving this technology. (p. 1717)

Getting this balance right will be tricky, yet essential. “Patent law and industries that rely on patents will have to adapt to this new environment or face potential obsolescence,” Desai and Magliocca correctly conclude.

Immersive Technology

A final sector we might eventually want to apply some sort of intermediary immunity model to is immersive technology. “Immersive technology” refers to services that currently utilize wearable devices (such as a head-mounted display or headset) to let users explore virtual worlds, virtual objects, or hologram-like projections. Immersive technology can be separated into two different, but related groups: virtual reality (VR) and augmented reality (AR).

These technologies are still in the cradle, but many companies are already developing VR and AR technologies for both entertainment and professional uses. As they gain more widespread usage, immersive technologies could raise some policy issues, including concerns about privacy, intellectual property (ex: who owns certain “experiences”), and potentially even worries about distraction and addiction.

It would not be surprising, therefore, if some critics begin advocating greater regulation of, or liability for, VR and AR intermediaries. If that happens, policymakers will need to consider immunizing them from the threat of lawsuits or else innovation will die in these sectors.

Conclusion

Following the general logic of permissionless innovation, and understanding the importance of keeping intermediaries free of punishing liability for what others might do with their general-purpose technologies and platforms, the proper focus of regulation should remain on the user and uses of those technologies.

Accordingly, policymakers should craft a “Section 230 for the maker movement” by adopting legal protections for robotics, 3D printing, and immersive technology. At the same time, we should seek out better solutions—legal and otherwise—to the old problems that might persist or new ones that might come about due to the use of these new devices and platforms. But we should not let hypothetical worst-case scenarios and concerns about future technologies lead us down a path where intermediaries are “deputized” or hit with punishing liability for downstream actions by third parties.

Note#1 : This is a preliminary sketch of a law review article I would eventually like to write entitled, “A Section 230 for the “Makers” Movement: Extending Section 230 Immunities to Robotics, 3D Printing & Virtual Reality.” Toward that end, I welcome suggestions for (a) which general-purpose technologies deserve some sort of immunization, and also (b) what other legal immunity regimes exist that we could learn from. Please forward any ideas you might have along to me.

Note #2: My thanks to Adam Marcus and Christopher Koopman for their helpful suggestions on this essay.

The FCC’s Open Internet Order is long and complex and the challenge to it is likewise difficult to untangle. The agency regularly engages in ad hoc rulemaking that results, per Judge Posner, in “unprincipled compromises of Rube Goldberg complexity among contending interest groups viewed merely as clamoring suppliants who have somehow to be conciliated.” The Open Internet Order is no exception and therefore faces several legal vulnerabilities.

In my view, the soft underbelly of the Order is the agency’s position that ISPs are not First Amendment speakers. While courts are generally very deferential to agencies, they are not deferential on constitutional questions. Further, the court panel (two Democrat appointees, one Republican appointee), unfortunately, was not in the carriers’ favor. The major carriers, however, have focused their arguments on whether the agency should receive deference in classifying Internet access as a telecommunications service.

That said, it’s possible the major carriers could get at least a partial win with their arguments. That likelihood is increased because Alamo Broadband and Dan Berninger raised the First Amendment problems with the Order. Given the strength of the First Amendment arguments, the Court might shy away from reaching the issue of whether ISPs are speakers. Below, some thoughts on the moments during oral arguments that surprised me and what went according to predictions.

The Unexpected

A receptive ear in Judge Williams re: the First Amendment arguments. (Good for: ISPs) The First Amendment arguments went better than I’d expected. Alamo and Berninger’s counsel, Brett Shumate, argued the First Amendment issues well and had good responses for skeptical questions. Shumate found a receptive ear in Judge Williams, who seemed to understand the serious First Amendment risks posed by the Order. Williams repeatedly brought up the fact that MetroPCS a few years ago tried to curate the Internet and provide its customers free YouTube, only to face resistance from the FCC and net neutrality activists.

The other two judges were more skeptical but Shumate corrected some misconceptions. The biggest substantive objection from Srinivasan, who sounded the most skeptical of the First Amendment arguments, was that if the Court reaches the First Amendment issues, it has determined that the FCC has reasonably classified Internet access as a common carrier service. He suggested that this means the First Amendment issues mostly disappear. No, Shumate explained. Congress and the FCC can call services whatever they want. They could declare Google Search or Twitter feeds a common carrier service tomorrow and that would have zero effect on whether filtering by Google and Twitter is protected by the First Amendment. Tatel asked whether Section 230’s liability protections suggest ISPs are common carriers and Shumate corrected that misconception, a subject I have written on before.

A major FCC concession that ISPs have to option to change their offerings and escape common carrier regulation. (Good for: ISPs) Title II advocates are spinning the terse First Amendment exchanges as a victory. I’m not convinced. The reason the arguments didn’t generate more heat was because the FCC lawyer made a huge concession at the outset: ISPs that choose to filter the Internet are not covered by the Open Internet Order.

FCC lawyer: “If [ISPs] want to curate the Internet…that would drop them out of the definition of Broadband Internet Access Service.” Judge Williams: “They have that option under the Order?” FCC lawyer: “Absolutely, your Honor. …If they filter the Internet and don’t provide access to all or substantially all endpoints, then they drop out of the definition of [BIAS] and the rules don’t apply to them.”

This admission seriously undermines the purposes of the Order. The FCC is stating outright that ISPs have the option to filter and to avoid the rules. That seems to mean that Comcast’s Stream Internet protocol television service, where it is curating streaming TV programs, is not covered by the rules. If Facebook’s Free Basics or a similar service launched in the US giving free, limited access to the Web, that is not covered by the Order. Finally, this means that the many broadband packages that offer family-friendly filtering are outside of the FCC’s rules. It’s not clear how much remains to be regulated since all ISPs reserve the right to filter content and each filters at least some content.

Judge Tatel directing most questioning. (Good for: wash) Many view Judge Tatel as the “swing vote” but I was surprised at the relative quiet from Williams and Srinivasan. Tatel was the most inquisitive, by my listening. He was much more skeptical of some of the FCC’s arguments regarding interconnection than I expected but also more skeptical of the First Amendment arguments than I expected.

Little discussion of Chevron Step 0. (Good for: FCC) Many on the free-market side wanted to make this case about Chevron Step 0 and the notion that Title II is too economically and socially significant to warrant deference. Unfortunately, at oral argument there was very little discussion of Chevron Step 0.

The Expected

Focus on agency discretion. (Good for: FCC) The judges generally seem to see this as a straightforward Chevron case and the questions focused on Chevron Step 1, whether there is ambiguity in the statute about “offering telecommunications” for the FCC to interpret. As expected, the FCC did fairly well in their arguments because these technical issues are very hard to untangle.

On Chevron Step 2, whether the reinterpretation of “telecommunications service” to include Internet access was reasonable, the US Telecom attorney was strong. He leaned heavily on the fact that in Section 230, which amends the Communications Act, Congress announces a national policy that the Internet and specifically Internet access services, should remain “unfettered by Federal regulation.” That would seem to preclude the FCC from using, at the very least, its most powerful regulatory weapon–common carriage–against Internet access providers. Even if “telecommunications service” is ambiguous, he stated, it was unreasonable to include Internet access in that definition.

Focus on whether mobile broadband can be properly classified under Title II. (Benefit: ISPs) As many commentators have noted, the idea that the traditional phone network and the mobile broadband network can be classified as the same interconnected network is far-fetched. Each judge seemed very skeptical of the FCC’s argument and Tatel suggested there was a lack of adequate notice.

Srinivasan pointed out that striking down the wireless rules and maintaining the wireline rules would mean that using the same tablet in different areas of your house would lead to different regulatory treatment, depending on whether you’re on the cellular broadband network or Wifi. Title II supporters think this is pretty clever gotcha but communications law already abounds with seemingly absurd FCC- and court-created legal distinctions. (The FCC invents its own absurd distinction and offers vastly different regulatory treatment for DNS operated by an ISP v. DNS operated by literally anyone else.)

Conclusion

Predictions about major regulatory cases are notoriously difficult. I’ve read (and made) enough predictions about big court cases to know that prognosticators almost always get it wrong. If that’s the case, at least consider one thought-provoking outcome: the rules are largely struck down because the FCC provided inadequate notice on most of the major issues of classification.

If the rules, in contrast, were sustained under Chevron and judged to have had adequate notice, the Court would likely need to confront the First Amendment issues. I don’t think Tatel and Srinivasan, especially, want to rule on these hard constitutional questions. The judges must know the Supreme Court has, as Prof. Susan Crawford says, an “absolutist approach” to the First Amendment that protects speakers of all kinds. Sustaining the rules means the FCC risks a loss on First Amendment grounds on appeal that would nearly eliminate the ability of the FCC to regulate the Internet. For that reason, and because of the notice problems, the Court may strike down the rules on notice and comment grounds, thereby preserving the ability of the FCC to take a fourth bite at the apple.

On October 7th I appeared on a webinar hosted by Prof. Barry Umansky and Ball State’s Digital Policy Institute about the FCC’s Title II case before the DC Circuit Court of Appeals, US Telecom Association v. FCC. The other panelists were Andrew Schwartzman of Georgetown University and Stuart Brotman of Harvard Law School and the Brookings Institution. Check it out, but here’s a brief summary of our hour-long discussion.

Much of our discussion was about whether and how the Court will analyze the FCC’s Open Internet rules under the Chevron doctrine. Andrew argues that this is a Chevron case, that “telecommunications service” is ambiguous in the Communications Act, and that the FCC’s reinterpretation of telecommunications to include Internet access is reasonable. I disagreed and argued that classifying Internet access service as a “telecommunications service” is unreasonable given technical realities and Sections 620, 230, and 231 of the Communications Act.

Later, Andrew contended that ISPs are clearly common carriers and the FCC is simply codifying this reality. Again, I disagreed. ISPs, for instance, reserve the right to revoke service from people based on the content they send or post (like being abusive, harassing, or hateful online). Common carriers don’t do that. ISPs filter content they suspect customers don’t want (like spam). Common carriers don’t do that. ISPs offer customized access services (like parental controls and Web whitelists and blacklists). Common carriers don’t do that.

Stuart raises the point that the deferential Chevron doctrine might not be applied at all. Making this case to the Court–that regulating most of the Internet is too socially and economically significant to receive Chevron deference–seems to be dominant legal strategy for Title II opponents. As Prof. Dan Lyons, points out in a blog post this week, the Supreme Court seems to be increasingly hostile to agencies’ major reinterpretations of law.

We’ll see. I actually agree with my copanelist Andrew that the DC Circuit will tend to view this as a garden-variety administrative law case. Courts are generally deferential to expert agencies on reinterpreting the law and, as Lyons notes, it’s still pretty rare for courts to find that an agency decision does not get substantial deference.

For that reason, I point out in the webinar that the perhaps the strongest argument for the ISPs is raised by Alamo Broadband and Dan Berninger–that the Open Internet rules violate the First Amendment. I wrote recently why the Open Internet rules may violate the First Amendment. I note in the webinar that, unlike administrative law questions, courts are not deferential to agencies when the First Amendment is at issue. Courts interpret the coverage of the First Amendment broadly and the First Amendment is increasingly an effective tool to strike down regulations that implicate speech.

We wrap up the webinar by discussing whether a legislative compromise is possible before the 2016 elections (no). There will more analysis of the legal briefs before the December oral arguments and I’d expect two major issues, whether Chevron applies and whether the rules violate the First Amendment, to be in the conversation.

As FCC Commissioner Jessica Rosenworcel said of the Internet, “It is our printing press.” Unfortunately, for First Amendment purposes, regulators and courts treat our modern printing presses — electronic media — very differently from the traditional ones. Therefore, there is persistent political and activist pressure on regulators to rule that Internet intermediaries — like social networks and search engines — are not engaging in constitutionally-protected speech.

Most controversial is the idea that, as content creators and curators, Internet service providers are speakers with First Amendment rights. The FCC’s 2015 Open Internet Order designates ISPs as common carriers and generally prohibits ISPs from blocking Internet content. The agency asserts outright that ISPs “are not speakers.” These Title II rules may be struck down on procedural grounds, but the First Amendment issues pose a significant threat to the new rules.

ISPs are Speakers Courts and Congress, as explained below, have long recognized that ISPs possess editorial discretion. Extensive ISP filtering was much more common in the 1990s but still exists today. Take JNet and DNet. These ISPs block large portions of Internet content that may violate religious principles. They also block neutral services like gaming and video if the subscriber wishes. JNet offers several services, including DSL Internet access, and markets itself to religious Jews. It is server-based (not client-based) and offers several types of filters, including application-based blocking, blacklists, and whitelists. Similarly, DNet, targeted mostly to Christian families in the Carolinas, offers DSL and wireless server-based filtering of content like pornography and erotic material. A strict no-blocking rule on the “last mile” access connection, which most net neutrality proponents want enforced, would prohibit these types of services.

The extensive filtering these ISPs do is not as common as it once was, but they illustrate the reality that ISPs do have editorial discretion and they do exercise it. For that reason, scholars have pointed out for nearly a decade that any meaningful no-blocking rule compels speech from ISPs and other Internet platforms. ISPs would be forced to transmit content that they object to.

Therefore, the Title II rules, especially a no-blocking rule, may not survive a First Amendment challenge. Title II proponents frequently assert that ISPs are “dumb pipes” and must be prohibited from exercising any editorial control over what is transmitted from consumers. Net neutrality activists around the globe, for instance, want to prohibit Internet.org, a free app jointly produced by Facebook and wireless carriers, because it “blocks” access to content that is is not selected to be included within the package.

To avoid scrutiny from a court, the FCC will need to show that ISPs resemble common carriers like telephone companies and FedEx that — though transmitting speech — don’t have editorial discretion and have essentially no First Amendment rights. However, if ISPs instead resemble electronic media like cable TV companies or search engines that exercise editorial control over transmitted content, the Title II rules represent compelled speech and will receive significant court scrutiny.

Internet Platforms and Curation A court holding that ISPs are speakers for First Amendment purposes is important because Internet-based, curated distribution is replacing traditional ways consumers accessed news and media — bookstores, newsstands, broadcast radio, cable TV. The nature of “publication” and “speakers” has changed rapidly in a short time because information is much more accessible in the Internet age. Clay Shirky notes that the traditional formula of “Filter, then publish,” has been replaced with “Publish, then filter.”

While the nature of media changed, many still want to regulate the intermediaries. Google’s algorithm is a common target for regulation. Politico recently published a piece calling for search engine regulation because of Google’s ostensible ability to sway close elections through opaque algorithm tweaks. Many online companies and media companies likewise want to regulate the order in which Search results appear, an effort gaining traction in Europe. Further, some academics and activists would like to extend neutrality rules to Twitter’s and Facebook’s curation of user streams.

Fortunately, those efforts would likely fail in the US because Internet intermediaries receive constitutional protection. As Eugene Volokh persuasively argues, “search engines are speakers” and regulations affecting Google’s algorithms must withstand First Amendment scrutiny. Law professor Jonathan Zittrain advises regulatory caution and notes that “content curators…have a First Amendment right to present their content as they see fit.” ISPs likewise have an existing right (seldom exercised) to curate and filter content. As net neutrality supporter Harold Feld says, if the FCC doesn’t classify ISPs as common carriers, “nothing requires your ISP to deliver [Internet content]. If Comcast decides I am evil and blocks [my website], they can do it.”

Courts call this ability to filter, anachronistically, “editorial discretion.” In this new media world of content abundance, “curation” better represents what defines protected speech because most of the actual messages transmitted originate from third parties. Certainly, print organizations have substantial editorial control over what is published, but radio and TV is less controlled and newer media platforms display a wide range of editorial controls. Many of the most important modern speakers in this “publish, then filter” environment are curators. New media, like aggregators, cable companies, search engines, and ISPs, often use an intentional, semi-automated, iterative process to decide what content to omit and what to transmit.

Constitutional protection of curators means regulators likely cannot force a Christian cable operator to carry Cinemax. Likewise, Apple can continue to block apps containing Confederate flags or nudity in the App Store. Even though ISP filtering of content may be a blunter tool, like a WISP operated by Christians or Jews that blocks websites for its religious users, or like Internet.org that transmits only select Internet content, the First Amendment protects that ability to tailor content.

The Dumb Pipes Myth Readers of law review articles from net neutrality advocates and of the Open Internet Order are left with the false impression that ISPs are passive transmitters — dumb pipes — that never block content. Title II supporters have to maintain this facade because if they suggest that ISPs exercise editorial control, the no-blocking rules trigger First Amendment scrutiny. Fortunately for First Amendment purists, there is sufficient evidence of ISPs filtering content to raise serious questions about the constitutionality of the Open Internet Order. Internet service providers can and do engage in filtering, and some curate content in ways that are much more intentional than First Amendment-protected speech activity like cable TV distribution and Google search results.

There are, as mentioned, small ISPs like JNet and Clean Internet that provide Internet access marketed to religious users. In addition to its wireline service, DNet is also a wireless ISP and advertises that they filter pornography and other content. Sprint, one of the Big Four national wireless carriers, last year offered social media plans and parental controls, including whitelists and blacklists, through its Virgin Mobile subsidiary.

I’ve posed this question to Title II advocates several times — Aren’t religious ISPs engaged in First Amendment-protected speech? To date, none have denied it and seem content to pretend server-based filtering by wired and wireless access providers doesn’t exist. Susan Crawford, for instance, wrote a law review piece about ISPs’ purported lack of First Amendment protection. She noted, correctly, that if ISPs were engaged in editorial decisions about filtering content, that would pose a problem for the FCC regulations. However, she abruptly discontinued a Twitter back-and-forth with me when I pointed out she omitted instances of religious ISPs exercising the editorial discretion she fears.

It’s not just smaller ISPs that filter. AT&T, for instance, like nearly every major ISP and Web company, reserves the right in its acceptable use policy to pull down content “that is determined by AT&T to be obscene, indecent, hateful, malicious, racist, defamatory, fraudulent, libelous, treasonous, excessively violent or promoting the use of violence or otherwise harmful to others.” This is not idle language. Groups like the Anti-Defamation League, for instance, knowing that they have enforceable acceptable use policies actively lobby and persuade ISPs and Web companies to remove content from anti-Semites and groups like the KKK.

Title II proponents like to point out that the large ISPs engage in relatively little of the curation and filtering that I’ve described. Therefore, they reason, ISPs are common carriers. I’m not persuaded. That distinction appears immaterial considering the FCC made no such distinction in its Open Internet Order. Further, large ISP reluctance to offer, say, family-friendly Internet packages is entirely predictable considering the FCC has for a decade chilled that exercise of free speech through ham-fisted attempts at net neutrality enforcement, merger conditions, and punitive fines.

Congress Intended to Encourage ISPs to Filter Content with Section 230 The FCC faces another obstacle to its conclusory determination that ISPs are not speakers. The 2015 Open Internet Order largely adopts net neutrality proponents’ First Amendment arguments and concludes that ISPs “serve as mere conduits for the messages of others, not as agents exercising editorial discretion.” However, Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act has a Good Samaritan provision that suggests ISPs are speakers, a view that several courts have endorsed.

For better or for worse, Section 230 makes ISPs and other Internet platforms that primarily rely on third-party content “super speakers.” Internet platforms can exercise editorial control and get all the benefits of being a speaker, like First Amendment protection, yet are immunized from many of the burdens, like liability for distributing online defamation and libel.

Why did Congress take this dramatic step in the mid-1990s? Quite simply, the drafters wanted to encourage ISPs to continue to block offensive content online. At that time, ISPs and bulletin board operators like Prodigy marketed themselves as family friendly and (inconsistently) blocked content that Prodigy administrators judged to be in bad taste. Because of this editorial discretion, in 1995 Prodigy faced costly liability in a defamation suit for defamatory statements one of its users posted, in a case called Stratton Oakmont v. Prodigy. Because of Stratton Oakmont and a few similar cases, Internet intermediaries faced two undesirable options to avoid liability for transmitted content:

1. become conduits and exercise no editorial control — thereby leaving even offensive content online; or
2. constantly police Internet content and take down all questionable material.

Congress disliked both options and quickly responded with Section 230 protections in 1996 to protect Internet-based distributors from becoming mere conduits. The statute protects “interactive computer services,” which includes, “specifically a service or system that provides access to the Internet….” Congress, therefore, preserved ISPs’ editorial role in cleaning up the Internet.

Several court cases recognize that ISPs and other Internet platforms exercise editorial discretion and are not mere conduits. As the district court said in the 1998 case Blumenthal v. Drudge, 230’s protections serve “as an incentive to Internet service providers to self-police the Internet for obscenity and other offensive material.” Similarly, the 9th Circuit Court of Appeals noted in the 2008 Roommate.com case that through 230, “Congress sought to [allow ISPs] to perform some editing on user-generated content….” A 10th Circuit decision states that “Congress clearly enacted § 230 to forbid the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.” Finally, as the Fourth Circuit said in Zeran v. America Online, Section 230 “forbids the imposition of publisher liability on a service provider for the exercise of its editorial and self-regulatory functions.”

At the very minimum, we have several courts saying that ISPs exercise editorial discretion — directly contradicting the assertions by Title II proponents and the FCC. Further, not only can ISPs filter content, it is a practice that Congress wished to encourage. The Title II rules chill those editorial functions, and that is a problem for the FCC.

Finally, while not a Section 230 case, a majority of the Supreme Court has tacitly endorsed Congress’ view that ISPs are speakers that can and should serve as curators of online content. In Ashcroft v. ACLU, the Court cited ISP filtering favorably as an alternative to unconstitutional provisions of the Child Online Protection Act. Taking these cases together, it’s unlikely a court will sustain the net neutrality advocate view that ISPs are not speakers and cannot engage in filtering.

The 2015 Open Internet Order and its Content-Neutrality Problem Section 230 poses an additional problem for the FCC. Most courts construe Section 230(c)(2) broadly in terms of what services are protected and the kinds of liability providers are immunized from. A broad reading may protect ISPs from FCC regulations that restrain ISP filtering abilities.

The FCC’s hastily-written Title II order seems to recognize this but reveals some internal tensions in an effort to allow some Section 230-type ISP filtering. For example, while the Order says ISPs are not First Amendment speakers, the Order appears to accept the premise that Section 230 restrains agency action. Specifically, the Order likely allows ISPs to block offensive content and offer family-friendly packages because the FCC permits, in paragraph 220, ISPs to block “traffic that is unwanted by end users.” The FCC cites to the portions of the 2010 Open Internet Order that allowed Internet access packages that block, specifically, pornographic content. In those referenced portions of the 2010 Order, the FCC cites Section 230 and expressly states that the agency will not impose liability for good-faith actions by ISPs to restrict harassing and offensive content.

This exception to the no-blocking rule, if it is indeed an exception, puts the FCC in a bind when defending its no-blocking rule against First Amendment challenges. As an initial matter, this exception that allows ISPs to actively block the content described in Section 230 suggests FCC acknowledgement that ISPs are exercising editorial control and engaged in protected speech.

Further, if the FCC interprets this “unwanted traffic” exception narrowly, the agency would allow ISPs to block only lewd, harassing, and violent material (that is, the material specifically mentioned in Section 230), but would penalize ISPs for blocking, say, political, religious, and entertainment content. Such a distinction means that the Title II rules are not content-neutral regulations and therefore likely to be struck down on First Amendment grounds. In the words of the Supreme Court, courts will “apply the most exacting scrutiny to regulations that…impose differential burdens upon speech because of its content.” If, on the other hand, the FCC interprets “unwanted traffic” broadly in a content-neutral manner, the rules allow widespread filtering of Internet content, undermine the FCC’s assertion that ISPs are not speakers, and eviscerate the entire purpose of the Title II rules.

Before concluding, one aside is probably necessary: This position — that ISPs have a constitutional right to filter Internet packages for consumers — is often misrepresented and maligned by net neutrality advocates. To be clear, that ISPs or other Internet platforms have a First Amendment right to select which online content to transmit does not mean anticompetitive blocking or throttling of, say, Netflix is permissible. That is illegal. It likewise does not mean ISPs can promise subscribers access to Internet content and subsequently block that content. That is also illegal. This is a narrower claim: The First Amendment protects ISPs’ prerogative to transparently offer kid-friendly and other filtered Internet packages like Internet.org.

The future of the media is Internet-based and content is increasingly curated. It’s important that regulators don’t deprive ISPs of their First Amendment rights because ISPs represent the canary in the coalmine. First Amendment protection has generally been a one-way ratchet that’s expanded free speech protections for several decades and has been used successfully to fight regulations that affect speech. A setback for the First Amendment would encourage media access activists to seek more regulation for new media. The “gatekeeper” theory used to justify regulation of ISPs is just the warmed-over “scarcity” rationale for the Fairness Doctrine and other restraints on speech. The calls to regulate Twitter, Facebook, and Google algorithms and Internet television will grow even louder if courts accept the FCC’s First Amendment analysis in the Open Internet Order. Fortunately, the Open Internet Order suffers from several deficiencies and there is a good chance courts will again remind regulators to keep their hands off the Internet.

Article was originally posted on Plain Text on September 3.

On Thursday, it was my great pleasure to participate in a Washington Legal Foundation (WLF) event on “Online Privacy Regulation: The Challenge of Defining Harm.” The entire event video can be found on YouTube here, but down below I pasted the clip of just my remarks. Other speakers at the event included:  FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner; John B. Morris, Jr., the Associate Administrator and Director of Internet Policy athe U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration; and Katherine Armstrong, Counsel at the law firm of Hogan Lovells. Glenn Lammi of the WLF moderated the session.

My remarks drew upon a few recent law review articles I have published relating digital privacy debates to previous debates over free speech and online child safety issues. (Here are those articles: 1, 2, 3).

Yesterday afternoon, the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) finally released its much-delayed rules for private drone operations. As The Wall Street Journal  points out, the rules “are about four years behind schedule,” but now the agency is asking for expedited public comments over the next 60 days on the whopping 200-page order. (You have to love the irony in that!) I’m still going through all the details in the FAA’s new order — and here’s a summary of what the major provisions — but here are some high-level thoughts about what the agency has proposed.

Opening the Skies…

• The good news is that, after a long delay, the FAA is finally taking some baby steps toward freeing up the market for private drone operations.
• Innovators will no longer have to operate entirely outside the law in a sort of drone black market. There’s now a path to legal operation. Specifically, small unmanned aircraft systems (UAS) operators (for drones under 55 lbs.) will be able to go through a formal certification process and, after passing a test, get to operate their systems.

… but Not Without Some Serious Constraints

• The problem is that the rules only open the skies incrementally for drone innovation.
• You can’t read through these 200 pages of regulations without getting sense that the FAA still wishes that private drones would just go away.
• For example, the FAA still wants to keep a bit of a leash around drones by (1) limiting their use to being daylight-only flights (2) that are in the visual line-of-sight of the operators at all times. And (3) the agency also says that drones cannot be flown over people.
• Those three limitations will hinder some obvious innovations, such as same-day drone delivery for small packages, which Amazon has suggested they are interested in pursuing. (Amazon isn’t happy about these restrictions.)

Impact on Small Innovators?

• But what I worry about more are all the small ‘Mom-and-Pop’ drone entrepreneur, who want to use airspace as a platform for open, creative innovation. These folks are out there but they don’t have the name or the resources to weather these restrictions the way that Amazon can. After all, if Amazon has to abandon same-day drone delivery because of the FAA rules, the company will still have a thriving commercial operation to fall back on. But all those small, nameless drone innovators currently experimenting with new, unforeseeable innovations may not be so lucky.
• As a result, there’s a real threat here of drone entrepreneurs bolting the U.S. and offering their services in more hospitable environments if the FAA doesn’t take a more flexible approach.
• [For more discussion of this problem, see my recent essay on “global innovation arbitrage.”]

Impact on News-Gathering?

• It’s also worth asking how these rules might limit legitimate news-gathering operations by both journalistic enterprises and average citizens. If we can never fly a drone over a crowd of people, as the rules stipulate, that places some rather serious constraints on our ability to capture real-time images and video from events of societal importance (such as political protests or even just major events like sporting events or concerts).
• [For more discussion about this, see this September 2014 Mercatus Center working paper, “News from Above: First Amendment Implications of the Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones.”]

Still Time to Reconsider More Flexible Rules

• Of course, these aren’t final rules and the agency still has time to relax some of these restrictions to free the skies for less fettered private drone operation.
• I suspect that drone innovators will protest the three specific limitations I identified above and ask for a more flexible approach to enforcing those rules.
• But it’s good that the FAA has finally taken the first step toward decriminalizing private drone operations in the United States.

___________________________

Additional  Reading

• Permissionless Innovation & Commercial Drones, February 4, 2015.
• DRM for Drones Will Fail, January 28, 2015.
• Regulatory Capture: FAA and Commercial Drones Edition, January 16, 2015.
• Global Innovation Arbitrage: Commercial Drones & Sharing Economy Edition, December 9, 2014.
• How to Destroy American Innovation: The FAA & Commercial Drones, October 6, 2014.
• Filing to FAA on Drones & “Model Aircraft”, Sept. 23, 2014.
• Private Drones & the First Amendment, Sept. 19, 2014.
• [TV interview] The Beneficial Uses of Private Drones, March 28, 2014.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FAA on integration of drones into the nation’s airspace, April 23, 2o13.
• Eli Dourado, Deregulate the Skies: Why We Can’t Afford to Fear Drones, Wired, April 23, 2013.
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014).
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014).

The use of unmanned aircraft systems, or “drones,” for private and commercial uses remains the subject of much debate. The issue has been heating up lately after Congress ordered the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to integrate UASs into the nation’s airspace system by 2015 as part of the FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012.

The debate has thus far centered mostly around the safety and privacy-related concerns associated with private use of drones. The FAA continues to move slowly on this front based on a fear that private drones could jeopardize air safety or the safety of others on the ground. Meanwhile, some privacy advocates are worried that private drones might be used in ways that invade private spaces or even public areas where citizens have a reasonable expectation of privacy. For these and other reasons, the FAA’s current ban on private operation of drones in the nation’s airspace remains in place.

But what about the speech-related implications of this debate? After all, private and commercial UASs can have many peaceful, speech-related uses. Indeed, to borrow Ithiel de Sola Pool’s term, private drones can be thought of as “technologies or freedom” that expand and enhance the ability of humans to gather and share information, thus in turn expanding the range of human knowledge and freedom.

A new Mercatus Center at George Mason University working paper, “News from Above: First Amendment Implications of the Federal Aviation Administration Ban on Commercial Drones,” deals with these questions.  This 59-page working paper was authored by Cynthia Love, Sean T. Lawson, and Avery Holton. (Love is currently a Law Clerk for Judge Carolyn B. McHugh in 10th Circuit U.S. Court of Appeals. Lawson and Holton are affliated with the Department of Communication at the University of Utah.)

“To date, little attention has been paid to the First Amendment implications of the [FAA] ban,” note Love, Lawson, and Holton. Their article argues that “aerial photography with UASs, whether commercial or not, is protected First Amendment activity, particularly for news-gathering purposes. The FAA must take First Amendment-protected uses of this technology into account as it proceeds with meeting its congressional mandate to promulgate rules for domestic UASs.” They conclude by noting that “The dangers of [the FAA’s] regulatory approach are no mere matter of esoteric administrative law. Rather, as we have demonstrated, use of threats to enforce illegally promulgated rules, in particular a ban on journalistic use of UASs, infringes upon perhaps our most cherished constitutional right, that of free speech and a free press.”

The authors note that we already have a well-established set of principles that guide how government may set content-neutral regulations related to the time, place, or manner for how certain technologies can be used. Unfortunately, the FAA doesn’t seem to be paying any attention to this time-tested jurisprudence. As the authors note:

Because the airspace within a public forum should itself be considered a public forum, the government may only restrict the journalistic use of UAS technology with content-neutral regulations of the time, place, or manner of such use. Such regulations must be “justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech,” be “narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest,” and “leave open ample alternative channels of communication.” The FAA’s blanket ban on commercial use fails to meet this test. The FAA’s ban is not a reasonable time, place, or manner restriction.

This new paper by Love, Lawson, and Holton will hopefully inform future policymaking and judicial activity on this front and, if nothing else, make the FAA to realize that it is not above the law–and in this case the First Amendment–when it comes to drone policy. Please read the entire paper for more details. It is exceptionally well done and could be a real game-changer in these debates.

P.S. I plan on attaching Love, Lawson, and Holton’s paper to my filing to the FAA next week in its proceeding on model aircraft regulation. The filing date for that proceeding was extended this summer and comments are now due next week. I will post my filing here shortly. The Mercatus Center filed comments with the FAA earlier about the prompt integration of drones into the nation’s airspace. You can read those comments here. You can also read Eli Dourado’s excellent Wired editorial on the matter here and here’s a video of me talking about these issues on the Stossel show a few months ago.

Verizon v. FCC, the court decision overturning the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) net neutrality rules, didn’t rule directly on the First Amendment issues. It did, however, reject the reasoning of net neutrality advocates who claim Internet service providers (ISPs) are not entitled to freedom of speech.

The court recognized that, in terms of the functionality that it offers consumers and the economic relationships among industry participants, the Internet is as similar to analog cable networks as it is to analog telephone networks. As a result, the court considered most of the issues in the net neutrality case to be “indistinguishable” from those addressed in  Midwest Video II, a seminal case addressing the FCC’s authority over cable systems. The court’s emphasis on the substantive similarities between analog cable services, which are clearly entitled to First Amendment protection, indicates that ISPs are likewise entitled to protection.

Net neutrality advocates argued that ISPs are not First Amendment “speakers” because ISPs do not exercise editorial discretion over Internet content. In essence, these advocates argued that ISPs forfeited their First Amendment rights as a result of their “actual conduct” in the marketplace.

Though the court didn’t address the First Amendment issues directly, the court’s reasoning regarding common carrier issues indicates that the “actual conduct” of ISPs is legally irrelevant to their status as First Amendment speakers.

In  Verizon v. FCC , the FCC argued that its net neutrality rules couldn’t be considered common carrier obligations with respect to edge providers because ISPs did not have direct commercial relationships with edge providers. But the court concluded that the nature of preexisting commercial relationships between ISPs and edge providers was irrelevant to the legal status of ISPs:

[T]he Commission appears to misunderstand the nature of the inquiry in which we must engage. The question is not whether, absent the [net neutrality rules], broadband providers would or did act as common carriers with respect to edge providers; rather, the question is whether, given the rules imposed by the [FCC], broadband providers are now obligated to act as common carriers.

FCC v. Verizon, No. 11-1355 at 52 (2014) (emphasis in original).

A court must engage in a similar inquiry when determining whether ISPs are “speakers” entitled to First Amendment protection. The question is not whether ISPs would or actually have exercised editorial discretion in the past. There is no Constitutional requirement that ISPs (or anyone else)  must speak at the earliest opportunity in order to preserve their right to speak in the future. The question is whether ISPs have the legal option of speaking — i.e., exercising editorial discretion.[2]

Of course, everyone knows ISPs have the ability to exercise such discretion. The court noted there was little dispute regarding the FCC’s finding that that ISPs have the technological ability to distinguish among different types of Internet traffic. Indeed, ISPs’ ability to exercise editorial discretion is the very reason the FCC adopted its net neutrality rules. It is also for this reason that, for First Amendment purposes, ISPs are substantially similar to television broadcasters and analog cable operators for whom First Amendment protections have already been applied.

Some net neutrality advocates attempt to skirt this fact by arguing that ISPs don’t “need” to exercise editorial discretion because today’s ISPs are less capacity constrained than broadcasters and analog cable operators. The essence of this argument is that the First Amendment permits the government to abridge a potential speaker’s freedom of speech if, in the government’s subjective view, the speaker would be able to get along just fine without speaking.

In their zeal to defend net neutrality, these advocates appear to have forgotten that, no matter how comfortable or familiar it may be, a muzzle is still a muzzle. The courts have not.

In  Verizon v. FCC, the court recognized that the relationships among ISPs, their subscribers, and edge providers are “indistinguishable” from those present in the analog cable market addressed by the Supreme Court in Midwest Video II:

The Midwest Video II cable operators’ primary “customers” were their subscribers, who paid to have programming delivered to them in their homes. There, as here, the Commission’s regulations required the regulated entities to carry the content of third parties to these customers—content the entities otherwise could have blocked at their discretion. Moreover, much like the rules at issue here, the Midwest Video II regulations compelled the operators to hold open certain channels for use at no cost—thus permitting specified programmers to “hire” the cable operators’ services for free.

FCC v. Verizon, No. 11-1355 at 54 (2014).

The court rejected the FCC’s arguments attempting to distinguish the Internet from cable — arguments that are substantially the same as those advanced by net neutrality advocates in the First Amendment context.

First, the court was unmoved by the argument that Internet content is delivered to end users only when an end user “requests” it, i.e., by clicking on a link. The court noted that cable customers could not actually receive content on a particular cable channel either unless they affirmatively chose to watch those channels, i.e., by changing the channel. ( See id.) The court recognized that, “The access requested by [cable video] programmers in Midwest Video II, like the access requested by edge providers here, is the ability to have their communications transmitted to end-user subscribers if those subscribers so desire.” (Id.)

Second, the court considered the capacity differences between the analog cable systems at issue in  Midwest Video II and the broadband Internet to be irrelevant to common carriage analysis:

Whether an entity qualifies as a carrier does not turn on how much content it is able to carry or the extent to which other content might be crowded out. A short train is no more a carrier than a long train, or even a train long enough to serve every possible customer.

FCC v. Verizon, No. 11-1355 at 55 (2014). The capacity issue is irrelevant to the applicability of the First Amendment for the same reason. A speaker has the right to refrain from speaking even if speaking would be undemanding.

Finally, the court concluded that the FCC could not distinguish its net neutrality rules from the rules at issue in  Midwest Video II using another variation on the “actual conduct” argument. In Midwest Video II, the Supreme Court emphasized that the FCC cable regulations in question “transferred control of the content of access cable channels from cable operators to members of the public.” Midwest Video II, 440 U.S. at 700. In Verizon v. FCC, the FCC argued that its net neutrality rules had not “transferred control” over the Internet content transmitted by ISPs because, “unlike cable systems, Internet access providers traditionally have not decided what sites their end users visit.” (FCC Brief at 65) The court did not consider the “actual conduct” of ISPs a relevant distinction:

The [net neutrality] regulations here accomplish the very same sort of transfer of control: whereas previously broadband providers could have blocked or discriminated against the content of certain edge providers, they must now carry the content those edge providers desire to transmit.

FCC v. Verizon, No. 11-1355 at 56 (2014).

Based on the court’s repeated emphasis on the substantive similarities between analog cable services, which the Supreme Court has held are “speakers”, and Internet services, it should now be obvious that ISPs are also “speakers” entitled to First Amendment protection. The use of Internet protocol rather than analog cable technology to deliver video services changes neither the economic nor the First Amendment considerations applicable to network operators, edge providers, and end users.

To be clear, application of the First Amendment to ISPs does not automatically mean that net neutrality rules would be unconstitutional. Whether a particular regulation is violative of the First Amendment depends on the applicable level of judicial scrutiny, the importance of the government interest at stake, and the degree of relatedness between the law and its purpose. Whether net neutrality rules would survive First Amendment scrutiny would thus depend in part on their own terms and the government’s rationale for adopting them.

That is why the applicability of the First Amendment to ISPs is so important. When Constitutional rights are at stake, the government has stronger incentives to adopt regulations that are well-reasoned and likely to achieve their intended goals than it does when it makes rules in the ordinary administrative context.

[1] The doctrine of constitutional avoidance counsels against deciding a constitutional question when a case can be resolved on some other basis. Once the court concluded that the FCC exceeded its authority in adopting the anti-blocking and anti-discrimination rules, the court had no need to address their constitutionality.

[2] Even if the “actual conduct” argument were valid, it would not control application of the First Amendment to ISPs. The fact that ISPs don’t exercise editorial discretion was motivated in part by FCC policies that chilled or prohibited the exercise of such discretion.

• In the dial-up era, telephone companies were subject to common carrier regulations prohibiting their exercise of editorial discretion over Internet content transmitted by third-party companies (e.g., America Online, who exercised editorial discretion over Internet content) while reducing economic incentives for telephone companies to provide their own Internet services;
• Though the FCC exempted cable broadband services from common carrier regulation relatively early in the broadband era, the FCC simultaneously asked whether and to what extent it should impose editorial restrictions on such services;
• In conjunction with its subsequent order extending the cable broadband exemption to telephone companies, the FCC issued a Broadband Policy Statement announcing that it would take action if it observed ISPs exercising editorial discretion; and
• After the DC Circuit ruled that the Broadband Policy Statement was unenforceable, the FCC adopted the net neutrality rules that the court struck down in Verizon v. FCC.

This history indicates that the “actual conduct” of ISPs evidences nothing more than their intent to comply with FCC rules and policies. It would be absurd to conclude that ISPs forfeited their right to First Amendment protection by virtue of their regulatory compliance.

Anupam Chander, Director of the California International Law Center and Martin Luther King, Jr. Hall Research Scholar at the UC Davis School of Law, discusses his recent paper with co-author Uyen P. Lee titled The Free Speech Foundations of Cyberlaw. Chander addresses how the first amendment promotes innovation on the Internet; how limitations to free speech vary between the US and Europe; the role of online intermediaries in promoting and protecting the first amendment; the Communications Decency Act; technology, piracy, and copyright protection; and the tension between privacy and free speech.

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Related Links

• The Free Speech Foundations of CyberLaw, Chander, Lee
• The Electronic Silk Road: How the Web Binds the World Together in Commerce, Amazon
• Rules of the Digital Age: PW Talks with Anupam Chander, Publishers Weekly
• Securing Privacy in the Internet Age, Amazon

Christopher Wolf, director of the law firm Hogan Lovells’ Privacy and Information Management group, addresses his new book with co-author Abraham Foxman, Viral Hate: Containing Its Spread on the Internet. To what extent do hateful or mean-spirited Internet users hide behind anonymity? How do we balance the protection of the First Amendment online while addressing the spread of hate speech? Wolf discusses how to define hate speech on the Internet; whether online hate speech leads to real-world violence; how news sites like the Huffington Post and New York Times have dealt with anonymity; lessons we should impart on the next generation of Internet users to discourage hate speech; and cases where anonymity has proved particularly beneficial or valuable.

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Related Links

• Viral Hate: Containing its Spread on the Internet, Amazon
• About Christopher Wolf, Future of Privacy
• Christopher Wolf Biography, Huffington Post

Free Press is holding its National Conference for Media Reform next week. The conference agenda describes the Internet as “central” to freedom of expression, which is how all mass media technologies have been described since the invention of the printing press ushered in the mass communications era. Despite recognizing that the Internet is a mass media technology, Free Press does not believe the Internet should be accorded the same constitutional protections as other mass media technologies. Like so many others, Free Press has forgotten that the dangers posed by government control of the Internet are similar to those posed by earlier mass media technologies. In a stunning reversal of the concepts embodied in the Bill of Rights, Free Press believes the executive and legislative branches of government are the source of protection for the freedom of expression. In their view, “Internet freedom means net neutrality.”

Tell that to Rodrigo Ferrari, a Chilean blogger who knows firsthand that net neutrality laws don’t protect freedom of expression on the Internet. According to a letter sent by PEN America to United States Attorney General Eric Holder and Secretary of State John Kerry, Ferrari created what was clearly a parody Twitter account that mimicked Andronico Luksic, a wealthy Chilean businessman. PEN America alleges that, at the request of Chilean authorities, the US Departments of State and Justice pressured Twitter to release data identifying Rodrigo as the owner of the parody account and may have provided this information to Chilean authorities without a subpoena or a formal request from the court hearing the case. As a result of US government action, Twitter shut down Ferrari’s parody account, and Chilean authorities are prosecuting Ferrari for the crime of “usurpation of identity” (a form of identity theft), which could result in a prison sentence.

If net neutrality actually meant Internet freedom, Ferrari would not be facing time in prison. Though both Chile and the US have imposed net neutrality regulations, that didn’t stop government authorities in either country from conspiring to deprive Rodrigo Ferrari of his privacy and subject him to criminal prosecution for expressing his views using the Internet. In 2010, Chile became the first country to impose net neutrality regulations, including a regulation that expressly requires that Internet service providers guarantee the privacy of users. At the time, one enthusiastic blogger said, “Chile is China’s antonym in Internet world.” Another asked, “If Chile can, why can’t we?” Later that same year, the Federal Communications Commission followed the Chilean example by imposing net neutrality regulations on Internet service providers in the US, shortly before the European Union rejected net neutrality rules as “unnecessary” and potentially harmful to innovation and investment.

Why didn’t Chilean and US net neutrality regulations “mean” Internet freedom for Ferrari? Because net neutrality regulations don’t restrain government authorities and are not  intended to protect consumers in any event. Net neutrality regulations are designed to maximize the access of content providers to consumers and consumer information that can be used to sell advertisements. That is why the net neutrality regulations adopted in Chile and the US apply only to “Internet service providers” (i.e., the companies that provide residential Internet connections). Twitter is not currently considered an “Internet service provider,” which means it can “block” whatever expression it wants.

To be clear, though I don’t support the actions of US authorities as alleged by PEN America, I’m not advocating that net neutrality regulations be extended to Twitter or other content providers. Ironically, however, neither is Free Press or any other net neutrality advocate. They support government restrictions applicable only to network operators despite evidence that Internet content is being “blocked” by content providers for commercial reasons. Net neutrality advocates also oppose First Amendment protection for Internet service providers despite evidence that the US government is using the Internet in a way that could chill our freedom of expression.

The asymmetrical approach to Internet regulation supported by net neutrality advocates may have succeeded in distorting the economics of the Internet marketplace, but the evidence indicates it has done nothing to enhance “Internet freedom.” Just ask Rodrigo Ferrari.

Susan W. Brenner, associate dean and professor of law at the University of Dayton School of Law,  discusses her new paper published in the Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology entitled “Cyber-threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control.”

Brenner argues that the approach the United States, like other countries, uses to control threats in real-space is ill-suited for controlling cyberthreats. She explains that because this approach evolved to deal with threat activity in a physical environment, it is predicated on a bureaucratic organizations. This is not an effective way of approaching cyber-threat control, she argues. 

Brenner also explains why congressional efforts at cybersecurity legislation are flawed and why U.S. authorities persist in pursuing antiquated strategies that cannot provide an effective cyberthreats defense system. She outlines an alternative approach to the task of protecting the country from cyberthreats, and approach that is predicated on older, more fluid threat control strategies.

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Related Links

• Cyber-Threats and the Limits of Bureaucratic Control, Brenner
• Cybercrime and the Law, Brenner
• Cyberwar: you lack imagination, Brenner
• Approaches to Cybercrime Jurisdiction, Brenner

Gabriella Coleman, the Wolfe Chair in Scientific and Technological Literacy in the Art History and Communication Studies Department at McGill University, discusses her new book, “Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking,” which has been released under a Creative Commons license.

Coleman, whose background is in anthropology, shares the results of her cultural survey of free and open source software (F/OSS) developers, the majority of whom, she found, shared similar backgrounds and world views. Among these similarities were an early introduction to technology and a passion for civil liberties, specifically free speech.

Coleman explains the ethics behind hackers’ devotion to F/OSS, the social codes that guide its production, and the political struggles through which hackers question the scope and direction of copyright and patent law. She also discusses the tension between the overtly political free software movement and the “politically agnostic” open source movement, as well as what the future of the hacker movement may look like.

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Related Links

• Coding Freedom: The Ethics and Aesthetics of Hacking, by Coleman
• Hacker Politics and Publics. Public Culture, by Coleman
• Hackers. The Johns Hopkins Encyclopedia of Digital Textuality. Forthcoming, 2012, by Coleman

Three rings for the broadcast-kings filling the sky,
Seven for the cable-lords in their head-end halls,
Nine for the telco-men doomed to die,
One for the White House to make its calls
On Capitol Hill where the powers lie,
One ring to rule them all, one ring to find them,
One ring to bring them all and without the Court bind them,
On Capitol Hill where the powers lie.

Myths resonate because they illustrate existential truths. In J.R.R. Tolkien’s mythical tale, the Lord of the Rings, the evil Lord Sauron imbued an otherwise very ordinary ring – the “One Ring”– with an extraordinary power: It could influence thought. When Sauron wore the One Ring, he could control the lords of the free peoples of Middle Earth through lesser “rings of power” he helped create. The extraordinary power of the One Ring was also its weakness: It eventually corrupted all who wore it, even those with good intentions. This duality is the central truth in Tolkien’s tale.

It is also central to current debates about freedom of expression and the Internet.

Since the invention of the printing press, those who control the means of mass communication have had the ability to influence thought. The printing press enabled the rapid and widespread circulation of ideas and information for the first time in history, including ideas that challenged the status quo (e.g., sedition and heresy). Governments viewed this new technology as a threat and responded by establishing control over the machinery of the printing press through state monopolies, press licenses, and special taxation.

“The right to think is the beginning of freedom, and speech must be protected from the government because speech is the beginning of thought.”

The Framers knew that freedom of expression is the foundation of freedom. They also recognized that governments could control thought by controlling the printing press, and included a clause in the First Amendment prohibiting government interference with the “freedom of the press.” Though this clause was aimed at the printing press, its protection is not limited to the mass communications media of the Eighteenth Century. The courts have held that the First Amendment encompasses new mass media technologies, including broadcast television and cable.

Several public interest groups, academics, and pundits across the political spectrum nevertheless argue that the latest mass communications technology – the Internet – does not merit protection from government interference on First Amendment grounds. They assert that neither the dissemination of speech by Internet service providers (ISPs) nor the results of Internet search engines (e.g., Google) are entitled to First Amendment protection. They fear that Internet companies will use the First Amendment to justify the exercise of editorial control over the free expression of their consumers.

Others (including the Competitive Enterprise Institute) argue that the First Amendment applies to bothISPs and search engines. They believe a government with unrestrained control over the means of mass communications has the incentive and the ability to use that power to control the thoughts of its people, which inevitably leads to authoritarianism. They point to Internet censorship by China, Syria, and other authoritarian governments as current proof of this principle.

Both sides in the Internet debate raise legitimate concerns. I suspect many consumers do not want ISPs and search engines to exercise unfettered control over the Internet. I suspect that just as many consumers do not want government to exercise unfettered control over the Internet either. How can we resolve these dual concerns?

The free peoples of Middle Earth struggled with a similar duality at the Council of Elrond, where they decided what should be done with the One Ring. “Why not use this ring?” wondered Boromir, a bold hero who had long fought the forces of Sauron and believed the ring could save his people. Aragorn, a cautious but no less valiant hero, abruptly answered that no one on the Council could safely wield it. When Elrond suggested that the ring must be destroyed, mutual distrust drove the Council to chaos. Order was restored only when Frodo, a hobbit with no armies to command and no physical power, volunteered for the dangerous task of destroying the ring.

The judicial branch is our Frodo. It has no armies to command and no physical power. It must rely on the willingness of others to abide by its decisions and their strength to enforce them. Like the peoples of Middle Earth who relied on Frodo, we rely on the courts to protect us from abuse of government power because the judicial branch is the least threatening to our liberty.

This is as true today as it was when the Constitution was signed. Changes in technology do not change the balance of power among our branches of government. As we have in the earlier eras of the printing press, broadcast television, and cable, we must trust the courts to apply the First Amendment to mass communications in the Internet era.

Providing ISPs and search engines with First Amendment rights would prevent dangerous and unnecessary government interference with the Internet while permitting the government to protect Internet consumers within Constitutional bounds. Although some advocates imply otherwise, application of the First Amendment to Internet companies would not preclude the government from regulating the Internet. The courts uphold regulations that limit freedom of expression so long as they are narrowly tailored to advance a compelling or substantial government interest.

We have always trusted the courts to balance the right to freedom of expression with other rights and governmental interests, and there is no reason to believe they cannot appropriately balance competing concerns involving the Internet. If the courts cannot be trusted with this task, no one can.

Would you pay good money for accurate predictions about important events, such as election results or military campaigns? Not if the U.S. Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) has its way. It recently took enforcement action against overseas prediction markets run by InTrade and TEN. The alleged offense? Allowing Americans to trade on claims about future events.

The blunt version: If you want to put your money where your mouth is, the CFTC wants to shut you up.

A prediction market allows its participants to buy and sell claims payable upon the occurrence of some future event, such as an election or Supreme Court opinion. Because they align incentives with accuracy and tap the wisdom of crowds, prediction markets offer useful information about future events. InTrade, for instance, accurately called the recent U.S. presidential vote in all but one state.

As far as the CFTC is concerned, people buying and selling claims about political futures deserve the same treatment as people buying and selling claims about pork futures: Heavy regulations, enforcement actions, and bans. Co-authors Josh Blackman, Miriam A. Cherry, and I described in this recent op-ed why the CFTC’s animosity to prediction markets threatens the First Amendment.

The CFTC has already managed to scare would-be entrepreneurs away from trying to run real-money prediction markets in the U.S. Now it threatens overseas markets. With luck, the Internet will render the CFTC’s censorship futile, saving the marketplace in ideas from the politics of ignorance.

Why take chances, though? I suggest two policies to protect prediction markets and the honest talk they host. First, the CFTC should implement the policies described in the jointly authored Comment on CFTC Concept Release on the Appropriate Regulatory Treatment of Event Contracts, July 6, 2008. (Aside to CFTC: Your web-based copy appears to have disappeared. Ask me for a copy.)

Second, real-money public prediction markets should make clear that they fall outside the CFTC’s jurisdiction by deploying notices, setting up independent contractor relations with traders, and dealing in negotiable conditional notes. For details, see these papers starting with this one.

[Aside to Jerry and Adam: per my promise.]

[Crossposted at Technology Liberation Front, and Agoraphilia.]

In a New York Times op-ed this weekend entitled “You Can’t Say That on the Internet,” Evgeny Morozov, author of The Net Delusion, worries that Silicon Valley is imposing a “deeply conservative” “new prudishness” on modern society. The cause, he says, are “dour, one-dimensional algorithms, the mathematical constructs that automatically determine the limits of what is culturally acceptable.” He proposes that some form of external algorithmic auditing be undertaken to counter this supposed problem. Here’s how he puts it in the conclusion of his essay:

Quaint prudishness, excessive enforcement of copyright, unneeded damage to our reputations: algorithmic gatekeeping is exacting a high toll on our public life. Instead of treating algorithms as a natural, objective reflection of reality, we must take them apart and closely examine each line of code. Can we do it without hurting Silicon Valley’s business model? The world of finance, facing a similar problem, offers a clue. After several disasters caused by algorithmic trading earlier this year, authorities in Hong Kong and Australia drafted proposals to establish regular independent audits of the design, development and modifications of computer systems used in such trades. Why couldn’t auditors do the same to Google? Silicon Valley wouldn’t have to disclose its proprietary algorithms, only share them with the auditors. A drastic measure? Perhaps. But it’s one that is proportional to the growing clout technology companies have in reshaping not only our economy but also our culture.

It should be noted that in a Slate essay this past January, Morozov had also proposed that steps be taken to root out lies, deceptions, and conspiracy theories on the Internet.  Morozov was particularly worried about “denialists of global warming or benefits of vaccination,” but he also wondered how we might deal with 9/11 conspiracy theorists, the anti-Darwinian intelligent design movement, and those that refuse to accept the link between HIV and AIDS.

To deal with that supposed problem, he recommended that Google “come up with a database of disputed claims” or “exercise a heavier curatorial control in presenting search results,” to weed out such things. He suggested that the other option “is to nudge search engines to take more responsibility for their index and exercise a heavier curatorial control in presenting search results for issues” that someone (he never says who) determines to be conspiratorial or anti-scientific in nature.

Taken together, these essays can be viewed as a preliminary sketch of what could become a comprehensive information control apparatus instituted at the code layer of the Internet. Morozov absolutely refuses to be nailed down on the details of that system, however. In a response to his earlier Slate essay, I argued that Morozov seemed to be advocating some sort of Ministry of Truth for online search, although he came up short on the details of who or what should play that role. But in both that piece and his New York Times essay this weekend, he implies that greater oversight and accountability are necessary.  “Is it time for some kind of a quality control system [for the Internet]?” he asked in his Slate oped. Perhaps it would be the algorithmic auditors he suggests in his new essay. But who, exactly, are those auditors? What is the scope of their powers?

When I (and others) made inquiries via Twitter requesting greater elaboration on these questions, Morozov summarily dismissed any conversation on the point. Worse yet, he engaged in what is becoming a regular Morozov debating tactic on Twitter: nasty, sarcastic, dismissive responses that call into question the intellectual credentials of anyone who even dares to ask him a question about his proposals.  Unless you happen to be Bruno Latour — the obtuse French sociologist and media theorist who Morozov showers with boundless, adorning praise — you can usually count on Morozov to dismiss you and your questions or concerns in a fairly peremptory fashion.

I’m perplexed by what leads Morozov to behave so badly. When I first met him a couple of years ago, it was at a Georgetown University event he invited me to speak at. He seemed like an agreeable, even charming, fellow in person. But on Twitter, Morozov bears his fangs at every juncture and spits out venomous missives and retorts that I would call sophomoric except that it would be an insult to sophomores everywhere. Morozov even accuses me of “trolling” him whenever I ask him questions on Twitter, even though I am doing nothing more that posing the same sort of hard questions to him that he regularly poses to others (albeit in a much more snarky fashion).  He always seems eager to dish it out, but then throws a Twitter temper tantrum whenever the roles are reversed and the tough questions come his way. Perhaps Morozov is miffed by some of what I had to say in my mixed review of his first book, The Net Delusion, or my Forbes column that raised questions about his earlier proposal for an Internet “quality control” regime.  But I invite others to closely read the tone of those two essays and tell me whether I said anything to warrant Morozov’s wrath. (In fact, I actually said some nice things about his book in that review and later named it the most important information technology policy book of the year.)

Regardless of what motivates his behavior, I do not think it is unreasonable to ask for more substantive responses from Morozov when he is making grand pronouncements and recommendations about how online culture and commerce should be governed. The best I could get him to say on Twitter is that is that he only had 1,200 words to play with in his latest Times oped and that more details about his proposal would be forthcoming. Well, in the spirit of getting that conversation going, allow me to outline a few questions:

1)      What is the specific harm here that needs to be addressed?

• Do you have evidence of systematic algorithmic manipulation or abuse by Google, Apple, or anyone else, for that matter? Or is this all just about a handful of anecdotes that seemed to be corrected fairly quickly?

2)      What standard or metric should we use to determine the extent of this problem, to the extent we determine it is a problem at all?

• To the extent autocomplete results are what troubles you, can you explain how individuals or entities are “harmed” by those results?
• If this is about reputation, what is your theory of reputational harm and when it is legally actionable?
• If this is about informational quality or “truth,” can you explain what would constitute success?
• Can you appreciate the concerns / values on the other side of this that might motivate some degree of algorithmic tailoring? For example, some digital intermediaries may seek to curb the use of a certain amount of vulgarity, hate speech, or other offensive content on their sites since they are broad-based platforms with diverse audiences. (That’s why most search providers default to “moderate” filtering for image searches, for example.) While I think we both favor maximizing free speech online, do you accept that some of this private speech and content balancing is entirely rational and has, to some extent, always gone on? Also, aren’t there plenty of other ways to find the content you’re looking for besides just Google, which you seem preoccupied with?

3)      What is the proposed remedy and what are its potential costs and unintended consequences?

• Can you explain the mechanism of control that you would like to see put in place to remedy this supposed problem? Would it be a formal regulatory regime?
• Have you considered the costs and /or potentially unintended consequences associated with an algorithmic auditing regime if it takes on a regulatory character?
• For example, if you are familiar with how long many regulatory proceedings can take to run their course, do you not fear the consequences of interminable delays and political gaming?
• How often should the “auditing” you propose take place? Would it be a regular affair, or would it be driven by complaints?

4)      Is this regime national in scope? Global? How will it be coordinated /administered?

• In the United States, presumably the Federal Communications Commission or Federal Trade Commission would be granted new authority to carry out algorithmic audits, or would a new entity need to be created?
• Is additional regulatory oversight necessary and, if so, how is this coordinated by nationally and globally?

5)      Are there freedom of speech / censorship considerations that flow from (3) and (4)?

• At least in the United States, algorithmic audits that had the force of law behind them could raise serious freedom of speech concerns. (See Yoo’s paper on “architectural censorship” and the recent work of Volokh & Grimmelmann on search regulation) and long-settled First Amendment law (see, e.g., Tornillo) ensures that editorial discretion is housed in private hands. How would you propose we get around these legal obstacles?

6)      Are there less-restrictive alternatives to administrative regulation?

• Might we be able to devise various alternative dispute resolution techniques to flag problems and deal with them in a non-regulatory / non-litigious fashion?
• Could voluntary industry best practices and/or codes of conduct be developed to assist these efforts?
• Could an entity like the Broadband Internet Technical Advisory Group (BITAG) help sort out “neutrality” claims in this context, as they do in the broadband context?
• Might it be the case that social norms and pressure can keep this problem in check? The very act of shining light on silly algorithmic screw-ups — much as you have in your recent opeds — has a way of keeping this problem in check.

I hope that Morozov finds these questions to be reasonable. My skepticism of most Internet regulation is no secret, so I suppose that Morozov or others might attempt to dismiss some of these questions as the paranoid delusions of a wild-eyed libertarian. But I suspect that I’m not the only one who feels uneasy with Morozov’s proposals since they could open the door to regulators across the globe to engage in “algorithmic auditing” on the flimsy assumption that some great harm exists from a few silly autocomplete suggestions or a couple conspiratorial websites. We deserve answers to questions like these before we start calling in the Code Cops to assume greater control over online speech.

I thought Todd Zywicki, a senior scholar with the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, did a nice job on Judge Napolitano’s “Freedom Watch” show addressing the contentious question of whether government should be regulating food advertising in order to somehow make American kids healthier. Todd pointed out how the advertising guidelines currently being developed are anything but “voluntary” and noted that there are many causes of childhood obesity. Watch the clip here:

Importantly, Todd also notes that there are First Amendment issues in play here. Commercial free speech is not completely without constitutional protection, as I noted in my recent Charleston Law Review article on “Advertising, Commercial Speech & First Amendment Parity.”

Finally, as we always note here about regulation generally — especially restrictions on advertising — there is no free lunch (excuse the pun in this case!). Advertising has traditionally been the great subsidizer of media and information in America. It has also kept competitors on their toes and kept prices in check.  These benefits are lost when we regulate advertising. So, while some nanny state-ers would like to convince us that they simply have the best interests of our kids in mind, the reality is that the regulations they favor will likely drive up costs for families and limit their choices of both products and media platforms, both of which are subsidized by advertising.

Yes, we pretty much have. That’s the inescapable conclusion following the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic First Amendment decision in Brown v. EMA back in June, which struck down a California law governing the sale of “violent video games” to minors.  By a 7-2 margin, the court held that video games have First Amendment protections on par with books, film, music and other forms of entertainment.

The folks over at ALEC asked me to explore what happens next and what steps state and local lawmakers can take in a post-Brown world if they wish to address concerns about video game content. My essay appears in the Nov/Dec Inside ALEC newsletter. You can read the entire thing here or via the Scribd embed I have placed down below the fold.

I argue that, going forward, this ruling will force state and local governments to change their approach to regulating all modern media content. Education and awareness-building efforts will be the more fruitful alternative since censorship has now been largely foreclosed.

Game Over for Video Game Censorship – Adam Thierer INSIDE ALEC [November 2011]

Twenty years ago, one of the best books ever penned about freedom of speech was released. Sadly, many people still haven’t heard of it. That book was Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment, by Jonathan Emord. With the exception of Ithiel de Sola Pool’s 1983 masterpiece Technologies of Freedom: On Free Speech in an Electronic Age, no book has a more profound impact on my thinking about free speech and technology policy than Emord’s 1991 classic. Emord’s book is, at once, a magisterial history and a polemical paean. This is no wishy-washy apologia for free speech, rather, it is a celebration of the amazing gift of freedom that the Founding Fathers gave us with the very first amendment to our constitution.

Unlike most people, Emord assumes nothing about the nature and purpose of the First Amendment; instead, he starts in pre-colonial times and explains how our rich heritage of freedom of speech and expression came about. Like Pool, Emord also makes the case for equality of all press providers and debunks the twisted logic behind much of this century’s corrupt jurisprudence governing speech transmitted via electronic media. Pool and Emord make it clear that if the First Amendment is retain its true meaning and purpose as a bulwark against government control of speech and expression, electronic media providers (TV, radio, cable, the Internet) must be accorded full First Amendment freedoms on par with traditional print media (newspapers, magazines, books and journals).

After developing his thorough history of free speech and the First Amendment in the first part of the book, Emord turns his attention to competing modern theories of First Amendment construction and interpretation. He outlines and critiques the Literalist Perspective, the Narrow Intentionalist Perspective, and the Relativist Perspective. Emord instead advocates what he labels a “preservationist perspective” which is composed of two essential elements: (1) Static Barriers again government intervention and (2) Adaptive Definitions for the terms “speech” and “press.”  He elaborates:

The effect of the Preservationist Perspective is to rely on the private sphere as a self-correcting mechanism. Should the government attempt to violate the private sphere, it will be barred by a high constitutional barrier. … Under the Preservationist Perspective, government regulation of who may speak or what  may be said would be strictly scrutinized and presumptively invalid. (p. 129)

Employing that framework, Emord spends much of the rest of the book demolishing the most dangerous variant of modern “relativist” thinking: the so-called “Media Access” school of thinking. Media access theories presume the existence of a mythical “right to be heard,” or a “right to respond publicly.” In essence, media access advocates believe that once a given media provider becomes popular enough, everyone has a “right” to speak through it. By this logic, if you build a large soapbox in your backyard, and are informative or entertaining enough to attract and retain an audience, the media access advocates apparently believe that the government should mandate that you share time on your soapbox with others in the name of “diversity.” They care little about the property rights you have in that soapbox, the effort and cost associated with your efforts to build that soapbox, or your editorial freedom to determine what is uttered on that soapbox. As Emord summarizes:

In short, the access advocates have transformed the marketplace of ideas from a laissez-faire model to a state-control model. For them, if the marketplace of ideas can be viewed as the contents of a cauldron, it is not enough to await random stirring; government must burn an eternal flame beneath the cauldron, keeping it at the boiling point. Silence is not an option; the government implores: Let there be speech! (p. 293)

He continues on to point out how silly that notion is:

The First Amendment does not require any set amount of diversity in the marketplace. If everyone were to choose to remain silent, the First Amendment would not be violated, for the amendment’s purpose is to deprive government of a power over the press and to leave to private citizens the decision of when to speak or not to speak and what to say. (p. 228)

While citizens certainly are at liberty to speak freely and communicate their views to others who will listen to them or air them, they do not have a right to demand access to the property of others to do so. If lawmakers could mandate that anyone who has taken the time and expense to build a soapbox to speak on must allow the rest of the world to stand on that soapbox with them in the name of “access” and “fairness,” it would contort the First Amendment into a tyrannical government mandate. This would retard, not expand, genuine freedom of speech and expression. Indeed, when such media access theories have been translated into public policy — as was the case with the old Fairness Doctrine — the effect has been generally to chill speech and expression throughout media.

What is really going on here is that media access advocates are looking to transform the First Amendment into a tool for social change to advance specific political ends or ideological objectives. “Rather than understanding the First Amendment to be a guardian of the private sphere of communication, the access advocates interpret it to be a guarantee of a preferred mix of ideological viewpoints,” notes Emord. “When the access advocates speak of minority views, they are almost always referring to views they believe to be inadequately represented in our society.”

Thus, the danger with media access mandates is that they ultimately transform the First Amendment into an affirmative tool of the state that legislators and regulators can wield to control content and influence the editorial judgments of the press. The ultimate danger of this twisted conception of the First Amendment, Emord rightly argues, is that, “It fundamentally shifts the marketplace of ideas from its private, unregulated, and interactive context to one within the compass of state control, making the marketplace ultimately responsible to government for determinations as to the choice of content expressed.” It converts the First Amendment from a shield against State action into a sword that the State can use as it sees fit. Nothing could be more dangerous and it is a complete contradiction of the original purpose and meaning of the First Amendment.

Emord’s book is the perfect antidote to such misguided thinking. If you care about the First Amendment and the continuing fight for freedom of speech and technological freedom, I beg you to read Freedom, Technology and the First Amendment. It’s as fresh and important today as it was 20 years ago.  A wide range of current policy tech policy debates will ultimately be decided by the courts, and which theory of the First Amendment guides them will make all the difference for the future of our digital society and real Internet freedom.