[Remarks p repared for Fifth Annual Conference on Governance of Emerging Technologies: Law, Policy & Ethics at Arizona State University, Phoenix, AZ, May 18, 2017.]

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What are we to make of this peculiar new term “permissionless innovation,” which has gained increasing currency in modern technology policy discussions? And how much relevance has this notion had—or should it have—on those conversations about the governance of emerging technologies? That’s what I’d like to discuss here today.

Uncertain Origins, Unclear Definitions

I should begin by noting that while I have written a book with the term in the title, I take no credit for coining the phrase “permissionless innovation,” nor have I been able to determine who the first person was to use the term. The phrase is sometimes attributed to Grace M. Hopper, a computer scientist who was a rear admiral in the United States Navy. She once famously noted that, “It’s easier to ask forgiveness than it is to get permission.”

“Hopper’s Law,” as it has come to be known in engineering circles, is probably the most concise articulation of the general notion of “permissionless innovation” that I’ve ever heard, but Hopper does not appear to have ever used the actual phrase anywhere. Moreover, Hopper was not necessarily applying this notion to the realm of technological governance, but was seemingly speaking more generically about the benefit of trying new things without asking for the blessing of any number of unnamed authorities or overseers—which could include businesses, bosses, teachers, or perhaps even government officials.

Today, however, we most often hear the “permissionless innovation” used in discussions about the governance of information technologies as well as a wide variety of emerging technologies. Unfortunately, scholars and advocates who have suggested that permissionless innovation should serve as the governing lodestar in these areas do not always precisely define what they mean by the term.

None of them seem to be suggesting, however, that permissionless innovation is synonymous with anarchy. To the contrary, many of them are quick to note that governments will continue to have a role to play. It is even rare to see advocates of permissionless innovation in these varied contexts calling for the abolition of any laws, programs, or agencies.

Instead, it seems to be the case that most of those defenders of permissionless innovation are using the term as a sort of shorthand when what they really mean to say is something like: “give innovators a bit more breathing room,” or, “don’t rush to regulate.”

This is consistent with my own articulation of the term, which goes as follows:

“Permissionless innovation refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if any develop, can be addressed later.”

Default Policy Positions

Framing the term in this fashion makes it clear that, as it pertains to technological governance, permissionless innovation is about setting our public policy defaults closer to green lights rather than red ones.

It switches the burden of proof to the opponents of ongoing technological change by asserting five things:

• First, technological innovation is the single most important determinant of long-term human well-being.
• Second, there is real value to learning through continued trial-and-error experimentation, resiliency, and ongoing adaptation to technological change.
• Third, constraints on new innovation should be the last resort, not the first. Innovation should be innocent until proven guilty.
• Fourth, as regulatory interventions are considered, policy should be based on evidence of concrete potential harm and not fear of worst-case hypotheticals.
• Fifth, and finally, where policy interventions are deemed needed, flexible, bottom-up solutions of an ex post (responsive) nature are almost always preferable to rigid, top-down controls of an ex ante (anticipatory) nature.

Shared Shortcomings of Both Visions

At least on the surface, that sort of governance vision stands in stark contrast to the “precautionary principle.” Defenders of the precautionary principle as the general default position in technology policy debates generally believe that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harm to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

That being said, I’d like to point out some of the shared shortcomings of both of these governance visions.

First, as with attempts to define the parameters of “permissionless innovation,” the precautionary principle is not always as rigid as its critics sometimes suggest. There are as many flavors of the precautionary principle as there are ice cream. Indeed, this is why many have criticized the precautionary principle not for what it says but rather for what it doesn’t say. It doesn’t tell us exactly how and when to apply precautionary measures, or how to evaluate the trade-offs associated with precaution.

This points the second and deeper underlying problem faced by advocates of both precautionary measures and permissionless innovation: Our collective inability to craft a widely-shared definition of what constitutes “technological harm” in various contexts. This is certainly not to suggest that no attempt has been made to do so. Rather, simply that we don’t seem to be any closer to concrete agreement about how or where to draw those lines.

Of course, let’s not kid ourselves into thinking that we can find bright-line answers to all these questions. After all, for many of these technological governance issues we are operating in the realm of “Level 3” or “Earth-level” systems, as Professors Allenby and Sarewitz refer to it in their book, The Techno-Human Condition. These are systems in which we deal with, as they say, “a context that is always shifting, and on meanings that are never fixed.”

That makes it even more challenging to define what we mean by “responsible innovation” or “socially desirable innovation” for purposes of determining optimal technology policy.

Risk Analysis through the Lens of Permissionless Innovation

For me, there are no easy ways out of this mess. But I do know two things for certain.

First, we must continue to refine and improve our risk analysis tools and techniques to make better determinations of when proposed interventions are sensible and cost-effective relative to the many trade-offs at work.

Again, I recognize the challenge of doing this when many of the issues and values in play are amorphous and metaphysical conflicts exist about how to even define some of these things. Most of the emerging technology policy issues I write about today, for example, involve some sort of privacy, safety, or security concern. In each case, however, very little consensus exists about what those terms even mean in varied contexts.

Nonetheless, the fact that benefit-cost analysis is hard should not serve as an excuse for failing to go through the exercise of attempting some sort of valuation of the many variables in play.

Soft Law Alternatives

The second thing I know for certain is that, due the combination of both definitional complexity regarding what constitutes technological harm, as well as the ever-accelerating pace of the so-called “pacing problem,” all roads lead back to soft law solutions instead of hard law remedies.

Last year, I had the pleasure of reading and reviewing Wendell Wallach’s new book and then having a nice conversation with him about it at Microsoft’s DC headquarters. The most interesting thing about our exchange was that, although we do not begin in the same place philosophically-speaking, we largely end up in the same place practically-speaking.

That is, there seemed to be some grudging acceptance on both our parts that “soft law” systems, multistakeholder processes, and various other informal governance mechanisms will need to fill the governance gap left by the gradual erosion of hard law.

Many other scholars, including many of you in this room, have discussed the growth of soft law mechanisms in specific contexts, but I believe we have probably failed to acknowledge the extent to which these informal governance models have already become the dominant form of technological governance, at least in the United States.

I’m currently co-authoring a very long study which documents how the Obama Administration came to rely quite heavily on multistakeholder processes, negotiated “best practices,” and industry codes of conduct as the primary governance mechanisms for a long list of emerging tech issues, including: driverless cars, commercial drones, big data, facial recognition, the Internet of Things and wearable technology, mobile medical applications, 3D printing, artificial intelligence, the Sharing Economy, and much more.

Most of these soft law processes were driven by the NTIA and FTC, but plenty of other agencies with an “N” or an “F” at the beginning of their name have undertaken some sort of soft law process, including NHTSA, the FDA, the FAA, and so on.

Now, I’m willing to bet that many of those involved in these processes who generally favor more anticipatory regulatory approaches would have preferred to start with hard law solutions to some of these issues. And I am equally certain that many of the innovators involved in those multistakeholder processes would have probably preferred not to have had to come to the table at all.

But at the end of the day, for the most part, all sides did come to the table and worked together in a good faith effort to find some rough consensus about what sort of informal guidelines would govern the future of innovation in these sectors.

The Worst of All Systems, Except All the Others

Plenty of questions remain about such soft law systems, and the irony is that defenders of both permissionless innovation and the precautionary principle will quite often be raising very similar concerns regarding the transparency, accountability, and enforceability of these systems.

But I’m inclined to believe that no matter where you sit on the permissionless vs. precautionary spectrum, and no matter what your reservations may be about it the new world of soft law governance that we find ourselves moving into, this is the future and the future is now.

Much as Churchill said of democracy being “the worst form of Government except for all those other forms that have been tried from time to time,” I think we are well on our way to a world in which soft law is the worst form of technological governance except for all those others that have been tried before.

Of course, the devil is always in the details and I suspect that we’ll have plenty of discuss and debate in that regard. Let’s get that conversation going.

Arik Hesseldahl has an interesting piece in Business Week about Apple’s control of the iPhone App approval process in which he asks: “Is a smartphone gatekeeper needed?” Plenty of people don’t think so and have raised a stink about Apple trying to play that role for the iPhone. It certainly could be true, as some critics suggest, that Apple is being too heavy-handed on occasion when rejecting apps, but it’s always easy for those of us on the outside of the process to think that.  Hesseldahl notes that:

it’s tempting to consider the implications of a less hands-on approach, as is the case with Macs, Microsoft (MSFT) Windows PCs, or other smartphones, including those running the Google (GOOG)-backed Android operating system. The software market for personal computing has existed in this way for nearly three decades, and while there have certainly been some problems along the way, I’d argue that overall we’re better off without Microsoft or Apple or some other organization approving software applications before they’re released to the market. PC users have learned to be careful about what they put on their computers through unhappy trial and error.

But he also notes that there is another side to the story:

My hunch is that greater vigilance is needed with smartphones, in part because they’re a relatively recent phenomenon. The iPhone has been on the market only 28 months. Users take them everywhere and are quickly inserting them into daily life in ways the personal computer never could have fit. Malware on smartphones could do significantly more damage than malware on a PC. Imagine a nasty application that records every word you speak—both on and off the phone—without your knowledge, and then e-mails the audio to a stranger. Or picture one that surreptitiously tracks your movements and sends them to a stalker.

Hesseldahl interviewed Phil Schiller, Apple’s senior vice-president for worldwide product marketing, for his piece and Schiller confirmed that malware [think iPhone worms] and and other safety & security concerns topped the list of problems that Apple was trying to head-off by managing the applications process. There’s also various types of illegal content that Apple has to contend with.

Anyway, my only interest in bringing this to everyone’s attention is because I have spent the last few years debating a growing crop of academics (Zittrain, Lessig, Wu) and policy shops (Public Knowledge, Free Press, etc) who suggest that proprietary devices and app stores constitute the revival of online “walled gardens” from the early Internet era (like AOL, Prodigy & CompuServe).  Personally, I don’t see any solid evidence that Apple’s model is indicative of a mass trend toward online “gatekeepers.” As Hesseldahl points out, there’s still plenty of other devices and stores out there from which to choose.  Moreover, as I pointed out in my first review of Zittrain’s book The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It, we should be thankful that we have a range of device and store options to choose from.  That’s a great thing. If you don’t like Apple’s style, then don’t get an iPhone.  It’s one of the reasons I didn’t.  Vote with your pocketbooks, people!

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski suggested at an FCC field hearing this week that the federal government might create its own “version of iTunes.” Multichannel News reports:

The chairman asked panelists to think about the value of a clearinghouse where best practices could be shared. He suggested that might be a way to spur the spin-off of public-sector apps from private sector initiatives and to prevent reinventing the wheel, rather than tapping into what is already being done. There is not a lot of shared info out there, he said.

If all we’re talking about is a clearinghouse that provides easy access to apps for government-developed apps, Google Code or SourceForge may be a better model than iTunes—though perhaps without the instant name recognition by ordinary consumers. Like SourceForge, Google Code allows hosting and management of open source projects, including Google’s own products. iTunes, by contrast, essentially offers consumers finished apps. Also, iTunes is a stand-alone piece of software, of which the Apps Store is  just one part, while I can’t imagine why Genachowski’s “store” need be anything more than a website.

Whatever the analogy, such a “store” could well be a valuable tool for sharing the benefits of software development by government employees, both with the private sector and among federal agencies as well as state, local and even foreign governments. But what, exactly, Genachowski had in mind for the store remains awfully vague: Multichannel News mentions, as examples, “applications that do everything from monitoring heart rates and blood sugar to checking for greenhouse gas levels.” If the idea ever goes anywhere, it should be based on two principles:

1. All apps should be open source and available to all users to use as they see fit.
2. The store should be limited to apps developed by government employees to meet the needs of government agencies.

These principles would maximize the store’s value in making taxpayer-funded software development easily accessible. As a moral matter, it might be appropriate to limit access to U.S. taxpayers, but why bother? Attempting to authenticate users would add unnecessary complexity and raise privacy concerns needlessly: Any app we wouldn’t want to fall into the hands of, say, North Korea, simply shouldn’t be in the store at all. Sharing apps internationally would expand the potential developer base while helping to public and private sectors alike in the U.S. and abroad. If a school district in Sheboygan, WI or a village in Sudan can benefit from an app rather than starting over, so much the better for everyone!

The second requirement, combined with the open source requirement, would also help to reduce direct competition between government coders and private coders. A clearinghouse for apps government truly needs to develop on its own makes a great deal of sense: If we’re already paying a government-employee to write an app so his agency can function more effectively, that  should be shared. But a broader “public option for software” could well harm both for-profit and not-for-profit development of software by the private sector. Unless its mandate were carefully constrained by statute, such a clearinghouse could easily grow into a “public works” program for the digital age, with pressure rising for government to fund software development for as a “public good.” How to draw that line would be difficult, and it’s probably not a task that should be left to the FCC; Congress should address the question.

Keeping government-developed apps open source would allow the private sector to benefit from public sector development, rather than competing with it. But if a private company wants to incorporate a government-developed app into proprietary software, they should be free to do so. The government shouldn’t be prejudicing the private sector’s choice of business models by requiring that its apps stay open source. Nor should the government prevent commercialization of software that springs from federally funded research, as currently permitted by the Bayh-Dole Act.

Perhaps the greatest danger of such a program is that it could become a vehicle for subtle government propaganda—in violation of existing laws against using taxpayer dollars to distribute propaganda inside the U.S. The iTunes store analogy is particularly inapt (no pun intended) because iTunes, of course, provides pure content as well as apps. But apps themselves could come with a particular slant because it is increasingly difficult to distinguish “pure content” from “pure apps.” This danger could be particularly acute if the store turned into a “jobs program,” which would be inherently political, just as FDR’s New Dealers used programs like the WPA Arts Project to advance a certain ideological message, and New Deal programs in general as a way of rewarding supporters and punishing opponents. We certainly wouldn’t a Republican administration, say, trying to take revenge on Google for its support of Democrats by investing public money into direct competitors to Google’s software. Nor would we want to funding for software development to become just another dimension for the culture wars.

With those important caveats, this could be a great idea.

I’ve been hammering Jonathan Zittrain pretty hard here over the past year for the thesis he sets forth in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It that digital “generativity” is at risk today. The reason I have been doing so is because all signs point in the exact opposite direction, and more so with each passing day. Contrary to Jonathan’s fear that the Internet and digital technologies are growing more closed, tethered, and sterile, I have argued that the facts on the ground show us how the world is actually becoming far more open, untethered, and innovative.  And that’s true even for the technology that Jonathan singles out in the book for special scorn — the iPhone.

Consider David Pogue’s post today on the New York Times‘ technology blog today entitled “So Many iPhone Apps, So Little Time.” Pogue reports that:

there are now 15,000 programs available on the App Store, and so many more are flooding in that Apple’s army of screeners can’t even keep up. I keep meaning to write a thoughtful, thorough roundup of the very best of these amazing programs, but every day that I don’t do it, the job becomes more daunting. […] Apple, which runs the store, keeps 30 percent of each sale. Even so, Ocarina [an application Pogue discusses in his essay] demonstrates that a programmer can make a staggering amount of money from the iPhone store. It’s a crazy new software model that I don’t remember seeing anywhere else. It’s not a boxed software program for $600, or even a shareware program you download for $25. It’s a buck a copy. The beauty here is that at these prices, there’s very little risk in trying something out. How many software programs have you bought for your Mac or PC? Two? Four? Well, the average iPhone owner may wind up installing 10, 20 or 30 programs. In all, according to Apple, iPhone owners have downloaded 500 million copies of these programs. Half a billion–since last July. There’s a lot of gloom in the tech industry (and every industry, for that matter). But even when the economy is crashing down around us, there’s still amazing power in a single good idea. And the one on display here–pricing software so low that millions of people buy it without batting an eye–is turning a few clever programmers into millionaires.

I ask you: Does this sound like a world that is growing less generative, as Zittrain argues? Because it sure doesn’t sound like it to me.  Moreover, if you still don’t think the iPhone is open enough, then there’s always a simple solution to that: just buy another phone!