Here’s a new animated explainer video that I narrated for the Federalist Society’s Regulatory Transparency Project. The 3-minute video discusses how earlier “tech giants” rose and fell as technological innovation and new competition sent them off to what the New York Times once appropriately called “The Hall of Fallen Giants.” It’s a continuing testament to the power of “creative destruction” to upend and reorder markets, even as many pundits insist that there’s no possibility change can happen.

This is an important lesson for us to remember today, as I noted in the recent editorial for The Hill about why, “Open-ended antitrust is an innovation killer“:

Those who worry about today’s largest tech giants becoming supposedly unassailable monopolies should consider how similar fears were expressed not so long ago about other tech titans, many of which we laugh about today. Just 14 years ago, headlines proclaimed that “MySpace Is a Natural Monopoly,” and asked, “Will MySpace Ever Lose Its Monopoly?” We all know how that “monopoly” ceased to exist. At the same time, pundits insisted “Apple should pull the plug on the iPhone,” since “there is no likelihood that Apple can be successful in a business this competitive.” The smartphone market of that era was viewed as completely under the control of BlackBerry, Palm, Motorola and Nokia. A few years prior to that, critics lambasted the merger of AOL and TimeWarner as a new corporate “Big Brother” that would decimate digital diversity and online competition.

Accordingly, policymakers should be humble and recognize that, “it’s better to let rivalry and innovation emerge organically,” and only bring in the wrecking ball of heavy-handed antitrust regulation as a last resort, I argued. Technological change and entrepreneurialism has a way of upending and reordering markets when we least expect it. Just ask all those members of the Hall of Fallen Giants.

Over at Discourse magazine, Connor Haaland and I have an new essay (“Can European-Style Industrial Policies Create Tech Supremacy?”) examining Europe’s effort to develop national champion in a variety of tech sectors using highly targeted industrial policy efforts. The results have not been encouraging, we find.

Thus far, however, the Europeans don’t have much to show for their attempts to produce home-grown tech champions. Despite highly targeted and expensive efforts to foster a domestic tech base, the EU has instead generated a string of industrial policy failures that should serve as a cautionary tale for U.S. pundits and policymakers, who seem increasingly open to more government-steered innovation efforts.

We examine case studies in internet access, search, GPS, video services, and the sharing economy. We then explore newly-proposed industrial policy efforts aimed at developing their domestic AI market. We note how:

no amount of centralized state planning or spending will be able to overcome Europe’s aversion to technological risk-taking and disruption. The EU’s innovation culture generally values stability—of existing laws, institutions and businesses—over disruptive technological change. […] There are no European versions of Microsoft, Google or Apple, even though Europeans obviously demand and consume the sort of products and services those U.S.-based companies provide. It’s simply not possible given the EU’s current regulatory regime.

It seems unlikely that Europe will have much better luck developing home-grown champions in AI and robotics using this same playbook. “American academics and policymakers with an affinity for industrial policy might want to consider a model other than Europe’s misguided combination of fruitless state planning and heavy-handed regulatory edicts,” we conclude.

Head over to Discourse  to read the entire essay.

The recently-passed CARES Act included $500 million for the CDC to develop a new “surveillance and data-collection system” to monitor the spread of COVID-19.

There’s a fierce debate about how to use technology for health surveillance for the COVID-19 crisis. Unfortunately this debate is happening in realtime as governments and tech companies try to reduce infection and death while complying with national laws and norms related to privacy.

Technology has helped during the crisis and saved lives. Social media, chat apps, and online forums allow doctors, public health officials, manufacturers, entrepreneurs, and regulators around the world to compare notes and share best practices. Broadband networks, Zoom, streaming media, and gaming make stay-at-home order much more pleasant and keeps millions of Americans at work, remotely. Telehealth apps allow doctors to safely view patients with symptoms. Finally, grocery and parcel delivery from Amazon, Grubhub, and other app companies keep pantries full and serve as a lifeline to many restaurants.

The great tech successes here, however, will be harder to replicate for contact tracing and public health surveillance. Even the countries that had the tech infrastructure somewhat in place for contact tracing and public health surveillance are finding it hard to scale. Privacy issues are also significant obstacles. (On the Truth on the Market blog, FTC Commissioner Christine Wilson provides a great survey of how other countries are using technology for public health and analysis of privacy considerations. Bronwyn Howell also has a good post on the topic.) Let’s examine some of the strengths and weaknesses of the technologies.

Cell tower location information

Personal smartphones typically connect to the nearest cell tower, so a cell networks record (roughly) where a smartphone is at a particular time. Mobile carriers are sharing aggregated cell tower data with public health officials in Austria, Germany, and Italy for mobility information.

This data is better than nothing for estimating district- or region-wide stay-at-home compliance but the geolocation is imprecise (to the half-mile or so). 

Cell tower data could be used to enforce a virtual geofence on quarantined people. This data is, for instance, used in Taiwan to enforce quarantines. If you leave a geofenced area, public health officials receive an automated notification of your leaving home.

Assessment: Ubiquitous, scalable. But: rarely useful and virtually useless for contact tracing.

GPS-based apps and bracelets

Many smartphone apps passively transmit precise GPS location to app companies at all hours of the day. Google and Apple have anonymized and aggregated this kind of information in order to assess stay-at-home order effects on mobility. Facebook reportedly is also sharing similar location data with public health officials.

As Trace Mitchell and I pointed out in Mercatus and National Review publications, this information is imperfect but could be combined with infection data to categorize neighborhoods or counties as high-risk or low-risk. 

GPS data, before it’s aggregated by the app companies for public view, reveals precisely where people are (within meters). Individual data is a goldmine for governments, but public health officials will have a hard time convincing Americans, tech companies, and judges they can be trusted with the data.

It’s an easier lift in other countries where trust in government is higher and central governments are more powerful. Precise geolocation could be used to enforce quarantines.

Hong Kong, for instance, has used GPS wristbands to enforce some quarantines. Tens of thousands of Polish residents in quarantines must download a geolocation-based app and check in, which allows authorities to enforce quarantine restrictions. It appears the most people support the initiative.

Finally, in Iceland, one third of citizens have voluntarily downloaded a geolocation app to assist public officials in contact tracing. Public health officials call or message people when geolocation records indicate previous proximity with an infected person. WSJ journalists reported on April 9 that:

If there is no response, they send a police squad car to the person’s house. The potentially infected person must remain in quarantine for 14 days and risk a fine of up to 250,000 Icelandic kronur ($1,750) if they break it.

That said, there are probably scattered examples of US officials using GPS for quarantines. Local officials in Louisville, Kentucky, for example, are requiring some COVID-19-positive or exposed people to wear GPS ankle monitors to enforce quarantine.

Assessment: Aggregated geolocation information is possibly useful for assessing regional stay-at-home norms. Individual geolocation information is not precise enough for effective contact tracing. It’s probably precise and effective for quarantine enforcement. But: individual geolocation is invasive and, if not volunteered by app companies or users, raises significant constitutional issues in the US.

Bluetooth apps

Many researchers and nations are working on or have released some type of Bluetooth app for contact tracing. This includes Singapore, the Czech Republic, Britain, Germany, Italy and New Zealand.  

For people who use these apps, Bluetooth runs in the background, recording other Bluetooth users nearby. Since Bluetooth is a low-power wireless technology, it really only can “see” other users within a few meters. If you use the app for awhile and later test positive for infection, you can register your diagnosis. The app will then notify (anonymously) everyone else using the app, and public health officials in some countries, who you came in contact with in the past several days. My colleague Andrea O’Sullivan wrote a great piece in Reason about contact tracing using Bluetooth.

These apps have benefits over other forms of public health tech surveillance: they are more precise than geolocation information and they are voluntary.

The problem is that, unlike geolocation apps, which have nearly 100% penetration with smartphone users, Bluetooth contact tracing apps have about 0% penetration in the US today. Further, these app creators, even governments, don’t seem to have the PR machine to gain meaningful public adoption. In Singapore, for instance, adoption is reportedly only 12% of the population, which is way too low to be very helpful.

A handful of institutions in the world could get appreciable use of Bluetooth contact tracing: telecom and tech companies have big ad budgets and they own the digital real estate on our smartphones.

Which is why the news that Google and Apple are working on a contact tracing app is noteworthy. They have the budget and ability to make their hundreds of millions of Android and iOS users aware of the contact tracing app. They could even go so far as push a notification to the home screen to all users encouraging them to use it.

However, I suspect they won’t push it hard. It would raise alarm bells with many users. Further, as Dan Grover stated a few weeks ago about why US tech companies haven’t been as active as Chinese tech companies in using apps to improve public education and norms related to COVID-19:

Since the post-2016 “techlash”, tech companies in Silicon Valley have acted with a sometimes suffocating sense of caution and unease about their power in the world. They are extremely careful to not do anything that would set off either party or anyone with ideas about regulation. And they seldom use their pixel real estate towards affecting political change.

[Ed.: their puzzling advocacy of Title II “net neutrality” regulation a big exception].

Techlash aside, presumably US companies also aren’t receiving the government pressure Chinese companies are receiving to push public health surveillance apps and information. [Ed.: Bloomberg reports that France and EU officials want the Google-Apple app to relay contact tracing notices to public health officials, not merely to affected users. HT Eli Dourado]

Like most people, I have mixed feelings about how coercive the state and how pushy tech companies should be during this pandemic. A big problem is that we still have only an inkling about how deadly COVID-19 is, how quickly it spreads, and how damaging stay-at-home rules and norms are for the economy. Further, contact-tracing apps still need extensive, laborious home visits and follow-up from public health officials to be effective–something the US has shown little ability to do.

There are other social costs to widespread tech-enabled tracing. Tyler Cowen points out in Bloomberg that contact tracing tech is likely inevitable, but that would leave behind those without smartphones. That’s true, and a major problem for the over-70 crowd, who lack smartphones as a group and are most vulnerable to COVID-19.

Because I predict that Apple and Google won’t push the app hard and I doubt there will be mandates from federal or state officials, I think there’s only a small chance (less than 15%) a contact tracing wireless technology will gain ubiquitous adoption this year (60% penetration, more than 200 million US smartphone users). 

Assessment: A Bluetooth app could protect privacy while, if volunteered, giving public health officials useful information for contact tracing. However, absent aggressive pushes from governments or tech companies, it’s unlikely there will be enough users to significantly help.

Health Passport

The chances of mass Bluetooth app use would increase if the underlying tech or API is used to create a “health passport” or “immunity passport”–a near-realtime medical certification that someone will not infect others. Politico reported on April 10 that Dr. Anthony Fauci, the White House point man on the pandemic, said the immunity passport idea “has merit.”

It’s not clear what limits Apple and Google will put on their API but most APIs can be customized by other businesses and users. The Bluetooth app and API could feed into a health passport app, showing at a glance whether you are infected or you’d been near someone infected recently.

For the venues like churches and gyms and operators like airlines and cruise ships that need high trust from participants and customers, on the spot testing via blood test or temperature taking or Bluetooth app will likely gain traction. 

There are the beginnings of a health passport in China with QR codes and individual risk classifications from public health officials. Particularly for airlines, which is a favored industry in most nations, there could be public pressure and widespread adoption of a digital health passport. Emirates Airlines and the Dubai Health Authority, for instance, last week required all passengers on a flight to Tunisia to take a COVID-19 blood test before boarding. Results came in 10 minutes.

Assessment: A health passport integrates several types of data into a single interface. The complexity makes widespread use unlikely but it could gain voluntary adoption by certain industries and populations (business travelers, tourists, nursing home residents).

Conclusion

In short, tech could help with quarantine enforcement and contact tracing, but there are thorny questions of privacy norms and it’s not clear US health officials have the ability to do the home visits and phone calls to detect spread and enforce quarantines. All of these technologies have issues (privacy or penetration or testing) and there are many unknowns about transmission and risk. The question is how far tech companies, federal and state law officials, the American public, and judges are prepared to go.

I am pleased to announce the release of my latest book, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom.” It’s a short manifesto (just under 100 pages) that condenses — and attempts to make more accessible — arguments that I have developed in various law review articles, working papers, and blog posts over the past few years. I have two goals with this book.

First, I attempt to show how the central fault line in almost all modern technology policy debates revolves around “the permission question,” which asks: Must the creators of new technologies seek the blessing of public officials before they develop and deploy their innovations? How that question is answered depends on the disposition one adopts toward new inventions. Two conflicting attitudes are evident.

One disposition is known as the “precautionary principle.” Generally speaking, it refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions.

The other vision can be labeled “permissionless innovation.” It refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed later.

I argue that we are witnessing a grand clash of visions between these two mindsets today in almost all major technology policy discussions today.

The second major objective of the book, as is made clear by the title, is to make a forceful case in favor of the latter disposition of “permissionless innovation.” I argue that policymakers should unapologetically embrace and defend the permissionless innovation ethos — not just for the Internet but also for all new classes of networked technologies and platforms. Some of the specific case studies discussed in the book include: the “Internet of Things” and wearable technologies, smart cars and autonomous vehicles, commercial drones, 3D printing, and various other new technologies that are just now emerging.

I explain how precautionary principle thinking is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about these technologies. The urge to regulate preemptively in these sectors is driven by a variety of safety, security, and privacy concerns, which are discussed throughout the book. Many of these concerns are valid and deserve serious consideration. However, I argue that if precautionary-minded regulatory solutions are adopted in a preemptive attempt to head-off these concerns, the consequences will be profoundly deleterious.

The central lesson of the booklet is this: Living in constant fear of hypothetical worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon them — means that best-case scenarios will never come about. When public policy is shaped by precautionary principle reasoning, it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, social adaptation, and long-run prosperity.

Again, that doesn’t mean we should ignore the various problems created by these highly disruptive technologies. But how we address these concerns matters greatly. If and when problems develop, there are many less burdensome ways to address them than through preemptive technological controls. The best solutions to complex social problems are almost always organic and “bottom-up” in nature. Luckily, there exists a wide variety of constructive approaches that can be tapped to address or alleviate concerns associated with new innovations. These include:

• education and empowerment efforts (including media literacy, digital citizenship efforts);
• social pressure from activists, academics, and the press and the public more generally.
• voluntary self-regulation and adoption of best practices (including privacy and security “by design” efforts); and,
• increased transparency and awareness-building efforts to enhance consumer knowledge about how new technologies work.

Such solutions are almost always superior to top-down, command-and-control regulatory edits and bureaucratic schemes of a “Mother, May I?” (i.e., permissioned) nature. The problem with “top-down” traditional regulatory systems is that they often tend to be overly-rigid, bureaucratic, inflexible, and slow to adapt to new realities. They focus on preemptive remedies that aim to predict the future, and future hypothetical problems that may not ever come about. Worse yet, administrative regulation generally preempts or prohibits the beneficial experiments that yield new and better ways of doing things. It raises the cost of starting or running a business or non-business venture, and generally discourages activities that benefit society.

To the extent that other public policies are needed to guide technological developments, simple legal principles are greatly preferable to technology-specific, micro-managed regulatory regimes. Again, ex ante (preemptive and precautionary) regulation is often highly inefficient, even dangerous. To the extent that any corrective legal action is needed to address harms, ex post measures, especially via the common law (torts, class actions, etc.), are typically superior. And the Federal Trade Commission will, of course, continue to play a backstop here by utilizing the broad consumer protection powers it possesses under Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, which prohibits “unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.” In recent years, the FTC has already brought and settled many cases involving its Section 5 authority to address identity theft and data security matters. If still more is needed, enhanced disclosure and transparency requirements would certainly be superior to outright bans on new forms of experimentation or other forms of heavy-handed technological controls.

In the end, however, I argue that, to the maximum extent possible, our default position toward new forms of technological innovation must remain: “innovation allowed.” That is especially the case because, more often than not, citizens find ways to adapt to technological change by employing a variety of coping mechanisms, new norms, or other creative fixes. We should have a little more faith in the ability of humanity to adapt to the challenges new innovations create for our culture and economy. We have done it countless times before. We are creative, resilient creatures. That’s why I remain so optimistic about our collective ability to confront the challenges posed by these new technologies and prosper in the process.

If you’re interested in taking a look, you can find a free PDF of the book at the Mercatus Center website or you can find out how to order it from there as an eBook. Hardcopies are also available. I’ll be doing more blogging about the book in coming weeks and months. The debate between the “permissionless innovation” and “precautionary principle” worldviews is just getting started and it promises to touch every tech policy debate going forward.

Related Essays :

• “The Growing Conflict of Visions over the Internet of Things & Privacy,” Technology Liberation Front, January 14, 2014.
• “CES 2014 Report: The Internet of Things Arrives, but Will Washington Welcome It?” Technology Liberation Front, January 8, 2014.
• “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” Technology Liberation Front, March 4, 2013.
• “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.
• “Planning for Hypothetical Horribles in Tech Policy Debates,” Technology Liberation Front, August 6, 2013.
• “Edith Ramirez’s ‘Big Data’ Speech: Privacy Concerns Prompt Precautionary Principle Thinking,” Technology Liberation Front, August 29, 2013.
• “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed,” Technology Liberation Front, April 29, 2011.
• “Copyright, Privacy, Property Rights & Information Control: Common Themes, Common Challenges,” Technology Liberation Front, April 10, 2012.
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013.
• “Why Do We Always Sell the Next Generation Short?” Forbes, January 8, 2012.
• “The Six Things That Drive ‘Technopanics,’” Forbes, March 4, 2012.

CBS and Time Warner Cable have been embroiled in a heated contractual battle over the past week that has resulted in viewers in some major markets losing access to CBS programming. When disputes like these go nuclear and signal blackouts occur, it is inevitable that some folks will call for policy interventions since nobody likes it when the content they love goes dark.

While some policy responses are warranted in this matter, policymakers should proceed with caution. Heated contractual negotiations are a normal part of any capitalist marketplace. We shouldn’t expect lawmakers to intervene to speed up negotiations or set content prices because that would disrupt the normal allocation of programming by placing a regulatory thumb too heavily on one side of the scale. This is why I am somewhat sympathetic to CBS in this fight. In an age when content creators struggle to protect their copyrighted content and get compensation for it, the last thing we need is government intervention that undermines the few distribution schemes that actually work well.

On the other hand, Time Warner Cable deserves sympathy here, too, since CBS currently enjoys some preexisting regulatory benefits. As I noted in this 2012 Forbes oped, “Toward a True Free Market in Television Programming,” many layers of red tape still encumber America’s video marketplace and prevent a truly free market in video programming from developing. The battle here revolves around the “retransmission consent” rules that were put in place as part of the Cable Act of 1992 and govern how video distributors carry signals from TV broadcasters, which includes CBS.

But those “retrans” rules are not the only part of the regulatory mess here. There are many related federal rules that tip the scales toward broadcasters and content creators, such as the requirement that video distributors carry broadcast signals even if they don’t want to (“must carry”); rules that prohibit distributors from striking deals with broadcasters outside their local communities (“network non-duplication” and “syndicated exclusivity” rules); regs specifying where broadcast channels appear on the cable channel lineup; and prohibitions against carrying sporting events on cable when the local stadium doesn’t sell all its seats on game day (“sports blackout rule”).

As they say on TV.. ” But Wait, There’s More!” Working in the favor of video distributors are the compulsory licensing requirements of the Copyright Act of 1976, which essentially forced a “duty to deal” upon broadcasters. Broadcasters have to let cable operators and other video distributors retransmit local stations, though the system at least ensures they get compensated for it. As I noted in my old Forbes essay, along with must carry rules, “Compulsory licensing is the original sin of video marketplace regulation. We could have avoided most of the regulatory mess of the past quarter century if Congress had simply left these rights and contractual negotiations alone. Once Congress forced broadcasters to share their programming, however, marketplace manipulation was off and rolling.”

Of course, the more primal and problematic intervention came decades before in the 1920s and ’30s when the government decided to nationalize spectrum management. Once mandates instead of markets where chosen as the primary allocation agent, America was off and running with a grand experiment in spectrum central planning. We’re still living with the results today. The very fact that spectrum is licensed and can only be used and sold for very narrow purposes as detailed in meticulous FCC regulations is a sign of just how far-removed we are from a pure free market here.

The question now is, what are we going to do about this fine mess? And is there any chance we can get it done?

The problem in this debate is that there are multiple layers of interventions that have built up over the years and created constituencies that are wedded to their preservation. Broadcasters, networks, independent content creators, big cable companies, small cable companies, satellite companies, sports leagues, and viewing consumers themselves — they all have conflicting interests and a stake in how this debate turns out. In his 2012 Mercatus Center working paper, “Consumer Welfare and TV Program Regulation,” media economist Bruce M. Owen noted that “What distinguishes TV programs from other mass media content, including both traditional print and new online media, is the extreme eagerness of Washington to engage in efforts to prevent markets from working freely, often in response to interest group pressures and opportunities for political advantage and with almost complete indifference to the welfare of consumers.”

As a result, if you talk to almost anyone involved in this debate, they will all insist that only their very specific reforms are the ones that can or should be implemented. Consequently, comprehensive reform will be challenging precisely because of all the conflicting interests and layers of law and regulation that must be eradicated.

But at least there is a blueprint for how to get the job done right. Many times here before I have written about “The Next Generation Television Marketplace Act,” which was floated last session by Rep. Steve Scalise (R-LA) and then-Senator Jim DeMint (R-SC). It proposed wiping off the books all the archaic rules outlined above. Alas, the bill never went anywhere in the last Congress and now that Sen. DeMint has left to lead the Heritage Foundation, there is no supporter in the Senate this session. Instead, we have some lawmakers floating bad ideas like S.912, the “Television Consumer Freedom Act of 2013,” which just proposes more regulatory gaming of an already over-gamed system.

We instead need policy reforms like the old DeMint-Scalise bill that clean up the regulatory mess of the past. But there just isn’t much appetite for such a house-cleaning. Most parties affected by these rules want very specific outcomes and deregulation won’t give them any such guarantees. After all, there will still be blackouts after deregulation. And the cost of some content may continue to go up in response to demand. And there will still be fights over sports programming. And there’s no certainty that all local broadcasters or small video distributors will survive. And so on, and so on.

But it is also true that a deregulatory environment is more likely to lead to even more experimentation and innovation with new business models, technologies, and methods of content creation and delivery. We already see much innovation in this marketplace despite all the red tape that exists. Just look at what’s been going on recent years with alternative video delivery platforms, including: Netflix, Hulu, XBox Live, Vudu, Roku, Redbox, Boxee, Amazon, Apple TV, Aereo, Google Chromecast, and so on. And don’t forget the strides that the old broadcast and cable giants have made here, too. CBS is actually a pretty good model for how content can be re-purposed online in creative ways on a firm’s own digital platform. Likewise, cable companies like Time Warner Cable are slowly but surely adapting to consumers’ demand for video to be delivered to multiple devices.

Of course, there there will always be hiccups along the road to video nirvana. Some regulatory activists seemingly expect that all content can be delivered effortless and cheaply to consumers without giving a thought in the world to just how complicated it is to get that content financed and distributed in the first place. Great content and great delivery platforms don’t just happen by magic or the good intentions of activists or policymakers. Those platforms happen because new markets and monetization mechanisms develop to facilitate them. If we cut back the regulatory deadwood in our modern information marketplace, we’d likely get even more experimentation and innovation that would likely produce all new ways of financing, creating, and delivering content to consumers. But we’ll never know unless we are willing to embrace change and kill all those old regulatory weeds that continue to grow in our information garden.

Alas, if Congress can’t muster the courage to do that, then lawmakers ought to at least consider asking the broadcasters to return all that juicy spectrum they are sitting on. After all, the current retrans racket gives the broadcasters an increasingly lucrative revenue stream when they deliver content on cable and satellite systems (in addition to the advertising revenues they already receive). No good reason exists to give them preferential treatment relative to any other cable channel out there today. Don’t forget, there are all sorts of garden-variety cable carriage disputes that happen outside the regulated retrans system today. (Remember last year’s big spats between AMC vs. Dish and Viacom vs. DirecTV?) There are no special rules that either side can rely on in those instances. So why should special rules be applied to other content companies simply because some of their properties are broadcast channels? Answer: they shouldn’t.

But if no other reforms occur and if companies like CBS still want to be more like a cable mega-channel — albeit, a very handsomely compensated cable channel — then by all means go for it. In the meantime, however, they can return all that spectrum for re-auction for some better purpose. In fact, back early 2009, CBS Corp. President and CEO Les Moonves told an investor conference that moving all CBS network programming to cable and satellite platforms would be “a very interesting proposition.” I agree! But, absent other reforms, it might be time to make that “interesting proposition” a mandatory one.

Adam Thierer, Senior Research Fellow at the Mercatus Center discusses his recent working paper with coauthor Brent Skorup, A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector. Thierer takes a look at how cronyism has manifested itself in technology and media markets — whether it be in the form of regulatory favoritism or tax privileges. Which tech companies are the worst offenders? What are the consequences for consumers? And, how does cronyism affect entrepreneurship over the long term?

Download

Related Links

• A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector, Thierer
• Video: A History of Cronysim and Capture in the Information Technology Sector, Thierer
• Adam Thierer Biography, Mercatus Center
• Adam Thierer on Anti-Tech Grump Evgeny Morozov, Thierer

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

Declan McCullagh, chief political correspondent for CNET and former Washington bureau chief for Wired News, discusses recent leaks of NSA surveillance programs. What do we know so far, and what more might be unveiled in the coming weeks? McCullagh covers legal challenges to the programs, the Patriot Act, the fourth amendment, email encryption, the media and public response, and broader implications for privacy and reform.

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Related Links

• Snowden: NSA snoops on U.S. phone calls without warrants, McCullagh
• Snowden: Feds can’t plug leaks by ‘murdering me’, McCullagh
• Feds: Power grid vulnerable to cyber threats, McCullagh

Earlier today on Twitter, I listed what I thought were the Top 5 “Biggest Internet Policy Issues of 2012.” In case you don’t follow me on Twitter — and shame on you if you don’t! — here were my choices:

1. Copyright wars reinvigorated post-SOPA; tide starting to turn in favor of copyright reform. [TLF posts on copyright.]
2. Privacy still red-hot w ECPA reform, online advertising regs & kids’ privacy issues all pending. [TLF posts on privacy.]
3. WCIT makes Internet governance / NetFreedom a major issue worldwide. [TLF posts on Net governance.]
4. Antitrust threat looms larger w pending Google case + Apple books investigation. [TLF posts on antitrust.]
5. Cybersecurity regulatory push continues in both legislative (CISPA) & executive branch. [TLF posts on cybersecurity.]

Lists like these are entirely subjective, of course, but I am basing my list on the general amount of chatter I tended to see and hear about each topic over the course of the year.

What do you think the top tech policy issues of the year were?

Here’s a presentation I delivered on “The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy” at the latest meeting of the Southern Economic Association this weekend. It outlines concerns about vertical integration in the tech economy and specifically addresses regulatory proposals set forth by Tim Wu (arguing for a “separations principle” for the tech economy) & Jonathan Zittrain (arguing for “API neutrality” for social media and digital platforms). This presentation is based on two papers published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University: “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (with Brent Skorup) & “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.”

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

On Friday, California Governor Jerry Brown signed SB 1161, which prohibits the state’s Public Utilities Commission from any new regulation of Voice over Internet Protocol or other IP-based services without the legislature’s authorization.

California now joins over twenty states that have enacted similar legislation.

The bill, which is only a few pages long, was introduced by State Senator Alex Padilla (D) in February.  It passed both houses of the California legislature with wide bi-partisan majorities.

California lawmakers and the governor are to be praised for quickly enacting this sensible piece of legislation.

Whatever the cost-benefit of continued state regulation of traditional utilities such as water, power, and landline telephone services, it’s clear that the toolkit of state and local PUCs is a terrible fit for Internet services such as Skype, Google Voice or Apple’s FaceTime.

Historically, as I argued in a Forbes piece last month, the imposition of public utility status on a service provider has been an extreme response to an extreme situation—a monopoly provider, unlikely to have competition because of the high cost of building  and operating competing infrastructure (so-called “natural monopoly”), offering a service that is indispensable to everyday life.

Service providers meeting that definition are transformed by PUC oversight into entities that are much closer to government agencies than private companies.  The PUC sets and modifies the utility’s pricing in excruciating detail.  PUC approval is required for each and every change or improvement to the utility’s asset base, or to add new services or retire obsolete offerings.

In exchange for offering service to all residents, utilities in turn are granted eminent domain and rights of way to lay and maintain pipes, wires and other infrastructure.

VoIP services may resemble traditional switched telephone networks, but they have none of the features of a traditional public utility.  Most do not even charge for basic service, nor do they rely on their own dedicated infrastructure.  Indeed, the reason VoIP is so much cheaper to offer than traditional telephony is that it can take advantage of the existing and ever-improving Internet as its delivery mechanism.

Because entry is cheap, VoIP providers have no monopoly, natural or otherwise.  In California, according to the FCC, residents have their choice of over 125 providers—more than enough competition to ensure market discipline.

Nor would residents be in any way helped by interposing a regulator to review and pre-approve each and every change to a VoIP provider’s service offerings.  Rather, the lightning-fast evolution of Internet services provides perhaps the worst mismatch possible for the deliberate and public processes of a local PUC.

Software developers don’t need eminent domain.

But the most serious mismatch between PUCs and VoIP providers is that there is little inherently local about VoIP offerings.  Where a case can be made for local oversight of public utilities operating extensive–even pervasive–local infrastructure, it’s hard to see what expertise a local PUC brings to the table in supervising a national or even international VoIP service.

On the other hand, it’s not hard to imagine the chaos and uncertainty VoIP providers and their customers would face if they had to satisfy fifty different state PUCs, not to mention municipal regulators and regulators in other countries.

In most cases that would mean dealing with regulators on a daily basis, on every minor aspect of a service offering.  In the typical PUC relationship, the regulator becomes the true customer and the residents mere “rate-payers” or even just “meters.”

Public utilities are not known for their constant innovation, and for good reason.

Whatever oversight VoIP providers require, local PUCs are clearly the wrong choice.  It’s no surprise, then, that SB 1161 was endorsed by major Silicon Valley trade groups, including TechNet, TechAmerica, and the Silicon Valley Leadership Group.

The law is a win for California residents and California businesses—both high-tech and otherwise.

Links

1. “Government Control of Net is Always a Bad Idea,” CNET News.com, June 4, 2012.
2. “Memo to Jerry Brown:  Sign SB 1161 for all Internet users,” CNET News.com, August 30, 2012.
3. “The Madness of Regulating VoIP as a Public Utility,” Forbes.com, Sept. 10, 2012.
4. “Brown Endorses Hands off Stance on Internet Calls,” The San Francisco Chronicle, Sept. 28. 2012.

I’ve been hearing more rumblings about “API neutrality” lately. This idea, which originated with Jonathan Zittrain’s book, The Future of the Internet–And How to Stop It, proposes to apply Net neutrality to the code/application layer of the Internet. A blog called “The API Rating Agency,” which appears to be written by Mehdi Medjaoui, posted an essay last week endorsing Zittrain’s proposal and adding some meat to the bones of it. (My thanks to CNet’s Declan McCullagh for bringing it to my attention).

Medjaoui is particularly worried about some of Twitter’s recent moves to crack down on 3rd party API uses. Twitter is trying to figure out how to monetize its platform and, in a digital environment where advertising seems to be the only business model that works, the company has decided to establish more restrictive guidelines for API use. In essence, Twitter believes it can no longer be a perfectly open platform if it hopes to find a way to make money. The company apparently believes that some restrictions will need to be placed on 3rd party uses of its API if the firm hopes to be able to attract and monetize enough eyeballs.

While no one is sure whether that strategy will work, Medjaoui doesn’t even want the experiment to go forward. Building on Zittrain, he proposes the following approach to API neutrality:

• Absolute data to 3rd party non-discrimination : all content, data, and views equally distributed on the third party ecosystem. Even a competitor could use an API in the same conditions than all others, with not restricted re-use of the data.
• Limited discrimination without tiering : If you don’t pay specific fees for quality of service, you cannot have a better quality of service, as rate limit, quotas, SLA than someone else in the API ecosystem.If you pay for a high level Quality of service, so you’ll benefit of this high level quality of service, but in the same condition than an other customer paying the same fee.
• First come first served : No enqueuing API calls from paying third party applications, as the free 3rd-party are in the rate limits.

Before I critique this, let’s go back and recall why Zittrain suggested we might need API neutrality for certain online services or digital platforms. Although Zittrain does not label it as such, API neutrality assumes the platform or device in question is a sort of public utility or common carrier. Zittrain is concerned that the absence of API neutrality could imperil “generativity,” technologies or networks that invite or allow tinkering and all sorts of creative secondary uses. Primary examples include general-purpose personal computers (PCs) and the traditional “best efforts” Internet. By contrast, Zittrain contemptuously refers to “tethered, sterile appliances,” or digital technologies or networks that discourage or disallow tinkering. Zittrain’s primary examples are proprietary devices like Apple’s iPhone or the TiVo, or online walled gardens like the old AOL and current cell phone networks. Such “take it or leave it” devices or platforms earn Zittrain’s wrath. He argues that we run the risk of seeing the glorious days of generative devices and the open Internet give way to those tethered appliances and closed networks. He fears most users will flock to tethered appliances in search of stability or security, and worries because those tethered appliances are less “open” and more “regulable,” thus allowing easier control by either large corporate intermediaries or government officials. In other words, the “future of the Internet” Zittrain is hoping to “stop” is a world dominated by tethered digital appliances and walled gardens, because they are too easily controlled by other actors. He argues:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Because he fears the rise of “walled gardens” and “mediated experiences,” Zittrain goes on to wonder, “Should we consider network neutrality-style mandates for appliancized systems?” He responds to his own question as follows:

The answer lies in that subset of appliancized systems that seeks to gain the benefits of third-party contributions while reserving the right to exclude it later. . . . Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms. (p. 183-4)

While many would agree that API neutrality represents a fine generic norm for online commerce and interactions, Zittrain implies it should be a legal standard to which online providers are held. He even alludes to the possibility of applying the common law principle of adverse possession more broadly in these contexts. He notes that adverse possession “dictates that people who openly occupy another’s private property without the owner’s explicit objection (or, for that matter, permission) can, after a lengthy period of time, come to legitimately acquire it.” (p. 183) He does not make it clear when that principle would be triggered as it pertains to digital platforms or social media APIs. But it would seem clear that his API neutrality rule would eventually regulate the major information providers and platforms of our day, including: Apple, Google, Twitter, Facebook, and many others.

As I argued in my paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” API neutrality regulation is a dangerous notion. There are many problems with the logic of Zittrain’s API neutrality proposal and with the application of adverse possession to social media platforms or digital applications. What follows below is my critique of the notion that appeared in that paper, and it also explains why Medjaoui’s new formulation and clarification of the principle is equally problematic.

First, most developers who offer open APIs are unlikely to close them later because they do not want to incur the wrath of “those who built on top of their interfaces,” to use Zittrain’s parlance. Social media services make themselves more attractive to users and advertisers by providing platforms with plentiful opportunities for diverse interactions and innovations. The “walled gardens” of the Internet’s first generation are largely things of the past. Thus, a powerful self-correcting mechanism is at work in this space. If social media operators were to lock down their platforms or applications in a highly restrictive fashion, both application developers and average users would likely revolt. Moreover, a move to foreclose or limit generative opportunities could spur more entry and innovation as other application (“app”) developers and users seek out more open, pro-generative alternatives.

Consider an example involving Apple and the iPhone. Shortly after the iPhone’s release, Apple reversed itself and opened its iPhone platform to third-party app developers. The result was an outpouring of innovation. Customers in more than 123 countries had downloaded more than eighteen billion apps from Apple’s App Store at a rate of more than 1 billion apps per month as of late 2011.

But what if Apple decides to suddenly shut its App Store and prohibit all third-party contributions, after initially allowing them? There is no obvious incentive for Apple to do so, and there are plenty of competitive reasons for Apple not to close off third-party development, especially as its application dominance is a key element of Apple’s success in the smartphone and tablet sectors. Under Zittrain’s proposed paradigm, regulators would treat the iPhone as the equivalent of a commoditized common carriage device and force the App Store to operate on regulated, public utility–like terms without editorial or technological (and perhaps interoperability) control by Apple itself. But if Apple were to open the door to developers only to slam it shut a short time later, the company would likely lose those developers and customers to alternative platforms. Google, Amazon, Microsoft, and others would be only too happy to take Apple’s business by offering a wealth of stores and devices that allow users greater freedom. Market choices, not regulatory edicts such as mandatory API neutrality, should determine the future of the Internet.

The same logic indicates the likely counterproductive effects of efforts to impose API neutrality on Twitter. Until recently, Twitter had a voluntary open access policy in that it allowed nearly unlimited third-party reuse and modification of its API. It is now partially abandoning that policy by taking greater control over the uses of its API. This policy reversal will, no doubt, lead to claims that the company is acting like one of Tim Wu’s proverbial “information empires” and that perhaps Zittrain’s API neutrality regime should be put in place as a remedy. Indeed, Zittrain has already referred to Twitter’s move as a “bait-and-switch” and recommended an API neutrality remedy. Zittrain’s actions could foreshadow more pressure from academics and policymakers that will first encourage Twitter to continue open access, but then potentially force the company to grant nondiscriminatory access to its platform on regulated terms. Nondiscriminatory access would represent a step toward the forced commoditization of the Twitter API and the involuntary surrender of the company’s property rights to some collective authority that will manage the platform as a common carrier or essential facility.

Yet again, innovation and competitive entry remain possible in this arena. There is nothing stopping other microblogging or short-messaging services from offering alternatives to Twitter. Some people would decry the potential lack of interoperability among competing services at first, but innovators would quickly find work-arounds. A decade ago, similar angst surrounded AOL’s growing power in the instant-messaging (IM) marketplace. Many feared AOL would monopolize the market and exclude competitors by denying interconnection. Markets evolved quickly, however. Today, anyone can download a free chat client like Digsby or Adium to manage IM services from AOL, Yahoo!, Google, Facebook, and just about any other company, all within a single interface, essentially making it irrelevant which chat service your friends use. These innovations occurred despite a mandate in the conditions of Time Warner’s acquisition of AOL that the post-merger firm provide for IM interoperability. The provision was quietly sunset as irrelevant a short three years later.

A similar market response could follow Twitter’s to exert excessive control over its APIs. In web 2.0 markets—that is, markets built on pure code—the fixed costs of investment are orders of magnitude less than they were with the massive physical networks of pipes and towers from the era of analog broadcasting and communications. Thus, major competition for Twitter is more than possible, and it is likely to come from sources and platforms we cannot currently imagine, just as few of us could have imagined something like Twitter developing.

Even if some social media platform owners did want to abandon previously open APIs and move to a sort of walled garden, there is no reason to classify such a move as anticompetitive foreclosure or leveraging of the platform. Marketplace experimentation in search of a sustainable business model should not be made illegal. Since most social media sites such as Twitter do not charge for the services they provide, some limited steps to lock down their platforms or APIs might help them earn a return on their investments by monetizing traffic on their own platforms. If a social media provider had to live under a strict version of Zittrain’s API neutrality principle, however, it might be extremely difficult to monetize traffic and increase businesses since the company would be forced to share its only valuable intellectual property.

In sum, if the government were to forcibly apply API neutrality or adverse possession principles through utility-like regulation, it would send a signal to social media entrepreneurs that their platforms are theirs in name only and could be coercively commoditized once they are popular enough. Such a move would constitute a serious disincentive to future innovation and investment. “API neutrality” would upend the way much of the modern digital economy operates and cripple many of America’s most innovative companies and sectors. In the long run, such changes could sacrifice America’s current role as a global information technology leader. For these reasons, API neutrality mandates should be rejected.

Additional Reading

• Twitter, the Monopolist? Is this Tim Wu’s “Threat Regime” In Action?
• A Vision of (Regulatory) Things to Come for Twitter?
• review of Zittrain’s “Future of the Internet”

Google’s first lesson for building affordable, one Gbps fiber networks with private capital is crystal clear: If government wants private companies to build ultra high-speed networks, it should start by waiving regulations, fees, and bureaucracy.

Executive Summary

For three years now the Obama Administration and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) have been pushing for national broadband connectivity as a way to strengthen our economy, spur innovation, and create new jobs across the country. They know that America requires more private investment to achieve their vision. But, despite their good intentions, their policies haven’t encouraged substantial private investment in communications infrastructure. That’s why the launch of Google Fiber is so critical to policymakers who are seeking to promote investment in next generation networks.

The Google Fiber deployment offers policymakers a rare opportunity to examine policies that successfully spurred new investment in America’s broadband infrastructure. Google’s intent was to “learn how to bring faster and better broadband access to more people.” Over the two years it planned, developed, and built its ultra high-speed fiber network, Google learned a number of valuable lessons for broadband deployment – lessons that policymakers can apply across America to meet our national broadband goals.

To my surprise, however, the policy response to the Google Fiber launch has been tepid. After reviewing Google’s deployment plans, I expected to hear the usual chorus of Rage Against the ISP from Public Knowledge, Free Press, and others from the left-of-center, so-called “public interest” community (PIC) who seek regulation of the Internet as a public utility. Instead, they responded to the launch with deafening silence.

Maybe they were stunned into silence. Google’s deployment is a  real-world rejection of the public interest community’s regulatory agenda more powerful than any hypothetical. Google is building fiber in Kansas City because its officials were willing to waive regulatory barriers to entry that have discouraged broadband deployments in other cities. Google’s first lesson for building affordable, one Gbps fiber networks with private capital is crystal clear: If government wants private companies to build ultra high-speed networks, it should start by waiving regulations, fees, and bureaucracy .

That’s the policy template that worked for the residents of Kansas City. It could work for the rest of America too, but only if all broadband providers receive the same treatment. When private companies compete on a level playing field, consumers always win. When government regulations mandate a particular business model or favor a particular competitor, bureaucracy is the only winner – everyone else loses.

Maybe the silence of PIC advocates indicates they’ve had a change of heart. Although PIC has violently opposed the efforts of other broadband providers to eliminate similar regulatory barriers in the past, perhaps the success of Google Fiber has persuaded them that deregulatory policies fairly applied to all competitors are essential to meeting our nation’s shared goal of national broadband connectivity.

Google’s deployment certainly indicates the PIC would benefit from a change in their approach to policy.  The Google Fiber business model contradicts virtually every element of the PIC’s current regulatory agenda .

• PIC says restrictive regulations don’t discourage new investment. Google says it passed over proposals by cities in California due to restrictive regulations.
• PIC says the government should limit the delivery of “specialized” IP-based video services by network operators. Google says specialized video services support fiber deployment.
• PIC says that the provision of subsidized devices by network operators harms innovation and term contracts harm consumers. Google says bundling its own, vertically integrated computing devices with its fiber network services in exchange for a two-year contract commitment is part of the “Full Google Experience.”
• PIC says the “open access” model is “easy” and viable even in competitive markets. Google says it abandoned its commitment to open access because it doesn’t think anyone else can deliver service as well as it can.
• PIC says the “end-to-end” regulatory model, which severs all business relationships between “core” network infrastructure and “edge” elements of the network, promotes innovation and investment. Google says we should explore alternatives to the “end-to-end” model, including vertical integration among network operators and edge providers.

Every level of our government could benefit from a change in its policy approach as well. If we are serious about achieving affordable, ultra high-speed broadband connectivity for every American, we must question the traditional assumptions underlying our legacy regulatory approach.  Google Fiber demonstrates that the problem isn’t deregulation, a lack of competition, or an unwillingness to invest in American infrastructure. It’s the imposition of burdensome bureaucracy, unnecessary costs, and political favoritism at all levels of government . Eliminating these regulatory barriers would drive investment in America’s infrastructure, spur innovation, create jobs, and grow the economy while helping to meet President Obama’s goal of connecting every American to broadband. Google has shown the way. Is government willing to let other competitors in the marketplace follow the same path?

Introduction

The story begins two years ago, when Google announced its plans to build experimental, ultra high-speed broadband networks and operate them on an “open access” basis. Over 1,100 communities asked Google to build a network in their area, including several “desperate cities” willing to change their names and even swim with sharks. Google ultimately chose Kansas City as its broadband mecca.

So far, people in this prosperous city on the plains are embracing Google Fiber with enthusiasm. A little over a week after Google offered designated areas an opportunity to request service, 46 neighborhoods had qualified. Analysts estimate Google has already achieved approximately 4 percent market penetration. Google’s bet on an all-IP, fiber network appears poised for early success in Kansas City, which is something every tech geek should be pleased to see.

Like most new enterprises, it’s unclear whether Google Fiber will enjoy financial success in the long term. Many analysts are skeptical that Google’s business model can be replicated on a larger scale. Others believe it will deliver a “knock-out punch” to existing cable and telecom operators. Though I have my doubts, I’m content to let the market determine Google Fiber’s financial fate.

I’m more intrigued by the public policy implications of the Google Fiber business plan. Am I the only one who is baffled by the unusual response to Google’s announcement? After reviewing Google Fiber’s terms of service, I expected to hear the usual chorus of Rage Against the ISP from Public Knowledge, Free Press, and other PIC advocates who believe the Internet should be a public utility. I also expected the technology press would be critical of several elements of Google’s service. I was surprised on both counts.

Many in the tech press are offering gushing praise for Google’s new service. BGR says Google Fiber is a “ridiculously awesome value” for “lucky” Kansas City residents. CNET suggests that the Google Fiber business model offers the “rest of the broadband industry” a template for successful deployment of one Gbps networks: “Google is showing the cable companies and telecommunications providers how a broadband network should be built.”

The notion that other ISPs should mimic Google Fiber may explain why PIC advocates have been so deafeningly silent on the Kansas City deployment. The PIC narrative says that “the evil folks at cable companies and telecoms” are sabotaging fiber deployment in order to maintain their legacy businesses. Google doesn’t have a legacy network business, and its informal corporate motto is “don’t be evil.” So, according to the PIC narrative, Google’s business model shouldn’t look anything like those implemented by existing ISPs.

It turns out that Google’s business model validates a host of existing industry practices that PIC advocates seek to outlaw or regulate, and demonstrates that existing regulations are the biggest factor inhibiting the deployment of all-IP fiber networks by other service providers. Ironically, to the extent Google’s business model does differ significantly from those typical of other ISPs, it relies on an industry structure – vertical integration – PIC advocates vociferously oppose. As the following analysis of the “lessons learned” from Google Fiber demonstrates in detail, Google’s model contradicts virtually every element of the PIC regulatory agenda.

First Lesson Learned: Deregulation promotes private investment

The first lesson Google learned from its fiber project:  If government wants private companies to build ultra high-speed networks, it should start by waiving regulations, fees, and bureaucracy.

It’s no accident that Google chose to deploy its broadband network in a city subject to deregulatory statewide video franchising laws (in Kansas and Missouri). (Federal law prohibits the provision of video programming services without a “franchise”.)

Franchises were historically granted by local county or municipal governments who gave virtual monopolies to cable providers in exchange for “universal service” commitments (i.e., commitments to build the cable network to every neighborhood irrespective of cost or demand). Although federal law has prohibited monopoly video franchises since 1992, when potential new entrants asked permission to build competitive cable networks, local franchising authorities often stonewalled their applications or demanded unreasonable concessions. When new entrants challenged the legality of these tactics, PIC advocates derided the potential competitors for attempting to enter the market.

In 2006, the FCC adopted an order prohibiting local franchising authorities from unreasonably refusing to award competitive franchises for video service. The FCC found that many local franchising regulations were “unreasonable barriers to entry” in the video market and were “discourage[ing] investment in the fiber-based infrastructure necessary for the provision of advanced broadband services.” The unreasonable regulations included excessive build-out mandates, the inclusion of non-video revenue in franchise “fees” (including advertising fees), and demands unrelated to the provision of video service. The FCC has since reported that 20 states have enacted statewide video franchising laws to streamline the delivery of video service.

PIC advocates opposed this deregulatory decision when it was made and continue to oppose it. When the FCC announced its decision, Harold Feld, then Senior Vice President of the Media Access Project, said preempting local franchise regulation would “deprive the public of the best way to guarantee that cable providers and competitors meet the needs of their local communities.” When states began implementing the decision through statewide franchising laws, Sascha Meinrath, Director of the New America Foundation’s Open Technology Institute, attacked such legislation for providing build-out waivers even when developments are “inaccessible using reasonable technical solutions.” Despite evidence of significant competitive entry in the video market since the FCC preempted unreasonable local franchising regulations, many PIC advocates still believe deregulation has had no positive impact.

This brief history of video franchising isn’t merely academic. Absent deregulation of local franchising in Kansas City, Google Fiber’s business model wouldn’t have been possible. When Time Warner Cable became the principal video service provider in the Kansas City market decades ago, its franchise required that it build its network to virtually every neighborhood, including areas that pose geographic challenges and neighborhoods where residents are less likely to subscribe. A monopolist can fund (i.e., cross-subsidize) uneconomic construction by raising prices in other neighborhoods. In a competitive market, however, cross-subsidization mandates typically inhibit entry. For example, New York City delayed Verizon’s FiOS deployment for nearly a year while the city negotiated a requirement that Verizon build its network in all five boroughs of the city.

In Kansas City, Google doesn’t have a build-out requirement. It will offer service only to neighborhoods that demonstrate their potential to cover the costs of construction. Google divided Kansas City into a number of small neighborhoods and then cherry picked the areas where it would be willing to offer service. It then set preregistration goals for these neighborhoods based on their size, density, and ease of construction. Eligible neighborhoods have six weeks to meet their preregistration goals. If they don’t, Google won’t construct its network in that area. In neighborhoods that are more expensive to build,Google says it wants to make sure that enough residents want its service before committing capital to network construction. There is “no need to dispatch crews and rip up asphalt in pursuit of a handful of potential customers when Google can laser in on the most eager concentrations of subscribers.”

Although it wasn’t required to obtain a municipal franchise, Google received stunning regulatory concessions and incentives from local governments, including free access to virtually everything the city owns or controls: rights of way, central office space, power, interconnections with anchor institutions, marketing and direct mail, and office space for Google employees. City officials also expedited the permitting process and assigned staff specifically to help Google. One county even offered to allow Google to hang its wires on parts of utility poles – for free – that are usually off-limits to communications companies.

The key element for Google was that Kansas City officials promised to stay out of the way. When Google’s vice president of access services, Milo Medin, was asked why Google chose Kansas City for its fiber deployment, he said, “We wanted to find a location where we could build quickly and efficiently.” In his testimony before Congress last year, Medin emphasized that “regulations – at the federal, state, and local levels – can be central factors in company decisions on investment and innovation.” Based on his experience with Google Fiber, he concluded that government regulation “often results in unreasonable fees, anti-investment terms and conditions, and long and unpredictable build-out timeframes” that “increase the cost and slow the pace of broadband network investment and deployment.”

Second Lesson Learned: Specialized Video Services Support Fiber Deployment

The second lesson Google learned from its fiber project:  Specialized video services help support the costs of fiber deployment.

In its order preempting unreasonable local franchise regulations, the FCC found that broadband deployment and video entry are “inextricably linked,” because broadband providers require the revenue from video services to offset the costs of fiber deployment. The FCC affirmed this finding in its 2010 net neutrality order, which exempted “specialized services”, including Internet Protocol-based video offerings, from net neutrality regulations. The FCC recognized that specialized video services “may drive additional private investment in broadband networks and provide end users valued services” that support the open Internet.

The Google Fiber business model indicates the FCC was right – specialized video services do help support the costs of fiber deployment. When it initially announced its fiber project, Google did not intend to offer specialized video services at all. Little more than a year ago, Google remained focused only on Internet connectivity and still had no plans to provide video services; though it said it wanted to “hear from Kansas City residents what additional services they would find most valuable.” By the time it launched the project, Google had decided to center its highest subscription rate on a new, specialized video service (Google Fiber TV) that Google says is “designed for how you watch today and how you’ll watch tomorrow.” It appears that, after listening to Kansas City residents, Google learned that many consumers want their ISP to offer specialized video services.

PIC advocates generally oppose any form of specialized service based on IP, especially video services. Less than a week after Google launched its own, IP-based video service, Public Knowledge filed a petition at the FCC arguing that Comcast’s specialized Xfinity video service is discriminatory and illegal. Although the petition is based on conditions imposed on the Comcast/NBC-Universal merger, Public Knowledge says the service may violate the FCC’s net neutrality rules as well.

Third Lesson Learned: Equipment Subsidies Offer Benefits to Consumers

The third lesson Google learned from its fiber project:  Equipment subsidies coupled with term contracts offer benefits to consumers.

The Google Fiber business model also embraces the standard communications industry practice of offering consumers subsidized equipment in exchange for term contracts. Consumers who opt for “The Full Google Experience” will get four devices, including a set-top box, a network box, a storage box, and a new tablet for use as a “remote control”, subject to a two-year contract.

Bundling branded set-top boxes and other devices is standard practice in the video industry, but Google’s approach is new in at least one respect: The tablet is a Google Nexus 7 running Google’s Android OS, a powerful computing device that is capable of far more than controlling a television set. Google is also offering the option of buying a “Chromebook” laptop for as little as $299 – slightly less than the amount of the “construction fee” Google is waiving for premium customers. By bundling its own, vertically integrated computing devices with its premium service, Google can leverage its fiber network to gain market share from the makers of other devices, software, and operating systems, including Apple and Microsoft.

Though I think it’s a savvy move that could have a long-lasting impact on the communications marketplace, I’m surprised that the PIC has said nothing about this new wrinkle on device bundling. On March 30, 2012, Public Knowledge released a paper asserting that subsidized video devices harm innovation. The paper says innovation suffers because it’s easier to attach devices provided by the video service provider, and most consumers “just find it simpler to settle for whatever device their cable company offers.” It also contends that the subsidized device model is unusual, and notes “no one rents their computer from their ISP.” I suppose that’s still true. Google isn’t renting the Nexus 7 – it’s giving it away (and subsidizing the Chromebook by waiving the construction fee).

Fourth Lesson Learned: Open Access Isn’t Viable in Competitive Markets

The fourth lesson Google learned from its fiber project:  Open access isn’t a viable business model in competitive markets.

When Google originally announced its intention to build its fiber network and operate it on an “open access” basis, Susan Crawford said we would “learn how easy it is” to allow competitive access to fiber networks and how little such networks cost. What we actually learned from Google Fiber is that “open access” isn’t a viable business model in a competitive market. Once Google analyzed how fiber networks are financed, built, and operated, it abandoned its earlier commitment to open access and decided not to allow other ISPs on its network. According to Google Fiber project manager Kevin Lo, “We don’t think anybody else can deliver a gig the way we can.” Translation: Open access doesn’t make financial sense in a competitive environment.

It’s still possible that Google could open its network to other ISPs in the future, but I suspect that in short term, Google’s reversal will dampen, if not extinguish, the PIC dream of open access networks in competitive markets.

Fifth Lesson Learned: Vertical Integration Offers an Alternative to the End-to-End Principle

The fifth lesson Google learned from its fiber project:  Vertical integration among “edge” and “infrastructure” providers offers an alternative to the “end-to-end” principle.

The elements of Google Fiber’s business model discussed so far affirm existing industry practice (and free market regulatory theory). In one respect, however, the Google model differs significantly from industry practice. Google is offering free Internet service, albeit limited to 5 Mbps, for seven years to customers who pay the “construction fee.” That speed is just fast enough to support Google’s primary advertising business, including the delivery of video advertisements, but just slow enough to avoid cannibalizing Google Fiber’s premium Internet and video services.

Even so, some analysts predict Google will lose money on its free service. So why would Google offer it?  Because Google’s “core advertising business is so powerful, dominant and profitable that it can subsidize almost everything else the company does, using Free to get customers in new markets.” Chris Anderson, the author of “FREE: The Future of a Radical Price,” has asked whether that’s fair when Google’s competitors don’t have a similar golden goose. Google’s response: “If a company chooses to use its profits from one product to help provide another product to consumers at low cost, that’s generally a good thing” (in the absence of tying arrangements).

On its own, Google’s willingness to subsidize broadband access to promote its advertising services might be unremarkable. But, when combined with its provision of a “free” Nexus 7 table and a subsidized Chromebook, it suggests that Google is willing to explore alternatives to the pure end-to-end Internet religion (practiced by PIC advocates and tech evangelists) in favor of a vertically integrated approach. The end-to-end purist believes core network infrastructure should be economically severed from the “edge” of the network, i.e., that Internet access should be offered entirely separately from the services, devices, applications that use network infrastructure. Strict adherence to this principle would prohibit the subsidization of network architecture by profits derived from services (e.g., specialized video and advertising), devices, and applications. Google was thought to be an end-to-end purist, but, assuming that were once true, it appears the company’s views have shifted.

What if large Internet “edge” companies – Google, Apple, and Microsoft – were vertically integrated with the large infrastructure providers – Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T? If the government allowed that to happen, it’s possible that the enormous profits generated by the edge companies (Apple is one of the most valuable companies in the world) would be used to rapidly drive ultra high-speed network deployment rather than fill cash coffers in offshore banks. Google is sitting on $43 billion overseas. Apple has more than $81 billion and Microsoft has $54 billion. By comparison, Verizon currently has about $10 billion in cash, which is less than one quarter of Google’s overseas holdings.

The reality of the Internet economy is that the “edge” generates more revenue than the “core”. In 2011,Comcast produced $8.7 billion in revenue from the sale of high-speed Internet access service. Google produced $37.9 billion in revenue, 96 percent of which was derived from advertising services.

While Google and other edge companies are content to let massive profits sit overseas, America’s network owners are reinvesting their capital in America. AT&T and Verizon ranked first and second, respectively, among U.S.-based companies by their U.S. capital spending in 2011, with Comcast coming in eighth. Google and Apple were ranked 24th and 25th, respectively, with approximately $2 billion in U.S. capital spending each. In 2011, AT&T alone invested ten times that much capital ($20.1 billion) in America. If companies like Comcast, Verizon, and AT&T had access to edge company capital, it could create a new broadband boom.

I’m not sure the edge companies are interested in a vertical integration model, and I’m reasonably certain the current administration wouldn’t allow it. But, now that Google has dipped its toes in the water, it might be a discussion worth having.

Is competition really a problem in the tech industry? That was the question the folks over at WebProNews asked me to come on their show and discuss this week. I offer my thoughts in the following 15-minute clip. Also, down below I have embedded a few of my recent relevant essays on this topic, a few of which I mentioned during the show.

• “On Fast Firms, Slow Regulators, Antitrust & the Digital Economy,” Technology Liberation Front, July 6, 2012
• “The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy,” Forbes, June 29, 2012.
• “Sunsetting Technology Regulation: Applying Moore’s Law to Washington,” Forbes, May 25, 2012.
• “Of “Tech Titans” and Schumpeter’s Vision,” Forbes, August 22, 2011.
• “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” Forbes, April 1, 2012.
• “Gary Reback’s Antitrust Love Letter,” Technology Liberation Front, September 20, 2009.
• “What is “Optimal Interoperability”? A Review of Palfrey & Gasser’s’“Interop,’” Technology Liberation Front, June 11, 2012.

In this new Money Morning article, “The Antitrust Curse: What Apple Can Learn From Microsoft, IBM,”  David Zeiler wonders whether the antitrust lawsuit filed against Apple and several book publishers by the U.S. Department of Justice last week could open the door to a broader case against Apple or, at a minimum, simply become a major distraction to the firm and it’s ability to innovate going forward. He uses IBM and Microsoft as case studies in this regard and notes that, “the problem with being in the DOJ’s gunsight is that it distracts management, makes the company hesitant to innovate, and blemishes the company’s public image.  While antitrust woes may not have been entirely responsible for Microsoft and IBM ceding their dominant positions in tech, they were clearly a major factor,” he says. “And worse for Apple, the e-book case could be just the beginning.”

Quite right. I raised the same concern in my recent Forbes column,”Regulatory, Antitrust and Disruptive Risks Threaten Apple’s Empire,” which Zeiler was kind enough to quote in his essay. In that piece, I argued:

Even if Apple beats back [the eBooks] investigation, broader questions are being raised about the company’s power that could invite a much broader investigation. The danger for Apple is that antitrust becomes an omnipresent threat that must be factored into all ongoing business decisions. Antitrust is a particular danger to Apple because the firm is highly vertically integrated and that integration is the source of many of their innovations.  As earlier tech titans like IBM and Microsoft learned, when antitrust hangs like the Sword of Damocles, every decision about how to evolve and innovate becomes a calculated gamble.

Regarding the earlier impact that antitrust Sword of Damocles had on Microsoft, Zeiler unearthed this terrific 2005 quote from Mark Kroese, a general manager of information services at the Microsoft Network, who described the impact of the MS antitrust case on innovation at the firm as follows: “Working at Microsoft today vs. five years ago is different,” Kroese said. “If anyone thinks the antitrust case hasn’t slowed us down, you’re wrong. If I want to meet with a products manager for Windows, there needs to be three lawyers in the room. We have to be so careful, we err on the side of caution. We are on such a fine line of conduct.” Regarding how antitrust chilled IBM, Zeiler cites veteran tech journalist Steve Wildstrom of Tech.pinions who noted,  “Twelve years of litigation were an enormous distraction in a time of rapid technological and business change. IBM management became cautious and over-lawyered, constantly looking over its shoulder-a condition that persisted for years after the case ended. The antitrust case was almost certainly a major cause of the serious decline of IBM in the late 1980s and early 90s,” Wildstrom said.

Of course, it is impossible to scientifically determine to what degree antitrust harassment contributed to either IBM or Microsoft’s inability to innovate and adapt to the rapidly changing market conditions. And let’s be clear: both IBM and MS have found ways to rebound and innovate in other ways. But one wonders what was lost in the process as the threat of antitrust constantly loomed and potentially chilled innovative efforts that could have kept both firms on the cutting-edge.

It’s not just Apple that faces similar threats today. Google is obviously another company increasingly mentioned as an antitrust target. Commenting of the dangers of a potential case against Google, Bernstein Research senior analyst Carlos Kirjner argues that “even if regulatory proceedings come to naught, the process has the potential, in the most extreme circumstances, to consume so much of the company’s energy that it can lead to important strategic missteps: many believe that Microsoft missed the boat on the Internet, and IBM on the importance of the personal computer, in large part because their management teams were focused on defending against the DoJ’s antitrust efforts.”

The better approach to disciplining tech firms and markets is to rely less on intervention and more on Schumpeter’s “perennial gales of creative destruction,” which are blowing harder than ever in our modern high-tech economy. In markets built largely upon binary code and governed by Moore’s Law, the pace and nature of change has become hyper-Schumpeterian: unrelenting and utterly unpredictable. Innovative risk-takers are constantly shaking things up and displacing yesterday’s lumbering, lethargic giants. Just ask some of the players that have been largely left in the dust, including AOL, AltaVista, MySpace, Palm, and others. Of course, there’s my favorite recent case study: Research In Motion’s BlackBerry smartphone.  As I noted in my recent column, “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” BlackBerry was virtually synonymous with “smartphones” and was considered one of the tech titans that seemed destined to dominate for many years to come. But now the BlackBerry’s days appear numbered and its parent company Research In Motion Ltd. is struggling for its very survival.

Too many tech industry pundits today ignore these dynamic realities and instead rely a myopic analytical approach to the information economy that is fundamentally static in character. Many static equilibrium scholars in both the legal and economic profession tend to adopt a snapshot view of markets and innovation. Such critics often express an overly nostalgic view of the technological past while adopting an excessively gloomy view of the present and the chances for future progress.

But, a la Schumpeter, modern tech markets are highly dynamic. There is no static end-state, “perfect competition,” or “market equilibrium” in today’s information technology marketplace. Change and innovation are chaotic, non-linear, and paradigm-shattering. Schumpeter said it best long ago when he noted how, “in capitalist reality as distinguished from its textbook picture, it is not [perfect] competition which counts but the competition from the new commodity, the new technology, the new source of supply, the new type of organization… competition which commands a decisive cost or quality advantage and which strikes not at the margins of the profits and the outputs of the existing firms but at their foundations and their very lives. This kind of competition is as much more effective than the other,” he argued, because the “ever-present threat” of dynamic, disruptive change “disciplines before it attacks.”

By contrast, the static equilibrium mindset is myopically fixated on short-term market share and price competition while ignoring “competition for innovation,” which is what matters most in the more dynamic Schumpeterian model. “Schumpeterian competition is primarily about active, risk-taking decision makers who seek to change their parameters,” note economists Jerry Ellig and Daniel Lin. “It is about continually destroying the old economic structure from within and replacing it with a new one.” Thus, while static or “perfect competition” models assume away innovation and are preoccupied with equilibrium, dynamic models revolve around disequilibrium and assume that the only constant is change. What is most important to economic progress, therefore, is the ongoing process of constant experimentation and spontaneous discovery that allows new business models and organizational structures to emerge in response to market signals.

The other danger of the static equilibrium mindset is that the same new innovators and innovations that obtain success and scale quite rapidly as a result of this process are sometimes thought to possess problematic market power. Accusations of “monopoly” quickly follow. As Nobel Laureate Ronald Coase noted, “if an economist finds something—a business practice of one sort or another—that he does not understand, he looks for a monopoly explanation. And as in this field we are very ignorant, the number of understandable practices tends to be very large, and the reliance on a monopoly explanation, frequent,” he argued.  Of course, non-economists are just as likely—perhaps more likely—to make that same error. This is why a short-term fixation on market share and market power is so problematic.

Moreover, as Schumpeter also taught us, it is essential that uneven entrepreneurial gains be tolerated so that innovation can occur and be continuously incentivized. Economies need innovators to take risks because progress is born from it. Penalizing the risk-takers by trying to “level the playing field” through rash regulation or antitrust interventions will simply sap the entrepreneurial spirit from the marketplace, limit technological innovation, and diminish the possibility of progress and prosperity over the long-haul.

If you’d like a better understanding of this dynamic conception of competition and an explanation of why the static equilibrium mindset — especially in the antitrust field — is so horribly misguided, then I strongly recommend you begin your investigation with the following readings:

So, the Department of Justice has formally filed suit against Apple and several major book publishers claiming collusion over eBook pricing. Let’s say Apple and the publishers are guilty as charged and in violation of our nation’s antitrust laws. Here’s my opinion on that: So what? What Apple and the publishers are doing here is trying to find a way to sustain creative works in an era when copyright law is slowly dying. As I noted here in a post yesterday, I take no joy in reporting the fact that property rights for intellectual creations no longer function effectively. I wish they did still work, but they are failing rather miserably in an age of highly decentralized digital dissemination. Moreover, I am not prepared to see government go to absurd enforcement extremes in an attempt to make intellectual property rights work. But, that being said, something needs to sustain and cross-subsidize cultural creations in an age of mass piracy. I have increasingly come to believe that consolidation of content and conduit (or devices) is a big part of the answer. Alternatively, some sort of informal collusion among cultural creators and information distributors may be the answer.

Apple and the publishers have figured that out and come up with a plan that keeps intellectual works flowing while making sure that the creators behind them get paid. At a time when copyright critics always say “just find a better business model” Apple and the publishers did just that. But now Department of Justice officials say that business model should be forbidden. That’s crazy.  If we’re going to let copyright die, we should at least grant more pricing and deal-making flexibility to the creative community to structure business arrangements that might give them a lifeline.

But won’t such deals give publishers and other creative artists and industries more pricing power that will help them keep prices up artificially? Yes, of course! That is the whole point! God forbid we actually have to pay something to cultural creators. Ain’t that a scandal. But here’s a news flash: That’s what copyright law was all about, too. It was about helping creators put some fences around their “property” to help them maintain some degree of pricing power for goods with zero marginal cost. The scheme worked brilliantly for many years. It spawned a vibrant marketplace of ideas and helped America become the leading exporter of expressive works on the planet. But now the effectiveness of traditional copyright is fading rapidly. Industry consolidation, cross-promotions, pricing deals, and so on, will increasingly be the “better business model” some will turn to.  So, are we going to allow it? Or will critics just keep mouthing “go find a better business model” and have the government step in every time they don’t like the one industry chooses?  I say let experimentation continue.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Treating these nascent digital services as regulated utilities would harm consumer welfare because public utility regulation has traditionally been the archenemy of innovation and competition. Furthermore, treating today’s leading social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to convert “natural monopoly” or “essential facility” claims into self-fulfilling prophecies. Related proposals to mandate “API neutrality” or enforce a “Separations Principle” on integrated information platforms would be particularly problematic. Such regulation also threatens innovation and investment. Marketplace experimentation in search of sustainable business models should not be made illegal.

Remedies less onerous than regulation are available. Transparency and data-portability policies would solve many of the problems that concern critics, and numerous private empowerment solutions exist for those users concerned about their privacy on social media sites.

Finally, because social media are fundamentally tied up with the production and dissemination of speech and expression, First Amendment values are at stake, warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny of proposals for regulation. Social media providers should possess the editorial discretion to determine how their platforms are configured and what can appear on them.

This 63-page paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Eventually, a shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in a MIT Press book.

Social Networks as Public Utilities [Adam Thierer]

The cover story of this week’s The New Republic is a review by Evgeny Morozov of Walter Isaacson’s biography of Steve Jobs. In 10,000 words it is more illuminating about what made Steve Jobs tick than Isaacson’s 656 pages of warmed-over anecdotes and Wikipedia glosses. Morozov gets it right when he draws the connection between Bauhaus and Apple–functionalism and simplicity über alles. But he doesn’t seem to like where this takes Apple or Jobs.

He calls Jobs’s adherence to the Bauhaus ideal “a kind of industrial Platonism” in which products have a true form or essence that must be discovered and revealed by a designer. What consumers think they want is irrelevant; they will know what they want when it is presented to them. That’s true as far as it goes, but Morozov is the real Platonist here.

Morozov’s ultimate indictment of Apple is that it refuses to consider the externalities its technologies impose on “society.” One may love one’s Apple products and how they have improved one’s life, but, Morozov says,

We need to identify the other moral instructions that may be embedded in a technology, which it promotes directly or indirectly. And this fuller analysis requires going beyond studying the immediate impact on the user and engaging with the broader–let us call it the “ecological”–impact of a device. (“Ecological” here has no environmental connotations; it simply indicates that a technology may affect not only its producer and its user, but also the values and the habits of the community in which they live.)

What is this negative externality Apple’s technology is inflicting on the value and habits of our communities? It’s that apps will kill the open Internet, except not for the reasons we think. Morozov cites and dismisses Jonathan Zittrain’s “generativity” critique saying that Zittrain is concerned only with the threat to innovation. Morozov, on the other hand, is concerned with loftier “ethical and aesthetic considerations.” Namely, that Apple’s app paradigm “may be destroying the Internet in much the same way that the automobile destroyed the sidewalks and the playgrounds.”

The point is not that we should forever cling to the shape and the format of the Internet as it exists today. It is that we should (to borrow Apple’s favorite phrase) “think different” and pay attention to the aesthetic and civic externalities of the app economy. Our choice is between erecting a virtual Portland or sleepwalking into a virtual Dallas. But Apple under Steve Jobs consistently refused to recognize that there is something valuable to the Web that it may be destroying.

After reading a competing cover story about Portland in another newsweekly, I’m not sure the choice is as clear as Morozov thinks it is. But the message is clear: like Portland’s planners do about a “livable city,” Morozov has a vision of what is the Internet’s pure form, and it’s not one left to messy markets.

Morozov quotes a Newsweek interview with Jobs just a few years after the Web was invented. Jobs sees it as “the ultimate direct-to-customer distribution channel.” He essentially predicts that you’ll be able to buy books online and that the bookstore will know what you like.

That the Web did become a shopping mall fifteen years after Jobs made his remark does not mean that he got the Web right. It means only that a powerful technology company that wants to change the Web as it pleases can currently do so with little or no resistance from anyone. If one day Apple decides to remove a built-in browser from the iPad, as the Web becomes less necessary in an apped world, it will not be because things took on a life of their own, but because Apple refused to investigate what other possible directions—or forms of life—“things” might have taken. For Jobs, with his pre-political mind, there was no other way to think about the Internet than to rely on the tired binary poles of supply and demand.

The notion that Apple turned the web into what it is today singlehandedly is laughable. Apple was moribund until 2000, didn’t introduce the iTunes Store until 2003, and has never had a strong presence on the web. The web has become what it is today because the convenience of getting any book you want, whenever you want it, and cheaply beats little bookstores stocked by proprietor’s whims, however aesthetically pleasing they may be–which they’re often not. And for the record, I hope we can all agree the web is more than a shopping mall.

More to the point, though, Jobs was not as much a Pied Piper as we’d like to think he was. Depite all his marketing moxie, he was constrained by the market. If Jobs ever thought there was a true essence of a computer, it was the Power Mac G4 Cube. As Isaacson says, “it was the pure expression of Jobs’s aesthetic.” And it was a flop. “Jobs later admitted that he had overdesigned and overpriced the Cube, just as he had the NeXT computer.” Remember the NeXT cube? How about the iPod Hi-Fi? The buttonless iPod shuffle? Ping? Those tired poles of supply and demand told Jobs “no” time after time, but we might just as easily dismiss gravity or entropy as tired.

If Apple were to remove the browser from the iPad today, there would be, shall we say, less demand for the tablet. If at some future date there is no more demand for a web browser, and Apple removes it to little fanfare, then what is the harm?

I guess it is some Platonic Internet that we’d lose. A pure internet that we don’t know we want. One that only philosopher-kings can see. One they will discuss at “Berlin-based think tanks” and in the pages of “quarterly magazines,” as Morozov praises Google for sponsoring. And it’s an Internet the philosopher-kings would plan for us the same way Neil Goldschmidt and his friends planned Portland.

No thanks. I prefer a Steve Jobs, pursuing a functionalist ideal with little care for the consequences, yet checked by those tired poles and the “perennial gale of creative destruction” that will someday catch up with Apple.

The DOJ’s recent press release on the Google/Motorola, Rockstar Bidco, and Apple/ Novell transactions struck me as a bit odd when I read it.  As I’ve now had a bit of time to digest it, I’ve grown to really dislike it.  For those who have not followed Jorge Contreras had an excellent summary of events at Patently-O.

For those of us who have been following the telecom patent battles, something remarkable happened a couple of weeks ago.  On February 7, the Wall St. Journal reported that, back in November, Apple sent a letter[1] to the European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) setting forth Apple’s position regarding its commitment to license patents essential to ETSI standards.  In particular, Apple’s letter clarified its interpretation of the so-called “FRAND” (fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory) licensing terms that ETSI participants are required to use when licensing standards-essential patents.  As one might imagine, the actual scope and contours of FRAND licenses have puzzled lawyers, regulators and courts for years, and past efforts at clarification have never been very successful.  The next day, on February 8, Google released a letter[2] that it sent to the Institute for Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), ETSI and several other standards organizations.  Like Apple, Google sought to clarify its position on FRAND licensing.  And just hours after Google’s announcement, Microsoft posted a statement of “Support for Industry Standards”[3] on its web site, laying out its own gloss on FRAND licensing.  For those who were left wondering what instigated this flurry of corporate “clarification”, the answer arrived a few days later when, on February 13, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) released its decision[4] to close the investigation of three significant patent-based transactions:  the acquisition of Motorola Mobility by Google, the acquisition of a large patent portfolio formerly held by Nortel Networks by “Rockstar Bidco” (a group including Microsoft, Apple, RIM and others), and the acquisition by Apple of certain Linux-related patents formerly held by Novell.  In its decision, the DOJ noted with approval the public statements by Apple and Microsoft, while expressing some concern with Google’s FRAND approach.  The European Commission approved Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility on the same day. To understand the significance of the Apple, Microsoft and Google FRAND statements, some background is in order.  The technical standards that enable our computers, mobile phones and home entertainment gear to communicate and interoperate are developed by corps of “volunteers” who get together in person and virtually under the auspices of standards-development organizations (SDOs).  These SDOs include large, international bodies such as ETSI and IEEE, as well as smaller consortia and interest groups.  The engineers who do the bulk of the work, however, are not employees of the SDOs (which are usually thinly-staffed non-profits), but of the companies who plan to sell products that implement the standards: the Apples, Googles, Motorolas and Microsofts of the world.  Should such a company obtain a patent covering the implementation of a standard, it would be able to exert significant leverage over the market for products that implemented the standard.  In particular, if a patent holder were to obtain, or even threaten to obtain, an injunction against manufacturers of competing standards-compliant products, either the standard would become far less useful, or the market would experience significant unanticipated costs.  This phenomenon is what commentators have come to call “patent hold-up”.  Due to the possibility of hold-up, most SDOs today require that participants in the standards-development process disclose their patents that are necessary to implement the standard and/or commit to license those patents on FRAND terms.

As Contreras notes, an important part of these FRAND commitments offered by Google, Motorola, and Apple related to the availability of injunctive relief (do go see the handy chart in Contreras’ post laying out the key differences in the commitments).  Contreras usefully summarizes the three statements’ positions on injunctive relief:

In their February FRAND statements, Apple and Microsoft each commit not to seek injunctions on the basis of their standards-essential patents.  Google makes a similar commitment, but qualifies it in typically lawyerly fashion (Google’s letter is more than 3 single-spaced pages in length, while Microsoft’s simple statement occupies about a quarter of a page).  In this case, Google’s careful qualifications (injunctive relief might be possible if the potential licensee does not itself agree to refrain from seeking an injunction, if licensing negotiations extended beyond a reasonable period, and the like) worked against it.  While the DOJ applauds Apple’s and Microsoft’s statements “that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals’ products form the market”, it views Google’s commitments as “less clear”.  The DOJ thus “continues to have concerns about the potential inappropriate use of [standards-essential patents] to disrupt competition”.

Its worth reading the DOJ’s press release on this point — specifically, that while the DOJ found that none of the three transactions itself raised competitive concerns or was substantially likely to lessen the competition, the DOJ expressed general concerns about the relationship between these firms’ market positions and ability to use the threat of injunctive relief to hold up rivals:

Apple’s and Google’s substantial share of mobile platforms makes it more likely that as the owners of additional SEPs they could hold up rivals, thus harming competition and innovation.  For example, Apple would likely benefit significantly through increased sales of its devices if it could exclude Android-based phones from the market or raise the costs of such phones through IP-licenses or patent litigation.  Google could similarly benefit by raising the costs of, or excluding, Apple devices because of the revenues it derives from Android-based devices. The specific transactions at issue, however, are not likely to substantially lessen competition.  The evidence shows that Motorola Mobility has had a long and aggressive history of seeking to capitalize on its intellectual property and has been engaged in extended disputes with Apple, Microsoft and others.  As Google’s acquisition of Motorola Mobility is unlikely to materially alter that policy, the division concluded that transferring ownership of the patents would not substantially alter current market dynamics.  This conclusion is limited to the transfer of ownership rights and not the exercise of those transferred rights. With respect to Apple/Novell, the division concluded that the acquisition of the patents from CPTN, formerly owned by Novell, is unlikely to harm competition.  While the patents Apple would acquire are important to the open source community and to Linux-based software in particular, the OIN, to which Novell belonged, requires its participating patent holders to offer a perpetual, royalty-free license for use in the “Linux-system.”  The division investigated whether the change in ownership would permit Apple to avoid OIN commitments and seek royalties from Linux users.  The division concluded it would not, a conclusion made easier by Apple’s commitment to honor Novell’s OIN licensing commitments. In its analysis of the transactions, the division took into account the fact that during the pendency of these investigations, Apple, Google and Microsoft each made public statements explaining their respective SEP licensing practices.  Both Apple and Microsoft made clear that they will not seek to prevent or exclude rivals’ products from the market in exercising their SEP rights.

What’s problematic about a competition enforcement agency extracting promises not to enforce lawfully obtained property rights during merger review, outside the formal consent process, and in transactions that do not raise competitive concerns themselves?  For starters, the DOJ’s expression about competitive concerns about “hold up” obfuscate an important issue.  In Rambus the D.C. Circuit clearly held that not all forms of what the DOJ describes here as patent holdup violate the antitrust laws in the first instance.  Both appellate courts discussion patent holdup as an antitrust violation have held the patent holder must deceptively induce the SSO to adopt the patented technology.  Rambus makes clear — as I’ve discussed — that a firm with lawfully acquired monopoly power who merely raises prices does not violate the antitrust laws.  The proposition that all forms of patent holdup are antitrust violations is dubious.  For an agency to extract concessions that go beyond the scope of the antitrust laws at all, much less through merger review of transactions that do not raise competitive concerns themselves, raises serious concerns.

Here is what the DOJ says about Google’s commitment:

If adhered to in practice, these positions could significantly reduce the possibility of a hold up or use of an injunction as a threat to inhibit or preclude innovation and competition. Google’s commitments have been less clear.  In particular, Google has stated to the IEEE and others on Feb. 8, 2012, that its policy is to refrain from seeking injunctive relief for the infringement of SEPs against a counter-party, but apparently only for disputes involving future license revenues, and only if the counterparty:  forgoes certain defenses such as challenging the validity of the patent; pays the full disputed amount into escrow; and agrees to a reciprocal process regarding injunctions.  Google’s statement therefore does not directly provide the same assurance as the other companies’ statements concerning the exercise of its newly acquired patent rights.  Nonetheless, the division determined that the acquisition of the patents by Google did not substantially lessen competition, but how Google may exercise its patents in the future remains a significant concern.

No doubt the DOJ statement is accurate and the DOJ’s concerns about patent holdup are genuine.  But that’s not the point.

The question of the appropriate role for injunctions and damages in patent infringement litigation is a complex one.  While many scholars certainly argue that the use of injunctions facilitates patent hold up and threatens innovation.  There are serious debates to be had about whether more vigorous antitrust enforcement of the contractual relationships between patent holders and standard setting organization (SSOs) would spur greater innovation.   The empirical evidence suggesting patent holdup is a pervasive problem is however, at best, quite mixed.  Further, others argue that the availability of injunctions is not only a fundamental aspect of our system of property rights, but also from an economic perspective, that the power of the injunctions facilitates efficient transacting by the parties.  For example, some contend that the power to obtain injunctive relief for infringement within the patent thicket results in a “cold war” of sorts in which the threat is sufficient to induce cross-licensing by all parties.  Surely, this is not first best.  But that isn’t the relevant question.

There are other more fundamental problems with the notion of patent holdup as an antitrust concern.  Kobayashi & Wright also raise concerns with the theoretical case for antitrust enforcement of patent holdup on several grounds.  One is that high probability of detection of patent holdup coupled with antitrust’s treble damages makes overdeterrence highly likely.  Another is that alternative remedies such as contract and the patent doctrine of equitable estoppel render the marginal benefits of antitrust enforcement trivial or negative in this context.  Froeb, Ganglmair & Werden raise similar points.   Suffice it to say that the debate on the appropriate scope of antitrust enforcement in patent holdup is ongoing as a general matter; there is certainly no consensus with regard to economic theory or empirical evidence that stripping the availability of injunctive relief from patent holders entering into contractual relationships with SSOs will enhance competition or improve consumer welfare.  It is quite possible that such an intervention would chill competition, participation in SSOs, and the efficient contracting process potentially facilitated by the availability of injunctive relief.

The policy debate I describe above is an important one.  Many of the questions at the center of that complex debate are not settled as a matter of economic theory, empirics, or law.  This post certainly has no ambitions to resolve them here; my goal is a much more modest one.  The DOJs policymaking efforts through the merger review process raise serious issues.  I would hope that all would agree — regardless of where they stand on the patent holdup debate — that the idea that these complex debates be hammered out in merger review at the DOJ because the DOJ happens to have a number of cases involving patent portfolios is a foolish one for several reasons.

First, it is unclear the DOJ could have extracted these FRAND concessions through proper merger review.  The DOJ apparently agreed that the transactions did not raise serious competitive concerns.   The pressure imposed by the DOJ upon the parties to make the commitments to the SSOs not to pursue injunctive relief as part of a FRAND commitment outside of the normal consent process raises serious concerns.  The imposition of settlement conditions far afield from the competitive consequences of the merger itself is something we do see from antitrust enforcement agencies in other countries quite frequently, but this sort of behavior burns significant reputational capital with the rest of the world when our agencies go abroad to lecture on the importance of keeping antitrust analysis consistent, predictable, and based upon the economic fundamentals of the transaction at hand.

Second, the DOJ Antitrust Division does not alone have comparative advantage in determining the optimal use of injunctions versus damages in the patent system.

Third, appearances here are quite problematic.  Given that the DOJ did not appear to have significant competitive concerns with the transactions, one can create the following narrative of events without too much creative effort: (1) the DOJ team has theoretical priors that injunctive relief is a significant competitive problem, (2) the DOJ happens to have these mergers in front of it pending review from a couple of firms likely to be repeat players in the antitrust enforcement game, (3) the DOJ asks the firms to make these concessions despite the fact that they have little to do with the conventional antitrust analysis of the transactions, under which they would have been approved without condition.

The more I think about the use of the merger review process to extract concessions from patent holders in the form of promises not to enforce property rights which they would otherwise be legally entitled to, the more the DOJ’s actions appear inappropriate.  The stakes are high here both in terms of identifying patent and competition rules that will foster rather than hamper innovation, but also with respect to compromising the integrity of merger review through the imposition of non-merger related conditions we are more akin to seeing from the FCC, states, or less well-developed antitrust regimes.

[Cross posted at Truth on the Market]

Today the Federal Trade Commission released a new report entitled, “Mobile Apps for Kids: Current Privacy Disclosures Are Disappointing,” which concludes that “confusing and hard-to-find disclosures do not give parents the control that they need in this area. The FTC argues that “parents need consistent, easily accessible, and recognizable disclosures regarding in-app purchase capabilities so that they can make informed decisions about whether to allow their children to use apps with such capabilities.”

It’s hard to be against the FTC’s “the more disclosure, the better” policy recommendation and I’m not about to come out against it here. But the question is: how much disclosure is enough? Reading through the report and seeing how hard the FTC hammers this point home makes me think the agency wants our app store checkout process to be littered with the pages of fine print disclosure policies that now accompany our credit card statements and home mortgage payments! Seriously, would that make us better off?

As a parent of two kids who both download countless apps on my Android phone, my wife’s iPhone, and our family’s Android tablet, I appreciate a certain amount of disclosure about what sort of information apps are collecting and how they are using it. I think Google’s Android marketplace strikes a nice balance here, providing us with the most crucial facts about what the application will access or share. Apple could do more on disclosure but the company also prides itself (to the dismay of some!) on its rigorous pre-screening process to make sure the apps in the App Store are safe and don’t violate certain privacy and security policies. Yet, as the FTC correctly points out, “the details of this screening process are not clear.” Of course, most Apple users simply don’t give a damn. They’re all too happy to let Apple just take care of it for them even if they’re not really sure what’s happening to their data behind the scenes. The more privacy-sensitive crowd wants greater disclosure and control, of course, and I’m sympathetic to that plea.  But again, how much disclosure is enough? Are you going to wade through pages of disclosure policies and privacy opt-ins before downloading that latest iteration of “Angry Birds” or “Cut the Rope”? Yeah, I didn’t think so.

Anyway, I don’t want to dwell on that. The more interested findings in the survey relate to price and market dynamics and I am hoping people don’t ignore them. After surveying the price of kids’ apps available in the Android Market and Apple App Store, the agency found that, “While prices ranged from free to $9.99, most of the 960 app store promotion pages listed a price of $0.99 or less. Indeed, 77% of the apps in the survey listed an install price of $0.99 or less, and 48% were free.  Free apps appeared to be the most frequently downloaded.” Here’s the pricing breakdown for both Android and Apple:

Folks, these are astonishing numbers. Almost 100% of the most downloaded kids apps in the Android Market are free… as in ZERO dollars and ZERO cents! And while Apple App Store prices tend to be a bit higher, 93% of apps are $2 or less.  This is one of the great consumer success stories of our time. Consumer welfare is vastly enhanced by the presence of hundred of kids apps that serve almost every interest and desire under the sun, and all for less than what you’d pay for a cup of coffee or a gallon of gas.

But wait, there’s more!!

This incredible success story is even more remarkable because of what the FTC finds next about market structure:

Staff found that hundreds of developers were responsible for the apps in the study. Staff encountered 441 unique developers in this study, only twelve of which had apps on both platforms. Only a handful of app developers were responsible for more than 10 apps in our sample. Developers with one app in our sample were popular, accounting for about 50% of all downloads/feedback ratings, even though they were responsible for only about 30% of the apps. In contrast, those developers with more than 10 apps in our sample accounted for about 1% of the feedback ratings for Apple, (and 20% of the downloads for Android) despite accounting for about 20% of all of the apps in the survey. This finding illustrates the broad and diverse nature of the mobile app marketplace.

“Broad and diverse marketplace,” you say?  That might be the understatement of the year!  I challenge you to find another part of not just our online ecosystem but indeed our entire economy that is this broad, diverse, innovate, competitive, and inexpensive.  I’m not sure that such a radically atomistic, mom-and-pop marketplace of entrepreneurs can last forever, but let’s pause and appreciate the fact that it does exist today.

Now, here’s the really interesting part of this story: This is generally what the world of kids’ online services looked like back in the late 1990s as well. It was incredibly diverse with lots of small mom-and-pop sites catering to kids and parents, often at no charge. And then along came COPPA. [Background here for those who are not familiar.] While COPPA helped address the legitimate problems a small handful of bad apples out there at the time created, it also raised serious compliance costs for that entire sector, including the many smaller mom-and-pop sites. In a letter send to the FTC back in 2005, child safety advocate Parry Aftab claimed that, “The cost of obtaining verifiable parental consent for interactive communications is very high, estimated at more than $45 per child, and even at that price difficult to obtain.” I have no idea how accurate that number was then (I think that was way too high of an estimate), or what the compliance cost per child was in the late 1990s, but let’s be conservative and say it was much smaller, perhaps less that a few bucks per child verified under COPPA.  And let’s assume that if we extended COPPA-like regulatory requirements to app stores that there would be some compliance cost. Again, even if the compliance cost was only a buck per kid, can you see how it devastating that would be to all the small mom-and-pop app developers out there who currently only get a dollar or two for their apps (assuming they charge anything at all)? Yes, it’s true that some of them use ads to offset their costs, but those ads have to pick up the tab for all their labor and development costs.  If you add new regulatory compliance costs to the mix, those mom-and-pop developers will be hit very hard. And then we will have far fewer of them. And the ones that remain will likely charge us more than the couple of bucks we pay per app today.

Further, even if the compliance cost per child gets down to a few cents (or tens of cents) per kid for large operators, it’s probably much higher for smaller operators. In other words, most of the costs here are fixed (hiring an extra employee, having lawyers review your policy, etc.), not marginal (the cost of verifying each additional kid), so it’s really hard to say what the real costs are. And with Apple and Google also taking a cut of the apps sold in the market, you really begin to see how adding on any additional compliance costs could hit the bottom lines of smaller app developers in a big way. When margins are this thin, burdensome regulatory mandates hurt even more. And sometimes they can drive you right out of business.

Which brings us back to the FTC’s role here. It’s clear that the consumer protection side of the agency has an important role to play here when it comes to ensuring consumers are better informed about data collection practices and corresponding privacy issues. But let’s not forget that the FTC was originally created as a competition agency. It’s supposed to care about market structure, competition, and consumer welfare. So, I wonder… are the folks in the FTC’s Bureau of Economics paying any attention to what their colleague are doing here? Because if we start layering on privacy regulations, all the good intentions in the world won’t be able to hold back the likely contraction and consolidation of this vibrant industry that will take place as small mom-and-pops struggle to absorb new regulatory burdens and compliance costs.

Something to think about before regulatory intervention drives up consumers prices and drives out of the market the countless entrepreneurs that make this sector so exciting–especially for parents and kids.

On NPR’s Marketplace this morning, I talk about net neutrality litigation with host John Moe.

Nearly a year after the FCC passed controversial new “Open Internet” rules by a 3-2 vote, the White House finally gave approval for the rules to be published last week, unleashing lawsuits from both supporters and detractors.

The supporters don’t have any hope or expectation of getting a court to make the rules more comprehensive.  So why sue?  When lawsuits challenging federal regulations are filed in multiple appellate courts, a lottery determines which court hears a consolidated appeal.

So lawsuits by net neutrality supporters are a procedural gimmick, an effort to take cases challenging the FCC’s authority out of the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, which has already made clear the FCC has no legal basis here.

But Verizon’s lawsuit challenges the rules as material changes to existing licenses for spectrum, a challenge that is exclusive to the D.C. Circuit.  If the D.C. Circuit agrees that the rules can be challenged under that provision of the law, then the case stays in D.C..

Beyond the procedure, the substance of Verizon’s challenge will be formidable.  In the 2010 Comcast case, the court eviscerated the FCC’s argument that various provisions of the Communications Act give them the authority to police broadband providers.

And the Open Internet order largely repeated those arguments, a sure sign that the agency really doesn’t expect to win here.  The December vote was largely symbolic, fulfilling an Obama campaign promise to codify net neutrality and moving the noisy and messy proceeding from the agency to the courts.

The real issue here is convergence.  In 1996, when the Communications Act was last overhauled, the commercial use of the Internet was in its infancy.  Broadcast TV, radio, telephone, cable, mobile and data services were still separate technologies, and the 1996 Act gave the FCC separate and different authority over each.  For the Internet, the agency got next to no authority.

In the 15 years since President Clinton signed the 1996 act, of course, the world of communications has been revolutionized by the Internet and broadband.  The FCC’s traditional regulatory subjects have largely converged onto the TCP/IP protocol, generating a flowering of innovation and new devices and services.  Cable providers are phone companies, phone companies are content providers, and computer companies such as Apple and Google are, well, everything.

Consumers are living in a golden age of communications, but the agency has been left with little to oversee.  Wireline voice has become an unprofitable and shrinking business as consumers cut the cord.  The audience for broadcast TV is getting older and smaller at a rapid pace.  This term, the Supreme Court is likely to slap the agency again for its Victorian sensibilities with regard to TV and radio content censorship.

Perhaps Congress will someday decide that broadband services require the kind of oversight and micromanagement the FCC once had over traditional forms of communication.  Then again, wiser heads may take note of the success of the Internet in a world without much regulation, and decide to leave well enough alone.  Perhaps a great overhaul of communications law will clear the decks altogether, creating a single body of law for the converged industries.

Who can say?  But in the meantime, the FCC can’t simply grant itself new authority to regulate.  Regardless of the sincerity of its belief that “prophylactic” rules to preserve the Open Internet are important, federal agencies can’t regulate without Congressional authorization.  Whether in the courts or in Congress itself, the net neutrality rules will be struck down, first and foremost because the FCC had no power to enact them.

For Forbes this morning, I reflect on the publication late last week of the FCC’s “Open Internet” or net neutrality rules and their impact on spectrum auctions past and future.  Hint:  not good.

An important study last year by Prof. Faulhaber and Prof. Farber, former chief economist and chief technologist, respectively, for the FCC, found that the last-minute imposition of net neutrality limits on the 700 MHz “C” block in the FCC’s 2008 auction reduced the winning bid by 60%–a few billion dollars for the Treasury.

Yet the FCC maintained in the December Report and Order approving similar rules for all broadband providers that the cost impact of these “prophylactic” rules would be minimal, because, after all, they simply endorse practices most providers already follow.  (And the need for the new rules, then, came from where?)

In response to oral and written questions directed at the agency by Congress over the course of the last ten months (while the White House mysteriously held up publication of the new rules), the agency maintained with a straight face that a detailed cost-benefit analysis of the new rules was part of the rulemaking.  But the Chairman seems unable to identify a single paragraph in the majority’s 200-page report where that analysis can be found.

Well, but perhaps bidders in the 2008 auction misjudged the potential negative impact of the new rules on their ability to best utilize the C block.  Perhaps a 60% reduction in bid price was an overreaction to the neutrality limits.  Perhaps, but not likely.  Already, Verizon, which won the auction and is using the spectrum for its state-of-the-art 4G LTE service, has been hit with a truly frivolous complaint from Free Press regarding Google’s refusal to allow software that tethers Android phones to other devices to share the network connection.

And there were rumblings earlier this year in WIRED that curated app stores would also violate the “no blocking” provision in the C block auction (provisions, recall, that were added at the request of Google as a condition of their participating in the auction).  If that were true, then Verizon could never offer an iPhone on the LTE network.  A definite and pointless limit to the value of the C block…for consumers most of all.

These seem like complaints unlikely to go anywhere, but then again who knows?  Even prevailing in FCC adjudications takes time, money, and uncertainty.  Investors don’t like that.  And the new net neutrality rules make complaining even easier, as I noted earlier this year.

So the impact of the net neutrality rules, should they survive Congressional and legal challenges, will be to reduce incentives for broadband carriers to continue investing in their networks.  It won’t stop them, obviously.  But it will surely slow them down.  By how much?  Well, as much as 60%, apparently.  And given that the major facilities-based carriers spend around $20 billion a year in network investments, even a few percentage points of uncertainty translate into real losses.

Balanced out by which benefits, exactly?  Oh right–these are “prophylactic” rules.  So the benefits aren’t knowable.  Until the future.  Maybe.

If reduced investment wasn’t a bad enough result, there’s a deeper and more deeply disturbing lesson of last year’s Net Neutrality free-for-all.  The FCC, an “expert agency,” has become increasingly political.  Its experts are being run over by operative inside and outside the agency with an agenda that lives outside the agency’s expertise, trumping traditional independent values of costs and benefits, and of applying scarce resources to their best and highest use.

That may be one reason Congress has yet to move forward with pending legislation granting the agency authority to conduct Voluntary Incentive Auctions, and why the draft legislation tries to curb the flexibility the agency has if it does get the new authority.

Flexibility, after all, cost the taxpayers a small fortune in the 2008 auction.  And it led to conditions being placed on the license that aren’t helping anyone, and which may keep consumers from getting what all but a few loudmouths genuinely value.

A rulemaking whose goal was to “preserve” the Open Internet may wind up having the opposite result.  The joke, unfortunately, is on mobile users.

For CNET this morning, I offer five crucial corrections to the Protect IP Act, which was passed out of committee in the Senate back in May.

Yesterday, Rep. Bob Goodlatte, co-chair of the Congressional Internet Caucus, told a Silicon Valley audience that the House was working on its own version and would introduce it in the next few weeks.

Protect IP would extend efforts to combat copyright infringement and trademark abuse online, especially by websites registered outside the U.S.

Since Goodlatte promised the new bill would be “quite different” from the Senate version, I thought it a good time to get out my red pen and start crossing off the worst mistakes in policy and in drafting in Protect IP.

The full details are in the article, but in brief, here’s what I hope the House does in its version:

1. Drop provisions that tamper with the DNS system in an effort to block U.S. access to banned sites.
2. Drop provisions that tamper with search engines, indices, and any other linkage to banned sites.
3. Remove a private right of action that would allow copyright and trademark holders to obtain court orders banning ad networks and financial transaction processors from doing business with banned sites.
4. Scale back current enforcement abuses by the Department of Homeland Security under the existing PRO-IP Act of 2008.
5. Focus the vague and overinclusive definition of the kind of websites that can be banned, limiting it to truly criminal enterprises.

As I’ve written elsewhere, the Senate version was in some ways even worse than last year’s COICA bill.  It imposes significant costs on innocent Internet users, and would do so with no corresponding benefits to anyone, including rightsholders.

The best thing the House could do would be to ignore this dud and work instead on reforming the broken copyright system.  That would do the most to correct the imbalance in endless copyrights and a shrinking public domain, eliminating much of the incentive for infringement that exists today.

But short of that, I hope at least that the most dangerous provisions are removed.

In my work critiquing the Lessig-Zittrain-Wu school of thinking–which fears the decline and fall of online “openness” and digital  “generativity”–I have argued that, while there is no such thing as perfect “openness,” things are actually getting more open and generative all the time. All that really counts from my perspective is that we are witnessing healthy innovation across the generativity continuum.

Will some devices and platforms continue to be “closed”? Sure. Think Apple and cable set-top boxes. But (a) there’s a ton of innovation taking place on top of those supposedly “closed” platforms and (b) there are other options consumers can exercise if they don’t like those content /information delivery methods. [See this chapter from the Next Digital Decade book for my fuller critique.]

And, even if one adopts a rigid Zittrainian view of openness and generativity, each day seems to bring more good news. From that perspective it’s hard to find a better headline than this one: ” Smartphone Makers Bow to Demands for More Openness.” That’s from ArsTechnica today and it refers to the fact that smartphone giant HTC just announced it would no longer attempt to lock the bootloader on its smartphones, meaning geeks like me can root and hack their devices to their heart’s content. As the Ars story notes:

HTC has long been seen as a relatively modder-friendly phone manufacturer. Although many of their phones have had locked bootloaders, workarounds were easy enough for software developers to spot in order to gain superuser access to their phones. That changed recently, however, when modders discovered that two new Android phones—the HTC Sensation and Evo 3D—would come with software that prohibited bypassing locked bootloaders. “The system was locked but exploitable before,” Android enthusiast Irwin Proud told Wired.com in an interview. “Suddenly they required signature checks,” or digital verification of software that allows it to load. An Android activist, Proud has organized online campaigns to fight against locked-down phone releases. After hearing this, the modding community wasn’t happy. Users launched WakeUpHTC.com, a website which gave upset modders all of HTC’s contact info, encouraging them to bombard the company with requests for a change in its bootloader policy. On Thursday, the company relented.

Here’s specifically what HTC’s CEO Peter Chou had to say in a Facebook post:

“There has been overwhelmingly customer feedback that people want access to open bootloaders on HTC phones. I want you to know that we’ve listened. Today, I’m confirming we will no longer be locking the bootloaders on our devices. Thanks for your passion, support and patience.”

Now that’s what I call a Zittrainian success story! Markets and public pressure prevailed and led to more openness and generativity in the purest sense of the terms.

I suppose that some will still worry and retort that “well, the carriers might still try to lock down the devices.” That story might have been more believable five years ago but the new reality of the smartphone world today is that the OS and app makers now hold most of the cards. Carriers are practically giving away the store (literally!) as they rush to get the latest and greatest phones and operating systems from the likes of Apple, Google, Microsoft, HTC, Motorola, LG, and so on.  This is amazingly dynamic ecosystem with multiple layers of innovation and competition.

I don’t think there’s any way the generativity genie could be put back in the bottle at this point. Too many people want tinker-friendly devices and more “open” platforms.  Of course, it’s also true that some devices will remain somewhat more locked-down to ensure “stability” or simplicity for those users who desire it. But what’s wrong with that? Shouldn’t they have that choice? Again, it’s the innovation across the full range of devices and platforms that is so important and impressive in this case. That’s all we should really care about. Finally, if goes without saying that even the most heavily fortified security can be broken when determined people try hard enough.

I hope Zittrain, Wu, and Lessig appreciate this and that they and others acknowledge these beneficial developments so that we can avoid foolish calls to regulate this healthy information ecosystem. These guys should declare victory and pop the champagne. The vision they favor is prevailing.

This morning, the Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on Privacy, Technology, and the Law had a hearing entitled: “Protecting Mobile Privacy: Your Smartphones, Tablets, Cell Phones and Your Privacy.” It was a remarkably scattered affair, and I blogged three key—and very distinct—elements of it on the Cato@Liberty blog:

• The Department of Justice used this “mobile privacy” hearing to call for increased surveillance of Internet and mobile phone users.
• To escape a prosecutorial dead-end, Senator Blumenthal (D-CT) strongly suggested that he would outlaw the collection of radio signals. Where this government power would lead is quite profound.
• Ignoring mobile privacy, Senator Schumer (D-NY) touted his hobby-horse, mobile app censorship.

Valid concerns with what mobile operating system providers Google and Apple have done with location information were somewhat lost in this disjointed and confused hearing.

I spaced out and completely forget to post a link here to my latest Forbes column which came out over the weekend.  It’s a look at back at last week’s hullabaloo over “Apple, The iPhone, and a Locational Privacy Techno-Panic.” In it, I argue:

Some of the concerns raised about the retention of locational data are valid. But panic, prohibition and a “privacy precautionary principle” that would preemptively block technological innovation until government regulators give their blessings are not valid answers to these concerns. The struggle to conceptualize and protect privacy rights should be an evolutionary and experimental process, not one micro-managed at every turn by regulation.

I conclude the piece by noting that:

Public pressure and market norms also encourage companies to correct bone-headed mistakes like the locational info retained by Apple.  But we shouldn’t expect less data collection or less “tracking” any time soon.  Information powers the digital economy, and we must learn to assimilate new technology into our lives.

Read the rest here. And if you missed essay Larry Downes posted here on the same subject last week, make sure to check it out.

I’ve written a long article this morning for CNET (See “Privacy panic debate:  Whose data is it?”) on the discovery of the iPhone location tracking file and the utterly predictable panic response that followed.  Its life-cycle follows precisely the crisis model Adam Thierer has so frequently and eloquently traced, most recently here on TLF.

In particular, the CNET article takes a close and serious look at Richard Thaler’s column in Saturday’s New York Times, “Show us the data.  (It’s ours, after all.)” Thaler uses the iPhone scare as occassion to propose a regulatory fix to the “problem” of users being unable to access in “computer-friendly form” copies of the information “collected on” them by merchants. 

That information, Thaler assumes, is a discreet kind of property and must, since it refers to customer behavior, be the sole property of the customer, “lent” to the merchant and reclaimable at any time.

Information can certainly be treated as if it were property, and often is under law.  Personally, I don’t find the property metaphor to be the most useful in dealing with intangibles, but if you’re going to go there you need to understand the economics of how information behaves in ways very different to physical property.  (See my chapter on the subject in “The Next Digital Decade.”)

Thaler’s “proposed rule” is wrong on the facts (he doesn’t seem to know how cell phone bills really look, and he certainly doesn’t understand how supermarket club cards operate–and these are his leading examples of the “problem”), wrong on the law, and even wrong on the business and economics.  (Other than that, it’s a pretty good article!)

This kind of intellectual frivolity is par for the course with many academic economists.  Thaler is at the University of Chicago’s business school, and describes himself as an economist and behavioral scientist.  That means instead of throwing around calculus all day, he devises toy experiments with a few subjects–or reads the findings of other behavioral scientists who have done the same.

Not only is the article bad privacy policy, it’s bad economics.  The latter is certainly the more serious concern.  Nearly 70 years after Ronald Coase called on economists to put down the pencil and paper methods and do actual empirical research in how markets actually work, the profession has if anything become more insular.  There are exceptions, of course, but they stand out in a field of mediocrity.

Which is too bad.  We need good economists now, more than ever.

There’s a nice piece of reporting from Ian Shapira in today’s Washington Post entitled, “Once the Hobby of Tech Geeks, iPhone Jailbreaking Now a Lucrative Industry.” In the article, Shapira documents the rise of independent, unauthorized Apple apps (especially tethering apps) and points out that what was once a small black market has now turned into a booming, maturing business sector in its own right.  In fact, Sharpia notes, there are already “market leaders” in the field:

At the top of the jailbreaking hierarchy sits Jay Freeman, 29, the founder and operator of Cydia, the biggest unofficial iPhone app store, which offers about 700 paid designs and other modifications out of about 30,000 others that are free. Based out of an office near Santa Barbara, Calif., Freeman said Cydia, launched in 2008, now earns about $250,000 after taxes in profit annually. He just hired his first full-time employee from Delicious, the Yahoo-owned bookmarking site, to improve Cydia’s design. “The whole point is to fight against the corporate overlord,” Freeman said. “This is grass-roots movement, and that’s what makes Cydia so interesting. Apple is this ivory tower, a controlled experience, and the thing that really bought people into jailbreaking is that it makes the experience theirs.”

In another sign this black market is now going mainstream, advertisers are apparently flocking to it:

In what might be the ultimate sign that the jailbreak industry is losing its anti-establishment character, Toyota recently offered a free program on Cydia’s store, promoting the company’s Scion sedan. Once installed, the car is displayed on the background of the iPhone home screen, and the iPhone icons are re-fashioned to look like the emblem on the front grill.

Interestingly, however, some people now complain that Cydia is getting too big for its britches and has come to be “as domineering as Apple is in the non-jailbreak world.”  What delicious irony! Yet, I do not for one minute believe that Cydia has any sort of “lock” on the “unlocking” marketplace. This is an insanely dynamic sector that is subject to near-constant fits of disruptive technological change.

Anyway, I feel a bit vindicated when I read articles like Shapira’s since I have spent the last few years pushing back against the theories set forth by various scholars, such as Jonathan Zittrain and Tim Wu, who claim that online openness or “generativity” are dying.  They often cite Apple as the big, bad boogeyman of closed code and claim that Steve Jobs is hellbent on destroying digital generativity and the open Internet as we know it.

Of course, it is certainly true that Jobs and Apple prefer a more “closed” model that grants them more control over their products, such as the iPhone and iPad. And they make some good arguments why a certain amount of control is a good thing. It helps to have a more standardized platform for developers, for example, by avoiding fragmentation. A certain degree of control can also help to crack down on malicious apps in the App Store. And without a certain amount of control it becomes hard to honor warranties when phones or apps break.

Despite those excuses, Apple is still just a bit too domineering for some of us.  I don’t own any of their products.  Never have; never will. If it’s not tinker-friendly right out of the box, it’s just not for me.  I cannot even begin to count how many times I have rooted and installed new ROMs on my Droid OG.  (Thank You CyanogenMod!) And I bricked my last Windows Mobile 6 phone after repeated hacking.

And, yet, Apple is still wildly successful and has millions of extremely happy customers who — for reasons that still boggle my mind — are willing to line up in the wee hours of the cold morning around the block in front Apple Stores to get their hands on the latest goodies the company has to offer.  (Seriously, what is wrong with you people!)

But this gets back to the point I have reiterated in my debates with Zittrain, Wu, and the other “openness evangelicals”: Even if I share their general love of more “open” and “generative” platforms or devices, there’s no reason to be nearly as worried as they are about them “dying.”  And there’s certainly no need for drastic action, especially of a regulatory nature, to work this out.  The market for openness is working marvelously. Innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the “open” vs. “closed” continuum. Moreover, there certainly isn’t any shortage of digital “generativity” taking place on both open and closed platforms today. Again, even though Jobs and Apple try to control their platform and App Store, some amazingly generative things are happening there every day and consumers absolutely adore their Apple devices.

Anyway, I discussed all these issues in much greater detail in my chapter on “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters,” which was included in the book, The Next Digital Decade: Essays on the Future of the Internet (2011). Simply stated, things are getting more open all the time and there’s just no putting the generativity genie back in the bottle.  Here’s a short section that appears on page 149 of the book related to the issues discussed here:

______________________

Things Are Getting More Open All the Time Anyway

Most corporate attempts to bottle up information or close off their platforms end badly.  The walled gardens of the past failed miserably.  In critiquing Zittrain’s book, Ann Bartow has noted that “if Zittrain is correct that CompuServe and America Online (AOL) exemplify the evils of tethering, it’s pretty clear the market punished those entities pretty harshly without Internet governance-style interventions.”^[1] Indeed, let’s not forget that AOL was the big, bad corporate boogeyman of Lessig’s Code and yet, just a decade later, it has been relegated to an also-ran in the Internet ecosystem.

There are few reasons to believe that today’s efforts to build such walled gardens would end much differently.  Indeed, increasingly when companies or coders erect walls of any sort, holes form quickly. For example, it usually doesn’t take long for a determined group of hackers to find ways around copy/security protections and “root” or “jailbreak” phones and other devices.^[2] Once hacked, users are usually then able to configure their devices or applications however they wish, effectively thumbing their noses at the developers.   This process tends to unfold in a matter of just days, even hours, after the release of a new device or operating system.

Number of Days Before New Devices Were “Rooted” or “Jailbroken” ^[3]

Of course, not every user will make the effort—or take the risk^[4]—to hack their devices in this fashion, even once instructions are widely  available for doing so.  Nonetheless, even if copyright law might sometimes seek to restrict it, the hacking option still exists for those who wish to exercise it.  Moreover, because many manufacturers know their devices are likely to be hacked, they are increasingly willing to make them more “open” right out of the gates or offer more functionality/flexibility to make users happy

[1] Bartow, supra note 17 at 1088, www.michiganlawreview.org/assets/pdfs/108/6/bartow.pdf

[2] “In living proof that as long as there’s a thriving geek fan culture for a device, it will never be long for the new version to be jailbroken: behold iOS 4.1. Most people are perfectly willing to let their devices do the talking for them, accept what’s given, and just run sanctioned software. But there are those intrepid few—who actually make up a fairly notable portion of the market—who want more out of their devices and find ways around the handicaps built into them by the manufacturers.” Kit Dotson, New iOS for Apple TV Firmware Released, Promptly Decrypted, SiliconAngle, Sept. 28, 2010, http://siliconangle.com/blog/2010/09/28/new-ios-for-apple-tv-firmware-released-promptly-decrypted

[3] Original research conducted by author and Adam Marcus based on news reports.

[4] Rooting or jailbreaking a smartphone creates the risk of “bricking” the device—rendering it completely inoperable (and thus no more useful than a brick). Additionally, hacking devices in this fashion typically voids any manufacturer warranty.

The New York Times reports that, “Facebook is hoping to do something better and faster than any other technology start-up-turned-Internet superpower. Befriend Washington. Facebook has layered its executive, legal, policy and communications ranks with high-powered politicos from both parties, beefing up its firepower for future battles in Washington and beyond.”  The article goes on to cite a variety of recent hires by Facebook, its new DC office, and its increased political giving.

This isn’t at all surprising and, in one sense, it’s almost impossible to argue with the logic of Facebook deciding to beef up its lobbying presence inside the Beltway. In fact, later in the Times story we hear the same two traditional arguments trotted out for why Facebook must do so: (1) Because everyone’s doing it! and (2) You don’t want be Microsoft, do you?   But I’m not so sure whether “normalizing relations” with Washington is such a good idea for Facebook or other major tech companies, and I’m certainly not persuaded by the logic of those two common refrains regarding why every tech company must rush to Washington.

In an essay I penned for the Cato Institute last November entitled “The Sad State of Cyber-Politics,” I reiterated arguments made a decade earlier by two brilliant men: Cypress Semiconductor CEO T. J. Rodgers and the late great Milton Friedman. Rodgers penned a prescient manifesto for Cato in 2000 with the provocative title: “Why Silicon Valley Should Not Normalize Relations with Washington, D.C.” in which he argued that, “The political scene in Washington is antithetical to the core values that drive our success in the international marketplace and risks converting entrepreneurs into statist businessmen.” A year earlier, Friedman penned another Cato essay called “The Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse” in which he lamented the persistent propensity of companies to persecute one’s competitors using regulation or the threat thereof. What both men stressed was that coming to Washington has a tendency to change a company’s focus and disposition, and not for the better — if you believe in real capitalism, that is, and not the abominable crony capitalism fostered by Washington.

But few in the high-tech world have listened to this logic, especially when the whole rest of the world was falling all over themselves to open a Washington, DC office first in an effort to cover their butts from regulatory encroachments and then later to figure out how the wield the hammer of Big Government to their corporate advantage. I documented numerous examples of the latter in my Cato essay.

I’m not saying that the folks at Facebook are going to be looking to screw over their competitors right away. In fact, I can’t currently think of any examples of how they might.  The company is still firmly in that “cover your butt” period that is common when a hot new digital innovator first comes to DC.  And I certainly can’t blame them for wanting to push back against many misguided forms of Internet regulation, such as free speech controls or heavy-handed privacy regulation.  But I fear there will come a day when they fall in line with many other high-tech companies and trade associations and seek to turn the regulatory state to their advantage.  Only time will tell. And I certainly hope I am wrong.

Regardless, as the folks at Facebook and other high-tech firms ponder their future inside the Beltway, let me ask them to return to the two premises for “normalizing relations” that I cited above and explain why they are not exactly true:

Premise #1: Everyone’s doing it!  Most are, but not all. How active are Apple and Sony to name just two companies without a major DC presence?  Most days of the week, Steve Jobs seems to be giving DC a big middle finger. I’m the last guy in the world you’ll ever hear giving Apple much credit since I hate their products, but Jobs is about the closest thing you’ll find to an Ayn Rand character in Silicon Valley these days.  He seems to do exactly what he wants to build innovative products for consumers and, in the process, ignore all his critics, especially those in Washington. Of course, not everybody can be Steve Jobs in this regard, but I can’t help but wonder: Why don’t more of them try? What if high-tech entrepreneurs just told Washington to buzz off?

Premise #2: You don’t want be Microsoft, do you? The Times article says, “legal analysts say Facebook is hoping to avoid mistakes made by predecessors like Microsoft. And they say the company is becoming politically savvy earlier in its life than Google, whose connections were firmly established once Eric E. Schmidt, the chief executive, advised the Obama presidential campaign and the administration.”

I’ve never really bought into this argument. I think it’s pretty far-fetched to claim, as so many people in this field do, that if Microsoft would have just had a small army of lobbyists here on the ground back in the early 1990s that none of their antitrust problems would have popped up. And regarding Google coming to Washington in the hope of winning friends, well, how’s that working out for them?!  As I noted in my Cato essay:

Everybody — and I do mean everybody — wants Google dead, right now. Google currently serves as the Great Satan in this drama — taking over the role Microsoft filled a decade ago — as just about everyone views it with a combination of envy and enmity.

Indeed, no one could be happier about Facebook coming to town at this moment than Google!  They get to hand the “Great Satan” baton off to Facebook and wish them the best!  Of course, Google’s problems with Washington aren’t done by a long-shot, but I’m quite sure they’re relieved to see Facebook getting grilled more at hearings and events around town these days.

Anyway, in all seriousness, I’ll say the same thing to the fine folks in the Facebook DC office — several of whom I know well — that I’ve said to countless other tech companies here in the Beltway through the years: Stay true to the same principles that made your company so great to begin with.  It wasn’t Washington that built Facebook, or Google, or Microsoft, or any other high-tech innovators; it was entrepreneurial capitalism that did.  Free minds and free markets made the high-tech sector what it is today, not handouts and special favors from Washington. Stick to real capitalism; avoid the crony variety.