That’s all nice-sounding rhetoric but it sure doesn’t seem to match up with Hawley’s recent essays and policy proposals, which are straight out of the old era’s elitist and highly paternalistic Washington-Knows-Best playbook. Specifically, Hawley has called for a top-down, technocratic regulatory regime for the Internet and the digital economy more generally. Hawley has repeatedly made claims that digital technology companies have gotten a sweetheart deal from government and they they have censored conservative voices. That’s utter nonsense, but those arguments have driven his increasingly fanatic rhetoric and command-and-control policy proposals. If he succeeds in his plan to empower unelected bureaucrats inside the Beltway to reshape the Internet, it will destroy one of the greatest American success stories in recent memory. It’s hard to understand how that could be labelled “conservative” in any sense of the word.

I’ve been tracking Sen. Hawley’s increasingly radical plans for the digital economy in a series of essays, including:

• “Sen. Hawley’s Moral Panic Over Social Media“
• “How Conservatives Came to Favor the Fairness Doctrine & Net Neutrality“
• “The White House Social Media Summit and the Return of ‘Regulation by Raised Eyebrow’“
• “The Not-So-SMART Act“

In these articles, I have documented how Sen. Hawley has been whipping up a panic about digital technology companies and social media platforms to soften to ground for massive intervention by DC elites. Consider his hotly-worded USA Today op-ed from May in which he argued that, “social media wastes our time and resources,” and is “a field of little productive value” that have only “given us an addiction economy.” Sen. Hawley refers to sites like Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter as “parasites” and blames them for a litany of social problems (including an unproven link to increased suicide). He has even suggested that, “we’d be better off if Facebook disappeared” and seems to hope the same for other sites.

More insultingly, he has argued that the entire digital economy was basically one giant mistake. He says that America’s recent focus on growing the Internet and information technology sectors has “encouraged a generation of our brightest engineers to enter a field of little productive value,” which he regards as “an opportunity missed for the nation.” “What marvels might these bright minds have produced,” Hawley asks, “had they been oriented toward the common good?”

Again, this isn’t the sort of rhetoric that conservatives are usually known for. This is elitist, paternalistic tripe that we usually hear from market-hating neo-Marxists. It takes a lot of hubris for Sen. Hawley to suggest that he knows best which professions or sectors are in “the common good.” As I responded in one of my essays:

Had some benevolent philosopher kings in Washington stopped the digital economy from developing over the past quarter century, would all those tech workers really have chosen more noble-minded and worthwhile professions? Could he or others in Congress really have had the foresight to steer us in a better direction?

Why would Sen. Hawley think DC elites could do a better job centrally planning the economy? He doesn’t really tell us, instead preferring to fall back on conspiratorial rhetoric about evil “Big Tech” companies “censoring” conservatives voices. That’s the same card he played when he joined President Trump at the White House for the surreal, rambling “Social Media Summit” that took place last month. Trump used the same approach that Sen. Hawley and Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX) have been using during recently Senate Judiciary Committee hearings: brow-beat witnesses and make wild claims about the whole digital world being out to muzzle conservative voices. As Andrea O’Sullivan and I noted in our essay about the Social Media Summit:

The President and other conservatives are tapping another approach: indirect censorship through both subtle and direct threats. This is an old playbook that goes by many different names: “jawboning,” “administrative arm-twisting,” “agency threats,” and “regulation by raised eyebrow.” These were the names given to broadcast-era efforts to pressure old radio and TV outlets to bring their programming choices in line with the desires of politicians and bureaucrats.

This is an old DC playbook that elites have used for decades to “work the refs” and try to extract promises from various parties under threat of more far-reaching regulation if they fail to comply with the demands of politicians. Again, there’s nothing remotely “conservative” about it.

Brushing aside such concerns, Sen. Hawley has started sketching out what a comprehensive regulatory regime for the Internet and social media might look like. He does so in two new bills, the “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” (co-sponsored by Sen. Cruz) and the “Social Media Addiction Reduction Technology (SMART) Act.” These two measures, if implemented, would radically remake the digital economy and lead to a remarkably intrusive regulatory regime for online speech and commerce.

The ridiculously named “Ending Support for Internet Censorship Act” would actually encourage the exact opposite result than its title suggests. The proposal would mandate that regulators at the Federal Trade Commission evaluate whether platforms have engaged in “politically biased moderation,” which is defined as moderation practices that are supposedly, “designed to negatively affect” or those that “disproportionately [restrict] or promote access to … a political party, political candidate, or political viewpoint.” Social media providers would need to petition the FTC for “immunity certifications” to then get regular audits to ensure they are moderating content in a government-approved manner. If they didn’t, they would lose their platform liability protections, which could effectively run them out of business.

This is permission slip-based regulation and it makes the old Federal Communications Commission licensing regime for broadcast radio and television look like child’s play by comparison. Hawley’s “Mother, May I?” licensing scheme for the Net would have unelected FTC bureaucrats make speech decisions for the entire Internet. It’s a massive First Amendment violation, and it would almost certainly face constitutional challenge if implemented.

What makes this all the more shocking, as I noted in response, this measure combines core elements of the old Fairness Doctrine as well as “net neutrality” mandates that conservatives have traditionally decried. The bill would also empower insider-the-Beltway lawyers, lobbyists, and consultants, who would be needed to navigate the maze of red tape this measure would give rise to. Worst of all, the measure is a massive gift to the trial lawyers Republicans love to hate because Hawley’s new regulatory regime would empower them to file an endless string of frivolous suits aimed at simply shaking down companies through early settlements. Again, how is this “conservative”?

Then there’s Hawley’s new “SMART Act,” which as Andrea O’Sullivan and I argue in our latest essay is really quite stupid. The highly technocratic measure lists a variety of business practices that would be automatically verboten. As Andrea and I summarize:

On the chopping block are infinite scrolling, video autoplay, and “gamification” features like offering badges or streaks for accomplishing certain feats. The bill would also require that social media companies build default time limits and pop-up notifications telling users how long they’ve been on a platform within six months of the bill passing. Weirdly, the bill specifies a time limit of 30 minutes on all social media platforms on all devices per day, after which point they will be locked out. The user would be able to raise that limit through platform settings, but it would reset to 30 minutes at the beginning of each month.

Who would have ever thought we now be living in a world where conservatives are calling for paternalistic, Washington-knows-best nannyism that lets agency bureaucrats forcibly shut down your social media access each day after just 30 minutes of use? Hell, why stop there? Perhaps Sen. Hawley could next impose daily limits how many Netflix shows we stream, how many podcasts we listen to, or how much time we spend playing video games. After all, he clearly thinks he knows what is in our own best interest.

No matter how much Sen. Hawley rails against elites and big government, what he has been saying and proposing represent elitism and regulatory paternalism of the very highest order. He may say that “the old era is ending and the old ways will not do” in his speeches, but through his actions he has whole-hardheartedly embraced the old order. And while he can mouth lines about how “it’s time that we stood up to big government, to the people in government who think they know better,” and while he might claim that he is “for free competition [and] the free market,” in reality, Sen. Hawley has become the most aggressive Republican booster of Big Government and managed markets that I have seen in my 30 years covering technology policy.

Hopefully, the real conservatives left out there will make a stand against Sen. Hawley’s abominable corruption of their movement and ideals.

Written with Christopher Koopman and Brent Skorup (originally published on Medium on 4/10/17)

Innovation isn’t just about the latest gee-whiz gizmos and gadgets. That’s all nice, but something far more profound is at stake: Innovation is the single most important determinant of long-term human well-being. There exists widespread consensus among historians, economists, political scientists and other scholars that technological innovation is the linchpin of expanded economic growth, opportunity, choice, mobility, and human flourishing more generally. It is the ongoing search for new and better ways of doing things that drives human learning and prosperity in every sense — economic, social, and cultural.

The United States is uniquely positioned to lead the world into the next era of global technological advancement and wealth creation. That’s why we and our colleagues at the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University devote so much time and energy to defending the importance of innovation and countering threats to it. Unfortunately, those threats continue to multiply as fast as new technologies emerge.

Indeed, it isn’t easy keeping on top of all of these issues and threats because the only constant in the world of innovation policy — the study of technological change and its impact on social, economic, and political systems — is constant change. You go to sleep one night thinking you’ve got the world figured out, only to awake the next morning to see that another tectonic shift has reshaped the landscape.

In the industrial era, it was hard enough mapping the contours of this field of academic study. This task has grown far more challenging. Computing and Internet-enabled innovations have fundamentally reshaped society and have also helped spawn other technological revolutions in diverse fields such as: robotics, autonomous systems, artificial intelligence, big data, the Sharing Economy, 3D printing, virtual reality, aviation, advanced medical technology, blockchain and Bitcoin, and the so-called the Internet of Things.

The short-term social and economic disruptions caused by these and other new technologies often lead to backlashes and even occasional “techno-panics.” When those panics bubble over into the political arena, the risk is that misguided regulatory policies will short-circuit opportunities for creators and entrepreneurs to pursue life-enriching innovations.

At the Mercatus Center, where we study these and other topics, our goal is to bring greater focus to these emerging technologies and the many different facets of innovation policy surrounding them. How we accomplish these goals is as challenging as it is exciting. As more and more industries and business are affected by these emerging technologies, the decisions that policymakers make about them will have profound effects on large parts of our economy and society.

Specifically, as we place ourselves at the forefront of these debates, our aim is to:

• Explore how innovation policy affects economic growth and mobility, consumer welfare, and global competitive advantage;
• Identify barriers to entrepreneurial endeavors and devise a roadmap for how to remove them;
• Push back against technopanics and overly-broad theories of “technological harm” that could limit innovation opportunities and greater consumer choice; and
• Confront the legal and ethical concerns surrounding emerging technologies and craft constructive solutions to those problems to avoid solutions of the top-down, “command-and-control” variety.

Overall, our vision is simple: Permissionless innovation must become the norm rather than the exception. This means innovation and innovators are protected against efforts to preemptively control ongoing trial-and-error experimentation. We should let creative minds and empowered entrepreneurs experiment with new and better ways of doing things. It also means that the future if public policy should be rooted in fact-based analysis and not shaped by outlandish fears of hypothetical worst-case scenarios.

Going forward, you will continue to see Mercatus producing research applying permissionless innovation across a host of areas. You can also expect us to begin pursuing big questions about the future.

What if we could reduce the number of deaths on US roadways from 96 people per day to zero? What if we could double life expectancy? Triple it? Wouldn’t it be nice if we could travel from New York to London in three hours? New York to Los Angeles in 2.5 hours? What if we welcomed automation instead of fearing its effects on the workforce? What if we could remove the technical and political barriers keeping us from going to Mars and then beyond it? And so on.

We pose these questions not merely because they are intellectually interesting and important, but also because we hope to make the case for embracing the future with a sense of wonder and optimism about how technological advancement can radically improve human well-being in both the short- and long-run.

It isn’t enough to simply point out where innovators and entrepreneurs are being hindered. It isn’t enough to simply tell people that the future will be bright. We must explain, in real terms, how hindering innovation opportunities undermines our collective ability to constantly improve the human condition.

And because there is a symbiotic relationship between freedom and progress, we must defend our collective ability as a society to achieve very concrete, widely-shared advances in well-being through a general freedom to experiment with new technologies and better ways of doing things.

That is our vision for the Technology Policy Program at the Mercatus Center and we hope it is one that the public and public policymakers will embrace going forward.

I wanted to draw your attention to this important address on online platform regulation by Alex Chisholm, the head of UK’s Competition and Markets Authority. That’s the non-ministerial department in the UK responsible for competition policy issues. Chisholm delivered the address on October 27th at the Bundesnetzagentur conference in Bonn. It’s a terrific speech that other policymakers would be wise to read and mimic to ensure that antitrust and competition policy decisions don’t derail the many benefits of the Information Revolution.

“Today, as regulators, we have the responsibility but also the great historical privilege of playing an influential role in the deployment throughout the economy of the latest of these defining technological eras,” Chisholm began. “As regulators, we must try to minimise the inevitable mismatch between how we’ve done things before and the opportunities and risks of the new,” he argued.

He continued on to specify three recommendations for those crafting policy on this front:

1. “First, blanket solutions should be avoided. Instead an evidence-based assessment of potential adverse effects of specific industry features or practices should be carried out before either ex ante regulatory or ex post enforcement tools are deployed. In either case this should be closely targeted to the specific harm identified, and every care given to avoid disproportionate actions and unwelcome side-effects. In that respect, online platforms and the digital economy do not differ from any other sector: there is no need to reinvent the regulatory wheel.
2. Secondly, the significant risks associated with premature, broad-brush ex ante legislation or rule-making point towards a need to shift away from sector-specific regulation to ex post antitrust enforcement, which is better adapted to the period we’re in, with its fast-changing technology and evolving market reactions.
3. Thirdly, as regulators, policymakers, businesses and consumers, we all need to adapt our practices to harvest the benefits of the new while containing its costs and risks.”

That’s an excellent framework that can and should guide future antitrust and competition policy decisions by policymakers across the globe. But Chisholm wasn’t done. Here are some of my other favorite highlights from his address:

• On avoiding “one-size-fits-all” regulation: “[T]here is no ‘digital one size fits all’. . .  [O]penness is not necessarily always good for competition, nor are closed systems always bad.”
• On dealing with the pace of change: “Leaving aside costs of compliance, protecting consumers by virtue of ex ante regulation is inherently difficult in digital markets where consumer preferences evolve fast and in a less predictable manner.”
• On the difficulty of forecasting: “Where ex ante regulation is introduced, it therefore risks harming innovation by locking in existing standards and discouraging or preventing more disruptive innovations. The evolution of digital markets has been particularly difficult to predict.”
• On how to level the playing field: “Finally, consider deregulation. If policymakers were to seek to avoid every hypothetical consumer harm through pre-emptive ex ante regulation, they would likely prevent many best-case scenarios entailing significant consumer benefits from ever coming about. Policymakers and regulators should be open to the idea that a review of existing regulation and its suitability in the context of online platforms may in certain cases actually result in a withdrawal of such regulation – creating a reasonably level playing field by ‘levelling down’ as opposed to ‘levelling up’.”

I really appreciate those last few points, and they are very much consistent with the recommendations set forth in my recent book on  Permissionless Innovation. In the book, I argued that, “Trying to preemptively plan for every hypothetical worst-case scenario means that many best-case scenarios will never come about.”

I was pleased to see the book cited in Chisholm’s speech, as well as some work that Mercatus scholars had done on how to level the proverbial playing field within sectors undergoing rapid technological and regulatory change. Chris Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I have argue that, while regulatory asymmetries represent a legitimate policy problem,

the solution is not to punish new innovations by simply rolling old regulatory regimes onto new technologies and sectors. The better alternative is to level the playing field by “deregulating down” to put everyone on equal footing, not by “regulating up” to achieve parity. Policymakers should relax old rules on incumbents as new entrants and new technologies challenge the status quo. By extension, new entrants should only face minimal regulatory requirements as more onerous and unnecessary restrictions on incumbents are relaxed.

Anyway, make sure to read Alex Chisholm’s entire speech. It’s very much worth your time. Incidentally, I think his vision is very much consistent with that of  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, a Commissioner with the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). I have written extensively here and elsewhere about Commissioner Ohlhausen’s laudable vision for wise tech policy-making, most recently in this essay.

The “Internet of Things” (IoT) is already growing at a breakneck pace and is expected to continue to accelerate rapidly. In a short new paper (“Projecting the Growth and Economic Impact of the Internet of Things“) that I’ve just released with my Mercatus Center colleague Andrea Castillo, we provide a brief explanation of IoT technologies before describing the current projections of the economic and technological impacts that IoT could have on society. In addition to creating massive gains for consumers, IoT is projected to provide dramatic improvements in manufacturing, health care, energy, transportation, retail services, government, and general economic growth. Take a look at our paper if you’re interested, and you might also want to check out my 118-page law review article, “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation” as well as my recent congressional testimony on the policy issues surrounding the IoT.)

On June 9th, the Federal Trade Commission hosted an excellent workshop on “The ‘Sharing’ Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators,” which included 4 major panels and dozens of experts speaking about these important issues. It was my great pleasure to be part of the 4th panel of the day on the policy implications of the sharing economy. Along with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman and Matt Mitchell, I submitted a 20-page filing  to the Commission summarizing our research findings in this area. (We also released a major new working paper that same day on, “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the ‘Lemons Problem.’” (All Mercatus Center research on sharing economy issues can be found on this page and we plan on releasing additional papers in coming months.)

The FTC has now posted the videos from their workshop and down below I have embedded my particular panel. My remarks begin around the 5-minute mark of the video.

Along with colleagues at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, I am releasing two major new reports today dealing with the regulation of the sharing economy. The first report is a 20-page filing to the Federal Trade Commission that we are submitting to the agency for its upcoming June 9th workshop on “The “Sharing” Economy: Issues Facing Platforms, Participants, and Regulators.” We have been invited to participate in that event and I will be speaking on the fourth panel of the workshop. The filing I am submitting today for that workshop was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman and Matt Mitchell.

The second report we are releasing today is a new 47-page working paper entitled, “How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational Feedback Mechanisms Solve the ‘Lemons Problem.'” This study was co-authored with my Mercatus colleagues Christopher Koopman, Anne Hobson, and Chris Kuiper.

I will summarize each report briefly here.

In our new filing to the FTC, we address the five questions the Commission set forth in its workshop annoucement. Those five questions are as follows:

• How can state and local regulators meet legitimate regulatory goals (such as protecting consumers, and promoting public health and safety) in connection with their oversight of sharing economy platforms and business models, without also restraining competition or hindering innovation?
• How have sharing economy platforms affected competition, innovation, consumer choice, and platform participants in the sectors in which they operate? How might they in the future?
• What consumer protection issues—including privacy and data security, online reviews and disclosures, and claims about earnings and costs—do these platforms raise, and who is responsible for addressing these issues?
• What particular concerns or issues do sharing economy transactions raise regarding the protection of platform participants? What responsibility does a sharing economy platform bear for consumer injury arising from transactions undertaken through the platform?
• How effective are reputation systems and other trust mechanisms, such as the vetting of sellers, insurance coverage, or complaint procedures, in encouraging consumers and suppliers to do business on sharing economy platforms?

We provide detailed answers to each of these questions as well as one additional major question that was not posed by the Commission in its workshop notice but which is, no doubt, on the minds of many at the agency and outside it: What should the FTC do about state and local barriers to entry and innovation that might be thwarting the growth of the sharing economy? (I blogged about that issue here a couple of weeks ago and our filing includes that discussion.)

Please take a look at our filing for detailed answers to each of these questions. (Incidentally, our filing is an extension of an earlier working paper that Koopman, Mitchell, and I released late last year on “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change.”) But, to briefly highlight the thrust of our argument, here’s a passage from our new filing:

As the debate surrounding the sharing economy moves forward, policymakers must keep in mind that merely because regulations were once justified on the grounds of consumer protection does not mean they accomplished those goals or that they are still needed today. Even well-intentioned policies must be judged against real-world evidence. Unfortunately, the evidence shows that many traditional consumer protection regulations hurt consumers; in the words of New York Attorney General Eric Schneiderman, they are often “cumbersome, and some are just plain protectionist.” Markets, competition, reputational systems, and ongoing innovation often solve problems better than regulation when they are given a chance to do so. There are two reasons for this. First, market imperfections create powerful profit opportunities for entrepreneurs who are able to find ways to correct them. Second, regulatory solutions too often undermine competition and lock in inefficient business models.

We continue on to explain exactly why that is the case, while also offering some constructive solutions to other issues that are on the minds of regulators.

Meanwhile, the new working paper we are releasing today provides much greater detail on the fifth of the five questions the FTC posed in its workshop notice regarding reputation systems and other trust mechanisms. Here is the abstract from the paper:

This paper argues that the sharing economy—through the use of the Internet and real time reputational feedback mechanisms—is providing a solution to the lemons problem that many regulators have spent decades attempting to overcome. Section I provides an overview of the sharing economy and traces its rapid growth. Section II revisits the lemons theory as well as the various regulatory solutions proposed to deal with the problem of asymmetric information. Section III discusses the relationship between reputation and trust and analyzes how reputational incentives affect commercial interactions. Section IV discusses how information asymmetries were addressed in the pre-Internet era. It also discusses how the evolution of both the Internet and information systems (especially the reputational feedback mechanisms of the sharing economy) addresses the lemons problem. Section V explains how these new realities affect public policy and concludes that asymmetric information is not a legitimate rationale for policy intervention in light of technological changes. We also argue that continued use of this rationale to regulate in the name of consumer protection might, in fact, make consumers worse off. This has ramifications for the current debate over regulation of the sharing economy.

We believe that our research makes it clear “how the sharing economy relies upon—and has helped spur the growth of—sophisticated reputational feedback mechanisms that facilitate online trust and commerce, overcoming many of the information asymmetries that seemed intractable… just a generation ago. In combination with online review services and other information-sharing technologies enabled by the Internet,” we conclude, “these reputational tools can help create more effective, and largely self-regulating, markets that provide more information to more individuals than ever before.”

We look forward to continuing engagement with officials at the FTC and other policymakers at the federal, state, and even international level on these issues. We hope our research will help legislators and regulators find sensible ways to adjust policy for the sharing economy so as not to derail the sort of “permissionless innovation” that has thus far powered this exciting sector and produced the many pro-consumer benefits flowing from it. Check out our filing and new paper for more details.

The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^[5]

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . .  In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7]  In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1]     See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2]     Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3]     Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets:  Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6]     Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7]     Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8]     Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9]     Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10]   See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name:  Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14]   Id.

[15]   Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16]   See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17]   See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20]  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases.  It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23]   FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24]   See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

Today, Eli Dourado, Ryan Hagemann and I filed comments with the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) in its proceeding on the “Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems” (i.e. small private drones). In this filing, we begin by arguing that just as “permissionless innovation” has been the primary driver of entrepreneurialism and economic growth in many sectors of the economy over the past decade, that same model can and should guide policy decisions in other sectors, including the nation’s airspace. “While safety-related considerations can merit some precautionary policies,” we argue, “it is important that those regulations leave ample space for unpredictable innovation opportunities.”

We continue on in our filing to note that  “while the FAA’s NPRM is accompanied by a regulatory evaluation that includes benefit-cost analysis, the analysis does not meet the standard required by Executive Order 12866. In particular, it fails to consider all costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives.” After that, we itemize the good and the bad of the FAA propose with an eye toward how the agency can maximize innovation opportunities. We conclude by noting:

 The FAA must carefully consider the potential effect of UASs on the US economy. If it does not, innovation and technological advancement in the commercial UAS space will find a home elsewhere in the world. Many of the most innovative UAS advances are already happening abroad, not in the United States. If the United States is to be a leader in the development of UAS technologies, the FAA must open the American skies to innovation.

You can read our entire 9-page filing here.

___________________________

Additional  Reading

• Permissionless Innovation & Commercial Drones, February 4, 2015.
• DRM for Drones Will Fail, January 28, 2015.
• Regulatory Capture: FAA and Commercial Drones Edition, January 16, 2015.
• Global Innovation Arbitrage: Commercial Drones & Sharing Economy Edition, December 9, 2014.
• How to Destroy American Innovation: The FAA & Commercial Drones, October 6, 2014.
• Filing to FAA on Drones & “Model Aircraft”, Sept. 23, 2014.
• Private Drones & the First Amendment, Sept. 19, 2014.
• [TV interview] The Beneficial Uses of Private Drones, March 28, 2014.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FAA on integration of drones into the nation’s airspace, April 23, 2o13.
• Eli Dourado, Deregulate the Skies: Why We Can’t Afford to Fear Drones, Wired, April 23, 2013.
• Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom (2014).
• [Video] Cap Hill Briefing on Emerging Tech Policy Issues (June 2014).

The Obama Administration has just released a draft “Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015.” Generally speaking, the bill aims to translate fair information practice principles (FIPPs) — which have traditionally been flexible and voluntary guidelines — into a formal set of industry best practices that would be federally enforced on private sector digital innovators. This includes federally-mandated Privacy Review Boards, approved by the Federal Trade Commission, the agency that will be primarily responsible for enforcing the new regulatory regime.

Many of the principles found in the Administration’s draft proposal are quite sensible as best practices, but the danger here is that they could soon be converted into a heavy-handed, bureaucratized regulatory regime for America’s highly innovative, data-driven economy.

No matter how well-intentioned this proposal may be, it is vital to recognize that restrictions on data collection could negatively impact innovation, consumer choice, and the competitiveness of America’s digital economy.

Online privacy and security is vitally important, but we should look to use alternative and less costly approaches to protecting privacy and security that rely on education, empowerment, and targeted enforcement of existing laws. Serious and lasting long-term privacy protection requires a layered, multifaceted approach incorporating many solutions.

That is why flexible data collection and use policies and evolving best practices will ultimately serve consumers better than one-size-fits all, top-down regulatory edicts. Instead of imposing these FIPPs in a rigid regulatory fashion, privacy and security best practices will need to evolve gradually to new marketplace realities and be applied in a more organic and flexible fashion, often outside the realm of public policy.

Regulatory approaches, like the Obama Administration’s latest proposal, will instead impose significant costs on consumers and the economy. Data is the fuel that powers our information economy. Privacy-related mandates that curtail the use of data to better target or personalize new services could raise costs for consumers. There is no free lunch. Something has to pay for all the wonderful free sites and services we enjoy today. If data can’t be used to cross-subsidize those services, prices will go up.

Data regulations could also indirectly cost consumers by diminishing the abundance of content and culture now supported by the data-driven economy. In other words, even if prices and paywalls don’t go up, quantity or quality could suffer if data collection is restricted.

Data regulations could also hurt the competitiveness of domestic markets and the global competitive advantage that America’s tech sector has in this space. That regulatory burden would fall hardest on smaller operators and new start-ups. Today’s “app economy” has given countless small innovators a chance to compete on even footing with the biggest players. Burdensome data collection restrictions could short-circuit the engine that drives entrepreneurial innovation among mom-and-pop companies if ad dollars get consolidated in the hands of only the larger companies that can afford to comply with new rules.

We don’t want to go down the path the European Union charted in the 1990s with heavy-handed data directives. That suffocated high-tech entrepreneurialism and innovation there. America’s Internet sector came to be the envy of the world because our more flexible, light-touch regulatory regime leaves more breathing room for competition and innovation compared to Europe’s top-down regime. We should not abandon that approach now.

Finally, the Obama Administration’s proposal deals exclusively with private sector data collection and has nothing to say about government surveillance activities. The Administration would be wise to channel its energies into that far more significant privacy problem first.

Additional Reading from Adam Thierer of the Mercatus Center

Law Review Articles:

• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law and Public Policy, Vol. 36, No. 2, (2013).
• “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates,” George Mason Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4, (2013).
• “Privacy Law’s Precautionary Principle Problem,” Maine Law Review, Vol. 66, No. 2 (2014).
• “The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without Derailing Innovation,” Richmond Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 21 (2015).
• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, No. 1, (2013).

Testimony / Filings

• Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee on the Internet of Things, February 11, 2015.
• Testimony before the Senate Commerce Committee on Privacy, Data Collection & Do Not Track, April 24, 2013.
• Filing to the Federal Trade Commission on Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things, May 31, 2013.
• Filing to the Federal Trade Commission on Protecting Consumer Privacy in an Era of Rapid Change, February 22, 2011.

I’ve just released a short new paper, co-authored with my Mercatus Center colleagues Christopher Koopman and Matthew Mitchell, on “The Sharing Economy and Consumer Protection Regulation: The Case for Policy Change.” The paper is being released to coincide with a Congressional Internet Caucus Advisory Committee event that I am speaking at today on “Should Congress be Caring About Sharing? Regulation and the Future of Uber, Airbnb and the Sharing Economy.”

In this new paper, Koopman, Mitchell, and I discuss how the sharing economy has changed the way many Americans commute, shop, vacation, borrow, and so on. Of course, the sharing economy “has also disrupted long-established industries, from taxis to hotels, and has confounded policymakers,” we note. “In particular, regulators are trying to determine how to apply many of the traditional ‘consumer protection’ regulations to these new and innovative firms.” This has led to a major debate over the public policies that should govern the sharing economy.

We argue that, coupled with the Internet and various new informational resources, the rapid growth of the sharing economy alleviates the need for much traditional top-down regulation. These recent innovations are likely doing a much better job of serving consumer needs by offering new innovations, more choices, more service differentiation, better prices, and higher-quality services. In particular, the sharing economy and the various feedback mechanism it relies upon helps solve the tradition economic problem of “asymmetrical information,” which is often cited as a rationale for regulation. We conclude, therefore, that “the key contribution of the sharing economy is that it has overcome market imperfections without recourse to traditional forms of regulation. Continued application of these outmoded regulatory regimes is likely to harm consumers.”

We note that this is especially likely to be the case when the failure of traditional regulatory models is taken into account. As we document in the paper, all too often, well-intentioned “public interest” regulation is often captured by industry and used to to serve their interests:

by limiting entry, or by raising rivals’ costs, regulations can be useful to the regulated firms. Though regulations often make consumers worse off, they are often sustained by political pressure from consumer advocates because they can be disguised as “consumer protection.”

We provide evidence of the problem of regulatory capture and note it has been a particular problem in many of the sectors that are now being disrupted by sharing economy innovators–such as taxi and transportation services. It is evident that regulation has not lived up to its lofty expectations in many sectors. Accordingly, when market circumstances change dramatically—or when new technology or competition alleviate the need for regulation—then public policy should evolve and adapt to accommodate these new realities.

Of course, many bad laws and regulations that policymakers remain on the books and have constituencies who will defend them vociferously. Our paper concludes with some recommendations for how to “level the regulatory playing field” in a pro-consumer, pro-innovation fashion. We note that while differential regulatory treatment of incumbents and new entrants does represent a potential problem, there’s a sensible, pro-consumer and pro-innovation way to solve that problem:

such regulatory asymmetries represent a legitimate policy problem. But the solution is not to punish new innovations by simply rolling old regulatory regimes onto new technologies and sectors. The better alternative is to level the playing field by “deregulating down” to put everyone on equal footing, not by “regulating up” to achieve parity. Policymakers should relax old rules on incumbents as new entrants and new technologies challenge the status quo. By extension, new entrants should only face minimal regulatory requirements as more onerous and unnecessary restrictions on incumbents are relaxed.

Download this new paper on the Mercatus website or via SSRN or ResearchGate. Incidentally, we plan to release a much longer Mercatus Center white paper early next year that will explore reputational feedback mechanisms in far greater detail and explain how these systems help address the problem of “asymmetrical information” in these and other contexts.

Also see: “The Debate over the Sharing Economy: Talking Points & Recommended Reading,” which includes the following video of me on the Stossel Show discussing these issues recently.

The sharing economy is growing faster than ever and becoming a hot policy topic these days. I’ve been fielding a lot of media calls lately about the nature of the sharing economy and how it should be regulated. (See latest clip below from the Stossel show on Fox Business Network.) Thus, I sketched out some general thoughts about the issue and thought I would share them here, along with some helpful additional reading I have come across while researching the issue. I’d welcome comments on this outline as well as suggestions for additional reading. (Note: I’ve also embedded some useful images from Jeremiah Owyang of Crowd Companies.)

1) Just because policymakers claim that regulation is meant to protect consumers does not mean it actually does so.

1. Cronyism/ Rent-seeking: Regulation is often “captured” by powerful and politically well-connected incumbents and used to their own benefit. (+ Lobbying activity creates deadweight losses for society.)
2. Innovation-killing: Regulations become a formidable barrier to new innovation, entry, and entrepreneurism.
3. Unintended consequences: Instead of resulting in lower prices & better service, the opposite often happens: Higher prices & lower quality service. (Example: Painting all cabs same color destroying branding & ability to differentiate).

2) The Internet and information technology alleviates the need for top-down regulation & actually does a better job of serving consumers.

1. Ease of entry/innovation in online world means that new entrants can come in to provide better options and solve problems previously thought to be unsolvable in the absence of regulation.
2. Informational empowerment: The Internet and information technology solves old problem of lack of consumer access to information about products and services. This gives them monitoring tools to find more and better choices. (i.e., it lowers both search costs & transaction costs). (“To the extent that consumer protection regulation is based on the claim that consumers lack adequate information, the case for government intervention is weakened by the Internet’s powerful and unprecedented ability to provide timely and pointed consumer information.” – John C. Moorhouse)
3. Feedback mechanisms (product & service rating / review systems) create powerful reputational incentives for all parties involved in transactions to perform better.
4. Self-regulating markets: The combination of these three factors results in a powerful check on market power or abusive behavior. The result is reasonably well-functioning and self-regulating markets. Bad actors get weeded out.
5. Law should evolve: When circumstances change dramatically, regulation should as well. If traditional rationales for regulation evaporate, or new technology or competition alleviates need for it, then the law should adapt.

3) Sharing economy has demonstrably improved consumer welfare. It provides:

1. more choices / competition
2. more service innovation / differentiation
3. better prices
4. higher quality services  (safety & cleanliness /convenience / peace of mind)
5. Better options & conditions for workers

4) If we need to “level the (regulatory) playing field,” best way to do so is by “deregulating down” to put everyone on equal footing; not by “regulating up” to achieve parity.

1. Regulatory asymmetry is real: Incumbents are right that they are at disadvantage relative to new sharing economy start-ups.
2. Don’t punish new innovations for it: But solution is not to just roll the old regulatory regime onto the new innovators.
3. Parity through liberalization: Instead, policymakers should “deregulate down” to achieve regulatory parity. Loosen old rules on incumbents as new entrants challenge status quo.
4. “Permissionless innovation” should trump “precautionary principle” regulation: Preemptive, precautionary regulation does not improve consumer welfare. Competition and choice do better. Thus, our default position toward the sharing economy should be “innovation allowed” or permissionless innovation.
5. Alternative remedies exist: Accidents will always happen, of course. But insurance, contracts, product liability, and other legal remedies exist when things go wrong. The difference is that ex post remedies don’t discourage innovation and competition like ex ante regulation does. By trying to head off every hypothetical worst-case scenario, preemptive regulations actually discourage many best-case scenarios from ever coming about.

5) Bottom line = Good intentions only get you so far in this world.

1. Just because a law was put on the books for noble purposes, it does not mean it really accomplished those goals, or still does so today.
2. Markets, competition, and ongoing innovation typically solve problems better than law when we give them a chance to do so.

[P.S. On 9/30, my Mercatus Center colleague Matt Mitchell posted this excellent follow-up essay building on my outline and improving it greatly.]

Additional Reading

• Randolph J. May & Michael J. Horney, “The Sharing Economy: A Positive Shared Vision for the Future,” Free State Foundation, Perspectives from FSF Scholars, Vol. 9, No. 26, July 30, 2014.
• R.J. Lehmann, “The Sharing Economy Will Thrive Only If Government Doesn’t Strangle It,” Reason, August 2, 2014.
• Andrew Moylan and R.J. Lehmann, “Five Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy,” R Street, Policy Study No. 26, July 2014.
• Eli Lehrer & Andrew Moylan, “Embracing the Peer-Production Economy,” National Affairs, 2014, p. 51-63.
• Arun Sundararajan, “Why the Government Doesn’t Need to Regulate the Sharing Economy,” Wired, October 22, 2012.
• Matthew Mitchell and Michael Farren, “If you Like Uber, You Would’ve Loved the Jitney,” LA Times, July 12, 2014.
• Daniel M. Rothschild, “How Uber and Airbnb Resurrect ‘Dead Capital,’” The Umlaut, April 9, 2014.
• Daniel M. Rothschild, “Renters and Rent-Seeking in San Francisco,” Technology Liberation Front, April 15, 2014.
• [podcast] Michael Munger on the Sharing Economy, EconTalk, July 7, 2014.
• video of Michael Munger talk on the Sharing Economy, September 25, 2014.
• John C. Moorhouse, “Consumer Protection Regulation and Information on the Internet,” in Fred E. Foldvary & Daniel B. Klein (eds), The Half-Life of Policy Rationales: How New Technology Affects Old Policy Issues (Cato Institute, 2003).
• Rachel Bostman, What’s Mine is Yours: The Rise of Collaborative Consumption (2010).
• Jeremiah Owyang, A Glossary of Emerging Terms in the Collaborative Economy, August 29, 2014

With each booth I pass and presentation I listen to at the 2014 International Consumer Electronics Show (CES), it becomes increasingly evident that the “Internet of Things” era has arrived. In just a few short years, the Internet of Things (IoT) has gone from industry buzzword to marketplace reality. Countless new IoT devices are on display throughout the halls of the Las Vegas Convention Center this week, including various wearable technologies, smart appliances, remote monitoring services, autonomous vehicles, and much more.

This isn’t vaporware; these are devices or services that are already on the market or will launch shortly. Some will fail, of course, just as many other earlier technologies on display at past CES shows didn’t pan out. But many of these IoT technologies will succeed, driven by growing consumer demand for highly personalized, ubiquitous, and instantaneous services.

But will policymakers let the Internet of Things revolution continue or will they stop it dead in its tracks? Interestingly, not too many people out here in Vegas at the CES seem all that worried about the latter outcome. Indeed, what I find most striking about the conversation out here at CES this week versus the one about IoT that has been taking place in Washington over the past year is that there is a large and growing disconnect between consumers and policymakers about what the Internet of Things means for the future.

When every device has a sensor, a chip, and some sort of networking capability, amazing opportunities become available to consumers. And that’s what has them so excited and ready to embrace these new technologies. But those same capabilities are exactly what raise the blood pressure of many policymakers and policy activists who fear the safety, security, or privacy-related problems that might creep up in a world filled with such technologies.

But at least so far, most consumers don’t seem to share the same worries. Instead, they are too busy shouting “More, More, More!” IoT technologies have generated enormous interest and every projection I’ve seen so far shows that explosive growth can be expected across all classes of devices. ABI Research estimates that there are more than ten billion wirelessly connected devices in the market today and more than thirty billion devices expected by 2020. Last year Cisco projected that by 2020 thirty-seven billion intelligent things will be connected and communicating but has now apparently revised that estimate upward to 40 or 50 billion. Thus, we are well on the way to a world where “everyone and everything will be connected to the network.”

Yet, it remains unclear what the IoT public policy landscape will look like in coming years and what disposition lawmakers and regulators will adopt toward these new amazing new technologies. Two distinct policy disposition are clashing over what approach should govern the future of innovation in this space.

I discussed this tension during a CES panel this morning on “The Internet of Things and the Home of the Future.” It featured outstanding opening remarks by FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen, who made the case for regulatory humility and focusing on how these new technologies can empower individuals in important new ways. “The Internet has evolved in one generation from a network of electronically interlinked research facilities in the United States to one of the most dynamic forces in the global economy, in the process reshaping entire industries and even changing the way we interact on a personal level,” she noted. “And the Internet of Things offers the promise of even greater progress ahead for consumers and competition.” I strongly encourage you to read Commissioner Ohlhausen’s entire speech. It is terrific and sets exactly the right tone for these discussions.

After Commissioner Ohlhausen spoke, we had a panel discussion that was expertly moderated by tech policy guru Larry Downes and which included remarks from Robert M. McDowell (Hudson Institute), Jeff  Hagins, (Smart Things), Robert Pepper (Cisco), Marc Rogers (Lookout), and me.

When I spoke, I described the future of the Internet of Things as a grand battle of two alternative worldviews: the “precautionary principle” and “permissionless innovation.” The “precautionary principle” refers to the belief that new innovations should be curtailed or disallowed until their developers can prove that they will not cause any harms to individuals, groups, specific entities, cultural norms, or various existing laws, norms, or traditions. The other worldview, “permissionless innovation,” refers to the notion that experimentation with new technologies and business models should generally be permitted by default. Unless a compelling case can be made that a new invention will bring serious harm to society, innovation should be allowed to continue unabated and problems, if they develop at all, can be addressed later.

I’ll soon be releasing a new eBook about this conflict of visions. The book will be called, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom” and it should be out in the next few weeks. In it, I will explain how precautionary principle thinking is increasingly creeping into modern information technology policy discussions, explain how that is dangerous and must be rejected, and argue that policymakers should instead unapologetically embrace and defend the permissionless innovation vision — not just for the Internet but also for all new classes of networked technologies and platforms.

This intellectual tension is already evident in debates over the Internet of Things. While we are still very early in this debate, we can expect rising calls for preemptive regulatory controls on IoT technologies based on various safety, security, and especially privacy rationales.  If the precautionary principle mentality wins out and trumps the permissionless innovation ethos that has already powered the first wave of the digital revolution, it will have profound ramifications.

As I’ll note in my forthcoming eBook, preserving and extending the permissionless innovation ethos to the Internet of Things is not about “protecting corporate profits” or assisting any particular technology, industry sector, or set of innovators. Rather, preserving an environment in which permissionless innovation can flourish is about ensuring that individuals as both citizens and consumers continue to enjoy the myriad benefits that accompany an open, innovative information ecosystem. More profoundly, this general freedom to innovate is essential for powering the next great wave of industrial innovation and rejuvenating our dynamic, high-growth economy. Even more profoundly, this is about preserving social and economic freedom more generally while rejecting the central-planning mentality and methods that throughout history have stifled human progress and prosperity.

Safety, security, and privacy problems will continue to persist, of course, and we should work to find practical, “bottom-up” solutions to them. As I detail in my eBook, education and empowerment, social pressure, societal norms, voluntary self-regulation, transparency efforts, and targeted enforcement of existing legal norms (especially through the common law) are almost always superior to “top-down,” command-and-control regulatory edits and bureaucratic schemes of a “Mother, May I” (i.e., permissioned) nature. Preemptive technological controls of that sort would limit new innovation in this space and sacrifice the many benefits that will flow to consumers from continued experimentation.

Those who advocate precautionary regulatory approaches to the Internet of Things should think through to consequences of preemptively prohibiting technological innovation and realize that not everyone shares their same values, especially pertaining to privacy, which is a highly subjective concept that is often difficult to legislate around. We should instead find ways work with together to seek out those practical, bottom-up solutions that will help individuals, institutions, and society learn how to better cope with technological change over time. Using this approach, we can embrace our dynamic future together without doing permanent damage to our innovative minds and economy.

Here are a few Internet policy essays I collected over the past year which I thought were particularly well done and worth highlighting once more. They are listed in chronological order:

• L. Gordon Crovitz – “Silicon Valley’s ‘Suicide Impulse,'” Wall Street Journal, January 28. (“It’s a measure of how far Silicon Valley has strayed from its entrepreneurial roots that a top regulator is calling on technology companies to do less lobbying and more competing,” Crovitz argued. “Rather than lobby government to go after one another, Silicon Valley lobbyists should unite to go after overreaching government. Instead of the “suicide impulse” of lobbying for more regulation, Silicon Valley should seek deregulation and a long-overdue freedom to return to its entrepreneurial roots.”)
• John Gruber – “Open and Shut,” Daring Fireball, March 1. (An absolutely brutal evisceration of Tim Wu’s recent work.)
• R. U. Sirius – “Cypherpunk Rising: WikiLeaks, Encryption, and the Coming Surveillance Dystopia,” The Verge, March 7.
• Julian Sanchez – “A Reply to Epstein & Pilon on NSA’s Metadata Program,” Cato at Liberty, June 16. (A meticulous point-by-point takedown of an essay by Roger Pilon & Richard Epstein defending NSA’s online surveillance tactics.)
• Ethan Zuckerman – “Is Cybertopianism Really Such a Bad Thing?” Slate, June 17 (A “defense of believing that technology can do good.”)

• Jill Lepore – “The Prism: Privacy in an Age of Publicity,” New Yorker, June 24. (An examination of the evolution of privacy norms over the past 150 years. Lepore argued that “As a matter of historical analysis, the relationship between secrecy and privacy can be stated in an axiom: the defense of privacy follows, and never precedes, the emergence of new technologies for the exposure of secrets. In other words, the case for privacy always comes too late. The horse is out of the barn.”)
• Michael Nelson – ” Six Myths of Innovation Policy,” The European Institute Blog, July 2013. (An interesting examination of some myths about innovation policy with a discussion about how it impacts policy in both U.S. and E.U.)
• Daniel O’Connor – “Rent Seeking and the Internet Economy (Part 1): Why is the Internet So Frequently the Target of Rent Seekers?” DisCo blog, August 15. (Nice overview of what rent-seeking is and why it is increasing in the tech economy.)
• Bruce Schneier – “Our Decreasing Tolerance To Risk,” Forbes, August 23. (Good exploration of the psychology of risk by one of the great experts on the topic. It’s not strictly about information technology policy, but it has profound ramifications for it. He notes: “We need to relearn how to recognize the trade-offs that come from risk management, especially risk from our fellow human beings.  We need to relearn how to accept risk, and even embrace it, as essential to human progress and our free society.  The more we expect technology to protect us from people in the same way it protects us from nature, the more we will sacrifice the very values of our society in futile attempts to achieve this security.”)
• Clive Thompson – “Googling Yourself Takes on a Whole New Meaning,” New York Times Magazine, August 30, 2013. (I’d be hard-pressed to find a more gifted and insightful technology pundit than Clive Thompson and he delivers yet again in this interesting piece. My review of his excellent new book was published by Reason. Needless to say, I loved it.)
• Eli Noam – “Towards the Federated Internet,” InterMEDIA, Autumn 2013. (A provocative essay advocating for an “internet of internets” to replace the current unified global Internet. Noam argues that the time has come to abandon our slavish allegiance to the dream of a single, uniform global network and “we should instead think about a system of federated internets working together in some form of technological coexistence of interoperability.”)

And my vote for worst Internet policy essay of the year goes to Washington Post columnist Robert J. Samuelson for his astonishing essay, “Beware the Internet and the Danger of Cyberattacks,” in which he says, “If I could, I would repeal the Internet. It is the technological marvel of the age, but it is not — as most people imagine — a symbol of progress. Just the opposite. We would be better off without it.”  Where does one even begin with such logic?!  Well, I responded here.  [A close runner-up for the Worst of Year prize would be this essay by Benjamin Kunkel, “Socialize Social Media! A Manifesto.” But it’s so hard to take that essay seriously that it should probably just be disqualified from the competition entirely.]

Anyway, let me know some of your favorite (or even least favorite) Net policy essays of 2013. (And yes, I fully expect some of you to list some of my essays as candidates for Worst of Year honors!)

Tomorrow, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) will host an all-day workshop entitled, “Internet of Things: Privacy and Security in a Connected World.” [Detailed agenda here.] According to the FTC: “The workshop will focus on privacy and security issues related to increased connectivity for consumers, both in the home (including home automation, smart home appliances and connected devices), and when consumers are on the move (including health and fitness devices, personal devices, and cars).”

Where is the FTC heading on this front? This Politico story by Erin Mershon from last week offers some possible ideas. Yet, it still remains unclear whether this is just another inquiry into an exciting set of new technologies or if it is, as I worried in my recent comments to the FTC on this matter, “the beginning of a regulatory regime for a new set of information technologies that are still in their infancy.”

First, for those not familiar with the “Internet of Things,” this short new report from Daniel Castro & Jordan Misra of the Center for Data Innovation offers a good definition:

The “Internet of Things” refers to the concept that the Internet is no longer just a global network for people to communicate with one another using computers, but it is also a platform or devices to communicate electronically with the world around them. The result is a world that is alive with information as data flows from one device to another and is shared and reused for a multitude of purposes. Harnessing the potential of all of this data for economic and social good will be one of the primary challenges and opportunities of the coming decades.

The report continues on to offer a wide range of examples of new products and services that could fulfill this promise.

What I find somewhat worrying about the FTC’s sudden interest in the Internet of Things is that it opens to the door for some regulatory-minded critics to encourage preemptive controls on this exciting new wave of digital age innovation, based almost entirely on hypothetical worst-case scenarios they have conjured up. And plenty of those boogeyman scenarios are floating around already because the Internet of Things has created a potential perfect storm of four major information policy concerns: online safety, privacy, security, and even intellectual property issues. You can find concerned critics from each of those quarters already wringing their hands about what the Internet of Things means for their pet issues.

This is why in both my filing to the agency and in an upcoming eBook, I discuss the danger of letting “precautionary principle” reasoning trump the alternative paradigm of “permissionless innovation.” As I’ve explained here before as well in this longer law review article, the precautionary principle generally holds that, because a given new technology could pose some theoretical danger or risk in the future, public policies should control or limit the development of such innovations until their creators can prove that they won’t cause any harms.

The problem with letting such precautionary thinking guide policy is that it poses a serious threat to technological progress, economic entrepreneurialism, and human prosperity. Under an information policy regime guided at every turn by a precautionary principle, technological innovation would be impossible because of fear of the unknown; hypothetical worst-case scenarios would trump all other considerations. Social learning and economic opportunities become far less likely, perhaps even impossible, under such a regime. In practical terms, it means fewer services, lower quality goods, higher prices, diminished economic growth, and a decline in the overall standard of living.

For these reasons, to the maximum extent possible, the default position toward new forms of technological innovation should be innovation allowed. This policy norm is better captured in the well-known Internet ideal of “permissionless innovation,” or the general freedom to experiment and learn through trial-and-error experimentation.

Which leads back to the FTC workshop tomorrow. Which path will the agency head down? If the recent comments of FTC Chairwoman Edith Ramirez are any indication, there is certainly a healthy appetite for precautionary principle policymaking, at least as it pertains to “big data.” As I noted here in a critique of one of her recent speeches, Chairwoman Ramirez has offered “a rather succinct articulation of precautionary principle thinking as applied to modern data collection practices.”

She worried that “‘big data’ leads to the indiscriminate collection of personal information,” and that “the indiscriminate collection of data violates the First Commandment of data hygiene: Thou shall not collect and hold onto personal information unnecessary to an identified purpose. Keeping data on the offchance that it might prove useful is not consistent with privacy best practices,” she continued, and she went on to argue that “Information that is not collected in the first place can’t be misused” and then suggests a parade of horribles that will befall if such data collection is allowed at all.  So, it would not be surprising to see her extend that sort of precautionary reasoning to the Internet of Things since all those fears would apply equally to it.

A better approach can be found in some remarks delivered by Ramirez’s fellow FTC Commissioner Maureen K. Ohlhausen. In an important speech last month entitled, “The Internet of Things and the FTC: Does Innovation Require Intervention?” Ohlhausen noted that, “The success of the Internet has in large part been driven by the freedom to experiment with different business models, the best of which have survived and thrived, even in the face of initial unfamiliarity and unease about the impact on consumers and competitors.” This reflects Ohlhausen’s general embrace of permissionless innovation reasoning and a rejection of the precautionary principle mindset articulated by FTC Chairwoman Ramirez.

More importantly, in her speech, Commissioner Ohlhausen went on to highlight another crucial point about why the precautionary mindset is dangerous when enshrined into laws or regulations. Put simply, many elites and regulatory advocates ignore regulator irrationality or regulatory ignorance. That is, they spend so much time focused on the supposed irrationality of consumers and their openness to persuasion or “manipulation” that they ignore the more concerning problem of the  irrationality or ignorance of those who (incorrectly) believe they are always in the best position to solve every complex problem. Regulators simply do not possess the requisite knowledge to perfectly plan for every conceivable outcome. This is particularly true for information technology markets, which generally evolve much more rapidly than other sectors, and especially more rapidly that law itself.

That insight leads Ohlhausen to issue a wise word of caution to her fellow regulators:

It is [] vital that government officials, like myself, approach new technologies with a dose of regulatory humility, by working hard to educate ourselves and others about the innovation, understand its effects on consumers and the marketplace, identify benefits and likely harms, and, if harms do arise, consider whether existing laws and regulations are sufficient to address them, before assuming that new rules are required.

That is absolutely right and this again makes it clears how Commissioner Ohlhausen’s approach to technological innovation is consistent with the permissionless innovation approach while Chairwoman Ramirez’s is based on precautionary principle thinking. This conflict of visions dominates almost all policy debates over new technology today, even if it is not always on such vivid display as it is in this case.

This also makes it abundantly clear just what is at stake as the FTC embarks on its exploration of the Internet of Things. Will we continue to embrace and defend the philosophy that made America’s digital economy the envy of the world (i.e., “permissionless innovation”), or will we be paralyzed by fear of the unknown and hypothetical worst-case scenarios.  As I have said here many times before, living in constant fear of such worst-case scenarios — and premising public policy upon them — means that best-cast scenarios will never come about.

So, stay tuned. The fight over the Internet of Things promises to be one of the most important public policy battles in the technology policy arena for many years to come.

This issue will be the focus of my forthcoming eBook, “Permissionless Innovation: The Continuing Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom,” but until that is released, here are a few other recommended readings on the topic:

Blog posts:

• “Who Really Believes in ‘Permissionless Innovation’?” Technology Liberation Front, March 4, 2013.
• “What Does It Mean to ‘Have a Conversation’ about a New Technology?” Technology Liberation Front, May 23, 2013.
• “Planning for Hypothetical Horribles in Tech Policy Debates,” Technology Liberation Front, August 6, 2013.
• “On the Line between Technology Ethics vs. Technology Policy,” Technology Liberation Front, August 1, 2013.
• “Edith Ramirez’s ‘Big Data’ Speech: Privacy Concerns Prompt Precautionary Principle Thinking,” Technology Liberation Front, August 29, 2013.
• “When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed,” Technology Liberation Front, April 29, 2011.
• “Copyright, Privacy, Property Rights & Information Control: Common Themes, Common Challenges,” Technology Liberation Front, April 10, 2012.
• “Can We Adapt to the Internet of Things?” IAPP Privacy Perspectives, June 19, 2013.

Testimony / Filings:

• Senate Testimony on Privacy, Data Collection & Do Not Track, April 24, 2013
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to the FTC in Privacy & Security Implications of the Internet of Things, May 31, 2013.
• Comments of the Mercatus Center to FAA on commercial domestic drones (with Jerry Brito and Eli Dourado) , April 23, 2013.

Journal articles & book chapters:

• “Technopanics, Threat Inflation, and the Danger of an Information Technology Precautionary Principle,” Minnesota Journal of Law, Science & Technology, Vol. 14, (2013): 309-386.
• “The Pursuit of Privacy in a World Where Information Control Is Failing,” Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol. 36, (2013): 409-455.
• “A Framework for Benefit-Cost Analysis in Digital Privacy Debates ,” George Mason University Law Review, Vol. 20, No. 4 (Summer 2013): 1055-1105.

Ian Brown and Christopher T. Marsden’s new book, Regulating Code: Good Governance and Better Regulation in the Information Age, will go down as one of the most important Internet policy books of 2013 for two reasons. First, their book offers an excellent overview of how Internet regulation has unfolded on five different fronts: privacy and data protection; copyright; content censorship; social networks and user-generated content issues; and net neutrality regulation. They craft detailed case studies that incorporate important insights about how countries across the globe are dealing with these issues. Second, the authors endorse a specific normative approach to Net governance that they argue is taking hold across these policy arenas. They call their preferred policy paradigm “prosumer law” and it envisions an active role for governments, which they think should pursue “smarter regulation” of code.

In terms of organization, Brown and Marsden’s book follows the same format found in Milton Mueller’s important 2010 book Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance; both books feature meaty case studies in the middle bookended by chapters that endorse a specific approach to Internet policymaking. (Incidentally, both books were published by MIT Press.) And, also like Mueller’s book, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code does a somewhat better job using case studies to explore the forces shaping Internet policy across the globe than it does making the normative case for their preferred approach to these issues.

Thus, for most readers, the primary benefit of reading either book will be to see how the respective authors develop rich portraits of the institutional political economy surrounding various Internet policy issues over the past 10 to 15 years. In fact, of all the books I have read and reviewed in recent years, I cannot think of two titles that have done a better job developing detailed case studies for such a diverse set of issues. For that reason alone, both texts are important resources for those studying ongoing Internet policy developments.

That’s not to say that both books don’t also make a solid case for their preferred policy paradigms, it’s just that the normative elements of the texts are over-shadowed by the excellent case studies. As a result, readers are left wanting more detail about what their respective policy paradigms would (or should) mean in practice. Regardless, in the remainder of this review, I’ll discuss Brown and Marsden’s normative approach to digital policy and contrast it with Mueller’s since they stand in stark contrast and help frame the policy battles to come on this front.

Governing Cyberspace: Mueller vs. Brown & Marsden

Mueller’s normative goal in Networks and States was to breathe new life into the old cyber-libertarian philosophy that was more prevalent during the Net’s founding era but which has lost favor in recent years. He made the case for a “cyberliberty” movement rooted in what he described as a “denationalized liberalism” vision of Net governance. He argued that “we need to find ways to translate classical liberal rights and freedoms into a governance framework suitable for the global Internet. There can be no cyberliberty without a political movement to define, defend, and institutionalize individual rights and freedoms on a transnational scale.”

I wholeheartedly endorsed that vision in my review of Mueller’s book, even if he was a bit short on the details of how to bring it about. But it is useful to keep Mueller’s paradigm in mind because it provides a nice contrast with the approach Brown and Marsden advocate, which is quite different.

Generally speaking, Brown and Marsden reject most forms of “Internet exceptionalism” and certainly reject the sort of “cyberliberty” ethos that Mueller and I embrace. They instead endorse a fairly broad role for governments in ordering the affairs of cyberspace. In their self-described “prosumer” paradigm, the State is generally viewed as benevolent actor, well-positioned to guide the course of code development toward supposedly more enlightened ends.

Consistent with the strong focus on European policymaking found throughout the book, the authors are quite enamored with the “co-regulatory” models that have become increasing prevalent across the continent. Like many other scholars and policy advocates today, they occasionally call for “multi-stakeholderism” as a solution but they do not necessarily mean the sort of truly voluntary, bottom-up multi-stakeholderism of the Net’s early days. Rather, they are usually thinking of multi-stakeholderism as what is essentially pluralistic politics; it’s the government setting the table, inviting the stakeholders to it, and then guiding (or at least “nudging”) policy along the way. “We are convinced that fudging with nudges needs to be reinforced with the reality of regulation and coregulation, in order to enable prosumers to maximize their potential on the broadband Internet,” they say. (p. 187)

Meet the New Boss, Same as the Old Boss?

Thus, despite the new gloss, their “prosumer law” paradigm ends up sounding quite a bit like a rehash of traditional “public interest” law and common carrier regulation, albeit with a new appreciation of just how dynamics markets built on code can be. Indeed, Brown and Marsden repeatedly acknowledge how often law and regulation fails to keep pace with the rapid evolution of digital technology. “Code changes quickly, user adoption more slowly, legal contracting and judicial adaptation to new technologies slower yet, and regulation through legislation slowest of all,” they correctly note (p. xv). This reflects what Larry Downes refers to as the most fundamental “law of disruption” of the digital age: “technology changes exponentially, but social, economic, and legal systems change incrementally.”

At the end of the day, however, that insight doesn’t seem to inform Brown and Marsden’s policy prescriptions all that much. Theirs is a world in which policy tinkering errors will apparently be corrected promptly and efficiently by still more policy tinkering, or “smarter regulation.” Moreover, like many other Internet policy scholars today, they don’t mind regulatory interventions that come early and often since they believe that will help regulators get out ahead of the technological curve and steer markets in preferred directions. “If regulators fail to address regulatory objects at first, then the regulatory object can grow until its technique overwhelms the regulator,” they say (p. 31).

This is the same mentality that is often on display in Tim Wu’s work, which I have been quite critical of here and elsewhere. For example, Wu has advocated informal “agency threats” and the use of “threat regimes” to accomplish policy goals that prove difficult to steer though the formal democratic rulemaking process. As part of his “defense of regulatory threats in particular contexts,” Wu stresses the importance of regulators taking control of fast-moving tech markets early in their life cycles. “Threat regimes,” Wu argues, “are best justified when the industry is undergoing rapid change — under conditions of ‘high uncertainty.’ Highly informal regimes are most useful, that is, when the agency faces a problem in an environment in which facts are highly unclear and evolving. Examples include periods surrounding a newly invented technology or business model, or a practice about which little is known,” Wu concludes.

This is essentially where most of the “co-regulation” schemes that Brown and Marsden favor would take us: Code regulators would take an active role in shaping the evolution of digital technologies and markets early in its life cycle. What are the preferred regulatory mechanisms? Like Wu and many other cyberlaw professors today, Brown and Marsden favor robust interconnection and interoperability mandates bolstered by antitrust actions as well. And, again, they aren’t willing to wait around and let the courts adjudicate these issues in an ex post fashion. “Essential facilities law is a very poor substitute for the active role of prosumer law that we advocate, especially in its Chicago school minimalist phase” (p. 185). In other words, we shouldn’t wait for someone to bring a case and litigate it through the courts when preemptive, proactive regulatory interventions can sagaciously steer us to a superior end.

More specifically, they propose that “competition authorities should impose ex ante interoperability requirements upon dominant social utilities… to minimize network barriers” (p. 190) and they model this on traditional regulatory schemes such as must-carry obligations, API interface disclosure requirements, and other interconnection mandates (such as those imposed on AOL/Time Warner a decade ago to alleviate fears about instant messaging dominance). They also note that “Effective, scalable state regulation often depends on the recruitment of intermediaries as enforcers” to help achieve various policy objectives (p. 170).

The Problem with Interoperability Über Alles

So, in essence, the Brown-Marsden Internet policy paradigm might be thought of as interoperability über alles. Interoperability and interconnection in pursuit of more “open” and “neutral” systems is generally considered an unalloyed good and most everything else is subservient to this objective.

This is a serious policy error and one that I address in great detail in my absurdly long review of John Palfrey and Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems. I’m not going to repeat all 6,500 words of that critique here when you can just click back and read it, but here’s the high level summary: There is no such thing as “optimal interoperability” that can be determined in an a priori fashion. Ongoing marketplace experimentation with technical standards, modes of information production and dissemination, and interoperable information systems, is almost always preferable to the artificial foreclosure of this dynamic process through state action. The former allows for better learning and coping mechanisms to develop while also incentivizing the spontaneous, natural evolution of the market and market responses. The latter (regulatory foreclosure of experimentation) limits that potential.

More importantly, when interoperability is treated as sacrosanct and forcibly imposed through top-down regulatory schemes, it will often have many unintended consequences and costs. It can even lock in existing market power and market structures by encouraging users and companies to flock to a single platform instead of trying to innovate around it. (Go back and take a look at how the “Kingsbury Commitment” — the interconnection deal from the early days of the U.S. telecom system — actually allowed AT&T to gain greater control over the industry instead of assisting independent operators.)

Citing Palfrey and Gasser, Brown and Marsden do note that “mandated interoperability is neither necessary in all cases nor necessarily desirable” (p. 32), but they don’t spend as much time as Palfrey and Gasser itemizing these trade-offs and the potential downsides of some interoperability mandates. But what frustrates me about both books is the almost quasi-religious reverence accorded to interoperability and open standards when such faith is simply not warranted after historical experience is taken into consideration.

Plenty of the best forms of digital innovation today are due to a lack of interoperability and openness. Proprietary systems have produced some of the most exciting devices (iPhone) and content (video games) of modern times. Then again, voluntary interoperable and “open” services and devices thrive, too. The key point here — and one that I develop in far greater detail in my book chapter, “The Case for Internet Optimism, Part 2 – Saving the Net From Its Supporters” — is that the market for digital services is working marvelously and providing us with choices of many different flavors. Innovation continues to unfold rapidly in both directions along the “open” vs. “closed” continuum. (Here are 30 more essays I have written on this topic if you need more proof.)

Generally speaking, we should avoid mandatory interop and openness solutions. We should instead push those approaches and solutions in a truly voluntary, bottom-up fashion. And, more importantly, we should be pushing for outside-the-box solutions of the Schumpeterian (creative destruction / disruptive innovation) variety instead of surrendering so quickly on competition through forced sharing mandates.

The Case for Patience & Policy Restraint

But Brown and Marsden clearly do not subscribe to that sort of Schumpeterian thinking. They think most code markets tip and lock into monopoly in fairly short order and that only wise interventions can rectify that. For example, they claim that Facebook’s “monopoly is now durable,” which will certainly come as a big surprise to the millions of us who do not use it all. And the story of MySpace’s rapid rise and equally precipitous fall has little bearing on this story, they argue.

But, no matter how you define the “social networking market,” here are two facts about it: First, it is still very, very young. It’s only about a decade old. Second, in that short period of time, we have already witnessed the entire first generation of players fall by the wayside. While the second generation is currently dominated by Facebook, it is by no means alone. Again, millions like me don’t use it at all and get along just fine with other “social networking” technologies, including Twitter, LinkedIn, Google+, and even older tech like email, SMS, and yes, phone calls! Accusations of “monopoly” in this space strain credulity in the extreme. I invite you to read my Mercatus working paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities,” for a more thorough debunking of this logic. (Note: The final version of that paper will be published in the CommLaw Conspectus shortly.)

Such facts should have a bearing on the debate about regulatory interventions. We continue to witness the power of Schumpeterian rivalry as new and existing players battle in a race for the prize of market power. Brown and Marsden fear that the race is already over in many sectors and that it is time to throw in the towel and get busy regulating. But when I look around at the information technology marketplace today, I am astonished just how radically different it looks from even just a few years ago, and not just in the social media market. I have written extensively about the smartphone marketplace, where innovation continues at a frantic pace. As I noted in my essay here on “Smartphones & Schumpeter,” it’s hard to remember now, but just 6 short years ago:

• The iPhone and Android had not yet landed.
• Most of the best-selling phones of 2007 were made by Nokia and Motorola.
• Feature phones still dominated the market; smartphones were still a luxury (and a clunky luxury at that).
• There were no app stores and what “apps” did exist were mostly proprietary and device or carrier-specific; and,
• There was no 4G service.

It’s also easy to forget just how many market analysts and policy wonks were making absurd predictions at the time about how the telecom operators at the time had so much market power that they would crush new innovation without regulation. Instead, in very short order, the market was completely upended in a way that mobile providers never saw coming. There was a huge shift in relative market power flowing from the core of these markets to the fringes, especially to Apple, which wasn’t even a player in that space before the launch of the iPhone.

As I noted in concluding that piece last year, these facts should lead us to believe that this is a healthy, dynamic marketplace in action. Not even Schumpeter could have imagined creative destruction on this scale. (Just look as BlackBerry). But much the same could be said of many other sectors of the information economy.  While it is certainly true that many large players exist, we continue to see a healthy amount of churn in these markets and an astonishing amount of technological innovation.

Public Choice Insights: What History Tells Us

One would hope these realities would have a greater bearing on the policy prescriptions suggested by analysts like Brown and Marsden, but they don’t seem to. Instead, the attitude on display here is that governments can, generally speaking, act wisely and nudge efficiently to correct short-term market hiccups and set us on a better course. But there are strong reasons to question that presumption.

Specifically, what I found most regrettable about Brown and Marsden’s book was the way — like all too many books in this field these days — the authors briefly introduce “public choice” insights and concerns only to summarily dismiss them as unfounded or overblown. (See my review of Brett Frischmann’s book, Infrastructure: The Social Value of Shared Resources for a more extended discussion of this problem as it pertains to discussions about not just infrastructure regulation by the regulation of all complex industries and technologies.)

Brown and Marsden make it clear that their intentions are pure and that their methods would incorporate the lessons of the past, but they aren’t very interested in dwelling on the long, lamentable history of regulatory failures and capture in the communications and media policy sectors. They do note the dangers of a growing “security-industrial complex” and argue that “commercial actors dominate technical actors in policy debates.” They also say that the “potential for capture by regulated interests, especially large corporate lobbies, is an essential insight” that informs their approach. The problem is that it really doesn’t. They largely ignore those insights and instead imply that, to the extent this is a problem at all, we can build a better breed of bureaucrats going forward who will craft “smarter regulation” that is immune from such pressures. Or, they claim that “multi-stakeholderism” — again, the new, more activist and government-influenced conception of it — can overcome these public choice problems.

A better understanding of power politics that is informed by the wisdom of the ages would instead counsel that minimizing the scope of politicization of technology markets is the better remedy. Capture and cronyism in communications and media markets has always grown in direct proportion to the overall scope of law governing those sectors. (I invite you to read all the troubling examples of this that Brent Skorup and I have documented in our new 72-page working paper, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” Warning: It makes for miserable reading but proves beyond any doubt that there is something to public choice concerns.)

To be clear, it’s not that I believe that “market failures” or “code failures” never occur, rather, as I noted in this debate with Larry Lessig, it’s that such problems are typically “better addressed by voluntary, spontaneous, bottom-up, marketplace responses than by coerced, top-down, governmental solutions. Moreover, the decisive advantage of the market-driven approach to correcting code failure comes down to the rapidity and nimbleness of those response(s).” It’s not just that traditional regulatory remedies cannot keep pace with code markets, it’s that those attempting to craft the remedies do not possess the requisite knowledge needed to know how to steer us down a superior path. (See my essay, “Antitrust & Innovation in the New Economy: The Problem with the Static Equilibrium Mindset,” for more on that point.)

Regardless, at a minimum, I expect scholars to take seriously the very real public choice problems at work in this arena. You cannot talk about the history of these sectors without acknowledging the horrifically anti-consumer policies that were often put in place at the request of one industry or another to shield themselves from disruptive innovation. No amount of wishful thinking about “prosumer” policies will change these grim political realities. Only by minimizing chances to politicize technology markets and decisions can we overcome these problems.

Conclusion

For those of us who prefer to focus on freeing code, Brown and Marsden’s Regulating Code is another reminder that liberty is increasingly a loser in Internet policy circles these days. Milton Mueller’s dream of decentralized, denationalized liberalism seems more and more unlikely as armies of policymakers, regulators, special interests, regulatory advocates, academics, and others all line up and plead for their pet interest or cause to be satisfied through pure power politics. No matter what you call it — fudging, nudging, coregulation, smart regulation, multistakeholderism, prosumer law, or whatever else, — there is no escaping the fact that we are witnessing the complete politicization of almost every facet of code creation and digital decisionmaking today.

Despite my deep reservations about a more politicized cyberspace, Brown and Marsden’s book is an important text because it is one of the most sophisticated articulations and defenses of it to date. Their book also helps us better understand the rapidly developing institutional political economy of Internet regulation in both broad and narrow policy contexts. Thus, it is worth your time and attention even if, like me, you are disheartened to be reading yet another Net policy book that ultimately endorses mandates over of markets as the primary modus operandi of the information age.

Additional Resources about the book:

• the official MIT Press website for Regulating Code
• shorter Brown & Marsden paper on “Prosumer Law” (via SSRN)
• Little Atoms podcast featuring Brown & Marsden discussing Regulating Code
• Ian Brown edited this beefy Research Handbook On Governance Of The Internet, which makes a nice complement to Regulating Code. It offers even more detailed case studies on the major issues featured in the book. A terrific resource (if you can afford it!)
• a video of Brown & Marsden discussing the book at the Oxford Internet Institute (also embedded below):

Other books you should read alongside “Regulating Code” (links are for my reviews of each):

• Milton Mueller’s Networks and States: The Global Politics of Internet Governance
• John Palfrey & Urs Gasser’s Interop: The Promise and Perils of Highly Interconnected Systems
• Rebecca MacKinnon’s Consent of the Networked: The Worldwide Struggle for Internet Freedom
• David G. Post’s In Search of Jefferson’s Moose: Notes on the State of Cyberspace
• Christopher Yoo’s The Dynamic Internet: How Technology, Users, and Businesses are Transforming the Network
• Larry Lessig’s Code (my 2-part exchange with Lessig upon Code’s 10^th anniversary: Part 1, Part 2)

Here’s a presentation I delivered on “The War on Vertical Integration in the Digital Economy” at the latest meeting of the Southern Economic Association this weekend. It outlines concerns about vertical integration in the tech economy and specifically addresses regulatory proposals set forth by Tim Wu (arguing for a “separations principle” for the tech economy) & Jonathan Zittrain (arguing for “API neutrality” for social media and digital platforms). This presentation is based on two papers published by the Mercatus Center at George Mason University: “Uncreative Destruction: The Misguided War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy” (with Brent Skorup) & “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.”

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

Is competition really a problem in the tech industry? That was the question the folks over at WebProNews asked me to come on their show and discuss this week. I offer my thoughts in the following 15-minute clip. Also, down below I have embedded a few of my recent relevant essays on this topic, a few of which I mentioned during the show.

• “On Fast Firms, Slow Regulators, Antitrust & the Digital Economy,” Technology Liberation Front, July 6, 2012
• “The Rule Of Three: The Nature of Competition In The Digital Economy,” Forbes, June 29, 2012.
• “Sunsetting Technology Regulation: Applying Moore’s Law to Washington,” Forbes, May 25, 2012.
• “Of “Tech Titans” and Schumpeter’s Vision,” Forbes, August 22, 2011.
• “Bye Bye BlackBerry. How Long Will Apple Last?” Forbes, April 1, 2012.
• “Gary Reback’s Antitrust Love Letter,” Technology Liberation Front, September 20, 2009.
• “What is “Optimal Interoperability”? A Review of Palfrey & Gasser’s’“Interop,’” Technology Liberation Front, June 11, 2012.

This morning I spoke at a U.S. Chamber of Commerce event on “Responsible Data Uses: Benefits to Consumers, Businesses and the Economy.” In preparing for the event, I dusted off some old working notes for speeches I had delivered at other events about privacy policy and “big data” and expanded them a bit to account for recent policy developments. For what it’s worth, I figured I would post those notes here.  (I apologize about the informality but I never write out my speeches, I just work from bullet points.)

—————–

Benefits of “Big Data”

• “big data” has numerous micro- and macroeconomic benefits
• Micro benefits:
  • data aggregation of all varieties has powerful social and economic benefits that are sometimes invisible to consumers and citizens but are nonetheless enjoyed by them
  • big data can positively impact the 3 key micro variables – quality, quantity & price – and benefit consumers / citizens in the process

• Macro benefits:
  • Data is the lifeblood of the information economy and it has an increasing bearing on the global competitiveness of companies and countries
  • In the old days, when we talked about comparative and competitive advantage, the focus was on natural resources, labor, and capital.
  • Today, we increasingly talk about another variable: information
  • Data is increasing one of the most important resources that can benefit economic growth, innovation, and the competitive advantage of firms and nations.

Privacy Concerns

• of course, “big data” also raises big privacy concerns for many groups and individuals
• this has led to calls for regulatory action and virtually all levels of government – federal, state, local, and international – are considering expanded controls on data collection and aggregation

America’s Privacy Regime

• I want to address what I regard as the most powerful myth that governs this debate
• namely, I speak of the myth that America doesn’t have a privacy framework that can balance these goals and concerns about “big data” and data collection in general
• we hear various advocates say that America needs a new privacy regime, and many of these advocates suggest that that regime should more like Europe’s

Europe’s Regime

• first, what is that European regime?
  • a more preemptive top-down approach / data “directives” / stringent requirements on data use
  • basically, under the EU regime, privacy trumps almost all other considerations, regardless of cost or complexity.
  • It’s more of a “Mother, May I” regime in which innovation needs to be “permissioned”

• what’s wrong with European approach?
  • We can relate this back to the question of competitive advantage
  • The European approach leaves less room for innovative uses of data and ongoing marketplace experimentation
  • There’s also some evidence that this regime might influence industry structure and competitiveness as well as the quality and quantity of choices for the consumer
  • Anecdotally-speaking, we can ask ourselves this simple question: Can any of us name a global leader in the modern digital economy that was born in Europe?
  • I suppose there are a few, but I struggle to name them
  • Now, why is that?
  • It could be high taxes and the lack of healthy market for venture capital.
  • But it also must have something to do with regulatory structure that Europe has adopted.

America’s Current Advantages

• Regardless, here’s what we do know: America’s digital economy innovators and social media operators are household names across the globe. Our firms are the envy of the world
• Moreover, while many sectors of the U.S. economy are struggling, I bet if you stopped the average Joe in the street and asked them to name one sector of America’s economy that is currently thriving and an example of innovation that others should emulate, most of them would probably mention information technology and the digital economy.
• Again, many factors may contribute to our current success relative to Europe but certainly our “light-touch” legal and regulatory approach must have had some bearing on that outcome

America’s Privacy Regime

• So, what exactly is America’s privacy regime?
• Again, some say we don’t have one and that regulation is, therefore, needed
• I beg to differ
• America does have a privacy regime; it is one that is:
  • governed by a set of evolutionary norms,
  • ongoing online marketplace interactions and experiments, contractual negotiations,
  • public and press pressures,
  • self-regulatory systems,
  • educational efforts and user empowerment,
  • personal responsibility,
  • and targeted legal enforcement and the use of state torts when true harms can be demonstrated.

•   compared with Europe, our legal regime:
• More bottom-up enforcement
• Issue-specific / Sectoral approach to addressing
• Relies on common law / case law / torts
• States have role; often more stringent than fed law
• evolving industry Self-regulation

• That’s been the uniquely American approach to privacy protection and we should not abandon it lightly.

It’s the Same Regime We’ve Used to Address Online Safety

• Importantly, it’s largely the same approach we have taken in this country toward online speech and child safety matters.
• There, too, we have focused on what I call the “3-E” approach:
  • Education
  • Empowerment, and
  • Enforcement against particularly bad apples

• Thus, in both the online child safety space as well as the privacy policy space, we have made great strides in pushing both personal responsibility and corporate responsibility as the first line of defense, not the last.
• Now, it has always been true, and will always be the case, that “more can be done.”
• Consumers could do more: We need to constantly encourage consumers to take more care to protect the personal data they care most about and to take steps to safeguard that which they do not want collected in the first place
• Companies could do more: And we also need to constantly encourage companies who collect data to take greater steps to:
  • first consider asking permission to collect and use that data
  • second, to be transparent about what data they are collection and what they are using it for
  • and third, to ensure adequate safeguards are in place to guard against unauthorized use of that data

The Difference between the Traditional American Model & the Emerging “Co-Regulatory” Model

• in a sense, this vision tracks the Obama Administration’s proposed model for privacy and data collection
• but here’s the difference: the Obama Administration wants to force this process in a more heavy-handed way by involving various federal agencies in the day-to-day management of how all these decisions get made
• in essence, it’s a small but certain step toward the European model of “co-regulation”
  • government steers, industry rows
  • “multi-stakeholder process”
  • Everyone has a “seat at the table”
  • But we don’t need “a table” if the table is being set by government
  • there’s nothing wrong with truly voluntary “multi-stakeholder” processes, but when the government is the one setting the “seats at the table” and talking about enforcing the “codes” that the committee comes up with, it opens the door to a co-regulation model  that has some real dangers:
    • If every decision about how information is used or aggregated becomes the equivalent of a committee decision — with everyone “at the table” getting a vote or a veto – then it will almost certainly be the case that less innovation occurs
    • The process could lack traditional democratic accountability / due process if more of an “agency threats” model evolves out of this.  After all, if certain officials are in charge of who gets a “seat at the table” and also responsible for enforcing whatever is decided “at the table,” it raises the question of how much pressure they can bring to bear on the process. (File this under “regulation by raised eyebrow”).
    • Any way you cut it, regulation by committee (in this case, the “multistakeholder” process) could become the equivalent of a tax on innovation and have detrimental impacts on the quality and price of online services

Conclusion

• For these reasons, we should instead continue to rely on the uniquely American model of privacy policy that balances diverse goals and values in a more spontaneous, evolutionary, and voluntary way without incessant government oversight and intervention.
• Again, the traditional American model isn’t perfect and sometimes we will need targeted statutes, torts, and even FTC (Sec. 5) enforcement to handle the bad apples out there who cause the most serious problems in terms of privacy violations or data breeches.
• But that more targeted approach to enforcement, along with the education and empowerment-based approaches I have outlined, can adapt to new challenges in this space and the child safety space while also ensuring our global competitive advantage is not sacrificed in the process.
• To sum up: let’s not casually trade in the American model for Europe’s. America’s more flexible, evolutionary model of privacy protection has served us well so far and can adapt to balance competing needs without crushing our innovative information economy or America’s global competitiveness.

Additional Reading:

• my big Mercatus Center filing to the FTC last year on privacy and Do Not Track regulation
• my recent Forbes oped, “The Problem with Obama’s “Let’s Be More Like Europe” Privacy Plan“
• Initial Thoughts on FTC’s Final Privacy Report
• video & slides from Hill Briefing on Online Privacy Policy
• Isn’t “Do Not Track” Just a “Broadcast Flag” Mandate for Privacy?
• Privacy as an Information Control Regime: The Challenges Ahead
• Obama Admin’s “Let’s-Be-Europe” Approach to Privacy Will Undermine U.S. Competitiveness
• Lessons from the Gmail Privacy Scare of 2004
• When It Comes to Information Control, Everybody Has a Pet Issue & Everyone Will Be Disappointed
• And so the IP & Porn Wars Give Way to the Privacy & Cybersecurity Wars
• Book Review: Solove’s Understanding Privacy

Today the Mercatus Center has released a short new paper I have authored on “Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech.”  I begin the piece by noting that:

Federal policy makers, state legislators, and state attorneys general have recently shown interest in regulating commercial advertising and marketing. Several new regulatory initiatives are being proposed, or are already underway, that could severely curtail or restrict advertising or marketing on a variety of platforms. The consequences of these stepped-up regulatory efforts will be profound and will hurt consumer welfare both directly and indirectly.

I go on to note that “advertising can be an easy target for politicians or regulatory activist groups who make a variety of (typically unsubstantiated) claims about its negative impact on society,” but then continue on to explain how “the role of commercial speech in a free-market economy is often misunderstood or taken for granted.” I outline how, despite regulators’ concerns, consumers actually derive three important types of benefits from advertising and marketing: (1) Informational / Educational Benefits; (2) Market Choice / Pro-Competitive Benefits; and (3) Media Promotion / Cross-Subsidization.  After discussing each benefit, I conclude that:

For these reasons, a stepped-up regulatory crusade against advertising and marketing will hurt consumer welfare since it will raise prices, restrict choice, and diminish marketplace competition and innovation—both in ad-supported content and service markets, and throughout the economy at large.  Simply stated, there is no free lunch.

Read the entire 1,800-word essay here.  I have also embedded the document down below in a Scribd reader.

Unappreciated Benefits of Advertising and Commercial Speech (Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

The smell of high-tech regulation is increasingly in the air these days and many lawmakers and some activist groups now have the mobile marketplace in their regulatory cross-hairs. Critics make a variety of claims about the wireless market supposedly lacking competition, choice, innovation, or reasonable pricing. Consequently, they want to wrap America’s wireless sector in a sea of red tape.   Two important new studies thoroughly debunk these assertions and set the record straight regarding the state of wireless competition and innovation in the U.S. today. These reports are must-reading for Washington policymakers and FCC officials who are currently contemplating regulatory action.

First, Gerald Faulhaber and Dave Farber have a new report out entitled “Innovation in the Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework.”  Here’s what Faulhaber and Farber find:

the three segments of the wireless marketplace (applications, devices, and core network) have exhibited very substantial innovation and investment since its inception. Perhaps more interesting, innovation in each segment is highly dependent upon innovation in the other segments. For example, new applications depend upon both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in spectral efficiency of the core network to provide the network capacity to serve those applications. Further, we find that the three segments of the industry are also highly competitive. There are many players in each segment, each of which aggressively seeks out customers through new technology and new business methods. The results of this competition are manifest: (i) firms are driven to innovate and invest in order to win in the competitive marketplace; (ii) new business models have emerged that give customers more choice; and (iii) firms have opened new areas such as wireless broadband and laptop wireless in order to expand their strategic options.

They continue on to address the policy issues in play here and discuss the “consumer-centric” approach they recommend that the FCC adopt:

Having found that all three segments are highly competitive, we ask, where is the market failure? If none, then the principle of customer-centric applies: let customers make the key decisions regarding which products, services, open vs. managed business models, net neutrality, et al. will survive in the marketplace. While there is no shortage of pundits, advocates, lobbyists and academics advising the FCC that it, rather than customers, should be making these decisions and advising the FCC what those decisions should be, a customer-centric FCC must leave these decisions to customers in a competitive marketplace. Should the FCC decide to preempt customers and make choices for them, it follows as does night from day that the result will be (i) less customer choice, and therefore reduced customer well-being; (ii) higher costs for producers and therefore customers; (iii) lower incentives to invest and innovate, harming customers, producers and the American economy. In this case, economics and technology are on the same page: economists advise intervention only in the case of demonstrated market failure, and then only if there is evidence that the intervention will do more good than harm. The technologist’s advice is more pithy and down to earth: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!

Amen to that.  Let’s hope our lawmakers are listening.

Second, Everett Ehrlich, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Wayne Leighton have a terrific new paper out entitled “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation and Choice in Wireless Communications,” which reaches similar conclusions to those Faulhaber and Farber found in their report. Here’s the executive summary from the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton report:

Proposals to increase regulation of mobile wireless services, for example, by applying “net neutrality” regulation, are often based on claims that such regulation would enhance innovation and increase consumer choice. In fact, they would have the opposite effect. The business practices that would be banned by such regulation are efficient mechanisms for spreading and reducing risk, lowering transactions costs, and enhancing marketing activities, all of which contribute to innovation and choice. Moreover, product differentiation increases competition and thus contributes both directly and indirectly to consumer choice. While some types of exclusive agreements and other “discriminatory” practices can theoretically harm competition, the precondition for such harm to occur – i.e., market power in one or more of the affected markets – generally is not present in wireless markets. Hence, the proposed regulations cannot be justified on grounds of market failure. Rather than increasing innovation and consumer choice, as promised, they would severely disrupt the wireless sector’s highly successful business model and significantly reduce innovation and consumer choice.

Like the Faulhaber-Farber paper, the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper examines the major segments of the wireless marketplace — applications, devices, and networks — and shows them all to be vigorously competitive and experiencing significant innovation. Some of the following tables and charts help to illustrate this.

This first table shows how concentration ratios for the U.S. market (as measured by HHI) are among the lowest in the world.

The next two charts show that U.S. carriers have the lowest revenue per minute (60% lower than the average OECD country) even though average minutes per use are more than twice the amount of the next highest ranked country (Canada).

Finally, this final chart from their report offers a snapshot of mobile Internet penetration in 16 countries showing the U.S. on top:

Incidentally, the Faulhaber-Farber study also does a nice job listing the various mobile application stores out there today:

Device Manufacturer App Stores Apple’s App Store BlackBerry’s App World Palm’s App Catalog Nokia’s Ovi Store Samsung’s Application Store Sony’s PlayNow arena LG’s Application Store

Software Developers Google’s Android Market Microsoft’s Windows Mobile

Carriers AT&T’s MEdia Mall Verizon Wireless’ Tools & Applications Sprint’s Software Store US Cellular’s easyedge Cellular South’s Discover Center Cricket’s Downloads

Independent Stores Handango GetJar

And the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper provides some addition perspective on innovation in the handset and applications space:

On the metrics that seem to be of greatest concern to regulation advocates – choice and innovation – the data also show the industry is performing well. For example, CTIA reports there are more than 630 different wireless handsets and devices available in the U.S., compared with only 147 in the United Kingdom, and notes that many of the most advanced handsets introduced in recent months have been launched in the U.S., including (among others) the iPhone 3G, the Google G1, and the Blackberry Storm. Amazon’s highly popular Kindle was also launched in the U.S. with connectivity provided by Sprint – while its European launch was delayed for a full year by Amazon’s inability to reach agreement with a mobile carrier there. As noted above, the number and variety of available applications is increasing rapidly: In addition to the Apple Apps Store, application downloads are now available from the Android Market (Google), the Palm Software Store, Blackberry App World and the Nokia Ovi Store, offering a total of more than 60,000 different applications. On July 14, 2009 Apple announced that more than 1.5 billion applications had been downloaded from its iPhone App Store since its launch in July 2008.

Actually, that number is even higher now.  As I noted here recently, in just a little over a year, Apple reports there’s been 2 billion downloads of over 85,000 apps from over 125,000 developers.  It’s just stunning when you think about it.

I encourage everyone to read both reports cover-to-cover.  They provide a comprehensive look at the reality on the ground — or in the air, as the case may be — in America’s mobile marketplace.

More restraint is in order when it comes to the Obama administrations intent to escalate “antitrust” enforcement against business and enterprise in America.

A skeptical interpretation of antitrust’s realities—up to and including recent campaigns targeting Intel, Google, XM-Sirius; and earlier campaigns against Microsoft and the AOL Time Warner merger, as well as rejected mergers like Echostar/DirecTV—is that antitrust often advances the well being of various species of political predators rather than consumers.

Antitrust is a form of economic regulation. And like all economic regulation, it transfers wealth from somebody to somebody else, often in response to special-interest urging. Partly in recognition of such shortcomings, many economic sectors like transportation and telecommunications were (partly) deregulated and liberalized during the last quarter of the 20th century. But antitrust regulation typically gets a pass. Even in the “new economy,” this century-old smokestack era concept is used to justify constraints and conditions imposed on vigorously competitive modern companies. Antitrust is wrongly seen as being in the public interest, as having a superior role to play in policing markets relative to the alternatives.

In antitrust cases, targeted companies’ rivals have a direct financial interest in the outcome. Appeals to antitrust as a public interest law do not change the fact that private motives of rivals, and even ambitious enforcers, are not simply lurking in the background, but running the show. The idea that antitrust helps consumers and that it has a role to play in the new economy deserves reexamination and challenge.

Under antitrust law, a laundry list of business practices (tying, bundling, discrimination, exclusive deals, and so on) are regarded suspiciously, some outlawed altogether. But business transactions are fundamentally voluntary, non-coercive dealings—unlike the forced antitrust interventions that rivals often seek. From this fresh perspective, one finds that even the most “despised” business behaviors—even collusion and mega-mergers—can be pro-competitive and pro-consumer. To the extent that antitrust regulation strikes down practices that have misunderstood or ignored efficiency justifications, especially in an information-based economy, individuals and society are made unnecessarily poorer.

The list of vilified business practices is long, but needn’t be, and we often try to explain why. If anyone cares about economic recovery and jobs, today’s aim should be to “deregulate to stimulate,” so a list of vilified trustbuster practices would be far more advantageous to consumers.