If there is one thing I have learned in almost 23 years of covering communications and media regulation it is this: No matter how well-intentioned, regulation often has unintended consequences that hurt the very consumers the rules are meant to protect. Case in point: “universal service” mandates that require a company to serve an entire area as a condition of offering service at all. The intention is noble: Get service out to everyone in the community, preferably at a very cheap rate. Alas, the result of mandating that result is clear: You get less competition, less investment, less innovation, and less consumer choice. And often you don’t even get everyone served.

Consider this Wall Street Journal article today, “Google Fiber Is Fast, but Is It Fair? The Company Provides Neighborhoods With Faster and Cheaper Service, but Are Some Being Left Behind?” In the story, Alistair Barr notes that:

U.S. policy long favored extending service to all. AT&T touted its “universal service” in advertisements more than a century ago. The concept was codified in a 1934 law requiring nationwide “wire and radio services” to reach everyone at “reasonable charges.” In exchange for wiring a community, telecommunications providers often gained a monopoly. Cities made similar deals with cable-TV providers beginning in the 1960s.

The problem, of course, is that while this model allowed for the slow spread of service to most communities, it came at a very steep cost: Monopoly and plain vanilla service. I documented this in a 1994 essay entitled, “Unnatural Monopoly: Critical Moments in the Development of the Bell System Monopoly.” As well-intentioned regulatory mandates started piling up, competition slowly disappeared. And a devil’s deal was eventually cut between regulators and AT&T to adopt the company’s advertising motto — “One Policy, One System, Universal Service” — as the de facto law of the land.

It took us almost a century to dig ourselves out of that mess and move towards telecommunications competition. Alas, we’re still living with the vestiges of this old regulatory mentality. Cities and counties across America still impose a wide variety of “universal service” regulatory mandates. Again, their intention is noble: They want everyone in their community served. You can’t blame them for that. But the result is still the same: Limited facilities-based competition and investment.

And so we return to today’s Wall Street Journal story about Google Fiber, which explains how local officials are finally starting to understand these realities. The story notes:

In 2011, Google struck a deal with authorities in both Kansas City, Kan., and Kansas City, Mo., to build the service based on customer demand. City officials say they didn’t push hard for universal coverage because they thought faster Internet service would boost the local economy and they were competing against so many other cities. “The main point was to win and bring that infrastructure to our city,” said Rick Usher, assistant city manager of Kansas City, Mo. As phone and cable companies slowed their own expansion plans, more cities allowed the selective approach.

Google’s ‘build-to-demand’ model is catching on because it produces results: More infrastructure investment, innovation, and competition. Traditional telecom and broadband operators are prepared to step up investment, too, when the incentives are right:

Verizon was required by cities and some state laws to build and offer its FiOS service widely across cities. It stopped expanding to new cities in 2010; to date, it has spent more than $23 billion on the FiOS rollout. Chief Financial Officer Fran Shammo said in March that the company wouldn’t expand to additional markets until FiOS had “finally returned its cost of capital.” If Verizon resumes expansion, the company would consider Google’s build-to-demand model because it has the potential to be more profitable, said Chris Levendos, a Verizon executive overseeing the FiOS build-out in Manhattan. Others are doing just that. AT&T said in April it would offer Internet speeds of up to one gigabit in as many as 100 cities. It is building to demand and working with local authorities to reduce construction costs, the company said. Tuesday, it said it would bring the high-speed service to Cupertino, Calif., close to Google’s headquarters. This approach “starts to make this business model look quite attractive,” John Stankey, AT&T’s chief strategy officer, said at an investor conference on Aug. 13.

Again, when you get the incentives right and give investors and innovators a green light, they will seize the opportunity. And that’s even true — actually, it is especially true — for high fixed-cost investments like fiber networks.

But wait, aren’t there some pockets of the population that will fall through the cracks under this alternative arrangement? In the short-term, potentially yes. But the right answer to that “digital divide” problem is never to restrict short-term investment and innovation opportunities just because you think you have a better, more “well intentioned” plan. That is the crucial mistake policymakers made in the past. Their desire to get everyone served at the exact same time with the exact same plain vanilla service meant we got sub-optimal technologies and stagnant markets with little hope of any new innovation or investment over the long-haul.

This is how “universal service” consistently fails us. Universal service sells us short. It sells human ingenuity short. The logic that motivates universal service regulation is that: ‘Well, this is about the best we can do. Let’s just get everyone some basic level of service and that will be just and good.’  Can you imagine if we would have applied this logic to other major markets and technologies?!

But what about the under-served communities? First, when you allow new innovation in networks, you never know how or where they might spread next. If you have more competitors offering unique networks architectures and services, there is a very good chance that entrepreneurial minds will figure out how to push out the boundaries of what is possible, especially in terms of how the service is delivered.

Consider this: Back in the old days, did it really make sense to try to stretch a thin copper wire way, way out into the middle of every valley, desert, farm field, and mountain? The myopic universal service mindset says: ‘Well, that’s all we had at the time.’ Perhaps for a time it really was. But how much quicker might we have seen some sort of alternative system if we hadn’t locked in those old assumptions as policy requirements? Is it impossible to believe that wireless technologies might have developed much more quickly if the incentives would have been right? Again, there was no reason for any innovators or investors to even consider the idea at a time when policymakers were mandating copper wires be stretched to every corner of the land, and as they were showering favored companies with subsidies to achieve that goal. That’s not something a new innovator could compete with, and so no one did. It would have been like policymakers saying we needed a “universal service” policy for cheap hamburgers for the masses and then showering McDonald’s with subsidies since they were the first one in many local markets who could deliver on that promise. Had we had such a universal cheap hamburger policy, do you think any other fast food places would have ever come to town and tried to compete against those subsidized burgers? Not likely.

The lesson for today’s policymakers is clear: Open up markets, relax regulatory burdens, eliminate discriminatory taxes and subsidies, and clear away other barriers to investment. Then see what happens. As the Google Fiber experience suggests, innovative minds can and will emerge to offer constructive solutions and slowly spread new networks and technologies.

OK, but won’t there still be some communities that are underserved, even with all that new innovation and investment. It’s certainly possible. And where those communities exist, some government action may be necessary to incentivize the spread of some sort of network to them, or even have the government build it for the community. I’m not opposed to that. (Have you ever driven through the hills of West Virginia or the mountains of rural Western states? Hard places to get wired networks out to!) I’m not very optimistic local governments will do a very good job of building sophisticated networks because they already have a horrible track record in this regard. But, again, I don’t oppose local action on this front if no other alternatives appear after a certain period of time.

But, again, the answer here is not crazy national and state-based universal service mandates that regulate everyone in every community as if they had the same problem. Let competition and innovation work its magic where it can and do not mess that up. Where it proves much harder for that network competition and innovation to take root, use smart incentives to get companies to build out their networks further, or offer alternative wireless infrastructure of some sort, or just have the government build the networks themselves. But we should always give competition and innovation the benefit of the doubt and see what happens first.

So, let me perfectly clear what I am saying here: GOOD INTENTIONS ARE NEVER ENOUGH! [And yes, I am using all caps because I am shouting!] The next time somebody starts mouthing something about how they have the moral high ground in these debates because their intentions are supposedly pure as the driven snow, ask them to show you results. Tell them you want evidence that their intentions have actually produced something concrete and positive for society. If their answer is, in essence, ‘Well, with our regulatory mandates we can at least get everybody some basic level of really crappy monopoly service,’ then tell them that they can take their good intentions and shove them. We can do better.

Some recent tech news provides insight into the trajectory of broadband and television markets. These stories also indicate a poor prognosis for a net neutrality. Political and ISP opposition to new rules aside (which is substantial), even net neutrality proponents point out that “neutrality” is difficult to define and even harder to implement. Now that the line between “Internet video” and “television” delivered via Internet Protocol (IP) is increasingly blurring, net neutrality goals are suffering from mission creep.

First, there was the announcement that Netflix, like many large content companies, was entering into a paid peering agreement with Comcast, prompting a complaint from Netflix CEO Reed Hastings who argued that ISPs have too much leverage in negotiating these interconnection deals.

Second, Comcast and Apple discussed a possible partnership whereby Comcast customers would receive prioritized access to Apple’s new video service. Apple’s TV offering would be a “managed service” exempt from net neutrality obligations.

Interconnection and managed services are generally not considered net neutrality issues. They are not “loopholes.” They were expressly exempted from the FCC’s 2010 (now-defunct) rules. However, net neutrality proponents are attempting to bring interconnection and managed services to the FCC’s attention as the FCC crafts new net neutrality rules. Net neutrality proponents have an uphill battle already, and the following trends won’t help.

1. Interconnection becomes less about traffic burden and more about leverage.

The ostensible reason that content companies like Netflix (or third parties like Cogent) pay ISPs for interconnection is because video content unloads a substantial amount of traffic onto ISPs’ last-mile networks.

Someone has to pay for network upgrades to handle the traffic. Typically, the parties seem to abide by the equity principle that whoever is sending the traffic–in this case, Netflix–should bear the costs via paid peering. That way, the increased expense is incurred by Netflix who can spread costs across its subscribers. If ISPs incurred the expense of upgrades, they’d have to spread costs over its subscriber base, but many of their subscribers are not Netflix users.

That principle doesn’t seem to hold for WatchESPN, which is owned by Disney. WatchESPN is an online service that provides live streams of ESPN television programming, like ESPN2 and ESPNU, to personal computers and also includes ESPN3, an online-only livestream of non-marquee sports. If a company has leverage in other markets, like Disney does in TV programming markets, I suspect ISPs can’t or won’t charge for interconnection. These interconnection deals are non-public but Disney probably doesn’t pay ISPs for transmitting WatchESPN traffic onto ISPs’ last-mile networks. The existence of a list of ESPN’s “Participating Providers” indicates that ISPs actually have to pay ESPN for the privilege of carrying WatchESPN content.

Netflix is different from WatchESPN in significant ways (it has substantially more traffic, for one). However, it is a popular service and seems to be flexing its leverage muscle with its Open Connect program, which provided higher-quality videos to participating ISPs. It’s plausible that someday video sources like Netflix will gain leverage, especially as broadband competition increases, and ISPs will have to pay content companies for traffic, rather than the reverse. When competitive leverage is the issue, antitrust agencies, not the FCC, have the appropriate tools to police business practices.

2. The rise of managed services in video.

Managed services include services ISPs provide to customers like VoIP and video-on-demand (VOD). They are on data streams that receive priority for guaranteed quality assurance since customers won’t tolerate a jittery phone call or movie stream. Crucially, managed services are carried on the same physical broadband network but are on separate data streams that don’t interfere with a customer’s Internet service.

The Apple-Comcast deal, if it comes to fruition, would be the first major video offering provided as a managed service. (Comcast has experimented with managed services affiliated with Xbox and TiVo.) Verizon is also a potential influential player since it just bought an Intel streaming TV service. Future plans are uncertain but Verizon might launch a TV product that it could sell outside of the FiOS footprint with a bundle of cable channels, live television, and live sports.

Net neutrality proponents decry managed services as exploiting a loophole in the net neutrality rules but it’s hardly a loophole. The FCC views managed services as a social good that ISPs should invest in. The FCC’s net neutrality advisory committee last August released a report and concluded that managed services provide “considerable” benefits to consumers. The report went on to articulate principles that resemble a safe harbor for ISPs contemplating managed services. Given this consensus view, I see no reason why the FCC would threaten managed services with new rules.

3. Uncertainty about what is “the Internet” and what is “television.”

Managed services and other developments are blurring the line between the Internet and television, which makes “neutrality” on the Internet harder to define and implement. We see similar tensions in phone service. Residential voice service is already largely carried via IP. According to FCC data, 2014 will likely be the year that more people subscribe to VoIP service than plain-old-telephone service. The IP Transition reveals the legal and practical tensions when technology advances make the FCC’s regulatory silos–“phone” and “Internet”–anachronistic.

Those same technology changes and legal ambiguity are carrying over into television. TV is also increasingly carried via IP and it’s unclear where “TV” ends and “Internet video” begins. This distinction matters because television is regulated heavily while Internet video is barely regulated at all. On one end of the spectrum you have video-on-demand from a cable operator. VOD is carried over a cable operator’s broadband lines but fits under the FCC’s cable service rules. On the other end of the spectrum you have Netflix and YouTube. Netflix and YouTube are online-only video services delivered via broadband but are definitely outside of cable rules.

In the gray zone between “TV” and “Internet video” lies several services and physical networks that are not entirely in either category. These services include WatchESPN and ESPN3, which are owned by a cable network and are included in traditional television negotiations but delivered via a broadband connection.

IPTV, also, is not entirely TV nor Internet video. AT&T’s UVerse, Verizon’s FiOS, and Google Fiber’s television product are pure or hybrid IPTV networks that “look” like cable or satellite TV to consumers but are not. AT&T, Verizon, and Google voluntarily assent to many, but not all, cable regulations even though their service occupies a legally ambiguous area.

Finally, on the horizon, are managed video and gaming services and “virtual MSOs” like Apple’s or Verizon’s video products. These are probably outside of traditional cable rules–like program access rules and broadcast carriage mandates–but there is still regulatory uncertainty.

Broadband and video markets are in a unique state of flux. New business models are slowly emerging and firms are attempting to figure out each other’s leverage. However, as phone and video move out of their traditional regulatory categories and converge with broadband services, companies face substantial regulatory compliance risks. In such an environment, more than ever, the FCC should proceed cautiously and give certainty to firms. In any case, I’m optimistic that experts’ predictions will be borne out: ex ante net neutrality rules are looking increasingly rigid and inappropriate for this ever-changing market environment.

Related Posts

1. Yes, Net Neutrality is a Dead Man Walking. We Already Have a Fast Lane.
2. Who Won the Net Neutrality Case?
3. If You’re Reliant on the Internet, You Loathe Net Neutrality.

Call it what you want: a bailout, a thumb on the scales, bidder restrictions–the FCC might conspicuously intervene in the 2015 incentive auctions at the behest of smaller carriers and public interest advocates.

Chairman Wheeler’s recent comments indicate the FCC may devise a way to prevent the largest two carriers–AT&T and Verizon–from purchasing “too much” of the television broadcasters’ spectrum at auction. AT&T likely sees the writing on the wall and argues that if there are auction limits, the restrictions should apply only to the auction, rather than more extreme restrictions that would penalize AT&T and Verizon, the largest carriers, for previously-acquired spectrum. As The Switch’s Brian Fung put it,

the small carriers favor what are called “asymmetric” spectrum caps that affect various carriers differently, while opponents prefer “symmetric” caps that don’t account for existing market positions.

While I wish AT&T put up more of a fight to auction interventions, they (and staff at the FCC) are handicapped in pursuing an unrestricted auction. The blame lies mostly with Congress who gave the FCC vague (thus ripe for abuse) and conflicting mandates spanning decades. The 1993 law authorizing auctions, for instance, requires the FCC to “avoid[] excessive concentration of licenses” and to “disseminat[e] licenses among a wide variety of applicants” among other regulatory carve-outs for smaller competitors. These latter requirements, if implemented as rigorously as smaller carriers would like, directly undermine the purpose of the 2012 American Taxpayer Relief Act that requires the upcoming spectrum auctions raise $7 billion for a public safety broadband network and $20 billion for deficit reduction.

By asymmetrically penalizing AT&T and Verizon, the FCC increases the probability the auction fails to raise the tens of billions of dollars needed (see Fred Campbell’s recent paper). I haven’t heard a policymaker speak about the incentive auction without remarking how extraordinarily complex it is. That complexity–as was made clear in this week’s Senate hearing on the subject–means no one knows how much spectrum will be auctioned off or how much money will be raised. I was doubtful the FCC would secure the called-for 120 MHz for auction in the first place, but the Senate hearing convinced me that they might not get even 60 MHz. If the FCC meddles too much and the broadcasters aren’t assured they’ll get top dollar for their spectrum, the broadcasters might not show up to sell.

For many reasons, the FCC should ignore the pressures to restrict the large carriers in bidding. Smaller carriers argue the large carriers will outbid them only to preclude competition and hoard the spectrum. Every major carrier is spending billions to expand its footprint and capacity rapidly so the hoarding argument is hard to accept (not to mention, carriers face FCC build out requirements). The hoarding argument also confounds me because AT&T and Verizon are at the forefront arguing for more spectrum auctions, particularly spectrum from federal agencies. Would they want the market flooded with new spectrum only so they could spend billions to hoard it?

Asymmetric auction restrictions also resemble a bailout for smaller carriers. T-Mobile and Sprint–who most actively lobby for auction restrictions–are not mom-and-pop establishments. Each is a sophisticated, powerful corporation with access to capital markets and backed by larger international telecoms–Germany’s Deutsche Telekom for T-Mobile and Japan’s SoftBank for Sprint. DT and SoftBank have both pledged to spend billions in the next few years to improve their American carrier’s competitive position. Such carriers do not need an FCC handout.

The bailout resemblance is more apparent when you realize Sprint has been hamstrung for nearly a decade with damaging business decisions. Three come immediately to mind: 1) the dreadful merger with Nextel in 2005; 2) the ill-fated bet in 2008 to forgo LTE rollout in favor of WiMax, a competing 4G standard; and 3) the loss of over one million customers when it discontinued its push-to-talk iDEN service for network upgrades. The losses from the Nextel merger alone approach $30 billion.

To be clear, I don’t second-guess Sprint’s decisions. They did what innovative firms are supposed to do in attempting big, risky investments. However, it should not be the job of the FCC to favor some firms through spectrum auctions because some carriers’ business decisions did not pan out. That is not a competitive wireless auction–that is an FCC-orchestrated bailout. Granted, the FCC has been handed conflicting mandates. The Commission has ample discretion, however, to conduct a competitive auction that both complies with the law and improves chances of reaching the ambitious revenue goals. Intense meddling with auction results could prove disastrous.

Last week, the House held a hearing about the so-called IP Transition. The IP Transition refers to the telephone industry practice of carrying all wire-based consumer services–voice, Internet, and television–via faster, better fiber networks and not on the traditional copper wires that had fewer capabilities. Most consumers have not and will not notice the change. The completed IP Transition, however, has enormous implications for how the FCC regulates. As one telecom watcher said, “What’s at stake? Everything in telecom policy.”

For 100 years or so, phone service has had a special place in regulatory law given its importance in connecting the public. Phone service was almost exclusively over copper wires, a service affectionately called “plain old telephone service” (POTS). AT&T became the government-approved POTS national monopolist in 1913 (which ended with the AT&T antitrust breakup in the 1980s). The deal was: AT&T got to be a protected monopolist while the government got to require AT&T provide various public benefits. The most significant of these is universal service–AT&T had to serve virtually every US household and charge reasonable rates even to remote (that is, expensive) customers.

To create more phone competitors to the Baby Bells–the phone companies spun off from the AT&T break-up in the 1980s–the Congress passed the 1996 Telecom Act and the FCC put burdens on the Baby Bells to allow new phone companies to lease the Baby Bells’ AT&T-created copper wires at regulated rates. The market changed in ways never envisioned in the 1990s however. Today, phone companies face competition–not from the new phone companies leasing the old monopoly infrastructure but from entirely different technologies. You can receive voice service from your cable company (“digital voice”), your “phone” company (POTS), your wireless company, and even Internet-based providers like Vonage and Skype. Increasingly, households are leaving POTS behind in favor of voice service from cable or wireless providers. Yet POTS providers–like Verizon and AT&T (which also offer wireless service)–must abide by monopoly-era regulations that their cable and wireless competitors–Comcast, Sprint, and others–don’t have to abide by.

Understanding the significance of the IP Transition requires (unfortunately) knowing a little bit about Title I and Title II of the Communications Act. “Telecommunications services,” which are the phone companies with copper networks, are heavily regulated by the FCC under Title II. On the other hand, “information services,” which includes Internet service, are lightly regulated under Title I. This division made some sense in the 1990s. It is increasingly under stress now because burdened “telecommunications” companies like AT&T and Verizon are offering “information services” like Internet via DSL, FiOS, and U-Verse. Conversely, lightly-regulated “information services” companies like Comcast, Charter, and Time-Warner Cable are entering the regulated telephone market but face few of the regulatory burdens.

Which brings us to the IP Transition. As Title II phone companies replace their copper wires with fiber and deploy broadband networks to compete with cable companies, their customers’ phone service is being carried via IP packets. Functionally, these new networks act like a heavily-regulated Title II service since they carry voice, but they also act like the Title I broadband networks that cable providers built. So should these new fiber networks be burdened like Title II services or deregulated like Title I services? Or is it possible to achieve some middle ground using existing law? Those are the questions before the FCC and policymakers. Billions of dollars of investment will be accelerated or slowed and many firms will live or die depending on how the FCC and Congress act. Stay tuned.

Over on Forbes today, I have a very long post inspired by Monday’s oral arguments in Verizon’s challenge of the FCC’s Open Internet rules, passed in 2010

I say “inspired” because the post has nothing to say about the oral arguments which, in any case, I did not attend.  Mainstream journalists can’t resist the temptation to try to read into the questions asked or the mood of the judges some indication of how the decision will come out

But as anyone who has ever worked in a court or followed appellate practice  well knows, the tone of oral arguments signals nothing about a judge’s point-of-view.  Often, the harshest questioning is reserved for the side a judge is leaning towards supporting, perhaps because the briefs filed were inadequate.  Bad briefs create more work for the judge and her clerks.

I use the occasion of the hearing to take a fresh look at the net neutrality “debate,” which has been on-going since at least 2005, when I first started paying attention to it.  In particular, I try to disentangle the political term “net neutrality” (undefined and, indeed, not even used in the 2010 Open Internet order) from the engineering principles of packet routing.

According to advocates for government regulation of broadband access, the political argument for net neutrality regulation is simply a codification of the Internet’s design.  But regardless of whether it would even make sense to transform the FCC into the governing body of engineering protocols for the network (the Internet Society and the its engineering task forces are and always have been doing a fine job, thanks very much), the reality is that the political argument has almost nothing to do with the underlying engineering.

Indeed, those most strongly advocating for more government regulation either don’t understand the engineering or intentionally mischaracterize it, or both.  That’s clear from the wide range of supposed competitive problems that have been lumped together under the banner of “net neutrality” issues over the years–almost none of which have anything to do with packet routing.

Fortunately, very little of the larger political agenda of the loose coalition of net neutrality advocates is reflected in the rules ultimately passed by a bare majority of the FCC in 2010.  Even so, those rules, limited as they were, face many challenges.

For one thing, the FCC, despite over a year of dedicated attention to the problem, could identify only four incidents that suggested any kind of market failure, and only one of which (the Comcast-BitTorrent incident) was ever actually considered in detail by the Commission.  (Two of the others never even rose to the level of a complaint.)  The agency was left to regulate on the basis of “preserving” the Open Internet through what it called (nearly a dozen times) “prophylactic” rules.

Second, and of particular interest in the D.C. Circuit proceeding, Congress has never authorized the FCC to issue rules dealing with broadband Internet access.  Though many authorizing bills have circulated over the years, none have ever made it out of committee.  With no legal basis to regulate, the agency was left pointing to irrelevant provisions of the existing Communications Act–most of which were already rejected by the same court in the Comcast case.  Nothing in the law has changed since Comcast, and on that basis, regardless of the merits of Internet regulation, the FCC is very likely to lose.  Which the Commission surely knew in passing the rules in 2010.

The piece ends by describing, as I did in my testimony before the House Judiciary Committee in early 2011, how the Report and Order betray the technical reality that from an engineering standpoint, even the supposed neutrality of packet routing is largely a sentimental myth.  The FCC identified and exempted a dozen network management technologies, practices, and protocols that they acknowledged do not follow the neutrality principle, but which are essential to effective and efficient management of the network.  There is no “neutral” Internet to preserve, and never was.

The agency was right to exempt these practices.  But the problem with the rules as written is that they could not and did not extend to future innovations that new applications and new users will certainly make as essential as today’s management techniques.

If the rules stand, network engineers, application developers, device makers and others in the vibrant, dynamic Internet ecosystem will be forced to seek permission to innovate from the FCC, which will both slow the high-speed world of Internet design to a crawl and introduce a decision maker with no technical expertise and lots of political baggage.

That of course was the kind of counter-productive and unnecessary regulatory intrusion that Internet users successfully rose up against last year when the UN’s International Telecommunications Union threatened to assert itself in basic Internet governance, or the year before that when Congress, without technical understanding of the most basic variety, tried to re-architect the Internet  on behalf of media companies in the failed SOPA and PIPA legislation.

If the FCC gains a foothold in broadband access with the Open Internet rules or other efforts to gain oversight where Congress has delegated none, expect a similar reaction.  Or, in any case, hope for one.

Over at The Switch, the Washington Post’s excellent new technology policy blog, Brian Fung has an interesting post about tethering and Google Glass, but I think he perpetuates a common misconception:

Carriers have all sorts of rules about tethering, and sorting through them can be like feeling your way down a dark alley. Verizon used to charge $20 a month for tethering before the FCC ruled it had to allow tethering for free. Now, any data you use comes out of your cellular plan’s overall data allowance. AT&T gives you a separate pool of data for tethering plans, but charges up to $50 a month for the right, much as Verizon once did.

Fung claims that due to the likely increase in tethering as devices like Google Glass come to market, “assuming the FCC didn’t require all wireless carriers to make tethering free, it’d be a huge source of potential revenue for companies like AT&T.”

In fact, the cost of tethering on AT&T is not very different from the cost of doing so on Verizon, which means by definition that AT&T is not likely to get a windfall from increased use of tethering. It’s also evidence that the FCC tethering rule for Verizon doesn’t matter very much.

Let’s look first at the state of tethering on Verizon. New post-paid consumer contracts on Verizon must be for the new Share Everything plans that first came out last year. The plans charge a monthly line access fee per device, which includes unlimited calling and texting, and a monthly fee for data, which includes tethering. You decide which devices you want to connect and how much data you want to use. Let’s say you have 2 smartphones that each use 3GB of data per month. You pay $40/device and $80 for data per month, for a total of $160/month. Again, allegedly because of FCC rules, this plan includes tethering.

AT&T has comparable plans, called Mobile Share. The pricing is a little different, because AT&T charges a different amount per line depending on how much data you get. But if you want 2 smartphones and 6 total GB of data, it costs you $160/month, the same as on Verizon. And guess what, the AT&T plan includes tethering, even though the FCC doesn’t mandate that AT&T provide it.

Unlike Verizon, AT&T still offers its legacy plans to new customers. These plans do not come with free tethering, but the additional cost of tethering is at most $20 per line. Tethering is included if you pay for 5GB of data, and the upgrade from 3GB of data to 5GB of data is from $30 to $50. And that $20 upgrade cost includes 2GB of extra data. But if you want 2 smartphone lines with unlimited calling and texting, with 3GB per line and no tethering, it costs $210/month under the legacy plan. So at least for some users, switching to the Mobile Share plan is both cheaper and comes with the added bonus of free tethering.

When you consider that a) Verizon doesn’t even offer legacy plans any more, and b) many consumers, especially heavy callers and texters, are better off under the Mobile Share plans anyway, it becomes clear that tethering is not really more lucrative for AT&T than for Verizon. The FCC’s tethering mandate for Verizon did not make tethering much cheaper on Verizon than on AT&T, because there is actually fierce competition between Verizon and AT&T. If anything, the mandate probably incentivized Verizon to ditch their legacy plans for new customers, restricting consumer choice. But the bottom line is that, contra Fung, tethering is not likely to be a major source of revenue for AT&T absent FCC intervention.

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector.” In this 73-page working paper, which we hope to place in a law review or political science journal shortly, we document the evolution of government-granted privileges, or “cronyism,” in the information and communications technology marketplace and in the media-producing sectors. Specifically, we offer detailed histories of rent-seeking and regulatory capture in: the early history of the telephony and spectrum licensing in the United States; local cable TV franchising; the universal service system; the digital TV transition in the 1990s; and modern video marketplace regulation (i.e., must-carry and retransmission consent rules, among others.

Our paper also shows how cronyism is slowly creeping into new high-technology sectors.We document how Internet companies and other high-tech giants are among the fastest-growing lobbying shops in Washington these days. According to the Center for Responsive Politics, lobbying spending by information technology sectors has almost doubled since the turn of the century, from roughly $200 million in 2000 to $390 million in 2012.  The computing and Internet sector has been responsible for most of that growth in recent years. Worse yet, we document how many of these high-tech firms are increasingly seeking and receiving government favors, mostly in the form of targeted tax breaks or incentives.

We argue that the creeping cronyism could have two major negative ramifications. First, it could dull entrepreneurialism and competition in this highly innovative sector since time and resources spent on influencing politicians and capturing regulators cannot be spent competing and innovating in the marketplace. Cronyism will also negatively impact consumer welfare by denying consumers more and better products and services. Additionally, consumers might end up paying higher prices or higher taxes due to government privileges for industry.

Second, cronyism also raises the specter of greater government control of the Internet and of the digital economy. When policymakers dispense favors, they usually expect something in return. They also become accustomed to having greater informal powers over the sector receiving favors, and contribute to DC’s infamous “revolving door” problem.

High-tech America’s recent embrace of Washington could take it down the familiar path followed by the agriculture, telecommunications, and automotive sectors (among many others), with government becoming both protector and punisher of industry. Today’s dynamic tech industries will increasingly come under the “Mother, may I?” permission-based regulatory regime that encumbered the older information technology sectors.

Finally, this paper offers strategies for stalling and diminishing the cronyism already taking root in the high-tech sector. We suggest several targeted reforms to limit or undo cronyism. Generally speaking, however, we note that, as economist David R. Henderson argued in an earlier Mercatus Center report, “There is only one way to end, or at least to reduce, the amount of cronyism, and that is to reduce government power.”

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd. The Scribd version is embedded down below. (Also, here’s some coverage of the paper over at the Washington Post’s “Wonkblog” from our old colleague Tim Lee. Here’s more coverage from Bloomberg Businessweek and the San Francisco Chronicle. And here’s a U.S. News oped that Brent and I wrote condensing our paper into just 600 words. Finally, a short 3-minute video of me discussing the problem of tech cronyism is also embedded below.)

A History of Cronyism and Capture in the Information Technology Sector [Thierer and Skorup – July 2013] by Adam Thierer

Declan McCullagh, chief political correspondent for CNET and former Washington bureau chief for Wired News, discusses recent leaks of NSA surveillance programs. What do we know so far, and what more might be unveiled in the coming weeks? McCullagh covers legal challenges to the programs, the Patriot Act, the fourth amendment, email encryption, the media and public response, and broader implications for privacy and reform.

Download

Related Links

• Snowden: NSA snoops on U.S. phone calls without warrants, McCullagh
• Snowden: Feds can’t plug leaks by ‘murdering me’, McCullagh
• Feds: Power grid vulnerable to cyber threats, McCullagh

Ryan Radia, associate director of technology studies at the Competitive Enterprise Institute, discusses the amicus brief he helped author in the case of Verizon v. Federal Communications Commission now before the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. Radia analyzes the case, which will determine the fate of the FCC’s net neutrality rule. While Verizon is arguing that the FCC does not have the authority to issue suce rules, Radia says that the constitutional implications of the net neutrality rule are more important. He explains that the amicus brief outlines both First and Fifth Amendment arguments against the rule, stating that net neutrality impinges on the speech of Internet service providers and constitutes an illegal taking of their private property.

[Flash 9 is required to listen to audio.]

Download

Related Links

• Brief of Amici Curiae, by CEI, Cato et al.
• Video: Why Net Neutrality Regulations are Infirm, by Radia
• Verizon slams the FCC’s net neutrality rules as unconstitutional, The Next Web

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released my new white paper, “The Perils of Classifying Social Media Platforms as Public Utilities.” [PDF] I first presented a draft of this paper last November at a Michigan State University conference on “The Governance of Social Media.” [Video of my panel here.]

In this paper, I note that to the extent public utility-style regulation has been debated within the Internet policy arena over the past decade, the focus has been almost entirely on the physical layer of the Internet. The question has been whether Internet service providers should be considered “essential facilities” or “natural monopolies” and regulated as public utilities. The debate over “net neutrality” regulation has been animated by such concerns.

While that debate still rages, the rhetoric of public utilities and essential facilities is increasingly creeping into policy discussions about other layers of the Internet, such as the search layer. More recently, there have been rumblings within academic and public policy circles regarding whether social media platforms, especially social networking sites, might also possess public utility characteristics. Presumably, such a classification would entail greater regulation of those sites’ structures and business practices.

Proponents of treating social media platforms as public utilities offer a variety of justifications for regulation. Amorphous “fairness” concerns animate many of these calls, but privacy and reputational concerns are also frequently mentioned as rationales for regulation. Proponents of regulation also sometimes invoke “social utility” or “social commons” arguments in defense of increased government oversight, even though these notions lack clear definition.

Social media platforms do not resemble traditional public utilities, however, and there are good reasons why policymakers should avoid a rush to regulate them as such. Treating these nascent digital services as regulated utilities would harm consumer welfare because public utility regulation has traditionally been the archenemy of innovation and competition. Furthermore, treating today’s leading social media providers as digital essential facilities threatens to convert “natural monopoly” or “essential facility” claims into self-fulfilling prophecies. Related proposals to mandate “API neutrality” or enforce a “Separations Principle” on integrated information platforms would be particularly problematic. Such regulation also threatens innovation and investment. Marketplace experimentation in search of sustainable business models should not be made illegal.

Remedies less onerous than regulation are available. Transparency and data-portability policies would solve many of the problems that concern critics, and numerous private empowerment solutions exist for those users concerned about their privacy on social media sites.

Finally, because social media are fundamentally tied up with the production and dissemination of speech and expression, First Amendment values are at stake, warranting heightened constitutional scrutiny of proposals for regulation. Social media providers should possess the editorial discretion to determine how their platforms are configured and what can appear on them.

This 63-page paper can be found on the Mercatus site here, on SSRN, or on Scribd.  I’ve also embedded it below in a Scribd reader. Eventually, a shorter version of this paper will appear as a chapter in a MIT Press book.

Social Networks as Public Utilities [Adam Thierer]

Here are some quick thoughts on the proposed AT&T – T-Mobile merger, mostly borrowed from my previous writing on the wireless marketplace. First, however, I highly recommend this excellent analysis of the issue by Larry Downes, which cuts through the hysteria we’re already hearing and offers a sober look at the issues at stake here.  Anyway, here are a few of my random thoughts on the deal:

• The deal will likely be approved: First, to cut to the chase.. After much wrangling, the deal will probably be approved primarily because of two factors, both of which help political officials as much as AT&T: (1) The deal delivers upon the National Broadband Plan promise of getting the country blanketed with wireless broadband; and (2) it “brings home” T-Mobile by giving an American company control of a German-held interest. As Larry Dignan of ZNet says, it is tantamount to “playing the patriotism card.”

• One reason it might not be approved: Some Administration critics, especially from the more liberal part of the Democratic base, could make this a litmus test for Obama administration’s antitrust enforcement efforts. In the wake of the Comcast merger approval — albeit after several pounds of flesh were handed over “voluntarily” to get the deal approved — some of the Administration’s base will be looking for blood. I remember how the Powell FCC was under real heat to “get tough” on mergers back in 2001-02 and during that time blocked the proposed DirecTV-EchoStar deal, possibly as a result of the pressure. The same thing could happen to AT&T – T-Mobile here.

• It’s all about spectrum: From AT&T’s perspective, this deal is all about getting more high-quality spectrum, which is in increasingly short supply. Indeed, as Jerry Brito noted earlier, this merger should serve as another wake-up call regarding the need to get spectrum reform going again to ensure that existing players can reallocate their spectrum to those who demand it most. (Hint: Incentivize the TV broadcasters to sell... NOW!) But, in the short-term, this deal helps AT&T built out a more robust nationwide wireless network. Over the long-haul, that should help T-Mobile deliver better service to its customers.

• For T-Mobile… it survives!: What’s in the deal for T-Mobile and its customers?  Well, at this point, the company must just be relieved they made it this far and that someone wanted to buy them! Seriously, did anyone think T-Mobile would make it this long as a stand-alone operator?  I certainly didn’t. And many industry analysts have express surprise that it to this long for Deutsche Telekom to put them on the table and find a buyer. If the DOJ moves to block the deal, would it be on the hope of T-Mobile continuing to be a stand-alone #4 competitor?  That seems like a very risky proposition to me.  I suppose the better argument would be to block the deal based on the hope that T-Mobile might eventually hook up with Sprint to create a more formidable #3 operator. But, on that point…

• Standard compatibility helps: AT&T is a good fit for T-Mobile going forward because of their mutual reliance on HSPA+ for wireless broadband. That should smooth the integration process. Sprint, by contrast, would have made a lousy merger partner in this regard because of the different standards the firms have picked for next-generation wireless broadband.

• The market will still be quite competitive: I can’t see there being a major antitrust problem here in light of lower HHI in U.S. compared to international markets. As I noted in my essay on “Wireless Networks & Lemonade Stand Economics,” surveys have shown that the U.S. wireless market is much more competitive than most Asian and European markets. Even with this merger the HHI will still likely be much lower than those other countries.

• We need to accept the fact that the market is maturing. But as I also made clear in that “lemonade stand” essay last year, in a high fixed cost, low margin cost industry like broadband, it’s impossible to have hundreds (or even dozens) of competitors. This is particular true for the wireless sector. Rolling out a sophisticated and reliable wireless architecture is incredibly costly and labor-intensive. Just siting all the towers, for example, can be cumbersome and get quite expensive.  And then there are the endless “truck rolls” to fix tiny problems and upgrade facilities. Thus, like so many other mature industries, the “Rule of Three” was bound to kick in for wireless. From baby food to burgers, from candy bars to credit cards, and from tennis shoes to blue jeans, the story is the same: almost every mature industry usually shakes out to just a handful of providers. There are usually two or three large operators serving the entire sector, and then a few niche providers.  In this sense, AT&T and Verizon are the Coke and Pepsi of wireless broadband. And as with the soda market, there will be other smaller competitors and entrants at the margin, but none with the size the deliver the underlying product across the nation in a ubiquitous, highly competitive fashion. Thus, Sprint, US Cellular, Cricket, and MetroPCS will be the niche players of wireless, serving unique regions or offering unique plans (like Metro’s recent announcement of a lowest-cost wireless plan announced to date, but with various limitations on service). This is the way capitalism works.

• Don’t forget about Clearwire & the cable guys: Seems like a lot of folks are writing off Clearwire and WiMax technology already, but that could be a mistake. It’s a unique consortium approach to next-gen wireless and includes investment from major cable operators Comcast, Time Warner Cable, and Brighthouse.  Of course, Sprint is a major partner in Clearwire and this could be the company’s chance to do something really exciting with those deep-pocketed backers in the cable industry.  There’s no guarantee it will pan out, but with names (and money) like that involved, I wouldn’t write it off just yet.  And their very presence in this landscape helps ensure that the market remains contestable.

• Don’t forget about Apple, Google, Microsoft, BlackBerry etc:  The mobile ecosystem is remarkably dynamic and features many different layers and players. A recent report by Mary Meeker and Matt Murphy of Kleiner Perkins Caufield & Byers on “Top Mobile Internet Trends” revealed that roughly 10 Billion mobile Internet devices will soon be upon upon us. That’s truly amazing. What’s equally amazing to me is how all the innovation in this space is changing the competitive dynamics of the wireless marketplace. In particular, the most interesting thing about today’s mobile marketplace is how the network infrastructure guys cower in fear of the big OS guys — Apple and Google in particular. The providers of the underlying infrastructure who supposedly have all the power sure don’t seem like it when it comes time to line up new smartphones. As the iPhone wars make clear, the carriers are falling all over themselves in a scramble to land the best devices out there and would pretty much do whatever Apple and Google want them to in order to get them. And don’t forget about the actual device makers, like Motorola and HTC! And the chipmakers! And the app makers! The reason this is important is because those providers in other layers of the mobile ecosystem increasingly exert enormous pressure on the network providers and act as a check on their power.

• Expect some Net neutrality “voluntary concessions”: The FCC will use the approval process to engage in some good ol’ fashion merger extortion and force all sorts of “voluntary concessions.” Some sort of Net neutrality provision(s) will likely be among them. Because AT&T has attempted to impose some limits on tethering and has recently crafted new data plans, you can expect that NN advocates with lead with sweeping restrictions on T’s ability to manage their service offerings and they might even push for formal price controls on new tiering or metering schemes.

• Markets are better at sorting out good vs. bad deals through experimentation: I have elsewhere written about the hysteria that so often accompanies media and communications mergers. There’s always a Chicken Little crowd that tells us the sky will fall. Reality usually plays out quite differently. To the extent the sky falls, it isn’t on consumers but on the companies themselves. Many mega-deals unravel or never live up to their initial billing. Sometimes that’s simply because the merging entities can’t unearth those oh-so-illusive “synergies” that they are looking for. But usually those deals don’t pan out as hoped because markets are ongoing experiments and others — other rivals, new entrants, investors, consumers, etc — respond to those experiments and innovate around incumbents. Do you remember the phone you carried around in your pocket just a few years ago? It made calls and it… well… it made calls. Think about how far we’ve come in such a short time. I am giving serious consideration to canceling my home wireline broadband plan once Verizon comes out with the right 4G smartphone for me. Hell, the 3G phone I carry around right now in my pocket is close to becoming my primary computer as it is. I already use it to write blog posts, to Tweet, to text, to email, schedule events, play games, and sometimes I even use it to make phone calls! The degree of innovation in this space never ceases to amaze me. Thus, when it comes to deals like AT&T – T-Mobile, we should avoid the static snapshot mentality and should instead be patient and see how things play out.  It isn’t the end of the story, it’s just another chapter in what has so far been an amazing journey.

Additional Reading:

• Wireless Innovation is Alive & Well: Two New Reports Set the Record Straight
• CTIA’s Refutation of Tim Wu’s 2007 Wireless Net Neutrality Paper
• Just How Dynamic is the Mobile Internet Marketplace?
• Progress on Spectrum Inventory…if Only Illusory
• Good news from House Energy & Commerce on spectrum
• The MetroPCS Net Neutrality Hullabaloo

The Washington Post editorializes this morning on the “Google-Verizon” proposal for government regulation of the Internet:

For more than a decade, “net neutrality” — a commitment not to discriminate in the transmission of Internet content — has been a rule tacitly understood by Internet users and providers alike. But in April, a court ruled that the Federal Communications Commission has no regulatory authority over Internet service providers. For many, this put the status quo in jeopardy. Without the threat of enforcement, might service providers start shaping the flow of traffic in ways that threaten the online meritocracy, in which new and established Web sites are equally accessible and sites rise or fall on the basis of their ability to attract viewers?

What a Washington-centric view of the world, to think that net neutrality has been maintained all this time by the fear of an FCC clubbing. Deviations from net neutrality haven’t happened because neutrality is the best, most durable engineering principle for the Internet, and because neutral is the way consumers want their Internet service.

Should it be cast in stone by regulation, locking in the pro-Google-and-Verizon status quo? No. The way the Internet works should continue to evolve, experiments with non-neutrality failing one after another . . . until perhaps one comes along that serves consumers better! The FCC would be nothing but a drag on innovation and a bulwark protecting Google and Verizon’s currently happy competitive circumstances.

I’ll give the Post one thing: It represents Washington, D.C. eminently well. The Internet should be regulated because it’s not regulated.

“If it moves, tax it. If it keeps moving, regulate it. And if it stops moving, subsidize it.”

A favorite PR maven pitched me (and probably many of you) Senator Al Franken’s (D-MN) email suggesting that WiFi is threatened by the Google-Verizon “deal.”

“The Google-Verizon ‘framework’ was written so as not to apply to wireless Internet services,” says Franken. “If you use wi-fi or access the Internet on your phone, this is a serious problem.”

Kindamaybenotsomuch. WiFi is wireless, yes, but it’s not what they’re talking about when they say “wireless.”

But what caught my eye is Senator Franken’s somewhat inverted take on power arrangements in the federal government: “This evening, I’ll be speaking at an FCC hearing in Minneapolis. I’ll urge the commissioners to reject the Google-Verizon framework, stop the Comcast/NBC merger, and take action to keep the Internet free and open.”

Folks, Article I, section 1 of the United States Constitution creates the United States Senate, with section 3 describing the Senate’s makeup and some procedures.

The Federal Communications Commission is not a constitutional body. The best view is that Congress has no authority to establish an FCC like we have today. The better view is that Congress should not maintain the sprawling FCC we have today. And the only correct view is that FCC is a creation of Congress, beneath it in every relevant respect.

Senator Franken is supposed to be the boss of the FCC, not a supplicant “urging” the FCC to do x, y, and z.

Does it matter a lot? No. Senator Franken is mostly making a symbolic appeal to gin up constituent support. But he’s also symbolizing the abasement of the legislative branch to an independent agency that has no constitutional pedigree.

As Steve Titch discusses below, Google and Verizon, two of the leading antagonists in the long-running drama over FCC net neutrality regulation, may be about to call a truce.   According to numerous media reports, the two firms have or soon will agree to a compromise framework for regulation, which would provide for a limited degree of regulation by the FCC.

The exact provisions of the compromise are unclear.   Reportedly, however, the plan would ban Internet access providers such as Verizon from blocking content outright, while allowing them to offer prioritized service for a fee.   The provisions would not apply to wireless Internet access, which would be kept mostly free of regulation.

While Google and Verizon have long been adversaries on this issue, it’s been no secret that the two have been working together to craft out common ground.   The two in fact, filed joint comments in the FCC’s rulemaking on the issue earlier this year, and the CEOs of the two firms even jointly authored a Wall Street Journal op-ed on broadband policy.

The incentives for both are clear.   With federal courts earlier this year rebuffing the FCC’s attempts to impose regulation, it was no doubt clear to Google that nothing could happen without a compromise.   Moreover, the “big is bad” tenor of the debate no doubt gave Google – one of the largest firms in our galaxy – reason to rethink.   For Verizon, a deal would provide some policy certainty, much-needed given the vast investments in broadband it is making.  And since the firm has always disavowed any desire to block wireline content, the new rules would come at little apparent cost.

For many die-hard neutrality regulation purists, the reported deal was seen as a Category 5 catastrophe.   “Google Decides It Can Be Evil,” read one post on the Daily Kos.   “The End of the Internet as We Know It,” wrote the always-understated Josh Silver of Free Press.

But the despair on the Left doesn’t necessarily mean this is a big victory for the free market.  Far from it.   For starters, the deal would give the FCC clear authority – which it does not now have – to oversee Internet service.   Even if this were limited to outright blocking of content and not other form of network management, there is reason for concern.   In 2008, remember, the FCC found Comcast liable for “blocking” BitTorrent traffic, even though that blocking was incidental and temporary.

Secondly, it is unclear how an exemption for wireless service would be crafted.  But such mode-specific rules tend not to cope well in the ever-changing wireless world. It may seem easy today to differentiate the two, but what happens in the future?  Most “wireless” traffic even today travel by wire as least some part of the way.  What happens if the two are intermixed further?  Does it matter if the services are marketed together?  Or if the distinction is made invisible to the user?  

Whatever, if anything is eventually agreed to by Google and Verizon, it is unlikely that the long-running Net Neutrality show will end anytime soon.   Over the past few weeks, FCC chairman Julius Genachowski has been facilitating talks among a broader group of interested parties on net neutrality.   There’s no reason to believe that an agreement between Google and Verizon would be accepted by that broader group, at least not without considerable changes.  AT&T, for instance, has already made it clear that it is not a party to any deal.   In addition, it’s nearly certain that any plan would have to be approved by Congress, which in the past has been a virtual black hole for telecommunications reform proposals.

The lawyers and lobbyists who have built their careers out of working this issue can rest easy.   For good or bad, the net neutrality debate is not ending anytime soon.

Today I appeared on CNBC’s “Power Lunch” to debate Net neutrality issues and the specific role of pricing in this debate. Specifically, the producers wanted to know whether websites should be allowed to pay a higher fee to allow consumers faster access to their sites or should it be equal for every website.  The show was partially a response to the rumors that the may be some sort of deal pending between Verizon and Google about prioritized services. On the program, I was up against Craig Aaron of Free Press.  During the discussion I made several points, many of which first appeared in my 2005 essay on “The Real Net Neutrality Debate: Pricing Flexibility Versus Pricing Regulation.” Here are the key points I tried to get across:

• In a free-market economy, companies should be able to freely set prices for goods and services without fear of government price controls.
• This isn’t about consumers paying more for basic Internet access or having their connections “slowed down”?  This is about whether the government will allow some broadband services to be differentiated or specialized for unique needs, such as online gaming, live event telecasts, secure telepresence conferences, telemedicine, etc.
• Differentiated and prioritized services and pricing are part of almost every industrial sector in a capitalistic economy. (ex: airlines, package shipping, hotels, amusement parks, grades of gasoline, etc.)  Why should it be any different for broadband?
• It’s always important to remember that there is no such thing as a free lunch. Something has to pay for Internet access. It doesn’t just fall like manna from heaven.  Differentiated services may help in this regard by allowing carriers to price more intensive or specialized users and uses to ensure that carriers don’t have to hit everyone – including average household users – with the same bill for service.  Why should the government make that illegal through Net neutrality regulation?
• Heavy-handing tech mandates – especially Internet price controls – could have a profoundly deleterious impact on investment, innovation, and competition. After all, there can be no innovation or investment without a company first turning a profit.   We don’t want to return to the era of rotary-dial regulated monopoly, in which our choices were few and our services were standardized and rudimentary.  We should let our current experiment with facilities-based, head-to-head competition continue.

http://plus.cnbc.com/rssvideosearch/action/player/id/1559985749/code/cnbcplayershare

PFF has just published the transcript for an event we hosted last month asking “What Should the Next Communications Act Look Like?”  The event featured (in order of appearance) Link Hoewing of Verizon, Walter McCormick of US Telecom, Peter Pitsch of Intel, Barbara Esbin, Ray Gifford of Wilkinson, Barker, Knauer, and Michael Calabrese of the New America Foundation. It was a terrific discussion and it couldn’t have been more timely in light of recent regulatory developments at the FCC.  The folks at NextGenWeb were kind enough to make a video of the event and post it online along with a writeup, so I’ve included that video along with the event transcript down below the fold.

What Should the Next Coummunications Act Look Like [PFF Event Transcript] http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Noting that the Telecom Act has become ” irrelevant to the ecosystem that has developed,” Verizon’s Executive Vice President Tom Tauke today called for Congress to overhaul the nation’s archaic communications laws and the regulatory regime that the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is currently attempting to pigeonhole the Internet and entire Digital Economy into.  It’s an excellent speech, and I encourage you to read the entire thing (which I have embedded down below the fold in a Scribd reader).

“[T]he test for government intervention in the marketplace is to prevent either harm to users or anti-competitive activity,” he said. He rightly noted that, in an age of technological convergence and vigorous cross-platform competition, the old silo-based approach of the Telecom Act — with its various Titles for outmoded market definitions — no longer makes any sense. He noted:

by the very nature of the Internet Ecosystem, many are working together or competing in other company’s turf. Computer companies sell phones, and quite successfully. Search engines sell open operating systems. Network providers create their own apps stores. That means that the value proposition to the consumer is really a package created by many companies acting together with little, if any, regard to their previous corporate histories. So no set of companies should be immune from scrutiny.

Of course, a regulatory regime already exists that accomplishes this goal: antitrust law. But Tauke’s proposal isn’t quite that sweeping. He doesn’t call for the FCC to be dynamited the ground and to just shift everything into the antitrust bucket, which some of us would prefer. Instead, he speaks generically about the need for a more sensible process — most likely still enforced by the FCC — that would work as follows:

we could structure a process that uses the innovative, flexible and technology-driven nature of the Internet to address issues as they arise. Instead of the traditional rule-making process, federal enforcement agencies could structure themselves around an ongoing engagement with Internet engineers and technologists to analyze technology trends, define norms to guide such questions as network management, and understand in advance the implications of new, emerging technologies.

Moreover, he advocates greater reliance on expert technical opinion and interaction to help inform the policy process:

Technology leaders and experts from all players involved in the Internet should set up voluntary organizations and forums to provide advice, recommendations, and advisory opinions to government agencies. This will help inform the agencies’ role as backstops that deter damaging activities that undermine the vibrant competition and openness that defines the Internet.

Again, he doesn’t really make it clear who will be administering this new process; his focus on getting Congress to clear out the old regulatory cobwebs and adopt a fresh policy approach for the Digital Age.

Of course, it remains to be seen if anyone in Congress will bite. Many policymakers’ idea of “reform” is to just layer on more misguided regulations to the old system. It’s like attempting to renovate a dilapidated old home by adding a fresh coat of paint and new window treatments. That fact is, the foundations are still crumbling.  Fundamental change is needed, and fast.

I was hoping that Tauke would come right out and endorse what continues to be the best “third way” alternative out there: Progress & Freedom Foundation’s “Digital Age Communications Act” or “DACA” framework. In 2005-6, PFF brought together over 50 leading scholars–a non-partisan collection of lawyers, economists, engineers and others—with the ultimate aim of crafting a regulatory framework that is adaptive to the frequently changing communications landscape. The resulting Digital Age Communications Act  proposal advocated tearing down the old regulatory paradigms and replacing them all with a Federal Trade Commission-like “unfair competition” standard.

Under DACA, the FCC would retain some baseline regulatory authority to oversee the marketplace but this authority would be quite limited and would be based on more settled principles of competition law and economics (namely, streamlined antitrust regulation). Serious anti-competitive corporate actions that lead to demonstrable consumer harm would still be policed and punished under DACA. But this would be done on a limited, case-by-case basis without prejudging business models or practices or by imposing prophylactic regulatory regimes. In essence, DACA stood for the proposition that an  ex post form of regulatory oversight was infinitely preferable to ex ante forms of preemptive and prophylactic regulation by the FCC.

To be clear, this is regulation. And, on a personal note, when the DACA working group released its initial framework in June 2005, I dissented to the plan on the grounds that DACA did not do enough to tie the hands of regulators. Moreover, I argued that there was no need to import a competition policy regime into the FCC when the Federal Trade Commission and Department of Justice remain perfectly capable of enforcing antitrust laws when anti-competitive conduct can be proven.

Nonetheless, the DACA framework would be vastly superior to the sort of heavy-handed regulatory approach that some defenders of the ancien regime still favor.  DACA has the added advantage of not being as susceptible to the problems of regulatory creep and regulatory capture.

Tauke didn’t go quite that far today, but I do hope that if Congress got around to reopening the Telecom Act and freshening up public policy in this area that they’d give DACA a second look.  It’s a reasonable “third way” approach that would satisfy many of the goals of traditional regulatory policy regime without all the excess baggage. Tom Tauke’s call for Congress to at least reopen and reconsider the broken old regime is the first step toward that goal.

Prepared Remarks of Verizon EVP Tom Tauke http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Progress Snapshot 6.6, The Progress & Freedom Foundation (PDF)

Mobile broadband speeds (at the “core” of wireless networks) are about to skyrocket—and revolutionize what we can do on-the-go online (at the “edge”).  Consider four recent stories:

1. Networks: MobileCrunch notes that Verizon will begin offering 4G mobile broadband service (using Long Term Evolution or LTE) “in up to 60 markets by mid-2012″—at an estimated 5-12 Mbps down and 2-5 Mbps up, LTE would be faster than most wired broadband service.
2. Devices: Sprint plans to launch its first 4G phone (using WiMax, a competing standard to LTE) this summer.
3. Applications: Google has finally released Google Earth for the Nexus One smartphone on T-Mobile, the first to run Google’s Android 2.1 operating system.
4. Content: In November, Google announced that YouTube would begin offering high-definition 1080p video, including on mobile devices.

While the Nexus One may be the first Android phone with a processor powerful enough to crunch the visual awesomeness that is Google Earth, such applications will still chug along on even the best of today’s 3G wireless networks.  But combine the ongoing increases in mobile device processing power made possible by Moore’s Law with similar innovation in broadband infrastructure, and everything changes: You can run hugely data-intensive apps that require real-time streaming, from driving directions with all the rich imagery of Google Earth to mobile videoconferencing to virtual world experiences that rival today’s desktop versions to streaming 1080p high-definition video (3.7+ Mbps) to… well, if I knew, I’d be in Silicon Valley launching a next-gen mobile start-up!

This interconnection of infrastructure, devices and applications should remind us that broadband isn’t just about “big dumb pipes”—especially in the mobile environment, where bandwidth is far more scarce (even in 4G) due to spectrum constraints.  Network congestion can spoil even the best devices on the best networks.  Just ask users in New York City, where AT&T has apparently just stopped selling the iPhone online in order to try to relieve AT&T’s over-taxed network under the staggering bandwidth demands of Williamsburg hipsters, Latter-Day Beatniks from the Village, Chelsea boys, and Upper West Side Charlotte Yorks all streaming an infinite plethora of YouTube videos and so on.

Unfortunately, the “neutralists” think that regulation, rather than innovation, is the better solution to dealing with the constant tension between the capacities of networks and the bandwidth demands of new applications.  But as Adam Thierer noted in making the The 5-Part Case against Net Neutrality Regulation in his debate last week with Ben Scott of the radical “media reform” advocacy group “Free Press”:

Innovation at the core of networks is every bit as important as innovation at the edge: We don’t want stagnation at the core or networks, and the applications that ride on them, will suffer.

Funding the Future of Broadband

All this begs the critical question: What  funds the networks of the future? What policies need to be in place to make sure they are delivered? If we believe Free Press and other pro-regulatory forces backing the FCC’s pending plan to impose Net neutrality regulation, freezing innovation at the core through “common carriage” regulation is the best way to ensure greater network innovation and investment.  That’s essentially the argument they advanced in their filing to the FCC in the net neutrality proceeding (summarized here).  Does that make any sense? When was the last time increased regulation of anything led to increased investment and innovation in this or any other sector?

Importantly, the sort of mandatory dumb pipe approach that Free Press and the FCC favor would limit potentially beneficial forms of network experimentation with new approaches to delivering bits in a more rapid, more reliable, or more secure fashion.  Free Press apparently thinks speedy, reliable and secure networks just magically appear, like manna falling from heaven.  But networks don’t get built thanks to divine intervention or magic tricks.  Someone actually has to convince investors and shareholders to invest billions in risk capital on what are essentially high-tech crap-shoots.

Will massive investments in LTE or WiMax 4G wireless networks pay off as carriers compete with each to attract customers? That’s a very risky bet, since consumer wireless broadband service prices aren’t set by the cost of the networks but by what the market will bear: How much would  you pay per month for a mobile data service capable of running applications that just aren’t feasible in today’s mobile environment?  That probably depends on whether there’s a “killer app” to make the greater speed of 4G plans worth the premium over 3G.  So, why would network operators try to strangle innovation at the applications layer (as Free Press fears)?  Faster web browsing is great, but what will really make buying a 4G phone and service plan worth the price premium are innovative mobile applications like mobile Google Earth, Microsoft’s Photosynth, 3-D gaming, immersive virtual worlds, and so on.

Rolling the dice on multi-billion dollar next-generation networks becomes an even scarier proposition once regulatory risk is factored into the equation.  Would  you like to be the guy who has to convince your board, your employees, your shareholders, and the rest of the world that a multi-year, multi-billion investment in a commercially unproven technology is worth the risk when you have an FCC ready to wrap its tentacles around those networks and apply vague, open-ended regulatory notions like “Net neutrality” to them?

Consider recent innovations announced by Verizon and Google.

Verizon’s 10Gbps Super-Fast Fiber Demonstration

Verizon recently conducted a successful field-test of a passive optical network system known as XG-PON “that can transmit data at 10 Gbps) downstream and 2.4 Gbps upstream, four times as fast as the current top transmission speeds supporting the company’s all-fiber FiOS network.” Brian Whitton, executive director of access and video technologies at Verizon said, “This further validates our strategic choice of fiber-to-the-premises as the best way to build a future-proof network.”  It certainly does—assuming you can recoup the initial cost of building and deploying that network. But regulation which treats such advanced networks as nothing more than dumb pipes would undercut such innovations by dampening the incentive to further invest and innovate in this fashion.

That’s not to say Verizon and other network operators will need to block traffic or betray “neutrality” principles as Free Press fears.  Even today, Verizon has done what Free Press seems to think would never happen without regulation: Verizon recently announced it would begin allowing users to place Skype calls directly over the 3G network (which was previously only possible on Verizon phones over a Wi-Fi network).  As the Los Angeles Times explained:

By embracing Skype, Verizon is betting that any revenue it might lose from customers downgrading their voice-calling plans will be more than made up by added sales of data plans and a share of the revenue from Skype subscriptions.

So Verizon gets a cut of the revenue—so what?  How, exactly, is this obviously non-neutral deal bad for consumers?

Verizon’s Deal with HBO & TV Everywhere

The Los Angeles Times mentions another deal cut by Verizon that should illustrate just how important innovation is at the business model layer—i.e., in figuring out how to support the content and services taken for granted by users.  In response to the accelerating shift of consumers towards “cutting the video cord” as Internet-delivered video has become a more clear alternative to traditional cable or satellite video service, HBO has cut a deal with Verizon to make its content available to FiOS subscribers just as it does with other cable operators.

Again, this is exactly the kind of partnership that may be needed to sustain content production in a world where the traditional cable model is breaking down quickly.  Yet, for all their talk about the need for “new business models,” Free Press wants to ban this sort of innovation.  When the cable industry has attempted to expand upon the model of its deal with HBO to give subscribers online access to a far wider range of video programming through “TV Everywhere” service, Free Press has accused the cable industry of “Colluding to Kill Online TV” and demanded immediate antitrust action and “structural rules like compulsory licenses.”

Google’s 1Gbps Fiber Pilot Project

While Verizon’s December announcement about 10-Gbps FiOS speeds drew relatively little attention, Google generated lots of excitement when it announced earlier this month that it would build a 1 Gbps fiber network to serve up to 500,000 customers.  Google says it’s not entering the broadband business but considers this a “business model nudge and an innovation nudge.”[4] If it succeeds in raising the bar for broadband service and demonstrating what users could do with greater bandwidth, great!

But let’s not forget that the economic engine that drives Google (and will cross-subsidize this experiment) is advertising, which is under fierce attack.  Verizon and other Internet Service Providers (ISPs), by contrast, have to rely on subscription revenues to not just to pay the costs of that infrastructure but also the risk premium associated with building out new, faster networks in advance of consumer demand.  Unfortunately, all the recent hysteria about the use of “deep packet inspection” for behavioral advertising seems to have made it very unlikely that ISPs will be able to supplement subscription revenue with ad dollars any time soon.  But that’s exactly the kind of business model innovation that could defray some of the costs of deploying 4G wireless or super-fast fiber networks.

Even with the cross-subsidy of advertising for this promising pilot project, Google’s high hopes may be wrecked again by the same kind of extortionary demands that have long faced cable operators (and, more recently, fiber competitors) when dealing with local governments.  Google faced just such absurd demands with its municipal Wi-Fi scheme in San Francisco, ultimately helping to crater the deal.

A Framework for Promoting Openness, Investment & Innovation

Google and Verizon are, of course, just two of the many key players operating at the cutting edge—and convergence of—infrastructure, devices, applications and content technologies and business models.  But the two companies seem to have found common ground in working together—perhaps through their high profile partnership to make Motorola’s Droid handset, which runs Google’s Android operating system, the flagship of Verizon’s smartphone offerings.

Most notably, the two companies managed to work through most, though not all, their differences on the deeply divisive issue of net neutrality to forge a common set of principles for how to address technical disputes about network management: through self-regulation, especially through expert technical bodies like IETF, “with governmental involvement limited to dealing with bad actors on a case-by-case basis where industry mechanisms are unable to resolve conduct that is anticompetitive and harms consumers.” These principles, presented to the FCC in January, provide a clear alternative to the kind of “prophylactic” regulatory regime of full-blown “line-sharing” or “forced-access” mandates contemplated by Free Press.  These principles are also strongly reminiscent of the consensus proposal reached by a non-partisan group of 50 lawyers, economists, engineers and others PFF brought together in 2005-6 in the Digital Age Communications Act (DACA) project: Address actual harms through case-by-case adjudication ex post under the consumer welfare standard of antitrust law. Perhaps it’s time to dust off DACA as a “third way” on net neutrality.

Innovation at the Core Drives Innovation at the Edge (& Vice Versa) http://d1.scribdassets.com/ScribdViewer.swf

Worth It?

OK, time for a quick rant. What is all this confusion and consternation over early termination fees (ETFs) for high-end smartphones?  I mean, seriously, how hard is this process to understand?  The FCC has worked itself into a lather over this and is bombarding wireless operators and Google with hate mail letters of inquiry harassing asking them about their ETF policies.  I just don’t get it.  Let’s review some simple realities:

• Smartphones — especially high-end devices like the iPhone, the Droid, and the Nexus One — are basically mobile mini computers.
• Mini mobile computers do not grow on trees; someone has to make them and sell them at a profit or else no one would offer them to begin with.
• But the people who make and sell these devices (and wireless service for these devices) want to ensure rapid, widespread distribution to win over customers and recoup their costs.
• So, they offer a classic business inducement — an upfront subsidy for the product in exchange for monthly payments to amortize the upfront “loan” they have given the customer;
• AND THEN THEY FORM A CONTRACT WITH THE BUYER TO MAKE THE DEAL WORK. And that contract obligates both sides to live up to their end of the deal.
• Hey… did I mention they need to form a contract to make the deal worth it? OK, good, wanted to make sure I got that point across.
• Then they give you a nice shiny new mobile mini-computer that for some reason we Americans still insist on calling a cell phone.
• Then you start paying off the “loan” they’ve given you for that device over the span of the service contract. This is called “prorating.”
• But, if you default on that loan by breaking your contract, you’ll be hit with a penalty — an early termination fee — since it would leave the carrier without a way to recoup the cost of that shiny new mobile mini-computer that they handed you on the cheap when you just absolutely had to have the hot new toy in town.

Is this process really all that complicated? And why is it so controversial? It certainly shouldn’t be. Prorating happens every day in countless ways in a capitalist economy.  And yet in the apparent techno-entitlement society we live in these days, some people seem to think there’s something scandalous about this process when it happens with our beloved mobile devices.  In reality, the smartphone subsidy and prorated contract system is really one of the great pro-consumer accomplishments of our time. With various inducements and buyer loyalty credits, I recently got my Motorola Droid from Verizon for just $99 bucks. Like the iPhone and Google’s new Nexus One, the Droid is worth over $500 bucks, and yet millions of Americans have been able to obtain these spectacular devices because of this system of upfront subsidies and prorating. And it’s not like Lucifer is present at the signing of the contract asking for a blood offering or your first born as part of the exchange. Nobody forces you to buy a $500 phone!

Moreover, if you really want, there are plenty of “unlocked” mobile devices you can pay full freight for and then take to any carrier you want to get service. Needless to say, not a lot of people bother. I think that tells us something. And, again, who can really blame consumers… just look at the prices of these unsubsidized phones! $574.99 for the Droid, $649.99 for the Nexus One, and $909.99 for the Sony Ericsson Xperia!  You could buy a used car for that kind of money.

Look, I can appreciate arguments about “better transparency” in this process to make sure consumers know what they are getting into, but you don’t need a PhD in economics to understand that you’ll have to make some payments over the long haul to pay off what you got up front on the cheap. My guess is that most people who buy an expensive smartphone have likely also has had a car or home loan at some point in their lives–or any loan for that matter.  The principle in all cases is the same: There is no free lunch.

Last week I commented on a severely one-sided FCC net neutrality hearing that featured a endless parade of horribles being prophesied by virtually every speaker. The litany of spooky stories became tedious and absurd. Everyone foretold of the impending doom that awaits unless government intervenes to save us from various corporate conspiracies to “silence” our voices.  Unsurprisingly, evidence was in short supply. It was pure Chicken Little poppycock.

This got me thinking again about what I have referred to as the “problem of proportionality.” I have discussed the problem of proportionality in the context of public policy debates about online safety and privacy, but it seems equally applicable to debates about net neutrality. Here’s how I explained the “problem of proportionality” in an earlier essay:

let’s think about how some of our lawmakers and media personalities talk about the Internet.  If we were to judge the Internet based upon the daily headlines in various media outlets or from the titles of various Congressional or regulatory agency hearings, then we’d be led to believe that the Internet is a scary, dangerous place. That ’s especially the case when it comes to concerns about online privacy and child safety. Everywhere you turn there’s a bogeyman story about the supposed dangers of cyberspace. But let’s go back to the numbers. While I certainly understand the concerns many folks have about their personal privacy or their child’s safety online, the fact is the vast majority of online transactions that take place online each and every second of the day are of an entirely harmless, even socially beneficial nature.  I refer to this disconnect as the “problem of proportionality” in debates about online safety and privacy. People are not just making mountains out of molehills, in many cases they are just making the molehills up or blowing them massively out of proportion.

Again, much the same is true of net neutrality. Indeed, it is even more true since actual net neutrality “incidents” are so hard to come by.  I was reminded of this recently when I was reading some stats posted over at the Verizon Policy Blog by Link Hoewing, Verizon’s Assistant Vice President of Internet and Technology Issues. Link wrote, “every day over Verizon’s network, 100 million people connect using a cell phone, landline phone or broadband connection. The amount of information they send back and forth is staggering:”

• 1.7 billion text messages exchanged
• 50 million video/pictures exchanged
• 400 million e-mails received
• 8.7 petabytes of video streamed—the equivalent of 4 million full-length movies
• 1 billion phone calls connected

Indeed, those are staggering numbers. And I have seen similar numbers from other operators, although not quite as large as this.

But what I find most remarkable when I hear data about daily traffic volume is that all this activity is taking place without a peep about net neutrality “violations,” you know, like those nefarious-minded corporate conspiracies to “silence” us by blocking speech or expression.  Now, how can that be?  After all, we don’t have a net neutrality law on the books today.  There’s nothing stopping these carriers from engaging in the sort of behavior the worrywarts were predicting at last week’s hearing.

Of course, the critics would counter with the old “it’s-only-a-matter-of-time!” argument, or claim that the operators are on their best behavior right now because so many are watching for potential net neutrality violations. But there’s no way to prove that one way or the other. It’s all just conjecture at this stage. Regardless, the fact remains: trying to find actual net neutrality “violations” today is not just needle-in-the-haystack hard, it’s darn near impossible.

The better explanation for why that is the case comes down to simple economics and sound business practices: (1) ISPs have no incentive to block traffic since they only make money make money by carrying more content, not less; and (2) angering customers and getting a bad rap with the press is really bad for business — as in lost customers, lost shareholders, and therefore, lost profits.

So, it’s important to bring a little sanity and proportionality back to debates about net neutrality. There’s just no evidence supporting the horror stories bandied about about pro-regulatory critics. Billions of transactions are taking place online each and every day without any neutrality “violations” whatsoever.

I’ve just released a new PFF white paper looking at the hysteria that has often accompanied major media mergers and then taking a look at the marketplace reality years after the fact.  Here‘s the PDF, but I have also pasted the entire thing down below.

_____________________________

A Brief History of Media Merger Hysteria: From AOL-Time Warner to Comcast-NBC

by Adam Thierer

Although the pending union of Comcast and NBC Universal has not yet made it to the altar, Chicken Little-esque wails about the marriage have already begun in earnest. For example, the pro-regulatory media organization Free Press has already set up a website to complain about the deal.[1] And Jeff Chester, executive director of the Center for Digital Democracy, has called it “an unholy marriage.”[2] The fever only promises to spread once the deal is formally announced, and a lengthy fight over the deal is expected at the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) and whichever antitrust agency reviews the deal.[3]

But reality tends to play out somewhat less dramatically than the script penned by the media worrywarts. It’s worth looking back at some of the more prominent examples of media merger hysteria in recent years to understand why such panic is unwarranted, and why a deal between Comcast and NBC Universal is unlikely to lead to the sort of problems that the pessimists suggest.[4]

AOL-Time Warner: From the “New Totalitarianism” to Digital Divorce Court in Less Than a Decade

When the mega-merger between media giant Time Warner and Internet superstar AOL was announced in early 2000, the marriage was greeted with a cacophony of righteous indignation and apocalyptic predictions.  When referring to the dangers of the deal, syndicated columnist Norman Solomon, a longtime associate of the media watch group Fairness & Accuracy In Reporting, summoned the ghost of Aldous Huxley when he and referred to the transaction in terms of “servitude,” “ministries of propaganda,” and “new totalitarianisms.”[5] Similarly, USC Professor of Communications Robert Scheer wondered if the merger represented “Big Brother” and claimed, “Diversity is out, niches are gone, it’s Skippy peanut butter time. AOL is the Levitown of the Internet, mom and apple pie, ‘50s boredom, conformity and dullness as a virtue: A Net nanny reigning in potentially restless souls.”[6]

Such pessimistic predictions proved wildly overblown. To say that the merger failed to create the sort of synergies (and profits) that were originally hoped for would be an epic understatement.[7] The titles of two popular books about the deal summed up the firm’s troubles: One was entitled Fools Rush In (by Nina Munk) and the other, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere (by Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey).[8]

The numbers were mind-boggling. By April 2002, just two years after the deal was struck, AOL-Time Warner had already reported a staggering $54 billion loss.^[9] By January 2003, losses had grown to $99 billion.^[10] By September 2003, Time Warner decided to drop AOL from its name altogether and the deal continued to slowly unravel from there.^[11] In a 2006 interview with the Wall Street Journal, Time Warner President Jeffrey Bewkes famously declared the death of “synergy” and went so far as to call synergy “bullsh*t”!^[12] In early 2008, Time Warner decided to shed AOL’s dial-up service^[13] and now is set to spin off AOL entirely.[14] Looking back at the deal, Fortune magazine senior editor at large Allan Sloan called it the “turkey of the decade”:

The day the deal was announced, Jan. 10, 2000, Time Warner closed at the equivalent of $184.50 a share. After almost 10 years of travail, the $184.50 has shrunk to about $42.25, consisting of one Time Warner share and a quarter of a Time Warner Cable share. The 77 percent decline is triple the decline in the Standard & Poor’s 500-stock index over the same period.[15]

And the Time Warner-AOL split wasn’t the end of this messy divorce process. In 2008, Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment decided to split.^[16] Time Warner has even spun off some of its oldest properties. In 2006, it announced that it was putting 18 of the 50 magazines in its Time magazine division up for sale.^[17]

As is always the case, these divestitures and down-sizing efforts garnered little attention compared with the hullaballoo and hysteria that accompanied the announcement of the deal back in 2000.^[18]

News Corp/DirecTV: Murdoch’s “Digital Death Star” Blows Up

No media industry personality attracts more attention (or angst) than News Corp. Chairman and CEO Rupert Murdoch. The popular leftist blog The Daily Kos has likened him to “a fascist Hitler antichrist.”[19] And CNN founder Ted Turner once compared the popularity of the News Corp.’s Fox News Channel to the rise of Adolf Hitler prior to World War II.^[20] Alternatively, Murdoch has been accused of being a Marxist.[21] Meanwhile, Karl Frisch, a Senior Fellow at Media Matters for America, speaks of Murdoch’s “evil empire”^[22] and a recent MSNBC poll has asked people to vote on the question: “Is Rupert Murdoch evil?”[23] In 2003, when asked by talk show host Chris Matthews, “Would you break up [News Corp.-owned] Fox?” then Democratic presidential candidate Howard Dean answered, “On ideological grounds, absolutely yes.”^[24] And in their book Our Media, Not Theirs, John Nichols and Robert McChesney took the Murdoch-as-evil-overlord storyline to its logical extreme when they suggested Hollywood was on to something by scripting a media tycoon like Murdoch as the bad guy in a James Bond movie: “No wonder conspiracy theories are so popular in America; no wonder, when the makers of James Bond movies look for believable villains these days, they eschew Eurotrash bad guys for more credibly threatening villains such as the Rupert Murdoch-like media baron of 1997’s Tomorrow Never Dies.”^[25]

These Murdochian fears came to a head in 2003 when News Corp. announced it was pursuing a takeover of satellite television operator DirecTV.  Paranoid predictions of a pending media apocalypse followed.  A group of regulatory activists filed joint comments to the FCC claiming that if News Corp. and DirecTV were allowed to merge, “the result will be unprecedented concentration within all aspects of the television marketplace, as well as increased prices for consumers of cable and satellite television.”[26] Similarly, then-FCC Commissioner Jonathan Adelstein worried that the deal would “result in unprecedented control over local and national media properties in one global media empire. Its shockwaves will undoubtedly recast our entire media landscape.” He continued; “With this unprecedented combination, News Corp. could be in a position to raise programming prices for consumers, harm competition in video programming and distribution markets nationwide, and decrease the diversity of media voices.”[27]

Not to be outdone, full-time media fussbudget Jeff Chester predicted that Murdoch would use this “Digital Death Star” as the base of a nefarious scheme to conquer the media universe:

Murdoch will use DirecTV as a ‘death star’ to force his programming on cable companies by threatening a price war unless they give Fox favorable access. Since News Corp will control cable TV’s principal multichannel competitor, it will easily create new channels—unlike anyone else in the TV business.  Rather than engage in open combat and competition, cable powerbrokers such as Comcast and AOL-Time Warner will likely accommodate Murdoch and add his new channels to their own services. Imagine Fox News on steroids. Worse, with DirecTV’s capacity to ‘spotbeam’ channels to serve distinct communities, localized versions of Fox programs could be available in major cities across the nation.[28]

Imagine the horror of new, “spotbeamed” local media competition!  However, unlike the destruction of the planet Alderaan by the Death Star in Star Wars,[29] no one was harmed in the making of the News Corp-DirecTV marriage.  Indeed, the rebels would get the best of Darth Murdoch since his “Digital Death Star” was abandoned just three years after construction.  In December 2006, News Corp. decided to divest the company to Liberty Media Corporation in an effort to win back more controlling News Corp. stock.^[30]

Ironically, many of the same groups that had vociferously protested the original News Corp-DirecTV deal again found reason to complain when the deal was being undone! The FCC’s failure to implement various restrictions as part of the license transfer, they claimed, would “result in continuing control by News Corp. over content distribution, harming competition in both the programming and distribution markets, reducing consumer choice and raising cable prices.”^[31] Unsurprisingly, little mention was made of the previous round of pessimistic predictions or whether there had ever been any merit to the lugubrious lamentations of the media critics.

Sirius-XM: “Merger to Monopoly” or Prelude to Bankruptcy?

Some of the most entertaining and wrong-headed predictions about the future of the media marketplace often come from media moguls themselves. For example, back in 2003, when he was still President and Chief Operating Officer of Viacom, Mel Karmazin said in reference to Microsoft, AOL Time Warner, and Comcast: “I can’t imagine being a competitor with any of these guys.”[32] Just six years later, however, plenty of others are competing with those companies. Microsoft finds itself in a heated war with Google on all fronts, AOL-Time Warner has fallen apart, and Comcast is squaring off against telco (e.g., Verizon’s FiOS and AT&T U-Verse) and online video competitors (e.g., YouTube, Hulu) that were unfathomable in 2003—not to mention the traditional satellite TV competitors they still face. Meanwhile, Karmazin abandoned Viacom and is now struggling to find a way to make subscription-based satellite radio survive the ongoing digital music bloodbath caused by the rise of online music services and a little thing called the iPod.

Of course, hysteria ran rampant when Sirius and XM were merging, too.  Critics called it a “merger to monopoly” and predicted a variety of coming calamities.[33] National Association of Broadcasters Vice President Dennis Wharton described the merger as a “monopoly platform for offensive programming” that would be “anti-consumer.”^[34] Mr. Wharton later remarked that the merged firms “will raise prices, won’t improve their technology and will limit their offerings.”^[35] A coalition of six non-profits claimed that the merger was “perhaps the worst offense against the basic principle that competition is the consumer’s best friend” and, if approved, “a tsunami of mergers could ripple through the digital space at the worst possible moment.”^[36] They predicted that “once the competition is eliminated, prices will rise over time,” “innovation will slow to the pace preferred by the monopolist and consumers will be much worse off in the long run.”^[37] Another coalition argued that the new company would “abuse consumers, artists and other input suppliers in the satellite radio market.”[38]

In the end, the merger took an astonishing 500-plus days for the FCC to finally approve[39] and was conditioned with a lengthy set of “voluntary concessions” to supposedly rectify these potential harms—including pricing constraints that could limit the firm’s ability to cover costs and pay down debt over time.

Unsurprisingly, things haven’t turned out so well for Sirius XM. When the merger was finally approved by the FCC in August 2008, Commissioner Copps dissented vigorously on various grounds but specifically insisted that, “We must assume that the marketplace can support two financially viable competitors.”[40] Unfortunately for Commissioner Copps—as well as Sirius XM—it’s not even clear that the market can sustain one satellite radio provider. The company’s stock went into freefall following completion of the deal and, at one point, its stock fell below 10 cents per share. The company flirted with bankruptcy in February of this year as “satellite radio failed to win over many younger listeners, and competition from other sources slowed subscriber growth.”[41] In March 2009, Karmazin orchestrated a cash-for-stock swap with Liberty Media to get a $530 million lifeline and avoid bankruptcy.[42] But even with the cash infusion Sirius XM faces an uncertain future with stiff competition.[43] “Sirius is girding for slower growth than in the past,” notes Olga Kharif of Business Week, “and analysts remain concerned about the company’s ability to control costs.”[44] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin predicts the overleveraged company “will disappear from the landscape. The subscribers will go to another tech or entertainment company in bankruptcy proceedings. Subscription radio just does not have that much appeal to most people.”[45]

Whether Melvin’s dour forecast for satellite radio proves accurate remains to be seen. What’s clear, however, is that the fears bandied about by critics when the Sirius-XM deal was pending have not come to pass.

Murdoch’s Wall Street Journal Quest

In 2007, Rupert Murdoch announced his desire to purchase The Wall Street Journal.  Once again, a great deal of hand-wringing ensued. “This takeover is bad news for anyone who cares about quality journalism and a healthy democracy,” argued Robert McChesney. “Giving any single company—let alone one controlled by Rupert Murdoch—this much media power is unconscionable.”[46] And FCC Commissioner Copps warned that “It will create a single company with enormous influence over politics, art and culture across the nation and especially in the New York metropolitan area.”[47]

Today, however, the Journal keeps humming along and continues to produce some of the finest journalism on the planet. Meanwhile, “politics, art and culture” seem largely unaffected by the deal—either in New York or the nation.

And the deal certainly hasn’t made Murdoch or News Corp. any richer. “His purchase of The Wall Street Journal is widely seen as one of the worst moves of his career,” notes Michael Wolff of Vanity Fair.[48] News Corp. has already taken a whopping $3 billion write-down on the deal.  Considering the $5 billion price tag Murdoch paid two years ago, one wonders if he’ll hold on to this property any longer than he did DirecTV.

Comcast-NBC Universal: Debunking the Fears Preemptively

No doubt we’ll soon be hearing many of these same apocalyptic predictions about the Comcast-NBC deal. Free Press has said the new entity “will have an incentive to prioritize NBC shows over other local and independent voices and programs, making it even harder to find alternatives on the cable dial.”[49] And Free Press Executive Director Josh Silver has called for the Obama Administration to block the deal saying “it would further starve Americans of [media] diversity.”[50] Even competitors are complaining. Liberty Media Corp. Chairman John Malone, which owns DirecTV, has suggested that they might push the government to reject the deal.[51] Many other rivals will likely join that bandwagon.

These critics will likely raise vertical integration fears and claim that Comcast will act as a “gatekeeper” by limiting the ability of independent voices to get a slot on cable distribution systems, or by withholding NBC-Universal content from other platforms and providers. But there’s little historical evidence that suggests this will be a problem. As the adjoining exhibit illustrates, the overall number of video programming channels available in America has skyrocketed, from just 70 channels in 1990 to 565 channels in 2006, the last year for which the FCC has made data available.

More importantly—and despite claims to the contrary—vertical integration in the video marketplace has plummeted over the past two decades. While many more cable and satellite networks are available today than ever before, the greatest share of the growth in the multichannel video marketplace has come from independently owned video networks. Since 1990, the number of cable-owned or affiliated channels has increased slightly, but it pales in comparison with the growth of independently owned and operated video networks. In real terms, therefore, the percentage of the overall video marketplace controlled (i.e., owned and operated) by cable companies has plummeted—from 50% in 1990 to just 14.9% in 2006. Moreover, in the wake of the Time Warner Cable and Time Warner Entertainment divorce, vertical integration in the cable sector has probably fallen into the single digits. Even if the merger of Comcast and NBC-Universal results in slight increase in industry vertical integration, it almost certainly will not surpass 20 percent.  Consequently, as far as vertically integrated industries go, it is impossible to conclude that this market could be characterized as being controlled by “gatekeepers.”

It is difficult to imagine that Comcast would buck these trends and begin restricting independent options on its systems or withhold its content from others.  Video distributors don’t make money by restricting choice. Consumers would flock to alternative video providers and media services if Comcast played such games. The great thing about the modern media marketplace is that there is always another place for consumers to turn to find something they want.[52] Sports programming could be an exception to the rule, and is the one issue that Comcast may need to bargain over with FCC regulators or antitrust officials since they own regional sports networks that other video distributors want access to.^[53] But traditional concerns about access to over-the-air broadcast signals (namely, the NBC local broadcast television properties) shouldn’t be as much of an issue today as it was the past.  Frankly, local broadcasters need all the eyeballs they can get these days. Thus, it’s unlikely that Comcast would try to withhold those stations from other video distributors, especially since a great deal of NBC programming is already available through other means. And intense competition exists for some of the most important news and informational services that NBC offers, such as local news, weather, and traffic.

Overall, therefore, it’s hard to see the case for the FCC rejecting the deal. Regulators need to be forward-looking about what is driving this deal.  This deal isn’t about protecting old markets but instead about building new ones. “The real motivation behind this deal,” argues Mike Berkley, former CEO of SplashCast Media, “is survival.”

Comcast understands that the price point for distributing TV into homes is going to fall dramatically in the coming years. Comcast’s 3 distribution products, Voice – TV – Internet, are collapsing into just one, single product: Internet. This poses a huge threat to Comcast’s top line. As such, Comcast is hedging through diversification into content, moving up the media value chain. Comcast will be looking to replace lost revenue in distribution with revenue from content (advertising, subscriptions, etc).[54]

Similarly, Wall Street Journal business columnist Holman Jenkins points out that Comcast is scrambling to find a way to rework their business model as the era of set-top box-delivered video slowly gives way to a world of ubiquitously available online video:

This would be a merger, after all, of two businesses that seem headed toward some combination of the fates of newspapers, music CDs and the old wireline telephone business. Customers want the product for free. Comcast’s lifeblood, the $100-a-month cable bill and the $50-a-month broadband bill, increasingly look like duplicative expenses. And so on. True, the number of households that have actually dropped their cable subscriptions in favor of subsisting on TV streamed or downloaded from the Internet is not yet large. But for the Roberts family and its Comcast property, their worst fears lurk just around the corner—being reduced to a “dumb pipe,” subject to commodity pricing while somebody else (Google) makes all the money. Yet an escape route is vexingly hard to envision. Time Warner and Comcast have been talking up plans to make their respective cable lineups available by computer—as long as you keep paying your cable bill. This is a stopgap, especially appealing to anyone who owns two homes but wants to pay only one cable bill. Never mind, too, that hundreds of shows are already available online for free, via Web sites operated by none other than Comcast and the TV networks themselves.[55]

In light of such technological upheaval and marketplace uncertainty, it’s important that regulators proceed cautiously when reviewing this deal or future deals.

Conclusion: Let Markets Evolve

The point here is not that media mergers are inherently good or always make sense. Indeed, as the examples discussed above illustrate, mergers sometimes prove to be huge blunders.[56] But the hysteria sometimes heard before media mergers are consummated rarely bears any relationship to reality once the deals move forward. Media markets are extremely dynamic and prone to disruptive change and technological leap-frogging. Mergers are often one response to that turbulence.

But mergers are no panacea, and they often fail to produce the “synergies” hoped for. A 2004 survey by McKinsey & Co. found that “Nearly 70 percent of the mergers in our database failed to achieve the revenue synergies estimated by the acquirer’s management.”[57] Perhaps, therefore, the best argument for blocking media mergers is not their potentially pernicious effect on markets or consumers, but rather to save the merging firms (and their stockholders) from a miserable marriage!

On the other hand, experimenting with alternative business models and ownership structures is an important part of any dynamic market, because markets are not static but represent and ongoing processes of entrepreneurial “discovery.”[58] Thus, policymakers would be wise to avoid micro-managing mergers and instead let things run their course.  Sometimes collaboration makes a great deal of sense, especially when the significant costs of providing a media service becomes impossible absent a partnership. Indeed, federal officials and agencies are currently exploring how (or whether) journalism can survive an era of seeming perpetual media upheaval.[59] Healthy media companies certainly must be part of the answer and new ownership arrangements might be part of the solution.

Given how difficult it is to predict the future course of events in this chaotic sector, humility—not hubris—is the sensible disposition when it comes to media merger policy. At a minimum, policymakers should insist that ongoing debates are governed by facts instead of fanaticism, because, if the past decade is any guide, discussions about media mergers have been more often rooted in hyperbolic rhetoric and unsubstantiated hysteria.

[1] www.freepress.net/comcast

[2] Quoted in Cecilia Kang, Public Interest Groups Rail against a Comcast and NBC Merger, Washington Post, Post Tech Blog, Nov. 9, 2009, http://voices.washingtonpost.com/posttech/2009/11/for_example_were_advancing_tv.html

[3] “For regulators, a deal like this is a gift; an occasion to impose their will upon needy companies that would otherwise be outside their regulatory reach.” Craig Moffett, Bernstein Research, Comcast: Snatching Defeat from the Jaws of Victory? Oct. 23, 2009, at 14.

[4] Cecilia Kang, A New Kind of Company, A New Kind of Challenge for Feds, Washington Post, Nov. 26, 2009, at 1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/26/AR2009112602500.html

[5] Norman Soloman, AOL Time Warner: Calling The Faithful To Their Knees, Jan. 2000, www.fair.org/media-beat/000113.html

[6] Robert Scheer, Confessions of an E-Columnist, Jan. 14, 2000, Online Journalism Review, www.ojr.org/ojr/workplace/1017966109.php

[7] Looking back at the deal almost ten years later, AOL co-founder Steve Case said, “The synergy we hoped to have, the combination of two members of digital media, didn’t happen as we had planned.” Quoted in Thomas Heath, The Rising Titans of ’98: Where Are They Now?, Washington Post, Nov. 30, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/29/AR2009112902385.html?sub=AR

[8] Nina Munk, Fools Rush In: Steve Case, Jerry Levin, and the Unmaking of AOL Time Warner (New York: Harper Business, 2004); Kara Swisher and Lisa Dickey, There Must Be a Pony in Here Somewhere: The AOL Time Warner Debacle and the Quest for a Digital Future (New York: Crown Business, 2003).

[9] Frank Pellegrini, What AOL Time Warner’s $54 Billion Loss Means, April 25, 2002, Time Online, www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,233436,00.html

[10] Jim Hu, AOL Loses Ted Turner and $99 billion, CNet News.com, Jan. 30, 2004, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-loses-Ted-Turner-and-99-billion/2100-1023_3-982648.html

[11] Jim Hu, AOL Time Warner Drops AOL from Name, CNet News.com, Sept. 18, 2003, http://news.cnet.com/AOL-Time-Warner-drops-AOL-from-name/2100-1025_3-5078688.html

[12] Matthew Karnitschnig, After Years of Pushing Synergy, Time Warner Inc. Says Enough, Wall Street Journal, June 2, 2006, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB114921801650969574.html

[13] Geraldine Fabrikant, Time Warner Plans to Split Off AOL’s Dial-Up Service, New York Times, Feb. 7, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/02/07/business/07warner.html?_r=1&adxnnl=1&oref=slogin&adxnnlx=1209654030-ZpEGB/n3jS5TGHX63DONHg

[14] John Letzing, AOL, On The Verge Of Independence, Weighs On Parent, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 4, 2009, http://online.wsj.com/article/BT-CO-20091104-718782.html

[15] Allan Sloan, ‘Cash for . . .’ and the Year’s Other Clunkers, Washington Post, Nov. 17, 2009, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/16/AR2009111603775.html

[16] Tim Arango, Time Warner Spinning Off Cable Unit, New York Times, April 30, 2008, www.nytimes.com/2008/04/30/business/30warner-web.html?ref=technology

[17] Carolyn Pritchard, Time Inc. to Sell 18 Magazine Titles, MarketWatch, Sept. 12, 2006,  www.marketwatch.com/News/Story/Story.aspx?guid=%7B94967C37%2D9B4A%2D4C1A%2D8AC0%2D64904C1267A1%7D&dist=rss&siteid=mktw&rss=1

[18] “Break-ups and divestitures do not generally get front-page treatment,” notes Ben Compaine, author of Who Owns the Media?  See Ben Compaine, Domination Fantasies, Reason, Jan. 2004, p. 28, www.reason.com/news/show/29001.html

[19] www.dailykos.com/story/2009/9/7/778254/-Rupert-Murdoch-is-a-Fascist-Hitler-Antichrist

[20] Jim Finkle, Turner Compares Fox’s Popularity to Hitler, Broadcasting & Cable, Jan. 25, 2005, www.broadcastingcable.com/CA499014.html

[21] Ian Douglas, Rupert Murdoch is a Marxist, Telegraph.Co.UK, Nov. 9, 2009,  http://blogs.telegraph.co.uk/technology/iandouglas/100004169/rupert-murdoch-is-a-marxist

[22] Karl Frisch, Fox Nation: The Seedy Underbelly of Rupert Murdoch’s Evil Empire? MediaMatters.org, June 2, 2009, http://mediamatters.org/columns/200906020036

[23] www.msnbc.msn.com/id/19817142/

[24] Dean Vows to ‘Break Up Giant Media Enterprises,’ The Drudge Report, Dec. 2, 2003, www.drudgereport.com/dean1.htm; Bill McConnell, Dean Threatens to Break Up Media Giants, Broadcasting & Cable, Dec. 3, 2003, www.broadcastingcable.com/index.asp?layout=articlePrint&articleID=CA339546.

[25] John Nichols and Robert W. McChesney, Our Media, Not Theirs: The Democratic Struggle against Corporate Media (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2002) at 31.

[26] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Center for Digital Democracy, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of News Corporation/Fox Entertainment Group Merger with Hughes Electronics Corporation/DirecTV, MB Docket No. 03-124, July 1, 2003, www.consumersunion.org/pdf/0701-DirecTV.pdf

[27] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Jonathan S. Adelstein, Re:  General Motors Corporation and Hughes Electronics Corporation, Transferors, and The News Corporation Limited, Transferee, MB Docket No. 03-124, Jan. 14, 2004, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-03-330A6.doc

[28] Jeff Chester, Rupert Murdoch’s Digital Death Star, AlterNet, May 20, 2003, www.alternet.org/story/15949

[29] Destruction of Alderaan, Wookieepedia: The Star Wars Wiki, http://starwars.wikia.com/wiki/Destruction_of_Alderaan

[30] News Corporation and Liberty Media Corporation Sign Share Exchange Agreement, News Corp Press Release, Dec. 22, 2006, www.newscorp.com/news/news_322.html.  A frustrated Murdoch referred to DirecTV as a “turd bird” just before he sold it off. See Jill Goldsmith, Murdoch Looks to Release Bird, Variety, Sept. 14, 2006, www.variety.com/article/VR1117950090.html?categoryid=1236&cs=1

[31] Consumers Union, Consumer Federation of America, Free Press, and Media Access Project, Comments In the Matter of Authority to Transfer Control of DirecTV, MB Docket No. 07-18, March 23, 2007, www.mediaaccess.org/file_download/177

[32] Richard Linnett, Media Rivals Backslap at Cable Conference, AdAge.com, June 10, 2003.

[33] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[34] Dennis Wharton, National Association of Broadcasters, NAB Statement in Response to Sirius/XM Proposed Merger, Feb. 19, 2007, www.nab.org/AM/Template.cfm?Section=Search&template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentID=8258.

[35] Peter Whoriskey and Kim Hart, Justice Dept. Approves XM-Sirius Radio Merger, The Washington Post, Mar. 25, 2008, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/03/24/AR2008032401645.html.

[36] The XM-Sirius Merger: Monopoly or Competition from New Technologies: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary Subcommittee on Antitrust, Competition Policy and Consumer Rights, 3 & 6 (March 20, 2007) (statement of Common Cause et. al), www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/2007_-_0320_Public_Interest_GroupsStatement-_Senate_Judiciary.pdf

[37] Id. at 6.

[38] Common Cause, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union, Free Press, Comments in the Matter of Consolidated Application for Authority To Transfer Control of XM Radio Inc. and Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., MB Docket No. 07-57July 9, 2007, at 1, www.hearusnow.org/fileadmin/sitecontent/xm-sirius_comments.pdf

[39] James Gattuso, Day 505: The XM-Sirius Circus Is Finally Over, Technology Liberation Front Blog, Aug. 7, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/08/07/day-505-the-xm-sirius-circus-is-finally-over

[40] Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Michael J. Copps, Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses, XM Satellite Radio Holdings Inc., Transferor, to Sirius Satellite Radio Inc., Transferee, MB Docket No. 07-57, Aug. 5, 2008, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC-08-178A3.pdf

[41] Andrew Ross Sorkin & Zachery Kouwe, Sirius XM Prepares for Possible Bankruptcy, New York Times, Feb. 10, 2009,  www.nytimes.com/2009/02/11/technology/companies/11radio.html

[42] Jon Birger, Mel Karmazin Fights to Rescue Sirius, Fortune.com, March 16, 2009, http://money.cnn.com/2009/03/13/technology/birger_sirius.fortune/index.htm

[43] Former stockbroker and RealMoney.com contributor Tim Melvin worries about the “significant competition for the company going forward” He notes:

Most of the younger people I know have iPod docks in their vehicles for listening to music. Smartphones are bringing music and podcasts to mobile consumers. E-reading machines have wireless connections that can eventually deliver content on a subscription or pay-per-use basis. I really do not need the sports channels from Sirius if I can watch and listen to the games I want on my phone. As time goes by, satellite radio will be viewed as a stepping-stone technology that was replaced by smartphones and other portable media devices.

Tim Melvin, Sirius’ Hopes Keep Slipping Away, The Street.com, Nov. 10, 2009, www.thestreet.com/story/10624757/1/sirius-hopes-keep-slipping-away.html?cm_ven=GOOGLEFI

[44] Olga Kharif, Sirius XM: The Good and Bad Earnings News, Business Week, Nov. 5, 2009, www.businessweek.com/technology/content/nov2009/tc2009115_002716.htm

[45] Melvin, supra 39.

[46] Robert McChesney, Murdoch’s Deal for the Journal: Yet Another Blow for Journalism, Free Press Press Release, July 30, 2007, www.freepress.net/release/260

[47] Michael Copps, Letter to FCC Chairman Kevin Martin, Oct. 25, 2007, http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-277576A1.pdf

[48] Michael Wolff, Rupert to Internet: It’s War! Vanity Fair, Nov. 2009, at 112.

[49] www.freepress.net/comcast

[50] Josh Silver, Too Big to Block? Why Obama Must Stop the Comcast-NBC Merger, Huffington Post, Nov. 13, 2009, www.huffingtonpost.com/josh-silver/too-big-to-block-why-obam_b_356826.html

[51] www.forbes.com/feeds/afx/2009/11/19/afx7143505.html

[52] Adam Thierer and Grant Eskelsen, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Metrics: The True State of the Modern Media Marketplace, Summer 2008, www.pff.org/mediametrics

[53] However, experience with regulation of sports programming suggests that FCC meddling has had negative unintended consequences.  See W. Kenneth Ferree, Competition in the Sports Programming Marketplace, Testimony before the Subcommittee on Telecommunications and the Internet, House Committee on Energy and Commerce, March 5, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/030508ferreetestimony.pdf; Barbara Esbin, Unable to Watch the Big Game? Testimony before the National Conference of State Legislatures Communications, Financial Services and Interstate Commerce Committee, Apr. 25, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/testimony/2008/080425esbinNCSLpresentation.pdf

[54] Mike Berkley, The Comcast-NBC Deal is a Defensive Move by Comcast. It’s about Survival, TV News Stream, Nov. 16, 2009, http://tvnewsstream.com/the-comcast-nbc-deal-is-a-defensive-move-by-c

[55] Holman Jenkins, The Economics of Jay Leno, Wall Street Journal, Nov. 18, 2009, at A17, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704431804574541684183772504.html

[56] Chris O’Brien, Beware the Hype Around Mergers, MercuryNews.com, Nov. 12, 2009, www.mercurynews.com/chris-obrien/ci_13756963?nclick_check=1

[57] Scott A. Christofferson, Robert S. McNish & Diane L. Sias, Where Mergers Go Wrong, McKinsey on Finance, Winter 2004, at 2, http://westportcapital.com/library/McKinsey_Where_Mergers_Go_Wrong.pdf.  The authors noted that, “acquirers face an obvious challenge in coping with an acute lack of reliable information. They typically have little actual data about the target company, limited access to its managers, suppliers, channel partners, and customers, and insufficient experience to guide synergy estimation and benchmarks.”

[58] See, e.g., Israel M. Kirzner, Competition, Regulation, and the Market Process: An “Austrian” Perspective, Cato Institute Policy Analysis No. 18, 1982, www.cato.org/pubs/pas/pa018.html

[59] For example, congressional hearings have been held on this topic and the Federal Trade Commission is holding a workshop on December 1^st and 2^nd asking, “Will Journalism Survive the Internet Age?” www.ftc.gov/opp/workshops/news/index.shtml

by Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, Progress Snapshot 5.11 (PDF)

Ten years ago, Nobel Prize-winning economist Milton Friedman lamented the “Business Community’s Suicidal Impulse:” the persistent propensity to persecute one’s competitors through regulation or the threat thereof. Friedman asked: “Is it really in the self-interest of Silicon Valley to set the government on Microsoft?” After yesterday’s FCC vote’s to open a formal “Net Neutrality” rule-making, we must ask whether the high-tech industry—or consumers—will benefit from inviting government regulation of the Internet under the mantra of “neutrality.”

The hatred directed at Microsoft in the 1990s has more recently been focused on the industry that has brought broadband to Americans’ homes (Internet Service Providers) and the company that has done more than any other to make the web useful (Google). Both have been attacked for exercising supposed “gatekeeper” control over the Internet in one fashion or another. They are now turning their guns on each other—the first strikes in what threatens to become an all-out, thermonuclear war in the tech industry over increasingly broad neutrality mandates. Unless we find a way to achieve “Digital Détente,” the consequences of this increasing regulatory brinkmanship will be “mutually assured destruction” (MAD) for industry and consumers.

New Fronts in the Neutrality Wars

The FCC’s proposed rules would apply to all broadband providers, including wireless, but not to Google or many other players operating in other layers of the Net who favor such broadband-specific rules. With this rulemaking looming, AT&T came after Google with letters to the FCC in late September and then another last week accusing the company of violating neutrality principles in their business practices and arguing that any neutrality rules that apply to ISPs should apply equally to Google’s panoply of popular services. In particular, AT&T accused Google of “search engine bias,” suggesting that only government-enforced neutrality mandates could protect consumers from Google’s supposed “monopolist” control.

The promise made yesterday by the FCC—to only apply neutrality principles to the infrastructure layer of the Net—is hollow and will ultimately prove unenforceable. The reality is that regulation always spreads. The march of regulation can sometimes be glacial, but it is, sadly, almost inevitable: Regulatory regimes grow but almost never contract. Indeed, in some ways, the prediction we made just three weeks ago is already coming true: The basic premise of neutrality regulation is already being proposed for other layers of the Internet—and not just by AT&T in retaliation. One need not agree with all of AT&T’s accusations to recognize that, whatever the FCC might say today, any large online intermediary with a popular platform potentially faces the threat of “network neutrality” mandates—because every platform is essentially a “network,” too. We’re not just talking about “search neutrality” (Google as well as Microsoft) but also about “device neutrality” (mobile handsets), “app neutrality” (Apple’s iTunes store, Facebook’s developers and Google’s Android mobile OS) and so on for social networking, email, instant messaging, online advertising, etc.

An open letter sent to FCC Chairman Julius Genachowski this week by 28 founders and CEOs of leading application providers—including Amazon, Google, Facebook, Netflix, Craigslist, Sony and Twitter—speaks generally about the need for the FCC to enforce a “guarantee of neutral, nondiscriminatory access by users.” While many of these signatories may have in mind ISPs as the network “gatekeepers” that need to be reined in by the FCC, the more successful among them are likely to find this letter used against them in the future—perhaps even by co-signatories—to advance a broad conception of what the government must do to ensure “openness” and “access” for platforms at all layers of the Internet.

Dumb Networks, Dumb Devices

The intellectual foundations for this regulatory creep have already been laid by groups like Free Press and Public Knowledge and law professors like Columbia’s Tim Wu, Harvard’s Jonathan Zittrain and Seton Hall’s Frank Pasquale. As originally conceived by Tim Wu in 2003, “network neutrality” is not unique to broadband networks: “the basic economic problem found in the network neutrality debate (a form of ‘platform exclusion’ or ‘vertical foreclosure’) can be found in many other markets.” Indeed, Wu’s popular Net Neutrality FAQ declares:

The promotion of network neutrality is no different than the challenge of promoting fair evolutionary competition in any privately owned environment, whether a telephone network, operating system, or even a retail store. Government regulation in such contexts invariably tries to help ensure that the short-term interests of the owner do not prevent the best products or applications becoming available to end-users.

Zittrain picked up where Wu left off in The Future of the Internet and How to Stop It—attacking, as the enemies of innovation, not ISPs but the supposedly “closed” platforms of Apple, TiVo and Microsoft’s Xbox. Zittrain warns that:

If there is a present worldwide threat to neutrality in the movement of bits, it comes not from restrictions on traditional Internet access that can be evaded using generative PCs, but from enhancements to traditional and emerging appliancized services that are not open to third-party tinkering.

Zittrain’s general solution is “API [Applications Programming Interface] neutrality:” If you create a platform (whether hardware or software) and begin allowing third-party contributions (“generativity”), you will lose all control over devices or applications that can run on that platform.

Those who offer open APIs on the Net in an attempt to harness the generative cycle ought to remain application-neutral after their efforts have succeeded, so all those who built on top of their interface can continue to do so on equal terms…. [N]etwork neutrality ought to be applied to the new platforms of Web services that, in turn, depend on Internet connectivity to function.

Clearly, if Zittrain and his allies have their way, the sort of neutrality mandates envisioned by the FCC or some Congressmen for ISPs will eventually cover companies such as Apple, Google, Facebook, Myspace, Twitter and Amazon—all singled out by Zittrain in a New York Times op-ed in July:

If the market settles into a handful of gated cloud communities whose proprietors control the availability of new code, the time may come to ensure that their platforms do not discriminate. Such a demand could take many forms, from an outright regulatory requirement to a more subtle set of incentives — tax breaks or liability relief — that nudge companies to maintain the kind of openness that earlier allowed them a level playing field on which they could lure users from competing, mighty incumbents.

Frank Pasquale agrees on the need to restrain all “the dominant players at all layers of online life,” but focuses on his demand for a Federal Search Commission to control supposedly “biased” search results. While the FCC wrings its hands over “managed services” offered by ISPs, search engines are increasingly offering their own value-added services by “blending” algorithmically-derived results with special features like maps, videos, books or music depending on what the search term suggests the user is interested in. “Artificially” ensuring that these features appear on the first page of search results is clearly non-neutral, and necessarily involves search engines making ”managed” decisions as to whose features to include. Yet such features also clearly benefit users—dramatically improving the usefulness of search engines and helping to sustain struggling business models like music retailing.

But one need not resort to the works of “ivory tower” academics to see the slippery slope we’re already tumbling down with the infinitely elastic principle of “neutrality.” The prospect of the FCC gradually transforming into a “Federal Information Commission” becomes more apparent when one reads the Wireless Innovation and Investment Notice of Inquiry recently released by the FCC:

As other approaches, such as cloud computing, evolve, will established standards or de facto standards become more important to the applications development process? For example, can a dominant cloud computing position raise the same competitive issues that are now being discussed in the context of network neutrality? Will it be necessary to modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces to promote further innovation in the development and deployment of new applications and services?

One can imagine how some might use such language to accuse Google of being in “a dominant cloud computing position” such that “the context of network neutrality” will be applied to cloud service (like Google Voice) to “modify the existing balance between regulatory and market forces” through regulation. Indeed, that’s precisely what AT&T has suggested in recent letters (September 25 ^th and October 14 ^th) to the FCC.

AT&T’s partner Apple has already been the subject of such attacks for its decision to block the Google Voice app earlier this summer. The incident marked the beginning of open warfare between Google and AT&T/Apple. The FCC quickly jumped into the mix, first questioning how Apple manages its iTunes apps store for the iPhone, then questioning how Google runs its free Voice application. What legal authority the FCC has over either service is far from clear, but Apple seems to have gotten the message: It recently approved the Spotify music streaming app for the iPhone, which could be a serious competitive threat to the iTunes music store. This small incident highlights how easily regulators can impose their will through informal mechanisms like open-ended investigations even without clear authority to issue rules or bring enforcement actions. Yet none dare call it what it is: regulatory blackmail.

The Inevitability of Regulatory Capture

No doubt, other industry players will cheer on such regulatory harassment of the titans of tech—and maybe even demand more of it. Regulatory creep is driven by more than the self-interests of every bureaucracy to expand its own mission, budget and staff. As the Electronic Frontier Foundation has noted, “Experience shows that the FCC is particularly vulnerable to regulatory capture.” While lobbyists play an important role in defending business from government, all too many businesses naively look at government as a beast that can be tamed, trained, and turned to one’s own advantage, and often try to use the expanding regulatory apparatus to their own advantage or simply throw their competitors under the bus to save themselves. The result is a Hobbesian regulatory “war of all against all” within industry.

As Professor Alfred E. Kahn explained in his 2-volume opus, The Economics of Regulation, all regulation—however high-minded—is inevitably captured by special interests because:

When a commission is responsible for the performance of an industry, it is under never completely escapable pressure to protect the health of the companies it regulates, to assure a desirable performance by relying on those monopolistic chosen instruments and its own controls rather than on the unplanned and unplannable forces of competition. […] Responsible for the continued provision and improvement of service, [the regulatory commission] comes increasingly and understandably to identify the interest of the public with that of the existing companies on whom it must rely to deliver goods.

If Internet regulation follows the same course as other industries, the FCC and/or lawmakers will eventually indulge calls by all sides to bring more providers and technologies “into the regulatory fold.” Clearly, this process has already begun. Even before rules are on the books, the companies that have made America the leader in the Digital Revolution are turning on each other in a dangerous game of brinksmanship, escalating demands for regulation and playing right into the hands of those who want to bring the entire high-tech sector under the thumb of government—under an Orwellian conception of “Internet Freedom” that makes corporations the real Big Brother, and government, our savior.

Toward a Less MAD World: Digital Détente

Sincere defenders of real Internet Freedom—that is, freedom from government techno-meddling—recognize that there will always be disputes over how companies deal with each other online across all layers of the Internet. The question is not whether we need a technical coordinating mechanism for handling such disputes. Someone should mediate conflicts over alleged deviations from abstract neutrality principles. But should that arbitrator be an inherently political body like FCC? Or should we instead look to truly independent, apolitical arbitrators like the Internet Engineering Task Force or collaborative efforts like the Network Neutrality Squad? Such alternative dispute resolution mechanisms and fora need not have the power of law to be effective: The weight of their expert opinion, based on careful investigation of the facts, would likely resolve most disputes, because companies have strong reputational incentives to comply with reasoned rulings by truly neutral experts. And the white hot spotlight of public attention has a way of disciplining marketplace behavior as well.

Government would still have a role to play, of course, in enforcing antitrust laws where anticompetitive harm to consumers can be proven, and in enforcing the promises companies make to consumers. Ultimately, however, certain business models and technologies require non-neutral treatment, and the best remedy for concerns about non-neutrality is competition itself: In the high-tech sector more than any other, disruptive innovation makes it difficult for even the most successful companies to stay on top forever. Competitive entry—or even the threat of new entry—provides a powerful check on the power of so-called “gatekeepers,” but even more important is the prospect that today’s leaders will be tomorrow’s laggards: There’s little reason to think Google (search and advertising), Apple (smart phones and music) and Facebook (social networking) won’t someday find themselves playing catch-up, just as IBM (computers), Microsoft (desktop software and search), Friendster and MySpace (social networking), and Yahoo! and AOL (web portals) have had to do.

“Digital Détente” would require that all parties concede something and work constructively toward a more “peaceful” ( i.e., less regulatory) resolution. And yet, no Internet company wants to disarm unilaterally, foreswearing politics as a continuation of competition by other means. Only through multilateral disarmament could they break out of the current cycle of regulatory one-upmanship: If the companies in the Internet ecosystem could form a united front against increased government regulation and in favor of removing existing regulatory obstacles to competition, they could all return to their core competencies of creativity and innovation.

The alternative is a regulatory “nuclear winter”: high-tech titans turning their political fire on each other, catching innocent third parties in the cross-fire and bringing a dark cloud of government regulation over the entire Internet. Such increased regulation would stifle investment and innovation throughout the Internet ecosystem. Thus, it is consumers who will ultimately suffer most from the tech industry’s suicidal impulse, as their choices and digital lives are impoverished. For their sake, we hope all industry players will step back from the brink to avoid such high-tech mutually assured destruction.

The smell of high-tech regulation is increasingly in the air these days and many lawmakers and some activist groups now have the mobile marketplace in their regulatory cross-hairs. Critics make a variety of claims about the wireless market supposedly lacking competition, choice, innovation, or reasonable pricing. Consequently, they want to wrap America’s wireless sector in a sea of red tape.   Two important new studies thoroughly debunk these assertions and set the record straight regarding the state of wireless competition and innovation in the U.S. today. These reports are must-reading for Washington policymakers and FCC officials who are currently contemplating regulatory action.

First, Gerald Faulhaber and Dave Farber have a new report out entitled “Innovation in the Wireless Ecosystem: A Customer-Centric Framework.”  Here’s what Faulhaber and Farber find:

the three segments of the wireless marketplace (applications, devices, and core network) have exhibited very substantial innovation and investment since its inception. Perhaps more interesting, innovation in each segment is highly dependent upon innovation in the other segments. For example, new applications depend upon both advances in device hardware capabilities and advances in spectral efficiency of the core network to provide the network capacity to serve those applications. Further, we find that the three segments of the industry are also highly competitive. There are many players in each segment, each of which aggressively seeks out customers through new technology and new business methods. The results of this competition are manifest: (i) firms are driven to innovate and invest in order to win in the competitive marketplace; (ii) new business models have emerged that give customers more choice; and (iii) firms have opened new areas such as wireless broadband and laptop wireless in order to expand their strategic options.

They continue on to address the policy issues in play here and discuss the “consumer-centric” approach they recommend that the FCC adopt:

Having found that all three segments are highly competitive, we ask, where is the market failure? If none, then the principle of customer-centric applies: let customers make the key decisions regarding which products, services, open vs. managed business models, net neutrality, et al. will survive in the marketplace. While there is no shortage of pundits, advocates, lobbyists and academics advising the FCC that it, rather than customers, should be making these decisions and advising the FCC what those decisions should be, a customer-centric FCC must leave these decisions to customers in a competitive marketplace. Should the FCC decide to preempt customers and make choices for them, it follows as does night from day that the result will be (i) less customer choice, and therefore reduced customer well-being; (ii) higher costs for producers and therefore customers; (iii) lower incentives to invest and innovate, harming customers, producers and the American economy. In this case, economics and technology are on the same page: economists advise intervention only in the case of demonstrated market failure, and then only if there is evidence that the intervention will do more good than harm. The technologist’s advice is more pithy and down to earth: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it!

Amen to that.  Let’s hope our lawmakers are listening.

Second, Everett Ehrlich, Jeffrey Eisenach, and Wayne Leighton have a terrific new paper out entitled “The Impact of Regulation on Innovation and Choice in Wireless Communications,” which reaches similar conclusions to those Faulhaber and Farber found in their report. Here’s the executive summary from the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton report:

Proposals to increase regulation of mobile wireless services, for example, by applying “net neutrality” regulation, are often based on claims that such regulation would enhance innovation and increase consumer choice. In fact, they would have the opposite effect. The business practices that would be banned by such regulation are efficient mechanisms for spreading and reducing risk, lowering transactions costs, and enhancing marketing activities, all of which contribute to innovation and choice. Moreover, product differentiation increases competition and thus contributes both directly and indirectly to consumer choice. While some types of exclusive agreements and other “discriminatory” practices can theoretically harm competition, the precondition for such harm to occur – i.e., market power in one or more of the affected markets – generally is not present in wireless markets. Hence, the proposed regulations cannot be justified on grounds of market failure. Rather than increasing innovation and consumer choice, as promised, they would severely disrupt the wireless sector’s highly successful business model and significantly reduce innovation and consumer choice.

Like the Faulhaber-Farber paper, the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper examines the major segments of the wireless marketplace — applications, devices, and networks — and shows them all to be vigorously competitive and experiencing significant innovation. Some of the following tables and charts help to illustrate this.

This first table shows how concentration ratios for the U.S. market (as measured by HHI) are among the lowest in the world.

The next two charts show that U.S. carriers have the lowest revenue per minute (60% lower than the average OECD country) even though average minutes per use are more than twice the amount of the next highest ranked country (Canada).

Finally, this final chart from their report offers a snapshot of mobile Internet penetration in 16 countries showing the U.S. on top:

Incidentally, the Faulhaber-Farber study also does a nice job listing the various mobile application stores out there today:

Device Manufacturer App Stores Apple’s App Store BlackBerry’s App World Palm’s App Catalog Nokia’s Ovi Store Samsung’s Application Store Sony’s PlayNow arena LG’s Application Store

Software Developers Google’s Android Market Microsoft’s Windows Mobile

Carriers AT&T’s MEdia Mall Verizon Wireless’ Tools & Applications Sprint’s Software Store US Cellular’s easyedge Cellular South’s Discover Center Cricket’s Downloads

Independent Stores Handango GetJar

And the Ehrlich-Eisenach-Leighton paper provides some addition perspective on innovation in the handset and applications space:

On the metrics that seem to be of greatest concern to regulation advocates – choice and innovation – the data also show the industry is performing well. For example, CTIA reports there are more than 630 different wireless handsets and devices available in the U.S., compared with only 147 in the United Kingdom, and notes that many of the most advanced handsets introduced in recent months have been launched in the U.S., including (among others) the iPhone 3G, the Google G1, and the Blackberry Storm. Amazon’s highly popular Kindle was also launched in the U.S. with connectivity provided by Sprint – while its European launch was delayed for a full year by Amazon’s inability to reach agreement with a mobile carrier there. As noted above, the number and variety of available applications is increasing rapidly: In addition to the Apple Apps Store, application downloads are now available from the Android Market (Google), the Palm Software Store, Blackberry App World and the Nokia Ovi Store, offering a total of more than 60,000 different applications. On July 14, 2009 Apple announced that more than 1.5 billion applications had been downloaded from its iPhone App Store since its launch in July 2008.

Actually, that number is even higher now.  As I noted here recently, in just a little over a year, Apple reports there’s been 2 billion downloads of over 85,000 apps from over 125,000 developers.  It’s just stunning when you think about it.

I encourage everyone to read both reports cover-to-cover.  They provide a comprehensive look at the reality on the ground — or in the air, as the case may be — in America’s mobile marketplace.

Seems like every week the tech rumor mills unveil some new smartphone that’s supposedly going to give the iPhone a run for its money. Over the past couple years, dozens of advanced handsets have been released with much fanfare — the LG Voyager, Palm Pre, Blackberry Storm, Samsung Omnia, to name a few — but time and time again, we end up with a device that can’t hold a candle to the iPhone’s amazing browser, massive app store, and sleek multi-touch interface.

But all this could change later this year. A number of handsets are due for release on several major networks over the next few months that run on Android, Google’s open source mobile operating system. Android is currently available on only a single device, the HTC G1. It’s a decent phone, but it lacks the polish of the iPhone and is only available with a contract from T-Mobile, which lags behind Sprint, AT&T, and Verizon in terms of 3G coverage.

I’m especially excited about the Android 2.0-based Motorola “Sholes,” a great-looking phone that’s supposedly due for release in November 2009 from Verizon. If rumors pan out, the Sholes should come with a slide-out keyboard, an extremely high-res display, a 5MP camera, and all-around solid specs. Via Android and Me:

The Motorola Sholes should include:

• OMAP3430 – 600 MHz ARM Cortex A8 + PowerVR SGX 530 GPU + 430MHz C64x+ DSP + ISP (Image Signal Processor)
• Dimensions 60.00 x 115.80 x 13.70 mm
• Weight 169 g
• Battery Li-ion 1400 mAh.
• Standby 450 hours, talk time 420 minutes
• 3.7-inch touch-sensitive display with a resolution of 854×480 pixels, 16 million color depth. Physical screen size is 45.72 mm by 81.34 mm.
• 512MB/256MB ROM/RAM
• microSD / microSDHC expansion slot
• Camera: 5.0 megapixel with autofocus and video recorder
• Connectivity: USB2.0, 3.5mm audio jack, Bluetooth 2.0 + EDR, Wi-Fi
• Supported audio formats: AMR-NB/WB, MP3, PCM / WAV, AAC, AAC +, eAAC +, WMA
• Supported video formats: MPEG-4, H.263, H.264, WMV
• GPS

Policymakers should take note of the coming onslaught of Android phones as a reminder that platform competition is alive and well in the U.S. wireless market — despite the claims of certain activists and academics whose definition of “consumer choice” encompasses only those devices that they deem sufficiently “open.”

The latest edition (Version 4.0) of my PFF special report on “Parental Controls and Online Child Protection: A Survey of Tools & Methods” is now up.  For those not familiar with the report, it explores the market for parental control tools, rating schemes, education and media literacy efforts, and various other tools, methods, and initiatives aimed at promoting online child safety.  After evaluating that state of this market, I conclude: “There has never been a time in our nation’s history when parents have had more tools and methods at their disposal to help them decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.”  Moreover, I believe that the parental controls and content management tools cataloged in the report represent a better, less restrictive alternative to government regulation.

Version 4.0 of the report is now over 250 pages long (up from 200 pages in Version 3.0) and it contains almost 70 exhibits (up from 50), 725 references (up from roughly 500), and numerous updates in all five sections of the book. Major updates have been made to the Internet, social networking, and mobile media sections, reflecting the growing importance of those sectors and issues. Other new sections or appendices have also been added to the report, including:

• a new section examining how many households really need parental control tools;
• a new appendix on the downsides of mandatory parental controls and restrictive default settings;
• a new section on the dangers of “deputizing the online middleman” solution as an approach to solving child safety concerns;
• a new appendix reviewing the findings of 5 past online safety task forces;
• … and much more.

I issue major updates once a year and 1 or 2 minor tweaks during the course of the year to reflect the evolution of the parental control and online child safety marketplace and debate. The report is available free-of-charge on the PFF website, and the previous editions of the report are housed there too in case you want to see how it has evolved over the past couple of years. For those interested in taking a quick look at the report, I have embedded it down below the fold as a Scribd file. Finally, as is always the case, I encourage readers to send me updates and suggestions for how to improve the report and I will incorporate them into future versions.

Over at the Verizon Policy Blog, Link Hoewing has a sharp piece up entitled, “Of Business Models and Innovation.” He makes a point that I have often stressed in my debates with Zittrain and Lessig, namely, that the whole “open vs. closed” debate is typically greatly overstated or misunderstood.   Hoewing correctly argues that:

The point is not that open or managed models are always better or worse.  The point is that there is no one “right” model for promoting innovation.  There are examples of managed and open business models that have been both good for innovation and bad for it. There are also examples of managed and open models that have both succeeded and failed.  The point is in a competitive market to let companies develop business models they believe will serve consumers best and see how things play out.

Exactly right.  Moreover, the really important point here is that there exists a diverse spectrum of innovative digital alternatives from which to choose. Along the “open vs. closed” spectrum, the range of digital technologies and business models continues to grow and grow in both directions.  Do you want wide-open, tinker-friendly devices, sites, or software? You got it. Do you want a more closed, simple, and safe online experience?  You can have that, too.  And there are plenty of choices in between.

This is called progress!

Today, the U.S. Department of Commerce’s National Telecommunications and Information Administration (NTIA) announced the members of the new Online Safety and Technology Working Group (OSTWG).  I am honored to be among those chosen to participate in this new task force and I look forward to continuing the work started last year with the Harvard Berkman Center’s Internet Safety Technical Task Force (ISTTF), which I also served on.   I was very proud of the work done by the ISTTF and the impressive final report that Prof. John Palfrey crafted to reflect our findings.  I am eager to investigate these issues further and take a look at the latest research and technologies that can help us better understand how to protect our kids online while also protecting the free speech and privacy rights of Netizens.

The new NTIA working group, which was established under the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act,” will report to the Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information on industry-implemented online child safety tools and efforts. Within a year of convening its first meeting, the group will submit a report of its findings and make recommendations on how to increase online safety measures.

Below the fold I have listed the complete roster of OSTWG task force members.  I very much looking forward to working with this outstanding group.  And I’m happy to report that my TLF blogging colleague Braden Cox will be joining me on this task force!

Ms. Parry Aftab, WiredSafety Ms. Elizabeth Banker, Yahoo! Inc. Mr. Christopher Bubb, AOL Ms. Anne Collier, Net Family News, Inc./ConnectSafely.org Mr. Braden Cox, NetChoice Coalition Ms. Caroline Curtin, Microsoft Mr. Brian Cute, Afilias U.S.A. Mr. Jeremy Geigle, Arizona Family Council Ms. Marsali Hancock, Internet Keep Safe Coalition Mr. Michael Kaiser, National Cyber Security Alliance Mr. Christopher Kelly, Facebook Mr. Brian Knapp, Loopt, Inc. Mr. Timothy Lordan, Internet Education Foundation Mr. Larry Magid, SafeKids.com/ConnectSafely.org Mr. Brian Markwalter, Consumer Electronics Association Mr. Michael McKeehan, Verizon Communications, Inc. Dr. Samuel McQuade, III, Rochester Institute of Technology Ms. Orit Michiel, Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. Mr. John Morris, Center for Democracy & Technology Mr. Jonathon Nevett, Network Solutions, LLC Mr. Hemanshu Nigam, MySpace/Fox Interactive Media Ms. Jill Nissen, Ning, Inc. Mr. Jay Opperman, Comcast Corporation Mr. Kevin Rupy, United States Telecom Association Mr. John Shehan, National Center for Missing & Exploited Children Mr. K. Dane Snowden, CTIA – the Wireless Association Mr. Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation Ms. Patricia Vance, Entertainment Software Rating Board Mr. Ralph Yarro, The CP80 Foundation

• denotes co-chairs of the task force

As anyone who has spent time searching for comments on the FCC’s website can tell you, the agency doesn’t exactly have the most user-friendly website.  In the interest of making it easier for others to read the comments that came in last week in the agency’s “Child Safe Viewing Act” Notice of Inquiry, I have compiled all the major comments (those over 3 or 4 pages) and provided links to them below the fold.

Again, this proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  I filed 150+ pages worth of comments in this matter last week, and here’s my analysis of why this bill and the FCC’s proceeding are worth monitoring closely.

• Association of National Advertisers (ANA)
• AT&T
• Center for Democracy & Technology (Individual Comments)
• CDT (Joint Comments with other Public Interest Groups)
• Children’s Media Policy Coalition
• Coalition for Independent Ratings
• Comcast
• Common Sense Media
• Consumer Electronic Association (CEA)
• CTIA – The Wireless Association
• Cox Communications
• CustomPlay
• Digimarc Corp
• Digital Watermarking Alliance
• Digital Media Association
• Dish Network
• DirecTV
• Entertainment Software Association (ESA)
• Family Online Safety Institute (FOSI)
• Google (+ attachments A, B, C)
• Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)
• Microsoft
• NAB + NCTA + MPAA (0n TV Guidelines)
• National Cable & Telecommunications Association (NCTA)
• Progress & Freedom Foundation (PFF)
• Sanyo
• Smart Television Alliance
• Sprint-Nextel
• TiVo
• TV Guardian
• TV Watch
• U.S. Telecom Association
• Verizon & Verizon Wireless
• Wi-LAN V-Chip Corp

Today I filed comments with the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) in its proceeding examining the marketplace for “advanced blocking technologies.”  This proceeding was required under the “Child Safe Viewing Act of 2007,” which Congress passed last year and President Bush signed last December. The goal of the bill and the FCC’s proceeding (MB 09-26) is to study “advanced blocking technologies” that “may be appropriate across a wide variety of distribution platforms, including wired, wireless, and Internet platforms.”  My colleagues will no doubt laugh about the fact that I have dropped an absurd 150 pages worth of comments on the FCC in this matter, but I had a lot to say on this topic!  Parental controls, child safety, and free speech issues have been the focus of much of my research agenda over the past 10 years.

In my filing, I argue that the FCC should tread carefully in this matter since the agency has no authority over most of the media platforms and technologies described in the Commission’s recent Notice of Inquiry.  Moreover, any related mandates or regulatory actions in in this area could diminish future innovation in this field and would violate the First Amendment rights of media creators and consumers alike.  The other major conclusions of my filing are as follows:

• There exists an unprecedented abundance of parental control tools to help parents decide what constitutes acceptable media content in their homes and in the lives of their children.
• There is a trade-off between complexity and convenience for both tools and ratings, and no parental control tool is completely foolproof.
• Most homes have no need for parental control technologies because parents rely on other methods or there are no children in the home.
• The role of household media rules and methods is underappreciated and those rules have an important bearing on this debate.
• Parental control technologies work best in combination with educational efforts and parental involvement.
• The search for technological silver-bullets and “universal” solutions represent a quixotic, Holy Grail-like quest and it will destroy innovation in this marketplace.
• Enforcement of “household standards” made possible through use of parental controls and other methods negates the need for “community standards”-based content regulation.

My entire filing can be found here and down below in a Scribd reader.  All comments in the matter are due tomorrow and then reply comments are due on May 18th.

[FCC FILING] Adam Thierer-PFF Re Child Safe Viewing Act NOI (MB 09-26) http://d.scribd.com/ScribdViewer.swf?document_id=14264143&access_key=key-2nrvjm96q9cl5vep567l&page=1&version=1&viewMode=

Some sensible thinking here about broadband pork stimulus plans from Saul Hansell of the New York Times. In his piece on the NYT Bits blog this week, “Does Broadband Need a Stimulus?” he argues that people should stop grumbling about the “relatively small sum” of $6 billion that the new administration has proposed for wiring rural areas and urban centers. Hansell argues:

This also seems to be a rather sound policy choice because, as I look at it, the noise about a broadband gap is hooey. With new cable modem technology becoming available, 19 out of 20 American homes eventually will be able to have Internet service that is faster than any available now anywhere in the world. And that’s without one new cable being laid. That fact hasn’t prevented a lot of folks involved in telecommunications policy from calling for a lot of money to be spent on backhoes and cable riggers. For example, the Communications Workers of America and the Telecommunications Industry Association called for $25 billion in subsidies to network providers as well as tax breaks. The Free Press, a group that advocates for media diversity, recommended spending $44 billion, with an emphasis on subsidizing companies to compete with existing cable and phone companies. Running a new fiber-optic cable to every American home may well increase competition in broadband providers, but it isn’t needed to deliver high-speed Internet service. Current cable modems use just one of the more than 100 channels on a typical cable system and can often offer speeds of 16 megabits per second or more. The next generation of modems, using a technology called Docsis 3, allows several of those video channels to be combined to offer what ultimately can be Internet service as fast as 1 gigabit per second — 10 times faster than is offered in Japan, which generally is regarded as having the fastest broadband infrastructure.

What is most significant about Docsis 3 is that it turns out to be quite inexpensive to upgrade existing cable systems to use it. As a result, Comcast and other cable systems are already deploying the technology rather quickly. In other words, with no government intervention, the country is going to have the infrastructure very soon to provide almost everyone with the fastest possible Internet service. To be sure, Verizon and, to a much lesser degree, AT&T, are already building out fiber-optic-based networks that compete with the cable companies in broadband, voice and video. Clearwire, a venture that includes Sprint, is building a wireless broadband network. Certainly, competition often lowers prices and increases choices. But it is hardly clear that the country would get an adequate return from subsidizing what is essentially duplicate capacity.

Amen to all that. Plus, Hansell might have cited the 70 years of experience we have with universal service programs, which have proven to be the very model of waste, fraud, and abuse that many tax-and-spenders claim they now wish to avoid. Moreover, those inefficient subsidies have discouraged competition in rural areas. If we only subsidized McDonalds in rural area, do you think Burger King, Taco Bell or any other fast-food chain would have ever come to town?  But that’s basically the way this racket has worked in the telecom world for years.