The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is taking a more active interest in state and local barriers to entry and innovation that could threaten the continued growth of the digital economy in general and the sharing economy in particular. The agency recently announced it would be hosting a June 9th workshop “to examine competition, consumer protection, and economic issues raised by the proliferation of online and mobile peer-to peer business platforms in certain sectors of the [sharing] economy.” Filings are due to the agency in this matter by May 26th. (Along with my Mercatus Center colleagues, I will be submitting comments and also releasing a big paper on reputational feedback mechanisms that same week. We have already released this paper on the general topic.)

Relatedly, just yesterday, the FTC sent a letter to Michigan policymakers about restricting entry by Tesla and other direct-to-consumer sellers of vehicles. Michigan passed a law in October 2014 prohibiting such direct sales. The FTC’s strongly-worded letter decries the state’s law as “protectionism for independent franchised dealers” noting that “current provisions operate as a special protection for dealers—a protection that is likely harming both competition and consumers.” The agency argues that:

consumers are the ones best situated to choose for themselves both the vehicles they want to buy and how they want to buy them. Automobile manufacturers have an economic incentive to respond to consumer preferences by choosing the most effective distribution method for their vehicle brands. Absent supportable public policy considerations, the law should permit automobile manufacturers to choose their distribution method to be responsive to the desires of motor vehicle buyers.

The agency cites the “well-developed body of research on these issues strongly suggests that government restrictions on distribution are rarely desirable for consumers” and the staff letter continues on to utterly demolish the bogus arguments set forth by defenders of the blatantly self-serving, cronyist law. (For more discussion of just how anti-competitive and anti-consumer these laws are in practice, see this January 2015 Mercatus Center study, “State Franchise Law Carjacks Auto Buyers,” by Jerry Ellig and Jesse Martinez.)

The FTC’s letter is another example of how the agency can take steps using its advocacy tools to explain to state and local policymakers how their laws may be protectionist and anti-consumer in character. Needless to say, this also has ramifications for how the agency approaches parochial restraints on entry and innovation affecting the sharing economy.

In our forthcoming Mercatus Center comments to the FTC for its June 6th sharing economy workshop, Christopher Koopman, Matt Mitchell, and I will address many issues related to the sharing economy and its regulation. Beyond addressing all five of the specific questions asked in the Commission’s workshop notice, we also include a discussion about “Federal Responses to Local Anticompetitive Regulations.” Down below I have reproduced the current rough draft of that section of our filing in the hope of getting input from others. Needless to say, the idea of the FTC aggressively using its advocacy efforts or even federal antitrust laws to address state and local barriers to trade and innovation will make some folks uncomfortable–especially on federalism grounds. But we argue that a good case can be made for the agency using both its advocacy and antitrust tools to address these issues. Let us know what you think.

The Federal Trade Commission possesses two primary tools to address public restraints of trade created by state and local authorities: advocacy and antitrust.[1]

Through its advocacy program, the Commission can provide specific comments to state and local officials regarding the effects of both proposed and existing regulations.[2] Commissioner Joshua Wright has noted that, “For many years, the FTC has used its mantle to comment on legislation and regulation that may restrain competition in a way that harms consumers.”[3] Thus, at a minimum, the Commission can and should shine light on parochial governmental efforts to restrain trade and limit innovation throughout the sharing economy.[4] By shining more light on state or local anti-competitive rules, the Commission will hopefully make governments, or their surrogate bodies (such as licensing boards), more transparent about their practices and more accountable for laws or regulations that could harm consumer welfare. However, to be successful, the Commission’s advocacy efforts depend upon the willingness of state and local legislators and regulators to heed its advice.^[5]

The Commission has already used its advisory role in its recent guidance to state and local policymakers regarding the regulation of ridesharing services. The Commission noted then that “a regulatory framework should be responsive to new methods of competition,” and set forth the following vision regarding what it regards as the proper approach to parochial regulation of passenger transportation services:

Staff recommends that a regulatory framework for passenger vehicle transportation should allow for flexibility and adaptation in response to new and innovative methods of competition, while still maintaining appropriate consumer protections. [Regulators] also should proceed with caution in responding to calls for change that may have the effect of impairing new forms or methods of competition that are desirable to consumers. . . .  In general, competition should only be restricted when necessary to achieve some countervailing procompetitive virtue or other public benefit such as protecting the public from significant harm.[6]

This represents a reasonable framework for addressing concerns about parochial regulation of the sharing economy more generally.

Unfortunately, in areas relevant to the regulation of the sharing economy (e.g., taxicab regulations and rules governing home and apartment rentals) anticompetitive regulations have remained on the books—and in some instances have expanded—in spite of more than 30 years of Commission comment and advocacy.[7]  In fact, as Public Citizen noted in a recent Supreme Court filing:

[M]any more occupations are regulated than ever before, and most boards doing the regulating—in both traditional and new professions—are dominated by industry members who compete in the regulated market. Those board member-competitors, in turn, commonly engage in regulation that can be seen as anticompetitive self-protection. The particular forms anticompetitive regulations take are highly varied, the possibilities seemingly limited only by the imaginations of the board members.[8]

In these instances, the Commission’s antitrust enforcement authority may need to be utilized when its advocacy efforts fall short with regard to regulations that favor incumbents by limiting competition and entry.[9] Many academics have endorsed expanded antitrust oversight of public barriers to trade and innovation.[10] As Commissioner Wright has argued, “the FTC is in a good position to use its full arsenal of tools to ensure that state and local regulators do not thwart new entrants from using technology to disrupt existing marketplace.”[11] He notes specifically that he is “quite confident that a significant shift of agency resources away from enforcement efforts aimed at taming private restraints of trade and instead toward fighting public restraints would improve consumer welfare.”[12] We agree.

The Supreme Court’s recent decision in North Carolina State Board of Dental Examiners v. Federal Trade Commission made it clear that local authorities cannot claim broad immunity from federal antitrust laws.[13] This is particularly true, the Court noted, “where a State delegates control over a market to a nonsovereign actor,” such as a professional licensing board consisting primarily of members of the affected interest being regulated.[14] “Limits on state-action immunity are most essential when a State seeks to delegate its regulatory power to active market participants,” the Court held, “for dual allegiances are not always apparent to an actor and prohibitions against anticompetitive self-regulation by active market participants are an axiom of federal antitrust policy.”[15]

The touchstone of this case and the Court’s related jurisprudence in this area is political accountability.[16] State officials must (1) “clearly articulate” and (2) “actively supervise” licensing arrangements and regulatory bodies if they hope to withstand federal antitrust scrutiny.[17] The Court clarified this test in N.C. Dental holding that “the Sherman Act confers immunity only if the State accepts political accountability for the anticompetitive conduct it permits and controls.”[18] In other words, if state and local officials want to engage in protectionist activities that restrain trade in pursuit of some other countervailing objective, then they need to own up to it by being transparent about their anticompetitive intentions and then actively oversee the process after that to ensure it is not completely captured by affected interests.[19]

Some might argue that this does not go far enough to eradicate anti-competitive barriers to trade at the state or local level that could restrain the innovative potential of the sharing economy. While that may be true, some limits on the Commission’s federal antitrust discretion are necessary to avoid impinging upon legitimate state and local priorities.

Over time, it is our hope that by empowering the public with more options, more information and better ways to shine light on bad actors, the sharing economy will continue to make many of those old regulations unnecessary. Thus, in line with Commissioner Maureen Ohlhausen’s wise advice, the Commission should encourage state and local officials to exercise patience and humility as they confront technological changes that disrupt traditional regulatory systems.[20]

But when parochial regulators engage in blatantly anti-competitive activities that restrain trade, foster cartelization, or harm consumer welfare in other ways, the Commission can act to counter the worst of those tendencies.[21] The Commission’s standard of review going forward was appropriately articulated by Commissioner Wright recently when he noted that, “in the context of potentially disruptive forms of competition through new technologies or new business models, we should generally be skeptical of regulatory efforts that have the effect of favoring incumbent industry participants.”[22]

Such parochial protectionist barriers to trade and innovation will become even more concerning as the potential reach of so many sharing economy businesses grows larger. The boundary between intrastate and interstate commerce is sometimes difficult to determine for many sharing economy platforms. Clearly, much of the commerce in question occurs within the boundaries of a state or municipality, but sharing economy services also rely upon Internet-enabled platforms with a broader reach. To the extent state or local restrictions on sharing economy operations create negative externalities in the form of “interstate spillovers,” the case for federal intervention is strengthened.[23] It would be preferable if Congress chose to deal with such spillovers using its Commerce Clause authority (Art. 1, Sec. 8 of the Constitution),[24] but the presence of such negative externalities might also bolster the case for the Commission’s use of antitrust to address parochial restraints on trade.

[1]     See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 19-20.

[2]     Id., at 20. (“The primary goal of such advocacy is to convince policymakers to consider and then minimize any adverse effects on competition that may result from regulations aimed at preventing various consumer harms.”) Also see James C. Cooper and William E. Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms: Antitrust Law and Public Restraints on Competition,” Boston University Law Review, Vol. 90, No. 4, (August 2010): 1582, “Competition advocacy helps solve consumers’ collective action problem by acting within the regulatory process to advocate for regulations that do not restrict competition unless there is a compelling consumer protection rationale for imposing such costs on citizens.”).

[3]     Joshua D. Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets:  Public Choice, Regulatory Capture, and the FTC,” Remarks of Joshua D. Wright Commissioner, Federal Trade Commission at the Big Ideas about Information Lecture Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, April 2, 2015, at 15, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/04/regulation-high-tech-markets-public-choice-regulatory-capture-ftc.

[4]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1610, (“Competition agencies could devote greater resources to conduct research to measure the effects of public policies that restrict competition. A research program could accumulate and analyze empirical data that assesses the consumer welfare effects of specific restrictions. Such a program could also assess whether the stated public interest objectives of government restrictions are realized in practice.”)

[5]     Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1582, (“The value of competition advocacy should be measured by (1) the degree to which comments altered regulatory outcomes times (2) the value to consumers of those improved outcomes. For all practical purposes, however, both elements are difficult to measure with any degree of certainty.”).

[6]     Federal Trade Commission, Staff Comments Before the Colorado Public Utilities Commission In The Matter of The Proposed Rules Regulating Transportation By Motor Vehicle, 4 Code of Colorado Regulations, (March 6, 2013), http://ftc.gov/os/2013/03/130703coloradopublicutilities.pdf.

[7]     Marvin Ammori, “Can the FTC Save Uber,” Slate, March 12, 2013, http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/future_tense/2013/03/uber_lyft_sidecar_can_the_ftc_fight_local_taxi_commissions.html (noting that, “not only does the FTC have the authority to take these cities to impartial federal courts and end their anticompetitive actions; it also has deep expertise in taxi markets and antitrust doctrines.”) Also see, Edmund W. Kitch, “Taxi Reform—The FTC Can Hack It,” Regulation, May/June 1984, http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/serials/files/regulation/1984/5/v8n3-3.pdf.

[8]     Brief of Amici Curiae Public Citizen in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 24.

[9]     Brief of Antitrust Scholars as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 6, 2014): 24, (“Antitrust review is entirely appropriate for curbing the excesses of occupational licensing because the anticompetitive effect has a similar effect on the market—and in particular consumers—as does traditional cartel activity.”)

[10]   See Mark A. Perry, “Municipal Supervision and State Action Antitrust Immunity,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 57, (Fall 1990): 1413-1445; William J. Martin, “State Action Antitrust Immunity for Municipally Supervised Parties,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 72, (Summer, 2005): 1079-1102; Jarod M. Bona, “The Antitrust Implications of Licensed Occupations Choosing Their Own Exclusive Jurisdiction,” University of St. Thomas Journal of Law & Public Policy, Vol 5, (Spring 2011): 28-51; Ingram Weber “The Antitrust State Action Doctrine and State Licensing Boards,” The University of Chicago Law Review, Vol. 79, (2012); Aaron Edlin and Rebecca Haw, “Cartels by Another Name:  Should Licensed Occupations Face Antitrust Scrutiny?,” University of Pennsylvania Law Review, Vol. 162, (2014): 1093-1164.

[11]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 28-9.

[12]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 29.

[13]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[14]   Id.

[15]   Id. Also see Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1143, (“Who could seriously argue that an unsupervised group of competitors appointed to regulate their own profession can be counted on to neglect their selfish interests in favor of the state’s?”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 3, (“Antitrust immunity for private parties who act under color of state law is especially problematic, given that anticompetitive conduct is most likely to occur when private parties are in a position to exploit government’s regulatory powers.”)

[16]   See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Reflections on the Supreme Court’s North Carolina Dental Decision and the FTC’s Campaign to Rein in State Action Immunity, before the Heritage Foundation, Washington, DC, March 31, 2015, at 16, https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/03/reflections-supreme-courts-north-carolina-dental-decision-ftcs-campaign, (“states need to be politically accountable for whatever market distortions they impose on consumers.”); Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1137, (“political accountability is the price a state must pay for antitrust immunity.)

[17]   See Federal Trade Commission, Office of Policy and Planning, Report of the State Action Task Force (2003): 54, (“clear articulation requires that a state enunciate an affirmative intent to displace competition and to replace it with a stated criterion. Active supervision requires the state to examine individual private conduct, pursuant to that regulatory regime, to ensure that it comports with that stated criterion. Only then can the underlying conduct accurately be deemed that of the state itself, and political responsibility for the conduct fairly placed with the state.”) This test has been developed and refined in a variety of cases over the past 35 years. See: California Retail Liquor Dealers Ass’n v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97 (1980); Cmty. Comm’ns Co., Inc. v. City of Boulder, 455 U.S. 40, 48-51 (1982); City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Advertising, Inc., 499 U.S. 365 (1991); FTC v. Ticor Title Ins. Co., 504 U.S. 621 (1992).

[18]   North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015).

[19]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1156. (“Requiring that the state place its imprimatur on regulation is at least better than the status quo, in which states too often delegate self-regulation to professionals and walk away.”) See also North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, 135 S. Ct. 1101 (2015) (“[Federal antitrust] immunity requires that the anticompetitive conduct of nonsovereign actors, especially those authorized by the State to regulate their own profession, result from procedures that suffice to make it the State’s own.”).

[20]  Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Commissioner, Fed. Trade Commission, “Regulatory Humility in Practice,” Remarks of the American Enterprise Institute, Washington, D.C. (April 1, 2015).

[21]   Edlin & Haw, “Cartels by Another Name,” at 1094, (“state action doctrine should not prevent antitrust suits against state licensing boards that are comprised of private competitors deputized to regulate and to outright exclude their own competition, often with the threat of criminal sanction.”). See also Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 2, 21, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supreme_court_preview/BriefsV4/13-534_resp_amcu_plf-cato.authcheckdam.pdf, (noting that courts “should presume strongly against granting state-action immunity in antitrust cases.  It makes little sense to impose powerful civil and criminal punishments on private parties who are deemed to have engaged in anti-competitive conduct, while exempting government entities—or, worse, private parties acting under the government’s aegis—when they engage in the exact same conduct. . . . “Whatever one’s opinion of antitrust law in general, there is no justification for allowing states broad latitude to disregard federal law and erect private cartels with only vague instructions and loose oversight.”)

[22]   Wright, “Regulation in High-Tech Markets,” at 7.

[23]   FTC, Report of the State Action Task Force, 44, (“an unfortunate gap has emerged between scholarship and case law. Although many of the leading commentators have expressed serious concern regarding problems posed by interstate spillovers, their thinking has yet to take root in the law. Such spillovers undermine both economic efficiency and some of the same political representation values thought to be protected by principles of federalism.”); Brief Amicus of the Pacific Legal Foundation and Cato Institute, North Carolina State Bd. of Dental Exam’rs v. FTC, (August 2014): 13, (“Allowing states expansive power to exempt private actors from antitrust laws would also disrupt national economic policy by encouraging a patchwork of state-established entities licensed to engage in cartel behavior. This would disrupt interstate investment and consumer expectations, and would have spillover effects across state lines.”) Cooper and Kovacic, “U.S. Convergence with International Competition Norms,” at 1598, (“When a state exports the costs attendant to its anticompetitive regulatory scheme to those who have not participated in the political process, however, there is no political backstop; arguments for immunity based on federalism concerns are severely weakened, if not wholly eviscerated, in these situations.”

[24]   See Adam Thierer, The Delicate Balance: Federalism, Interstate Commerce, and Economic Freedom in the Technological Age (Washington, DC: The Heritage Foundation, 1998): 81-118.

Yesterday, the Article 29 Data Protection Working Party issued a press release providing more detailed guidance on how it would like to see Europe’s so-called “right to be forgotten” implemented and extended. The most important takeaway from the document was that, as Reuters reported, “European privacy regulators want Internet search engines such as Google and Microsoft’s Bing to scrub results globally.” Moreover, as The Register reported, the press release made it clear that “Europe’s data protection watchdogs say there’s no need for Google to notify webmasters when it de-lists a page under the so-called “right to be forgotten” ruling.” (Here’s excellent additional coverage from Bloomberg: “Google.com Said to Face EU Right-to-Be-Forgotten Rules“). These actions make it clear that European privacy regulators hope to expand the horizons of the right to be forgotten in a very significant way.

The folks over at Marketplace radio asked me to spend a few minutes with them today discussing the downsides of this proposal. Here’s the quick summary of what I told them:

• European privacy regulators are basically calling for an unprecedented global censorship regime that would impose their speech preferences and controls on the entire planet.
• Europe has no right to tell the rest of the world how to structure their policies governing online freedom of speech, yet they are trying to strong-arm major American tech companies like Google to do so indirectly.
• This is a grave threat to freedom of speech, freedom of expression, and Internet openness.
• This move sends a horrible signal to oppressive regimes worldwide. It could lead to a race to the bottom with governments in other countries attempting to export their own speech preferences to the rest of the global. You can kiss global Internet freedom goodbye if that happens.
• Relatedly, if European policymakers persist in these efforts, it could lead to future trade wars, even among friendly countries. Layers of speech controls like this could become formidable non-tariff barriers to trade and limit the growth of cross-border electronic commerce in the process.
• This certainly doesn’t help competition. Ironically, this news comes during the same week that we have learned some European policymakers want to break up Google on antitrust grounds. But the more that European regulators push Google to enforce global speech controls like this, the more market power those policymakers give the company! Google is one of the few companies that might be able to hire enough lawyers and engineers to comply with such a regulatory regime. Few other tech companies – and certainly no small startups – could ever hope to comply with this ruling. In essence, it’s a new regulatory barrier to entry that diminishes digital entrepreneurialism.
• Correspondingly, it’s another innovation-killer for Europe. If Europeans wonder why they fell so far behind in terms of Internet innovation over the past decade, they might consider looking at the wisdom of overly-restrictive data controls and speech regulations like this.
• Privacy is certainly an important value, and more could be done to protect it. But what European regulators are proposing here is completely over the top. It is like trying to kill a fly with an elephant gun. There are more sensible ways to encourage privacy protection.
• Instead of trying to export their speech controls and bully global innovators, European policymakers should just consider creating their own, government-funded search engines and then force their own citizens to use them. Let them try to create their own anti-free speech fortress and see how their citizens feel about living inside it.

Stay tuned, more to come on this front. In the meantime, here’s another response worth reading from of David Meyer of GigaOm.

[UPDATE 4/30/13: This article was subsequently published in Volume 65, Issues 2 of the Federal Communications Law Journal in April 2013. The links below now point to the final FCLJ version.]

The Mercatus Center at George Mason University has just released a new paper by Brent Skorup and me entitled, “Uncreative Destruction: The War on Vertical Integration in the Information Economy.”  Brent, who is the research director for the Information Economy Project at the George Mason University School of Law, and I have been working on this paper since the Spring and we are looking forward to getting it published in a law review shortly. The paper focuses on Tim Wu’s “separations principle” for the digital economy, something I’ve spent some time critiquing here in the past. Here’s the introduction from the 44-page paper that Brent and I just released:

Are information sectors sufficiently different from other sectors of the economy such that more stringent antitrust standards should be applied to them preemptively? Columbia Law School professor Tim Wu responds in the affirmative in his book The Master Switch: The Rise and Fall of Information Empires. Having successfully pushed net-neutrality regulation into the policy spotlight, Wu has turned his attention to what he regards as excessive market concentration and threats to free speech throughout the entire information economy.To support his call for increased antitrust intervention, Wu explains his view of competition in the information economy—a view that deviates substantially from current mainstream antitrust theory. First, Wu contends that “information monopolies” are pervasive in the information economy. Wu’s “monopolists” include Facebook, Apple, Google, and even Twitter. In The Master Switch and essays like “In the Grip of the New Monopolists,” Wu argues that these so-called monopolies are increasing their market power and require more aggressive oversight and regulation.Second, Wu argues that traditional antitrust analysis is not sufficient for information systems because they carry speech. He claims, “Information industries… can never be properly understood as ‘normal’ industries,”and traditional forms of regulation, including antitrust enforcement, “are clearly inadequate for the regulation of information industries.”Wu believes that because information industries “traffic in forms of individual expression” and are “fundamental to democracy,” they should be subject to greater regulatory treatment.Third, in contrast to current competition law’s focus on horizontal relationships, Wu desires a reinvigorated regulatory enforcement that addresses “the corrupting effects of vertically integrated power” in the information sectors.He is particularly concerned about private threats to free speech arising from such vertical integration.The solution, he says, is preventing vertical mergers in the information economy and the mandatory divestiture of vertically integrated companies. To implement this, Wu proposes a Separations Principle for the information economy, which would segregate information providers into three buckets, which we have labeled information creators, information distributors, and hardware makers.This article outlines Wu’s separations proposal, explains why his fears regarding vertical relationships should be rejected by regulatory and antitrust policymakers, and illustrates the legal and practical problems his Separations Principle poses. Wu justifies his Separations Principle by citing monopolies and market power in the information economy. He also advocates using U.S. antitrust authorities to enforce his Principle. We argue that the antitrust harms he fears are not present, and we highlight scholarship on the accepted benefits of vertically integrated firms. We show that Wu’s remedies are policy preferences wrapped in the language of competition law. In fact, the information economy is largely competitive and does not warrant interventionist regulatory enforcement. Since much of American economic vitality flows from the information economy and technology, policymakers should reject a radical antitrust remedy like Wu’s preemptive Separations Principle.

The paper can be downloaded from the Mercatus website, SSRN, or Scribd.

Filings are due to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) today as part of its review of the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) and the COPPA rule that the FTC devised and enforces. I didn’t have time to pen as much as I wanted, but I did submit a short filing to the agency in the matter based on some of my previous work both with Berin Szoka and on my own.  Here’s the executive summary for my filing:

It goes without saying that the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) is complicated law and rule. When considering the rule and proposals to amend it, it is easy to get lost in the weeds and ignore the bigger picture. That would be a mistake. There are broader, more important questions that need to be asked as part of the Federal Trade Commission’s effort to expand this regulatory regime. These questions involve not only the costs of increased regulation for online business interests, but the impact of expanded regulation on market structure, competition, and innovation. More importantly, these questions cut to the core of whether the public (including children) will be served with more and better digital innovations in the future. There is no free lunch. Regulation—even well-intentioned regulation like COPPA—is not a costless exercise. There are profound trade-offs for online content and culture that must always be considered.

Whatever one thinks about the effectiveness or sensibility of the COPPA regulatory model for the Web 1.0 world, it is clear that the regime is being strained by the unforeseen realities of the Web 2.0 world of hyper-ubiquitous connectivity and user-generated content creation and sharing. The digital genie cannot be put back in the bottle.  While COPPA may continue to have a marginal role to play in this rapidly evolving world, that role will likely be increasingly limited by the inherent realities of the information age.

Entire filing can be found on the Mercatus website, on SSRN, or via Scribd [Also embedded below in a Scribd reader.] [FILING] Comments of Adam Thierer – Mercatus Center – FTC COPPA 2011 Ammendments

Reading through the respective December 2010 privacy reports from the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) and Department of Commerce (DoC), one cannot help but be struck by the Obama Administration’s seeming desire to make America’s tech sector — and the regulatory regime that governs it — more closely resemble Europe’s.  The push for an ambitious new “privacy framework” and set of “fair information practices” is just a riff borrowed from the EU data directive.  And although the Obama team stops short of calling privacy a “dignity right” as many European policymakers are prone to do, it’s clear from both the FTC and DoC reports that that’s were they want to take us.

It’s interesting to me, though, that the Obama Administration relies on two fundamentally flawed rationales for the “European-ification” of American privacy law.  In this regard, I’ll reference some passages from the DoC’s report that appear in the section on “The Economic Imperative” for a new regime, which appears on pages 13-16 of the report.

Myth #1: Privacy Regs Are Needed to Get More People Online or Using Digital Technology

First, the DoC pulls out the old saw about the need for expanded privacy regs to ensure greater online trust and, as a result, promote increased online interactions.  The report claims that “maintaining consumer trust is vital to the success of the digital economy” and that “an erosion of trust will inhibit the adoption of new technologies” (p. 15)  The problem with the theory that online commerce or consumer interactions online are somehow being thwarted by a lack of more privacy regulation is that it is plainly contradicted by the facts. 

Interestingly, you need do nothing more that scan back just a couple of paragraphs in the DoC report to find some of those facts! For example, on pg. 14, the report notes: “The Internet is also increasingly important to the personal and working lives of individual Americans.  Ninety-six percent of working Americans use the Internet as part of their daily life, while sixty-two percent of working Americans use the Internet as an integral part of their jobs.”  Does the DoC not see the contradiction here, or is the Obama Administration claiming that we cannot rest until we move the needle from 96% to 100%?!

Then we have the DoC’s claim that “an erosion of trust will inhibit the adoption of new technologies.”  Really?  What, then, are we to make of the 500 million people who have flocked to Facebook despite repeated claims by some that it is a privacy pariah? And there are plenty of other examples of the explosion of online activity over the past decade.  The fact is, online participation and technology adoption is growing like wildfire. If you need more evidence, go through the data sets from the Pew Internet & American Life Project about Internet usage over time and try to find one metric that is decreasing.  [Just as an unrelated aside, I am still sometimes astonished by how many people use eBay despite continuing concerns about online fraud, which is a far more serious and legitimate “harm” than most supposed privacy violations.  Yet, eBay is now the world’s largest online marketplace with more than 90 million active users globally and $60 billion in transactions annually, or $2,000 every second.]

In sum, advocates of increased privacy regulation have fed the DoC a catchy line about the need for more privacy regulation in the name of encouraging greater online participation and the DoC has bought into that theory despite a lack of evidence that there is any real problem here.

Myth #2: Privacy Regs Are Needed to Promote the Competitiveness of U.S. High-Tech Firms

Second, we hear of the DoC speak of the need for “interoperability” or harmonization of privacy policies internationally to facilitate smoother online commercial interactions or data flows.  Despite the report’s admission that “a considerable amount of global commerce takes place on the Internet [and] global online transactions currently total an estimated $10 trillion annually” and is growing, the DoC continues on to argue that:

the lack of cross-border interoperability in privacy principles and regulations creates barriers to cross-border data flow and significant compliance costs for companies. Improving the global interoperability of data privacy approaches could enable increased exports of U.S. services and… support the overall objective of creating jobs by promoting exports. Thus, commercial data privacy considerations are vital not only to our domestic commerce, but also to international trade.

In other words, says the DoC, things are pretty good right now, but they will get a lot better once we harmonize privacy regulations in the direction of the E.U. and other regions.  But here’s the problem with that theory: The DoC is assuming that the benefits of regulatory harmonization — which, to be perfectly clear, would arrive in the form increased regulation on U.S. operators — would outweigh the cost of complying with those new rules.

The DoC says it wants to “prevent conflicting policy regimes from serving as a trade barrier” (p. 20), but should the U.S. impose burdensome new regulations on American companies to achieve that goal?  Would we really be better off if all U.S. firms and policy more closely resembled the E.U. in this regard?   To answer that question, you might conduct the simple experiment of stopping the average person in the street — here in the U.S. or even abroad — and asking them to name five major U.S. digital economy companies and then see if they can even name one major European competitor in the same arena. Needless to say, it’s hard to find many European counterparts that rival Google, Amazon, Apple, Facebook, eBay, Microsoft, etc.   Now, why is that?  Why is it that the information technology sector has thrived in America and that U.S. companies are leaders in many of their respective sectors across the globe?  Might it be precisely because we did not follow others down the path of “data directives” and heavy handed, top-down regulation of the Internet more generally?

Do you want some empirical evidence for why it’s a bad idea to achieve parity or harmonization in the fashion the DoC suggests?  Well then, consider this recent study by Avi Goldfarb and Catherine Tucker which found that “after the [European Union’s] Privacy Directive was passed [in 2002], advertising effectiveness decreased on average by around 65 percent in Europe relative to the rest of the world.”  They argue that because regulation decreases ad effectiveness, “this may change the number and types of businesses sustained by the advertising-supporting Internet.” Regulation of advertising and data collection for privacy purposes, it seems, can affect the global competitiveness of online firms.

The other problem with the DoC’s appeal for harmonization of privacy regulatory regimes through increased regulation is that it sets a horrible precedent.   At least thus far this has not been the approach the U.S. government has taken in most other Internet policy contexts, and with good reason.  Think about this in the context of speech controls.  When we see the Europeans or other regions and countries stifling free speech and expression online, has our response been to say, “Well, in the name of policy harmonization and improving cross-border interoperability, we Americans need to accept the wisdom of censoring the Net.”  Of course not!  That would be insane.  Instead, when confronted with conflicting regulatory regimes abroad, our response here in the States has usually been to proudly boast to the world that we have the more sensible approach to Net regulation, which is to say, it should be tightly limited so as not to stifle speech or commerce.  I really don’t care if you want to call that “American exceptionalism” or whatever else; I just think it’s plain old common sense.

And yet, in the case of privacy regulation, the Obama Administration’s Department of Commerce wants to throw that notion to the wind and harmonize in the direction of more regulation of U.S. companies.  Isn’t the Commerce Department supposed to be in the business of helping to promote U.S. trade, exports, commerce, and global competitiveness?  If so, the right approach to “leveling the playing field” in this context should be the same as it is in relation to speech policy or trade law: the rest of the world should deregulate down to our level; we should absolutely not regulate up to theirs.

What Unites Advocates of Speech Controls & Privacy Regulation? [pdf]

by Adam Thierer & Berin Szoka The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Progress on Point No. 16.19

Anyone who has spent time following debates about speech and privacy regulation comes to recognize the striking parallels between these two policy arenas. In this paper we will highlight the common rhetoric, proposals, and tactics that unite these regulatory movements. Moreover, we will argue that, at root, what often animates calls for regulation of both speech and privacy are two remarkably elitist beliefs:

1. People are too ignorant (or simply too busy) to be trusted to make wise decisions for themselves (or their children); and/or,
2. All or most people share essentially the same values or concerns and, therefore, “community standards” should trump household (or individual) standards.

While our use of the term “elitism” may unduly offend some understandably sensitive to populist demagoguery, our aim here is not to launch a broadside against elitism as Time magazine culture critic William H. Henry once defined it: “The willingness to assert unyieldingly that one idea, contribution or attainment is better than another.”^[1] Rather, our aim here is to critique that elitism which rises to the level of political condescension and legal sanction. We attack not so much the beliefs of some leaders, activists, or intellectuals that they have a better idea of what it in the public’s best interest than the public itself does, but rather the imposition of those beliefs through coercive, top-down mandates.

That sort of elitism—elitism enforced by law—is often the objective of speech and privacy regulatory advocates. Our goal is to identify the common themes that unite these regulatory movements, explain why such political elitism is unwarranted, and make it clear how it threatens individual liberty as well as the future of free and open Internet. As an alternative to this elitist vision, we advocate an empowerment agenda: fostering an environment in which users have the tools and information they need to make decisions for themselves and their families.

I. The Elitism of Speech Regulation

First, consider how those two elitist beliefs identified above are on display when lawmakers or regulatory advocates make efforts to control speech or content.^[2] Calls to regulate free speech are often premised on the belief that something must be done to “protect The Children.”^[3] Personal and parental responsibility ^[4] are regarded as inadequate safeguards ^[5] since some parents will inevitably fall down on the job by not adequately shielding their children’s eyes and ears from potentially objectionable (or supposedly harmful) speech. Therefore, government must regulate content that is indecent, profane, excessively violent, and so on. The definition of those things is then left to unelected bureaucrats and judges to make on our behalf.

But it’s not just about “The Children.” Some regulatory advocates believe that even the choices made by consenting adults must be disregarded because some people fail to understand the supposedly destructive nature of the speech they are consuming. Government must act to protect people from making what some regulatory advocates regard as destructive or even immoral choices that could bring harm to them or their loved ones.

In sum, regulatory advocates are essentially saying that people cannot be trusted or left to their own devices and, therefore, government must intervene and establish a baseline “community standard” on behalf of the entire citizenry to tell them what‘s best for them.^[6] Even if those citizens have tools and information at their disposal to make sensible decisions about objectionable content, that’s not good enough because they might not do the job properly. Government must do it for them!

II. The Elitism of Privacy Regulation

This same mentality motivates calls for privacy regulations. Those who call for government interventions to “protect privacy” often claim that people too willingly surrender personal information about themselves and that they don’t understand the adverse consequences of those actions.^[7] Alternatively, regulatory advocates claim that advertising and marketing efforts are inherently “manipulative” and that people do not realize they are being duped into surrendering personal information or into buying products or services they supposedly don’t need.^[8] Of course, those regulatory advocates rarely pause to explain to us how it is that they were not also duped and manipulated by the same things—again revealing their deeply-rooted elitism! (As discussed below, this makes it clear how the psychological phenomenon of “third-person effect hypothesis” is driving much of this debate.)

“Protecting The Children” is also used as a rhetorical cover for regulation here, but not as often in debates over speech controls.^[9] Instead, regulatory advocates mostly focus on adults who are presumed not to know what is in their own best interest—necessitating paternalistic government intervention on their behalf.

III. Intellectual Schizophrenia on Both the Left & Right

What is particularly interesting about all this is the way these two issues expose a sort of intellectual schizophrenia at work on both the Left and Right of the political spectrum. Left-leaning policymakers and intellectuals typically decry censorship efforts (except where “commercial speech,” “hate speech” and “bias” are at issue), but are quick to rally around proposals to layer privacy regulations on the Internet. The opposite is often true of many on the Right of the political spectrum: They typically declare privacy regulations to be paternalistic and antithetical to free enterprise (or perhaps just erosive of efforts to legislate morality),^[10] but in the next breath advocate controls on content they find objectionable.

Few on either side stop to consider the relationship between speech and privacy. In fact, they are but two sides of the same coin. After all, what is your “right to privacy” but a right to stop me from observing you and speaking about you?^[11] “Protecting privacy,” therefore, typically means restricting speech rights in the process. Advocates of privacy regulation often insist that the use, processing and collection of information are “conduct” unprotected by the First Amendment, but in fact, the First Amendment broadly protects the gathering and distribution of information as part of the process of communication (“speech”).^[12] Similarly, attempts to “clean up” speech or “protect The Children,” often require regulations that would betray the privacy of adults by expanding the role of government, and impose serious burdens on businesses and markets—such as age verification mandates ^[13] or extensive data retention requirements.^[14]

IV. Common Tactics & Regulatory Mechanisms

The two movements also share common political tactics and regulatory approaches. Privacy advocates generally favor “opt-in” mandates as the federal “baseline standard” for any website collecting information about users, especially their browsing habits (regardless of whether the information is “personally identifiable”). In other words, the law would create a property right in such “personal information” (ironically, many advocates of this approach criticize or reject intellectual property.) In a similar vein, many advocates of speech controls push for mandatory parental control tools or restrictive default settings.^[15] That is, if government won’t censor speech outright, regulatory advocates want lawmakers to at least (1) require that media, computing and communications devices be shipped to market with parental controls embedded or included (as proposed in Australia and with China’s “Green Dam” filter),^[16] and possibly, (2) that such controls be defaulted to their most restrictive position—forcing users to opt-out of the controls later if they want to consume media rated above a certain threshold.

More sophisticated advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation will likely argue that their paternalism is less elitist or intrusive because they merely want to “nudge” the public into making “better” decisions. Economist Richard Thaler and legal scholar Cass Sunstein (director of President Obama’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs, responsible for analyzing most new federal regulations) popularized this approach with their 2008 book Nudge: Improving Decisions about Health, Wealth, and Happiness. Based on behavioral economics studies, they argue that both government and private actors must inevitably make decisions about “choice architecture” and that, by setting defaults, incentives and rules smartly, “choice architects” can and should improve decision-making without blocking, fencing-off or significantly burdening choices.^[17]

In this regard, Sunstein and Thaler’s approach parallels the work of Lawrence Lessig, one of the most influential Internet policy thinkers. Lessig has argued that the “architecture” of “code” (how software is written) “regulates” all online activities and requires government oversight and intervention to keep in check. Otherwise, he warned ominously a decade ago, “Left to itself, cyberspace will become a perfect tool of control.”^[18] Lessig’s hyper-pessimistic predictions have proven unwarranted, however. Far from fostering a world of “perfect control,” code and cyberspace have proven remarkably difficult to regulate, but nonetheless has generally benefited consumers and citizens without centralized direction.^[19] Still, Lessig, Sunstein, and others of this ilk persist in their advocacy of “nudges” of many varieties to impose their will on cyberspace through mandates from above.

But while it might be possible to define “better decisions” and argue that poor choice architecture leads people to choose things they clearly don’t want in contexts like investment decisions and mortgages, how can elites know what other people really want in highly subjective contexts like privacy and speech? Should they rely on opinion polls—the highly subjective results of which depend heavily on “choice architecture” of question-crafting—to guess what the right default should be?^[20] Was the Chinese proposal to mandate deployment of “Green Dam” just a harmless “nudge” because users weren’t barred from uninstalling the filtering software that must accompany their computers (i.e., “opting-out”)? The problem becomes even more difficult where trade-offs among competing values are inevitable. For example, data collection about Internet users raises privacy concerns for some but benefits all, creating more funding for “free” content (i.e., speech) and services users prefer by making more valuable the advertising that supports online publishers. In short, regulations of speech and privacy are likely to be pure paternalism, even when billed as “libertarian paternalism as Thaler and Sunstein label their approach.^[21]

What might be called “regulatory blackmail” is also a time-honored tradition among both advocates of speech controls and privacy regulation. When censorship advocates have previously been impeded by the First Amendment, they have worked behind the scenes with lawmakers or regulatory agencies to use indirect pressure and strong-arming tactics to extract “voluntary concessions” from companies or others.^[22] For example, in 2004, the FCC strong-armed radio giant Clear Channel into agreeing to a “voluntary” consent decree that involved taking Howard Stern off the air.^[23] Similarly, in 2008, XM and Sirius Satellite Radio finally agreed to set aside 4% of their system capacity for use by politically favored racial minorities (a kind of speech control) as a “voluntary condition” of their merger—after the FCC had sat on their application for nearly 16 months.^[24] This race-based preference would have been unconstitutional if the FCC had imposed it directly.^[25] While the FTC has been far less prone to such abuse and actually plays a key role in holding companies to their promises, its current Chairman, Jon Leibowitz, has hung the “regulatory sword of Damocles” over the heads of the online advertising industry, threatening them with a “day of reckoning” if he doesn’t get what he wants from industry self-regulatory efforts.”^[26] The sword could actually fall if the FTC turns self-regulation into the European model of “co-regulation,” where the government steers and industry simply rows.^[27]

V. The Crisis Mentality that Drives Regulation

Speech and privacy regulatory advocates share another trait in common: an affinity for the use of a crisis mentality as a method of spurring political action. In his 1995 book The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy, political philosopher and economist Thomas Sowell formulated a model that he argued drives ideological crusades to expand government power over our lives and economy. “The great ideological crusades of the twentieth-century intellectuals have ranged across the most disparate fields,” noted Sowell. But what they all had in common, he argued, was “their moral exaltation of the anointed above others, who are to have their different views nullified and superseded by the views of the anointed, imposed via the power of government.”^[28] These government-expanding crusades shared several key elements, which Sowell identified as follows:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society, a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many, in response to the prescient conclusions of the few.
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes.

We see this model at work on a daily basis today with our government’s various efforts to reshape our economy, but the model is equally applicable to debates over speech controls and privacy regulation. In particular, the various “technopanics”^[29] we have witnessed in recent years fit this model. For example, consider how this model plays out in the debate over online social networking:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [online sexual predators], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [such as mandatory online age verification ^[30] or the Deleting Online Predators Act ^[31]] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [must stop kids and adults from being online together on same sites], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [some state Attorneys General].^[32]
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [child safety researchers and others are told that their research is meaningless or offbase].^[33]

We also see this model in play in other debates, such as efforts to regulate “excessively violent” video games and television programming.^[34] And consider how this model plays out on the privacy front:

1. Assertion of a great danger to the whole society [amorphous privacy violations], a danger to which the masses of people are oblivious.
2. An urgent need for government action [“baseline federal privacy regulation”] to avert impending catastrophe.
3. A need for government to drastically curtail the dangerous behavior of the many [anyone who shares information online], in response to the prescient conclusions of the few [a handful of privacy advocacy groups].
4. A disdainful dismissal of arguments to the contrary as either uninformed, irresponsible, or motivated by unworthy purposes [any suggestion that privacy concerns are being overblown and that most information-sharing is socially beneficial is dismissed out-of-hand].

Worse yet, regulatory intervention in these cases simply begets more and more intervention to correct the inevitable failures of, or dissatisfaction with, previous interventions.^[35] Thus, the “crisis” cycle never ends.

VI. Third-Person Effect Hypothesis as an Explanation

Something more profound than simple political elitism seems to be at work here, however. A phenomenon psychologists refer to as the “third-person effect hypothesis” can explain many calls for government intervention, especially in the media world.^[36] Simply stated, speech and privacy critics sometimes seem to only see and hear in media or communications what they want to see and hear—or what they don’t want to see or hear. When they encounter perspectives or preferences that are at odds with their own, they are more likely to be concerned about the impact of those things on others throughout society and come to believe that government must “do something” to correct those perspectives. Many people desire regulation because they think it will be good for others, not necessarily for themselves. The regulation they desire has a very specific purpose in mind: “re-tilting” speech or market behavior in their desired direction.

The third-person effect hypothesis was first formulated by W. Phillips Davison in a seminal 1983 article:

In its broadest formulation, this hypothesis predicts that people will tend to overestimate the influence that mass communications have on the attitudes and behavior of others. More specifically, individuals who are members of an audience that is exposed to a persuasive communication (whether or not this communication is intended to be persuasive) will expect the communication to have a greater effect on others than on themselves.^[37]

Davison used this hypothesis to explain how media critics on both the Left and Right seemed to simultaneously find “bias” in the same content or reports when they couldn’t possibly both be correct. In reality, their own personal preferences were biasing their ability to fairly evaluate that content. Davison’s article prompted further research by many other psychologists, social scientists, and public opinion experts to test just how powerful this phenomenon was in explaining calls for censorship and other social phenomena.^[38] In these studies, third-person effect has been shown to be the primary explanation for why many people fear—or even want to ban—various types of speech or expression, including news,^[39] misogynistic rap lyrics,^[40] television violence,^[41] video games,^[42] and pornography.^[43] In each case, the subjects surveyed expressed strong misgivings about allowing others to see or hear too much of the speech or expression in question, but greatly discounted the impact of that speech on themselves. Such studies thus reveal the strong paternalistic instinct behind proposals to regulate speech. As Davison notes:

Insofar as faith and morals are concerned… it is difficult to find a censor who will admit to having been adversely affected by the information whose dissemination is to be prohibited. Even the censor’s friends are usually safe from the pollution. It is the general public that must be protected. Or else, it is youthful members of the general public, or those with impressionable minds.^[44]

It’s easy to see how this same phenomenon is at work in debates about privacy. Regulatory advocates imagine their preferences are “correct” (right for everyone) and that the masses are being duped by external forces beyond their control or comprehension, even though the advocates themselves are somehow immune from the brain-washing and privy to some higher truth that the hoi polloi simply cannot fathom. Again, this is Sowell’s “Vision of the Anointed” at work.

Consider the flare-up in 2004 over the introduction of Gmail, Google’s free email service. At a time when Yahoo! mail (then as now the leading webmail provider) offered customers less than 10 megabytes of email storage, Gmail offered an astounding gigabyte of storage that would grow over time (now over 7 GB). Rather than charging some users for more storage or special features, Google paid for the service by showing advertisements next to each email “contextually” targeted to keywords in that email—a far more profitable form of advertising than “dumb banner” ads previously used by other webmail providers.^[45] Self-appointed (or, to extend Sowell’s framework, “self-anointed”) privacy advocates howled that Google was going to “read users’ email,” and led a crusade to ban such algorithmic contextual targeting.^[46] Thierer responded to these critics by pointing out that the service was purely voluntary and noted:

you don’t speak for me and a lot of other people in this world who will be more than happy to cut this deal with Google. So do us a favor and don’t ask the government to shut down a service just because you don’t like it. Privacy is a subjective condition and your value preferences are not representative of everyone else’s values in our diverse nation. Stop trying to coercively force your values and choices on others. We can decide these things on our own, thank you very much.^[47]

Interestingly, however, the frenzy of hysterical indignation about Gmail was followed by a collective cyber-yawn: Users increasingly understood that algorithms, not humans, were doing the “reading” and that, if they didn’t like it, they didn’t have to use it. Today, nearly 150 million of people around the world use Gmail, and it has a steadily growing share of the webmail market. Even though cyber-consumers have embraced the service, some privacy advocates persist in their effort to shut down Gmail. They appear determined to stop at nothing to impose their will on others—the essence of political elitism—even if that means cutting off free email service for 150 million people!^[48]

A similar debate has played out more recently regarding targeted online advertising in general. Advertising on search engines is, much like Gmail, targeted “contextually” based on search terms entered by users and most advertising on other websites is based on the nature of content on a site or page. But certain data is collected about users as they browse to make that advertising more effective—by measuring its performance, reducing fraud, preventing over-exposure, etc. Some privacy advocates have insisted that industry self-regulation of such practices (even if enforced by the FTC) is inadequate and have called for preemptive regulation. They are even more offended by “behavioral advertising” which allows publishers whose content would have little value as the basis for contextually targeting advertising on their own sites to compete for more highly valued advertising by showing ads to users based on other sites they’ve visited. In both cases, data collection can increase the funding available to publishers to produce more of the content and services preferred by users, thus conferring an enormous indirect benefit on users, but also directly benefits users by increasing the relevance of the advertising they see.^[49] For some of the more extreme advocates of privacy regulation, however, there are no trade-offs, only absolutist “solutions:” To them, privacy is so obviously desirable that they feel at ease in deciding what’s best for everyone else. Such absolutists often respond with righteous indignation and conspiratorial fulmination when challenged to identify the harm against which they’re protecting consumers, while disdainfully dismissing all talk of the benefits of online advertising as self-serving industry propaganda.^[50]

VII. The Principled Alternative: Trust People & Empower Them

There is an alternative to this elitist mentality: freedom and personal responsibility. Individuals should be permitted to live a life of their own, even if they sometimes make mistakes or choices that are at odds with what elites think is best for them. ^[51]

Of course, the world isn’t perfect. In an ideal world, adults would be fully empowered to tailor speech and privacy decisions to their own values and preferences. Specifically, in an ideal world, adults (and parents) would have (1) the information necessary to make informed decisions and (2) the tools and methods necessary to act upon that information. Importantly, those tools and methods would give them the ability to not only block the things they don’t like—objectionable content, annoying ads or the collection of data about them—while also finding the things they want.

Achieving that ideal is likely impossible, but the good news is that we are moving closer to it with each passing day. Citizens have more tools and methods at their disposal than ever before which enable them to make decisions for themselves and their families. And this is true for both parental controls ^[52] and privacy controls.^[53]

Of course, some speech and privacy elitists will argue that we can’t trust empowerment tools ( e.g., filters, rating systems, or other controls) that are created by companies or other affected parties. But rather than trying to enhance those tools and educate users about how to use them, these elitists skip right past user empowerment and channel their energies into regulations that would impose a top-down, one-size-fits all standard on all adults and families—or even into trying to craft the perfect “nudge” that will help users make what elites believe to be the “right” decisions. Of course, these tools can, and should, be improved. Those groups worried about speech/content and privacy issues should focus on how we might drive such protections from the bottom-up by empowering individuals instead of government bureaucrats. The goal in both cases should be a “let-a-thousand-flowers-bloom” approach, which offers diverse tools and strategies for our diverse citizenry.^[54] We need not accept “one-size-fits” all approaches, whether they be regulatory mandates or “nudges,” based on the presumption that elites know best.

Finally, it is vital not to lose sight of what’s ultimately at stake here. If regulatory approaches trump the empowerment agenda we have described, the future of a free and open Internet—indeed, as technology converges, the future of all media—is at risk.^[55] By imposing technological solutions from the top-down that can never keep pace with technological change, regulation necessarily forecloses freedom and innovation.^[56] By contrast, individual empowerment allows innovation to flourish. The better approach across the board is education, not regulation.^[57] Empowerment, not elitism, is the path forward. The digital elite should be leading this effort by developing and promoting technologies of empowerment, not crafting regulatory mandates to force their will upon us.^[58]

#

Adam Thierer is a Senior Fellow with The Progress & Freedom Foundation and the director of its Center for Digital Media Freedom. Berin Szoka  is a Senior Fellow with PFF and the Director of PFF’s Center for Internet Freedom.

[1] . William A. Henry, In Defense of Elitism (1995) at 2-3.

[2] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Congress, Content Regulation, and Child Protection: The Expanding Legislative Agenda, Progress Snapshot 4.4, Feb. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.4childprotection.html. Like American courts, we use the term “speech” as a broad catch-all for communications, including both actual speaking as well as other forms of transmitting, as well as receiving, information (“content”).

[3] . See generally Adam Thierer, Don’t Scapegoat Media, USA Today, Dec. 4, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.24scapegoatmedia.html; Marjorie Heins, Not in Front of the Children, “Indecency,” Censorship, and the Innocence of Youth (2001); Karen Sternheimer, It’s Not the Media: The Truth about Pop Culture’s Influence on Children (2003); Karen Sternheimer, Kids These Days: Facts and Fictions about Today’s Youth (2006).

[4] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, FCC Violence Report Concludes that Parenting Doesn’t Work, PFF Blog, Apr. 26, 2007, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2007/04/fcc_violence_re.html.

[5] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sen. Rockefeller Gives Up on Parenting at Senate Violence Hearing, PFF Blog, June 26, 2007, blog.pff.org/archives/2007/06/sen_rockefeller_1.html.

[6] . Adam Thierer, Conservatives, Porn, and “Community Standards,” The Technology Liberation Front, March 2, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/02/conservatives-porn-and-community-standards.

[7] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Online Advertising & User Privacy: Principles to Guide the Debate, Progress Snapshot 4.19, Sept. 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2008/ps4.19onlinetargeting.html.

[8] . Jeff Chester, for decades the great gadfly of American advertising, has decried “the system … developed to track each and every one of us and our behavior for one-on-one marketing efforts” as “manipulative, intrusive and un-democratic.” Wendy Melillo, Q&A: Chester Writes the Book on Privacy, Dec. 11, 2007, www.gfem.org/node/227. For instance, Chester and other leading “privacy advocates” ridicule the idea of smart phones as a “liberating technology” and insist that,

Despite the glowing words about customization and personalized service, what marketers and advertisers are increasingly offering consumers is merely the illusion of free choice. Mobile operators offer their various options and services, not on an individual basis, but preconfigured according to segmented demographic profiles.

Center for Digital Democracy and U.S. Public Interest Research Group, Complaint and Request for Inquiry and Injunctive Relief Concerning Unfair and Deceptive Mobile Marketing Practices, Jan. 13, 2009 (emphasis original), www.democraticmedia.org/files/FTCmobile_complaint0109.pdf. See generally Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Targeted Online Advertising: What’s the Harm & Where Are We Heading?, Progress on Point 16.2, Feb. 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.2targetonlinead.pdf.

[9] . Berin Szoka & Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, COPPA 2.0: The New Battle over Privacy, Age Verification, Online Safety & Free Speech, Progress on Point 16.11, May 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2009/pop16.11-COPPA-and-age-verification.pdf.

[10] . The Supreme Court has used a “right to privacy” to strike down laws against the use of contraception by married couples, Griswold v Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), and abortion, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).

[11] . Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 Stanford L. Rev. 1049 (2000), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop7.15freedomofspeech.pdf.

[12] . See , Amicus Brief for Association Of National Advertisers, Cato Institute, Coalition For Healthcare Communication, Pacific Legal Foundation And The Progress & Freedom Foundation In Support Of Appellants, IMS Health v. Sorrell, No. 09-1913-cv(L), 09-2056-cv(CON) (2nd Cir. 2009), available at www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/071309-Brief-Amici-Curiae-ANA-et-al-Second-Circuit-(09-1913-cv).pdf.

[13] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Social Networking and Age Verification: Many Hard Questions; No Easy Solutions, Progress on Point No. 14.5, March 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ pops/pop14.8ageverificationtranscript.pdf; www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop14.5ageverification.pdfAdam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Statement Regarding the Internet Safety Technical Task Force’s Final Report to the Attorneys General, Jan. 14, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/other/090114ISTTFthiererclosingstatement.pdf; Nancy Willard, Why Age and Identity Verification Will Not Work—And is a Really Bad Idea, Jan. 26, 2009, www.csriu.org/PDFs/digitalidnot.pdf; Jeff Schmidt, Online Child Safety: A Security Professional’s Take, The Guardian, Spring 2007, www.jschmidt.org/AgeVerification/Gardian_JSchmidt.pdf.

[14] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Mandatory Data Retention: How Much is Appropriate, PFF Blog, June 26, 2006, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2006/06/mandatory_data.html

[15] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Perils of Mandatory Parental Controls and Restrictive Defaults, Progress on Point 14.4, Apr. 11, 2008, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/2008/pop15.4defaultdanger.pdf.

[16] . Adam Thierer, China’s Green Dam Filter and the Threat of Rising Global Censorship, PFF Blog, June 17, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/06/chinas_green_dam_filter_and_threat_of_rising_globa.html

[17] . They define choice architecture as follows: “A structure designed by a choice architect(s) to improve the quality of decisions made by homo sapiens. Often invisible, choice architecture is the specific user-friendly shape of an organization’s policy or physical building when homo sapiens come into contact with it. Examples of choice architecture include a voter ballot, a procedure for handling well-meaning people who forget a deadline, or a skyscraper.” Nudge Glossary of Terms, www.nudges.org/glossary.cfm.

[18] . Lawrence Lessig, Code and Other Laws of Cyberspace (1999) at 6.

[19] . See Adam Thierer, Code, Pessimism, and the Illusion of “Perfect Control,” Cato Unbound, May 2009, www.cato-unbound.org/2009/05/08/adam-thierer/code-pessimism-and-the-illusion-of-perfect-control

[20] . See Solveig Singleton & Jim Harper, With A Grain of Salt: What Consumer Privacy Surveys Don’t Tell Us, 2001, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=299930.

[21] . As Cato Institute scholar Will Wilkinson has argued, the book’s “agreeably banal doctrine of choice-preserving helpfulness” blurs the lines between paternalism and libertarianism, and thus “the thrust of the conceptual renovation behind the term libertarian paternalism is to empower, not limit, political elites.” Why Opting Out Is No “Third Way,” Reason, October 2008, www.reason.com/news/show/128916.html. See also Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Sunstein’s “Libertarian Paternalism” is Really Just Paternalism, PFF Blog, April 7, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/04/sunsteins_liber.html.

[22] . See Robert Corn-Revere, “’Voluntary’ Self-Regulation and the Triumph of Euphemism,” in Rationales & Rationalizations: Regulating the Electronic Media (Robert Corn-Revere, ed., 1997), at 183-208.

[23] . Telecom Policy Report, Commission Settles Indecency Charges, But At What Cost?, June 30, 2004, http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_m0PJR/is_25_2/ai_n6091525.

[24] . See Adam Thierer, XM-Sirius, Regulatory Blackmail, and Diversity, June 17, 2008, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2008/06/xmsirius_regula.html.

[25] . See Comments of W. Kenneth Ferree on Implementation of Sirius-XM Merger Condition, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, MB Docket No. 07-57, March 30, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/033009siriusXMconditionfiling.pdf.

[26] . See Szoka & Adam Thierer, supra note 8 at 3.

[27] . See id. at 2.

[28] . Thomas Sowell, The Vision of the Anointed: Self-Congratulation as a Basis for Social Policy (1995) at 5.

[29] . Alice Marwick, To Catch a Predator? The MySpace Moral Panic, First Monday, Vol. 13, No. 6-2, June 2008, www.uic.edu/htbin/cgiwrap/bin/ojs/index.php/fm/article/view/2152/1966; Wade Roush, The Moral Panic over Social Networking Sites, Technology Review, Aug. 7, 2006, www.technologyreview.com/communications/17266; Anne Collier, Why Techopanics are Bad, Net Family News, April 23, 2009, www.netfamilynews.org/2009/04/why-technopanics-are-bad.html; Adam Thierer, Parents, Kids & Policymakers in the Digital Age: Safeguarding Against ‘Techno-Panics,’ Inside ALEC, July 2009, at 16-17, www.alec.org/am/pdf/Inside_July09.pdf; Adam Thierer, Progress & Freedom Foundation, Technopanics and the Great Social Networking Scare, PFF Blog, June 10, 2008, http://techliberation.com/2008/07/10/technopanics-and-the-great-social-networking-scare.

[30] . Supra note 13.

[31] . In the 109th Congress, former Rep. Michael Fitzpatrick (R-PA) introduced the Deleting Online Predators Act (DOPA), which proposed a ban on social networking sites in public schools and libraries. DOPA passed the House of Representatives shortly thereafter by a lopsided 410-15 vote, but failed to pass the Senate. The measure was reintroduced just a few weeks into the 110th Congress by Senator Ted Stevens (R-AK), the ranking minority member and former chairman of the Senate Commerce Committee. It was section 2 of a bill that Sen. Stevens sponsored titled the “Protecting Children in the 21st Century Act” (S. 49), but was later removed from the bill. See Declan McCullagh, Chat Rooms Could Face Expulsion, CNet News.com, July 28, 2006, http://news.com.com/2100-1028_3-6099414.html?part=rss&tag=6099414&subj=news.

[32] . See Emily Steel & Julia Angwin, MySpace Receives More Pressure to Limit Children’s Access to Site, Wall Street Journal, June 23, 2006, online.wsj.com/public/article/SB115102268445288250-YRxkt0rTsyyf1QiQf2EPBYSf7iU_20070624.html; Susan Haigh, Conn. Bill Would Force MySpace Age Check, Yahoo News.com, March 7, 2007, www.msnbc.msn.com/id/17502005.

[33] . See, e.g., Letter of Henry McMaster, Attorney General, South Carolina to Attorney General Richard Blumenthal and Attorney General Roy Cooper Regarding Internet Safety Task Force (“ISTTF”) Report, January 14, 2009, www.scag.gov/newsroom/pdf/2009/internetsafetyreport.pdf

[34] . See Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Video Games and “Moral Panic,” PFF Blog, Jan. 23, 2009, http://blog.pff.org/archives/2009/01/video_games_and_moral_panic.html ; Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Fact and Fiction in the Debate over Video Game Regulation, Progress Snapshot 13.7, March 2006, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/pops/pop13.7videogames.pdf.

[35] . “All varieties of interference with the market phenomena not only fail to achieve the ends aimed at by their authors and supporters, but bring about a state of affairs which—from the point of view of their authors’ and advocates’ valuations—is less desirable than the previous state affairs which they were designed to alter. If one wants to correct their manifest unsuitableness and preposterousness by supplementing the first acts of intervention with more and more of such acts, one must go farther and farther until the market economy has been entirely destroyed and socialism has been substituted for it.” Ludwig von Mises, Human Action, at 858 (3rd ed. 1963) (1949).

[36] . See generally Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Media Myths: Making Sense of the Debate over Media Ownership (2005) at 119-123, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/books/050610mediamyths.pdf (Explaining how the third-person effect serves as a powerful explanation for the heated backlash that followed an FCC effort to moderately liberalize media ownership rules in 2003-04).

[37] . W. Phillips Davison, The Third-Person Effect in Communication, 47 Public Opinion Quarterly 1, Spring 1983, at 3.

[38] . For the best overview of third-person effect research, see Douglas M. McLeod, Benjamin H. Detenber, and William P. Eveland., Jr., Behind the Third-Person Effect: Differentiating Perceptual Processes for Self and Other, 51 Journal of Communication, Vol. 51, No. 4, 2001, at 678-695.

[39] . Vincent Price, David H. Tewksbury & Li-Ning Huang, Third-person Effects of News Coverage: Orientations Toward Media, Journalism & Mass Communications Quarterly, Vol. 74, at 525-540.

[40] . Douglas M. McLeod, William P. Eveland & Amy I. Nathanson, Support for Censorship of Violent and Misogynic Rap Lyrics: And Analysis of the Third-Person Effect, Communications Research, Vol. 24, 1997, at 153-174.

[41] . Hernando Rojas, Dhavan V. Shah, and Ronald J. Faber, For the Good of Others: Censorship and the Third-Person Effect, International Journal of Public Opinion Research, Vol. 8, 1996, at 163-186.

[42] . James D. Ivory, Addictive, But Not For Me: The Third-Person Effect and Electronic Game Players’ Views Toward the Medium’s Potential for Dependency and Addiction, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, School of Journalism and Mass Communication, Aug. 2002.

[43] . Albert C. Gunther, Overrating the X-rating: The Third-person Perception and Support for Censorship of Pornography, Journal of Communication, Vol. 45, No. 1, 1995, at 27-38

[44] . Supra note 37 at 14. Along these lines, a December 2004 Washington Post article documented the process by which the Parents Television Council, a vociferous censorship advocacy group, screens various television programming. One of the PTC screeners interviewed for the story talked about the societal dangers of various broadcast and cable programs she rates, but then also noted how much she personally enjoys HBO’s “The Sopranos” and “Sex and the City,” as well as ABC’s “Desperate Housewives.” Apparently, in her opinion, what’s good for the goose is not good for the gander! See Bob Thompson, Fighting Indecency, One Bleep at a Time, The Washington Post, Dec. 9, 2004, at C1, www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A49907-2004Dec8.html.

[45] . See Chris Anderson, Free: The Future of a Radical Price at 112-118 (2009).

[46] . See Letter from Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Electronic Privacy Information Center, Beth Givens, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, Pam Dixon, World Privacy Forum, to California Attorney General Lockyer, May 3, 2004, http://epic.org/privacy/gmail/agltr5.3.04.html.

[47] . See email from Adam Thierer to Declan McCullaugh on Politech Email discussion group, April 30, 2004, http://lists.jammed.com/politech/2004/04/0083.html (emphasis added).

[48] . See Complaint and Request for Injunction of the Electronic Privacy Information Center against Google, Inc., March 17, 2009, http://epic.org/privacy/cloudcomputing/google/ftc031709.pdf; see also Ryan Radia, Should the FTC Shut Down Gmail and Google Docs Because of an Already-Fixed Bug?, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 18, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/03/18/should-the-ftc-shut-down-gmail-and-google-docs-because-of-an-already-fixed-bug/.

[49] . See Berin Szoka & Mark Adams, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, The Benefits of Online Advertising & the Costs of Regulation, PFF Working Paper, forthcoming.

[50] . Anti-advertising crusader Jeff Chester often resorts to questioning the motives of those who question whether his regulatory prescriptions would actually benefit consumers, see, e.g., http://techliberation.com/2009/06/17/behavioral-advertising-industry-practices-hearing-some-issues-that-need-to-be-discussed/#comment-11698840. See generally Jeff Chester, Digital Destiny: New Media and the Future of Democracy (2007).

[51] . “The only freedom which deserves the name is that of pursuing our own good in our own way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs or impede their efforts to obtain it. Each is the proper guardian of his own health, whether bodily or mental and spiritual.” John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (Penguin Classics, 1859, 1986) at 72.

[52] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Parental Controls & Online Child Protection, Special Report, Version 4.0, Summer 2009, www.pff.org/parentalcontrols.

[53] . Adam Thierer, Berin Szoka & Adam Marcus, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Privacy Solutions, PFF Blog, Ongoing Series, http://blog.pff.org/archives/ongoing_series/privacy_solutions.

[54] . Comments of Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, In the Matter of Implementation of the Child Save Viewing Act; Examination of Parental Control Technologies for Video or Audio Programming; MB Docket No. 09-26, April 16, 2009, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/filings/2009/041509-%5bFCC-FILING%5d-Adam-Thierer-PFF-re-FCC-Child-Safe-Viewing-Act-NOI-(MB-09-26).pdf.

[55] . See Adam Thierer, FCC v. Fox and the Future of the First Amendment in the Information Age, Engage, Feb. 20, 2009, www.fed-soc.org/doclib/20090216_ThiererEngage101.pdf

[56] . “To act on the belief that we possess the knowledge and the power which enable us to shape the processes of society entirely to our liking, knowledge which in fact we do not possess, is likely to make us do much harm.” Friedrich von Hayek, “The Pretence of Knowledge,” in The Essence of Hayek, (Hoover Inst., 1984), at 276.

[57] . Adam Thierer, The Progress & Freedom Foundation, Two Sensible, Education-Based Legislative Approaches to Online Child safety, Progress Snapshot 3.10, Sept. 2007, www.pff.org/issues-pubs/ps/2007/ps3.10safetyeducationbills.pdf.

[58] . See, e.g., Berin Szoka, Google, CDT, Online Advertising & Preserving Persistent User Choice Across Ad Networks Through Plug-ins, Technology Liberation Front Blog, March 13, 2009, http://techliberation.com/2009/ 03/13/google-cdt-online-advertising-preserving-persistent-user-choice-across-ad-networks-through-plug-ins/.

According to the Threat Level blog, the Obama Administration has declared the text of a proposed Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement a national security secret.

Thing is . . . it can’t be. And that would also be contrary to Obama administration policy.